Volume 20: Number 1

February 2013

RISK WATCH

The Britannia Steam Ship

Insurance Association Limited

CLAIMS AND LEGAL

a supplement for Members claims handlers

and legal departments

Personal
injury
1 Longshoremen claims in the USA

Longshoremen
claims in the USA

Navigation
and seamanship
3 Damage to shore cranes at
Japanese ports

Risk
management
4 Hatch covers weathertight issues
5 Mooring snap-back zones and
hazard identification

Containers
and cargoes
8 Fire in palm kernel expellers (PKE)

Regulatory
update
7 MARPOL Annex VI
7 MARPOL pre-washes and discharging
of slops to shore-side

Miscellaneous
8 Publications

US longshoremen are covered by a compensation scheme known as

the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWC), which
is a no-fault scheme and covers, among other things, medical expenses
and sick pay.
However, if a longshoreman is injured in the
course of his employment and the injury is
caused by the negligence of a third party
(usually the crew of the ship on which he is
working) he has a right to pursue a claim for
compensation.

the number of accidents. When accidents do

occur, the guidelines should also help the
crew in taking the appropriate action to
ensure that the accident is investigated and
suitably documented.
1 Before cargo operations begin and at the

Ships now spend less time in port, with

shorter turnaround times and as a
consequence accidents can occur without
the knowledge of the ships crew. Therefore,
when a claim is made by a longshoreman it
is often difficult to defend because the crew
can provide no information about the
incident. The Managers analysis of recent
claims has identified the most common
causes of accidents to longshoremen
mostly slips and trips and forms the basis of
the following guidelines to try and reduce

start of the first watch each day that cargo

operations are performed:
Gangway (accommodation ladder) The
gangway must be properly and safely
rigged: the handrail lines must be taut, the
gangway must be deployed at a proper
angle, the safety net must be in place, the
stairs must be clean without any oil, grease
or foreign substance on them and the
bottom step/plate must be a safe distance
above the wharf.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 20: Number 1: February 2013

Personal injury

Longshoremen claims in the USA

Main deck The entire main deck must be
inspected (not only in the designated area
where the longshoremen will be working) for
any dangerous conditions, including open
manholes and obstructions on deck and any
oil, grease or foreign substance on the deck.
Any faults should be rectified before the
longshoremen board the ship.
Once the above procedures have been
followed, an entry should be made in the
deck log to show that all the necessary
inspections have taken place and that any
corrective measures have been carried out.
2 During Cargo Operations:

Gangway (accommodation ladder) This

should be periodically inspected for
cleanliness, tightness of handrail lines,
deployment angle, safety net placement, and
distance of the bottom step plate from wharf.
Any dangerous conditions on the gangway
should be corrected.
It is good practice to keep a log at the top of
the gangway, so that the longshoremen can
sign on when they board the ship and sign
off when they leave (although this may not
always be possible as in some ports the
longshoremen may refuse to sign the log).
The log also serves a practical purpose, as it
enables the crew to check who is on board
and to ensure that all of the longshoremen
have left the ship when cargo operations are
completed.
Main deck The main deck should be
inspected at regular intervals (including areas
where longshoremen are or will be
working and also access routes to these
areas) to make sure that there is no oil, grease
or any foreign substance on deck. Any open
manhole covers should be closed or properly
guarded and guards or cautionary signs
should be placed around any obstructions
on deck that may present a trip hazard.
Equipment/areas used by crew Make sure
that any ship equipment or areas under the
active control of the ships crew during cargo

operations do not present a danger to the

longshoremen working nearby the
equipment or passing through the area
controlled by the ships crew.
Make deck log entries of the periodic
inspections of the gangway and main deck
confirming they are in good condition and
clean, and note the time of any cleaning/
maintenance on the gangway or main deck,
specifying the area cleaned.
3 Crew observations during cargo operations:

