HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH

MOHUNTA
AND
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN
REDDY
C.C.C.A.No. 408 OF 2003
DATED 8th November, 2012
BETWEEN
Mohammed Azharuddin
..
Appellan
t
And
The Board of Control for Cricket in India
Through its Secretary, having its office at
Brabourne Statidum, Fort Area, Mumbai,
Maharashtra
And ors
.Respondents.HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE
ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA
AND
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN
REDDY

C.C.C.A.No. 408 OF 2003

JUDGMENT:
1.
Mohammed Azharuddin, the appellant
herein, was highly reputed cricket player. It is
well known to all the cricket loving public as
well as general public that Mohammed
Azharuddin was an outstanding cricketer (player
as well as Captain of Indian Team) who held an
excellent record in both Test and One-day
International (ODI) limited overs game cricket
matches.
2.
In and around 2000, there had been
media reports making allegations of under
performance, match fixing betting, accepting
gifts etc., against several Cricket Players
including foreign players. Taking innumerable
reports that had come in both print and
electronic media making allegations as stated
supra against several Cricket players, the then
Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Youth Affairs and
Sports, Government of India, took cognizance of
those reports and asked the Central Bureau of
Investigation (for short the CBI) to collect and
evaluate various news items and information so
published in that regard and thereafter, conduct
an enquiry into those allegations which was
done. On the request of the Ministry of Culture
Youth Affairs and Sports Union of India, the BCCI
(first respondent herein) thereafter initiated
preliminary enquiry appointing the second
respondent as its Commissioner in regard

thereto. Ultimately, at the culmination of the

enquiry and submitting report, The BCCI/first
respondent passed its order dated 05.12.2000,
imposing punishment against the appellant,
which inter alia reads to the following effect:
ORDER
OF
THE
DISCIPLINARY
COMMITTEEE OF BOARD OF CONTROL FOR
CRICKET IN INIDA PASSED AT THE MEETING
HELD ON 5TH DECEMBER 2000 AT CHENNAI:
Mr. Mohd. Azharuddin:
The CBI has submitted a Report titled
Report on Cricket Match Fixing & Related Mal
Practices in October, 2000. The Board of
Control for Crikcet in India (BCCI) had referred
the matter to its Commissioner, Mr.K.Madhavan
to make an appropriate enquiry. During Mr.
Madhavans
further
enquiry
he
gave
opportunities to Mr.Azharuddin to give his
explanations to him which he did in the form of
a signed statement. Subsequently Mr.Madhavan
submitted his report.
Mr.Mohd. Azharuddin was given a notice
to appear before the Disciplinary Committee of
the Board on 28.11.2000 at Hotel Taj Mahal,
Mansingh Road, New Delhi. At the said hearing,
on 28.11.2000, Mr.Azharuddin haded over a
letter dt. 28.11.2000 addressed to the Chairman
of the Disciplinary Committee. Dr.A.C.Muthaiah,
the contents of the said letter is reproduced
below:
Kindly refer to your letter dated

24.11.2000. I wish to say that I fully

cooperated with the enquiry conducted by
Shri Madhavan, commissioner appointed
by the BCCI. He recorded my statement in
minute details. I had specifically denied
the allegations about Cricket Match Fixing
and allied matters in their totality. I had no
connection with any person outside the
cricket fraternity.
As far as my knowledge goes, no
cricket player indulged in match fixing.
I am under great strain because in
addition to the enquiry by the BCCI,
separate enquiries/investigations by the
Income Tax, Directorate of Enforcement
have been launched against me without
any basis.
I have served the BCCI and my
country with distinction. I am confident
that having regard to my excellent and
outstanding performance as a captain and
as a player, BCCI would do full justice to
me.

The submissions made by Mr.Azharuddin

as above was given due consideration. It was
put to Mr.Azharuddin whether he is aware that if
he is found guilty in the proceedings before the
Disciplinary Committee then an appropriate
action could be taken against him for which he
had answered in the affirmative.

Thereafter, the proceedings were

recorded and signed by all the members of the
Disciplinary
Committee
and
also
by
Mr.Azharuddin and point-3 of the proceedings of
the Disciplinary Committee Meeting held on 28 th
November 2000 is reproduced below:
Clause-3. On being asked whether
he had anything further to add by way of
explanations regarding the allegations as
mentioned in the aforesaid reports., he
stated that he had brought with him a
letter
dated
November
28,2000,
addressed to the President, BCCI. He
handed it over to the Committee. Copy
thereof is enclosed as Annexure to these
proceedings. He stated that he had
mentioned in the said letter what he wants
to submit before the Committee and has
nothing further to add except that he
innocent he is hopeful that the Committee
and BCCI would do full justice to him.
The Disciplinary Committee has carefully
considered the facts and the findings of the
Report of the Commissioner arrived at on a
consideration of the Report of the CBI as well as
the
statements/submissions
made
by
Mr.Azharuddi before the Commissioner and also
the statements/submissions made by him at the
hearing on 28.11.2000 before the Disciplinary
Committee. The Commissioners Report has
correctly dealt with these aspects and has held
that the explanations given by Mr.Azharuddin
are unacceptable to him for the reasons given in

his report.
The
Disciplinary
Committee
has
considered the entire matter and the
explanations and the oral submissions made by
Mr.Azharuddin and are unable to accept the
same. After having given anxious consideration
to the entire matter and on the basis of the
statements/submissions made by Mr.Azharuddin
before the Disciplinary Committee, Report of the
Commissioner which also considered the Report
of the CBI, the Disciplinary Committee is also of
the opinion that Mr.Azharuddin is guilty as found
by the Commissioner.
After due deliberation and keeping in
mind the interest of the future of the Indian
Cricket, the Members of the Disciplinary
Committee present have unanimously taken the
decision as follows:
i)

He had close contacts and nexus

with bookies/punters like M.K.Gupta,
Ajay Gupta, Gyan Gupta and Ameesh
Gupta etc., and was involved in
match fixing.

ii)

He is guilty of unbecoming conduct

and misconduct as a national level
player in maintaining such frequent
contacts with bookies/punters.

iii)

In his case, the misconduct is

aggravated, as he was the Captain of
the Indian Team for long and let
down the country and the cricket

loving public in a despicable manner.

The Disciplinary Committee is of the
considered opinion that Mr.Azharuddin has
conducted himself in a manner which is
prejudicial to the interests of the game of
cricket, more particularly as a Captain of the
Indian Team.
In taking its decision the Disciplinary
Committee has also kept in mind the
contributions made by Mr.Azharuddin to the
game of cricket.
After due deliberation and keeping in mind
the interest of the future of the Indian Cricket
the Members of the Disciplinary Committee
present have unanimously taken the decision as
follows:
Mr.Mohd. Azharuddin be debarred
from
playing
any
cricket
matches
conducted or authorized by ICC/BCCI or
affiliated associations and also debarred
from holding any position in ICC/BCCI or
any of its affiliated associations, for life
commencing from 5th December, 2000. He
will also be not eligible for any Benefit
Matches allotted/conducted by the BCCI or
its
affiliated
members
and
BCCIs
contribution to his Benevolent Fund
accrued as of today, will be forfeited with
effect from 5th December, 2000.

Sd/

K.M.

Ram

Prasad

Sd/

Dr.A.C.Muthaiah
Member-Disciplinary Committee

ChairmanDisciplinary
Committee

Dated 5th December, 2000

Chennai.

3.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order inflicting
the
punishment
upon
him,
Mohammed
Azharuddin/appellant preferred O.S.No.10 of
2001 on the file of the learned II Additional Chief
Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
4.
For the sake of convenience, the parties
herein are referred to as arrayed in the suit.
5.
The suit was instituted by the plaintiff
inter alia seeking the following reliefs:
a) to declare a portion of Rule 38(ii) of the
Rules and Regulations of the Board of Control
for Cricket in India (for short the Board) after it
severance to the extent which precludes and
prohibits the plaintiff from calling into question
the action taken by the Committee as a result of
an inquiry under the Rule, in any court of law as
bad and illegal;
b) to declare the appointment of the
defendant 2 and the report drawn up by him as
null and void, ultra vires and contrary to the
established procedure;
c) to declare the proceedings of defendant

1/Board dated 05.12.2000 inflicting thereunder

punishment and imposition of life ban on the
plaintiff, which was duly communicated by the
Secretary through his letter dated 11.12.2000,
as null and void being contrary to the Rules and
Regulations of the Board and violative of the
principles of natural justice;
d) to declare that the plaintiff be permitted
to play cricket during his life time for the Indian
National Team and such other teams and shall
be entitled to all retirement benefits as an
international cricketer is entitled to in India and
to permit him to hold any such position as may
be available or as may be considered in the
Board or the ICC; and
e) to issue a perpetual and permanent
injunction restraining the defendants in any way
either interfering or restricting the cricketing
career of the plaintiff directly or indirectly.
6.(a) It is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff
is a law-abiding citizen. Owing to excellent
performance in cricket, he was selected to
represent Indian National Team in Cricket Test
match series against England in the year 198485. On his debut itself, he created a world
record by scoring three centuries in a row in
three tests (a record which is still holding the
field). He had also held many other records
under his cap. It is further averred that
considering his excellent performance, he was
selected as the Captain of the Indian National
Team in which capacity he represented the
country in several test and one day
international cricket matches, the details of
which, though mentioned in detail in the plaint,

are not really necessary for us to adjudicate the

controversies involved in this appeal.
6.(b)
At the outset, it is pertinent to
notice as to the cause for the institution of the
subject suit before the Court below which was in
view of the innumerable reports that had come
in both the print and electronic media making
allegations of under performance, match fixing,
betting, accepting gifts, etc. against several
Cricket players, which the Secretary, Ministry of
Culture, Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of
India, took cognizance of leading to take
cognizance and ask the CBI to collect and
evaluate various news items and information so
published in that regard and thereafter, conduct
an enquiry into those allegations. Ultimately, at
the culmination of the enquiry, the punishment
in question was inflicted upon the plaintiff,
which was inter alia assailed before the Court
below under the subject suit.
6.(c).
It is pleaded that the defendant 1
being the Board is a society registered at
Madras (Chennai) on 28.11.1940 under the
provisions of the Societies Registration Act,
1860
which
is
required
to
be
administered/governed in accordance with its
memorandum and Rules and Regulations as last
amended at the Special General Meeting held
on 15.08.1994 at Udaipur. Any action on the
part of the Board which is not in consonance
with
its
memorandum
and
Rules
and
Regulations is illegal. It is also specifically
pleaded that the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant 1/Board is in the nature
of a service contract and that the principles and

procedure laid down by the Supreme Court with

regard to initiation, conduct, conclusion,
issuance of show cause notices, charge memos
and imposition of punishment in disciplinary
proceedings, etc. also govern and apply to the
disciplinary proceedings of the Board.
6.(d)
It is further pleaded that defendant
3 for the Board appointed the defendant 2, a
practicing Advocate and its client, who in fact
was not qualified to conduct the enquiry was
appointed as the Commissioner in gross
violation of its Rules and Regulations inasmuch
as they do not stipulate any specific provision to
do so whereby such action on the part of the
Board being in flagrant violation of its own
Rules and Regulations is illegal, arbitrary and ex
facie sheer consequence of the biased attitude
of the defendant 3 against the plaintiff. The
Board did not disclose its intention of appointing
a Commissioner as no resolution was passed to
that effect. Apart from that the disciplinary
committee with three members alone was
competent to conduct such proceedings as
clearly envisaged under Rule 38 of the Rules
and Regulations of the Board. It is claimed that
the preliminary enquiry ( for short PE) initiated
on the request of the Ministry of Culture Youth
Affairs and Sports was merely an internal
enquiry which was conducted by the CBI initially
to satisfy itself and see as to whether any
cognizable offence for the registration of a
regular case (for short, RC) was made out or
not whereby the PE report works out to be just
a prima facie personal opinion of the CBI which

