POLITICAL LAW 1

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)

G.R. No. 125793
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under
RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his
"repatriation."
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the
country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he
lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due
to political or economic exigencies.
It was his father who could have been motivated by
economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for
atu alizatio . The de isio as his pa e t s a d ot his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly
to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they
acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor
children at the time of repatriation.
G.R. Nos. 166143-47
Three (3) instances justify the declaration of failure of
election, to wit:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes;

for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in

Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates
for senator need not possess any other qualification to run
for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.
G.R. No. 221697 CONCURRING OPINION
To acquire a new domicile one must demonstrate three
things:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there (animus manendi); and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi).
As "intent" is basically a "state of mind" that exists only in
idea; its existence can only be determined by the overt acts
that translate it to fact.

(b) the election in any polling place had been suspended

before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; or

The realization of such intent need not be made in one fell

swoop by the execution of a single formal act. Rather, the
fulfillment of the intent to change domicile can be made via a
series of steps through what the Court adverts as an
"incremental process" or the execution of "incremental
transfer moves."

(c) after the voting and during the preparation and

transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.

The facts of the case suggest that Sen. Poe's change of

domicile and repatriation from the US to the Philippines was
"accomplished, not in a single key move but, through an
incremental process" that started in early 2005.

We go along with the COMELEC en banc in giving more

weight to the affidavits and certifications executed by the
members of the Board of Election Inspectors and the PNP
and military authorities that the elections held were peaceful
and orderly, under the presumption that their official duties
had been regularly performed.

G.R. No. 221697 CONCURRING OPINION

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution merely provides:
Section1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.

G.R. No. 157870

Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate

2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents

who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

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POLITICAL LAW 2
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born" Filipino does not even appear in the
above-quoted provision. This Court, however, has construed
the term to refer to those falling under items one to four of
the section, as opposed to those who underwent
naturalization under item number 5. But Sen. Poe was not
born before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution so that the
first item is inapplicable. That being said, her status as a
foundling does not foreclose the likelihood that either or
both of her biological parents were Filipinos rendering her a
natural-born Filipino under items 3 and/or 4 of Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Indeed, while it is not denied that Sen. Poe was abandoned
by her biological parents, her abandonment on the date and
specific place above indicated does not obliterate the fact
that she had biological parents and the private respondents
had not shown any proof that they were not Filipino citizens.
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the
burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his
claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of
evidence required by law.
G.R. No. 195580
Four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot
case, thus:
1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest is involved;
3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
G.R. No. 195580

and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the
benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That were a
corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered
enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations
must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at
least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of
Directors, in order that the corporation shall be considered a
Philippine national.
G.R. No. 195580
The fi st ase is the li e al ule , o the Co t ol Test
pertaining to the portion in 1967 SEC Rules which states,
s ha es elo gi g to o po atio s o pa t e ships at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall
e o side ed as of Philippi e atio alit . U de the test,
there is no need to further trace the ownership of the 60%
(or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation
since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is
considered as Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule
Proper which states, "but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage
shall be counted as of Philippine nationality." Under the Strict
Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the
Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be
traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership.
Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must
first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and
added to the shares directly owned in the Investee
Corporation.
G.R. No. 195580
The "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining
whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation, within
the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled
to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of
the natural resources of the Philippines. When in the mind of
the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity
ownership in the corporation, then it may apply the
"grandfather rule."

"Control test" under RA 7042, otherwise known as the

Foreign Investments Act (FIA)

G.R. No. 195580

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:

Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides:

a.) The term Philippine national shall mean a citizen of the

Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines; a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of
funds for pension or other employee retirement or
separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly

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POLITICAL LAW 3
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

at the time of payment. x x x

xxxx

(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all

or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor
of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed
of for value and otherwise exempt from execution x x x.

The President may enter into agreements with Foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
G.R. No. 195615
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
G.R. No. 195615
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 8. Issuance, form, and contents of a writ of
execution. The writ of execution shall: (1) issue in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines from the court which
granted the motion; (2) state the name of the court, the case
number and title, the dispositive part of the subject judgment
or order; and (3) require the sheriff or other proper officer to
whom it is directed to enforce the writ according to its terms,
in the manner hereinafter provided:

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is

not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall
deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. x x x
xxxx

(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy

on debts due the judgment obligor and other credits,
including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties,
commissions and other personal property not capable of
manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties.
xxx
G.R. No. 157870
Given that the drug testing policy for employees under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness
of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest
in an office is circumscribed by the company's work policies,
the collective bargaining agreement, and the inherent right of
the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
G.R. No. 157870

(a) If the execution be against the property of the judgment

obligor, to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the real
or personal property of such judgment obligor;
(b) If it be against real or personal property in the hand of
personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants,
or trustees, of the judgment obligor, to satisfy the judgment,
with interest, out of such property;
G.R. No. 195615
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 9. Execution of judgments for money, how
enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand. The
officers shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money
by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution
and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash,
certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount
of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the
judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,

i.
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part
of the employees,
ii.
the compelling state concern likely to be met by
the search, and
iii.
the well - defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the
random testing,
we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
G.R. No. 157870
That Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of
undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36
expressly provides how drug testing should be conducted,

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
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POLITICAL LAW 4
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing in
accordance with the school rules or company's work rules.
Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the Dangerous Drugs Board to
issue the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then,
the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR.

another branch.
A.C. No. 7399

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers

have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under
what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be
conducted.

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A

Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is
in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof."

G.R. No. 182248

G.R. No. 164785

In resolving administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is

not indispensable to dispense justice to the parties. The
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings. Submission of position papers may
be sufficient for as long as the parties thereto are given the
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or an opportunit to e plain ones side or opportunit to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person
is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an
action or a ruling. It does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice. Where opportunity to
be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.67
(Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious

freedom. The section reads as follows:

G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893 & 183951

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
i.
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
ii.
the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;
iii.
when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and
iv.
the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893 & 183951
The system of separation of powers contemplates the
division of the functions of government into its three (3)
branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws;
the executive which is required to carry out the law; and the
judiciary which is charged with interpreting the law.

Consequent to the actual delineation of power, each branch

of government is entitled to be left alone to discharge its
duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, as
Justice Laurel asserted "will neither direct nor restrain
executive [or legislative action]." Expressed in another
perspective, the system of separated powers is designed to
restrain one branch from inappropriate interference in the
business, or intruding upon the central prerogatives of

No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
The e is othi g i petitio e s state e ts su je t of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he
came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of
a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech.
G.R. No. 164785
Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievance.
The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms
encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may
be regulated to some extent to serve important public
interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has
been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are
reached when the expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern.
"[T]he f eedo to e p ess o e s se ti e ts a d elief does
not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed
within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights
of others."
It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected
speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements,
obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement,
insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of peace and expression endangering national security.

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
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POLITICAL LAW 5
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

G.R. No. 166910

Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit
authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may
validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public
utilities to some administrative agencies. Therefore, a special
franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary
if the law already specifically authorizes an administrative
body to grant a franchise or to award a contract.
G.R. No. 183871
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form
of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the

aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant.
G.R. No. 180452
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the
aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant.

G.R. No. 171101

G.R. No. 180452

The "operative fact" doctrine is stated that a legislative or

executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional
by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.

Warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:

In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact

doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of
the military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must
be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon
the rights of the accused therein.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

G.R. No. 171101

The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.
LisMota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this
Court will undertake judicial review means that the Court
will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although
properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground, such as the application of the statute or the
general law.
The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be
legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is
determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.
G.R. No. 180452
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

G.R. No. 180705

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
G.R. No. 192791
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the

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POLITICAL LAW 6
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall
always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local

office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term

of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this
will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes

(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but
such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion
as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from

involuntary interruption which may be brought about by
certain events or causes.

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC,

who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who
served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to
any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first
appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are
also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

G.R. No. 201716

For the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply."
G.R. No. 201716

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the

Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted
from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that "reappointment"
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.

Capco was elected vice-mayor on January 18, 1988 for a term

ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became
mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent
mayor.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or

designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Talaga was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during

terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections,
Talaga lost to Taga ao. Ho e e , efo e Taga ao s 1
-2001
term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001.

G.R. No. 201716

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a
disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160,
or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.

Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 19921995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to
run again for the mayoralty position during the 1998
elections, Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for
a o , sought Cap o s dis ualifi atio fo iolatio of the
three-term limit rule.
There was no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco
"was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law"
when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
G.R. No. 201716

When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was

challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit
rule.
The Cou t held the ei that the e ai de of Taga ao s term
after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor
should not be considered for purposes of applying the threeterm limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of
Talaga s a o ship as dis upted his defeat du i g the
1998 elections.

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
COMPILED BY ATTY. RAL CASABAR

POLITICAL LAW 7
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
G.R. No. 201716

expiration of the term.

The conversion of a municipality into a city does not

o stitute a i te uptio of the i u e t offi ial s
continuity of service.

G.R. No. 203974

Latasa was elected and served as mayor of the Municipality

of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and
1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood law
providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed
his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections,
the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of
Digos City for violation of the three-term limit rule on the
basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish
his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been
deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very
instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased
from acting as chief executive of the local government unit.
He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

Legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec.

453 of the LGC quoted earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It
shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly
urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the
minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
G.R. No. 203974
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted
by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or
any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the
sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code.
G.R. No. 203974

G.R. No. 201716

The period during which a local elected official is under
preventive suspension cannot be considered as an
interruption of the continuity of his service or an interruption
that allo s a ele ti e offi ial s sta i offi e e o d th ee
terms because the suspended official continues to stay in
office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
The est i di ato of the suspe ded offi ial s o ti uit i
office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for

determining the qualified voters who will participate in the
plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
The province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction
of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy.

G.R. No. 201716

When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for a full
term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term;
an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
G.R. No. 201716
When an official is defeated in an election protest and said
decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve
the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits
because the nullification of his proclamation came after the

Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political

rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will also be
affe ted Ca a atua s o e sio i to a HUC. Nota l ,
the administrative supervision of the province over the city
will effectively be revoked upon conversion.
G.R. No. 195580
The Court may still take cognizance of an otherwise moot and
academic case, if it finds that
(a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved;
(c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
G.R. No. 150640

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
COMPILED BY ATTY. RAL CASABAR

POLITICAL LAW 8
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
G.R. No. 159618
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the
nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking
of, p i ate p ope t fo a pu li use ithout the o e s
consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation." It
is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on a
common necessity and interest of appropriating the property
of individual members of the community to the great
necessities of the whole community."
G.R. No. 150640
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained
by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no
person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
G.R. No. 150640
The public nature of the prospective exercise of
expropriation cannot depend on the "numerical count of
those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the
community to be benefited." The number of people is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,
provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited
to particular individuals.
G.R. No. 159618
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a gi e uestio ." Spe ifi all , it is "a pa t s pe so al a d
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result"
G.R. No. 159618
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it
has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in
the public interest.
G.R. No. 159618

The Court has given recognition to the obligatory effect of

executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Senate.
Save for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25,
Art. XVIII of the Constitutionwhen a treaty is required, the
Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving
political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty.
What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need
the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to
complete the ratification process.
G.R. No. 159618
By their nature, treaties and international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing
and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of
their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction.
The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender
may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a
reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the
same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale
that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.
G.R. No. 178678
The terms "electioneering" and "partisan political activity"
have well-established meanings in the Omnibus Election
Code, to wit:
Section 79. x x x
The te
ele tio a paig o pa tisa politi al a ti it
refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:

The doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2,

Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with
all nations. An exchange of notes falls "into the category of
inter-governmental agreements," which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement.

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or

other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and

"executive agreements" have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action.

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or

holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,

parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials

designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate;

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
COMPILED BY ATTY. RAL CASABAR

POLITICAL LAW 9
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (2006-2016)
or

G.R. No. 211356

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support

for or against a candidate.

Despite the hotel s lassifi atio as a uisa e pe a ide s,

however, We still find in this case that the LGU may
e e theless p ope l o de the hotel s de olitio . This is
because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the
objectives of the government.

The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose

of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nominations for
candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or
coalition of parties shall not be considered as election
campaign or partisan election activity.

G.R. No. 216691

Public expression of opinions or discussions of probable
issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be
nominated in a forth coming political party convention shall
not be construed as part of any election campaign or
partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
G.R. No. 188456
It is clear that the COMELEC has not abdicated its
constitutional and legal mandate to control and supervise the
elections. Smartmatic and TIM are merely service providers
or lessors of goods and services to the Commission. Indeed,
Article 6.7 of the Automation Contract, provides that "the
entire process of voting, counting, transmission,
consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be conducted by
COMELEC s pe so el a d offi ials.

Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible.

The election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be
filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted
from the date of proclamation.
Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that
the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives
the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule
should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere
procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a
mere technicality but an essential requirement, the noncompliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over
the case.

G.R. Nos. 171947-48

G.R. No. 202666
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitio e s hild e positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible
o l to the sa tio ed stude ts Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
p i a i asio si e it as the i o s Fa e ook f ie ds
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts.

Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly

provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even
be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical
legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear
as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of
the trust reposed in them.

G.R. No. 203655

Well-established is the rule that administrative issuances
such as the NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant
to the rule-making power granted by statutehave the force
and effect of law.
Being an issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the
NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore, has the same binding effect as
if it were issued by the President himself. As such, no agency
or instrumentality covered by the JV Guidelines can validly
stray from the mandatory procedures set forth therein.

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)
COMPILED BY ATTY. RAL CASABAR