Arrogante vs. Deliarte

VOL.
528,JULY24,2007
63
Arrogante vs. Deliarte

*
G.R.No.152132.July24,2007.
LORDITO ARROGANTE, JOHNSTON ARROGANTE,

ARME ARROGANTE, and FE D. ARROGANTE,
petitioners, vs. BEETHOVEN DELIARTE, Joined by
SPOUSELEONORADUENAS,respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Property; Partition; A contract entered
into upon future inheritance characterized as void under Article
1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code; Requisites for the Application
of the Law.The1978privatedeedofsale,insofarasitdisposedof
Bernabes share in the conjugal partnership prior to his death, is
void for being a conveyance of the Deliarte siblings future
inheritance. Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code
characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as
void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the
succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract
formspartofthein
_______________
* THIRDDIVISION.
64
64
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
heritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancyofarightwhichispurelyhereditaryinnature.
Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on contracts respecting
future inheritance admits of exceptions as when a person partitions
his estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future
inheritance admits of exceptions, as when a person partitions his
estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil Code.
However,theprivatedeedofsaledoesnotpurporttobeapartition
of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the application of
Article1347.NowhereinthesaiddocumentdoesBernabeseparate,
divide, and assign to his children his share in the subject lot
effective only upon his death. Indeed, the document does not even
bearthesignatureofBernabe.
Same; Same; Same; Partition of property representing future
inheritance cannot be made effective during the lifetime of its

owner.Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe
undertookanoralpartitionofhisestate.Althoughwehaveheldon
several occasions that an oral or parole partition is valid, our
holdings thereon were confined to instances wherein the partition
had actually been consummated, enforced, and recognized by the
parties. Absent a showing of an overt act by Bernabe indicative of
anunequivocalintenttopartitionhisestateamonghischildren,his
knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private deed of sale
does not equate to an oral partition by an act inter vivos. Besides,
partition of property representing future inheritance cannot be
madeeffectiveduringthelifetimeofitsowner.
Same; Parole Evidence; The failure of the deed of sale to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties supports the application
of the parole evidence rule.Theparoleevidenceruleisapplicable.
While the application thereof presupposes the existence of a valid
agreement, the innominate contract between the parties has been
directly put in issue by the respondents. Verily, the failure of the
deedofsaletoexpressthetrueintentandagreementoftheparties
supportstheapplicationoftheparoleevidencerule.
Contracts; Statute of Frauds; The Statute of Frauds applies
only to executory, not to completed, executed, or partially consum
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
65

mated contracts.We agree with both the lower and the appellate
courts that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the instant
case. The general rule is that contracts are valid in whatever form
theymaybe.OneexceptiontheretoistheStatuteofFraudswhich
requires a written instrument for the enforceability of a contract.
However, jurisprudence dictates that the Statute of Frauds only
applies to executory, not to completed, executed, or partially
consummated,contracts.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Zosa and Quijano Law Officesforpetitioners.
Florido and Associatesforrespondents.
NACHURA,J.:
1
ThisPetitionforReviewonCertiorariassailstheDecision
datedAugust28,2001oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
2
G.R. CV No. 58493 which affirmed the Decision dated
February 18, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch10,ofCebuCityinanactionforquietingoftitleand
damages.
It appears that the lot in controversy, Lot No. 472A
(subjectlot),issituatedinPoblacionDaanbantayan,Cebu,
andwasoriginallyconjugalpropertyofthespousesBernabe
Deliarte,Sr.andGregoriaPlacenciawhohadninechildren,
including herein respondent Beethoven Deliarte and
petitioner Fe Deliarte Arrogante. The other petitioners,