could not be the basis for inflicting the

punishment etc. It is also claimed that as the PE
was an exercise, which was conducted by the
CBI prior to the registration of RC, it cannot be
said to be a one conducted under the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Cr.P.C.), by reason of which, statements if any
recorded during the PE can, at best, be termed
as previous statements on which no reliance
can legally be placed.
6.(e)
It is further pleaded that the
Investigating Officer CBI forwarded its PE report
to the Ministry of Culture Youth Affairs and
Sports, Government of India, who forwarded it
to the Board. It is emphasised that the contents
of the report do not disclose commission of any
offence under the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) or Public Gambling Act.
6.(f)
It is also claimed that the
defendants did not supply copies of the
statements allegedly given by various witnesses
before the CBI during the PE but directed the
plaintiff to appear before the defendant 2 at
Chennai. However, in order to co-operate with
the enquiry, the plaintiff agreed to and
appeared before the defendant 2 at Hyderabad
and denied the baseless allegations levelled
against him both in the media and in the PE. It
is alleged that the enquiry conducted by the
defendant 2 in any case was not transparent,
fair and independent, as he did not call or
examine any witness who gave statement
against him in his presence, apart from which at

the end even before the plaintiff could make his

presence before him on the summons sent by
him, he announced the date of submission of his
report to the Board, which indicates that the
enquiry was a sham and mere formality which
was done just with the motive of seeing that the
plaintiff should be punished. In addition to that
the defendant 2 placed reliance upon the PE
report and the statements which were in fact
not recorded before him only for the purpose of
finding or holding the plaintiff as guilty, illegally
and in violation of the principles of natural
justice or established procedure prescribed
under law in regard thereto. On the other hand,
likewise quite illegally only two members of the
disciplinary committee of the Board solely relied
upon the PE report which was mechanically
endorsed by the defendant 2 and issued the
proceedings dated 5.12.2000 debarring the
plaintiff from playing cricket matches conducted
or authorised by itself or the ICC or its affiliated
associations with effect from 05.12.2000 and
also holding any post in those Bodies in post
haste without consulting or referring to the third
member of the disciplinary committee which is
borne out by the fact that he did not sign the
proceedings. That apart the Board also forfeited
the benevolent fund to be arranged to the
plaintiff.
6.(g).
It is claimed that Rule 38(ii) of the
Rules and Regulations of the Board which
prohibited the plaintiff to initiate legal
proceedings against the Board questioning the
action taken by it against him is per se illegal

and not binding on the plaintiff as it has no legal

force and is opposed to the public policy.
6.(h).
It is finally pleaded that no appeal is
provided against the report of the defendant 2
and order dated 05.12.2000. Unless the
impugned report and order are set aside
declaring them as illegal, null and void and ultra
vires, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and
injury. He claims that he has no efficacious
alternative remedy than instituting the present
suit in order to seek justice.
7. (a)
The Defendant 1/the Board, filed its
written statement specifically denying all the
material averments made which inter alia reads
to the following effect:
7.(b).
It is stated that the suit filed by the
plaintiff is not maintainable either in law or on
the facts of the case for want of misjoinder
and/or non-joinder of parties. The Court below
has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try
the suit as no part of the cause of action has
arisen within its jurisdiction. It is further pleaded
that the entire suit is based on vexatious,
wrongful and unsustainable contentions by
reason of which it is liable to be rejected in
limine with exemplary costs. It is further
claimed that the suit is also liable to be
dismissed on the ground of improper valuation
and improper payment of court fee.
7.(c).
It is claimed further that the Board
is an autonomous and independent body
registered in accordance with the provisions of

Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1860 and

its actions are guided by its own constitution. It
is claimed that the Board can initiate domestic
enquiry in accordance with its Rules and
Regulations subject to the compliance of the
principles of natural justice, equity and fair play,
but the findings and/or decisions of the
domestic body cannot be superseded by a Court
of law through a judicial scrutiny.
7.(d).
It is specifically denied that the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
1 is in the nature of a service contract. It is
specifically pleaded that there is a contractual
obligation between cricket players and the
Board whereas the players by virtue of the
provisions of Rule 10 of its Rules and
Regulations would fall within the jurisdiction of
the Board. The Rules and Regulations of the
Board are not violative of any public policy and
not prima facie illegal. They are exhaustive in
nature and provide each and every modality
with regard to initiation, conduct, conclusion,
imposition of punishment, etc., in the matter of
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Board
to which the plaintiff had submitted himself. The
plaintiff having accepted the Rules and
Regulations of the Board is estopped from
making any effort to wriggle out of the
proceedings. It is specifically denied that though
the defendant 2 got no qualification was
appointed as the Commissioner illegally beyond
the ambit of and in flagrant violation of its rules
and regulations asserting that in fact his
appointment was proper and legal. It is also

specifically claimed that the enquiry was a

sham and mere formality intended to implicate
the plaintiff and impose punishment upon them.
It is also pleaded that even though the enquiry
does not disclose the commission of any offence
under the provisions of IPC or any other statute,
still as the facts clearly disclose the commission
of misconduct by the plaintiff, the domestic
body like the defendant 1 is statutorily entitled
to take appropriate disciplinary action within the
framework of its own Rules and Regulations.
7.(e)
It is also specifically denied that the
plaintiff was not supplied with the copies of the
statements of the witnesses examined during
the enquiry conducted by the CBI and that the
report of the CBI is baseless and incorrect. It is
claimed that on the specific request of the
plaintiff, he was supplied with a full copy of the
report of the CBI, the receipt of which was duly
acknowledged by the plaintiff following which
only the plaintiff appeared before the defendant
2 during the enquiry and submitted 27 pages
statements which are on record. It is claimed
that every statement made by the plaintiff was
recorded in the presence of defendant 2 and
was signed by him. It is also claimed that
though the plaintiff was given opportunity to
examine any witness or witnesses with a view
to avoid recording of corroborating evidence
against him, he wilfully had chosen not to call
for any evidence being addressed or any
witness being examined. It is stated that the
plaintiff was initially asked to appear before the
defendant 2 at New Delhi but at the behest of

the plaintiff and to afford complete and

reasonable opportunity, the domestic enquiry
was conducted at Hyderabad which is the place
of residence of the plaintiff.
7.(f).
It is also claimed that the plaintiff
expressed his satisfaction and gratitude for the
courtesy extended to him during the course of
entire enquiry. It is therefore denied that the
enquiry proceedings are void ab initio or illegal
or violative in the eye of law while pleading that
it has been sufficiently established that the
plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct. It is
therefore pleaded that the whole and sole
motive on the part of the plaintiff in making
false allegations in the plaint is to mislead the
Court suppressing the material facts.
7.(g).
It is claimed further that the CBI
report was duly considered with open mind and
independently. The ultimate decision was
arrived at only after due consideration of all
aspects that came to light which substantially
proved that the plaintiff was guilty of gross
misconduct. It is further claimed that the
decision was taken and the punishment was
imposed upon the plaintiff in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of
the Board legally and validly. It is specifically
denied that there was non-application of mind
or that there was mechanical or erroneous
conclusion or that the plaintiff was subjected to
harsh punishment. While denying that the
decision of the defendant 3 was marked by
mala fide intentions, it is claimed that it is

totally immaterial whether the third Member of

the disciplinary committee was present during
the course of hearing or not. It is claimed that
the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the
suit. According to him it is misconceived,
illegal, wrongful and based on utter false and
misleading pleadings to entertain it.
7.(h).
It is further claimed that the
defendant 2 submitted his report dated
05.12.2000 to the first defendant / Board at
Chennai. On the other hand CBI report was
made and published at New Delhi; Infact except
the mere hearing afforded to the plaintiff at
Hyderabad, no event whatsoever bearing on the
subject matter of the suit took place within the
jurisdiction of the Court below; by reason of
which also the suit is not maintainable on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is
therefore prayed ultimately that the suit is liable
to be dismissed.
8.
The Defendant 2 and 3 filed separate
written statements which confer with the
written statement of the defendant No.1 which
need not be reproduced once again. It is suffice
to refer to some important aspects which the
defendant No.2 dealt with directly. He claimed
that no relief could be claimed against him as
he just conducted the enquiry and submitted
the report thereon pursuant to his appointment
as the Commissioner in regard thereto. He
pleaded that Rule 38(ii) of the Rules and
Regulations of the Board were amended on
29.09.2000 in accordance with which, only

indeed,
he
conducted
the
disciplinary
proceedings thereafter. With regards to his
eligibility he claims that at the time of his
retirement in the year 1992 he was the Joint
Director of CBI, he has got vast experience in
doing investigation and prosecution of cases
and also conducting as well as monitoring large
number of departmental enquiries/disciplinary
proceedings. Therefore he denies that he lacked
experience in conducting the disciplinary
proceedings. It is specifically claimed by him
that the statements of the plaintiff were
recorded in detail affording him proper and
necessary opportunity which is reflected in the
correspondence that took place between the
plaintiff and himself, viz. Letters dated
08.11.2000,
10.11.2000,
13.11.2000,
14.11.2000, 15.11.2000, 17.11.2000 etc. His
claim is that the plaintiff did question during the
entire enquiry his appointment or jurisdiction to
conduct the enquiry; on the other hand the
plaintiff himself sent a fax message dated
17.11.2000 on his own volition to him
expressing his gratitude for the courtesy
extended to him during the enquiry; It is
pleaded thereby that only with a view to
prejudice the Court below he has made false
pleas in the plaint. It is claimed that the CBI
which need not record the statements of the
witnesses in the presence of plaintiff supplied
those statements to the plaintiff in toto as
required by law. It is therefore denied that the
plaintiff was not given full and complete
opportunity to make use of those statements for
the cross examination of witnesses at the time

of enquiry. On the other hand the defendant 2 is

objective in preparing his report.
9.
On the basis of these pleadings, the Court
below framed the following issues for
adjudication:
1.
Whether the appointment of second
defendant as Commissioner under
the proceedings dated 29.08.2000 is
valid?
2.
Whether the first defendant had
inherent
power
to
appoint
Commissioner
for
conducting
enquiry?
3.
Whether the second defendant is
incompetent and unqualified for
being appointed as Commissioner by
the first defendant?
4.
Whether the enquiry conducted by
defendant No.2 is not legal and valid
on the several grounds alleged in the
plaint?
5.
Whether the allegation of match
fixing against plaintiff is not proved?
6.
Whether the first defendant had not
followed the procedure prescribed by
its bye-laws and the principles of
natural justice and, if so, its order
dated 05.12.2000 is not valid?
7.
Whether this Court has no territorial
jurisdiction?
8.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for
the declarations prayed for?
9.
To what relief?

10.
In support of the claim of the plaintiff, he
got examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked
Exs.A.1 to A.3. On behalf of the defendants, one
witness was examined as D.W.1 and got marked
Exs.B.1 to B.22.
11.
On a consideration and evaluation of both
oral and documentary evidence adduced, the
Court below recorded the findings in respect of
all the Issues in favour of the defendants and
ultimately dismissed the suit by its judgment
and decree dated 27.08.2003, whereas assailing
that judgment and decree the plaintiff preferred
the present appeal under Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
12.
Heard the learned counsel on either side
at length. They have drawn our attention to
various case law relied upon by them in support
of their contentions, and perused the
voluminous material placed on record.
13.
Learned Counsel for the parties have
elaborately advanced arguments inconsonance
with the pleadings made respectively placing
reliance upon catena of decisions in support of
their respective claims.
14.
As can be seen from the contentions or
arguments urged before us by the learned
counsel on either side at great length, the
points that arise for our consideration and
decision in the appeal are as follows:
1)
Whether the Court below has
territorial jurisdiction to try the suit ?

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

Whether the suit is maintainable

(a) by virtue of rule 38(1) of
the Rules and regulations of
the Board which prohibit to file
the suit and
(b) by virtue of non joinder of
necessary parties?
Whether the Board got power to
appoint the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner by the order dated on
29.08.2000 to conduct the enquiry
with regards to any acts of
indiscipline and misconduct of the
plaintiff and submit report, in view of
Rule 38 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Board and hence the
appointment is valid?
Whether the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner was competent and
qualified to conduct the enquiry
against the plaintiff effectively in the
light of the fact that he was advising
the Board as an Advocate on legal
issues?
Whether the defendant 2 had
followed the rule of principles of
natural justice during the course of
entire enquiry?
Whether the defendant 2 had made
any independent enquiry to prove
the allegations of match fixing by
affording an opportunity to the
plaintiff
to
cross-examine
the
concerned
witnesses
whose
statements were relied upon while

7)

8)

9)
10)
11)

drawing
up
his
report
dated
24.11.2000?
Whether the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 of the Board passed by
only two members instead of three
members
of
the
disciplinary
Committee as mandated by Rule 18
of the Rules and Regulations is legal
and valid, more particularly in the
light of letter dated 04.12.2000
addressed by the third Member of it
to the Board seeking to fix fresh date
for convening the meeting?
What are the effects of the report
dated 24.11.2000 of the defendant 2
and the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 of the Board?
Whether the judgment and decree
passed by the Court below are liable
to be set aside consequently?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to
the reliefs prayed for in the suit?
If so, to what relief?

