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Not to be quoted

CITIZENS TRUST IN PUBLIC AND POLITICAL


INSTITUTIONS IN NEPAL

Steinar Askvik, Ishtiaq Jamil 1

Abstract

This paper examines patterns of popular trust in political and public institutions in
Nepal. Thereafter, the paper examines to what extent such trust is linked to, on the
one hand, Nepalese citizens' social and political identities, and on the other hand, to
citizens' perceptions of institutional performance. Our findings demonstrate that trust
varies extensively among different public institutions. Trust is high in a number of
professional institutions such as schools and hospitals. It is also quite high in local
government institutions such as the Village/Town and District Development
Committees. Trust in the parliament and the government is much lower. Second,
identity based trust such as demographic and social characteristic of respondents, their
caste, religious, and political identities have less explanatory power on the level of
citizens trust in political and public institutions compared to performance based
variables. Trust in political and public institutions primarily depend upon how citizens
assess the performance of such institutions. Hence, patterns of institutional trust
depend very much on how respondents evaluate the current macro political situation
of Nepal, whether recent political changes are judged to be in the right direction.

Steinar Askvik, Associate Professor, Department of Administration and Organization Theory,


University of Bergen, Norway (Steinar.askvik@aorg.uib.no)
Ishtiaq Jamil, Associate Professor, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University
of Bergen, Norway (ishtiaq.jamil@aorg.uib.no)

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine patterns of popular trust in public institutions
in Nepal. Trust in public institutions implies that citizens extend positive expectations
to the members of such institutions and assume that they follow procedures that will
produce beneficial outcomes for themselves and for society at large. When citizens
trust institutions they may believe in the normative idea of an institution, i.e. that a
democratically elected parliament will be the best way to govern a society, or that an
independent court system will secure a fair and neutral interpretation and application
of the laws adopted by the parliament. Furthermore, trust in public institutions
presupposes that people have confidence in the mechanisms established to sanction
the behaviour of office holders, so that when the latter deviate from what is prescribed
they will be held accountable.

In what follows we explore to what extent such trust is linked to, on the one hand,
Nepalese citizens' perceptions of institutional performance, and on the other hand
citizens' social and political identities. The study is built on the assumption that the
more trust citizens have in public institutions and the process of governance, the
closer is the relationship between the state and society. Such close proximity may
enhance partnership between government and civil society, foster democratic
practices, and facilitate better provision of public services (Askvik and Bak, 2005;
Boukaert et al. 2005: 460; Putnam, 1993; Evans, 1996; Fukuyama, 1995). In fact trust
in public institutions can be interpreted as a basic requirement for the proper workings
of a democratic political regime: it tends to promote popular support and reduce
resistance against the regime.

The scenario of trust in public institutions in developing countries is not very


encouraging. Distrust is said to be quite common and follows from governments
failure to deliver what citizens expect. Distrust is frequently the result of a gap
between citizens expectation and governments actual performance. Governments
failure to perform may erode public confidence in public institutions and may impede
representativeness and inclusiveness in the delivery of public services. Distrusting
citizens may be less inclined to obey the law, pay taxes and comply in general (Levi
and Stoker 2000).
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Why is trust a relevant issue in Nepal? After the recent political turmoil in Nepal, the
country has now opted for a democratic constitution and is undergoing reforms in
order to reduce the influence of monarchism and elitism in the government. The (new)
Nepal is promising to be more democratic on the basis of more inclusiveness and
representativeness of all sections of the community. In order to achieve this, trust is a
key variable to reach consensus about the type of government and the process of
governance in Nepal as well as for enhancing collective action. Trust lowers costs of
transactions, reduces risks and uncertainties in choosing an option, and makes the
actions of individuals and organizations more predictable. Without people confidence
and trust in government institutions, the realization of all the promises may be a far
cry and the system of governance in the country may again struggle with the problem
of legitimacy.

2. THE CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

Our focus is on trust in public institutions. According to more general theories we


may distinguish between trusts in persons and trust in institutions. Some analysts,
such as for instance Seligman (1997), drawing on Luhmann (1979), claim that only
persons may be considered proper objects of trust in so far as trust refers to how
people handle risk and uncertainty in interpersonal relationship. When you trust
someone you take a risk in relation to another actor and assume that the person in
question will meet your expectations and not betray you. Thus, trust denotes belief in
the goodwill of individuals, and, to Seligman, it does not make sense to talk about
belief in the goodwill of institutions in a similar way. From a rational choice
perspective another analyst, Hardin (1999:23), also argues that it makes little sense for
"most people most of the time to trust institutions. Trust presupposes information
about the interests and incentives of the other person. Since institutions, in particular
government institutions, encompass large number of office-holders, it becomes
impossible for ordinary citizens to keep track of how members of such institutions
think and act, and what kind of interests they pursue.

Sztompka (1999:41-45), on the other hand, argues that people may have different
targets of trust, and social groups, organisations, and institutions may all stand out as
objects of social trust because they encompass human activity and human beings.
When Sztompka trusts Lufthansa and is prepared to fly with them, the meaning of
which is that he trusts "their pilots, the cabin crew, the ground personnel, technicians,
controllers, supervisors". In order to trust them he does not have to engage with all of
them in face to face interaction. He will have some notions of Lufthansa and its
employees based on various sources: certain limited personal experiences, references
from friends, commercials, newspaper reports, TV etc. According to Sztompka the
difference between interpersonal trust and trust directed towards other social objects
is not a fundamental one in so far as also the latter imply some references to human
actions. As suggested by Fukuyama (1995; 1999), the radius of trust may cover
different objects in different societies: from the strong, specific trust most people
extend to members of their own family, their friends and immediate neighbours to the
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generalised trust they may have in members of certain categories, institutions,


professions, or completely unknown strangers. For instance, you may be inclined to
trust members of your own ethnic group or the incumbents of certain positions.