Lordito,Johnston,andArme,Jr.,allsurnamedArrogante,
are the children of Fe and, thus, nephews of Beethoven.
RespondentLeonoraDuenasisthewifeofBeethoven.
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate
JusticesCancioC.Garcia(nowAssociateJusticeoftheSupremeCourt)
andHilarionL.Aquino,concurring;Rollo,pp.2739.
2Rollo,pp.4347.
66
66
AseriesofmisfortunesstrucktheDeliartefamily.Thefirst
tragedyoccurredwhenabrotherofBeethovenandFewas
hospitalized and eventually died in Davao. Beethoven
shouldered the hospitalization and other related expenses,
includingthetransportofthebodyfromDavaotoCebuand
thentoDaanbantayan.
The next occurrence took place a year after, when
Gregoria was likewise hospitalized and subsequently died
on July 29, 1978. Once again, Beethoven paid for all
necessary expenses. Soon thereafter, it was Bernabe, the
parties ailing father, who died on November 7, 1980. Not
surprisingly, it was Beethoven who spent for their fathers
hospitalizationandburial.
In between the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe, on
November 16, 1978, the Deliarte siblings agreed to waive
andconveyinfavorofBeethovenalltheirrights,interests,3
andclaimstothesubjectlotinconsiderationofP15,000.00.
Atthesigningofthedeedofabsolutesale,thesiblingswho
failed to attend the family gathering, either because they
were dead or were simply unable to, were represented by
theirrespectivespouseswhosignedthedocumentontheir
4
behalf. Bernabe, who was already blind at that time, was
likewisepresentandknewofthesalethattookplaceamong
hischildren.
Thus, from then on, Beethoven occupied and possessed
the subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the concept of
owner. He exercised full ownership and control over the
subject lot without any objection from all his siblings,
or
5
theirheirs,until1993whenthecontroversyarose. Infact,
on March 26, 1986, all of Beethovens siblings, except Fe,
signedadeedofconfirmationofsaleinfavorofBeethoven
toratifythe1978privatedeedofsale.
_______________
3AnnexAoftheComplaint;records,p.4.
4TSN,September8,1995,pp.79.
5Paymentofrealtytaxes,constructionofhollowblockfence.
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
67

Sometime in August 1993, petitioner Lordito Arrogante
installed placards on the fence erected by respondents,
claiming
that the subject lot was illegally acquired by the
6
latter. TheplacardsdepictedBeethovenasalandgrabber
whohadunconscionablytakenthesubjectlotfromLordito7
whoclaimedthatthelotisadevisefromhisgrandfather.
Allegedly, the bequeathal was made in Bernabes last will
and testament which was,
unfortunately, torn up and
8
destroyedbyBeethoven.
Thus,onNovember10,1993,respondentsfiledanaction
forquietingoftitleanddamagesagainstthepetitioners.
Intheiranswer,thepetitionersaverredthatBeethoven
doesnotownthewholeofthesubjectlotbecauseBernabe
wasstillalivein1978whenBeethovenssiblingssoldtohim
alltheirrightsandclaimstoandinterestsinthatlot.Thus,
thesiblingscouldsellonlytheirrespectiveinheritancefrom
onehalfofthesubjectlot,representingGregoriassharein
the conjugal property. Corollarily, the petitioners claimed
that Fe continues to own 1/9 of onehalf of the subject lot,
comprisingBernabesshareoftheproperty,whichallegedly
wasnotcontemplatedintheconveyancein1978.According
topetitioners,thiscontentionissupportedbyFesfailureto
signthedeedofconfirmationofsalein1986.
As regards the damaging placards, the petitioners
asseveratedthatLorditoactedonhisownwhenheinstalled
the same, and that this was resorted to merely to air his
grievance against his uncle, Beethoven, for claiming
ownershipoftheentirelot.
Aftertrial,theRTCrenderedaDecisionquietingtitleon
the subject lot in favor of respondents and directing
petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay the respondents
P150,000.00
_______________
6ExhibitE3,Records,p.144.
7ExhibitsEtoE14,id.,atpp.143147;TSN,March19,1996,pp.
1723.
8TSN,March19,1996,pp.1719.
68
68
as moral damages, P25,000.00 as attorneys fees, and

P10,000.00aslitigationexpenses.
Onappeal,theCAaffirmedthetrialcourtsdecisionbut
deletedtheawardofattorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses.
In ruling for the respondents, both the trial and appellate
courts upheld the validity of the 1978 sale as between the
parties.ConsideringthatpetitionerFesignedthedocument
and consented to the transaction, she is now barred from
repudiatingthetermsthereof.Inthisregard,theRTCand
the CA applied the parole evidence rule and allowed the

