B265753

IN THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
LEONARD NORMAN COHEN,
LC INVESTMENTS, LLC
Plaintiff and Respondent
v.
KELLEY A. LYNCH
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
CASE NO. BC338322
JUDGE ROBERT HESS
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Kelley Lynch
1754 N. Van Ness Avenue
Hollywood, California 90028
323.331.4250
In Propria Persona

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY . 7
ARGUMENT.10
CONCLUSION 35
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT .. 38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119-20, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989)
Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128 [185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874]
Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 [150 Cal. Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942]
Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390
Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1045
Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691
Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 929, 933
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991)
City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (1989)
Clark v. United States, 298 U.S. 1 1933
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)
Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4 th 831, 841
County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1226
County of Ventura v. Tillett (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105, 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741
Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 502
Dill v. Berquist Construction Co., 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 746
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)
Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Company, 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 (1985)
3

In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1295

In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 114 (1974)
In re Marriage of Melton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 931, 937
In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342
Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472
Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333
McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]
Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 290-291, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 602
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1187, 1208 & n.25; 1211
n.27, 1218-19(1999)
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 59697 (1978)
Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574, 122 P.2d 564
Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4 th, 1, 20
Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 669, 884 P.2d 126
Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)
Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co., (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228. 51
Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 18 414
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 111 U. S. 637
4

Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 154, U.S. 46

Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Lyon (1980) 165 Cal.Rptr. 95, 105 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 13
Selma Auto Mall v. Appellate Department (1996) 33 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1683
Shamblin v. Brittain, 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 (1988)
Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 (1878)
Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 267 [279 Cal. Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418]
Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-1117
[222 Cal. Rptr. 556]
Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1988) 33 Cal. 3d 348, 355
[188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 657 P.2d 365], citing to 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal,
244
STATUTES
Code of Civil Procedure Sections 415.20, 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, and 416.90
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008
Evidence Code Section 956
CONSTITUTION
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
California Constitution
MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES
3 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE, (1st ed. 1938), 60.03; 126 A.L.R. 386
7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, 286, p. 828
9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal 198201, pp. 274278
5

Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, 126 with 121

FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 1233

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

Appellant Kelley Lynch was Leonard Cohens personal manager, and worked in other
capacities (although never as his business manager), for approximately seventeen years. As
of October 2004, Cohen understood that Lynch had or planned to report allegations related
to tax fraud to Internal Revenue Service, and demanded that she meet with him and his
personal tax and corporate lawyer, Richard Westin, privately hand over corporate books and
records, and assist with the unraveling of certain entities and transactions. Lynch refused.
Lynch addressed the background information, and blatant retaliation, quite specifically in the
declaration she submitted to the trial court supporting her motion for terminating sanctions
(fraud upon the court). (Cohen Aug. 29 147, Unredacted.) The record includes: a sixvolume clerks transcript (CT), two volume supplemental clerks transcript (Supp. CT),
one volume augmented record (Aug. CT), Cohens motion to augment granted July 26,
2016 (Cohen Aug.), Lynchs Opposition to Cohens Motion to Augment (Lynchs
Opposition), and all documents and records on file with this Court.
INTRODUCTION
In this appeal, Lynch challenges the June 23, 2015 order denying her 2015 Motion
(fraud upon the court), and contests the trial courts May 29, 2015 order redacting her
declaration and a portion of the evidence she filed in support of her 2015 Motion. Lynch
supported her motion with extensive evidentiary submissions. (AOB 3; 6 CT 1359-1374;
Aug. CT 35-155.) Lynchs opening brief argued that the trial court abused its discretion
when it wrongfully mischaracterized her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the
court) as a motion to reconsider and, in a separate hearing, improperly sealed evidence.
(AOB 1-3). Lynchs opening brief argued that extrinsic and intrinsic fraud are not mutually
exclusive. (AOB 10). The fact of the matter, with respect to this so-called case, is that both
types of fraud are present and have been used to tamper with the administration of justice
while depriving Lynch of her right to due process. (AOB 12.) Lynch was not served the
summons and complaint, the proof of service is evidence of extrinsic fraud, there is now
perjury with respect to service, the documents Respondents submitted to the trial court in
7

response to her motion to vacate were replete with fraudulent misrepresentations and
perjured statements, the court had no jurisdiction over her, the legal pleadings have been
used to obtain fraudulent federal and state tax refunds fraudulently and falsely accusing
Lynch of misappropriation, Lynch was deprived of a fair and meaningful hearing, and
Lynch was not notified of entry of the default judgment. Lynchs opening brief satisfactorily
set forth and argued that the Courts denial of her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud
upon the court) and sealing order were an abuse of discretion. (AOB 4.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents argument, with respect to their attempt to reargue and misrepresent the
issues on appeal, is entirely flawed. Lynch did not present, as Respondents have alleged in
their Reply Brief, a one-sided recitation of the facts favorable to her without regard to
Cohens evidence or the trial courts findings. Her Opening Brief set forth the following
facts:
On August 15, 2005, Respondents filed a Complaint with LA Superior Court, Case
No. BC338322. (1 Supp. CT 137.) On May 15, 2006, a default judgment was entered
against Lynch. (CT 197.) The proof of service (CT 149) was evidence of extrinsic fraud.
On August 9, 2013, after relocating to Los Angeles, Lynch diligently filed a motion to vacate
the fraudulently obtained default judgment. (CT 001 Supplemental Transcript, Volume I of
II). On January 17, 2014, Lynchs motion to vacate was denied. (CT 1149.) Although
ordered by the Court to do so, Plaintiffs failed to file an order for the Court to execute and
enter into the record and failed to serve Lynch any such proposed order. (CT 5.)
On March 17, 2015, due to the use of extensive fraudulent misrepresentations,
blatantly false accusations, and perjured statements in their response documents including
those specifically related to service of process - Lynch filed a motion for terminating
sanctions (fraud upon the court) and asked the court to vacate the January 17, 2014 decision
procured through fraud, issue terminating and/or other sanctions, and refer Leonard Cohen
and his legal representatives, Michelle Rice and Robert Kory, to the District Attorney for
perjury prosecutions (CT 985) and the California State Bar for disciplinary action. (CT 6
984, Volumes I through IV.)
8

On March 1, 2015, Lynch submitted a declaration, supported by extensive evidence,

to Internal Revenue Service and other authorities. CT 40. She ultimately decided to submit
that declaration to the trial court with her motion for terminating sanctions as it specifically
addressed a great deal of the fraudulent and perjured legal pleadings and declarations,
submitted to LA Superior Court in Case No. BC 338322. Many of the LA Superior Court
legal pleadings and declarations subsequently transmitted to Internal Revenue Service and
other tax authorities which then relied on them to issue Leonard Cohen fraudulent tax
refunds. (CT 6.)
On May 29, 2015, Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC filed an ex parte order
to seal corporate property, property belonging to Lynch, evidence submitted to the U.S.
District Court in Colorado, evidence submitted to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, documents available for purchase on Pacer, and other evidence. On
May 29, 2015, Los Angeles Superior Court granted the ex parte application to seal portions
of the court record. (CT 1, 36, 150, Augmentation Volume 1 of 1.)
On July 28, 2015, Kelley Lynch filed appeals with respect to the denial of her motion
for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court) and the order sealing portions of the court
record. The appeals were consolidated. (CT 1371, 1373.)
Respondents simply used their disingenuous argument, falsely alleging that Lynch did
not accurately present the record, as an opportunity to reframe and reargue their case and
the underlying merits of the motion for terminating sanctions itself. Additionally,
Respondents Reply Brief was submitted to this Court a week late following two separate
requests for extensions of time and should be disregarded in its entirety. With respect to
Respondents position that Lynch did not present facts favorable to Respondents, Lynch will
remind this court that her appeal relates to a motion addressing fraud upon the court. That
fraud has now infested the appeal process itself. Lynch is under no legal or ethical obligation
to advance fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements, or any type of deception into
a legal proceeding. This is an unconscionable abuse of process.
Respondents Brief: Lynch has twice attacked the 2006 default judgment. The first time was a motion to
vacate filed in 2013, in which claimed that she was never served with Cohens summons and complaint. (1
Supp. 1-100 [2013 Motion].) The trial court denied the motion with prejudice because Lynch did not
9