POINT No.1:
15.
It is the specific plea of the plaintiff in the
plaint that the cause of action arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court below in as
much as the defendant 2 had conducted the
enquiry proceedings at Hyderabad and that
necessary communications with regards to the
subject enquiry including the service of the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 were sent to
his Hyderabad address, where he was a
permanent resident. Therefore, it is the

contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff

that the Court below got territorial jurisdiction to
try the suit.
16.
The defendants while claiming at one
stage that the Court below got no territorial
jurisdiction have claimed at another stage that
the enquiry was conducted at Hyderabad which
is the place of permanent resident of the
plaintiff. This makes at categorical that the
cause of action to file the suit arose at
Hyderabad. Section 20 CPC which is relevant
here enjoins.
17.
Thus by virtue of this provision the Court
below got jurisdiction to entertain the suit as
within its local jurisdiction the plaintiff used to
reside and also the enquiry was conducted
which would give necessary cause of action.
POINT No.2:
18.
Rule 42 of the Rules and Regulations of
the Board is relevant here, it reads to the
following effect:
42. Suit by or against the Board:
The Board shall sue or be sued in the
name of the Secretary.
This Rule appears to be quite contradictory to
the prohibition enshrined in Rule 38(ii) which is
to the effect that the action, if any, taken by the
Committee as a result of an enquiry shall not be
called into question in any court of law. Here
Section 9 CPC is also relevant as this provision
in fact gives right to the plaintiff to file the suit.

This section enjoins the Courts shall subject to

the provisions herein contained have jurisdiction
to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of
which their cognizance is either expressly or
impliedly barred. So by virtue of this provision
everybody will have a right to file suit of civil
nature for readdressing his grievance unless
there is a statutory bar to do so.
19.
Definitely this suit filed to redress the
grievances of the plaintiff as enunciated is
purely civil in nature. Rule 38(2) will not have
any statutory enforcement independently.
20.
In GANGA BAI Vs. VIJAY KUMAR [supra],
the Supreme Court, inter alia while dealing with
the basic distinction between the right of suit
and right of appeal also dealt with the right of
suit exclusively. This decision in fact clarifies
categorically the question raised in the present
context. When every body will have an inherent
right to file a suit to redress his grievance
against another or others unless prohibited by
law any provision made against the spirit of that
concept cannot be held to be valid. On the other
hand any precedents laid by the constitutional
Courts operate as law as interpreted which will
have statutory force. It is quite unconstitutional
to prevent a person from exercising such right
though infringed quite arbitrarily. In fact the
Apex Court held :
15. It is thus clear that the appeal
filed by Defendants 2 and 3 in the High
Court was directed originally not against
any part of the preliminary decree but
against a mere finding recorded by the

trial ourt that the partition was not

genuine. The main controversy before us
centres round the question whether that
appeal was maintainable. On this question
the position seems to us well established.
There is a basic distinction between the
right of suit and the right of appeal. There
is an inherent right in every person to
bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the
suit is barred by statute one may, at ones
peril, bring a suit of ones choice. It is no
answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to
claim, that the law confers no such right to
sue. A suit for its maintainability requires
no authority of law and it is enough that
no statute bars the suit. But the position in
regard to appeals is quite the opposite.
The right of appeal inheres in no one and
therefore an appeal for its maintainability
must have the clear authority of law. That
explains why the right of appeal is
described as a creature of statute.
[Emphasis is ours]
It is comprehensible from this decision that
there is a basic distinction between the right of
suit and the right of appeal and that a suit is
maintainable if there is no statutory bar to do
so. Significantly in the present case, Rule 42
clearly posits that the Board can be sued in the
name of its Secretary which is quite
contradictory to the Rule 38(ii) which enjoins
that any action taken by the Committee as a
result of an enquiry shall not be called into
question in any Court of law. When there are
contradictory provisions on the subject within

the rules that which is in accordance with law

laid or interpreted statutorily will prevail and will
be enforced. The embargo contained in Rule
38(ii) which runs contrary to the other rule, is
clearly illegal and arbitrary and hence invalid
thereby.
21.
In fact the Supreme Court in ZEE
TELEFILMS LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA [supra]
clearly clarified the status of the board for the
purpose of initiating action against the board
when the board involved in violating the right of
a cricket player who was found by the rules and
regulations of the board. Under similar
questions raised, in fact the Supreme Court
observed and held:
23. The facts established in this
case show the following:
1. The Board is not created by
a statute.
2. No part of the share capital
of the Board is held by the
Government.
3. Practically no financial
assistance
is
given
by
the
Government to meet the whole or
entire expenditure of the Board.
4. The Board does enjoy a
monopoly status in the field of
cricket but such status is not Stateconferred or State-protected.
5. There is no existence of a
deep and pervasive State control.
The control if any is only regulatory
in nature as applicable to other
similar bodies. This control is not

specifically exercised under any

special statute applicable to the
Board. All functions of the Board are
not public functions nor are they
closely related to governmental
functions.
6. The Board is not created by
transfer of a government-owned
corporation. It is an autonomous
body.

31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied

that the Board does discharge some duties
like the selection of an Indian cricket
team, controlling the activities of the
players and others involved in the game of
cricket. These activities can be said to be
akin to public duties or State functions and
if there is any violation of any
constitutional or statutory obligation or
rights of other citizens, the aggrieved
party may not have a relief by way of a
petition under Article 32. But that does not
mean that the violator of such right would
go scot-free merely because it or he is not
a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence
there is always a just remedy for the
violation of a right of a citizen. Though the
remedy under Article 32 is not available,
an aggrieved party can always seek a
remedy under the ordinary course of law
or by way of a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, which is much
wider than Article 32.

203. It is not disputed that the Union of

India has not recognised any other
national sports body for regulating the
game of cricket in India. It is the
categorical stand of the Union of India that
only by such recognition granted by the
Union of India, is the team selected by the
Board the Indian cricket team which it
could not do in the absence thereof. We
cannot accept the submission of Mr
Venugopal to the effect that even while
playing abroad, the Board sends its own
team. It is evident from the records which
fact has also been noticed by the Delhi
High Court in its judgment in Rahul Mehra
[(2004) 114 DLT 323 (DB)] that the Board
fields its team as the Indian team and not
as Board Eleven, which without having any
authority from the Union of India, it will
not be able to do. The stand that the
cricket team selected by the Board only
represents it and not the country is
incorrect. Having regard to the Rules of
the ICC, its own Rules as also various
documents placed before this Court by the
Union of India, the conduct of both the
Board and the Union of India clearly goes
to show that sub silentio both the parties
had been acting on the premise that the
Board is recognised as the only recognised
national federation for the purpose of
regulating the game of cricket in India.
[Emphasis is ours]
Thus it is held by the Supreme Court that

although the Board is an autonomous body, it

cannot be denied the fact that the Board does
discharge some duties akin to public duties or
State functions, namely, the selection of an
Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of
the players and others involved in the game of
cricket; if there is any violation of any
constitutional or statutory obligation or rights,
the aggrieved party can always seek a remedy
under the ordinary course of law and the
violator of such right would not go scot-free
merely because it is not a State. Though the
plaintiff was bound by the rules and regulations
of the Board that does not mean that the Board
could act quite arbitrarily infringing his
fundamental rights. By virtue of Article 21 of
the Constitution, he is guaranteed life and
liberty. This entitles him to live with dignity and
fight any injustice that may be done to him.
Punishing him without any basis is definitely
curtailment of his life and liberty guaranteed
under the said Article and quite arbitrary.
Though the Board got enormous powers as
contemplated by its rules and regulations that
should be subject to fair play and fundamental
rights of the players selected by it. In a
democratic country every system in vogue
therein should be conducted within the process
of democracy. In the light of this law laid down
by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the
Board being an autonomous body, its actions
cannot be subject to challenge before a Court of
law.
22.

With regard to the contention of learned

counsel for the defendants that the suit is not

maintainable against the Board as the
relationship between the plaintiff and the Board
is a contract of service by reason of which also
the plaintiff is not entitled to question any rules
or regulations framed by the Board and, at best,
the plaintiff can lay a suit for damages in such
cases if he is so advised in INDIAN AIRLINES
CORPN. Vs. SUKHDEO RAI [supra] the Supreme
Court held thus:
12. The regulations contain the
terms and conditions which govern the
relationship between the Corporation and
its employees. Though made under the
power conferred by the statute, they
merely embody the terms and conditions
of service in the Corporation but do not
constitute a statutory restriction as to the
kind of contracts which the Corporation
can make with its servants or the grounds
on which it can terminate them. That
being so, and the Corporation having
undoubtedly the power to dismiss its
employees,
the
dismissal
of
the
respondent was with jurisdiction, and
although it was wrongful in the sense of its
being in breach of the terms and
conditions which governed the relationship
between
the
Corporation
and
the
respondent, it did subsist. The present
case, therefore, did not fall under any of
the three well-recognized exceptions, and
therefore, the respondent was only
entitled to damages and not to the
declaration that his dismissal was null and

void.
[Emphasis is ours]
So in this the Supreme Court under relevant
circumstances particularly non falling of the
case under any of the three well-recognized
exceptions, held that the respondent-workman
was only entitled to seek damages instead of
seeking a declaration as to his dismissal as null
and void. On facts, this decision has no
application to the present case.
23.
In the present case, no statutory provision
is placed before us whereby a suit is not
maintainable against the Board except a
restriction contained in Rule 38 that the action
of Committee shall not be assailed before a
Court of law which is clearly in consistent with
Rule 42 which in unmistakable terms provides
that the Board can sue and be sued. In so far as
non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties to the suit
is concerned, specific reliefs are sought against
the Board only, as rightly put it by the learned
counsel for the plaintiff, and therefore, the
contention raised in that regard cannot be
countenanced.
24.
The learned counsel for the defendants
also has argued that the suit is not maintainable
on the ground of mis-joinder and non-joinder of
parties. Refuting this contention, the learned
counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the
reliefs in the suit are only sought against the
Board and therefore necessary and proper
parties are arraigned in the suit and there was
no need to implead any other parties for the

purpose of maintaining the suit and that the suit

as framed and instituted is clearly maintainable.
25.
In the light of the facts and circumstances
of cases discussed hereinabove and keeping in
mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court
referred to supra on the point, we hold that the
suit is maintainable. We accordingly answer the
Point No.2 in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants.
POINT No. 3:
26.
It is the case of the plaintiff that Rule 38
at the relevant point of time did not ipso facto
envisage appointment of a Commissioner by the
Board for conducting an enquiry into the
allegations of any act of indiscipline or
misconduct of any player and that the Board
has no power to appoint the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner on 29.08.2000 which is contrary
to its Rules and Regulations. In the light of this
specific plea, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff has strenuously argued that the
appointment
of
defendant
2
as
the
Commissioner on 29.08.2000 by the Board is
illegal, invalid and void ab initio having been
done in complete disobedience to its own Rules
and Regulations. The learned counsel thus
asserted that the Board got no power
whatsoever to appoint the defendant 2 for that
post to conduct the enquiry against the plaintiff
and thus it is illegal and invalid.
27.
The learned counsel has further argued
that the so-called amendment carried out to the