crew should to be properly instructed about

what to do if they witness dangerous or
potentially dangerous practices:
The ships crew should not tell the
longshoremen or stevedores how to do their
jobs as the longshoremen and stevedores
are the experts in the cargo handling field.
If the crew become aware of an unsafe
practice they should notify the captain or
officer on watch immediately. Depending on
the level of risk, officers can either stop cargo
operations immediately (and then discuss
the situation with the stevedoring
superintendent or foreman) or they can
discuss whether to stop cargo operations
(again, with the stevedoring superintendent
or foreman) whilst the situation is assessed.
The officers should make an entry in the log
book about this discussion, including the
name and position of the stevedore
superintendent or foreman.
At the end of each watch officers watch
he should check with the other
crewmembers on watch and, if appropriate,
note in the ships log: No longshoremen
injuries observed or reported.
4 If a longshoreman injury is observed or
reported and once first aid requirements
have been dealt with the captain or
officer on watch should:

Find out the name of the injured

longshoreman.
Determine the type of injury he sustained.

Identify the precise location where the

injury occurred.
Inspect the area where the injury occurred
in order to determine the cause of the
accident and take photographs immediately.
Find out and make a note in the deck log of
the name(s) of any crewmembers who were
on duty at the time or who may have been in
the area of the accident.
Question each crewmember as to whether
he witnessed any accident and, if so, obtain a
statement detailing what he witnessed.
If the incident was not witnessed by a crew
member on watch, still obtain a statement to
the effect that he did not witness the
accident and also note the conditions
observed in the accident area i.e., no oil or
grease, or if oil and grease, what was the
source ship or stevedore equipment.

If there is any doubt about such accidents,

then contact the P&I correspondent listed in
the Britannia List of Correspondents, who will
advise if further action or a more comprehensive
investigation is required. If the incident occurs
in the USA then the P&I correspondent should
always be contacted immediately.
There is no guarantee that following these steps
will prevent any longshoreman injuries, but
doing so will place a ship owner and its lawyers
in a better position to analyse and defend any
subsequent claims.

Navigation and seamanship

Damage to shore cranes at Japanese ports

The Association has recently been notified of a number of cases where ships have made contact with
shore cranes when departing from Japanese ports.
As there are generally no harbour regulations
in Japan which provide that shore cranes
should not operate in berthing/unberthing
areas, there is usually a legal burden on the
ship to prove that the stevedores or terminal
had a duty to re-position the crane.
In the cases reported to the Association, the
Master had made a verbal request for the
crane to be repositioned by the stevedores.
However, the stevedores failed to carry out
the request before the ship un-berthed and
the ship was still held responsible for the
damage. The ship could not then pass this
liability to the stevedores, the terminal or the
operators, as there was no written record of
the request made by the Master to move the
cranes. The position is the same where the
ship has been requested by the port
authority to shift along the berth and as a
consequence, contact is made with shore
cranes or with other objects on the jetty.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that
terminal owners at Japanese ports expect
Owners to contract directly with the crane
manufacturer to repair damaged cranes and
it is not acceptable to the terminal for an
independent repair contractor to be appointed.
Often the manufacturer will insist that the
damaged part is completely replaced, even
in circumstances where minor repairs could
be carried out to rectify the damage. This can

have a substantial impact on the costs of the

repairs. For example, in one recent incident,
an independent crane expert assessed the
repairs and estimated the cost at
approximately USD25,000 whereas the
Japanese manufacturers estimate was in
the region of USD295,000.
The Association makes the following
recommendations:

Prior to the departure of the ship the Master

should determine whether there is any
obstruction on the jetty which might cause
a problem during the ships unberthing.
In good time, and certainly prior to the
disembarkation of the stevedore foreman and/
or terminal personnel responsible for the jetty
crane or other obstruction, the Master should
make a request in writing that the shore
cranes be moved clear of the ship and this
request must be copied to the ships agents.
The Master or duty officer must also ensure
that the cranes/obstructions have actually
been moved as requested, rather than simply
relying on the stevedores to carry out this
task unchecked. If a pilot is involved, he
should also be notified.
If the Master, having decided that there
might a risk of contact with a shore crane
and requests that it be moved, then it is

important that the Master refuses to unberth the ship until the shore crane has
been moved. Alternatively the Master may
consider an alternative un-berthing
manoeuvre, perhaps with the use of
additional tugs.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 20: Number 1: February 2013

Risk management

Hatch covers weathertight issues

Risk management condition surveys have highlighted a number
of recurring problems relating to the general condition and the
weathertight integrity of ships hatch covers.
Cases include:
A new ship which passed a hose test, but
failed three separate ultrasonic tests, due to
gaps in the incorrectly fitted hatch cover
corner joints.
A number of ships which had passed a hose
test of the hatch covers, often under Class
supervision, failed an ultrasonic test as the
hatch cover packing was missing or
deteriorated in patches.
Hatch cover packing replaced with lengths
shorter than 1 metre which resulted in a
number of gaps in the packing.
Ships hatch cover packing replaced during
a drydock which failed an ultrasonic test due
to mis-seated packing or gaps between the
packing and compression bar.
Hatch cover packing permanently indented,
packing channels corroded or missing and
the incorrect glue used to replace the
packing, resulting in detached sections.
Hatch cleats and wedges missing, corroded
or unable to be utilised due to deformations
in the hatch cover and/or cleats.
In a typical steel hatch cover arrangement,
the primary method of preventing ingress of
water into cargo holds is via the steel to steel
contact between the hatch cover and the
hatch coaming. Thereafter, a continuous
gasket of relatively soft elastic material
compressed to achieve the necessary
weathertightness (International Association
of Classification Societies IACS) is installed
on the cargo side of this steel barrier to
provide a weathertight seal.
To prevent ingress of water and thereby
maintain cargo worthiness, the hatch cover
gasket must be in contact with a
compression bar during all seagoing
conditions including when some degree of
flexing of the hatch cover is to be expected.

The extent to which the contact is

maintained will depend upon the degree
of compression being achieved between
the gasket and the metal compression bar.
This design compression is determined by
the manufacturers and it is important to
ensure that this level of compression is
maintained when replacing or repairing
hatch cover gaskets or other relevant
components.
The most commonly observed source of
potential water ingress is due to corrosion
of the compression bar and a deterioration
in the condition of the gaskets i.e. a lack of
effective maintenance.
Classification and maintenance

The requirements of a Classification Society

are different to those of the P&I Clubs due
largely to the fact that a P&I Club is
concerned with the cargoworthiness as
well as the seaworthiness of the ship. An
IACS Classification Society noted in 2010
that The Classification Societies overall
objective is to ensure the safe operation of
the ship in all sea and weather conditions.
As long as the seaworthiness of the ship is
ensured, Class pays limited attention to the
well-being of water-sensitive cargo.
The ships Classification Society will usually
check all the hatch covers during Special
Surveys. If hatches are found to be leaking
during the test, necessary repairs are
required to be made before the hatch
covers are tested again and certified as fit
for their purpose. The period between such
testing may be as much as 5 years.

Best practice

Hatch cover packing

Undertake regular inspection of the hatch
seals, including both packing and
compression bars.
Replace if packing is visibly deteriorated,
or if there are any gaps in the packing.
Regularly measure the permanent
indentation and replace the packing if it is
in excess of half the design compression.
Check for potential sources of damage to
packing from sharp or rough edges on
coaming or from wasted steel support
pads, coaming side plates and packing
channels.
General
Rectify any steel-to-steel contact
problems (wasting of steel edge or uneven
edges) before renewal of rubber gaskets.
Keep the retaining channels and
compression bars in good condition.
Clean hatch coaming tops before closing
hatch covers to avoid damage or uneven
wear of the packing.
Drainage channels to be maintained and
free from obstructions, and non-return
devices fully operational.
Keep cleats and wedges in serviceable
condition and correctly adjusted.
Hauling wires and chains must be
adjusted correctly to avoid uneven seating
when closed.