introductionofevidenceontheadditionalconsiderationfor
the conveyance, namely, the expenses incurred by
Beethovenduringthethreetragediesthathadbefallenthe
Deliartefamily.Bothcourtsfoundthatthesalewasalready
completelyexecuted,thusremovingitfromtheambitofthe
9
StatuteofFrauds.
As for the award of moral damages, the trial and
appellate courts held that the other petitioners failure to
prevent Lordito from putting up, or at least, removing the
placards, amounted to the defamation and opprobrium of
Beethoven with their knowledge and acquiescence. Thus,
the assessment of moral damages was appropriate, given
thehumiliationandembarrassmentsufferedbyBeethoven
consideringhisstatureandreputationinthecommunityas
anelectricalengineerhandlingseveralbigprojects.
However,petitionersinsistthatthelowercourtserredin
their rulings. They maintain that the 1978 sale did not
contemplate the alienation of Bernabes share in the
conjugal partnership as he failed to sign the private
document. As such, the courts application of the parole
evidenceruleandtheStatuteofFraudswereerroneous.In
thesamevein,thepetitionerspositthatbothcourtsruling
thattheyarejointlyandseverallyliableformoraldamages
isinconsistentwith
_______________
9Rollo,pp.36,46.
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
69

the evidence on record that Lordito was the sole author of
thedamagingplacards.
Inthisappeal,theissuesfortheresolutionofthisCourt
are:
I.
WHETHERORNOTTHEPRIVATEDEEDOFSALEEXECUTED
IN1978ISAVALIDCONVEYANCEOFTHEENTIRELOT472A
TOPETITIONERBEETHOVENDELIARTE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IS
APPLICABLETOTHISCASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS
APPLICABLETOTHISCASE.
IV.
WHETHERORNOTTHEPETITIONERSAREJOINTLYAND
SEVERALLYLIABLEFORMORALDAMAGES.
Attheoutset,wenotethatboththelowerandtheappellate
courtsfailedtoidentifytheapplicablelaw.
First.The1978privatedeedofsale,insofarasitdisposed
ofBernabesshareintheconjugalpartnershippriortohis
death,isvoidforbeingaconveyanceoftheDeliartesiblings
futureinheritance.
Article1347,paragraph2oftheCivilCodecharacterizes
10
a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void.
The
_______________
10CivilCode,Article1347:
All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including
future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissiblemayalsobetheobjectofcontracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
casesexpresslyauthorizedbylaw.
70
70
law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the

succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the
contractformspartoftheinheritance;and(3)thepromissor
has, with respect to the object, an11expectancy of a right
whichispurelyhereditaryinnature.
In this case, at the time the contract was entered into,
successiontoBernabesestatehadyettobeopened,andthe
objectthereof,i.e.,Bernabesshareinthesubjectlot,formed
part of his childrens inheritance, and the children merely
hadaninchoatehereditaryrightthereto.
True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future
inheritance admits of exceptions, as when a person
partitionshisestatebyanactinter
vivosunderArticle1080
12
of the Civil Code. However, the private deed of sale does
not purport to be a partition of Bernabes estate as would
exemptitfromtheapplicationofArticle1347.Nowherein
the said document does Bernabe separate, divide, and
assign to his children
his share in the subject lot effective
13
onlyuponhisdeath. Indeed,thedocumentdoesnoteven
bearthesignatureofBernabe.
_______________
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
publicorder,orpublicpolicymaylikewisebetheobjectofacontract.
11
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and
Jurisprudence,Vol.IV,p.525,1985.
12 J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. v. Balansag, G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005,
453SCRA211,223.
CivilCode,Article1080:
Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudicethelegitimeofthecompulsoryheirs.
Aparentwho,intheinterestofhisorherfamily,desirestokeepany
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail

himself of the right granted to him in this article, by ordering that the
legitimeoftheotherchildrentowhomthepropertyisnotassigned,be
paidincash.
13 See
Civil Code, Article 1079 and J.L.T. Agro v. Balansag, supra
note12,atp.226.
71
VOL.528,JULY24,2007
71

Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe
undertookanoralpartitionofhisestate.Althoughwehave
heldonseveraloccasionsthatanoralorparolepartitionis
valid, our holdings thereon were confined to instances
wherein the partition had actually been
consummated,
14
enforced,andrecognizedbytheparties. Absentashowing
of an overt act by Bernabe indicative of an unequivocal
intent to partition his estate among his children, his
knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private deed
of sale does not equate to an oral partition by an act inter
vivos. Besides, partition of property representing future
inheritancecannotbemadeeffectiveduringthelifetimeof
15
itsowner.
Consideringtheforegoing,itfollowsthatthe1986deed
ofconfirmationofsalewhichsoughttoratifythe1978sale
16
likewisesuffersfromthesameinfirmity. Inshort,the1986
deedisalsovoid.
Nevertheless,
it is apparent that Bernabe treated his
17
share in the subject lot as his childrens present
inheritance, and he relinquished all his rights and claim
thereonintheirfavorsubjecttoBeethovenscompensation
fortheexpensesheinitiallyshoulderedforthefamily.The
recordsrevealthatBernabe,priortohishospitalizationand
death, wanted to ensure that his children attended to the
expenditure relating thereto, and even articulated his
desirethatsuchsurpassthe
_______________
14Chavez
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,G.R.No.68282, November
8, 1990, 191 SCRA 211, 216; Tan v. Lim, G.R. No. 128004, September
25,1998,296SCRA455,474475;Hernandez v. Andal,78 Phil. 196, 203
(1947).
15Bautista
v. GrioAquino,G.R. No. L79958, October 28, 1988, 166
SCRA790,795;Tinsay v. Yusay,47Phil.639(1925).
16
See Taedo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104482, January 22,
1996,252SCRA80,87.
17Onehalfofthesubjectlotashisshareintheconjugalpartnership,
plus1/10ofonehalf,hiswifesshare.SeeCivilCode,Article892,par.2.
Theshareofthesurvivingspouseisequaltothatofonechild.
72
72
provision for both his son and wife,

Beethovens and Fes
18
brother and mother, respectively. Their arrangement
contemplated the Deliarte siblings equal responsibility for
thefamilysincurredexpenses.
We take judicial notice of this collective sense of
responsibilitytowardsfamily.AswithmostnuclearFilipino
families, the Deliarte siblings endeavored to provide for
their parents or any member of their family in need. This
was evident in Florenda Deliarte Nacuas, the youngest
Deliartesiblings,remittancetoherparentsofhersalaryfor
19
twoyearssotheycouldredeemthesubjectlot.
Florenda corroborated the testimony of Beethoven that
their father was present during, and was aware
of, the
20
transactionthattookplaceamonghischildren. The1978
deed of sale, albeit void, evidenced the consent and
acquiescence of each Deliarte sibling to said transaction.
They raised no objection even after Beethoven forthwith
possessedandoccupiedthesubjectlot.
Theforegoingarrangement,vaguelyreflectedinthevoid
deed of sale, points to a meeting of the minds among the
partiesconstitutiveofaninnominatecontract,akintoboth
21
anonerousandaremuneratorydonation. Inthisregard,
Bernabes waiver and relinquishment of his share in the
subject lot is effectively a donation inter vivos to his
children. However, the gratuitous act is coupled with an
onerouscauseequalaccountabilityoftheDeliartesiblings
for the hospitalization and death expenses of deceased
familymemberstobetakenfromtheirsharesinthesubject
lot.Inturn,theremunerativecausepertainstoBeethovens
recompenseforthefamilyexpensesheinitiallyshouldered.
_______________
18TSN,September8,1995,p.5;TSN,September28,1995,p.25.
19TSN,September25,1995,p.24.
20Id.,atp.34.
21SeeCivilCode,Articles1305,1307,726and733.
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
73

During his lifetime, Bernabe remained the absolute owner
ofhisundividedinterestinthesubjectlot.Accordingly,he
could have validly disposed of his interest therein. His
consent to the disposition of the subject lot in favor of
Beethoven, agreed upon among his children, is evident,
consideringhispresencein,knowledgeof,andacquiescence
to the transaction. Further, the arrangement was
immediately effected by the parties with no objection from
Bernabe or any of the Deliarte siblings, including herein
petitionerFe.Ineluctably,theactualarrangementbetween
thepartiesincludedBernabe,andtheobjectthereofdidnot
constitutefutureinheritance.
Second.Theparoleevidenceruleisapplicable.Whilethe
application thereof presupposes the existence of a valid
agreement,theinnominatecontractbetweenthepartieshas
been directly put in issue by the respondents. Verily, the

failure of the deed of sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties
supports the application of the
22
paroleevidencerule.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the absence of
Bernabes signature in the 1978 deed of sale is not
necessarily conclusive of his dissent or opposition to the
effected arrangement. As previously adverted to, the
agreementhadmultiplecausesorconsideration,apartfrom
the P15,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. To repeat, the
agreementbetweenthepartieshadbothanonerousanda
remunerative cause. Also worthy of note is the moral
consideration for the agreement given the relationship
betweentheparties.
Third. We agree with both the lower and the appellate
courts that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the
instantcase.
Thegeneralruleisthatcontractsarevalidinwhatever
23
formtheymaybe. OneexceptiontheretoistheStatuteof
_______________
22RulesofCourt,Rule130,Section9.
23CivilCode,Article1356.
74
74
Frauds which requires a written

