Ottoman Policy and Restrictions on Jewish Settlement in Palestine: 1881-1908: Part I

Author(s): Neville J. Mandel

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct., 1974), pp. 312-332
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282539
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Ottoman Policy and Restrictionson Jewish

Settlement in Palestine: 1881-1908-Part I
Neville J. Mandel
Periodisationin historyis arbitrary,but for the Jewsof ImperialRussia,
alreadyan unhappycommunity,the assassinationof TsarAlexanderII in
1881usheredin a painfulnewera.Thepogromsafterhis deathwerefollowed by the notorious 'May Laws' of 1882 which stepped up economic
discrimination
againstthe Jews.The stirringamongthe Jewishcommunity,
bothphysicaland intellectual,was heightened.Manymoreof themstarted
to leave,mainlyfor America,and not a few beganto thinkseriouslyabout
Jewishnationalism,with the result that the 'Loversof Zion' Movement
gainedmomentum.Some of them, whetherfor reasonsof sheerphysical
safetyor nationalismor a combinationof both, thoughtof findinga home
in the OttomanEmpire.The SublimePorte was well-informedof these
trendsand of theircontagiouseffectson otherJews,especiallyin AustroHungary,fromthe start.Whatis more,the Portedecidedto opposeJewish
settlementin Palestinein autumn1881,some monthsbeforethe increased
flow of Jewsin that directiongot underway. ('Palestine',for the purpose
of this article,is used to meanthe areareferredto in contemporaryOttoman parlanceand documentsas 'Arzi Filistin',which at the end of the
nineteenthcenturywas not a singleadministrativeunit but was made up
of the Mutasarriflik
of Jerusalemto the south and the Sancaksof Nablus
and Acre in the north; these Sancakswere part of the Vilayetof Sam
('Syria')until 1888,whereaftertheywereincorporatedinto the new Vilayet
of Beirut).
On examination,the Porte's awarenessof trends among the Jews of
EasternEuropewas not as surprisingas it may seem at first sight. Given
the aggressiveintentionsthroughoutthe nineteenthcenturyof Russiaand
Austro-Hungaryon the OttomanEmpire,the Porte had good reasonto
try to keep abreastof events in those rival empires.Thus, interalia, its
diplomaticrepresentatives
in St. Petersburgand Viennareportedregularly
on Jewishaffairs,and thereis even a file in the cataloguesof the Ottoman
Foreign Ministry,listed under Russia, entitled 'Situation[of] the Jews;
Questionof theirImmigrationinto Turkey:1881'.1
Moreover,therehad been some directapproachesto the SublimePorte
on this matter.In 1879LaurenceOliphant,an Englishwriter,travellerand
mystic, had submitteda scheme to settle Jews on the east bank of the
RiverJordan.2In 1881a groupof Englishand Germanbusinessmensent
a representativeto negotiatewith the Governmentfor a concessionto
builda railwayfrom Smyrnato Baghdad,along the lengthof whichthey
proposedto settle Jews.3Their representativesaw the ForeignMinister
who, accordingto Reuter'sreports,was in favourof Jewishimmigration
into the Empire.4The Councilof Ministersconsideredthe questionand
in November1881it was announcedthat:

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

313

[Jewish]immigrantswill be able to settleas scatteredgroupsthroughout

Turkey,excludingPalestine.They must submit to all the laws of the
Empireand becomeOttomansubjects5.
With growing numbers of Russian Jews applying to the Ottoman
Consul-Generalat Odessa for visas to enter Palestine, the following
noticewas postedoutsidehis officea few monthslater,on April28, 1882:
The OttomanGovernmentinformsall [Jews]wishingto immigrateinto
Turkeythat they are not permittedto settle in Palestine.They may
immigrateinto the other provincesof [the Empire]and settle as they
wish, providedonly that they becomeOttomansubjectsand acceptthe
obligationto fulfilthe laws of the Empire.6
The specificexclusionof Palestinehad not been expectedby the Jews.
To themit seemedhardto believethat the OttomanGovernment,with its
recordof hospitalityto the Jews since their expulsionfrom Spain in the
fifteenthcentury,shouldnow forbidJewsto settlein Palestine.Whenthe
announcementwas made in Odessa, LauranceOliphantwas in Eastern
Europeon behalfof the MansionHouseCommittee,a Britishorganization
concernedwith the relief of persecutedJewsfrom Russiaand Rumania.7
The Jewswhomhe met persuadedhim to go to Constantinoplein orderto
find out more about the Porte'spolicy and also, if possible,to gain permission for numbersof Jews to settle in Palestine.8At the same time,
though independentlyof Oliphant,the CentralOfficeof one of the first
'Loversof Zion' groupswas transferredfrom Odessato Constantinople
in the hope of obtaininga grant of land in Palestinefor three hundred
settlers.9 Then, at the beginningof June,JacobRosenfeld,the editorof
Razsvet (a Jewish paper in St. Petersburgwhich sympathisedwith the
'Loversof Zion') came to Constantinopleto investigatethe situationas
well. 10

In Constantinople,Oliphantfound abouttwo hundredJewishrefugees.

He also discoveredthat on entry to the Empirethey were requiredto
adopt Ottomannationalityand declarenot only that they acceptedthe
laws of the Empirewithoutreserve,but also that they would not settlein
Palestine.11 Oliphantapproachedthe AmericanMinisterat the Porte to
see if he would be preparedto try and clarifythe position.WhenGeneral
Wallacesaid that he could only do so if a requestcame from the Jews
themselves,12 Oliphantsent a telegramto Jewshe had met in Bucharestand thus another delegation seeking permissionfor Jews to settle in
Palestinehurriedto Constantinople.
GeneralWallacemet this delegationon June6 and a few days laterhe
spoke to the OttomanForeignMinisterwho confirmedwhat was known
already.13It all boiled down to the same thing. ImmigrantJews were
welcome in the Empire,but not in Palestine;they could settle in small
groups,providedthat (a) they relinquishedtheir foreignnationalityand
becameOttomansubjects,and (b) they did not seekany specialprivileges,
but werecontentto remainboundby the existinglaws.14
Varioustheories were advancedto explain the Government'spolicy.
Oliphantsuggestedthat it derivedfrom MuslimsentimentsoverPalestine,

314

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

anti-Jewishinfluencesin Constantinopleandthe strainedrelationsbetween

the OttomanEmpireand Britainbecauseof the crisiswhichhaddeveloped
over Egypt during the first half of 1882.15But these explanationsare
unconvincing.Even if accepted,the first two of them barely sufficeto
justifythe Porte'srigidoppositionfromthe outset;and the last of themis
clearlywrong, since the Porte had decidedin autumn 1881not to allow
Jewishsettlementin Palestine-well beforethe crisisoverEgypt.
In the Mutasarr&flik
of Jerusalem,Jewish newcomersput forward
equally unlikely explanationsfor the difficultiesthey encounteredon
arrival.Theypointeda suspiciousfingerat local Sephardim
(OrientalJews)
who had no particularliking for Ashkenazim(EuropeanJews),16 and at
certainJewsliving on alms in Jerusalemwho fearedthat the immigrants
mightalso have to be supportedfrom the same funds.17 Othersclaimed
thatthe Mutasarrif,RaufPasa,waspersonallyill-disposedtowardsJews.18
AdmittedlyRauf Pa?adoes not sound at all sympatheticfrom contemporary (Jewish) records but, whateverhis personal feelings, the fact
remainsthat at all times he was acting on strict instructionsfrom Constantinople.
Moreover,when pressed by foreign governmentsthe Porte gave unsatisfactoryexplanationsof its policy as well. In 1887it arguedthat the
majorityof the immigrantswere pennilessand thereforeadded to the
penuryalreadyprevailingin Jerusalem.19It also contendedthat the aged
and sick among the immigrantswerea dangerto healthin Jerusalem;20
and that the Jews were a threat to public order because of Christian
fanaticismwhich,accordingto the GrandVezir,KamilPasa,rose to such
a pitchduringEasterthatJewswerecompelledto remainindoorslest they
wereattackedand even murderedin the streets!21
The real reasonslay elsewhere.They were principallytwo. First, the
SublimePortefearedthe possibilityof nurturinganothernationalproblem
in the Empire.Secondly,it did not wantto increasethe numberof foreign
subjects,particularlyEuropeans,in its domains.
Towardsthe end of 1882IsaacFernandez,the Presidentof the Alliance
IsralliteUniverselle
in Constantinople,wastold of the firstof thesereasons.
Ottoman ministersinformedhim that they were determined'to resist
firmlythe immigrationof Jewsinto Syriaand Mesopotamia,as they [did]
not wish to have anothernationalityestablishedin greatnumbersin that
part of the Empire'.22A year later, the Ministerof InternalAffairsand
othersexplicitlyindicatedto Fernandezthat they regardedJewishcolonisation of Palestineas a politicalissue and 'they did not want, after the
Bulgarian,Rumanianand otherquestions,to havea new questionon their
hands.'23 By 1888KamilPa?awas even more specificwhenhe referredto
'the reportthat had spreadabroadthat the Jews throughoutthe world
intendedto strengthenthemselvesin and aroundJerusalemwith a view,
at some futuretime, [to] re-establishingtheir ancientkingdomthere'.24
In the lightof theirlong seriesof misfortuneswithnationalminoritiessince
the beginningof the nineteenthcentury(which had led to considerable
territoriallosses in the Balkans)and only shortlyafter the Congressof
Berlin(1878), the apprehensionsof the Ottomanministerswere understandable.

