Tolentino v.

Secretary of Finance
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There
are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution,
because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe
Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the

second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weightof legislative practice.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, chargedthat there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it
with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed
to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During
the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn
for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of
a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of
the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chairdeclared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion, the approval of theconference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the bodyadopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have noconcern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number
of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject
toqualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
theHouse with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as
the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles
of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine

National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election
fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the
so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on
the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

GR no. 202242 April 16 2013
Facts: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of congress

refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each,
and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8
of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members
only with only one representative from congress.
Issue: W/N the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec
8 of the constitution.
Held: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a
representative of congress should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the
framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.

and declared that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries

(FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the present
case
II. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 is constitutional
III. Whether or not the Court properly determined the coverage of
compulsory acquisition
IV. Whether or not the matter on just compensation has been correctly
passed upon by the Court
V. Whether or not the subject agricultural lands may be sold to third parties
though they have not been fully paid

VI. Whether HLI violated any of the provisions under the SDP
VII. Whether or not the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI is valid
HELD:

Hacienda Luisita vs. LIPCO

G.R. No. 171101: July 5, 2011
FACTS:
Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in the above-captioned
case on July 5, 2011, the petitioners present for resolution several issues
concerning the said Decision. To recall, in the 2011 Decision, the Court
ordered, among others, that the lands subject of Hacienda Luisita
Incorporateds (HLI) stock distribution plan (SDP) be placed under
compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP

(1) The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited to invalid or unconstitutional

laws. Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine
does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as
invalid. The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court
of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to
its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with. Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to
statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that
are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasilegislative in nature.

(2) As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, it took

the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18)
years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of constitutionality will not be passed

upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an

appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in
belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The
second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. The last but the most
important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota
of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the
case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some
other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. Based on the foregoing
disquisitions, We maintain that this Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.

(3) FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it
limited the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas
the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares, which is
the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco). We cannot subscribe to this
view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the
revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.
(4) In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just
compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to
DAR for land distribution to the FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the
"taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2.
We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date
when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of
the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these
lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November
21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily
issued under compulsory acquisition.
(5) There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita
were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989, then the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands

under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, and, consequently, the qualified
FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with respect to their
land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not. The proposition is erroneous. Under RA
6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation
patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that
the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the
instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not
the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
(6) AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of the
FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP and is an
imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10. FARM further asserts that
"[i]f that minimum threshold is not met, why allow [stock distribution
option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a political
accommodation to the powerful."
Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the SDP, RA
6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that improving the economic status of
the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP or is an
imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would
justify discarding the stock distribution option.
(7) Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs
will never have control over these agricultural lands for as long as they
remain as stockholders of HLI. In line with Our finding that control over
agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We
reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never
gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the
SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as
an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of
HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the
protective mantle of RA 6657.
In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the
benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no
obligation to refund or return them, since, as We have mentioned in our
July 5, 2011 Decision, "the benefits x x x were received by the FWBs as
farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other fringe benefits

were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining

agreement with Tadeco."
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved
contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic
monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days
paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the
dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA
8042.

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause
unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his
employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground
that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession
or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the
noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of
OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing
constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on,
OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis
OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year;
and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he

questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of RA 8042.

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.

ISSUES:

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection.

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as
a protected sector.
HELD:

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp
G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations

incorporated under Philippinelaws, both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agriculturalchemicals.Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery
component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until
adequate capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted
to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to
1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the
amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaintfor
collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465,
claiming that it was unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues
that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465 because itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the
case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts
that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
because"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers
themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.

CLAUDIA S. YAP, Petitioner, v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT

and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by
Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping
Limited.The contract was for 12 months.On 23 August 2001,Yapboarded
M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or
about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with
the scrapping bonus.However, he insisted that he was entitled to the
payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally
dismissed from employment.He alleged that he opted for immediate
transfer but none was made.
Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They further
alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the
vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to Thenamaris
other vessels.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the

constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What is the power of taxation?
RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine
of standing is a mereprocedural technicality which may be waived.The
imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state.
While it is true that thepower to tax can be used as an implement of police
power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenuegeneration. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
substantialpurposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power
and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers
are distinct andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of
the State to enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of
taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main
purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior or conduct, while
taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and"lawful means"
tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police
power. Thepower of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by
inherent and constitutional limitations.
Yap v. Thenamaris Ships & Intermare Maritime
G.R. No. 179532: May 30, 2011

Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled that
petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad faith when
they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not able to board;
and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his contract for a period of nine months (US$12,870.00), P100,000 for
moral damages, and P50,000 for exemplary damages with 10% of the
same for Attys fees.
Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award of
salaries from that corresponding to nine months to only three months
(US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.
Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of
respondent. However, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that
"there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for every year of the
unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this
can be applied."
Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, respondents
filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However,
the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this
petition.

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964
for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the
action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had
been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code
Issues:

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an

illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the]
unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less" is constitutional;

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or

ambiguous.

[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting petitioner
only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is
far short of the "every year of the unexpired term" threshold.

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA

4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and
any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in
favor of the statute.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for being
violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection. Moreover, the subject
clause does not state any definitive governmental purpose, hence, it also
violates petitioner's right to substantive due process.
Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is the
doctrine of operative fact applied when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
This case should not be included in the exception. It was not the fault of
petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed
by respondents.
Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker
allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the
lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this
Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question.
Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary clause.
Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:

Held:

2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite.
Vehicular Traffic is not defined and no distinctions were made between
cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446
(December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the

dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality
to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any
law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there
shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April
24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general

applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is
to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made
in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.

CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for
a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed
that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year
due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite
the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for
a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied
with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a
petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for
tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year
period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year
2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed
its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this
appeal.

Respondent Aichi filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, with the petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.On even date,
respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA for the refund/credit of
the same input VAT. The CTA partially granted the petition. In a Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of
the NIRC and a prior filing of an administrative claim is a condition
precedent before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA En Banc affirmed
the division ruling.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall
be understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month
as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of
days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987
impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable.
Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year
reglementary period.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of

Asia, Inc.,
G.R. No. 184823, 06 October 2010

ISSUE
Whether the respondents judicial and administrative claims for tax
refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period as provided
in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.
HELD
NO.
The two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July
1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence,
respondents administrative claim was timely filed.The filing of the judicial
claim was premature. However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the
administrative claim, [the Supreme Court is] constrained to deny
respondents claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of
Section 112(D). Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR
has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents
in support of the application [for tax refund/credit], within which to grant
or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers
recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of
the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to
act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is
to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously
filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the
decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we
find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature. The premature
filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.