instrument for the
24
enforceability of a contract. However, jurisprudence
dictates that the Statute of Frauds only applies to
executory, not to completed,
executed, or partially
25
consummated,contracts.
Inthecaseatbench,wefindthatallrequisitesforavalid
contractarepresent,specifically:(1)consentoftheparties;
(2) object or subject matter, comprised of the parties
respective shares in the subject lot; and (3) the
consideration, over and above the P15,000.00 stipulated
price.Wenotethattheagreementbetweenthepartieshad
long been consummated and completed. In fact, the
agreement clearly contemplated immediate execution by
the parties. More importantly, the parties, including
petitioner Fe, ratified
the agreement by the acceptance of
26
benefitsthereunder.
OneotherthingmilitatesagainstFesclaimofownership
silence and palpable failure to object to the execution of
theagreement.Feinsiststhatsheonlyintendedtosellher
share
_______________
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered
into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.
However,whenthelawrequiresthatacontractbeinsomeforminorderthatit
maybevalidorenforceable,orthatacontractbeprovedinacertainway,that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right of the
partiesstatedinthefollowingarticlecannotbeexercised.
24SeeCivilCode,Articles1356and1402.
25Averia
v. Averia,G.R.No.141877,August13,2004,436 SCRA 459,
466; Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, October

20, 2004, 441 SCRA 1, 22; Ainza v. Padua, G.R. No. 165420, June 30,
2005, 462 SCRA 614, 619; Sps. Dela Cerna v. Sps. Briones, G.R. No.
160805,November24,2006,508SCRA62.
ContractsinfringingtheStatuteofFrauds,referredtoinNo.2ofArticle1403,
areratifiedbythefailuretoobjecttothepresentationoforalevidencetoprove
thesame,orbytheacceptanceofbenefitsunderthem.
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
75

ofthelotinheritedfromhermothersestate,exclusiveofher
fatherssharetherein.
We are not persuaded by the belated claim. This
afterthought is belied by the express stipulations in the
1978 deed of sale that the heirs of Bernabe and Gregoria,
absolutely sell, quitclaim, and transfer the subject lot in
favorofBeethoven.Althoughavoidcontractisnotasource
ofrightsandobligationsbetweentheparties,theprovisions
in the written agreement and their signature thereon are
equivalent to an express waiver of all their rights and
interestsintheentirelotinfavorofBeethoven,regardless
ofwhichpartpertainedtotheirmothersorfathersestate.
Truly significant is the fact that in all the years that
Beethovenoccupiedthesubjectlot,Feneverdisturbedthe
formerinhispossession.Neitherdidshepresentherother
siblingstobuttresshercontradictingclaimoverthesubject
lot.Likewise,sheneveraskedforapartitionoftheproperty
even after the death of their father, Bernabe, to settle his
estate, or when her other siblings executed the deed of
confirmation of sale in 1986. Fe also does not pretend to
share in the payment of realty taxes thereon, but merely
advances the claim that Priscillana,
one of their siblings,
27
had already paid said taxes. Ultimately, petitioner Fe is
estopped from staking a claim on the subject lot and
wrestingownershipthereinfromBeethoven. 28
OurholdinginthecaseofTinsay v. Yusay isstillgood
law,thus:
Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement
Exhibit1,theagreementstandingalonewas,ofcourse,ineffective
asagainsther.Theattempttopartitionherlandamongherheirs,
constitutingapartitionoffutureinheritancewasinvalidunderthe
secondparagraphofArticle1271oftheCivilCodeandforthesame
reasontherenunciationofallinterestinthelandwhichnowconsti
_______________
27TSN,December14,1995,pp.1314.
28Supranote15,atpp.644645.
76
76
tuteslotsNos.241and713madebytheappellantsinfavorofthe
childrenofJovitoYusaywouldlikewisebeofnobindingforceasto
theundividedportionwhichbelongedtoJuanServando.Butifthe
parties entered into the partition agreement in good faith and
treatedallofthelandasapresentinheritance,andiftheappellants
onthestrengthoftheagreementobtainedtheirTorrenstitletothe
land allotted to them therein, and if Perpetua Sian in reliance on
theappellantsrenunciationofallinterestclaimedbyheronbehalf
ofherchildreninthecadastralcaserefrainedfrompresentingany
opposition to the appellants claim to the entire fee in the land
assigned to them in the partition agreement and if the appellants
after the death of Juana Servando continued to enjoy the benefits
of the agreement refusing to compensate the heirs of Jovito Yusay
for the latters loss of their interest in lots Nos. 2 and 744 through
the registration of the lots in the name of the appellants and the
subsequent alienation of the same to innocent third parties, said
appellants are now estopped from repudiating the partition
agreement of 1911 and from claiming any further interest in lots
Nos. 241 and 713. There is, however, no reason why they should
notbeallowedtoshareinthedistributionoftheotherpropertyleft
byJuanaServando.
Fourth.Astothelowercourtsawardofmoraldamages,we
sustain respondents entitlement thereto. Undeniably,
respondents suffered besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, 29and social humiliation due to the damaging
placards. The injury is aggravated because of the
relationshipamongtheparties.RespondentBeethovenwas
able to prove that his nephews, petitioners Lordito,
Johnston,andArme,Jr.,stayedwithhimatsomepoint,and
that he financially
supported and trained them to be
30
electricians.
Yet,Lorditodeniesmaliceintheaforesaidact.Heargues
thathisonlyquarrelwithBeethovenstemsfromthelatters
claim of ownership over the subject lot which was,
supposedly,alreadybequeathedtohimbyhisgrandfather,
Bernabe. Lordito maintains that his claim is valid,
supportedbyawill
_______________
29SeeCivilCode,Articles2217and2219.
30TSN,September8,1995,pp.1820.
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VOL.528,JULY24,2007
77