Mooring snap-back zones and hazard identification

Mooring operations are always potentially hazardous and the
chances of disfiguring and debilitating injuries or even fatality
are very high.
The Code of Safe Working Practices (COSWP)
lays down guidelines and recommendations
intended to make mooring operations safer
for all involved. These include the carrying
out of a thorough risk assessment and
prominent marking of identified hazards.
Hazards may include rotating drum ends, trip
hazards such as walkways and pipe ducts
and snap-back zones. These hazards should
be marked/painted to make them prominent
and to serve as a visual reminder to crew
working on the mooring deck. Mooring areas
are to be kept as clutter free as possible. Deck
working areas should have some form of
anti-slip surface applied and the working area
should be well lit for night time operations.
Despite these recommendations, the
Managers have noted that on occasion these
simple and easy to implement guidelines are
not being followed. Hazards are not identified
and snap-back zones are not marked.
The pre-preparation for mooring operations
should include an assessment of the mooring
plan (ship specific and supplied by the
shipyard), with duties assigned on the basis
of training and abilities. This may require
additional training for staff not familiar with
the ships mooring plan. Consideration shall
also be given to the stowage and storage of
ropes when not in use and when deployed
on bollards. When unusual or non-standard
mooring arrangements are required,
careful planning is needed and a new risk
assessment should be carried out.

Point of
failure

A simple mooring
system illustrating
the potential snapback zone area

The decisions made on the basis of the risk

assessment should be communicated to all
participants in the mooring operation. Leads
creating sharp angles are to be avoided and
ropes and wires should not be fed through
the same lead or bollard. The use of selftensioning winches requires additional
planning, with particular care given to
ensure that the tension is applied in the
same direction.

Point of
restraint

Snap-back
zone

For further guidance please refer to COSWP

chapter 25 on anchoring, mooring and
towing operations.

Point of
failure

A complex mooring
system illustrating
the potential snapback zone area

Point of
restraint

Pedestal
roller
Old man

Snap-back
zone

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 20: Number 1: February 2013

Containers and cargoes

Fire in palm kernel expellers (PKE)

Recently, one of our Members ships suffered a hold fire while loading palm kernel expellers (PKE) in
Kuantan, Malaysia. The dangers associated with PKE are well known, but this recent fire investigation has
highlighted issues and concerns that should be noted.
There was intermittent rain throughout the
loading process and loading had to be
stopped many times. After one of these
stoppages, when the hold was reopened, it
was found to be full of smoke but no flames
could be seen. The hatches were closed
immediately in order to deprive the fire of
oxygen and, following an inspection by
the port safety officer, CO2 was released into
the hold.
The CO2 did not completely extinguish the
fire and smoke continued to build up. The
decision was made to excavate and
discharge cargo to try and find the seat of
burning and then to extinguish the fire with
water. This meant the ship had to be moved to
a different berth where a crane was available
for the discharge operations. Discharge and
intermittent fire-fighting continued over 3
days before the fire was put out and all the
burnt material removed. The low water
pressure ashore meant that shore based
water jets were unable to reach across the
ship to the seat of burning. Therefore the
ships own seawater lines were eventually
used to douse the fire.
With the fire eventually extinguished, all cargo
was discharged from the affected hold and
the hold walls were inspected. P&I surveyors
and experts were called on to investigate the
fire and they designed a procedure to ensure
that the re-loaded cargo was safe.
PKE production appears to have been very
high during this recent season, with storage
spaces full, and so manufacturers want to
export the cargo as quickly as possible.