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

315

Secondly,the OttomanGovernmentdid not warm to the prospectof

Europeanimmigrantsflowingin relativelylage numbersinto the Empire.
By the nineteenthcenturythe Europeanwas dislikedand distrustedby the
Turk. Under the system of 'Capitulations'(whose historywas long and
complicated)he enjoyed extensiveextra-territorialprivileges,including
the rightto trade,traveland hold propertyfreelythroughoutthe Empire.
Throughthe Capitulations,he was also largelyexempt from Ottoman
taxes and dues, and beyondthe reachof Ottomancourts. By the middle
of the nineteenthcenturythe Powers were exploitingthe Capitulations
shamelesslyto deepentheir influencein the Empire,while the Ottoman
Governmentwas tryingto abolishthem.In thesecircumstances,Ottoman
ministersmusthave askedthemselveswhy, of all thingsand of all places,
let Europeannumbersand influenceincreasein Palestine.They had only
to recallthat whilethe CrimeanWar(1854-6)had nominallybeenfought
over the ChristianHoly Placesin Jerusalem,a broaderissue had beenthe
attempt by Russia to distort'the Capitulationsin order to extend her
protectionover all GreekOrthodoxsubjectsof the Empire.Whatwould
happennow if EuropeanJewswereallowedto flood into Palestine?
Furthermore,
thereweretwo subsidiaryconsiderations
whichstrengthened the Porte'soppositionto Jewishsettlementin Palestine.Many of the
prospectiveimmigrantsbelongedto the 'Loversof Zion' Movementand
they had given the Ottoman Governmentthe impression that their
movementwaslargerand morepowerfulthanit actuallywas.Forexample,
theyexaggeratedtheirnumbersin the EuropeanJewishpress25and in the
summerof 1882they sent variousdelegationsto Constantinople,one of
which-from Rumania-bore a petition speakingof 'hundredsof thousands' of potential Jewish immigrants.26They contacted prominent
OttomanJews,27not to speakof the AmericanMinisterat the Porteand
the OttomanMinistersof InternalAffairsand of War.28And within a
shortwhile, they movedBaronEdmondde Rothschildof Paristo use his
influenceon their behalf as well.29 Little wonder that the Government
quicklybecameapprehensiveof what was afoot.
The othersubsidiaryconsiderationwas thatmostof theJewsin question
were Russiansubjects,and Russia was the arch-enemyof the Ottoman
Empire.Duringthe nineteenthcenturyalone, therehad been four RussoTurkish wars, the last as recentlyas 1877-8. Moreover,the Ottoman
Governmentheld Russiaresponsiblefor Balkannationalism.The 'Lovers
of Zion' were Jewish nationalists,and the Porte had no wish to have
another Russian-educated,and possibly Russian-inspired,nationalist
movementto contendwith, especiallyin the heartof the Arab provinces
of the Empirewhich as yet were still free of the 'canker'of European
nationalism.
Thesereasons,takentogether,add up to solid groundsfor the Ottoman
Government'simmediateopposition to Jewish settlementin Palestine.
Anothernationalproblemand a largeinfluxof Europeansinto a sensitive
part of the Empirewereunwantedin themselves.But a nationalproblem
wherealmost all the membersof that nationalitywere Europeans-and
Russiansubjectsto boot-could not be countenancedin anycircumstances.
Publichygienein Jerusalemwas besidethe point.

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

Ottomanpolicy remainedconstantthroughoutthe 1880'sand the first

half of the 1890s,and it probablywas not subjectedto any fundamental
review until Theodor Herzl's famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat,was
publishedin February1896.30In this pamphlet,Herzlgavemoreconcrete
expressionto Jewishnationalaspirations,arguing(as suggestedin the title)
that the 'Jewishproblem'could only be solved by establishinga Jewish
state, possiblyin Palestinebut possiblyelsewhere,31in whichpersecuted
Jewscould live in freedomand dignity.This pamphletled directlyto the
formationof the ZionistMovementin 1897with Herzlat its head.
It is not generallyappreciatedthat Herzlbroughthimselfand his ideas
to the Porte'sattentionone yearbeforethe firstZionistCongresswas held.
He did so by travellingto Constantinoplein June1896andmakingcontact
not only with severalsenior officialsin person but also with the Sultan
through an intermediary.Displayingimpressiveignoranceof Ottoman
sensitivities,Herzl'sideaswerenot calculatedto appealto the Porte.At a
time when the Government'sgrip over its remainingterritoriesin the
Balkanswas far from secure,and when the Sultanwas underattackfrom
YoungTurksabroadfor the 'dismemberment'
of the Empire,Herzlasked
that Palestineshould be grantedto the Jews with officialblessingin the
form of what he called a 'Charter'.And at a time when the Government
had had more than enoughof heavyEuropeaninterferencein its internal
affairs,includingcontrolof its PublicDebt since 1881,Herzlhoped that
his JewishState would enjoy GreatPowerprotection.32In exchangefor
Palestine,he nebulouslyoffered'to regulatethe whole financesof Turkey'
for 'His Majestythe Sultan'.33
'His Majestythe Sultan'was that enigmaticfigure,AbdiilhamidII, who
came to power in 1876. His presenceand personalitycannot be ignored
because, although the Council of Ministersdealt with the question of
Jewish settlementin Palestine from 1881, power and politics in the
OttomanEmpirewere more and more influenced,and laterwholly controlled,by Abdiulhamid
until the Young TurkRevolutionin 1908.
Abdiilhamidprobablyknewof the increasedflow of Jewishimmigrants
towardsPalestinefrom very early on. In keepingwith his character,his
attitudeseemsto have been one of suspicionand ambivalence.In 1881he
was reportedto favourthe Anglo-Germanproposalto settle Jews along
the proposedrailwayfromSmyrnato Baghdad;34 and he was saidto have
receivedthe Rumaniandelegation,which came to Constantinoplethe
followingsummer(althoughthe evidencefor this is weak).35 However,in
1891he told the MilitarySupervisoryCommissionat the YlldizPalace:
Grantingthe status of [Ottoman]subjectsto these Jews and settling
themis most harmful;and sinceit may in the futureraisethe issue of a
Jewishgovernment,it is imperativenot to acceptthem.36
And in 1892 the OttomanHigh Commissionerin Egypt told Sir Evelyn
Baring,the BritishConsul-General,that the Sultanwas disturbedby an
attemptto settleJewson the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.37 Butby the
followingyear Abdiulhamid
appearsto have consideredthe possibilityof
allowingJews to settle elsewhere,for he told the HahamBasi (the Chief
Rabbi of the Empire)that he was willing to offer Russian and other

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

317

oppressedJewsrefugein the Empire,particularlyin EasternAnatolia,so

that they togetherwith OttomanJewsmight furnishhim with a force of
100,000soldiers,to be attachedto the FourthArmy. This proposalwas
welcomedby the Haham Bast and his RabbinicalCouncil,but nothing
came of it because,accordingto the Turkish(Jewish)historian,Abraham
Galante,the Councilof Ministersconsideredit ill-advised3 8-presumably
for the reasonsoutlinedabove.
In 1896 Theodor Herzl met Philipp Michael de Newlinski, a Polish
aristocratwho had once worked in the Austro-HungarianEmbassyat
Constantinopleand was employedby Abdulhamidfor specialdiplomatic
missions.39 In JuneHerzltravelledwith de Newlinskito Constantinople.
On the train there, de NewlinskiintroducedHerzl to Tevflk Pa?a (the
OttomanAmbassadorat Belgrade),KaratodoriPa?aand Ziya Pa?a(both
describedas 'elderstatesmen'),who werereturningto Constantinopleafter
the coronationof Tsar Nicholas11.40 Herzlexplainedhis projectto Ziya
Pa~a,who agreedthat 'the benefitsin moneyand presssupportwhichyou
promiseus are very great'.But, he warned,'no one is even likelyto have
41
pourparlerswith you if you demandan independentPalestine'.
A day afterHerzland de Newlinskiarrivedin Constantinople,Abdillhamidtold the latterthat:
If Mr Herzlis as muchyourfriendas you aremine,thenadvisehim not
to take anotherstep in this matter.I cannotsell even a foot of land,for
it does not belongto me, but to my people. My people have won this
empireby fightingfor it with theirblood and havefertilizedit with their
blood. We will again cover it with our blood beforewe allow it to be
wrestedawayfromus. The men of two of my regimentsfrom Syriaand
Palestinelet themselvesbe killedone by one at Plevna.Not one of them
yielded;they all gave theirlives on that battlefield.The TurkishEmpire
belongsnot to me, but to the Turkishpeople. I cannot give away any
part of it. Let the Jews save their billions.When my Empireis partitioned,they may get Palestinefor nothing.But only our corpsewill be
divided.I will not agreeto vivisection.42
Herzl's reputationas a leadingjournalist attached to an influential
Viennesenewspaper(the Neue Freie Presse), his hints of assistancefor the
Empire'sfinancesand de Newlinski'scontactsenabledhim to meetseveral
prominent figures during the fortnight he spent in Constantinople.
Abdiulhamid
refusedto receivehim, but as he learntmore about Herzl's
proposalshe askedde Newlinskiabout the possibilityof cedingPalestine
to the Jewsin exchangefor some otherterritory,43 a suggestionwhichhad
been made to Herzl a few days earlierby 'IzzatPa~aal-'Abid'44Abdiulhamid'sSecondSecretaryand a Arab from Damascuswho, amongother
things,held a briefon the Sultan'sstafffor affairsin the Arabprovinces.
On the day of Herzl's departurefrom Constantinople,Abdulhamid
presentedhim through de Newlinski with Commander'sCross of the
Mecidiye Order.De Newlinskialso broughta messagethat the Sultan
wishedhim to influencethe Europeanpress towardsa more favourable
view of the Empireand to obtain a loan of T?2,000,000.45 Abduilhamid
was willingto exploreHerzl'sworth-or so it seemed.

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

Herzl'sassessmentof his receptionin Constantinople(basedon his own

impressionsand hearsay from de Newlinski and others) was that the
Grand Vezir, Halil Rifat Paa (whom he met twice) was averse to his
scheme, whereas some senior officials-'Izzat Pa?a al-'Abid, Mehmed
Nuri Bey (Chief Secretaryat the Foreign Ministry)and IbrahimCavid
Bey (the GrandVezir'sson and a memberof the Councilof State)-were
favourablyinclined,thougheach was not withouthis reservations.46The
Grand Vezir'soppositionand the generalreserveelsewheresoon made
themselvesfelt. Apartfromanythingelse, Herzlheardsix monthsafterhis
visit to Constantinoplethat the Porte was 'angry'with him, becausethe
presssupporthe had promisedhad not been forthcoming.47
Withinthe Jewishworld supportfor Herzl grew,especiallyin student
circlesand among'Loversof Zion' in EasternEurope.In February1897,
Dr d'Arbela,the directorof the Rothschildhospitalin Jerusalem,informed
Herzlthat 'allPalestinetalksaboutournationalistplan'.48This,of course,
did not fail to attractthe attentionof the Ottomanauthorities.49In April,
a visit to Palestineby a group of distinguishedBritishJews, including
IsraelZangwilland HerbertBentwich,50and news in May of a rally at
New Yorkin supportof the firstZionistCongress(to be heldthatsummer)
alarmedthe MutasarrWfof Jerusalem,IbrahimHakki Pa?a. As it was
originallyproposed to hold the first Zionist Congressin Munich, the
withthe GermanConsulat Jerusalem,who suggested
Mutasarrifconferred
that pressreportsabout this congresswereveryexaggerated.At the same
time he felt that the establishmentof a Jewishstatein Palestineshouldnot
be consideredutterlyremote.Carefullyspeakingin a privatecapacity,the
Consulregrettedthat Jewshad continuedto enterPalestine,becauseinter
alia the immigrantswere a potentialpolitical danger,as they 'frequently
inclined towards the Social-DemocratParty'.51 Ibrahim HakkhPa,a
reportedthis post-hasteto the Porteand the restrictionsagainstthe Jews
in Palestine(describedbelow) were renewed,one month beforethe first
ZionistCongress.52
The Congresswasheldat Baselandnot at Munichas originallyplanned.
The ZionistMovement'sprogramme,workedout at this Congress,began
by declaringthat:
The object of Zionismis to establishfor the Jewishpeople a home in
Palestinesecuredby publiclaw.
Althoughthe Germantext spokeequivocallyof a Heimstattein preference
to the moreexplicitJudenstaat,this publicstatementof Zionistaimscould
not but alarm the OttomanGovernment.The wide coveragewhich the
Europeanpress accordedthe Congress,and the ensuingenthusiasmfor
the ZionistMovement,especiallyamongJewsin EasternEurope,can only
haveaddedto the Porte'sdisquiet.Thusthat autumn,so that thereshould
be no mistakingthe Government'sattitude,the GrandVezir prompted
IsaacFernandez,as a prominentJewin Constantinople,to makeit known
that the Portehad not givenHerzlany encouragementin his ideas.53
Evidence of the seriousnesswith which Abdiulhamidregardedthe
Zionist Movementis reflectedin the fact that shortlyafterthe firstCongresshe replacedthe Mutasarr!fof Jerusalem,who was a regularmember

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

319

of the provincialservice,with one of his Palacesecretaries.Over the next

years Ottoman representativesnot only in EasternEurope but also at
Washington,London,Viennaand Berlinreportedon the progressof the
ZionistMovement,54 and even used specialfundsto obtaintheirinformation.55 Theirdespatchesappearto have been read by the Sultan,and he
clearlyattachedimportanceto them. Thus in 1900, after an increasein
Jewishemigrationfrom Rumania,the Presidentof the Commissionof
Immigrantsat the Portetold Fernandezthat:
As a generalrule, in Constantinople,in all officialdepartments,in all
ministerialofficesand in the GrandVezirate,one does not daretakethe
smallestmeasurein favourof the Jews(especiallyconcerningPalestine),
the smallestinitiativein theirregard,withouthavingadvisedtheImperial
Palacebeforehand.The Sultanhas madethe Jewishquestiona personal
question.All Jewishaffairsare concentratedin the Palace.None of the
views of the ministersand of the Council of State [whichare] most
favourableto Jewishinterestshaverecrossedthe thresholdof the Ylldlz
[Palace]once they have penetratedinto it. 56
Herzlhad set an audiencewith the Sultanas a majorobjective.In 1898
Abdiilhamidacknowledgeda telegramsent to him by the secondZionist
Congress.However,suchencouragementas this gave was dissipatedlater
that year when Palace officialsvisibly snubbedHerzl who had come to
Constantinoplein the wake of KaiserWilhelmII.s7 Hopes of an early
meetingwith the Sultanin 1899were destroyedby the deathof de Newlinskiwhilstin Constantinopleon a missionfor Herzl.58 For the next two
years Herzl tried to obtain his audience through various contacts in
Constantinople.Eventually Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian Jewish
scholarand an intimateof the Sultan,was able to persuadeAbdiilhamid
to receiveHerzlin May 1901.59
The audiencelasted over two hours. Herzlrecordsin his diarythat he
'got everything'.60 In returnfor 'somemeasureparticularlyfriendlyto the
Jews', Herzl offeredto relieve the Empireof the Public Debt, and the
degreeof foreigncontrol accompanyingit since 1881 (when the Powers
set up the 'Councilof the Public Debt'). Abdiilhamidmade a show of
interest.He promisedHerzlto keeptheirdiscussionssecret,to furnishhim
with a detailedaccountof the Empire'sfinancialsituationand to makea
'pro-Jewishproclamation'at a moment designatedby Herzl. Herzl left
Constantinoplewell satisfied(eventhoughtwo daysafterhis audiencewith
the Sultanhe fell foul of 'IzzatPa?ain the meshof Palaceintrigues).61 But
he had been deceived by Abdiilhamid'saffabilityand histrionics.The
Sultan,on the otherhand,had takenHerzl'smeasure:
This Herzllooks completelylike a prophet,like a leaderof his people.
He has very clevereyes; he speakscarefullyand clearly.62
Onlyin subsequentmonths,afterall the lettersandmemorandadetailing
his proposalsfor the consolidationof the Public Debt were ignored,did
Herzlsensethat somethingwas amiss.He was recalledtwiceto Constantinople (in Februaryand July of 1902), and on both occasions he communicatedwith Abdiulhamidthrough various Palace officials.63These

320

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

'discussions'had the outwardform of genuinenegotiations,althoughthe

Sultan could not be induced to modify the establishedconditions for
Jewishsettlementin the OttomanEmpire,and Herzltoo gaveno ground:
'A CharterwithoutPalestine!I refusedat once.'64
Herzlwas not alonein volunteeringto ameliorateOttomanfinancesand
to consolidatethe PublicDebt; other groups,both privateand national,
soughtto gainconcessionsfromthe Sultan.Whena Frenchprojectfor the
consolidationof the Debt was approvedin 1902,Herzlrealizedsadlythat
Abdiilhamidhad engineeredhis visits to the Palacemerelyto obtain the
best possibletermsfromthe successfulFrenchgroup.65
Herzltriedto regainthe Palace'sattentionsover the next two yearsby
elaboratingnewfinancialschemesandaffectingto hold out to the Ottoman
Empireits last opportunityfor redemptionbeforehe concludedalternative
schemeswith GreatBritainfor Jewishcolonizationin the SinaiPeninsula
and East Africa.66But all Herzl'scoaxingwent in vain. Whenhe died in
1904,the OttomanGovernmenthad not acceptedany of his suggestionsand the Empire,sick as it was, livedon.
In 1905, the seventhZionist Congress-the first after Herzl'sdeathresolvedthat its efforts must be directedexclusivelytowards Palestine.
Alternativeschemes,suchas the East Africaproject,wereno longerto be
considered.Thisdecisionwas reachedafterheateddebate,mainlybetween
MenahemUssishkinfor the 'Ziyyone Ziyyon' (Palestine-oriented
Zionists)
andIsraelZangwillfor the so-called'Territorialists'.
Reportsof this debate
in The Times, L'IndependenceBelge and in Zionistjournals,alarmedthe
Porte as well as the authoritiesin Palestine.67The Porte immediately
orderedthe suspensionof all landtransfersto Jewsthenin processandthe
stringentimplementationof the existingrestrictions.68 The Mutasarrif of
Jerusalemhad long conversationsabouttheCongresswithDavidLevontin,
the managerof the Anglo-PalestineCompany(a Zionistbankin Jaffa).He
askedLevontin,who had attendedthe Congresswhy, with his knowledge
of local conditions,did he allow a resolutionto be adoptedwhichfocused
Zionistaims entirelyon Palestine.Moreover,why this talk of autonomy,
why so muchpublicityand why appealto the GreatPowersto inducethe
OttomanGovernmentto accedeto the Zionists'wishes?And what truth
was there to the rumour that Ussishkin would be the 'Prince of
Jerusalem'?69
Thereafterthe Zionist Movement did not make any approachesto
Abdiilhamiduntil autumn1907whenDavid Wolffsohn,Herzl'ssuccessor
as President,visited Constantinople.He too conductedindirectnegotiations with the Sultanthroughhis First Secretary,TahsinPasa, and other
officials,but these representationswere no more successfulthan Herzl's
had been;70 and the possibilityof any change in Ottomanpolicy only
offereditself-in theory, at least-with the Young Turk Revolutionthe
followingyear.
Under Abdiilhamid (1876-1908), things could hardly have been
otherwise.The basic reasonsunderlyingOttomanoppositionto Jewish
settlement in Palestine had been greatly reinforcedby developments
both within the Empire and beyond since the early 1880s. Ottoman
territoriesin the Balkanshad become a primefocus of Europeandiplo-

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

321

macy and Balkannationalismhad increasedto dangerousproportions.

Crete,aftera seriesof revolts,had gainedits independencein 1898.The
Armenianshad causedseriousdisturbanceswhichwerecruellyput down,
and there had been upheavalsboth in the Hauran(to the north-eastof
Palestine)and in the Yemen.Moreover,for the EuropeanPowersthis was
an era of new alliancesand alignmentswhich,in sum,put less and less of
a premiumon the continuedexistenceof the OttomanEmpire.Russia's
interestin influence,and if possiblea presence,south of the Bosphorus
was as pronouncedas ever, and Austro-Hungarystill held Bosnia and
Herzegovinain her graspunderthe termsof the Treatyof Berlin(1878).
It was also an era of greatimperialisticexpansionon the part of Europe
which among other things touchedthe OttomanEmpire'sone-timeprovincesin North Africa.Egypt,alreadytenuouslyattachedto the Empire,
becamea Britishprotectoratein 1882.Tunis,also nominallya tributaryto
the Empire,becamea Frenchprotectoratein 1883. The Anglo-French
incidentat Fashodain 1898-9, the Franco-Germancrisis over Morocco
in 1905, and Anglo-Russianrivalry in Persia culminatingin the 1907
conventionbetweenthose Powerswereprobablydisquieting,even though
all theseeventstook placeoutsidethe Empire.In thispoliticalclimate,both
at homeand internationally,Abdiilhamidwas in no positionto relinquish
freelyany part of his Empire,autocratas he was. That the Zionistswere
carefulto requesta limitedformof autonomyin Palestineand at all times
assertedthe Jews'loyaltyto the Sultanwas of little consequence.
Abdiulhamidhad still other reasonsto oppose the Zionists'proposals
for Palestine. He knew full well that he reigned over a discontented
Empire,and he was nervous.Amongotherthingshe was concernedabout
the loyaltyof his Arabsubjectsand consciouslypursuedpolicieswhichhe
hoped would increasehis popularityamong them. He also posed as a
championof Pan-Islamismin an effortto maintainthe supportof his own
Muslimsubjectsand also to rally Muslimsbeyondthe Empire'sborders.
He thereforeclaimed to be Caliph (spiritualruler of the Muslims)in
additionto being Sultan(temporalrulerof the Empire).With an eye to
his Arabsubjectsand as the would-beCaliphof all Muslims,Abdullhamid
could scarcelyhandJerusalem,the thirdcity of Islam,to the Jews.
Finally,Herzl's'golden-egg'-his proposalsto consolidatethe Ottoman
Public Debt-lacked substance, attractivenessand practicality.First,
Herzl and the Zionists simply did not command the immense funds
necessaryfor the task. Secondly,althoughthe Empirehad been virtually
bankruptwhen Abdiilhamidcame to power, its financialsituationhad
improvedover the yearsunderthe supervisionof the EuropeanPowers.
Theircontrolwas exercisedthroughthe 'Councilfor the PublicDebt' and
it is inconceivablethat they would have surrenderedtheir administration
of the Debt (and the scope it offeredto interferein the Empire'sinternal
affairs), let alone tolerate its consolidationby a Jewish group to be
recompensedwith a foothold in a part of the Empirewhich was still, at
the turn of the century,of undeniableinterestto the Powersthemselves.
On June29, 1882,the firsttiny groupof 'Loversof Zion',numberingall
of 14 souls, sailed from Constantinoplefor Jaffa.On the very same day,

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

the PortZcabledthe Mutasarrif of Jerusalem,orderinghim not to let any

Russian, Rumanianor BulgarianJews to disembarkat Jaffa or Haifa;
such Jewswerenot to set foot in any of the fourso-called'Holy Cities'of
Palestine(Jerusalem,Hebron,Safedand Tiberias)and wereto proceedto
some other Ottomanport aboardthe ship they came on.71
This prohibitionwas contraryto one of the Capitulationswith Russia
whichassuredher subjectsof unrestrictedtravelthroughoutthe Ottoman
Empire(exceptArabia).72 Whenthe Mutasarrif soughtclarificationfrom
Constantinople,he was orderedto expel all Jewswho had settledin the
Mutasarriflikwithinthe last four months;only to permitJewishpilgrims
and businessmento remainfor a briefperiod;and to preventotherJews
(i.e. prospectivesettlers)from landing.73Similarinstructionswere soon
receivedand enforcedin the Vilayet of Sam(embracingthe northernpart
of Palestine).74The termsof these and subsequentinstructionsmade it
clearthat the Portewas primarilyconcernedto preventRussianJewsfrom
settling in Palestine.Jews from other countrieswere arrivingin much
less concern.
smallernumbers,and wereof correspondingly
Irregularitieswere not long in arising.Some RussianJews appliedfor
visas to Constantinople,wherethey obtainedpermitsto travelwithinthe
OttomanEmpire.Thus they would arriveat Palestinewith valid papers,
but as prospectivesettlersthey wererefusedentry.This led to complaints,
andat the end of 1882the Ministryof Policein Constantinoplewasordered
by the Council of Ministersto stop issuing internaltravel permitsto
RussianJewsuntil the Governmenttook a decisionon the matter.75 The
reasongiven for this orderwas that the Jewishimmigrantswere not fulfilling the first obligation requiredof them, i.e. to become Ottoman
subjects.76In spring1883it was reportedthat a completebar was being
imposedon the entryof all Jewsat Beirutand Haifa.7 7 Againstthis,it was
still possiblefor Jews from countriesother than Russiaand Rumaniato
disembarkat Jaffa.And even in the case of Russianand RumanianJews,
pilgrimsand businessmenwereallowedto land.78
But the Mutasarrif of Jerusalemappearsto have recognizedthat it did
not accordwith the Porte'srealpurposeto admittheseJewswho claimed
that they came for prayeror business, but in fact came to settle. He
thereforeturnedto Constantinoplefor advice.A correspondenceensued;
the Ministriesof Internaland ForeignAffairsconferred;the opinionsof
the Porte'slegaladvisersweresought;and the Councilof Stateconsidered
the questionin March,1884.79 Aftera furtherexchangewithJerusalem,80
it was decidedto close Palestineto all Jewishbusinessmen,on the grounds
that the Capitulations,whichpermittedEuropeansto tradefreelywithin
the OttomanEmpire,appliedexclusivelyto areas'appropriatefor trade'the Councilof State did not considerthat Palestinewas such an area.81
Henceforth,only Jewishpilgrims could enter Palestine.Their passports
were to be properlyvisaedby OttomanConsulsabroad;on arrivalthey
wereto handovera depositguaranteeingtheirdeparture,and theywereto
leave after thirtydays.82
In all this, the role of the Powerswas crucial.If the entry restrictions
were to be effective,they had to be acceptedby the Powers, on whose
nationalstheyfell. And,broadlyspeaking,the Powersdid not acceptthem,

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLEMENT

323

since they were bent on preservingtheir privilegesgranted under the

Capitulations(which,as alreadymentioned,the Portewastryingto curtail).
There were of course certain differencesin the positions taken by the
variousPowers,dependingto some extent on the state of their relations
with the Ottoman Empire. For example, from the 1880's onwards,
Germanywas trying to befriendthe OttomanEmpireand on occasion
seemedinclinedto fall in with the entryrestrictions.83 But in generalthe
Powers refusedto acquiescein them, and so in 1888, after adoptinga
strong stand,84 they were able to extracta concessionfrom the Porte
permittingJews to settle in Palestine,providedthat they arrivedsingly,
and not en masse.

85

The only major exception among the Powers during the 1880s was
Russia which at first did accept the restrictionsand was even suspected
by someof havinggoneso faras to invitethem.86Thereasonsfor Russia's
attitude requireinvestigation-perhapsshe feared that a larger Jewish
community in Palestine could endanger the status quo over the Holy

Placesin Jerusalem,or perhapsher standwas merelyan extensionof the

TsaristGovernment'sattitudeto its Jewsat home.
Whateverthe reason, the importantpoint is that Russia changedher
position and joined the other Powersin resistingthe restrictionsin the
early 1890s.This becameevidentin May 1891,when Said Pa?a,the Ottoman ForeignMinister,receivedword from Odessathat greatlyincreased
numbersof RussianJewswereapplyingfor visasto enterthe Empire87(as
a resultof rumoursof forthcominganti-Jewishmeasuresin Russiain 1890
and the actual expulsionof Jews from Moscow in spring 1891).Abdulhamidwas informedandon June28 he minutedon a submissionapparently
askingif Jewishimmigrantsshouldbe admitted:
[This]memorandumshouldbe returned.It is not permissibleto take a
course which, by accepting[into the Empire]those who are expelled
from every place, may in the futureresult in the creationof a Jewish
governmentin Jerusalem.Sinceit is necessarythat they shouldbe sent
to America,they and their like shouldnot be accepted,and shouldbe
put aboardshipsimmediatelyand sent to America.88
Abdiilhamidalso orderedthe Councilof Ministersto re-submitto him a
'seriousand decisiveresolution'on the matter.89
Whileawaitinga decision,the ForeignMinisterissuedvariousinstructions to Ottomanrepresentatives
in Russiawiththe objectof ensuringthat
only Jewswho werebonafidepilgrimsweregrantedthree-monthvisasfor
Palestine.90Parallelinstructionswere also sent by the Grand Vezir to
Palestine, orderingthe authoritiesthere to enforce the existing entry
restrictionsstrictly.9l
The decision,taken a few weeks later, was drasticenough.The entire
OttomanEmpirewas closed to RussianJews.No visas wereto be issued
to them and port officialsthroughoutthe Empirewere not to let them
disembark;shippingcompaniesthereforeought not to receivethem on
board.92 And on October 19, Said Pa?awent furtherand-presumably
with Abdiilhamid'sknowledge-closed the Empireto foreignJews of all
nationalities,on the groundsthat they endangeredpublichealth.93Such

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

a sweepingstep, so clearly violating the Capitulations,was inevitably

rejectedby the Powerswho arguedthat it went 'beyondthe necessitiesof
the case'.94 Rebuffed,SaidPa?acontinuedto pressRussiafor the nexttwo
yearsto preventshippingcompaniesfromgivingherJewspassageinto the
Empire.His efforts were unsuccessful,presumablybecause Russia had
come to sharethe view that preservingher privilegesunderthe Capitulations was more importantthan worryingabout the Jews' presencein
Palestine-which anyhowcould be used to increaseher influencein that
country.95
Throughoutthe 1880sthe OttomanGovernmentconcentratedon trying
to stop Jewsfrom settlingin Palestine.It failedfor variousreasonswhich
will be explainedin a subsequentarticle and so, by the 1890s, it was
forcedto turnits attentionsto anotherproblem:how to preventJewsfrom
buyinglandin Palestine.Theinterestwhichthe 'Loversof Zion'hadshown
in land had causedpricesto rise and also led to speculationin realestate.
Rauf Pa?a,the Mutasarrif of Jerusalemfrom 1877to 1889,had done his
best to hinderJewsfrom acquiringland, and to an extentthis had kept a
reinon prices.Buthis successor,Re?adPa?a(1889-90),took no suchsteps.
As a result local Jews rushed to buy land, immigrationsocieties sent
representativesfrom abroadfor the same purposeand even local Arabs
purchasedland with the intention of resellingit to Jews. The Hebrew
writer,Asher Ginsberg(Ahad Ha-'Am), visitedPalestinein 1891.He was
appalledat the numberof land-agents,both Araband Jewish,and also at
theirgreedwhichhad been stimulatedby the Jews'appetitefor land.96
In November 1892 the Mutasarrif of Jerusalemreceivedordersfrom
Constantinople,prohibitingthe sale of miri land (state land requiring
official permissionfor transfer)to all Jews.97 As most of the land in
Palestinewas miri, therewereloud protestsfrom OttomanJewsand also
from foreigners-bothJewishandGentile-who hadinvestedin land.98As
usual the foreignerscomplained-but with unusualvehemence-to their
consuls, who immediatelynotified their embassies at Constantinople.
Notes clamouringagainsta 'manifestbreach'of the Capitulationswere
deliveredto the Porteearlyin 1893.99The Porterepliedin April,explaining that the latest measurewas dictatedby political considerationsand
was not meantto depriveforeignersof theirrights.It was designedonly
'to preventthe permanentestablishmentin Palestineof Jewishimmigrants
who despite the existingprohibitionhave succeededor may succeedin
penetratingthe country'.?00ThePortefelt thatPowerswhichhadaccepted
its Note in 1888forbiddingthe entryof Jewsen masse into Palestinecould
not now object to a measureaimed at strengtheningthat prohibition.
The regulationapplied to both Ottomanand foreign Jews, so that the
lattercould not complainof discrimination!(Therealreasonwas that the
Porte wanted to preventOttomanJews from buyingland on behalf of
foreignJews). However,to go some way to meet the Powers,the Porte
statedthat foreignJews,who werelegallyresidentin Palestine,could buy
land-provided that (a) they presentedat the Land RegistryOffice in
Jerusalema certificate,issued by their Consulate and ratified by the
Mutasarrif, statingthat they were legal residents;and (b) they undertook

OTTOMAN
POLICYAND JEWISHSETTLEMENT

325

not to let 'illegal Jews' live on their land (if urban) or set up a colony on it

(if rural).
Thislastconcessionon landpurchasesby foreignJewswas typicalof the
loopholeswhichdevelopedin the restrictions.At a timewhenthe Government was preparedto close the whole Empireto Jews in an attemptto
stop them settlingin Palestine,the right of certainforeignJewsto live in
the countryand also to acquireland was recognized.Partof the problem
lay in the fact that the Governmentwas underpressurefrom the Powers
whichwerenot willingto acquiescein any measurecurtailingtheirprivileges underthe Capitulations.But equally,part of the problemlay within
the Governmentitself.No singledepartmentof stateappearsto havebeen
designatedto attendto problemsarisingout of Jewishsettlementin Palestine-presumablybecausein theorythereshouldhavebeen no settlement
at all. The local authoritiescorrespondedwith at least four departments:
the GrandVezirate,andthe Ministriesof Internaland ForeignAffairs,and
the Cadastre(thedepartmentdealingwithlandquestions).Underpressure
from theirministers,and indeedfrom Abdiulhamid
himself,these departmentsappearto havefalleninto the commonOttomanpracticeof issuing
and re-issuingto the provincial governorsexistinginstructions-in this
case thoserelatingto Jewishimmigrants.Moreover,coordinationbetween
thesedepartmentsseemsto havebeenweak,so thatas theyeachmultiplied
the instructions,they frequentlymodifiedand often contradictedtheir
previousordersor those of anotherdepartment.The inconsistenciesin the
restrictionsgrewduringthe 1890s,and the local authoritieswereregularly
confrontedwith problemsthey did not knowhow to solve.
For example,the 1893land purchaserestrictionssoon provedunwieldy
sincevarioustechnicalitiesmeantthatfew salescouldbe completedlocally.
The Mutasarrifof Jerusalemtactfullydescribedthem as 'vague'-and by
1898was pressingthe GrandVezir for more preciseinstructions.101A
relatedquestionconcernedbuildingoperationson legallyownedland. In
1893BaronRothschildhad receivedsome buildingpermitsafterreaching
an agreementwith the Porteover how manyhousescould be built on the
colonies he supportedin Palestineand how many settlerscould live in
them.102Again by 1898, the AdministrativeCouncil in Jerusalemwas
asking the Ministryof InternalAffairs about conditions under which
additionalbuildingscould be constructedto accommodatethe colonies'
103
naturalincreaseand the needs of their expandingagriculture.
But by far the most complicatedand confusedsituationsaroseoverthe
entryrestrictions.In 1898,shortlybeforethe secondZionistCongress,the
Mutasarrifof Jerusalemwas orderedto revertto the unambiguousinstructions of 1884whichhad been based on a Councilof Statedecision:only
bonafide pilgrimscould visit Palestine,for up to thirtydays.104At this,
the AdministrativeCouncil in Jerusalemasked the Grand Vezir what
shouldbe done with those foreignJewsnow 'legallyresident'in Palestine
and, for that matter,with the considerablebody of Jewsillegallyresident
in the country.105The GrandVezir replied,somewhatunsatisfactorily,
that henceforthall Jews, without exception,were to be preventedfrom
settlingin Palestine.106
The Mutasarrifthen informedthe GrandVeziratethat variousconsuls

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

in Jerusalemdisclaimedknowledgeof the latestchanges.1I07In September

thereforethe ForeignMinistrysent Notes Verbalesto the foreignmissions
in the capital.TheseNotesreferredto the 1884regulations,butre-extended
the time permittedfor a Jewishpilgrim'svisit to threemonths.108This
smallsop to the Powersdid not impressthem,and they promptlyrejected
the Notes.109
Meanwhilein Palestineobstaclescontinuedto be put in the way of
groups of Jews who came to settle or could not pay a cash deposit to
guaranteetheir departureafter their 'pilgrimage'.This obstructionof
foreign nationals led the British Embassyto complainto the Foreign
Ministry,II0 and the American Minister at the Porte to call on the
ForeignMinister.TevfikPapatold Straus(who was a Jew)that:
Thereis no intentto preventAmericancitizens,be they Jewsor Christians, individually,as distinguishedfrom en masse, to visit Syria or
Palestineas travelers,or who come as visitors; the only object is to
preventthe furthercolonizationof Palestineby Jews,as the settlement
there of religious bodies in preponderatingnumbers may lead to
politicalcomplications,whichit is the purposeof the OttomanGovernment to avoid.111
Straushad no doubts about the quarterfrom which 'politicalcomplications'werefeared-it was, quiteplainly,the ZionistMovement.112But
in spiteof this,the ForeignMinisterupheldthe distinction,whichhadbeen
maintainedsince 1888,betweenJewsarrivingindividuallyand in numbers.
As the Portehad alreadyre-extendedpilgrims'visits to threemonths,the
attemptto revertto the 1884regulationshad in effectbeenfrustrated.This
may conceivablyhavegiventhe Powerssome satisfaction,but it couldnot
have given the authoritiesin Palestineany comfort.They were still left
withthe questionof whatto do withthoseforeignJewswho, havingarrived
singlyor in smallgroupssince 1888,had settledlegallyin Palestineand, it
appeared,couldcontinueto settlein the country-despitethe GrandVezir.
Similarly,they still had not receivedany guidanceon how to treat Jews
illegallyresidentin Palestine.
In 1897,a specialCommissionhad been set up in Jerusalemto try to
enforceentry restrictions.In September1899 the membersof this commissionsubmitteda reportto the AdministrativeCouncil.113Theyfound
that 'in someway'the 1891restrictionshad beenenforcedonly as regards
Jews from Russia, Rumania,Austro-Hungary,Greece and Persia, and
even these Jews had not seriouslybeen barredfrom enteringPalestine;
otherJewshad been admittedfreely.In 1897the restrictionswereapplied
morestrictlyby the Commission,but Jewscould alwaysenterPalestineas
pilgrims,and once in the countryit was virtuallyimpossibleto makethem
leave. It was difficultto identify them, since the registerswere in such
disorderthat no Jew's recent arrivalcould be proved. Moreover, the
consulsresistedthe expulsionof theirproteges.Therewereso manypoints
at which Jews could enter Palestine-by sea or overlandfrom the north
and south-that officialsacceptingbribescouldnot be detected;and there
was little point in searchingout the offendersif they werenot punishedas
at the present.The Commissionofferedvarioussuggestionsto make the

OTTOMANPOLICY AND JEWISH SETTLENENT

327

restrictionsmoreeffective:an enlargedpoliceforce,full-timeimmigration
commissions in Jaffa and Jerusalem,compulsory registrationof all
foreignersin the country,and cash rewardsfor exposingillegallyresident
Jews and corruptofficials.Above all, the cooperationof the consulswas
absolutelyessential.Alternatively,Jewswishingto settleshouldbe allowed
to do so, providedthat they adoptedOttomannationalityon arrival.But
at all costs an end had to be put to the chaosin Palestine.
The Portewas slow to face up to all the pointsbeingraisedby the local
authorities,but it could not possiblyignorethe constantflow of Jewish
immigrantswishingto settlein Palestineand otherpartsof the Empire-if
only because its representativesabroad continued to write about the
numbersapplyingfor visasand becausemanyJewish6migr6sfromRussia
were in evidencein Constantinople.Bad harvestsand anti-Semiticoutbreaksled to a furtherincreasein JewishemigrationfromRumaniain 1899.
Thereuponthe Council of Ministerscut back to one month the period
permittedto JewishpilgrimsreachingPalestine,and also orderedthe local
authoritiesto take a record of the details in Jewishpilgrims'visas on
entry.114 Thatwinterit was rumouredthatthe OttomanGovernmentwas
makingland availableto Jewsin Anatolia.Consequentlyfifteenhundred
RumanianJewishfamilies(as well as two hundredJewishfamiliesfrom
Bulgaria)appliedto the Porte for concessionsof land.115 This led the
Porte,in May 1900,to informthe Mutasarrif of Jerusalemthat 'following
inquiriesmade by Jewishemigrantsfrom Rumaniaand other countries',
only Muslim immigrantswere to be allowed to settle in the Mutasarriflik. 116 A monthlater,the Portesentthe foreignmissionsa Note Verbale
advising them that Jews would no longer be allowed to disembarkat
Constantinopleandinvitingthe Powersto requesttheirrespectiveshipping
companies not to book passages for Jews intending to settle in the
Empire.117 The Powers(includingRussia)rejectedthis Note in the same
way as they had disposedof a similarrequesta decadeearlier.118
For all this, growingnumbersof Jewscontinuedto reachPalestine,and
in April 1900the Mutasarr!fof Jerusalemsent the GrandVezira synopsis
of the report submitted the previous autumn to the Administrative
Councilby the local Commissionwhichwas supposedto enforcethe entry
restrictions.Two monthslater,in June,a committeeof enquirymadeup of
threeseniorofficialsfromthe Ministriesof Warand InternalAffairs,and
fromthe Cadastrewassentto Palestine.119OfficiallythisCommissioncame
to investigatequestionsconcerningland purchasesand buildingon the
colony at ZikhronYa'aqovbut Aaron Aaronsohn,the agronomist,who
testifiedbefore the commissioners,was alarmedat their inclinationto
overstepthe boundariesof theirformalmandateand interestthemselvesin
widerquestionsof Jewishsettlementin Palestine.120 Then in the autumn
of that yearthe Councilof Ministersconsolidatedthe regulationsgoverning Jewishentryand land purchasein Palestinewith a view to solvingall
the problemswhichhad troubledthe local authoritiesin recentyears.121
As fromJanuary28, 1901,122 Ottomanand foreignJews'longresident'
in Palestineandthose 'whoseresidenceis not prohibited'wereto enjoythe
samerightsas otherOttomansubjects.Theycouldbuymiri landandbuild
on it in accordancewith the Land Code. Thus, by this simplestep, the

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MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

status of Jews illegally resident for many years in Palestinehad been

regularised.They were to be treatedas Ottomansubjects,and they, like
all Ottomans,could buy land and build on it. Similarlythe disabilities
previouslysufferedby OttomanJewson accountof the recentimmigrants
had beenremoved.However,it was still forbiddenfor any propertyowner
to assistrecentJewishimmigrantsto remainin Palestine.
Therewerechangesin the regulationsregardingJewishpilgrimsas well.
They were no longer requiredto pay a cash deposit guaranteeingtheir
departureafter one month as previously.Instead,all Jews visiting Palestine as pilgrims(includingOttoman subjects)were to surrendertheir
passportsor papers on entry, and in exchangethey were to receive a
residencepermitallowingthemto stay in Palestinefor threemonths.This
permit,costing one piastre,was to differin form from other documents
givento visitorsenteringPalestine,and it soon becameknownas the 'Red
Slip' becauseof its colour. It was to be handedback when the pilgrims
departed,so thata checkcouldbe kepton JewsvisitingPalestine.Detailed
statisticswere to be compiledat the end of each month to enable the
authoritiesto expelpilgrimswhosepermitshad expired.Ottomanofficials
were warned that failure to enforce these orders would be severely
punished.
But, carefullydraftedas they were, the consolidatedregulationswere
fatally flawed. Jews could still enter Palestineas pilgrimsand certain
categoriesof Jewsillegallyresidentin Palestinehad beengrantedthe right
to purchaseland. And, on top of that, the Powersdid not waste time in
unceremoniously
rejectingthe new regulations.123
Herein lies a paradox. The Ottoman Governmentwas opposed to
modernJewishsettlementin Palestinefromthe outset.It had good reasons
for its oppositionandthesereasonsgrewstrongerwiththe passageof time.
It knew of Herzl'sideas well beforethe Zionist Movementwas founded.
Abdiulhamidtoo was personallyinvolvedand opposed. Ottomanpolicy
was thusclearand constant.It was quicklybackedup with restrictionson
Jewishentryinto Palestineand land purchasethere.And, for all that, it
failed.
But the paradox,as the phrasehas it, was more apparentthan real.
Importantdefectsin the Government'spolicy have been mentioned.But
therewas anotherreasonfor the failureof Ottomanpolicytowardsmodern
Jewishsettlementin Palestine.It lay in the veryrealdifficultiesinvolvedin
puttingthe policy into practicein Palestine.This aspect of the question
formsthe subjectof a secondarticlewhichis to appearin the nextnumber
of thisjournal.
NOTES
This articleis largelybased on archivalmaterialin the AllianceIsraelite Universellein
Paris(designated'AIU' in the references);the CentralZionistArchive,Jerusalem(CZA);
the Israel State Archive, Jerusalem(ISA (G) & ISA (T) for German and Turkish
materialrespectively);the Jewish ColonizationAssociation, London (JCA); the Public
RecordsOffice,London (FO & PRO (G) for Britishand Germanmaterialrespectively);
the OttomanForeignMinistry,Instanbul(OFM); and the Quaid'Orsay,Paris(Q d'O).
Otherabbreviationsusedin the referencesareas follows: Consple.(= Constantinople);
Damas. (= Damascus); Dir. Gen. (= Direction Gdnerale);Enc. (- Enclosure);
Jerus.(= Jerusalem);Kay.(= Kaymakam); Min. (= Minister);Mutas. (= Mutasarrif);

OTTOMAN
POLICYAND JEWISHSETTLEMENT

329

Pres. (= President); SP (= Sublime Porte); Tel. (= Telegram); T? Turkish([Ottoman] pounds).

I. OFM Carton208, Dossier 139. Althoughcatalogued,this file cannot be found in
the OFM archive.
2.

L. Oliphant, The Land of Gilead (London, 1880, pp. 502-10.

3. JewishChronicle,no. 650, September9, 1881.

4. Ibid.,no. 652, September23, 1881.
5.

Havazzelet, xii, 41, September 1, 1882; cf. The Levant Herald, iii, 444, November

24, 1881.
6. Ha-Meliz,xviii, 16, May 9, 1882.
7. TheTimes,no. 30,521, May 31, 1882.
8.

S. Yavne'eli, (ed.), Sefer ha-ziyyonut: tequfat hibbat ziyyon (Tel Aviv, 1961), i,

209-14.
9. C. Chissin,Miyyomanahadha-biluyim(Tel Aviv, 1925),p. 9, July 24, 1882.
10. Yavne'eli,op. cit., i, 209.
11. TheTimes,no. 30,521, May 31, 1882.
12. State Dept., Papers, 1882, pp. 516-17, no. 319, July 11, 1882; L. Wallace
(Consple.)to F. T. Frelinghuysen(Washington).
13. Ibid.,pp. 518-19,enc. 2 to no. 319, June 13, 1882, Wallaceto Said Pasa (SP).
14. Cf. FO 78/3394, no. 1155, December30, 1882, H. Wyndham(Consple.)to Earl
Granville(FO).
15. A. Druyanow, (ed.) Ketavim letoldot hibbat ziyyon ve-yishshuv erez yisra'el

(Odessaand Tel Aviv, 1919,1925and 1932),i, 37-8, June24, 1882,L. Oliphant(Consple.)

to D. Gordon [Lyck].
16. Ibid.,i, 318-23,November13, 1884,J. RivlinandY. M. Pines(Jerus.)to Gordon.
17. A. Druyanow,Pinskeruzemano(Jerusalem,1953),p. 191.
18. Druyanow,Ketavim,i, 321, November13, 1884;cf. Y. Ya'ariand M. Charizman,
Sefer ha-yovelpetahtiqva(Tel Aviv, 1929),pp. 174, 238 and 240.
19. FO 195/1581,no. 9, March 5, 1887, N. T. Moore (Jerus.)to Sir W. A. White
(Consple.).
20. FO 195/1581,no. 9, March5, 1887.
21. State Dept., Papers, 1888, ii, 1559-60, no. 57, January28, 1888, 0. S. Straus
(Consple.)to Secy. of State Baynard;and ISA(T), no. 47, December15, 1887, Ministry
of InternalAffairsto Mutas.(Jerus.).
22. FO 78/3394, no. 1155, December30, 1882, Wyndhamto Granville.
23. Letterof December20, 1883,I. Fernandezand S. Bloch (Consple.)to S. Hirsch
(Miqve Yisra'el), published in I. Margalith, Le Baron Edmond de Rothschild et la
colonisation juive en Palestine, 1882-1889 (Paris, 1957), p. 204.

24. State Dept., Papers,1888,ii, 1559?60,no. 57, January28, 1888.

25.

Yavne'eli, op. cid., i, 66; I. Klausner, Hibbat ziyyon berumanya (Jerusalem, 1958),

pp. 137?9;and K. S. Wissotski, Qevuzatmiktavim(Warsaw,1898),p. 62, April 5, 1885.

26. State Dept., Papers, 1882, pp. 517-18, enc. 1 to no. 319: Rumanianpetition.
27. Yavne'eli,op. cit., i, 214-15.
28. Chissin,op. cit., p. 9, July24, 1882.
29. Wissotski,op. cit., p. 55, April 2, 1885 and pp. 74-5, April 4, 1885.
30. T. Herzl, Der Judenstaat(Vienna,1896).Subsequentreferencesare to S. d'Avigdor's translation,TheJewishState (London, 1946).
31. Herzl,JewishState, pp. 29-30.
32.
33.

Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 30.

34. JewishChronicle,no. 652, September23, 1881.

35. Klausner,op. cit., pp. 110-11.
36. D. Farhi, 'Documents on the Attitude of the Ottoman Governmenttowards
Jewish Settlementin Palestineafter the Revolution of the Young Turks (1908-1909)'.
Unpublishedpaper given at Jerusalem,1970, p. 2, quoting C. R. Atilhan, 31 Mart
Faciasi (Istanbul,1956),pp. 43-4.
37. FO 78/4450, no. 34, February9, 1892, Sir E. Baring(Cairo)to Lord Salisbury
(FO).

330

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STUDIES

38. A. Galant6, Recueilde nouveaxdocumentsineditsconcernantl'histoiredes Juifs

de Turqluie.
(Instanbul,1949),pp. 36-40.
39. T. Herzl, TheCompleteDiaries, R. Patai (ed.) and H. Zohn (trans.);(New York
and London, 1960),i, 345-6, May 7, 1896.
40. Ibid.,i, 366 ff. June 17, 1896,whereHerzl calls Ziya Pasa 'Ziad'.
41. Loc. cit.
42. Ibid.,i, 378, June 19, 1896.
43. Ibid.,i, 394-6, June 26, 1896.
44. Ibid., i, 383, June 20, 1896.
45. Ibid., i, 401, June 29, 1896.
46. Ibid., i; for Halil Rifat's opposition, pp. 375-6, June 19, 1896, p. 383, June 21,
1896,pp. 400-1, June 29, 1896;'IzzatPasa al-'Abidwas 'bluntlynegative'at first.p. 371,
June 18, 1896,but laterwarmedto the idea in a modifiedform, p. 383, June20, 1896and
pp. 394-5,June 26, 1896,cf. p. 400, June29, 1896;IbrahimCavid'sinterestand reservations, pp. 371-2, June 18, 1896, and then 'categorically... in favour', p. 401, June 29,
1896.
47. Ibid.,ii, 508, January7, 1897; indeedthe Neue FreiePresse had publishedantiOttomanarticles:ibid.,ii, 481, October 13, 1896and ii, 491, October22, 1896.
48. Ibid.,ii, 517, February20, 1897.
49. PRO (G) K 692/Ttirkei195, no. 49, June 19, 1897, von Tischendorf(Jerus.)to
Reichskanzler(Berlin).
50. The group did not travelto Palestineas supportersof Herzl-see Herzl Diaries.
ii, 513, January29, 1897.
51. PRO (G) K 692/Tirkei 195, no. 49, June 19, 1897.
52. JCA 279/no. 26, August 5, 1897,J. Ni6go (Miqve Yisra'el)to Pres.,JCA (Paris).
53. AIU I.G.I., October29, 1897, Fernandezto AIU (Paris).
54. E.g. OFM 332/17, no. 9550/63, April 29, 1898, Ali FerruhPasa (Washington)to
Tevfik Pasa (Consple.); no. 23598/216, June 8, 1898, Antopulos (London) to Tevfik
Pasa; nos. 28858/74 and 28859/96,both July 9, 1898, Tevfik Pasa to MahmudNedim
Pasa(Viennaand AhmedTevfik Pasa (Berlin);nos. 23600/182,July 21, 1898and 23612/
189,July 28, 1898,both MahmudNedim Pasato Tevflk Pasa.
55. E.g. OFM 332/17telegramno. 58, April21, 1898,Ali FerruhPasato TevfikPasa.
56. JCA 280/ [unnumbered],February13, 1900, Niego (Smyrna)to Pres., JCA.
57. Herzl, Diaries,ii, 712, October 15, 1898.
58. Ibid., ii, 813, April 2, 1899.
59. Ibid., iii, 1092, May 8, 1901.
60. Ibid.,iii, 1110ff. May 19, 1901.
61. Ibid.,iii, 1131ff. May 21, 1901.
62. A. Vamb6ry,'MeineErinnerungenan Dr Herzl',Die Welt,xiv, 20 (1910),p. 479.
63. Herd], Diaries, iii, 1215-33, February 15-18, 1902; and ibid., iv, 131-342,
July 25-August2, 1902.
64. Ibid., iii, 1222, February17, 1902.
65. Ibid.,iii, 1256, March 14, 1902; iv, 1319,July 27, 1902; iv, 1331,July 31, 1902;
and iv, 1341, August 2, 1902.
66. E.g. ibid.,iv, 1617-19,March 12-October4, 1904.
67. JCA 267/no. 129, August25, 1905,A. Ant6bi(Jerus.)to Pres.,JCA.
68. JCA 261/enc. to no. 338, August 30, 1905,Ant6bi to Dir. Gen., JCA (Paris).
69. JCA 267/no. 129, August 25, 1905; and CZA Z2/598, September4, 1905, both
D. Levontin(Jaffa)to D. Wolffsohn(Cologne).
70. CZA W 35/4 (Wolffsohn'sincompletediary of his visit to Constantinople,for
October 25-November3, 1907); and CZA W 35/5 (notes by Wolffsohnand his companion, Dr N. Katzenelsohn).
71. Ha-maggid,xxvi, 28, July 19, 1882.
72. Therewereno Capitulationswith Rumania(independent1878)or with Bulgaria
(still nominallytributaryto the OttomanEmpirein 1882).
73. ISA (G) A I19, no. 858, July 12, 1882,von Tischendorf(Jerus.)to Reichskanzler
(Berlin);cf. Havazzelet,xii, 35 July 7, 1882.
74. FO 195/1410,no. 86, October24, 1882,G. J. Eldridge(Beirut)to Lord Dufferin
(Consple.);and enc. 1 to no. 97, November29, 1882,N. Vitale (Latakia)to Eldridge.
75. FO 78/3506,enc. to no. 48, January22, 1883,Wyndhamto Granville:'Notifica-