Rule 38 which came into force on and from

29.09.2000 cannot have any application to the
present case as the defendant 2 was appointed
as the Commissioner under the Rule on
29.08.2000 by which time the un-amended Rule
38 was holding the field under which such
appointment cannot be made. The learned
counsel also took us, in this regard, through the
plaint averments to show that such a specific
plea was taken at the threshold itself and
contended that despite taking that plea, the
Court below erred in rejecting the plea.
28.
As against this, it is the submission of
learned counsel for the defendants that as Rule
38 was duly amended which came into force on
29.09.2000 and that only thereafter the
defendant 2 as the Commissioner had, in fact,
initiated
the
enquiry
proceedings
the
appointment was ratified and valid which aspect
was rightly considered and upheld by the Court
below which does not require any interference
in this appeal.
29.
In the backdrop of these respective
arguments on the point, at the threshold it is
necessary for us to go through circumspectly
Rule 38 which stood as on 29.08.2000, it reads
as under:
38.
MISCONDUCT AND PROCEDURE TO
DEAL WITH:
(i)
The President shall take cognizance
of any act of indiscipline or
misconduct
of
any
player
representing India on any tour or in

any Test Match, official or unofficial,

in India or elsewhere or in any match
controlled and/or played under the
auspices of the Board and shall act
in the manner hereinafter specified.
(ii) The President shall frame or direct the
Secretary to frame charge or
charges against the player who is
guilty of indiscipline or misconduct.
Such charge or charges shall be
communicated
to
the
player
concerned by the Secretary and the
offending player shall be called upon
to give in writing such explanation as
he may have to render. The
President
shall
constitute
a
Committee of three persons of whom
the President shall be one. The
explanation from offending player
shall
be
placed
before
such
Committee. If after receipt of the
explanation from the offending
player, Committee is satisfied that
no steps are necessary to be taken,
the Committee may not take any
action. If the Committee is of the
opinion
that
the
explanation
submitted by the offending player is
not satisfactory, the Committee shall
convene a meeting and shall give
reasonable notice of the date, place
and time of the meeting to the
offending player to attend in person
before the Committee with such
evidence as he may have to lead

(iii)

before it. The Committee shall at

such meeting hear the offending
player, and the evidence he may
lead or produce and thereafter take
such action as the Committee may in
its discretion deem ft. In conducting
the enquiry against the offence
player, the Committee shall follow
the rules of Natural Justice. If an
offending player refuses or neglects
to render an explanation or fails to
appear before the Committee after
due notice to him, the Committee
shall be entitled to proceed ex-parte.
At a meeting of the Committee the
offending player shall not be entitled
to be represented by a lawyer. The
decision of the Committee shall be
final and binding on the offending
player and the Board. The action, if
any, taken by the Committee as a
result of an enquiry shall not be
called into question in any court of
law. The Secretary shall at the next
Annual General Meeting of the Board
place
before
the
Board
the
proceedings of the Committee and
its decision for the purpose of being
recorded only.
(a) If any Member, or an Associate
Member or any office-bearer or any
Vice President of the Board refuses
or neglects to comply with provisions
of the rules or shall be guilty of such
conduct as the Board may consider

likely to endanger the harmony or

affect the reputation, stability or
interest of the Board such member
or office-bearer or Vice-President
shall be liable to expulsion by a
resolution taken at a General
Meeting of the Board specially
convened for the purpose, provided
that the resolution for expulsion is
carried by a majority of 3/4th of the
votes of the members present and
voting.
(b) An office-bearer or a VicePresident of the Board shall be
expelled from their office in case
3/4th of majority present and voting
at a special General Meeting
convened for the purpose consider
that such office-bearer or VicePresident
has
forfeited
the
confidence of the Board.
(c) A Member or an Associate
Member or office-bearer or VicePresident expelled under these rules
shall forfeit all rights, privileges and
benefits.
(d) A member or an Associate
Member expelled under this rule
may on application made two years
after expulsion be readmitted by the
Board provided that a General
Meeting 3/4th of the Members present
and voting, vote for readmission of
such member.
[Emphasis is ours]

Admittedly, the rule as extracted above was in

force as on 29.08.2000 however, it is said that
thereafter this rule underwent amendment
which came into force on and from 29.09.2000.
30.
A bare perusal of the rule makes it plain
that if there is any act or indiscipline or
misconduct of any player, the President is
empowered to take cognizance thereof and
shall act in the manner so specified in the rule
only. In such an event, the rule thereafter
ordains that the President shall either frame
charges against such player in that behalf or
direct the Secretary to do so which shall be
communicated to such player by the Secretary.
In such cases, the offending player is called
upon to offer his explanation answering those
charges framed against him. After the receipt of
the explanation from the offending player, the
President
shall
constitute
a
Committee
consisting of three persons including himself
being one among the three members of the
Committee and the explanation shall be placed
before such Committee for its decision. If the
Committee is satisfied therewith, no action is to
be proposed against the offending player.
However, if the Committee is not content with
the explanation, a meeting shall be convened
by the Committee and reasonable notice of
date, place and time of the meeting shall be
afforded to the offending player enabling him to
attend in person before it becoming necessary
evidence, if any, he may have desired to lead
and place before it. Thereafter, the offending

player shall be heard by the Committee which

shall also allow him to adduce or produce
further evidence before it. In doing so, the
Committee shall also observe the rule of
principles of natural justice. It is also envisaged
therein that the decision of the Committee shall
be final and binding on the offending player as
well as the Board.
31.
It is clearly contemplated that if the
adherence of the provisions of the said rule is
violated while complying with those by any
Member or an Associate Member or any office
bearer or any Vice-President of the Board, they
shall be held to be guilty of such conduct which
may be considered by the Board as is likely to
endanger its harmony or affect its reputation,
stability and interest, thereby such guilty
member is liable to expulsion by way of a
resolution to be taken at a General Meeting of
the Board by 3/4th of the votes of the members
present at the time of voting. However, despite
contemplating imposition of this stringent
punishment upon the guilty expelled member,
under clause (d) of sub-rule (iii) of Rule 38, it is
specifically provided that an expelled member,
on his application two years after such
expulsion, may be re-admitted by the Board if
3/4th of the Members present at the time of
voting, voted for the re-admission of such
member at a General Meeting.
32.
No where in the entire Rule 38 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Board the
appointment of a Commissioner to enquire into

an alleged act of indiscipline or misconduct of a

player is envisaged. On the other hand, the
Committee,
as
discussed
hereinabove,
consisting of three members alone shall enquire
into such charges by strictly following the rule
of principles of natural justice whereas the
violation of the rule in complying with the
procedure contemplated therein also entail
severe punishment, namely, their expulsion
from their office. This clearly indicates the strict
nature of obligation placed on the Committee
when it is discharging its duties in conducting
the proceedings before it.
33.
While such is the tone and tenor of the
rule, in the present case, the specific averment
of the plaintiff is that the defendant 2 was
appointed on 29.08.2000 by the Board
purportedly under Rule 38 as a Commissioner in
gross violation of its Rules and Regulations as it
does not empower it to do so. The plaintiff as
P.W.1 also deposed to the same effect. Not only
this evidence but also the evidence of D.W.1 the
Executive Secretary at the relevant point of
time deposing on behalf of the Board manifestly
discloses to the said effect. Reference in this
regard may be made to para 9 of the chiefexamination of D.W.1 which supports this
observation, it reads as follows:
9.
Independent of the same, the 1st
Defendant, being concerned with the
serious allegations made with regard to
betting, match-fixing and other related
malpractice had resolved to cause an
inquiry to be conducted and in pursuance

of the same referred the matter to the 2 nd

Defendant on 29.08.2000 for conducting
an enquiry into the various said
allegations.
[Emphasis is ours]
It is however relevant to notice the
averments of the defendant 2 raised at para
2(iii) in his written statement which reads as
under:
iii.
......... The plaintiff while
questioning the appointment of this
Defendant and the actions of this
Defendant, has challenged the provisions
of the Rule 38(ii) relating to holding of
disciplinary
proceedings
as
before
amendment of the said Rules on
29.09.2000. This Defendant conducted the
disciplinary
proceedings
only
after
29.09.2000. .........
[Emphasis is ours]
The Defendant 2, in fact, in the preface of his
report dated 24.11.2000 submitted to the
Board, on this aspect, noted thus:
As
I
have
been
appointed
as
Commissioner by the Board of Control for
Cricket in India (BCCI) vide their letter
dated August 29, 2000 to conduct follow
up enquiries in such cases, BCCI made
available to me a copy of the report on 2 nd
November, 2000.
[Emphasis is ours]
Even the averment of defendant 3 in this

regard is to the similar effect. It is also useful to

look at para 8 of his written statement in this
context which reads as follows:
8.
.........It is submitted that Rue
38 of the Rules and Regulations of BCCI,
which was amended on 29.09.2000
specifically provide for reference of any
complaint
relating
to
indiscipline,
misconduct or violation of any of the Rules
and Regulations by any player, umpire,
etc. to a Commissioner for making a
preliminary enquiry. .........
[Emphasis is ours]
Whereas admittedly the Board appointed the
defendant
2
as
the
Commissioner
on
29.08.2000 and that the rule was amended.
It is crystal clear that by the date of
appointment of defendant as the Commissioner
by the Board on 29.08.2000 the unamended
Rule was holding the field which reflected that
the Board exercised its power in making such
appointment purportedly under Rule 38 thereof.
Fortunately or unfortunately, Rule 38 as stood
as on that day did not confer power on the
Board to appoint the Commissioner. Perhaps
that was one of the reasons why the Board
thought it fit to amend the Rules and
Regulations on 29.09.2000 i.e. immediately one
month after the appointment of the defendant 2
as the Commissioner under its unamended
Rules and Regulations. It may be true that the
amended Rules and Regulations confer power
on the Board to do so. This so-called
amendment will not come to the aid of the
Board to contend that the effect of the

amendment of its Rules and Regulations would

have impact and application on the acts made
and done by it prior thereto. Such contention, in
any event, does not stand to reason and cannot
be countenanced. It is rather startling to take
note of the fact that for the utter violation
committed in appointing the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner quite contrary to its own Rule,
the Board failed to initiate action, namely,
expulsion of the violator/violators of its Rules
and Regulations from the office as specifically
contemplated under Rule 38(iii)(a) as on
29.08.2000. In the light of this inaction on the
part of the Board, its continued action against
the plaintiff does not at all inspire the
confidence of this Court in so far as its
submission of fairness, transparency and the
avowed object of conducting the enquiry is
concerned.
34.
In support of his contentions on the point,
the learned counsel for the plaintiff seeks to
place reliance upon a Judgment of the Supreme
Court in STATE OF U.P. V. NEERAJ AWASTHI
[(2006) 1 SCC 667] wherein it was inter alia held
thus:
75. The fact that all appointments
have been made without following the
procedure, or services of some persons
appointed have been regularised in the
past, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a
normal mode which must receive the seal
of the court. Past practice is not always
the best practice. If illegality has been
committed in the past, it is beyond

comprehension as to how such illegality

can be allowed to perpetuate. The State
and the Board were bound to take steps in
accordance with law. Even in this behalf
Article 14 of the Constitution will have no
application. Article 14 has a positive
concept. No equality can be claimed in
illegality is now well settled.
[Emphasis is ours]
It is clear from the above that if an illegality is
committed, the protections enumerated under
the Constitution of India will have also no
application.
35.
In STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. KGSD
CANTEEN EMPLOYEES' WELFARE ASSN. [(2006)
1 SCC 567] the Supreme Court inter alia held
thus:
44. In any view, in our democratic
polity, an authority howsoever high it may
be cannot act in breach of an existing
statute or the rules which hold the field.
[Emphasis is ours]
It is thus clear that an authority howsoever high
it may be cannot be allowed to act in complete
breach of an existing statute or the rule.
36.
Thereby, as the Board in the present
case, in absolute breach of its own Rules and
Regulations illegally and arbitrarily appointed
the defendant 2 as the Commissioner to
conduct the enquiry against the plaintiff the
consequential action flown therefrom in toto is
nullity in the eye of law and no consequential
protection is available to the board in that
behalf.