establish that Cohens proof of service was false and did not demonstrate extrinsic fraud (1 CT 5; 5 CT
1159B, 1159G; Cohen Aug. 150, 153.) Lynch repackaged the same arguments in a 1,100 page Motion
for Terminating Sanctions that she filed in 2015 (2015 Motion). (1 CT 6 5 CT 1133.) The court
granted Cohens motion to seal some of Lynchs evidence, and denied the 2015 Motion as fundamentally
flawed because it was, in effect, a motion for reconsideration filed fourteen months after the court denied her
2013 Motion seeking equitable relief from the 2006 default judgment. The court concluded that Lynch did
not show new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and without showing extrinsic fraud. (Cohen Aug.
150-156, 164.) RB 8-9.
Lynch did not repackage the arguments made in her 2013 Motion to Vacate when
she submitted her 2015 Motion for Terminating Sanctions to the Court. Lynchs 2013
Motion to Vacate argued that she was not served Cohens summons and complaint, the
proof of service was evidence of extrinsic fraud, the court lacked jurisdiction over her, and
the judgment was void. While these facts with respect to service, lack of jurisdiction, and the
void judgment remained the same at the time Lynch filed her 2015 Motion for Terminating
Sanctions, that motion addressed Respondents, and their attorneys, use of fraudulent
misrepresentations, fabricated evidence, perjured statements, and other misconduct
committing fraud upon the court in the legal pleadings and declarations submitted to the
trial court in response to Lynchs 2013 Motion to Vacate. (CT 6 34; 5 CT 34 1133).
Void judgments are ineffective and unenforceable. County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1226. For that reason, an order incorrectly denying relief from a void
judgment is also void, as it gives effect to the judgment. Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 684, 691.
Respondents themselves have argued: A factual presentation that is but an attempt
to reargue on appeal those factual issues decided adversely to the trial level is doomed to
fail. In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507. Nevertheless, twenty-three
pages out of the forty-two page Reply Brief restate and reargue Respondents case and
attempt to argue the merits of the underlying case.
Due to the fact that Leonard Cohen and his legal team have transmitted the extensive
fraudulent and perjured legal pleadings and declarations in this case to Internal Revenue
Service, Franchise Tax Board, and other authorities, Lynch will privately address the
fraudulent misrepresentations and blatantly false statements that now infest this appeal with
10

those authorities. Respondents have also used their new case statement to insert unrelated
matters, such as the settlement with Richard Westin, into their Brief. Lynch assumes they
are attempting to include that and other unrelated matters in future res judicata and/or
claims preclusion arguments. This is another tactic Respondents have used against Lynch.
ARGUMENT
I.

Respondents Are Bad Faith Litigants Who Have Engaged in Fraud Upon
the Court

In addition to wielding its inherent power, there are other vehicles including dismissal by which a court may sanction a bad faith litigant. Cases involving such nefarious litigation
conduct have been decided by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), the plaintiff obtained a patent
by concocting a fraudulent trade journal article praising its glass-making device as
revolutionary. The article was used to persuade the Patent Office to issue a patent. The
plaintiff then relied on the fraudulent article to obtain a judgment for patent infringement
against a business competitor. In the instant case, Respondents have used their complaint,
other legal pleadings and declarations signed under the oath of perjury, to fraudulently
persuade the court to enter default judgment against Lynch. The default judgment
wrongfully converted Lynchs property, the property of corporations (including at least two
suspended corporations), to Leonard Cohen and his wholly owned LC Investments, LLC.
Leonard Cohen then used the fraudulent legal pleadings and declarations to persuade
Internal Revenue Service and Franchise Tax Board to accept Cohens tax returns, amend
others, and apply for and obtain fraudulent tax refunds. However, in this case, Lynch was
not served the summons and complaint and there is indeed extrinsic fraud, and now perjury,
with respect to the proof of service.
When the fraud in Hazel Atlas was uncovered, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the
judgment. Justice Hugo Black, addressing the plaintiffs manipulation of the judicial process,
explained the legal rationale as follows: Tampering with the administration of justice in the
manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a
wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in
11

which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.
Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246. For approximately 80 years now, the U.S. Supreme Court has
illuminated the appropriate legal remedy for holding the unscrupulous litigant accountable.
The opinion did not refer to the distinction between extrinsic or intrinsic fraud.
It is well established that a trial court may use its inherent power to sanction parties that
intentionally abuse the litigation process, such as those who perpetrate fraud on the court.
See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). Because this kind of fraud is so
insidious, the penalties a court may impose on a bad faith litigant who attempts to defile the
sanctity of the judicial process are justifiably stiff and include sanctions of dismissal and
default. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119-20, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989)
(Appellant chose to play fast and loose with [defendant] and with the district court. He was
caught out . . . Appellants brazen conduct merited so extreme a sanction . . . and the court,
jealous of its integrity and concerned about deterrence, was entitled to send a message, loud
and clear).
When fraud has been discovered and exposed, the consequences ought to be severe
enough to inhibit and repel repetition rather than serving to reward the abusive litigant. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit skillfully defined the concept of fraud
upon the court in Aoude, supra at 1118, as follows: A fraud on the court occurs where it can
be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some
unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to
adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the
presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.
When fraud upon the court is demonstrated, a trial court has the inherent power to take
action in response to the fraudulent conduct. As the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, in
Hazel Atlas, dismissal of claims or an entire action may be warranted by the fraud.
II.

A Void Order, Issued Without Jurisdiction, Is Appealable

Lynch did not file a motion to reconsider. She filed a motion for terminating sanctions
specifically addressing fraud upon the court. Her motion addressed the egregious use of
fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements, and blatantly false accusations in the
12

documents and declarations submitted to the trial court in response to Lynchs motion to
vacate. Lynch has continuously maintained that she was not served the summons and
complaint, the proof of service is evidence of extrinsic fraud, the court did not obtain
jurisdiction over her, and the original default judgment is void. She has also maintained that
all judgments emanating from the original void order are void as well. That would include,
but is not limited to, the trial courts January 17, 2014 decision. A void judgment is
appealable.
Although certain post-judgment orders are appealable (see 904.2, subd. (a)(2)), not
every post-judgment order that follows a final appealable judgment is appealable. Lakin v.
Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651. A post-judgment order is
appealable if it satisfies two additional requirements, one of which is that the issues raised
by the appeal from the order must be different from those arising from an appeal from the
judgment The reason for this general rule is that to allow the appeal from [an order
raising the same issues as those raised by the judgment] would have the effect of allowing
two appeals from the same ruling and might in some cases permit circumvention of the time
limitations for appealing from the judgment. (Ibid.) There was no appeal from either the
original default judgment or the January 17, 2014 decision.
Witkin describes four exceptions to the general rule that an order denying a motion
to vacate is non-appealable. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal 198201, pp. 274
278.) An order may be appealable if (1) there is no effective appeal from the judgment, (2)
the appellant was not an original party to the action, (3) the motion to vacate is authorized
by statute, or (4) the motion seeks to vacate a void judgment. (Ibid.) At least two of the
exceptions apply in this case.
A judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction over the parties. Lack
of jurisdiction in this fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear
or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.
Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691 (Carlson). In a broader sense, lack of
jurisdiction also exists when a court grants relief which [it] has no power to grant. (Ibid.)

