Professional Documents
Culture Documents
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON
MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO
TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.
SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF
THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision
in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in
the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
electing these candidates. They also established an independent COMELEC to enhance the
laboratory conditions under which elections must be conducted.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and
data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of
public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government the
separation of powers.
Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials,
however, does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in
place of elective local officials, canceling in the process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise
is to sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature.
Second, constitutional provisions fixing the terms of elective officials serve the ends of democratic
republicanism by depriving elective officials of any legal basis to remain in office after the end of their
terms, ensuring the holding of elections, and paving the way for the newly elected officials to assume
office.65 Such provisions, which are found in the 1987 Constitution, are framed upon the belief that to
ensure democratic values, there must be periodic electoral exercises. By refusing to include hold
over provisions in fixing the terms of elective national and non-barangay local officials, the framers of
the 1987 Constitution guaranteed not only the elective nature of these offices 66 but also secured our
democratic values.
In reviewing legislative measures impinging on core constitutional principles such as democratic
republicanism, the Court, as the last bulwark of democracy, must necessarily be deontological. The
Court must determine the constitutionality of a law based on the laws adherence to the
Constitution, not on the laws supposed beneficial consequences. The laudable ends of
legislative measures cannot justify the denial, even if temporal, of the sovereign peoples
constitutional right of suffrage to choose freely and periodically "those whom they please to
govern them."83 The Court should strike a balance between upholding constitutional imperatives on
regional autonomy and republican democratic principles, on the one hand, and the incumbent
administrations legislative initiative to synchronize elections, on the other hand. Had it done so here,
the Court would have faithfully performed its sworn duty to protect and uphold the Constitution
without fear or favor.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I join Justice Carpios dissent and agree that the "[C]ongress power to provide for the simultaneous
holding of elections for national and local officials x x x does not encompass the power to authorize
the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials x x x. To hold otherwise is to
sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature," and so sustain
the holdover of the incumbent ARMM officials pending the election and qualification of their
successors.
Hence, this Court cannot expand the appointing power of the President to encompass offices
expressly required by the Constitution to be "elective and representative." The republican form of
government can only be preserved by ensuring that elective offices can only be filled by persons
voted by the electors.
Even the ponencia recognizes that the grant of the power to appoint the ARMM officials to the
President would trample on the democratic and republican nature of our government as "the
peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systematically withdrawn to
the point of fostering an undemocratic regime x x x. [It] would likewise frontally breach the elective
and representative governance requirement of Section 18 Article X of the Constitution." However,
the ponencia evades the application of its own observation to the present case on the ground that
"this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated under RA
10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance x x x will not
systematically be touched or affected at all."
In a nutshell, the present petitions may be seen as in search of the answer to the question - how
does the Charter of a republican and democratic State achieve a viable and acceptable balance
between liberty, without which, government becomes an unbearable tyrant, and authority, without
which, society becomes an intolerable and dangerous arrangement?
Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine
their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial
importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the
intelligent exercise of such birthright. It was said that:
x x x As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever
may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir
of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their
Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority.
He has a voice in his Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality. x x x It has also been said that "[ c ]ompetition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms." Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space - including the means
to disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by
which the respondent implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the
broadcast media.
56
57
July 8, 2014
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral process in
the following wise:
30
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it
isthrough the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people
express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders in
accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should elect
whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving the
viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic
participation. (Citations omitted and italics ours)
31
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, 183951 and 183962 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH
COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PINOL, for and his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP),
represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the
present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the socalled Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
I believe this is a prudent move on the part of the Executive Department. By the very essence of our
republican and democratic form of government, the outcome of our constitutional processes,
particularly the legislative process and the constituent process of amending the constitution, cannot
be predetermined or predicted with certainty as it is made to appear by the consensus points of the
MOA-AD. Consequently, it is beyond the authority of any negotiating panel to commit the
implementation of any consensus point or a legal framework which is inconsistent with the present
Constitution or existing statutes.
Moreover, our constitutional processes are well-defined by various provisions of the Constitution.
The establishment of a political and territorial "space" under a so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) is nowhere to be found in the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the country's territorial and
political subdivisions as follows:
"The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided."2
SPP Case No. 10-009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ACCREDITATION AS COMELEC'S CITIZEN ARM FOR THE NATIONAL
AND LOCAL ELECTIONS SET ON MAY 10, 2010.
ONE VOTE MOVEMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT PASTOR JOSE
GONZALES, Petitioner
It does not seek to achieve its objectives, goals or programs through violence of other unlawful
means, nor aim to propagate any ideology opposed to the principles of a republican and democratic
government, and that it will undertake to police its ranks and prevent infiltration by persons or group
of persons who may, directly or indirectly, destroy its character of non-partisanship and impartially."
c) That it shall not be under the influence whatsoever of any foreign government corporation, or
entity and shall not solicit or receive, directly or indirectly, any contribution or aid of whatever form or
nature from any government, corporation or entity, and that neither shall said organization nor any of
its members seek to achieve its objectives or programs through violence, or aim to propagate any
ideology opposed to the principles of a republican and prevent infiltration by persons;
G.R. No. L-30364
Instead, the decisive question for me is whether the admitted fact of continued detention for more
than eighteen years, after the penalty had been reduced to ten years imprisonment, constitutes a
denial of liberty without due process. That the Constitution prohibits. The historic role of due process
as a safeguard of freedom cannot be sufficiently stressed. It bears repeating that freedom is the rule
and restraint the exception. The eloquent language of the Chief Justice Concepcion in People v.
Hernandez 9 comes to mind: "Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and
vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of
our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of
several aspects of freedom."