37.
Having due regard to the discussion made
hereinto when in the light of the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Rules and
Regulations of the Board that were in force as
on 29.08.2000 did not posit any appointment of
a Commissioner whereby the Board got no
power to make the appointment of the
defendant 2 as the Commissioner to conduct
the enquiry with regard to any act of indiscipline
and misconduct of the plaintiff and submit a
report to it in accordance with the Rule 38, the
appointment
of
defendant
2
as
the
Commissioner on 29.08.2000 in unabashed
violation of its Rules and Regulations is illegal,
invalid, ultra vires and nullity in the eyes of law.
The subsequent framing of the charges and
conducting of the enquiry cannot have the
power of ratifying the illegality so committed.
The Board could have issued another
appointment
order
consequent
to
the
amendment of the rule to avoid the illegality
flown from the appointment on 28.8.2000 and
the consequences of it. We accordingly answer
the Point Nos.2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendants.
POINT NO.4:
38.
It is contended by the plaintiff that
the defendant 2 while serving as the Joint
Director in the CBI availed voluntary retirement
from his service and started practicing as an
Advocate and was advising the Board in its legal
matters; by reason of which there was a
relationship of Advocate and client in between

them and therefore he was not qualified and

competent
to
be
appointed
as
the
Commissioner to conduct the enquiry against
the plaintiff on the grounds of bias, prejudice
and unfairness in arriving at the ultimate
conclusions. The learned counsel also has
stated that the Board did not even prepare any
panel
for
making
the
appointment
of
Commissioners and that no resolution had in
fact also been passed by the Board in that
context. In support of his contentions, he drew
our attention to the cross-examination made to
D.W.1 to show that the defendant was, in fact,
advising the Board as the Advocate at the
relevant point of time, which reads as under:
I did not meet Mr.Madhavan any time. D2 was advising BCCI after became an
Advocate. D-3 was the President of D-1 at
that time. I am not aware whether D-3
invited D-2 for his service. It is true that D2 was appointed as Enquiry Officer on
29.08.2000 (29th August, 2000). It is
correct that under the said appointment D2 conducted the enquiry. .........
[Emphasis is ours]
From the cross-examination of D.W.1, it is
proved that the defendant 2, being an Advocate
at the relevant point of time, was advising the
Board in its legal aspects.
39.
That apart, it is clearly urged before us
that the defendant 2 was not qualified and
competent
to
be
appointed
as
the
Commissioner inasmuch as he had no

experience and was not well acquainted with

the procedure laid and hence not adept and
unsustainable for conducting the subject
enquiries in as much as he had never been a
Judge nor had undergone any training in that
regard; and that he did not know the
rudimentaries or the basics of the sport of
cricket. On these grounds coupled with the fact
that his appointment itself is invalid being in
stark violation of the Rules and Regulations of
the Board, the consequential impugned order
dated 05.12.2000 is summarily liable to be set
aside.
40.
Apropos the contention that the
defendant 2 was not adept and unsuitable to be
appointed as the Commissioner to conduct the
subject enquiry, it is submitted that the
defendant 2 was, indeed, the Joint Director of
CBI that he had vast experience in conducting
investigations
and
in
prosecuting
and
monitoring various cases including large
number of departmental enquiries/disciplinary
proceedings; and that in view of this high-profile
and professional background, it is illegal and
unfair to term the defendant 2 to be not adept
and unsuitable for being appointed as the
Commissioner,
which
issue
was
fairly
considered and upheld by the Court below
which does not warrant any interference from
this Court. Reference is also made to para 8 of
the written statement filed by the defendant 2
which reflects that he was well acquainted with
the conducting of enquiries of this nature.

41.
It is true that in the light of the nature of
findings recorded by us hereinabove on the
Point Nos.1 to 3, it is usually not necessary for
this Court to adjudicate and decide the other
points and straight away the appeal can be
disposed of. However, we deal with the other
points formulated by us also on merits keeping
in mind the lengthy arguments put forth before
us by the learned counsel on either side which
thereby required to be decided on merits.
42.
In KUMAON MANDAL VIKAS NIGAM LTD.
Vs. GIRJA SHANKAR PANT [(2001) 1 SCC 182],
the Supreme Court explained as to what
procedure should normally be followed in a
disciplinary enquiry and held as under:
22. The sixty-five page report has
been sent to the Managing Director of the
Nigam against the petitioner recording
therein that the charges against him stand
proved what is the basis? Was the
enquiry officer justified in coming to such
a conclusion on the basis of the chargesheet only? The answer cannot possibly be
in the affirmative; if the records have been
considered, the immediate necessity
would be to consider as to who is the
person who has produced the same and
the next issue could be as regards the
nature of the records unfortunately
there is not a whisper in the rather longish
report in that regard. Where is the
presenting officer? Where is the notice
fixing the date of hearing? Where is the
list of witnesses? What has happened to

the defence witnesses? All these questions

arise but unfortunately no answer is to be
found in the rather longish report. But if
one does not have it can it be termed to
be in consonance with the concept of
justice or the same tantamounts to a total
miscarriage of justice. The High Court
answers it as miscarriage of justice and we
do lend our concurrence therewith.
[Empahsis is ours]
43.
In STATE OF UTTARANCHAL Vs. KHARAK
SINGH [(2008) 8 SCC 236], the Supreme Court
considering its earlier judgments deduced the
following principles as to the procedure to be
adopted in the departmental enquiries:
15. From the above decisions, the
following principles would emerge:
(i) The enquiries must be conducted
bona fide and care must be taken to see
that the enquiries do not become empty
formalities.
(ii) If an officer is a witness to any of
the incidents which is the subject-matter
of the enquiry or if the enquiry was
initiated on a report of an officer, then in
all fairness he should not be the enquiry
officer. If the said position becomes known
after the appointment of the enquiry
officer, during the enquiry, steps should
be taken to see that the task of holding an
enquiry is assigned to some other officer.
(iii)
In
an
enquiry,
the
employer/department should take steps
first to lead evidence against the

workman/delinquent charged and give an

opportunity to him to cross-examine the
witnesses
of
the
employer.
Only
thereafter, the workman/ delinquent be
asked whether he wants to lead any
evidence and asked to give any
explanation about the evidence led
against him.
(iv) On receipt of the enquiry report,
before proceeding further, it is incumbent
on the part of the disciplinary/punishing
authority to supply a copy of the enquiry
report and all connected materials relied
on by the enquiry officer to enable him to
offer his views, if any.
44.
As can be seen from the report dated
24.11.2000 submitted by the defendant 2 to the
Board, the above said principles laid down by
the Supreme Court had not been succinctly
followed by him while drawing up his report,
which clearly suggests that he was not well
acquainted with the fundamental principles and
procedure to be followed in conducting a
departmental enquiry. This failure on the part of
the defendant 2 as the Commissioner to
conduct the enquiry against the plaintiff strictly
as per the prescribed statutory procedure
obviously supports the argument of learned
counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant 2
was not competent and qualified to be
appointed as the Commissioner to conduct the
subject enquiry against the plaintiff. It is also
not forthcoming from the record as to what
inspired the Board to appoint the defendant 2

as the Commissioner in the light of the above

noted incompetency and lacking requisite
qualification for conducting the subject enquiry
as per the statutory norms.
45.
This apart, the defendant 2 being an
Advocate was advising the Board on its legal
aspect, should not have been appointed as the
Commissioner as such action on the part of the
Board ex facie shows that the defendant 2
would ordinarily be obliged to draw up his final
report in favour of the Board in the light of their
inter se relationship as Advocate and client.
Therefore, the Board failed, on this ground, to
keep this basic principle in mind while
appointing him as such being its legal adviser at
the relevant point of time. However, the learned
counsel for the defendants sought to defend the
appointment
of
defendant
2
as
the
Commissioner on the ground that an Advocate
could be appointed as the Commissioner to
conduct enquiries, placing reliance on a
judgment of the Supreme Court in THANJAVUR
TEXTILES LTD. Vs. B. PURUSHOTHAM [1999) 3
SCC 316] wherein it was held:
13. Once it was conceded in the
High Court by the learned Senior Counsel
who appeared for the workmen that an
advocate could be appointed as an
enquiry officer, the advocate would, in our
opinion, have all the normal powers of an
enquiry officer including the power to give
findings as to the misconduct of the
employees. We are unable to make a
distinction between the powers of an

enquiry officer who is an employee of the

Company and an outsider. If the Manager
was entitled to appoint an enquiry officer,
in either case, the appointee in his
capacity as an enquiry officer, would have
the same powers. We accordingly hold
that the advocate in this case could have
given findings as to misconduct and the
Division Bench of the High Court was
wrong in thinking that the advocate being
an outsider would not have the power to
give findings as to the misconduct of the
employees.
That was a case where the delinquent
employees clearly conceded before the High
Court their got no objection for the appointment
of the Advocate as an Enquiry Officer. In the
present case, neither a consent was given by
the plaintiff nor was sought by the Board for the
appointment of the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner to conduct the subject enquiry
against the plaintiff. In the light of this factual
scenario, that decision given on different set of
the facts cannot have any application to the
present case the facts of which are quite
distinct and different.
46.
Further, in this regard, the learned
counsel for the plaintiff has drawn the attention
of this Court to a Division Bench of the Delhi
High Court in MANJIT AHLUWALIA Vs. UNION OF
INDIA [53 (1994) DLT 571 (DB)]. Therein, His
Lordship D.P.Wadhwa, J (as His Lordship then
was) speaking for the Bench held thus:

14.
Since the appointment of
Inquiry Officer itself was void ab initio, his
holding disciplinary proceedings are of no
effect and these could not be acted upon
by the disciplinary authority in imposing
the
impugned
punishment
on
the
petitioner. It cannot be argued that the
disciplinary
authority
independently
applied its mind to the charges and it will
not validate an order which is bad at the
very start. The decision which is void ab
initio could not be validated by the
disciplinary authority.
[Emphasis is ours]
47.
In the light of the law laid down by the
Supreme Court on the point referred to
hereinabove and keeping in mind the facts and
circumstances of the case, we are of the
considered opinion that the Board should not
have appointed the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner, he being its legal adviser at the
relevant point of time, and not adept and
unsuitable for being appointed as he was not
well acquainted with the conducting of
disciplinary enquiries which is reflected from a
bare perusal of his report dated 24.11.2000;
and also unsuitable on the ground that there
was every likelihood and possibility of deciding
the matter with bias, prejudice and unfairness
against the plaintiff. We accordingly answer the
Point No.4 in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants.
POINT Nos. 5 AND 6:

48.
It is also urged that the principles of
natural justice had been utterly violated while
conducting the enquiry proceedings and
therefore on this premise also, the proceedings
arisen from such an illegal enquiry cannot be
relied upon and are liable to be brushed aside. It
is also argued that the plaintiff was not afforded
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
whose statements were said to have been
recorded by the CBI during its preliminary
enquiry but were, in fact, relied upon by the
defendant 2 while drawing up his report dated
24.11.2000 and therefore placing reliance on
such evidence is clearly hit by the relevant
provisions of Evidence Act, 1872.
49.
Against the allegations of match fixing, it
is submitted that those allegations were not
proved against the plaintiff in the preliminary
enquiry conducted by the CBI which is reflected
in its report dated 31.10.2000 forwarded to the
Board. That apart, the enquiry conducted by the
defendant 2 did not disclose any further
information than what the CBI did gather
evidence on the point for the simple reason that
the defendant 2 had not made any independent
enquiry in that regard but merely recorded the
statements of the plaintiff, perused the
preliminary enquiry of the CBI erroneously
placed reliance on such report and finally
submitted his report to the Board which report
has no legal basis and is nullity in the eyes of
law. It is also stated that the Board, without
looking into these basic aspects, was roller blind

in accepting and placing complete reliance on

the report dated 24.10.2000 in a very casual
and mechanical manner and came to the
conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of match
fixing without any material evidence before it
and without following the principles of natural
justice and not even affording an opportunity of
cross-examining
the
witnesses
whose
statements are said to have been recorded by
the CBI and which were simply relied upon by
defendant 2. Stating so, the learned counsel
posed a question to himself that when the CBI
failed to gather any concrete evidence during
its marathon preliminary enquiry and in fact
said so in its report to the effect that there was
no evidence against the plaintiff with regard to
match fixing, it is incomprehensible and
inexplicable as to how the Committee/the Board
came to a conclusion that the plaintiff is found
guilty of the allegation of match fixing in the
light of the fact that defendant 2 did not
conduct any independent enquiry, examine and
record
any
evidence
from
any
other
independent witnesses, save and except the
mere statement of the plaintiff alone, which is
only the record available before the Committee
for arriving at an erroneous conclusions, which
are liable to be set aside being recorded based
on no evidence at all. The learned counsel thus
submitted that in the absence of any
independent enquiry by defendant 2 with regard
to the allegation of match fixing against the
plaintiff, his client cannot be held to be guilty of
such an allegation without any concrete
evidence brought on record.