13

In Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 929, 933, an order denying a motion to
vacate a judgment was held to be appealable where the appellant claimed the judgment was
void because she was not personally served and the respondent committed extrinsic fraud by
obtaining an order reflecting service by publication. Moreover, in Carlson, supra, 54
Cal.App.4th at p. 696, an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment was held to be
appealable where the trial court lacked authority to enter a judgment based upon a purported
stipulation to which both parties had not agreed, as the trial courts action was not merely a
mistaken application of the law or a grant of excess relief, but a complete absence of power
to accord relief, a judgment completely outside the scope of the courts jurisdiction to grant.
. . . (Ibid.)
In her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court), Lynch moved to set
aside the May 15, 2006 default judgment and all resulting judgments. She argued the original
default judgment, and all decisions emanating therefrom, were void due to lack of service.
Lynchs argument, in her Opening Brief, set forth the fact that the trial court lacked
fundamental jurisdiction to act and/or that it acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction.
Therefore, Lynch has presented arguments that the order is appealable which include the
trial courts lack of jurisdiction.
III.

Lynchs Opening Brief Cites the Evidence Fairly, Accurately, and Provides
Meaningful Argument; She Has Not Waived Any Claim of Error
A. The Abuse of Discretion Standard

An important consideration in any appeal is the applicable standard of review. The

California Supreme Court has described the standard as whether the trial court exceeded
the bounds of reason. See Shamblin v. Brittain, 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 (1988). Other courts
have offered similar definitionsas one court put it, an abuse of discretion occurs only
when it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the
same circumstances. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 114 (1974). The varying
definitions have evidently led to heavy criticism. One appellate court complained that the
abuse of discretion standard is so amorphous as to mean everything and nothing at the
same time and be virtually useless as an analytic tool. Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan
14

Company, 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 (1985). Another court noted that such pejorative
boilerplate is misleading since it implies that in every case in which a trial court is reversed
for abuse of discretion its action was utterly irrational. City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207
Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (1989).
The court in City of Sacramento v. Drew, concluded: very little of general significance
can be said about discretion. The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled
power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing
the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is
shown. Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1988) 33 Cal. 3d 348,
355 [188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 657 P.2d 365], citing to 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971)
Appeal, 244. The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e.,
in the legal principles governing the subject of [the] action .... Action that transgresses the
confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call
such action an abuse of discretion. (See Hurtado, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 1022.) If the
trial [207 Cal. App. 3d 1298] court is mistaken about the scope of its discretion, the mistaken
position may be reasonable, i.e., one as to which reasonable judges could differ. (See, e.g.,
the majority and dissenting opinions in Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal. 3d 128.) But if the
trial court acts in accord with its mistaken view the action is nonetheless error; it is wrong on
the law. The legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action vary greatly with
context. (See Hurtado, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023.) They are derived from the
common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred.
Here the principles are embodied in a question of equity. The court exercises not
only statutory but also common law and equity jurisdiction. Courts have inherent equity,
supervisory and administrative powers. Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 [150
Cal. Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942]) as well as inherent power to control litigation before them.
Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-1117
[222 Cal. Rptr. 556]. Inherent powers of the court are derived from the state Constitution
and are not confined by or dependent on statute. Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.
3d 257, 267 [279 Cal. Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418].
15

The pertinent question is whether the grounds given by the court for its denial of
Lynchs motion for terminating sanctions were appropriate given the fact that her motion
was not a motion for reconsider and specifically addressed fraud upon the court. The trial
court erroneously applied the incorrect legal standard, and erred in its interpretation of the
facts, when construing Lynchs motion addressing fraud upon the court as a motion to
reconsider.
It has generally been stated that the acts for which a court of equity will on account
of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree between the same parties rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction have relation to frauds extrinsic or collateral to the matter
tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered.
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 (1878). There is little doubt that the majority
state rule is that the only type of fraud for which a court of equity will upset a judgment is
extrinsic fraud; that intrinsic fraud does not afford ground for relief. a Cf.
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, 126 with 121. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS,
1233; 3 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE, (1st ed. 1938), 60.03; 126 A.L.R. 386. Extrinsic
fraud is illustrated by McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 237 Pac. 42 (1925), where
the fraud alleged was the failure to notify interested parties of the pendency of a suit.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rendered decisions, in Hazel-Atlas and Throckmorton, that
have concluded that dependent upon the facts, extrinsic and intrinsic fraud constitute
grounds for setting aside a judgment. The allegations of Lynchs motion for terminating
sanctions clearly stated claims related to fraud on the court. The trial court identified the
incorrect legal rule to apply to the relief requested. Lynch requested appropriate relief for
both the extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch asked the
trial court to refer Cohen and his lawyers, Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, to the District
Attorney for perjury prosecutions and the State Bar for disciplinary actions.
United States Supreme Court precedent confirms that the court retains the power to
set aside a judgment that defiles our system of justice. The integrity of the civil litigation
process depends on truthful disclosure of facts. A system that depends on an adversarys
ability to uncover falsehoods is doomed to failure, which is why this kind of conduct must
16

be discouraged in the strongest possible way. A courts inherent power to vacate a judgment
procured by fraud fulfills a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in
certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence
to the rule that a final judgment is typically binding and final. Hazel- Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co. In Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme Court recognized that relief from a
judgment obtained by fraud on the court is warranted even where the underlying action
settled. 322 U.S. at 243. The Supreme Court stated: Every element of the fraud here
disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently
begotten judgments. Id. at 245. The majority ruled that relief was warranted despite Hazels
apparent lack of diligence in raising the fraud sooner. Id. at 245-46. The proper focus is the
integrity of the judicial process itself. See id. at 246.
Respondents have perpetrated an unconscionable plan or scheme to defraud the
court and defile our system of justice. Hazel Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250. The fraud upon the
court is based on the parties overall course of conduct as well as separate acts of
malfeasance and warrant relief from judgment. Because the focus with respect to fraud
upon the court is on the court itself, focusing on whether the consequence of that fraud is
final between the parties misapprehends the nature of the question presented.
B. The Opening Brief Does Not Violate Basic Rules Governing Appeals
Respondents Brief: The appellant must discuss all the evidence supporting the courts ruling;
otherwise the point is waived. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881. When a
party does not present evidence favorable to the respondent, the appellate court may presume the record
contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact by the trial court. Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Cashel & Emily (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218. Lynchs Statement of the Case presents only
Lynchs version of the evidence and omits the conflicting evidence favorable to Cohen that supports the trial
courts findings. (AOB 1-3.) Instead, Lynch tries to reargue the facts already decided against her. For
example, Lynch continues to assert, as she did in both her 2013 and 2015 Motions, that she was not
served the summons and complaint or legally notified of the entry of the default judgment (AOB 1.) But
Lynch cites merely to the proof of service, without identifying any record evidence to support her contention,
while avoiding the Edelman declaration that Cohen submitted to show all the details of service and notice.
(AOB 1-3; see 1 Supp. CT 136 2 Supp. CT 201.) RB 27.
Lynchs Opening Brief addressed evidence favorable to Leonard Cohen. It also
referred the Appellate Court to the entire record as the evidence submitted to the trial court,
while substantial, supports her argument that the proceedings were tainted by fraudulent
17

misrepresentations, perjured statements, and blatantly false accusations. Lynchs Opening

Brief addressed the fact that Leonard Cohen and Michelle Rice submitted declarations to the
trial court arguing that Lynch was the Jane Doe who was subserved. (AOB 10.) Lynch
was not the individual subserved. No female co-occupant existed. Lynch and her son, John
Rutger Penick, know of no such individual, and Respondents did not provide the court with
any evidence whatsoever related to the Jane Doe. They argued that Lynch was the Jane
Doe although she did not resemble the individual described in the proof of service.
Furthermore, Lynchs Opening Brief referred to approximately six (6) declarations
submitted to the trial court rebutting the allegations that she resembled the individual in the
proof of service, was in fact the Jane Doe who was allegedly subserved, had a female cooccupant, or was in fact served and/or subserved. See Declarations of Joan Lynch
Declaration (CT 184-255), John Rutger Penick (CT 257-260), Paulette Brandt (CT 262-274),
Clea Surkhang (Westphal) (CT 276-277), Palden Ronge (CT 279-281), and Daniel J. Meade
(CT 283 287), and CT 1215 - 1345. Ann Diamonds declaration (CT 1327 1333)
addressed the fact that, as a former friend and lover of Leonard Cohens, she understands
that Cohen makes false accusations about others, relies on gossip to advance his cause,
moves offensively to destroy people when forced to confront troubling situations, is a
skilled fabricator, and is a master manipulator [who] becomes ruthless and will go to
great lengths to see you neutralized and destroyed. Lynch also submitted a declaration (CT
1217 - 1260) in support of her motion for terminating sanctions. All seven (7) declarations,
submitted to the trial court in support of Lynchs motion for terminating sanctions, have
been submitted to this court and can be reviewed at CT 1215-1345. The record contains
evidence to sustain Lynchs argument that her motion is not a motion to reconsider, she was
not served the summons and complaint, and intrinsic and extrinsic fraud are not mutually
exclusive. Scott Edelmans declaration does not show all the details of service and notice.
His statements with respect to Chad Knaaks phone call are entirely hearsay and should be
disregarded in their entirety. Furthermore, the hearsay statements of Edelmans assistant are
inaccurate. Lynchs email to Edelman stated: If you try to serve this fraudulent lawsuit on
me one more time, I will hold you personally responsible for mental duress. (2 Supp. CT
18

152) Individuals who are properly served do not inform people that If you try to serve this
fraudulent lawsuit and inform opposing parties, and their representatives, repeatedly and
consistently that they were not served. Cohen, a wealthy individual with a team of
professional lawyers, had every opportunity to serve Lynch. He simply elected not to.
With respect to the Respondents position that Edelman continued to mail court
filings to Lynchs last known address (1 Supp. CT 142), and to provide her with electronic
copies of all filings, including Cohens request for entry of default, and information about
upcoming court dates and hearings. As of December 28, 2005, Lynch was homeless. At
no time did she have the ability to open, download, read, review, or print email attachments.
Furthermore, as the record clearly indicates, Lynch was not served the summons and
complaint and had no knowledge or awareness of the actual allegations in the complaint
until April 2010 when unauthenticated, and potentially fraudulent, copies of a handful of
documents were posted online by an individual who has stalked, harassed, and terrorized
Lynch, her family and friends for a period of approximately seven years. This individual also
routinely submits fabricated and fraudulent information to Lynch and other third parties.
The record also clearly indicates that Lynch and Cohens attorneys of record did not have an
agreement to serve her electronically. Part of the reason for that fact was Lynchs inability to
access or review attachments and, at times, emails themselves.(1 Supp. CT 142-145; 2 Supp.
CT 176-180, 187.)
Additionally, Lynchs Opening Brief, as stated above, addressed the declarations used
to support the motion for terminating sanctions. Paulette Brandts declaration confirmed
that she was at Lynchs home on August 24, 2005 (the day the process server allegedly
subserved Jane Doe), was present for Chad Knaaks call to Edelmans office, heard Chad
inform Edelmans office that Lynch was not served, and heard Lynch advise Chad to further
inform Edelman that she had reported allegations that Cohen committed tax fraud to IRS
and viewed the lawsuit as retaliation. (RT 1279.) Rutger Penicks initial declaration
confirmed that he resided with Lynch, they did not have a female co-occupant; he knew of
no individual who resembled Jane Doe; no one was advised to evade service; he personally
was home on August 24, 2005 (the day the process server alleged to have served Jane
19

Doe), he was present when Lynch came into his room (where he and Chad were) and asked
Chad to phone Cohens lawyer and advise him that she had not been served and if Edelman
attempted to serve the lawsuit, Lynch would hold him personally accountable. Rutger
Penicks declaration also confirmed that, since 2005, Lynch has consistently maintained that
she was not served Cohens lawsuit and he was personally present on numerous occasions
when Lynch phoned Cohens lawyers to discuss the fact that she was not served and they
simply hung up on her. Rutgers declaration (RT 1299 1301.) Lynch submitted sufficient
evidence to the trial court with respect to the extrinsic fraud re. the proof of service. Cohen
and Rice have merely perjured themselves, in their declarations, in their attempts to argue
that Lynch was the Jane Doe who was served. She was not and, as of August 24, 2005,
Cohen had not seen Lynch since October 2004 and Rice had not met Lynch.
Respondents Brief: The appellant must identify where in the record evidence appears to support her
contentions The opening briefly repeatedly makes factual contentions without record citations. For
example, the factual assertions on page 2 of Lynchs opening brief are not supported by any record references.
Instead, Lynch refers to matters outside the record, such as another default judgment entered against her in a
separate case Cohen had brought against her for return of his personal and business records.
Lynchs Opening Brief contained sufficient facts and citations. She may have
inadvertently failed to include a citation with respect to the default judgment in the related
case (BC341120) but that matter is not outside the record and Lynch did, as the entire record
must be reviewed, refer this Court to the entire four volumes of material submitted in
support of her 2015 Motion, as it is important to take into consider the totality of
circumstances and entire record. (AOB 2, citing Clerks Transcript Volumes 1 IV.) The
Respondents are the individuals who introduced the related case into this matter. This was
addressed in Lynchs declaration and evidence submitted to the trial court with that
declaration. (Cohen Aug. Unredacted.) The Respondents resubmitted Los Angeles
Sheriffs Departments Inventory to this Court with their Motion to Augment the Record.
(Cohen Aug. 22.) Respondents refuse to provide Lynch with the proof of service in the
related case and therefore she is unable to address that particular default judgment which is
not a part of this appeal but was mentioned due to Respondents reliance upon it in
connection with their Ex Parte Application to Seal Records. (CT Aug. 1-8.) That document
20

contained the following allegations: On May 15, 2006, the Court entered judgment that
Defendant was not a rightful owner of any assets nor had any interest in any of Plaintiffs
business entities and was ordered to return all money (judgment was for $7,341,345.00) and
property of Plaintiffs that she wrongfully retained or transferred after her termination as
Plaintiffs business manager. On May 9, 2006, in a related case, Case No. BC341120, all
property of Plaintiff that was located at Defendants then residence 2648 Mandeville Canyon
Road, Los Angeles, 90049 was rightfully owned by Plaintiff and returned to him (see
Exhibits A and B to Plaintiffs Motion to Seal Portions of the Court Record for which
Plaintiff is concurrently requesting the Court take Judicial Notice.) Defendant has
disregarded these clear Court orders to return all of his personal and business property by
disclosing clearly confidential and privileged attorney-client communications, confidential
business agreements, and tax information in connection with Defendants Motion. Lynch
has disregarded no such order, does not have the proof of service and other relevant
documents (including Steve Lindseys declaration), has requested them repeatedly from
Respondents and their attorneys of record, and they steadfastly refuse to provide Lynch with
same. The writ of possession did not address or extend to corporate records, Lynchs
personal property, the property of Machat & Machat or Phil Spector, or other property that
was wrongfully seized and which most certainly are not Leonard Cohens personal property.
Therefore, Lynch did not refer to matters outside the record, including with respect to
another default entered against her in a separate case Cohen had brought against her for
return of his personal property and business records. RB 28. (AOB 2-3.)
IV.

The Trial Court Improperly Denied Equitable Relief from the Default
Judgment

Equitable relief from default judgment may be granted where a party was prevented from
participating in the action due to an extrinsic mistake of a third party, and this denied the
party a fair hearing. See e.g., Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472; Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 502; Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342;
Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 (relief from default with
evidence that papers were lost).
21

The Appellate Court, in Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co., (1998) 67

Cal.App.4th 1228. 51, held that a void judgment is subject to attack at any time and any
subsequent order denying a partys motion to vacate, giving effect to a void judgment, is
itself void.
A Void Judgment Is Subject to Attack At Any Time, Either Directly or By Way of an
Independent Action in Equity
A judgment void on its face because rendered when the court lacked personal or
subject matter jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief which the court had
no power to grant, is subject to collateral attack at any time. See County of Ventura v. Tillett
(1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105, 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741; disapproved of on other grounds by
County of Los Angeles v. Soto (1984) 35 Cal.3d 483, 198 Cal.Rptr. 779, 674 P.2d 750; see
also Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Lyon (1980) 165 Cal.Rptr. 95, 105 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 13.)
An attack on a void judgment may also be direct, since a court has inherent power, apart
from statute, to correct its records by vacating a judgment which is void on its face, for such
a judgment is a nullity and may be ignored. Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574, 122
P.2d 564. See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co.
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Is Inapplicable to Void Judgments
The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to void judgments. Obviously a
judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral
attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps
for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud. (7 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure, supra, Judgment, 286, p. 828.) See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co.
As discussed above, the amended judgment was void and of no effect In addition,
the trial court's subsequent order denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the amended judgment,
in that it gives effect to a void judgment, is itself void. County of Ventura v. Tillett, supra,
133 Cal.App.3d at p. 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741. While defendants are correct in stating that
the order denying the motion to vacate was itself appealable, plaintiff's failure to appeal from
it, thus allowing it to become final, makes no difference.

A final but void order can have

no preclusive effect. A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no
22

rights are divested.

From it no rights can be obtained.

proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.

Being worthless in itself, all

It neither binds nor bars any one.

Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390. See Rochin v. Pat Johnson
Manufacturing Co.
A. The Court Improperly Mischaracterized Lynchs 2015 Motion as a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Denying Lynchs 2013 Motion
to Vacate
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) provides that, within 10 days
after service of the order, a party may make a motion to reconsider based upon new or
different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a
satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. New
York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.
Lynch did not file a motion to reconsider. The trial court, at the June 23, 2015
hearing (See Cohen Aug. 148-167), found as follows:
Court: Ms. Lynch, this is your motion for terminating and other sanctions. This action was
originally filed many years ago in about 2005, and as a among other things, a Complaint for
breach of fiduciary duty against you. And a default judgment was entered against you on
May 15, 2006, and that default judgment has been subsisting since that time. In August of
2013, you filed a Motion to Vacate and/or Modify Default Judgment, and that was
eventually heard on January 17th, 2014. And in that motion, you argued that the judgment is
void and dismissal was mandatory because there was no jurisdiction over you because you
had never properly been served with summons and complaint. And at the conclusion of
that hearing, the motion to vacate was denied with prejudice on a variety of grounds, among
other things, that it was procedurally deficient because it did not it wasnt properly served
on Plaintiffs, your own declaration was unsigned, that you had not acted with diligence in
bringing the motion to vacate because you said you found out about the action in April of
2010 but did not seek to have this set aside until August 2013. You bore the burden of
persuasion that the Proof of Service was false, and you had not carried that burden of proof
because you had failed to produce any evidence of that beyond an unsigned declaration by
yourself and a signed declaration by your son that said only that you were home at all times
during 2005. And you did not demonstrate extrinsic fraud because you conceded you were
living in the home where the request where the Notice of Request for Default was sent,
and that you were home when the process server attempted to serve you on the six
occasions - before subserving the Jane Doe. Now, when the court made that order, at that
point you had a couple of options, and one of those was to let it go, and the second was to
take an appeal.

23

Lynch: Well, I was arrested on a related case and imprisoned

Court: Im not sure that theres any basis on which for me to act. This is not a proper
motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration under CCP 1008 has to be done
very promptly. Its about ten days. And you are supposed to present facts or new law that
could not have been presented the first time around And what you want me to do is you
want me to dismiss their complaint. And thats thats not an appropriate remedy, and,
procedurally, your motion is fundamentally flawed
Lynch: This is not a motion to reconsider. This is a motion addressing fraud upon the court
which was used to obtain the default judgment. I was not served. I was home. No one
came to my house.
Court: We have adjudicated that already.
Lynch: But it was obtained through fraud upon the court. Theres tremendous perjury,
fraudulent misrepresentations, and other things Ive addressed.
Court: Maam, if I remember correctly, the proof of service on the underlying case was filed
was signed by the California Registered Processor, and under Evidence Code Section 647,
the Affidavit of Service by a Registered Process Server carries a presumption of correctness
that affects the burden of producing evidence. It is not conclusive, but it affects the burden
of producing evidence, and it requires you, the person who is who is challenging that
service, to persuade me that it is incorrect. It is there is no doubt whatsoever that you
were living at the residence where the service was attempting to be made.
Lynch: Well, I was living there, but the service wasnt made
Court: The the process servers declaration did not say that you were personally served.
Lynch: Well, there was no other female co-occupant there, apart from Paulette.
Court: The process servers declaration says that a Jane Doe came to the door and then
and they subserved the Jane Doe after multiple attempts to serve you, and thereafter it was
mailed.
Lynch: Well, plaintiffs are arguing it was me, first of all.
Court: I dont know.
Lynch: But there was no [male] co-occupant, and no one has been identified, and I was
home at all times. My son, Rutger, lived with me, and his friend Chad Knaak at that point
was staying with us. On the morning where I was alleged served, Paulette Brandt who is
24

over here was with me. No one came to my house. So it is conceivable that a process server
lied or simply didnt come there.
Court: It is, but you have to it affects the burden of producing evidence, and
unfortunately you had the opportunity to present that in 2013, when you filed that motion in
August 2013.
Lynch: Well, actually, I didnt realize in 2013 that I would be confronting an inconceivable
amount of lies, fraud, and perjured statements. I mean the latest issue is that my sons friend
called a Scott Edelman to tell him I wasnt served. Theyre saying that means I was served.
Its preposterous. I have maintained for ten years that I was not served, and it defies logic
that Leonard Cohen, who has two law firms representing him, wouldnt have me properly
served immediately if I alleged that
Court: Did you get the summons and complaint in the mail?
Lynch: No I did not
Lynch: I still dont know if your order was entered. I mean, I was in jail. I got out of jail.
Jeffrey Korn had sent me an email on January 22nd saying I would like you to approve or
comment on this. When I got out of jail a number of months later, I called him. He said he
would serve me; I never received anything. I dont even know if an order was filed. Its not
on LA Superior Courts website. And he refused to serve me anything, which is pretty
fascinating.
Court: Is there anything else you would like to add?
Lynch: Yes. Im addressing fraud upon the court. And I think that you, sir, should address
the fact that this judgment was obtained through fraud and perjury, and it this is not a
motion to reconsider. This is a motion for fraud upon the court. (Cohen Aug. 148-167.)
Lynchs motion for terminating sanctions did not ask the trial court to reconsider the
following: (1) the motion to vacate was procedurally deficient but it wasnt properly served
on Plaintiffs (although it was properly served on Scott Edelman who confirmed receipt and
referred Lynch to Robert Kory, who was not the attorney of record); (2) that Lynchs
declaration was in fact signed as her appellate attorney, Francisco Suarez, transformed her
declaration and case history into Exhibit A and her sons declaration into Exhibit B; (3)
Lynch acted diligently and should not be prejudiced due to the fact that Cohen willfully
bankrupted her and prevented her from participating in litigation; (4) the Court itself misled
Lynch into believing she could simply show up with witnesses who would be permitted to
25