As a result, the PKE, which was hot from its

manufacturing process, had neither the space
nor the time to cool to the recommended
IMSBC Code 50-55C before loading.
Temperatures as high as 90C had been
observed in some stockpiles which were
designated for the re-loading. These were
duly rejected and a rigorous programme of
checking temperatures in both stockpiles and
trucks arriving alongside was implemented.
As cargo from acceptable stockpiles was
loaded, other cargo was spread out into the
vacated space to give the recently-arrived
product the opportunity to cool sufficiently.
Investigation of the fire itself revealed two
possible and one probable cause of the
actual combustion. Discarded cigarette butts
were observed in warehouses from which
the first loaded PKE had been taken. If the fire
was caused by external ignition, then a
carelessly discarded cigarette butt was the
most plausible explanation.
However, the burning appeared to be
confined to a layer of the cargo, and this is
not what would be expected from a single
ignition source such as a cigarette butt.
Investigators concluded that some wet cargo
had undergone self heating and spontaneous
combustion. The wetted layer appeared to
be sandwiched between dry layers above
and below. Direct exposure to rain was
discounted as the charred cargo was beneath
deck and cross deck overhangs. The cargo
may have become wet on the open conveyor
in a period of rain, but the conclusion was
that the most likely cause was that some

cargo spillage on the aft end of the starboard

hatch cover had been wetted in a period of
rainfall and then had been shovelled into the
holds by the stevedores when the hatches
had been reopened. Dry cargo had then
been loaded on top.
From the day that the fire had been detected,
all holds had been monitored for carbon
monoxide, an indicator of heating which
could lead to spontaneous combustion
within the cargo.
Original assumptions about the cause of fire
had focussed on the pre-existing high
temperatures of the cargo prior to loading
and on the evidence of carelessly discarded
cigarettes. However, the cause of this fire was
subsequently determined to be wetted
cargo swept in after a period of rain.
Nevertheless there was still concern that the
high cargo temperatures and careless
stevedore practices could cause other fires.
Ships loading PKE in the near future should
consider the monitoring of stockpile
temperatures but it may be sufficient to
regularly test the temperatures of the cargo
arriving alongside or on board. Stevedores
may need to be closely supervised to ensure
safe cargo practices i.e. no smoking around
this combustible material and deck officers
must be careful to ensure the removal of
wetted spillage or wet material resting on
open conveyors.

Regulatory update

MARPOL Annex VI implementation of the North American

Emission Control Area (ECA) and the non-availability of compliant
fuel oil.
Following on from the article in the last issue
of Risk Watch (Volume 19: Number 3), the
Managers have received many requests for
information and clarification about
compliance with the new regulations. A
common question is what should be done if
the required low sulphur fuel is not available
prior to entry into the ECA and, in particular,
there has been confusion relating to
bunkering and use of marine distillate fuel
(with a sulphur content less than 1.00%) if
compliant fuel oil is not available.
The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) guidance notes on the NonAvailability of Compliant Fuel Oil for The
North American ECA seeks to clarify this issue
as follows:

The EPA has clarified that while we expect

distillate fuels of various grades to be used as
blending agents to produce 1.00% m/m
(10,000 ppm) sulphur fuel oil, we do not
expect ships to use a fuel oil with viscosity less
than 11 centistokes in order to meet the
1.00% m/m (10,000 ppm) fuel sulphur standard.
Therefore, consistent with this clarification,
prior to January 1, 2015, when the 0.10% m/m
(1,000 ppm) sulphur standard begins, we will
not give consideration to the availability of
distillate fuel oil, other than as a blending
agent, when we evaluate the circumstances
described in a submitted Fuel Oil NonAvailability Report. Rather, we will only
consider the availability of residual and
residual fuel oil blends in determining what
action, if any, to take.