50.
In so far as the violation of principles of
natural justice is concerned, it is seriously
contended that the plaintiff having participated
in the entire enquiry proceedings conducted by
the defendant 2 did not raise any objection
whatsoever and thus at this stage violation of
any principles of natural justice or any statutory
procedure during the enquiry conducted against
him cannot be raised.
51.
It is also put forth before this Court on
behalf of the defendants that the CBI in its
report dated 31.10.2000 came to the conclusion
against the plaintiff that he had contacts with
bookies and big time punters and had fixed
matches/performances and therefore was found
guilty of the charges levelled against him; and
that the defendant 2 upon conducting a fullfledged enquiry against the plaintiff and placing
reliance on the report of the CBI, submitted his
report to the Board indicting the plaintiff basing
on which the impugned order dated 05.12.2000
came to be issued. It was thus contended that
the allegations of match fixing against the
plaintiff have been proved beyond doubt in the
enquiry took up by defendant 2.
52.
It is pertinent to have a glance at the
report dated 24.11.2000 submitted by the
defendant 2 to the Board with regard to the socalled enquiry conducted against the plaintiff. In
a prelude to the report, the defendant 2 stated
thus:
It is necessary to explain the

difference between a Preliminary Enquiry

(PE) and a Regular Case (RC) Registered
by CBI. A case becomes an RC when an
FIR is registered by the CBI under Section
154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. In such a case, CBI would conduct a
statutory investigation under Chapter XII
of the Code of the Criminal Procedure,
1973. In such an investigation CBI has
powers of conducting searches and
arrests. An RC, namely an FIR, would be
registered by the CBI only if the complaint
received by the CBI discloses the
suspected commission of cognizable
offence by anyone. As against this, if the
complaint is received by the CBI does not
prima
facie
disclose
the
possible
commission of any cognizable offence, CBI
would register only a PE in which enquiries
are conducted on the basis of the general
police powers vested in the CBI. Such
enquiries are not conducted under the
provisions of the CrPC 1973. In a PE, CBI
has no power of arrest and generally has
no power of search also.
On completion of the enquiry CBI
submitted its report of 162 pages to
Government of India on 31st October, 2000
which was released to the media and the
public by the Government of India on 1 st
November, 2000.
[Emphasis is ours]
53.

From a perusal of the above excerpted

paragraph, it is clear that the CBI conducted

only the PE in the matter. That clearly
demonstrates that there was no complaint
given before the CBI disclosing the commission
of a cognizable offence in the matter. The PE
was conducted not under the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C). By
virtue of Section 154 Cr.PC the Police can
register a cognizable offence on receiving a
complaint which puts the criminal law into
motion followed by conducting necessary
investigation as contemplated by the latter
provisions (in the Cr.PC). In any case by virtue
of Section 161 Cr.PC coupled with Section 162
Cr.PC any statement made to a Police Officer,
during the course of investigation of a
cognizable offence, is not admissible except for
the purpose of disproving the veracity of the
maker of it subject to his examination before a
criminal court of law as contemplated therein.
Those statements, which can be taken
cognizance of, cannot form part of substantive
evidence to prove any criminal charge as the
case may be. That apart it is not shown as to
under what authority the Board could refer the
matter to the CBI for conducting preliminary
enquiry or investigation and file report. It is an
Agency to conduct necessary investigation into
any criminal charge as directed either by the
Central Government or a State Government as
the case may be. By virtue of Section 156(3)
Cr.PC, the CBI Court who got jurisdiction can
refer a complaint filed before it to the CBI for
conducting necessary investigation and report
with regards to a criminal charge subject to its

competency to take cognizance of it. Thereby it

appears that the reference of the matter to the
CBI for conducting necessary preliminary
enquiry or investigation in the matter is without
any authority. Even otherwise the preliminary
enquiry report of the CBI cannot be a basis to
take action against the plaintiff as the
nomenclature of it (preliminary enquiry) itself
indicates that it is subject to the final enquiry to
be conducted on showing sufficient material to
do so. Therefore the report of the CBI could not
be a basis for the defendant 2 to give his report
to the Board against the plaintiff. Utmost he
could have taken into consideration the CBI
record as aid to go on with the final enquiry
proceedings before him. He ought to have
examined the witnesses concerned and
recorded their statements giving opportunity to
the plaintiff to cross examine him subject to his
authority to do so. If on that basis he came to
the conclusion that the charges leveled against
the plaintiff were proved he could have sent his
report to the Board against the plaintiff
accordingly. These basic and fundamental
procedures were not followed by the defendant
2 while placing reliance on the statements
recorded by CBI. This failure on the part of
defendant 2 is fatal to the case of the
defendants. Therefore the consequential report
dated 24.11.2000 is a nullity in the eyes of law
and cannot be countenanced and acted upon.
54.
In CHAMPAKLAL CHIMANLAL SHAH Vs.
UNION OF INDIA [(1964) 5 SCR 190] the
Supreme Court categorically explained the

distinction between preliminary enquiry and

regular departmental enquiry and held as
under:
13.
Generally
therefore
a
preliminary enquiry is usually held to
determine whether a prima facie case for
a formal departmental enquiry is made
out, and it is very necessary that the two
should not be confused. Even where
government does not intend to take action
by way of punishment against a
temporary servant on a report of bad work
or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is
usually held to satisfy government that
there is reason to dispense with the
services of a temporary employee or to
revert him to his substantive post, for as
we have said already government does
not usually take action of this kind without
any reason. Therefore when a preliminary
enquiry of this nature is held in the case of
a temporary employee or a government
servant holding a higher rank temporarily
it must not be confused with the regular
departmental enquiry (which usually
follows such a preliminary enquiry) when
the government decides to frame charges
and get a departmental enquiry made in
order that one of the three major
punishments already indicated may be
inflicted on the government servant.
Therefore, so far as the preliminary
enquiry is concerned there is no question
of its being governed by Article 311(2) for
that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of

government to decide whether punitive

action should be taken or action should be
taken under the contract or the rules in
the case of a temporary government
servant or a servant holding higher rank
temporarily to which he has no right. In
short a preliminary enquiry is for the
purpose of collection of facts in regard to
the conduct and work of a government
servant in which he may or may not be
associated so that the authority concerned
may decide whether or not to subject the
servant
concerned
to
the
enquiry
necessary under Article 311 for inflicting
one of the three major punishments
mentioned therein. Such a preliminary
enquiry may even be held ex parte, for it
is
merely
for
the
satisfaction
of
government, though usually for the sake
of fairness, explanation is taken from the
servant concerned even as such an
enquiry. But at that stage he has no right
to be heard for the enquiry is merely for
the satisfaction of the government and it
is only when the government decides to
hold a regular departmental enquiry for
the purpose of inflicting one of the three
major punishments that the government
servant gets the protection of Article 311
and all the rights that that protection
implies as already indicated above. There
must therefore be no confusion between
the two enquiries and it is only when the
government
proceeds
to
hold
a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of

inflicting on the government servant one

of the three major punishments indicated
in Article 311 that the government servant
is entitled to the protection of that Article.

55.
As long back as in the year 1964 itself the
Supreme Court had occasion to distinguish
between preliminary enquiry and regular
departmental enquiry and stated the stark
differences in between the two enquiries. A
careful reading of the judgment makes it
abundantly obvious that generally a preliminary
enquiry is initiated only for the purpose of
collection of facts in respect of a particular
aspect/issue and such preliminary enquiry may
even be held ex parte as no punishment is
inflicted on the ultimate result of such enquiry.
On the other hand, a regular departmental
enquiry is usually proposed to be held with a
view to impose punishment upon the delinquent
persons if the allegations levelled against them
are proved ultimately in such an enquiry.
Therefore, in conducting regular departmental
enquiry, the constitutional protections shall be
afforded to the delinquent persons.
56.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff seeks
to place reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme
Court in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs.
CHINTAMAN SADASHIVA WAISHAMPAYAN [AIR
1961 SC 1623] wherein the Constitution Bench
dealing with the principles of natural justice
held as under:
10.
The only general

statement that can be safely made in this

connection is that the departmental
enquiries should observe rules of natural
justice, and that if they are fairly and
properly conducted the decisions reached
by the enquiry officers on the merits are
not open to be challenged on the ground
that the procedure followed was not
exactly in accordance with that which is
observed in courts of law. As Venkatarama
Aiyar, J. has observed in Union of India v.
T.R.Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882] stating it
broadly and without intending it to be
exhaustive it may be observed that rules
of natural justice require that a party
should have the opportunity of adducing
all relevant evidence on which he relies,
that the evidence of the opponent should
be taken in his presence, and that he
should be given the opportunity of crossexamining the witnesses examined by that
party, and that no materials should be
relied on against him without his being
given an opportunity of explaining them.
It is hardly necessary to emphasise that
the right to cross-examine the witnesses
who give evidence against him is a very
valuable right, and if it appears that
effective exercise of this right has been
prevented by the enquiry officer by not
giving to the officer relevant documents to
which he is entitled, that inevitably would
be that the enquiry had not been held in
accordance with rules of natural justice.
That is the view taken by the High Court,

and in the present appeal which has been

brought to this Court under Article 136 we
see no justification for interfering with it.
In this connection it would be relevant to
refer to the decision of this Court in Khem
Chand v. Union of India [AIR 1958 SC 300]
where this Court has emphasised the
importance of giving an opportunity to the
public officer defend himself by crossexamining the witnesses produced against
him.
[Emphasis is ours]
That apart way back in the year 1961, the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had
occasion to concisely lay down the manner and
method as to how the rule of principles of
natural justice be followed while conducting
departmental enquiry. It is clearly stated that
the observance of rules of natural justice is
necessary while conducting departmental
enquiries and if such enquiries are fairly and
properly conducted, the decisions thereon
cannot be subjected to challenge on the
premise that exact procedure, as is observed in
Courts of law, is not adhered to. Further, the
delinquent shall be given an opportunity of
cross-examining the witnesses and no material
should be taken into consideration against him
without affording him an opportunity of
explaining the same.
57.
The learned counsel also has drawn the
attention of this Court on that aspect to a
Judgment of this Court in MEENGLAS TEA

ESTATE Vs. WORKMEN [1963 SC 1719]. Therein,

the Supreme Court emphasized the purport of
the principles of natural justice and pithily held
thus:
4. The Tribunal held that the
enquiry was vitiated because it was not
held accordance with the principles of
natural justice. It is contended that this
conclusion was erroneous. But we have no
doubt about its correctness. The enquiry
consisted of putting questions to each
workman in turn. No witness was
examined in support of the charge before
the workman was questioned. It is an
elementary principle that a person who is
required to answer a charge must know
not only the accusation but also the
testimony by which the accusation is
supported. He must be given a fair chance
to hear the evidence in support of the
charge and to put such relevant questions
by way of cross-examination as he desires.
Then he must be given a chance to rebut
the evidence led against him. This is the
barest requirement of an enquiry of this
character and this requirement must be
substantially fulfilled before the result of
the enquiry can be accepted. A departure
from this requirement in effect throws the
burden upon the person charged to repel
the charge without first making it out
against him. In the present case neither
was any witness examined nor was any
statement made by any witness tendered
in evidence. The enquiry, such as it was,

made by Mr.Marshall or Mr.Nichols who

were not only in the position of judges but
also of prosecutors and witnesses. There
was no opportunity to the persons charged
to cross-examine them and indeed they
drew upon their own knowledge of the
incident and instead cross-examined the
persons charged.
[Emphasis is ours]
58.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff also
invited our attention to a Judgment of the
Supreme Court in THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,
U.P.WAREHOUSING CORPN. Vs. VIJAY NARAYAN
VAJPAYEE [1980 SC 840] wherein the Supreme
Court held as under:
14.
The rules of natural
justice in the circumstances of the case,
required that the respondent should be
given a reasonable opportunity to deny his
guilt, to defend himself and to establish
his innocence which means and includes
an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses relied upon by the appellant
Corporation and an opportunity to lead
evidence in defence of the charge as also
a show-cause notice for the proposed
punishment. Such an opportunity was
denied to the respondent in the instant
case. Admittedly, the respondent was not
allowed to lead evidence in defence.
Further, he was not allowed to crossexamine
certain
persons
whose
statements were not recorded by the
Enquiry Officer (opposite party 1) in the

presence of the respondent. There was

controversy on this point. But it was clear
to the High Court from the report of
enquiry by the opposite party 1 that he
relied upon the reports of some persons
and the statements of some other persons
who were not examined by him. A regular
departmental enquiry takes place only
after the charge-sheet is drawn up and
served upon the delinquent and the
latters explanation is obtained. In the
present case, no such enquiry was held
and the order of dismissal was passed
summarily after perusing the respondents
explanation. The rules of natural justice in
this case, were honoured in total breach.
The impugned order of dismissal was thus
bad in law and had been rightly set aside
by the High Court.
[Emphasis is ours]
Some more decisions of the Supreme Court as
well as the High Courts in the country were also
brought to our notice on this aspect holding to
the same effect and therefore they need not be
referred to here as there can be no dispute as to
the law laid down by the Supreme Court. We
therefore feel that it is not necessary to dilate
further on this issue.
59.
The learned counsel for the defendants,
on the other hand has drawn the attention of
this Court to a Judgment of the Supreme Court
in DEBOTOSH PAL CHOUDHURY Vs. PUNJAB
NATIONAL BANK [supra] and reiterated his
arguments that the need for compliance of the

principles of natural justice would depend upon

the facts and circumstances of each case.
Therein, the Supreme Court held thus:
7. So far as Regulation 6(18) of the
Regulations is concerned, it provides that
the inquiring authority may, after
the completion of the production of
evidence,
hear
the
presenting
officer, if any appointed, and the
officer/employee, or permit them to
file written briefs of their respective
cases within 15 days of the date of
completion of the production of
evidence, if they so desire.
(emphasis supplied)
On 22-9-1988 the petitioner while
concluding his defence, stated that he did
not intend to say anything further
provided no written brief was filed by the
presenting officer, which if done, should
be brought to his notice to enable him to
submit
the
counter-statement,
if
necessary. The enquiry officer then gave
two days time to the presenting officer as
well as to the petitioner to file written
briefs, if any. No written brief was filed by
the presenting officer and hence the
question of filing a written brief by the
petitioner did not arise at all and thus
there is no violation of Regulation 6(18).
However, the records disclose that a
written brief was, in fact, filed by the
petitioner within the time given by the
enquiry officer. Having participated fully in
the enquiry and on the sitting held on 22-