testify and incorrectly informed Lynch that her witnesses could not testify, when unavailable
and out of state, via CourtCall; (5) and/or that Lynchs sons declaration confirmed that they
had no female co-occupant, knew of no such person as described in the proof of service,
and the Jane Doe did not resemble Lynch. If Lynch had in fact decided to file a motion to
reconsider, these are the issues Lynch would have asked the Trial Court to reconsider.
Lynch did address, at this hearing, the fact that the original default judgment was void and
the court failed to obtain jurisdiction over her. Paulette Brandt was once again available, at
the June 23, 2015 hearing, and had hoped to testify. As her declarations clearly state, she
was present at Lynchs home on the morning of August 24, 2005. As for any arguments
with respect to why she did not receive the summons and complaint in the mail, Lynch does
not believe that speculating about either the process server or USPS is appropriate. Leonard
Cohen, or someone representing him, had attempted to change Lynchs mailing address to
his personal home address in Los Angeles so perhaps they actually were successful in that
regard. (4 CT 888-889.) It is impossible for Lynch to say with any degree of certainty.
Many of these issues were in fact addressed directly with the trial court at the January 17,
2014 hearing on the motion to vacate. (CT 1149 1159N.)
Lynchs motion for terminating sanctions did address new facts and/or evidence that
were unavailable to her as of the January 17, 2014 hearing. This was detailed for the trial
court in Lynchs Motion for Terminating Sanctions, her declaration, and all evidence
submitted with that motion. (1 CT 6 6 CT 1345.) That would include, but is not limited
to, the March 23, 2012 bail hearing testimony where Cohen testified that Lynch never stole
from him just his peace of mind and confirmed that he and Lynch were in a purely
business relationship. The entire basis for Respondents lawsuit against Lynch involves
misappropriation. The legal pleadings were used to obtain fraudulent tax refunds based
upon the complaint itself. Therefore, Cohens testimony that Lynch never stole from him is
highly relevant and material. Cohens testimony that he and Lynch were in a purely business
relationship is also relevant due to the fact that Michelle Rice submitted the fraudulent
domestic violence related orders, granted by LA Superior Court to Kory & Rice without a
hearing or evidence, with her declaration in response to Lynchs motion to vacate. Rice
26

attempted to argue that the fraudulent domestic violence related order prevented Lynch
from effecting service on Plaintiff LC Investments, LLC although Kory & Rice are the
registered agents for that entity which is now cancelled in the State of California.
Additionally, Lynch submitted the Boulder Combined Court email, and further evidence,
confirming that the Colorado order was not a domestic violence order although Cohen and
his attorneys, Kory & Rice, fraudulently registered it as such in California on May 25, 2011.
That particular matter is presently under appeal. This new evidence was submitted with
respect to perjured and/or fraudulent testimony, misrepresentations, or blatantly false
statements contained in Respondents documents filed in response to Lynchs motion to
vacate. With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch asked the trial court to refer Cohen, Kory
& Rice to the DA for perjury prosecutions and the State Bar for disciplinary action. (1 CT
28.)
Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to
establish personal jurisdiction. Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who
was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. Dill v.
Berquist Construction Co., 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 746. Lynch has
consistently maintained that Respondents failed to comply with the statutory requirements
for service of process, the court has no jurisdiction over her, and the default judgment is
void as are all judgments or decisions emanating therefrom.
B. Lynch Was Not Served and Did Not Have Actual Notice of the
Summons and Complaint
Neither Lynch, nor anyone in her home (including her two male co-occupants), were
served or subserved Respondents summons and complaint. The documents were not left in
the presence of a competent member of the household or person apparently in charge.
This issue, related to extrinsic fraud, has been addressed ad nauseum throughout the record
in this case, and Lynchs Motion for Terminating Sanctions addressed the fact that the
judsgment is void to the extent it provides relief which a court under no circumstances has
any authority to grant. Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th, 1, 20; Selma Auto Mall v. Appellate Department (1996) 33 Cal.App.4th 1672,
27

1683. No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the
court, or without notice to the party. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 154, U.S. 46. (1 CT
26.)
The Substituted Service on Lynch Did Not Comply with the Code of Civil Procedure
Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.20, subdivision (b), provides that if a copy of the
summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the
person to be served as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, they may
instead be served by leaving a copy of each at the persons usual place of abode in the
presence of a competent member of the household or person apparently in charge and
thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first class mail to the
person to be served at the address where the documents were left.
Lynch has disputed service of the summons and complaint. (AOB 10-11.) Lynch
had no female co-occupant, Respondents have identified no such individual, Respondents
have falsely argued that Lynch was the Jane Doe, and Lynch did not resemble the individual
described in the proof of service. See Declarations of Joan Lynch Declaration (CT 184-255),
John Rutger Penick (CT 257-260), Paulette Brandt (CT 262-274), Clea Surkhang (Westphal)
(CT 276-277), Palden Ronge (CT 279-281), and Daniel J. Meade (CT 283 287). The
declarations, personally signed by all declarants, can be reviewed at CT 1215-1345.
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that the court also discredited Lynchs
statement that the person who accepted the complaint was not Lynch herself and found that
Lynch had actual notice of the request for entry of default. (5 CT 1158-1159B). The trial
court informed Lynch, at the June 23, 2015 hearing, as follows: Court: The the process
servers declaration did not say that you were personally served. (Cohen Aug. 154) That
statement does not indicate that the Court determined that the person who accepted the
complaint was Lynch. No one at Lynchs home, including Lynch herself, was served.
On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment, the reviewing court
will not revisit the trial courts factual determination if supported by substantial evidence,
and will not second guess the trial courts credibility findings. Conseco Marketing, LLC v.
IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, 841.
A trial court may vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is
unavailable. Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 669, 884 P.2d
28

126. Appellant has carried the burden of proving that she is entitled to equitable relief.
Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 290-291, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 602. Lynchs
Opening Brief extensively addressed the trial courts equitable powers and explains how the
general principles apply to the specific facts of this case.
Lynch Did Not Have Actual Notice of the Summons and Complaint And/Or the
Default Proceedings
Respondents Brief: From the date the process server left eh summons and complaint with Jane Doe,
Lynch has repeatedly demonstrated that she had notice of the action. These demonstrations began the
afternoon of the substituted service of the summons and complaint at Lynchs residence with the call to
Edelmans office from Chad, threatening to assert mental duress if Edelman persisted in trying to serve
Lynch (1 Supp. CT 138), followed by emails from Lynch. (2 Supp. CT 152.) Lynch subsequently emailed
Edelman to say she would not attend the case management conference. (1 Supp. 139; 2 Supp. CT 154.)
Lynch does not deny receiving Edelmans notices or sending responsive emails. RB 36-37.
The above statements from Respondents Reply Brief misstate the facts and evidence.
On March 17, 2015, Lynch submitted a declaration to the trial court in support of her
motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court). That declaration, among other
things, addressed the perjured statements and misrepresentations in the declarations of
Leonard Cohen, Michelle Rice, Robert Kory, and Kevin Prins (Korys declaration
reintroduced Prins declaration into response documents related to Lynchs motion to
vacate). CT 985 1025. With respect to Edelmans declaration, and the call Chad Knaak
placed to Edelmans office, Lynchs declaration addressed the fact that all statements
Edelman made with respect to his assistant were hearsay, Lynch was not served the
summons and complaint and the proof of service was evidence of extrinsic fraud, why she
refused to provide a declaration from Chad Knaak (ongoing criminal harassment with
respect to her son, John Rutger Penick, and others), Lynchs confirmation that she was not
served and if Edelman attempted to serve her she would hold Gibson, Dunn accountable
for mental duress, the fact that the LA Times brought Cohens lawsuit to her attention, and
the fact that Edelman did not have the legal authority to serve her by email (including re. the
notice default judgment and all documents attached to his emails, sent while Lynch was
homeless, that she could not open, download, read, review, or print, and attending any

29

hearing would be preposterous as Lynch was unaware of the actual allegations set forth in
Cohens Complaint. CT 1021 1025.
Lynch was not served the summons and complaint. Understanding, through the LA
Times and other news outlets, that a complaint had been filed against Lynch is not service of
process. Lynch repeatedly contacted Respondents and their attorneys with respect to their
failure to serve her. The news accounts did not provide Lynch with the allegations set forth
in the complaint. A motion to set aside a judgment may be brought at any time despite a
statutory time bar where a party is able to establish that default was obtained through
extrinsic fraud. In re Marriage of Melton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 931, 937. Extrinsic fraud
occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present a claim or defense to the court
as a result of being kept in ignorance or in some other manner being fraudulently prevented
by the opposing party from fully participating in the proceeding. County of San Diego v.
Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228-1229. Extrinsic fraud is distinguishable from
intrinsic fraud, [which] goes to the merits of the prior proceeding and is not a valid ground
for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice of the action and has had
an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his
adversary but has unreasonably neglected to do so. Such a claim of fraud goes to the merits
of the prior proceeding which the moving party should have guarded against at the time.
In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1295. Because of the strong public policy
in favor of the finality of judgments, equitable relief from a default judgment or order is
available only in exceptional circumstances. (Gorham, supra, at pp. 1229-1230.) The trial
courts denial of equitable relief was an abuse of discretion. Lynchs Opening Brief
addressed her claims of extrinsic fraud. With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch believes
particularly based on the quasi-criminal nature of allegations related to misappropriation
that she had a right to confront the fabricated evidence used against her, fraudulent
misrepresentations alleged in the legal pleadings, and perjured statements submitted to the
court in declarations by Respondent and his representatives.
With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch continues to address that fraud with IRS,
FBI, DOJ, and other authorities, and asked the trial court to refer Cohen and his lawyers,
30

Kory & Rice, to the DA for perjury prosecutions and the State Bar for disciplinary action. (1
CT 28.) Lynch believes that is a completely appropriate remedy Lynch was absolutely
deprived of an opportunity to present a claim or defense to the court as a result of being
fraudulently prevented by the opposing parties from fully participating in the proceeding.
That warrants equitable relief. See County of San Diego v. Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1228-1229 which also held that a false proof of service essentially perpetrates a fraud on
the court which the court believed would be unfair, against the intent of the Legislature,
and a violation of fundamental due process.
The Gorham court stated that despite the strong public policy favoring finality of
judgments and the publics interest in these support cases, we will not compound the
miscarriage of justice in this case created by the lack of fundamental due process stemming
from the false proof of service filed by the DCSS that essentially deprived Gorham, the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (Id. at p. 1234,
quoting Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333.) The court held that under the
unique facts of this case, we conclude that once the court determined the default judgment
was void as a matter of law based on the lack of personal jurisdiction, it was required to
dismiss this action. (Ibid.)
C. The Court Erred in Precluding Live Testimony
Denying Lynch opportunity to call witnesses, confront adverse witnesses, and crossexamine witnesses was an abuse of discretion and violated Lynchs right to due process. The
opening brief addressed the fact that Lynch was not permitted to present witnesses, or
cross examine witnesses, at the hearing on the motion to vacate or with respect to the
motion for terminating sanctions. (AOB 11.)
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). The court had the
discretion to allow oral testimony and an opportunity for cross-examination. The
documentary evidence was incapable of replacing oral testimony. See Rosenthal v. Great W.
Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 18 414.
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In Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, held that the trial court is
empowered to hear and exclude oral testimony and that there are situations in which the trial
court should hear testimony and permit cross-examination. Lynch and Brandt, in their
declarations, explained to the trial court that due to information provided to them by court
personnel, they were led to believe that Lynch should simply show up at the hearing (on
January 17, 2014) with her witnesses, need not file additional documentation, and the trial
court did not accept CourtCall. As it turned out, this information was entirely incorrect.
Lynch should not be penalized for issues beyond her control. Furthermore, all of her
witnesses (including, but not limited to, Paulette Brandt, John Rutger Penick, Clea Surkhang,
Daniel Meade, and Palden Ronge, CT 1215-1345) were either available to testify, showed up
at the hearing prepared to do so, or were unavailable, out of the state or country, and were
willing to testify via CourtCall. This information was confirmed for the trial court in the
declarants declarations and/or letters they submitted to the trial court. The matter was also
addressed directly with the trial court during the January 17, 2014 hearing on Lynchs motion
to vacate. (5 CT 1148-1159N.)
The trial court provided Lynch with no reason for the decision to preclude oral
testimony and cross-examination. Cross- examination would have been particularly useful as
this is one manner in which parties are able to uncover and confront perjured testimony and
unreliable or fabricated evidence. As it is, the trial court could have simply decided that it
preferred the style in which Cohens declarations were written and, even if the statements
contained therein were untrue, they could not be confronted. The trial court was misled and
deceived by the declarations of Leonard Cohen, Robert Kory, Michelle Rice, Kevin Prins
(CT 985 1025) and the legal pleadings and declarations reintroduced to the court in the
documents they submitted in response to Lynchs motion to vacate. That would include,
but is not limited to, issues specifically related to the proof of service and effecting service
upon Lynch or Jane Doe.
The failure to permit live testimony, confrontation, and cross-examination was an
abuse of discretion, caused by errors on the part of the courts personnel, and deprived
Lynch of the right to a fair hearing. In the hearing on the motion to vacate, Lynch was
32

further prejudiced by the trial courts position that her declaration was unsigned. Lynch
authorized her former appellate attorney to sign her declaration and he elected to transform
her declaration and case history into a declaration, Exhibit A, and signed on her behalf. The
refusal to permit live testimony, confrontation, and cross-examination deprived Lynch of
due process.
V.

The Court Improperly Redacted & Sealed Lynchs Declaration & Evidence
Attached Thereto

The default judgment declares that Lynch has no interest in any of Cohens business entities, and ordered her
to return all of Cohens property that she wrongly retained after Cohen terminated her services. (Cohen Aug.
7, 11, 17; 2 Supp. CT 199.) But Lynch retained privileged and confidential documents belonging to Cohen,
and disclosed them and their contents in her motion for terminating sanctions as well as on her blog. (1 CT
74 4 CT 884; Aug. CT 1-2; Cohen Aug. 7-8, 11-12.) Cohen had never waived any privilege or
consented to disclosures of the information, and Lynch lacked authority to make those disclosures. (Aug. CT
1-2; Cohen Aug. 7-8, 11-12.) RB 38
The default judgment language is itself entirely fraudulent. Lynch had a legal interest
in Blue Mist Touring Company, Inc., Traditional Holdings, LLC, and Old Ideas, LLC. The
trial court wrongfully converted Lynchs property, and the property of corporations
(including at least two suspended corporations), to Leonard Cohen and his wholly owned
LC Investments, LLC. (AOB 14.) Lynch was excluded from attorney/client privileged by
Cohen who intentionally wrapped Richard Westin and Neal Greenberg, his representatives,
into attorney/client privilege with him. (6 CT 1219.) At no time was Lynch informed that
any of the documents under seal were privileged communications. To the extent that any
allegedly privileged or confidential information was provided to Lynch, which she in turn
relied on with respect to her federal and state tax returns and in other ways, the privilege was
waived. Furthermore, Lynchs communications to Cohen and his representatives, including
those arguing that the corporations did not have offices or clarifying her role in certain
transactions, K-1s, and corporate documents themselves are not Cohens privileged or
confidential communications. Lynchs Opposition, filed with this Court on July 11, 2016
addressed this more fully and attached a Crime Waiver Exception schedule. That
declaration, redacted by order of the trial court, and portions of the evidence attached
thereto, sealed by order of the trial court, is evidence related to a federal and state tax
33

controversy, all evidence supporting the declaration is evidence related to that controversy,
and the Crime Waiver Exception schedule should be taken into consideration with respect to
the sealing of Lynchs declaration and evidence.
Lynch Has Not Demonstrated Error in the May 29, 2015 Sealing Order
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that certain documents (corresponding to
Exhibits OO, QQ and RR to Lynchs Declaration) were not sealed by the trial court. Based
upon an order that includes evidence grouped together, and imprecise underlining, Lynch is
unable to discern precisely what is under seal. She has received Respondents Request for
Judicial Notice, filed one day after Respondents filed their late Brief, but is unable to
determine what the precise issue is. It is Lynchs understanding that Leonard Cohens
declaration in the CAK bond deal litigation before the Southern District of New York was in
fact submitted to the Court. Lynch does not agree with Respondents position regarding
what was or was not sealed by the federal courts and finds the argument that documents left
unsealed for ten to fifteen years and currently available through Pacer, Southern District of
New York, and U.S. District Court in Colorado totally unavailing. As Respondents Brief
was over one week late, and the Request for Judicial Notice filed a day after the late Brief,
Lynch asks this Court to strike the request from the record.
As for the Motion allegedly Lodging the proposed order related to the January 17,
2014 hearing, that information is not on LA Superior Courts website and the Court itself
recently confirmed that it is not in their database. In any event, Lynch was incarcerated
when Respondents allegedly served this document upon her, was not served, and after her
release from LA County Jail (related to the fraud domestic violence order), Lynch attempted
to have Cohens lawyer, Jeffrey Korn serve the document on her but he, in keeping with all
of Cohens lawyers and their conduct towards Lynch, refused to communicate with or serve
Lynch. San Diego v. Gorham addressed lack of service upon an inmate and that case would
most definitely apply to this situation.

34

The Wrongful Sealing Order, Default Judgment, January 17, 2014 Trial Court Order,
and Related Case No. BC341120
Respondents Brief: Regardless of whether the sealing order was proper, that is irrelevant to the fundamental
question of whether lynch is entitled to equitable relief from the 2006 default judgment. The few documents
that Lynch claims were improperly sealed have nothing to do with the reasons Lynch offers for setting aside
the 2006 default judgment.
The trial court has absolutely no jurisdiction to seal these documents. Lynch has
consistently maintained that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the fact that she was not
served the summons and complaint or notified of entry of default judgment. Respondents
are the individuals, through the documents (including Michelle Rices declaration, 5 CT 9871002) who introduced the related case (BC341120) into this matter. That case is not before
this court. That court was devoid of jurisdiction with respect to corporate property that was
not part of the writ of possession related to Cohens personal property. That would include,
but is not limited to, the property Lynch stored as a courtesy for Cohen from approximately
1996 and which he abandoned and failed to retrieve once they parted ways. Corporate
property is not Leonard Cohens personal property.
Leonard Cohens application to seal court records was and remains unjustified. The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a long-standing public right to access court records that
results in a presumption that anything filed with a court should be available to the public.
The public in general and news media in particular have a qualified right of access to court
proceedings and records. This right is rooted in the common law. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 59697 (1978). The First Amendment also confers on
the public a qualified right of access. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
580 (1980). Since the public has a First Amendment right of access to a court proceeding or
record, the sealing of the proceeding or record to preserve confidentiality must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling confidentiality interest.
As the California Supreme Court made clear in the palimony/fraud trial of celebrities
Clint Eastwood and Sondra Locke, the First Amendment and the common law provide a
presumptive right of public and press access to civil court proceedings and documents.
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1187, 1208 & n.25; 1211
35

n.27, 1218-19(1999). These rights do not simply disappear because the proceedings as in
the instant case - involve wealthy, powerful public figures represented by an army of
professionals. To the contrary, the publics interest in ensuring that equal treatment in such
cases is arguably stronger when public figures are involved.
Furthermore, the presumptive openness that applies to civil court proceedings and
records includes disputes involving personal relationships as in the Eastwood/Locke trial
in NBC Subsidiary as well as those involving personal financial matters - as in Burkle
v. Burkle (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1045, and the case at hand.
Despite this well-established right of public access, Respondent Leonard Cohen has
asked Los Angeles Superior Court and the Appellate Division to issue what are essentially
blanket sealing orders, as well as prior restraints on Lynchs speech, to conceal evidence and
information from public scrutiny.
Crime Fraud Exception
California Evidence Code Section 956 explains that there is no attorney-client
privilege if an attorney was sought or obtained to facilitate the commission or the planning
of a crime or fraud.
The crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is well established in
American jurisprudence. In a 1933 decision by the United States Supreme Court, Clark v.
United States, 298 U.S. 1 1933, the Court held that while there is a privilege protecting
confidential communications between a lawyer and a client, the privilege takes flight if the
relationship is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the
commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
The main issue on appeal is the fact that a Court decision, as well as the original
default judgment, was obtained through the use of extensive fraudulent misrepresentations,
the submission of perjured declarations and fabricated evidence, as well as through other
litigation misconduct. Therefore, this Court should promote transparency with respect to
the judicial decision-making process. The publics right of access serves that interest for our
court system.

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VI.

Due Process Violations

Kelley Lynch correctly contends that the cumulative effect of the fraud upon the

court, failure to serve Lynch, extrinsic fraud and now perjury with respect to the proof
of service, failure to permit Lynch to call and/or cross examine witnesses, and general
misconduct violated her right to due process and inconceivably harmed and prejudiced her.
The record establishes that Respondents, together with their attorneys, engaged in deliberate
and egregious misconduct. The trial courts judgments and orders were procured through
fraud upon the court and Lynch has requested a corrective remedy.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs any action of a State
through its legislature, its courts, or its executive officers, including action through its
prosecuting officers. In denying Lynchs motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the
court), the trial court has failed to provide her with a corrective judicial process. It seems
impossible to believe that the State of California, even if it has elected not to follow HazelAtlas, is without power to issue a remedial process when one is deprived of her property
without due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Upon the
state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and enforce
every right secured by that Constitution. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 111 U. S. 637. In
view of the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Appellate Court should not
simply assume that the state has denied to its court jurisdiction to redress a prohibited wrong
or provide a corrective judicial process. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
CONCLUSION
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that there is no basis for reversing the
Trial Courts January 17, 2014 decision or for granting terminating sanctions, or any
sanctions whatsoever, against Cohen. There is indeed a basis for providing relief to Lynch
from judgments and decisions, related to void orders that were procured through fraud upon
the court.
This Court should strike Respondents late, and preposterous Brief, from the record,
sanction them for their ongoing misconduct (that now includes willfully submitting an
37

altered trial court order to this court) and attempting to deceive the Appellate Court as to
what the trial court actually said or held with respect to substitute service upon Jane Doe.
The Appellate Court should reverse the trial courts decisions with respect to
Appellants motion for terminating sanctions, the sealing order, and instruct the court to
vacate the fraudulent yet void May 15, 2006 default judgment. The harm to Lynch is
inconceivable and entirely prejudicial.
Leonard Cohen, after wrongfully converting Lynchs property to himself via the fraud
default judgment, and withholding commissions and monies due her, has now asked this
Court to award him his costs on appeal. Cohen and his attorneys of record should be
sanctioned for their ongoing misconduct with this Court.
Dated: 17 October 2016

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________________
Kelley Lynch
In Propria Persona

38

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

(Rule 8.204(c), California Rules of Court)
The text of Appellants Reply Brief consists of 13,378 words as counted by the
Microsoft Word word-processing program used to generate this brief.
Dated: 17 October 2016
__________________________________
Kelley Lynch

39

PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
and not a party to the within action; my address is 1754 N. Van Hess Avenue, Hollywood,
California 90028.
On October 17, 2016, I served the foregoing document described as APPELLANTS
REPLY BRIEF on the interested parties in the action entitled Leonard Cohen and LC
Investments, LLC vs. Kelley A. Lynch, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No.
BC338322; Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven Case No. B265753
by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: See
attached Service List.
[X] U. S. MAIL: Unless otherwise noted on the attached Service List, BY MAIL: I placed a
true copy of the document in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, for each
addressee named on the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing with
United States Postal Service. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is
presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after
date of deposit or mailing affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
Executed on October 17, 2016, at Hollywood, California.

____________________________________
Paulette Brandt

40

SERVICE LIST
Wendy C. Lascher
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson LLP
1050 South Kimball Road
Ventura, California 93004
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC
[1 copy Appellants Reply Brief]
Judge Robert Hess
Department 24
Los Angeles County Superior Court
111 N. Hill Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
[1 copy Appellants Reply Brief]
Supreme Court of California
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, California 94102
[Electronic copy service under rule 8.212(c)(2)]
[1 electronic copy Appellants Reply Brief submitted under Rule 8.212(c)(2)]

41