Beethoven had torn up, which allegedly negates malice in
hisactofputtinguptheplacards.
Wearenotconvinced.
Tobeginwith,thesupposeddevisetoLorditoappearsto
bevoid.ConsideringthatBernabesestateconsistedmerely
of his conjugal share in the subject lot, the bequeathal
infringesonhiscompulsoryheirslegitimes,includingthat
31
of Lorditos mother, Fe. Lorditos claim, therefore, is only
subordinatetoBeethovensclaimasacompulsoryheir,even
without delving into the innominate contract between the
parties. In all, the ascription of malice and Lorditos
corresponding liability for moral damages is correct given
thewordsheemployedintheplacards.
However,weagreewithpetitionersthatthereisadearth
of evidence pointing to their collective responsibility for
Lorditosact.
Corollary thereto, Lordito admits and claims sole
responsibility for putting up the placards. The other
petitionersspecificparticipationinthetortiousactwasnot
proven. Failure to prevent Lordito or command him to
removetheplacards,alone,doesnotjustifythefindingthat
all the petitioners are jointly and severally liable. It does
notsufficethatallthepetitionersweremovedbyacommon
desiretoacquirethesubjectproperty,absentanyproofthat
theyindividuallyconcurredinLorditosact.
_______________
Onewhohasnocompulsoryheirsmaydisposebywillofallhisestateorany
partofitinfavorofanypersonhavingcapacitytosucceed.
Onewhohascompulsoryheirsmaydisposeofhisestateprovidedhedoesnot
contravenetheprovisionsofthisCodewithregardtothelegitimeofsaidheirs.
78
78
Entrenchedistherulethattherightsofapartycannotbe
32
prejudicedbyanact,declaration,oromissionofanother.
The exception under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Courtdoesnotobtaininthisinstance.Theotherpetitioners
acquiescence to and apparent concurrence in Lorditos act
cannotbeinferredmerelyfromtheirfailuretoremovethe
placards or reprimand Lordito. While the placards indeed
defamedBeethoven,thereisnothingthatdirectlylinksthe
otherpetitionerstothisdastardlyact.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
PARTIALLYGRANTED.TheAugust28,2001Decisionof
the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner
Lordito Arrogante is held solely liable to respondents for
moraldamagesintheamountofP150,000.00.Thequieting
of title in favor of respondents is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago (Chairperson), AustriaMartinez
andChicoNazario, JJ.,concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment modified.
Note.The settlement of the issue of ownership is the

first stage in an action for partition. (Ocampo vs. Ocampo,
427SCRA545[2004])
o0o
_______________
32RulesofCourt,Rule130,Section28.
79
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