9-1988 having confirmed that he did not

intend to say anything further, it would not
be appropriate for the petitioner to
contend that he had not been given any
reasonable opportunity to put forth his
case.
60.
There is no quarrel as to the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in the decisions
relied on by the learned counsel on either side.
We also agree with the submission of the
learned counsel for the defendants that the
application of the principles of natural justice
would vary from case to case and depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
However, we are in a hurry to sound a caveat
that under any circumstances, the principles of
natural justice cannot be violated so as to meet
the ends of justice although strict rules of
evidence and procedure would not apply to
departmental proceedings unlike in criminal
trials.
61.
As can be seen from the records, it is
apparent that the plaintiff was not allowed to
lead evidence in defence and was also not
allowed to cross-examine witnesses whose
statements were recorded by the CBI but were
simply relied on by the defendant 2 as the
Commissioner while drawing up his report dated
24.10.2000. Ex facie, there is a dispute on the
allegations made against the plaintiff. It is
therefore forthcoming from the record that the
report of enquiry submitted by the defendant 2
was merely based on the statements of some
other persons who were not examined by him.

Usually, a regular departmental enquiry takes

place only after charge-sheet is drawn up and
served upon the delinquent and the latters
explanation is called for. In contrast, in the
present case, no enquiry of such kind and
nature was held and the enquiry report was
submitted thereon simply recording the
statements of the plaintiff and placing reliance
upon the statements recorded by the CBI in its
preliminary enquiry. Basing on such enquiry
report dated 24.11.2000 of the defendant 2, the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 was passed
summarily without duly following the rule of
principles of natural justice. This aspect was not
considered by the Court below in the proper
perspective and erroneously recorded the
findings in favour of the defendants.
62.
In view of the elaborate discussion made
hereinabove and keeping in mind the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in a series of
decisions on the point including the Constitution
Bench Judgment in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Vs. CHINTAMAN SADASHIVA WAISHAMPAYAN
[supra], we are therefore of the firm view that
no independent enquiry was made by the
defendant 2 to find out as to whether the
plaintiff was really guilty of the charges of
match fixing and that no opportunity of crossexamining the witnesses whose statements
were relied upon by him was afforded to him
and thereby the rule of principles of natural
justice was violated throughout the enquiry
proceedings conducted by defendant 2 as a
Commissioner while conducting the subject
enquiry. We accordingly answer the Point Nos.5

and 6 in favour of the plaintiff and against the

defendants.
POINT NO.7:
63.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff
pointed out that the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 is also in utter violation of Rule 38 of
the Rules and Regulations in as much as it was
passed by a Committee of two Members but not
by a Committee of three Members as
specifically envisaged therein. The learned
counsel for the plaintiff further drew the
attention of this Court to the letter dated
04.12.2000 addressed by the third Member,
namely, Sri Kamal Morarka, to the President of
the Board, who is one of the Members of the socalled Committee, whereby he sought some
more time to go through the report of the CBI as
well as the report of defendant 2. The learned
counsel for the plaintiff therefore has contended
that notwithstanding the said letter, the other
two Members went ahead in conducting the
Meeting on 05.12.2000 and passed the
impugned order on that day itself in the
absence of the third Member for the reasons
best known to it which are not ex facie apparent
in the impugned order and therefore the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 is illegal,
invalid and ultra vires and cannot be
countenanced.
64.
The learned counsel for the defendants
on the other hand has contended that a
meeting was convened on 28.11.2000 by all the
three Members and the meeting held on
05.12.2000 was convened within the frame

work of the Rules and Regulations of the Board

and it was totally immaterial whether the third
Member of the Committee was present during
the course of hearing or not. The learned
counsel for the defendants therefore justified
the action of the Committee in passing the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000.
65.
It is pertinent to notice a portion of Rule
38 of the Rules and Regulations which deals
with the quorum of the Committee to deal with
the so-called subject enquiry, it reads as under:
38. MISCONDUCT AND PROCEDURE TO
DEAL WITH:

(ii) The President shall constitute a

Committee of three persons of whom
the President shall be one. The
explanation from offending player
shall
be
placed
before
such
Committee. If after receipt of the
explanation from the offending
player, Committee is satisfied that
no steps are necessary to be taken,
the Committee may not take any
action. If the Committee is of the
opinion
that
the
explanation
submitted by the offending player is
not satisfactory, the Committee shall
convene a meeting and shall give
reasonable notice of the date, place
and time of the meeting to the
offending player to attend in person
before the Committee with such
evidence as he may have to lead

before it. The Committee shall at

such meeting hear the offending
player, and the evidence he may
lead or produce and thereafter take
such action as the Committee may in
its discretion deem ft. In conducting
the enquiry against the offending
player, the Committee shall follow
the rules of Natural Justice.
[Emphasis is ours]
A careful reading of this part of the Rule
manifestly reflects that throughout the phrase
the Committee is used.
Obviously the
Committee consisted of three Members
including the President of the Board. That being
the purport of its own Rules and Regulations,
the Committee could not be permitted to
convene a meeting in the absence of any of its
Members. If for any reason, such a meeting was
convened in contravention of the Rule, the
result of such meeting being not in consonance
with that Rule should not be permitted to be
acted upon being illegal and a nullity in the eyes
of law. The Court below failed to consider the
controversy on this point in the right
perspective. It is therefore clear that the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 given based
on the illegal report dated 24.11.2000 of the
defendant 2 having been passed by the
Committee consisting only two Members is
illegal, invalid, arbitrary and nullity in the eyes
of law.
66.

The learned counsel for the plaintiff has

further placed reliance on a Judgment of the

Supreme Court in MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY Vs.
SESHRAO BALWANT RAO CHAVAN [(1989) 3 SCC
132] in support of the said contention. Therein,
the Supreme Court held:
20. Counsel for the appellant
argued that the express power of the ViceChancellor to regulate the work and
conduct of officers of the University
implies as well, the power to take
disciplinary action against officers. We are
unable to agree with this contention.
Firstly, the power to regulate the work and
conduct of officers cannot include the
power to take disciplinary action for their
removal. Secondly, the Act confers power
to appoint officers on the Executive
Council and it generally includes the
power to remove. This power is located
under Section 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is,
therefore, futile to contend that the ViceChancellor can exercise that power which
is conferred on the Executive Council. It is
a settled principle that when the Act
prescribes a particular body to exercise a
power, it must be exercised only by that
body. It cannot be exercised by others
unless it is delegated. The law must also
provide for such delegation. Halsburys
Laws of England (Vol. I, 4th end., para 32)
summarises these principles as follows :
32. Sub-delegation of powers. In
accordance with the maxim delegatus non
potest delegare, a statutory power must
be exercised only by the body or officer in

whom it has been confided, unless subdelegation of the power is authorised by

express words or necessary implication.
There is a strong presumption against
construing a grant of legislative, judicial or
disciplinary power as impliedly authorising
sub-delegation; and the same may be said
of any power to the exercise of which the
designated body should address its own
mind.
[Emphasis is ours]
From this Judgment, it is palpable that
while making a reference to Halsburys Laws of
England the Supreme Court succinctly held that
when the Act prescribed a particular body to
exercise a power, it must be exercised only by
that body and that it could not be exercised by
others unless it was delegated.
67.
In the present case, where as the Rule 38
clearly postulates that the Committee shall
consist of three Members and that Committee
shall conduct the enquiry and convene the
meetings therefore, no material is placed before
us to show that there was a delegation of the
power of the Committee to the two Members
out of the three Members to do so. In the
absence of it, the action of the Committee
consisting of two Members in passing the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 is against the
Rules and Regulations of the Board and
therefore cannot be countenanced more
particularly in the light of the request made by
the third Member to provide him some more
time to go through the CBI report as well as the
report submitted by defendant 2. In this regard,

it is useful to go through the letter dated

04.12.2000 addressed by the third Member,
namely, Sri Kamal Morarka to the President of
the Board, which reads as follows:
I am in receipt of your notice dated today
for the meeting of the Disciplinary
committee tomorrow at Chennai.
I am unable to reach Chennai tomorrow as
I have to travel to Delhi and Rajasthan.
Kindly fix a fresh date for the meeting
convenient to all the three members.
You will kindly appreciate that a decision
taken by two members of the Board would
not inspire confidence and should be
avoided.
I know there is tremendous media
pressure on you. However, we must also
keep in view that the Government ordered
the CBI enquiry in April 2000 CBI took six
months to make out the report quite
different from the expectations inasmuch
as they themselves have said there is no
evidence of match fixing. The report was
given to Mr.K.Madhavan for analysis which
he has submitted only around 24th to 26th
November 2000. As a member of the
committee, I got Mr.Madhavans report
only on 27th November 2000.
Since the CBI report runs into 162 pages,
Mr.Madhavans report with enclosures runs
into approx. 250 pages, I do not
understand how a three man committee is
supposed to expeditiously act on such a
voluminous document unless of course we
have a pre-determined mind and want to

act in haste.
I do not think an institution should act in
haste. Nothing will be lost if the matter is
given some more consideration especially
in view of the fact that the concerned
players are already under suspension.
[Emphasis is ours]
A reading of the letter reflects that the
third Member sought a fresh date for convening
the meeting; that, in fact, the CBI took six
months to conclude its preliminary enquiry and
came to a conclusion that there was no
evidence of match fixing. The third Member
expressed his opinion in the letter as to how a
three man committee was supposed to
expeditiously act on such a voluminous
document unless of course there was a predetermined mind on the enquiry and to act in
haste in that direction. He concluded his letter
by stating that nothing would be lost if the
matter was given some more consideration as
the players were already under suspension.
68.
In spite of this specific request from the
third Member to defer the meeting and fix a
fresh date therefor in order to enable him to
give some more time to go through the
voluminous reports of the CBI as well as the
defendant 2, the other two Members went
ahead with the meeting and passed the
impugned order in a mechanical and casual
manner not only in the absence of the third
Member but also ignoring his specific request
for deferring the meeting and fixing a fresh date

therefore in that behalf. No reasons are

forthcoming from the record as to how the
Committee consisting of two Members convene
the meeting in the absence of the third Member
despite his request to defer the same. This
stubborn attitude on the part of the two
members of the Committee suggests us to draw
an inference against the defendants and in
favour of the plaintiff. These aspects were not
gone into by the Court below thoroughly due to
which erroneous findings were recorded by it. If
these facts and circumstances of the case are
tested on the anvil and touchstone of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in
MARATHWADA
UNIVERSITY
Vs.
SESHRAO
BALWANT RAO CHAVAN, the sequitur is that the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 passed by an
incompetent Committee in rigorous violation of
the Rules and Regulations of the Board cannot
be countenanced being illegal, invalid and
arbitrary.
69.
Having due regard to the discussion made
supra and bearing in mind the law laid down by
the Supreme Court on this point, we are of the
considered view that the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 is illegal, invalid and arbitrary and
therefore no adverse consequences would flow
therefrom against the plaintiff. We accordingly
answer Point No.7 in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendants.
POINT NO.8:
70.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has
argued that as the appointment of defendant 2

is illegal, invalid and ultra vires of the Rules and

Regulations of the Board, the entire enquiry
proceedings conducted by the defendant 2 and
the report dated 24.11.2000 arisen thereform
are vitiated by illegality and the same are nullity
in the eyes of law which cannot be acted upon
in any manner and the same are liable to be set
aside. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also
has contended that the impugned order dated
05.12.2000, having been passed merely placing
reliance on the illegal enquiry report dated
24.11.2000, is also in utter violation of the Rule
38 in as much as it was passed by the
Committee consisting of two persons but not by
a Committee of three persons as specifically
envisaged therein. The learned counsel for the
plaintiff thus asserted that the enquiry report
dated 24.11.2000 of defendant 2 and the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 passed by
the incompetent Committee consisting of two
Members are illegal, arbitrary, invalid and nullity
in the eyes of law and the cannot be acted upon
and thereby no adverse consequence would
flow therefrom against the plaintiff. The learned
counsel has also attacked the impugned order
dated 05.12.2000 imposing the punishment as
detailed therein on the ground that there was
no valid and legal basis for doing so in the light
of the other submissions and that the same is
liable to be set aside on this score also.
71.
The learned counsel for the defendants
has pointed out that after the receipt of the
report dated 24.11.2000, the Committee
consisting of three Members, in fact, convened

a meeting on 28.11.2000 and afforded a full and

complete opportunity to the plaintiff to put forth
his case before it and thereafter only, the
Committee consisting of two Members passed
the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 which
again is in accordance with the amended Rules
and Regulations of the Board and therefore no
violation of any prescribed procedure can be
complained of; and that both the report dated
24.11.2000 and the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 are legal and valid, which aspect
was considered and upheld by the Court below
and therefore the same finding does not warrant
interference from this Court in this appeal.
72.
At the cost of repetition, we may state
here that we have already recorded findings
supra on Point Nos.2 to 7 in favour of the
plaintiff inter alia holding that the Board got no
power to appoint defendant 2 as the
Commissioner to conduct the subject enquiry
against the plaintiff under its unamended Rules
and Regulations which were in force on
29.08.2000; that the appointment of defendant
as the Commissioner is illegal, invalid and ultra
vires of the Rules and Regulations of the Board;
that the defendant 2 as the Commissioner was
not adept and unsuitable to conduct the subject
enquiry on the ground that he was an Advocate
who was advising the Board at the relevant
point of time that he lacked experience in
conducting the kind and nature of subject
enquiry; that the defendant 2 violated the
principles of natural justice during the course of
enquiry; that the defendant had not conducted

any independent enquiry to prove the allegation

of match fixing against the plaintiff; and that
the impugned order dated 05.12.2000 is illegal,
invalid and arbitrary having been passed by an
incompetent Committee consisting of two
Members instead of three Members.
73.
In the light of these findings recorded by
us hereinabove which are in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, the effect
of the enquiry report dated 24.11.2000
submitted by the defendant 2 and the
impugned order dated 05.12.2000 passed by
the Committee consisting of two Members can,
under the above circumstances, be said to be
that they have no legal force in the eyes of law
being nullity, illegal and invalid.
74.
In this context, reference may be made to
a Judgment of the Supreme Court in KIRAN
SINGH Vs. CHAMAN PASWAN [AIR 1954 SC 340].
Therein, the Supreme Court illuminatingly
explained the effect of the proceedings which
are nullity in the eyes of law, it reads as follows:
6.
It is a fundamental
principle well established that a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction is a
nullity, and that its invalidity could be set
up whenever and wherever it is sought to
be enforced or relied upon, even at the
stage of execution and even in collateral
proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction,
whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or
whether it is in respect of the subjectmatter of the action, strikes at the very

authority of the court to pass any decree,

and such a defect cannot be cured even
by consent of parties. If the question now
under consideration fell to be determined
only on the application of general
principles governing the matter, there can
be no doubt that the District Court of
Monghyr was coram non judice, and that
its judgment and decree would be
nullities. The question is what is the effect
of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on
this position.
[Emphasis is ours]
A perusal of this Judgment inter alia
clearly demonstrates that the proceedings
which are nullity in the eyes of law cannot be
cured even by the consent of parties. In the
present case, the report dated 24.11.2000 of
the defendant 2 and the impugned order dated
05.12.2000 being nullity in the eyes of law
cannot be cured. Therefore no punishment can
be inflicted upon the plaintiff on the basis of
such nullity proceedings.
75.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has
also drawn our attention to the judgment
rendered by one of us (AM,J) in THE
HOSHIARPUR CENTRAL Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER,
LABOUR COURT [(2004) 138 PLR 878]. Therein,
it was held thus:
8.
He had made entry into the
service of the petitioner through back door
method. It has been held by a Division
Bench of this Court in Brij Bhushans case

[(1998-2) 119 PLR 838] that the prayer for

reinstatement by a back door appointee
may be refused even though the
termination of the service of such an
employee may have been brought about
without compliance of the provisions
contained in Section 25-F or 25-G of the
Act. In view of the dictum of the Divison
Bench, I feel no hesitation in holding that
the respondent-workman has no right to
reinstatement
into
service
of
the
petitioner.
[Emphasis is ours]
Taking a cue from the said judgment, the
learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended
that as the initial appointment of defendant 2 as
the Commissioner itself was not in accordance
with the Rules and Regulations of the Board, his
subsequent actions are tainted with illegality
and are null and void in the eyes of law.
76.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has
also placed reliance on a Judgment of the
Supreme Court PRAMOD KUMAR Vs. U.P.
SECONDARY
EDUCATION
SERVICES
COMMISSION [(2008) 7 SCC 153] to assert that
an illegality cannot be regularized when the
statute or rules clearly expresses so. Therein,
the Supreme Court held thus:
18. If the essential educational
qualification for recruitment to a post is
not satisfied, ordinarily the same cannot
be condoned. Such an act cannot be
ratified. An appointment which is contrary
to the statute/statutory rules would be

void in law. An illegality cannot be

regularised, particularly, when the statute
in no unmistakable term says so. Only an
irregularity can be. [See Secy., State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC
1], National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh
[(2006) 5 SCC 493] and Post Master
General, Kolkata v. Tutu Das (Dutta)(2007)
5 SCC 317.]
[Emphasis is ours]
It is therefore clear from this that the well
established principle of law is that an
appointment made contrary to the statutory
provisions or the rules and regulations would be
void in law and that such an illegality cannot be
regularised, more particularly, when such
statute speaks of so in no unmistakable term.
77.
Coming to the present case, it is now
established from the evidence on record that
the appointment of defendant 2 as the
Commissioner was contrary to the Rules and
Regulations of the Board and is therefore
without jurisdiction, illegal, invalid and ultra
vires, and that the report dated 24.11.2000
submitted by him is equally illegal and invalid
and thus, the impugned order dated 05.12.2000
passed by a Committee consisting of two
Members instead of a Committee consisting of
three Members, basing on such illegal report is
similarly illegal, invalid and null and void in the
eyes of law.
78.
In view of the foregoing discussion and
placing reliance on the case law referred to
hereinabove on this point, we are of the
considered view that both the enquiry report

dated 24.11.2000 of defendant 2 and the

impugned order dated 05.12.2000 of the
Committee consisting of two Members are,
illegal, invalid and null and void in the eyes of
law and cannot, under any stretch of
imagination, be countenanced and acted upon.
We answer Point No.8 accordingly in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendants.
POINT NO.9:
79.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has
submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to seek
the reliefs as specifically prayed for in the suit in
the light of the submissions made hereinabove
on the other contentious points and therefore
prayed that the appeal is liable to be allowed by
duly setting aside the impugned judgement and
decree dated 27.08.2003 passed by the Court
below.
80.
On the contrary, the learned counsel for
the defendants has volubly contended that as
the suit itself is not maintainable, the plaintiff is
not legally entitled to seek any relief from this
Court as the Court below considered all the
aspects of the matter minutely and ultimately
dismissed the suit. The learned counsel for the
defendants has therefore urged this Court to
dismiss the appeal affirming the Judgment and
decree passed by the Court below.
81.
In the light of the above prayers sought
for by the plaintiff and in view of the
contentions of the respective parties, we have
given our anxious consideration to the lengthy

arguments put forth before us by the learned

counsel on either. We have also meticulously
looked at the report dated 24.11.2000 of the
defendant 2 submitted to the Board and the
order dated 05.12.2000 passed by the
Committee consisting of two Members of the
Board. We have also carefully gone through the
voluminous material placed on record including
the impugned Judgment and decree passed by
the Court below. We have also dealt with the
various points that have arisen for our
consideration and decision and, indeed,
recorded our findings on each of such points
after having examined the matter elaborately
vis--vis the evidence brought on record
coupled with more particularly the law laid down
by the Supreme Court on the points. It is
therefore obvious that the Court below
committed a grave error in evaluating and
appreciating the evidence and material brought
on record and in recording its findings on the
Issues framed by it and thus erroneously
dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. In the
light of this factual and legal scenario obtaining
in the matter, as discussed supra, we have no
hesitation in our mind to record a finding that
the plaintiff is entitled to all the reliefs as
prayed for in the suit and therefore, the suit as
framed and instituted before the Court below is
liable to be allowed. We accordingly answer
Point No.9 in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants.
POINT NO.10:

82.
In the result, the Judgment and decree
dated 27.08.2003 passed by the learned II
Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, in O.S.No.10 of 2001 is hereby set
aside.
Consequently,
the
order
dated
05.12.2000 passed by the defendant 1
debarring the plaintiff from playing any cricket
matches conducted or authorized by ICC/BCCI
or affiliated associations and also debarring him
from holding any position in ICC/BCCI or any of
its affiliated associations for life commencing
from 5th December, 2000 are set aside. Apart
from the above, the said order of Defendant 1BCCI holding that the plaintiff will not be eligible
for any Benefit Matches allotted/conducted by
the BCCI or its affiliated members and, further
directing the forfeiture of BCCIs contribution to
his Benevolent Fund accrued as on the date of
the said order shall also stand set aside.
The appeal is accordingly allowed with
costs.
-----------------------------------------JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA

--------------------------------------------------JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY

per HONOURABLE
MOHAN REDDY

SRI

JUSTICE

G.KRISHNA

I respectfully agree with the findings

arrived at by my learned brother. In addition I
add as follows:
This case is one best example of a player
wriggling out of the serious allegations of match
fixing, betting etc. made against him mainly
because of the inaction of the Board (BCCI) to
take appropriate action as per the procedure
established by law. Making allegations against
anybody is one thing whereas proving those
allegations, which requires placement of
necessary evidence which can be substantiated,
is another thing. Eventually the Board could not
establish as to whether the player is guilty of
the allegations made against him. Non-proving
of the allegations does not amount to whether
guilty or not guilty of the charges whereas it
only amounts to non-proving of the charges.
However the ultimate decision of the Board,
which does not have the support of sound
evidence, is unwarranted. The circumstances of
the case tell about the highly callous and
arbitrary action of the Board, callous in the
sense its omission or inaction to deal with such
a serious matter of national importance
following established principles of law together
with the principles of natural justice and
arbitrary in the sense it acted, as can be
inferred from the record, with the sole intention
of punishing the plaintiff having failed to follow
the procedure established by law and not giving
him an opportunity to defend himself and thus
misusing the unfettered powers vested in it
exhibiting as if that its decision whether
rational or irrational should not be challenged

and should be implemented. It also might be

that the Board acted in posthaste under selfimposed compulsion in view of the existence of
various circumstances then. This monopolized,
unreasonable and whimsical attitude of the
Board is highly deprecated. The sole motive of
the Board should be to promote the game
carrying out its mission or purpose honestly and
meaningfully and also to punish such players
who involve in such grave activities which
definitely destroy the spirit of the game. The
Board has to dispel any such criticisms that may
be pointed out against it. Inaction of the Board
may cause more damage than a player who
involves in such serious activities can do to the
game.

------------------------------------------JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA

--------------------------------------------------JUSTICE G. KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY

DATED 8th November, 2012

MsnrO/YCR