In a parallel fashion we assume that people may extend trust to organisations and
institutions. Standing out as combined structures of rules, roles and human actors that
generate activities, people may trust or distrust such entities depending upon how they
perceive them, and how they assess their actions. The kinds of institutions we focus
upon in this paper include the key public and political institutions of Nepal: i.e. the
parliament, the central government, the civil service, the judiciary, and the police.
When we ask people in Nepal to what extent they trust these institutions we
presuppose that they have an image of each institution as a combination of people,
positions, procedures, and processes. Such images may be more or less stable and
distinct, and they may be more or less anchored on valid information. In order to
construct their pictures of government institutions Nepalese citizens do not need to
know in detail how various institutions are designed. Yet their images of the
parliament or the civil service imply that respondents develop some expectations
towards the institutions in question, in particular how they will act, and whether their
actions will be beneficial to different social groups. A recent study from Bangladesh
demonstrated that poor people may have quite elaborate conceptions of the history
and structure of the national government, and their sources of information may be
mass media, exposure to election campaigns, and own experiences of approaching
civil servants (Ali and Hossain 2006).

When citizens indicate that they trust certain institutions we interpret that to mean that
they find these institutions trustworthy: i.e. based on the relevant institutional images
they have constructed, and in accordance with whatever criteria people adopt to
decide if an institution can be labelled trustworthy. As suggested below such criteria
may manifest themselves as generic, normative expectations:

"Trust reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and


institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations
held by the public. Citizen expectations of how government should
operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest,
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efficient, and responsive to society's needs. In brief, an expression of


trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and
support) is a summary judgement that the system is responsive and
will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny." (Miller
and Listhaug 1990: 358, quoted in Levi and Stoker 2000: 498)

However, judgements of trustworthiness may also be based on whether institutions


are seen as acting in the interests of specific groups. Thus members of an ethnic
minority group may distrust the civil service because they feel that their interests are
not properly represented by that institution. Yet the ethnic majority may find the same
civil service quite trustworthy because they perceive them to be responsive to their
needs. Such judgements of trustworthiness will, of course, depend upon the character
of the institution in question and what are the specific, popular expectations directed
towards each institution. More generally, Rothstein (2004) has proposed to link
conceptions of trustworthiness to a distinction between two main types of democratic,
political institutions: On the one hand, he claims, institutions, such as the parliament
and the cabinet, on the representational side of the political system will be assessed as
trustworthy when they represent the interests of the electorate properly. On the other
hand, institutions such as the judiciary and the civil service are expected to be
impartial and fair in order to be seen as trustworthy.

Below we distinguish between two main forms of institutional trust: trust emanating
from social identity groups and trust judgements based on institutional performance.
Trust based on social identity refers to a relationship where trust primarily is extended
to members of a particular social identity group. We assume that people tend to trust
each other when they perceive themselves to be bearers of a common identity, be it
extended family, social class, ethnicity, religion, geography etc. Such identity based
trust may be extended to public and political institutions when the institutions in
question are seen as representing the interests and values of certain identity groups, in
Nepal, for instance, defined by social position, caste, or regional and religious
affiliation. We ask to what extent are social identities affecting Nepalese citizens
trust in public institutions.

Performance based trust, on the other hand, refers to trust anchored in how citizens'
assess the current policy achievements of public institutions (Van de Walle and
Bouckaert, 2003). The main idea is that when citizens are satisfied with the output of
relevant institutions, they will tend to trust and support those institutions. Thus from a
performance perspective we ask to what extent is institutional trust in Nepal linked to
performance evaluations. Institutional performance may be evaluated from different
perspectives. Political assessments may focus upon how democratic principles are
developed and implemented, whether human and political rights are respected, if
elections are free and fair etc. Economic evaluations are concerned with how
government institutions are contributing to economic growth and development, and
whether they promote economic well-being. From their study of political support in
post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Mishler and Rose (2002) concluded that assessments of political performance had a
greater impact than economic performance. However, as Pharr et al. (2000) have
observed, it is important to keep in mind that citizens' performance evaluations reflect
subjective perceptions rather than objective measurements, and as such they are
dependent upon access to information through mass media and other sources.

Institutional trust is taken as dependent variable here because of the argument that it is
democratic capital (modern political institutions, electoral processes, social and
economic structural reforms, and accountability) and not social capital as argued by
Putnam (1993) that fosters democratic transition in post-colonial societies (Mitra,
2008: 557). According to the main argument of social capital cultural attributes such
as trust, civic associationism, shared norms, and social network in society trickle up to
the political institutional level and makes democracy work. In contrast, in societies
such as Nepal where caste, religions and linguistic groups have remained unchanged,
it is the political structure rather than the social structure that is the main driving force
of social change. The same is argued by studies on Scandinavian countries that the
performance and the organization of democratic and bureaucratic institutions generate
trust (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005: 343; Rothstein, 2004; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001).

3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL DIVERSITIES IN


NEPAL

Flanked by India in the South and the Tibetan region of China in the North, Nepal is a
landlocked country. The issue of trust in public and political institutions is very
relevant in the context of Nepal because of varied and sometimes volatile political
developments (Whelpton, 2005). The country in its present form was established as a
kingdom more than two hundred years ago. Since then the country has experienced
the rule of a dozen kings, the Ranas (1846-1951), party less Panchayat system (19601991), and at present a recently installed elected government through the constituent
assembly election in 2008. Nepal has now become a federal democratic republic by
abolishing monarchism, a secular state from a previously and only Hindu Kingdom,
and now a coalition government comprising different political parties and interests.
However, the Maoists who vehemently opposed monarchism won the majority of
seats to this Assembly. 2 Prior to this constituent assembly which was sworn in 2008,
Nepal experienced decade long Maoist armed insurgency in the period 1996-2006 and
mass movement for the restoration of democracy to put an end to the feudalistic
power

structure

and

the

hegemony

of

the

monarchy

(http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/political-development/concise-history.php,
accessed 27th November 2008).

Nepals experience with multiparty democracy is varied. Peoples demand for


democratic rule, more inclusion and participation in the process of governance have
been thwarted several times. In 1959 Nepal had an elected government for the first
time but was dissolved within 18th months and was replaced by Panchayat rule where
the monarch was the de-facto ruler and political parties were sidelined. Over the
years, peoples trust in the Panchayati system withered and gave rise to strong
peoples movement. As a result of the historical movement of the people in 1990, the
Panchayat system was overthrown and multi-party democracy was restored 3 . Within a
year, a democratic constitution was introduced, which, for the first time, made the
2

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) won 229 of 601 seats to Constituent Assembly election held in
April, 2008 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Nepal, accessed on 29th January, 2009).
3
C R Uprety and Tek Nath Dhakal (1992): Inculcation of Political Culture: Urgent Need for Nepal. A
Conference paper presented at the First SAARC Political Science Conference on Democracy in South
Asia: Problems and Prospects held on June 19-20, Kathmandu: Political Science Association Nepal.

people sovereign. However, less than six years after the restoration of multi-party
system, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist started an armed insurgency in 1996
claiming

for

more

justice,

fairness,

and

inclusion

in

governance

(http://www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/political-development/political-history.php,
accessed 27th November, 2008).

In the wake of escalation of Maoist insurgency which almost destabilized the state a
tug of war between political parties followed. The lack of democratic culture among
the leaders of different political parties has seriously disrupted the functioning of
political institutions. In addition the Palace massacre in 2001 opened the door for
King Gyanendra to take control over state power in 2005. However, his absolute rule
was short lived as people under the banner of different political parties staged massive
demonstrations for the restoration of democracy. Meanwhile, political parties formed
an alliance with the Maoist rebels that ended the decade long violence and insurgency.
As a result of peoples movement, the king, eventually, relinquished power and an
interim government took over in 2006 whose major task was to hold election to the
Constituent Assembly. Election to the Constituent Assembly was held in 2008 with a
mandate to formulate a new constitution for a so called new Nepal. However, in the
absence of political culture of democracy coupled with diverse regional based
interests, the country faces an uphill task when the issues of participation of different
ethnic groups and inclusions of hitherto neglected castes such as Dalits4 in the process
of governance are concerned. As the process of governance taking shape at a slow
pace, many interested parties view this as an opportunity to put forward their demands
and be part of the political bandwagon to power. As a result, the restoration of
democracy is now hanging on numerous tug-of wars and horse-trading between
different political parties.

Coupled with political divisions and cleavages, the small Himalayan state it is argued,
is divided into castes, religions, and ethnic groups rather than economic classes
(Berreman, 1979, Sharma, 1977). Hindu customs, values, and traditions are deeply
ingrained in society and are nurtured in the various institutions of state as well. Caste
4

In the Indian caste system, Dalit means oppressed. A Dalit, often called an untouchable, or an outcast,
is a person who does not have any varnas (color) (Berg, 2007: 5). They are also known as Scheduled
Caste (Wikipedia)

constitutes an enduring form of social inequality despite national legislation that


outlaws caste discrimination (Stash and Hannum, 2001, p. 354). It is an integral part
of the social structure and divides people into different ranks and status. Membership
in these caste structures is permanent and one cannot move from one caste to the
other. It is a social system with strong hierarchies and those at the top dominate those
at the bottom of the social hierarchy. These divisions are particularly rigid because
one is born into a caste and remains in it until death. In such a static and hierarchical
social system, power, status, and prestige are vested in those who are fortunate
enough to be born in higher castes. The lowest caste is devoid of proper
representation and considers it fortunate if its needs and demands are met by officials
who belong to the higher caste.
By privileging the language and culture of high-caste Hindus, the state has
marginalized non-Hindu and low-caste groups. Resentment in recent years has led to
the organization of ethno-political parties and agitation for minority rights.
Historically, members of the highest castes have owned the majority of land and
enjoyed greater political and economic privileges. Members of lower castes have been
excluded from political representation and economic opportunities. The untouchable
castes were not permitted to own land, and their civil liberties were circumscribed by
law. Caste discrimination is officially illegal but has not disappeared. In 1991, 80
percent of positions in the civil service, army, and police, and 90 percent of all higher
positions in the civil service in 2004, were occupied by members of the two highest
castes, namely Brahmins and Chhetris even though they comprise only 29% of the
total population (Jamil and Dangal, 2009; http://www.everyculture.com/MaNi/Nepal.html accessed on 27th November, 2008; Population Census of 2001).
Given the diverse political development, and cultural and ethnic variations, and in the
context of a new political scenario with a newly elected Constituent Assembly
debating about how to ensure more equality and equity in government decisionmaking in Nepal, the issue of trust in public and political institutions may be crucial
for establishing democracy, and fair and just governance.

If socio-economic and ethnic identities affect the level of trust in political and public
institutions then Nepal may have a long way to go to establish legitimate governance

acceptable to all. These ethnic and religious, especially caste cleavages are permanent
structures that often are reasons for exclusion of the lower caste from participation
and unequal share in public policies. In a situation where trust is more within ones
own caste, class, and ethnicity, then civic associationism and solidarity across
different groups may become difficult to achieve, which may in turn affect firm
footing of democratic norms.

On the other hand, if trust in institutions is contingent on how policies reflect peoples
needs and demands, then political stability and proper functioning of democratic
institutions are necessary to enhance trust.

4. METHODOLOGY
The study is based on a country wide door to door questionnaire survey of Nepal
where 1836 (originally the intention was to survey 20000 households) households
participated. 5 In order to achieve a representative sample size from all regions in
Nepal, we used the ecological and development regions which are generally used to
divide Nepal geographically from east to west and from north to the south. In
addition, rural-urban classification was also used to represent both urban and rural
areas. Households were randomly selected

Geographically Nepal is divided into three ecological and five development zones.
Ecological zones divide Nepal into three east-west zones. These are Terai (plain land
in the south bordering India), Mountain (high mountainous region in the north
bordering China), and in between is the Hill region where the capital Kathmandu is
located. Population wise, Terai and Hill zones are densely populated areas, while the
northern mountainous region is the least and thinly populated region. In addition, the
country is divided into five north-south administrative development zones. These are
Eastern, Central, Western, Mid Western, and Far Western regions.

Even though we administered a structured questionnaire, in many instances we had to establish a


dialogue with certain groups of respondents such as illiterate and less educated people and people
living in rural areas to collect information. As a result, some interviews were lengthy taking around
three hours. A normal interview to fill out the Trust questionnaire took around 40 minutes. This process
of establishing dialogue to make respondents comprehend the questionnaire and respond subsequently
also led to the generation of additional information that substantiated information gathered from the
questionnaire.

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If we criss-cross these three ecological and five administrative development zones we


get 15 regions. Nepals 75 districts are spread across these three ecological and five
administrative development zones. In our survey, we selected 17 districts from these
15 regions. The following table describes the distribution of the sample according to
ecological, development, and rural-urban classifications.

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Table 1: Distribution of respondents according to ecological, administrative


development and rural-urban classifications. Percentage.

Development
Regions

Districts

Ecological Regions
Mountain

RURAL

WDR
M/FWDR

CDR

URBAN

EDR

Total

CDR

WDR

Gorkha
Mustang
Kalikot
Darchula
Kailali
Banke
Udaypur
Mahottari
Ilam
Kathmandu
Lalitpur
Bhaktapur
Dolakha
Kaski
Kapilavastu
Dang
Morang

M/FWDR
EDR
5 Administrative Deve17 Districts
lopment
Regions

Hill
100

Total no. of
respondents

Terai

100
100
100

100
45
46
71
103
175
100
100
100
197
99
100
100
200
100
100
100

675

1836

45
46
71
103
175
100
100
100
197
99
100
100
200

191

970

EDR=Eastern Development Region, CDR=Central Development Region, WDR=Western


Development Region, M/FWDR=Mid and Far Western Development Regions

According to the population census of 2001, the rural population of Nepal is around
75%. However, in our survey the proportion of urban and rural populations are almost
the same which means urban areas are more represented and given more weight
because of the higher level of education, political activism and awareness. After
selecting districts, households were selected both from VDCs and Municipalities
(districts are further divided into Village Development Committees which are rural
local governments and municipalities which are urban local governments).
Respondents from each household were selected on the basis of age (those who are 18
and above) and gender in order to obtain a sample that is representative of the
population. Every fifth household was selected and administered questionnaire. Yet,
in the case of the mountain districts such as in Kalikot, Mustang and Darchula every
second household was selected because of sparse population scattered across a large
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geographical area. This method was followed to obtain a sample that is representative
of Nepals ethnic and religious diversity.

Table 2: Socio-demographic distribution of respondents compared with the


Population Census Data for 2001. Percentage.
Sociodemographic
features

Female
Male
Master degree or
higher
Graduate
Education Secondary
Primary
Literate
Illiterate
61 and above
Age
46-60
Groups
31-45
18-30
Hindu
Buddhist
Muslim
Religion
Kirat
Christian
Others
Gender

Respondents
(our sample)
%

45
55

Population
Census Data
of Nepal
2001*
%
50
50

5
23
42
5
12
12
5
19
38
38
87
8
3
.7
.7
.4

54

46
8
11
23
58
81
10
4
4
.4
.4
Ca. 23
1836
Total
million
* Population Census Data 2001, Central Bureau of Statistics,
Kathmandu, Nepal (http://www.cbs.gov.np/national_report_2001.php,
accessed 20th November, 2008)
The above table describes demographic characteristics of our sample and compared
with the Population Census Data of 2001 carried out by the Central Bureau of
Statistics of Nepal. Compared to the Population Census Data which includes all age
categories in the population, our sample collected data from only those respondents
who have filled 18 years of age and above. Also given the length and complexity of
our questionnaire which included mapping opinions on diverse economic and social

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aspects of respondents, we see an overrepresentation of males, educated, and urban


population in our sample.

The sample was reduced to 1836 because of political violence in some Terai districts
and inaccessibility to certain Mountain districts. The survey was carried out in the
period February-April, 2008. Prior to the nation-wide survey, a pilot survey was
carried out in October 2007 to test the questionnaire.

5. PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

As noted above the dependent variable of our analysis is trust in public and political
institutions. Table 1 below presents the overall distribution of responses to the main
question of how much confidence people have in various institutions in Nepal.
Altogether 18 institutions were listed. The numbers (%) suggest that, for instance, for
political parties 36% had no confidence at all, 38% had not very much confidence,
22% had quite a lot of confidence, while 5% had a great deal of confidence.

When we add the two last categories of responses the sum indicate that 27% of the
respondents have "positive" confidence in the political parties. We use this sum as an
indicator of the overall amount of trust in each institution. In the table institutions
have been ordered from lowest trust at the top (political parties) to highest at the
bottom (school, college).

We observe that there are great variations among the institutions in terms of how
many people who trust them. The most popular institutions are schools and colleges,
university, hospital, media. Also local institutions such as village/town development
committees, chief district administration offices and district development committees
attract a lot of trust. Less popular are central national institution such as the
judiciary/courts, the civil service, the army, and the police. Among civil society
organisations, trade unions are more popular than NGOs. Central government and the
parliament attract also less trust than most institutions. The exception is the king and
political parties which appear at the very bottom of the institutional trust ranking,

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indicating that most Nepalese citizens do not have very positive attitudes toward these
institutions.

Table 3: Trust in public institutions in Nepal. Percentage. N=1418(min) to 1775(max)


None at all
(1)
Political Parties

36

Not very much


confidence
(2)
38

Quite a lot
confidence
(3)
22

A great deal
confidence
(4)

Sum of quite
a lot+a great
deal

27

King

45

25

21

29

Central Government

18

37

40

45

Parliament

15

39

41

46

CIAA

20

31

36

13

49

The Police

17

31

44

53

NGOs

12

32

46

10

56

Army

12

29

44

14

58

Civil Service

10

31

51

59

Judiciary/Courts

10

23

52

14

66

District Development
Committee

25

62

70

Trade Unions

23

51

20

71

Chief District
Administration Office

23

63

72

Village/Town Development
committee

19

63

13

76

Media

15

55

27

82

Hospital

12

46

39

85

University

50

39

89

School / College

51

40

91

Question: I am going to name a number of organizations and institutions. For each one, could you tell
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not
very much confidence or none at all?

More generally, differences among the institutions suggest that some institutions are
less contested than others. Among the least contested are institutions in education,
health, and media and local government institutions. All of these attract a lot of trust.
However, in this paper we want to focus on confidence in the key political institutions
of Nepal and we have concentrated on the following, i.e. the parliament, the central
government, the civil service, the judiciary, and the police. These are less trusted than
some of the professional and local institutions included in the above table, yet
probably more important and critical, we believe, for the emerging new political
regime of Nepal. In the data analysis we assume that trust in these key governance
institutions may be interpreted as having a strong common component which provides
the basis for constructing an index of institutional trust. This common component

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refers to the whole set of key institutions that are critical for development of the new
Nepal.

Originally we considered to also include the king and the army among the key
national institutions, but an examination of the correlation matrix of institutional trust
(see Appendix table A1) and an exploratory principal components analysis (presented
in Appendix table A2: the two-factor model), suggested otherwise. If these two
institutions were included, a two-factor solution would be more appropriate for
explaining variations in the data. Most probably, because they are seen as belonging
to the old political regime that has been toppled, trust and distrust in these two
particular institutions is not part of the common institutional trust pattern we seek to
identify. To some extent, the data indicate, that may also be the case with the police
and the judiciary, but since they score high on both dimensions, we infer that they are
also perceived as part of the new political system. Hence we have decided to include
them in our index despite their association with the king and the army. Furthermore,
in support of such a decision, when we include the five said institutions the principal
component analysis produces a one-factor model which explains more than 50 per
cent of the total variation (Appendix table A2: one-factor model). The high factor
scores of the police and the judiciary definitely suggest that they are influenced by the
common factor.

We interpret the above to support our assumption that we can use the responses to the
five institutions in question as indicators of a generalised, common trust attitude
toward central governance institutions in the emerging new political regime of Nepal
at the time of the data collection. On the basis of the above analysis we have created
an index of institutional trust in the core institution (see Appendix table A2). The
index will be used as a measure of our dependent variable. The index varies between
0 and 15, where 0 means that a respondent have no confidence at all in any of the five
mentioned institutions, and 15 means that a respondent have a great deal of
confidence in all of the five institutions. Of the total distribution 2.6 per cent of
respondents have a minimum score of 0 and 4 per cent have a maximum score of 15
(Mean = 7.23).

16

6. SOURCES OF IDENTITY BASED TRUST


In this part of the paper we will explore how potential identity factors may affect trust
in public institutions. The general hypothesis is that membership of various social
groups may affect such trust because these groups for some reason identify with the
institutions in question. We distinguish between three main categories of potential
sources:

(i)

One group of sources encompasses variables related to demography, education

and social position. We have examined to what extent do such variables as age,
gender, living area, region, formal education employment sector, and social class
affect trust in public institutions. When we bring all of these variables together in one
model it appears from table 4 that such a model only explains 5.7 per cent of the total
variation in the institutional trust index. Most of the individual variables in the model
do not have a significant impact. Yet the two variables indicating living area suggest
that people living in rural (as opposed to urban) areas and the population of the Terai
region are more inclined to trust public institutions.
Table 4: Regressions of identity variables on trust in public institutions.
Dependent variable=trust index. Method=enter. Standardized beta coefficients.

Age: high
Gender: female
Area: rural
Region: Terai
Formal education
Civil servant
Soc.class
(Brahmin)
Chettri
Baysha
Sudra
(Hindu)
Buddhist
Muslim
Religious
Nationalism
Political interest
Congress
UML
Maoist

Demography,
education,
social position
,035
,034
,206***
,111**
-,009
,046
-,034

Caste and
religion

Political
identities

Combined
model
,006
,075
,167***
,084*
-,030
,047
-,006

-,006
-,051
-,059
--,043
-,007
,090**

--,058
-,063
-,080*
-,010
-,096*
,164***
,095**
,080**
,075*
,006

,121**
,120**
,085*
,076
,025

17

Explained
variance (R2)

.057

.011

.047

.096

n=926
n=1155
n=1208
n=713
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.000
NB for caste is Brahmin, and for religion is Hindu excluded from the analyses, because they
are used as reference categories. Also for religion, a small non-uniform group (1.8%) of
Christians, Kirats and others is removed from the analyses. Multicollinearity among
independent variables should not be a problem since the highest Pearson's r=0.31.

(ii)

The second group of variables we have examined in relation to identity based

trust encompasses caste and religion. We have examined to what extent Chettris,
Bayshas and Sudras deviate significantly from the other castes in terms of trust scores,
or whether Buddhists or Muslims differ from Hindus. Also here the amount of
explained variance is very limited: i.e. 1.1 percent. The data of table 4 suggest that
there are no significant differences among different castes and among the various
main religions. How respondents view public institutions is not very much affected by
which specific caste or religion they belong to. The only exception is the more generic
religiosity of respondents: whether they see themselves as a religious person or not.
The data suggest that people who, regardless of any specific belief system, see
themselves as religious, are more inclined to trust the public institutions than, for
instance, atheists or persons without a strong religious belief. Yet the correlation is
very small, and the overall finding is that the impact of caste and religion is very
limited.

(iii)

The third group of variables that may be linked to identity is what we have

labelled political identities. In table 4 we have operationalized that to mean whether


respondents are proud of their Nepalese citizenship, whether they are interested in
politics, and which political party they support. From the results it appears that
altogether this model explains 4.7 per cent. Four of the variables render significant
beta coefficients, and only those supporting the Maoists do not differ systematically
from the other political parties in terms of institutional trust. Thus, if you consider
yourself proud to be Nepalese you are more inclined to trust public institutions and
this is also the case if you are a political activist, i.e. someone very interested in
politics. Likewise, if you are supporting the Congress Party or the UML you are
probably more prone to trust public institutions. Although the total amount of
explained variance is rather limited the number of significant coefficients suggests

18

that political identities may affect institutional trust patterns in certain ways, and more
so than caste and religion.

(iv)

In a combined model we have included all the identity variables in one

regression equation. This model explains almost 10 per cent of the total variation
which is clearly more than any of the other models. From table 4 it appears that most
of the coefficients stand out as statistically significant even when we, in this way,
expand the number of independent variables. Thus, following from demographic
identity characteristics, if respondents are living in a rural area, and/or if they are from
the Terai region they are more inclined to trust the public institutions. Resulting from
religious identity characteristics, in the combined model there is also an indication
that respondents viewing themselves as religious are more trusting, while those who
classify themselves as Sudra are slightly less trusting of public institutions. And from
the political identity characteristics we can infer that taking pride in being a Nepalese
citizen and/or expressing interest in politics contribute to institutional trust in a
positive way. So does also political support of the Congress party.

In general, however, we may conclude from this part of our analysis that the impact of
identity variables on institutional trust is limited. Although we do find some
correlations the overall impression is that neither of these is very strong.

7. SOURCES OF PERFORMANCE BASED TRUST


In the next part we pursue the other main perspective on trust in public institutions,
i.e. that such trust primarily results from popular performance appraisals of
government institutions and policies. Also in this part of the analysis we start by
identifying different models in order to compare their explanatory power. The five
relevant models are presented in table 5. We are aware, of course, that the regression
techniques that we adopt cannot prove the direction of causality among our dependent
and independent variables. In many cases could we also construct models where
institutional trust stands out as an independent variable that, for instance, impact on
performance evaluations (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). The purpose of this
paper, however, is primarily to study institutional trust as a dependent variable, and to

19

see how far different explanatory models can take us when we use regression
techniques.

(i)

The first model is a straightforward attempt to examine if the personal well-

being of respondents influences their trust in public institutions. The underlying


assumption is that if people feel satisfied with life or financially, they may attribute
such satisfaction to public policies and thus be more inclined to trust the institutions
responsible for such policies. Although two out of three effects are statistically
significant, suggesting some support for the hypothesis, the amount of explained
variance (1.7 per cent) is very limited.

(ii)

The second model focuses on how respondents view the current and previous

political system of Nepal and how they assess its development toward full democracy.
From table 5 it appears that positive evaluations of the political system, both of today
and yesterday, clearly are linked to respondents trust judgements. All the coefficients
are statistically significant, and in particular one coefficient suggests a strong
relationship between institutional trust and to what extent the people now holding
government positions are handling the country's affairs in a satisfactory way. For all
the five variables taken together the amount of explained variance of 26 per cent
demonstrates that assessments of political system performance and democratic
development make up an important component of institutional trust evaluations.

(iii)

A third model taps the impact of popular attitudes toward politicians. To what

degree are politicians perceived as competent, knowing what they are doing? And are
they, in fact, doing what is right most of the time? Although the survey questionnaire
contains a number of other questions about politicians the above two questions seem
to be those who most clearly link attitudes toward politicians to institutional trust
judgements. For both variables the coefficients reveal significant statistics. From table
5 it appears that the amount of explained variance is about seven per cent, thus
indicating that popular attitudes toward politicians behaviour are relevant for the
overall interpretation of how institutional trust evaluations vary.

Table 5: Regression analyses of performance evaluations.


Dependent variable=trust index. Method=enter. Standardized beta coefficients.

20

Satisfied with
life as a whole
Satisfied with
life 5 yrs ago
Satisfied - now
Financial Situation
How well is political
system today
How well was
political system 5
yrs after
Democracy
developing
People at national
office handling
country
This country is run
for benefit of all
people
Most politicians are
competent & know
what they are doing
Politicians do what
is right most of time

Civil servants prompt and efficient


Not helpful
Reliable
Service delivery
index
Policy performance
index

Personal
wellbeing
,084*

Democratic
development

Views on
politicians

Views on
civil
servants

Policy
evaluations

,047

-,018

-,014

,085*

,037

,076*

,042

,104***

,094**

,140***

,106**

,309***

,228***

,145***

,086**

,126***

,007

,207***

,087**

,260***

,114****

-,146***
,146***

-,084**
,030
,278***

,117***

-,102***

,019

Explained variance
.017
.263
.070
.151
.108
(R2)
N
1202
1054
1263
1234
1338
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.000
Multicollinearity among independent variables should not be a problem since the highest
Pearson's r=-0.43 and the lowest tolerance statistic is 0.60.

(iv)

Combined
model

.309
884

The fourth performance based model we adopt in order to explain variations in

institutional trust judgements refers to popular views on civil servants. From a number
of questions about civil servants we have identified three variables that seem to
influence our dependent variable more than others: i.e. if civil servants are perceived
to be prompt and efficient, if they are experienced as not very helpful, and/or if they
are seen as reliable. The statistic results demonstrate that all of these variables are
linked to institutional trust evaluations. In particular if respondents consider civil
servants as to be prompt and efficient will they also tend to express trust in public
institutions? The explanatory power of this model is about 15 per cent suggesting that

21

performance evaluations of civil servants are more important than similar appraisals
of politicians.

(v)

The fifth model we introduce in table 5 departs from how respondents more

directly assess policy performance in different areas. We constructed two indexes


from two batteries of question: One based on how they judge the delivery of a number
of services (e.g. education, health, law and order, electricity supply etc.), altogether 21
service areas. Another is based on how they assess policy performance in eight areas:
poverty reduction, anti-crime measures, promoting security, generating employment,
checking pollution, family planning, checking corruption, controlling human
trafficking. For each battery of question we have adopted the average score as an
index of service delivery and policy performance respectively. Again the results show
that performance evaluations do explain significant variations in respondents'
institutional trust. The total amount of explained variance is almost 11 per cent, and of
the two indexes the relative impact of service delivery is more prominent.

(vi)

In the final model we have combined all the performance variables in one

regression analysis. The combined model explains almost 31 per cent of the variation
which is hardly five per cent more than the democratic development model, but
otherwise clearly more than any of the other models. Most of the original beta
coefficients are reduced in the combined model and some are not statistically
significant any more. Thus the variables measuring personal well-being become
insignificant in the combined model. So do also variables such as: satisfaction with
the present political system, politicians competence, civil servants reliability, and the
policy performance index. Satisfaction with people now in government office stands
out as the most important single variable of the combined regression model. Four out
of seven significant coefficients originate from the democratic development,
suggesting that assessments of democratic performance probably are the most
important component of trust in public institutions in Nepal.

22

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The above analyses have addressed the issue of popular trust in public institutions in
Nepal at a point in time when the political regime is changing and efforts are made to
strengthen democracy. Starting from an assumption that political trust is critical for
the survival of any democratic regime we wanted to examine to what extent Nepalese
citizens trust public and political institutions, and how such trust judgements are
affected by identity and performance based evaluations.

Our findings demonstrate firstly that trust varies extensively among different public
institutions. Trust is high in a number of professional institutions such as schools and
hospitals. It is also quite high in local government institutions such as the
Village/Town and District Development Committees. However, in a number of other
national institutions it is not so high, although when 66 per cent indicate that they trust
the courts this do suggest quite extensive support for the judiciary, and almost
likewise for the civil service. Trust in the parliament and the government is lower, yet
we must admit that it is difficult to compare such survey result across countries since
we do not know whether the survey questions have similar meanings in different
cultures. Still for political parties and the monarchy trust is definitely low since less
than 1 out of 3 respondents indicate that they trust these institutions.

In a second step we have analysed how the institutional trust patterns differ among
different social and political groups. Asking whether various types of group based
identities affect trust patterns, we compared the explanatory power of three different
models: one model based on the demographic and social characteristic of respondents,
another model was linked to caste and religion as sources of identity, and a third
model departed from political identities. For all three models the explanatory power is
rather limited, and the combined model, which included all the relevant variables,
explained less than 10 per cent of the total variance in institutional trust. Still, some
selected variables, such as for instance living area and sense of citizenship, reveal
certain identity based relationships of statistical significance. In general, we conclude
that identities do not appear as prominent factors for explaining variations of
institutional trust in Nepal.

23

In a final step we pursued an alternative set of explanations based on what we have


labelled the performance hypothesis, i.e. that trust in public institutions primarily
depend upon how citizens assess the performance of such institutions. Also here we
compared the explanatory power of different models such as respondents
assessments of: personal well-being, democracy development, politicians, civil
servants, policy performance in different areas. Our findings suggest that all types of
performance assessments, except those linked to personal well-being are of relevance.
Yet, the model which best fits the data is the one tapping assessments of development
toward democracy. This model explains more than 26 per cent of the variation.
Hence, patterns of institutional trust depend very much on how respondents evaluate
the current macro political situation of Nepal, whether recent political changes are
judged to be in the right direction.

The weak relationship between identity variables and institutional trust is to some
extent surprising. Other observers has emphasised that the political institutions of
Nepal until recently have been excluding significant socio-cultural groups from
democratic participation (e.g. Lawoti 2007). Hence, we could have expected more
divisions among advantaged and disadvantaged groups in terms of institutional
support. This seems not to be the case. Our findings probably represent good news for
Nepal, suggesting that trust is not dependent on ethnic, religious and social identities.
On the other hand, the greater explanatory power of the performance model on trust
indicates that better performance of political institutions enhances citizens trust in
these institutions. Positive interaction and experience with public institutions builds
confidence among people in these organizations which may in turn foster democratic
institutions to develop in Nepal.

24

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27

APPENDIX
Table A1:Correlation matrix of trust in key governance institutions of Nepal
Parliament
Parliament

Central
Government

Civil
Service

Judiciary/Courts

The
Police

King

1,000

Central
Government
Civil Service

,572

1,000

,402

,451

1,000

Judiciary/Courts

,299

,353

,382

1,000

The Police

,243

,295

,331

,419

1,000

(,060)

(,086)

,120

,150

,245

1,000

,148

,188

,255

,317

,483

,379

King
Army

All coefficients significant at p<.000, except those in brackets

Table A2: Dimensions of trust in key governance institutions of Nepal:


Principal components analyses of two alternative models.
Rotated
Two- factor model
including seven institutions
Factor 1
Factor 2

Unrotated
One- factor model including five
institutions
Single factor

Parliament

,808

-,016

,725

Central Government

,826

,059

,775

Civil Service

,700

,220

,737

Judiciary/Courts

,539

,418

,683

The Police

,367

,664

,628

King

-,075

,726

Army

,147

,809

Eigenvalue

2,277

1,849

2,531

Percentage of variance

32,5

26,4

50.6

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.


Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table A3: Index of institutional trust.% (N=1343)


Index
value
Percent

10

11

12

13

14

15

Total

2,6

1,3

2,8

4,7

5,7

9,8

11,6

11,4

14,1

11,0

13,8

6,3

3,0

1,3

,2

,4

100

M=7.23. Std.Dev.=2.92

28

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of identity variables


N
Age
1=up to 30 2=31 to 45
3=46 to 60 4=61 and above
Gender: female
0=male 1=female
Area: rural
0=urban 1=rural
Region: Terai
0=Mountain/Hill 1=Terail
Formal education
0=no formal education 1= primary to tertiary
Civil servant
0=no 1=yes
Social class
Scale: 1=upper class 5=lower class
Brahmin
0=no 1=yes
Chettri
0=no 1=yes
Baisya
0=no 1=yes
Sudra
0=no 1=yes
Hindu
0=no 1=yes
Buddhist
0=no 1=yes
Muslim
0=no 1=yes
Religious
Q: Would you say you are a religious person?
0=no 1=yes
Nationalism:
Q: How proud are you to be a Nepali? Scale:
1=not at all proud 4=very proud
Political interest:
Q: How interested would you say you are in
politics? Scale:
1=not at all 4=very interested
Congress
0=no 1=yes
UML
0=no 1=yes
Maoist
0=no 1=yes
Valid N (listwise)

Std.
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

1821

1,00

4,00

1,9023

,87411

1827

,00

1,00

,4444

,49704

1836

,00

1,00

,5120

,49999

1836

,00

1,00

,3676

,48230

1828

,00

1,00

,7588

,42796

1277

,00

1,00

,1989

,39933

1721

1,00

5,00

3,2098

,98927

1566

,00

1,00

,3895

,48780

1566

,00

1,00

,2656

,44182

1566

,00

1,00

,2452

,43035

1566

,00

1,00

,0996

,29958

1831

,00

1,00

,8706

,33578

1831

,00

1,00

,0814

,27349

1831

,00

1,00

,0300

,17074

1779

,00

1,00

,4109

,49214

1808

3,50

,661

1633

2,31

1,000

1757

,00

1,00

,2043

,40332

1757

,00

1,00

,1429

,35003

1757

,00

1,00

,0962

,29493

875

Table A5: Descriptive Statistics of performance variables


N
Satisfied - life as a whole
Q: All things considered, how satisfied are you with
your life as a whole these days? Scale:
1=dissatisfied
10=very satisfied
Satisfied - 5 yrs ago
Q:And how satisfied were you five years ago? Scale:
1=dissatisfied
10=very satisfied
Satisfied Financial Situation
Q: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

1739

10

6,64

2,287

1699

10

6,23

2,456

1773

10

6,25

2,447

29

your household? Scale:


1=dissatisfied
10=very satisfied
How well - political system today
Q: Where on this scale would you put the political
system as it is today? Scale
1=very bad
10=very good
How well - political system 5 yrs after
Q: Where on this scale would you put the political
system as you would expect it to be 5 years from now?
Scale
1=very bad
10=very good
Democracy Developing
Q: Are you satisfied with the way democracy is
developing in our country? Scale
1= Not at all satisfied
4= Very satisfied
People at national office handling country
Q: Are you satisfied with the way people now in the
government office are handling the country's affairs?
Scale
1= Not at all satisfied
4= Very satisfied
This country is run for the benefit of all people
Q: What is your opinion? Scale
1= Strongly Disagree
4= Strongly Agree
Most politicians are competent & know what they
are doing
Q: What is your opinion? Scale
1= Strongly Disagree
4= Strongly Agree
Politicians do what is right most of time
Q: What is your opinion? Scale
1= Strongly Disagree
4= Strongly Agree
Civil servants: Prompt and efficient
Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree
1= Strongly disagree
4= Strongly agree
Civil servants: Not helpful
Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree
1= Strongly disagree
4= Strongly agree
Civil servants: Reliable
Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree
1= Strongly disagree
4= Strongly agree
Service performance index
Q: How would you describe the delivery of the
following services today? Average of 21 service
areas. Scale: 1=very bad
5=very good
Policy performance index
How well has the Nepalese government succeeded in
the following areas? Average of 8 policy areas. Scale:
1= Succeeded very well
5= Did not succeed at all.
Valid N (listwise)

1694

10

3,63

2,513

1481

10

6,71

2,766

1664

2,19

,772

1634

2,10

,745

1650

2,33

,895

1615

2,04

,867

1711

2,06

,715

1643

2,28

,767

1692

2,49

,833

1673

2,10

,769

1825

1,00

4,95

3,1574

,55397

1819

1,00

5,13

3,7481

,73961

1001

30

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