For further information and advice please

visit the EPA website:
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/pol
icies/civil/caa/mobile/finalfuelavailabilityguida
nce-0626.pdf

MARPOL pre-washes and discharging of slops to shore-side

A Members ship recently called at Durban to discharge her cargo. The cargo was solvesso which is a
hydrocarbon fluid used mainly for agricultural chemicals and coatings and is a Category X cargo.
Under MARPOL Annex II reg. 13.6.1 it is a
requirement that all washing residues are
pumped ashore and that all washing
operations are supervised by an authorised
surveyor.
The Master contacted the local agents and
asked them to advise the South African
Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) of the
ships arrival and to ensure that an authorised
surveyor from the local authorities was
present during the MARPOL pre-wash and
disposal of resulting residues to a reception
facility. The ships agent advised that SAMSA
required three days notice prior to arrival in
order to arrange a surveyors attendance and

also that SAMSA could not be contacted at

that time as the ships arrival was outside
normal office hours.
The Master decided to commence the prewash without a SAMSA surveyor present to
oversee and verify the operations.
The ship was subsequently found to be in
contravention of the local Marine Pollution
(Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act
and fined ZAR 350,000 (approximately
USD43,500) by SAMSA on the grounds that
an authorized surveyor had not been present
throughout the entire MARPOL pre-wash
and disposing of slops procedure.

SAMSA pointed out that the local agents

advice to the Master was incorrect. Firstly, the
three days prior notification of a ships arrival
is only required if the cargo is classed as
explosives or munitions. Secondly, SAMSA
have a manned 24-hour duty number, which
means that authorised surveyors are able to
attend outside normal office hours.
It is clear that the Master should have waited
for SAMSA to be contacted and for an
approved surveyor to attend. However, the
situation may have been avoided if earlier
notice had been given to the agents and also
if the Master had queried the agents advice.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited

Regis House
45 King William Street
London EC4R 9AN
Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588
Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942
www.britanniapandi.com

RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam

Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be
found at www.britanniapandi.com/en/publications
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association
Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watch
to be reproduced but would ask that written
permission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Miscellaneous

Publications

INTERTANKO: New guide to the vetting

process 9th edition

The physical inspection of the ships

condition is only part of the whole screening
and risk management process, which
includes not only all statutory requirements
from Flag and Class, but also assesses inter
alia adequate insurance cover, safety
management, ISM, maintenance record,
communications, the standing of the owner,
office location, close-out and response to
incidents, reports in the media, detention
records and PSC deficiencies, crew training
and experience, quite apart from whether
the ship can be safely accommodated
alongside the berth. This revised and
expanded 360 page 9th edition will assist
tanker crew and personnel ashore to better
understand, and to be better prepared for,
vetting inspections and is available in hard
copy and as an electronic e-book.
Prices and full details are available on the
Intertanko website:
http://www.intertanko.com/BookShop/Tanker-Inspection-and-Maintenance/AGuide-to-the-Vetting-Process---NEW/

MARPOL Annex V, 2012 Edition

IMO dangerous goods wall chart

ISBN: 9789280115642
Price: GBP 10.00

ISBN: 9789280115666
Price: GBP 10.00

In July 2011 the Marine Environment

Protection Committee (MEPC) of IMO,
adopted the Revised MARPOL Annex V,
concerning Regulations for the prevention
of pollution by garbage from ships, which
entered into force on 1 January 2013.

This updated full-colour wall chart illustrates

the labels, marks and signs required under
the 1974 SOLAS Convention and detailed in
the IMDG Code.

The associated guidelines which assist States

and industry in the implementation of
MARPOL Annex V have been reviewed and
updated and two Guidelines were adopted
by the MEPC in March 2012. The 2012 edition
of this publication contains:

Further details of both the IMO publications

are available on the IMO website:
http://www.imo.org/Publications/Pages/JustPu
blished.aspx

the 2012 Guidelines for the implementation

of MARPOL Annex V (resolution
MEPC.219(63));
the 2012 Guidelines for the development
of garbage management plans (resolution
MEPC.220(63)); and
the Revised MARPOL Annex V (resolution
MEPC.201(62)).

Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles within
Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk