GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T.

QUIJANO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees.
J. Alaric P. Acosta for petitioners-appellant.
Esperanza Valenzoga for respondents-appellees.

BARREDO, J.:.
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in its Special Civil Case No. 2519,
dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed therein by the herein
petitioners-appellants Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenio T. Quijano to compel the herein respondent-appellee
Development Bank of the Philippines to accept said petitioners-appellants' back pay certificate payment of their
loan from the said appellee Bank, and to restrain the herein respondent-appellee ex-oficio sheriff of the province
of Misamis Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties the abovenamed appellant spouses had mortgaged with the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the loan
aforementioned.
The said appealed decision was based on the following:
STIPULATION OF FACTS.
The undersigned parties, thru counsels, hereby submit the foregoing stipulation of facts, to wit:
I. That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500.00;
II. That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution No. 2533 on April 30,
1953;
III. That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent-bank on March 23,
1954;
IV. That the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several releases, subject among
others, to the following conditions:.
"(1) That the amount of P4,200.00 shall be released only after:.
"(a) the execution and registration of the mortgage contract;
"(b) the presentation of a duly approved building permit;
"(c) the construction has been started and the value of the work done amounted to P6,500.00;.
"(d) the submission of the certificate of title covering Psu-136173, free form any encumbrance and
"(e) the submission of evidence showing full payment of current estate taxes;
(2) That the subsequent releases shall not be more than 100% of the value of the construction completed in
excess of P6,500.00; that all releases shall be made against the payroll of workers engaged in the project,
receipts of all materials used and that there are no unpaid labor or unpaid materials;

(3) That a sufficient amount may be withheld until the building is completed and painted and found in accordance
with the plans and specifications submitted;
(4) That the amount of insurance of the building, when completed, shall not be less than P18,000.00, which shall
be secured by the mortgagee, in accordance with its Board Resolution No. 3395, series of 1947;
(5) That the construction and painting of the building shall be completed within 120 days from the date of the
mortgage contract;
(6) That the release of this loan is subject to the availability of funds;
(7) That the lien appearing on the face of the title shall be cancelled, otherwise, Luciana Jimenez shall sign as
co-mortgagor; that this mortgage contract was registered on March 23, 1954 with the Register of Deeds of
Misamis Occidental at Oroquieta;
"V. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent
thereafter;
"VI. That as of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the respondent-bank, including
interests, was P13,983.59;
"VII. That on July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181, wrote the
respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the
respondent-bank, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;
"VIII. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his
offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897
was approved;
"IX. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis City Branch, filed on October 14, 1965, an application for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners, and that acting on the application of the
respondent-bank, the Provincial Sheriff, thru his deputies, scheduled the public auction sale for January 18,
1966, after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the respondent-bank;
"X. That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16, 1966 to February 18,
1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale."
Upon these facts and the submission of the parties that the only issue is whether or not the obligation of the
petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20,
1953 to Republic Act 304, the original back pay law, the trial court dismissed the petition, as already stated, and
directed respondent sheriff to proceed and continue with the public auction sale of the property mortgaged in
accordance with the foreclosure application of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines after due notice
to petitioners. In their appeal, petitioners' sole assignment of error is that: "The trial court erred in declaring that
the loan of the petitioners-appellants was not subsisting when Republic Act No. 897 was enacted on June 20,
1953."
The appeal has no merit.
The pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the aforementioned Back Pay Law, as amended by
Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953,1 read as follows:.
SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof
and within one year from the approval of this Amendatory Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be
promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right to the
Salaries and wages as provided in section one hereof and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the
applicant which shall state the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall
be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without
interests: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the

Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering
the whole or a part of the total salaries and wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and
recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the
applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Amendatory
Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities,
or the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same
for such settlement; ...
It is indeed settled that under the above provisions, the Government or any of its agencies does not have any
discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates, 2 when they are used by the applicants or original holders themselves for the
settlement of any of the obligations or liabilities specifically enumerated in the law. 3 It is equally clear, however, that the same provisions
expressly require that the obligations for which certificates of indebtedness may be accepted as payments of
must besubsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897; hence when, as in the instant case, such back
pay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of an obligation thereto which was not
subsisting at the time of the enactment of said amendatory Act on June 20, 1953, which corporation may not, legally
be compelled to accept the certificates.
It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on April 80,
1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they executed the
mortgage contract only on March 23, 1954, and furthermore, that the release of the amount of the said loan of
P19,500.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions by said appellants.
Under these circumstances, Our ruling in the case of Rodriguez vs. Development Bank of the Philippines 4 is
controlling.

In that case, Rodriguez obtained a loan from the said Development Bank of the Philippines to be received by
him in several releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and conditions specified in the loan
agreement. Pursuant to said agreement, Rodriguez received the first release in the sum of P5,000.00 on May
27, 1953, while the subsequent releases covering the P9,000.00 balance of the loan were all availed of and
received by him later than June, 1953. Later, Rodriguez paid the installments as they fell due. When a balance
of about P10,000.00 remained unpaid, Rodriguez offered to pay the said outstanding balance of the loan with his
back pay certificate. The Bank refused at first to accept the said tender of payment in certificate, and when it
accepted the same later, it limited its acceptance only to the amount of P5,000.00 representing the portion of the
loan released before the passage of Republic Act No. 897, although the amount of the back pay certificate
offered by Rodriguez was more than sufficient to cover the total unpaid balance of the loan. So, Rodriguez
instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Davao to compel the Bank to accept his back
pay certificate in payment of his whole outstanding obligation or, in other words, even for the portions of the loan
corresponding to the releases made after June 20, 1953. This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon
appeal to this Court, the dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale:.
It can not be said that appellant became indebted to the Bank for the total amount of P14,000.00 from the date
of the agreement. The releases of the balance of the agreed loan were made dependent on certain conditions
(see additional conditions mentioned in paragraph 4 of the stipulation of facts, supra) among which is the
availability of funds. Non-compliance with any of these conditions will not entitle the appellant to the release of
the balance of the agreed loan and conversely, will not entitle the bank to hold the appellant liable for the
unreleased amounts. Consequently, we hold, as did the trial court, that:.
"... the amounts released in July, 1953 and thereafter cannot be considered as obligations subsisting in June,
1953. The defendant may be compelled to accept a back pay certificate in payment of obligations subsisting
when the Amendatory Act was approved (Sec. 2, Republic Act 897). Republic Act 897 was approved on June
20, 1953. The defendant may not be compelled to accept plaintiff's back pay certificate in payment of the
amounts released after June 20, 1953."
t.hqw

The case of Sabelino v. RFC (G.R. No. L-11790, Sept. 30, 1958) relied upon by appellant is irrelevant, as the
mortgage indebtedness sought to be paid with appellee's back pay certificate therein, appears to have subsisted
prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 897. ...
Herein appellants' situation is even worse than that of Rodriguez. Here appellants actually availed of their
approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the corresponding

releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the mortgage contract on March 23,
1954. Undoubtedly, notwithstanding the approval by the appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of
appellants' loan application on April 30, 1953, appellants did not thereby incur any obligation to pay the same;
only after the corresponding amounts were released to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation
attach; and it cannot, therefore, be said that the said loan was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval
of Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953.
It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was approved by the
appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was perfected between them and said Bank, but it should be
noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of the Bank to grant
the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same could not have arisen until after the
amount of the loan has been actually released to them; and said release was even subject to their compliance
with certain conditions specified in the mortgage contract executed after the approval already of Republic Act
897. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled
veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or
contributed to the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve sympathy,
for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy
veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives and orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the
sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the
last war." (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74, as quoted
in Florentino, et al. vs. PNB, 98 Phil. 959, 961-963). On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for
interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This
Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. 5 No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It
must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.6 Thus, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law
limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this
Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.
t.hqw

Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24, 1948, they could not validly seek to discharge it
by application of their back pay certificate under Republic Act 304, on June 18, 1948, because that Act, in terms,
limited any such application to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act". (Sec. 2) 7

G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor
Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals presents.
Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of the Philippines" found
in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code 1 as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that,
coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products,
which is the flour produced. 2 That way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section
by respondent Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, as the construction it would place
on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not to mention the
policy of the Act. We affirm.
In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was an
appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of P7,948.00 as
wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows: "Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation,
primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process
of milling. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or
bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the
breakwater The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the
sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest." 3 The only issue, in the opinion of
respondent Court, is whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. The main
contention before respondent Court of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or
government facilities [were] utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is contrary to
law." 4 On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for
wharfage dues "upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of
the non-use of government-owned or private wharves." 5 Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken
by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our
decision in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs. 6 It did not feel called upon to
answer the question now before us as, in its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its
memorandum.
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its construction of
the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are not "products of the
Philippines", coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from abroad, and being "merely parts of
the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste." 7 We find, to repeat, such
contention unpersuasive and affirm the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all
articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ... exported from the
Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ...." One category refers to what is
imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does
appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the
above section. Petitioner appeared to have entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent
Court, it categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In
the process of milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports
abroad."8 It does take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste"
resulting from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines. It is
always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that

application is impossible or inadequate without them." 9 Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a
doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as
that. 10

2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While statutory construction
involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on one's predilections as to what policy
should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a reasonable interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the
reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
obviously means." 11 To paraphrase Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly,
the utmost effort should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory language in its total
context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom in the
construction of statutes to accept their view advanced by petitioner.
3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the legislative
purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt
as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be
attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute
may be contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to
prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and
Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such
efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not
respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has
never recommended itself. It does not now. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed. With costs
against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER,
ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.
Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can
pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.
Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view
that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and
members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that
the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them
and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to
desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing
Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the
litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2

The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17,
1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living
allowances. 4Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging
illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living
allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by
the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for
yes and three voted for no." 6The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood
filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for
obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that
defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for
the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike
against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition
for certiorari.

Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents to answer and set the
plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order
was issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July
20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered
by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6
thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12

On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent
Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation
in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant
petition has merit and should be given due course."

He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this Court
after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree
No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral
and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of
employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further
amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those
based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement,
except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee
relations unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional
trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is

This is to be compared with the

former phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change
with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or
claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment."

20

Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie,
respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.
1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein
provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court
judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit
for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the
law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior
toLizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call
for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It
is so even after the lapse of sixty years. 24
2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions.
They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that
ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike.
In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice
Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this
Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery
of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case."27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law.
Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction
of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took effect
on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based
on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by
law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations,

unless expressly excluded by this Code."

Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30

28

That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not followed by
private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On
this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of
Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the question involved was the failure of
the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number,
back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor
dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in the
first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would
not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this
notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift
their picket line and start returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for
reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for
Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is
certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately
return to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory
arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the
light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court
of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.
4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear
that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be
affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was
referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association
of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor
matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view
that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36 Certainly,
the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of
greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what
essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of
disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.