OTTOMAN
POLICYAND JEWISHSETTLEMENT

331

tion officielle'(n.d.).
76. Cf. Havazzelet,xiii, 9, February16, 1883.
77. FO 195/1447,no. 3, January 16, 1883, Eldridgeto Dufferin; and Havazzelet,
xiii, 9, February 16, 1883; cf. The Times, no. 30,730, January 30, 1883, letter from
L. Oliphant(Haifa),enclosingorder,dated December26, 1882,from Vali(Sam) to Kay.
(Haifa).
78. Havazzelet,xiii, 9, February16, 1883; cf. ibid., 15, April 6, 1883 and ibid., 16,
April 15, 1883.
79. ISA (T) no. 89, March4, 1884: minutesof this meeting(copied to Jerusalem).
80. ISA (1) no. 84, April8, 1884,Ministryof InternalAffairs(SP) to Mutas.(Jerus.).
81. ISA (T) no. 89, March4, 1884.
82. Havazzelet,xiv, 23, May 2, 1884.
83. E.g. FO 195/1612,no. 15, May 29, 1888, Moore to White.
84. Texts of American,Frenchand BritishNotes refusingto acquiescein the Porte's
regulationspublishedin State Dept., Papers,1888,ii, 1588-91,dated May 17, 23 and 24,
1888, respectively.
85. Ibid., p. 1619, October 4, 1888, translationof Note Verbale(SP) to American
Embassy(Consple.);cf. FO 195/1607,October6, 1888,White to Moore.
86. 0. Straus, UnderFour Administrations:
From Clevelandto Taft (Boston, 1922),
p. 80; cf. Wissotski,op. cit., pp. 71-2, April 2, 1885:reportof conversationwith Haham
Bast(Consple.);ibid.,p. 62, April 5, 1885,Wissotskito L. Pinsker(Odessa);Druyanow,
Ketavim,i, 280, May 26, 1885, A. Veneziani(Consple.)to Pinsker;and OFM A/346,
Note Verbaleno. 19, January14, 1887, RussianEmbassy(Consple.)to SP.
87. OFM A/346, no. 6682/1022,May 30, 1891,DikranEfendi(Odessa)to Said Pasa
(SP).

88. Farhi,op. cit., p. 2, quoting Atilhan, pp. 43-4.

89. Loc. cit.
90. OFM A/346, no. 100791/156,July 13, 1891, Said Pasa to Hiisni Pasa (St.
Petersburg);and no. 100954/126A, August 1, 1891,same to same.
91. Havazzelet,xxi, 36, July 3, 1891; and ibid., 37, July 10, 1891. The Grand Vezir
was also respondingto a telegramfrom Jerusalemnotablesprotestingagainstcontinued
Jewish immigration-cf. FO 195/1727, no. 25, July 16, 1891, J. Dickson (Jerus.) to
E. Fane (Consple.).
92. OFM A/346, no. 101693/170A, August 18, 1891, Said Pasa to Hiisni Pasa.
93. OFM A/346, Note Verbale,no. 701718/82, October 19, 1891, SP to Foreign
Missions (Consple.); cf. October 26, 1891, Said Pasa to Ottoman representatives
(Europeancapitalsand Washington).
94. FO 78/5479,enc. to no. 473: Note Verbale,no. 103, November 19, 1891, British
Embassy(Consple.)to SP.
95. OFM A/346, many despatchesand telegramsbetweenSaid Pasa and Ottoman
representativesin Russia from end 1891 to end 1893; finally, evasive Note Verbale,
no. 836, November29, 1893, RussianEmbassy(Consple.)to SP.
96. Ginsberg,'Emet me-erezyisra'el' (1891), republishedin Kol kitve Abadha-'Amn
(Tel Aviv, 1961),p. 26.
97. FO 195/1765,no. 35, December30, 1892,Dickson to Sir F. C. Ford (Consple.).
98. FO 195/1765,no. 35, December30, 1892,enc., December22, 1892;FO 195/1806,
encs. 1 and 2, March22 and 23, 1893,to no. 19, April 29, 1893, Dickson to Ford; and
ISA (G) A III 14, December16, 1892, I. Frutiger& Co. (Jerus.)to von Tischendorf.
99. CZA (A), January25, 1893, Note Verbale,Italian Embassy(Consple.) to SP;
February7, 1893, Note Verbale,Austro-HungarianEmbassy(Consple.) to SP.
100. ISA (G) A XXII 18, April 3, 1893, Note Verbale,SP to German Embassy
(Consple.); cf. FO 195/1789,enc., April 3, 1893, to no. 278, July 23, 1893: copy of
identicalNote to Italian Embassy(Consple.).
101. JCA 263/enc.2 to no. 9, July 14, 1899,Mutas.(Jerus.)to GrandVezir(SP).
102. This agreementis referredto in JCA 263/enc. to no. 26, November 14, 1899:
Resolution of Admin. Council (Jerus.).
103. JCA 263/enc.to no. 26, seeks guidancefrom Min. of InternalAffairsand refers
to two previousinquiries,dated August 15, 1898and December17, 1898.

332

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104. ISA (T) no. 86, July 9, 1898, Admin. Council (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir and Min.
of Internal Affairs (Consple.), referring to order dated May 17, 1898 from latter to
Mutas. (Jerus.).
105. ISA (1) no. 86.
106. ISA (T) no. 15, August 10, 1898, Grand Vezirate to Mutas. (Jerus.).
107. ISA (T) no. 14, August 20, 1898, Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezirate.
108. FO 78/5479, enc. 1 to no. 542: Note Verbale, September 19, 1898, SP to British
Embassy (Consple.); cf. Note Verbale, September 19, 1898, in ISA (G) A XXII 18, SP to
German Embassy (Consple.).
109. Documents Diplomatiques Franpais, 2nd Series, i, 187, no. 146, March 19, 1901,
T. Delcasse (Paris) to J. Constans (Consple.), refers to Note Verbale, September 24, 1898,
French Embassy (Consple.) to SP; ISA (G) A XXII 18, Note Verbale, September 28,
1898, German Embassy (Consple.) to SP; FO 78/5479, enc. 2 to no. 542: Note Verbale,
September 30, 1898, British Embassy (Consple.) to SP.
110. FO 78/5479, no. 542, October 13, 1898, Sir N. O'Conor (Consple.) to Salisbury.
111. State Dept., Papers, 1898, p. 1093, no. 25, November 22, 1898, Straus to J. Hay
(Washington).
112. State Dept., Papers, 1898, p. 1093, no. 25; cf. FO 78/5479, no. 7, February 9,
1899, Dickson to O'Conor; and FO 78/5479, no. 83, February 24, 1899, O'Conor to
Salisbury.
113. ISA (T) no. 93, April 28, 1908, Mutas. (Jerus.) to Grand Vezir, enclosing
synopsis of this report, dated September 30, 1899.
114. Ikdam, no. 1898, October 16, 1899.
115. JCA 280/ [unnumbered letter], February 13, 1900, Nidgo (Smyrna) to Pres., JCA.
116. AIU IV E 11, July 3, 1900, Antebi to Pres., AIU, enclosing copy of 'ordre
viziriel', May 18, 1900, to Mutas. (Jerus.).
117. FO 78/5479, enc. to no. 230: Note Verbale,June 27, 1900, SP to British Embassy
(Consple.).
118. Powers' Notes of rejection in OFM A/346.
119. FO 195/2075, enc. to no. 51, July 1, 1900, J. H. Monahan (Haifa) to Sir
R. Drummond-Hay (Beirut).
120. Letter, July 2, 1900, A. Aaronsohn (Zikhron Ya'aqov) to Dr H. Joffe, in
A. Samsonow, Zikhron Ya'aqov: parashat divre yameha (Zikhron Ya'aqov, 1943),
pp. 261-3.
121. JCA 264/enc. to no. 76 [n.d.] Min. of Internal Affairs to Provincial Governors
(ISA (T) no. 30 gives date as November 29, 1900).
122. ISA (G) A XXII 18: circular, January9,1901, Mutas. (Jerus.) to consuls (Jerus.);
cf. FO 78/5479, enc. to no. 34: Note Verbale, November 21, 1900, SP to Missions
(Consple.), giving notice of the new entry regulations, but merely stating that the land
purchase prohibition remains in force.
123. CZA (A), Note Verbale no. 784/61, December 10, 1900, Italian Embassy
(Consple.) to SP; and ISA (G) A XXII 18, Note Verbale, January 16, 1901, German
Embassy (Consple.) to SP; cf. State Dept., Papers, 1901, pp. 517-18, no. 354, February
28, 1901 and Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 2nd series, i, 187, no. 146, March 19,
1901, Hay and Delcass6, instructing their respective embassies at Constantinople not to
comply with the latest directives.