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20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for
certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly
paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
premium and overtime diff erentials for worked legal holidays from
November 1, 1974.
The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered Bank Employees
Associations claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section
2,Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction No. 9, which respectively provide:
Held:
From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and
Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on
holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid
employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the
implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days
therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum
wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the
courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as
null and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the
Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long
as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within
the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Power to construe
THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of
Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a
complaint with the Regional Offi ce No. IV, Department of Labor, now
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank,
for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for
and regulations. While it is true that the Minister has the authority in the
performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement,
construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the
statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.
**a. Dura lex sed lex
Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240
March 25, 1992
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don
Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual
the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch
162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio
Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate children as
described in art 992 should be construed as spurious children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated
that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed
evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of
People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret
agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police
which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper
defense to illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The
next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it
in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
As determined through Construction
**General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution,
to lift term limits of elective officials, by peoples initiative. Delfin wanted
COMELEC to control and supervise said peoples initiative the signaturegathering all over the country. The proposition is: Do you approve of lifting the
term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose
Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total
number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen.
Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of
by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
** 2. Specific Rules
a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and
Paz Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General
opposed this stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to
be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been
acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child
may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an
acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of
the father or mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the
intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Article 338
would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are
much less than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is
unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these
rights. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the
liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged
natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. An
acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of
the law, they should be allowed adoption.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x) merely to ban them from its
ownership and not from its management control or operation.
(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended
by Republic Act No.134)
which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the laws of nationalization
of certain rights, f r a n c h i s e s o r p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i o n
w i t h t h e R e t a i l Tr a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy Law would punish acts
intended to circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the
retail business.
Itchong Case
ISSUE
Is the employment of aliens in non-control position in a retail
establishment or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
RULING
Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law(X )unconstiright of employer to choose The nationalization of an economic measure
when founded on grounds of public policy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s
unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
C o n s t i t u t i o n because its aim is merely to further the material progress and
welfare of the citizens of a country. Indeed, in nationalizing employment
in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but
its sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those
of other nationalities. falls within the scope of police power, thru which
and by which the State insures its existence and security and
the supreme welfare of its citizens
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This pr
e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is
hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against
appellees.
Bustamante vs. NLRC, 1996
Petitioner
Osmalik S. Bustamante, Paulino A. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Mario D.
Sumonod, and Sabu J. Lamaran
Respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
Ponente
Padilla, J.
Docket Number and Date of Decision
G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996
Significance of the Case
In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due
an employee on account of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or
reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his
illegal dismissal.
This case finally abandoned the Mercury Drug rule and deduction of
earnings elsewhere rule then prevailing at that time.
Historical Backdrop
Prior to the present case, SC had applied different methods in the computation
of backwages.
Backwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay
(backwages) to an employee, it also had the implied power of reducing the
backpay where backpay was allowed. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR
can increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several
circumstances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employees
employment in other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal, or
the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from
outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside
employment.
This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases.
Cases are usually held up in the determination of whether or not the
computation of the award of backwages is correct.
Mercury Drug Rule . In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal
dismissal cases, the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. CIR,
1974, to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications
should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee.
In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages
equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made
the base figure for such awards without deduction, subject to deduction where
there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to
increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating
circumstances (e.g. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employers part.
On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279
of the said code provides:
[...] An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed
from the time his compensation was was withheld from him up to the time of
his reinstatement.
The above provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally applied by the Court
after the promulgation of theMercury Drug case, and during the effectivity of
P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. In effect, this qualified the
provision under P.D. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to 3 years.
Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21
March 1989, the pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was
amended to read as follows:
[...] An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than
in the sugar industry. While it is the lowly farm worker who must toil in the
field under the harshness of conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more
the fruits of production. While the planter lives in the comfort of his palatial
home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than not defies
the basic tenets of human dignity.[1]
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court seeking to review and set aside the August 8, 1993 Decision [2] and
January 21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 42,[4] Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 6894 for Declaratory Relief.
The antecedent facts that matter can be culled as follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening
the Sugar Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics
for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws
providing additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic
Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross
production of 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing
scheme, in the absence of any private agreement between the planters and
farm workers, depending on the mills total production for each immediately
preceding crop year; and specifically providing that any increase in the
planters share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase
shall accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers. [6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien
of P2.00 per picul on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for
subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar workers. [8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social
amelioration program in the sugar industry:
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; and
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (In milling districts where the annual
gross production is less than 150,000 piculs)
On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00
per picul on the gross production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 19911992, with an automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the
succeeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act subject to the
discretion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and upon
recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9]
Directly addressing the effect of the new P5.00 per picul lien vis--vis the two
previously existing laws, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides:
Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the
sugar industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as
amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under this Act: Provided, That
cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies at
the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be affected thereby.
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further states:
Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof
notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit,
interest, right or participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the
enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary under this
Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.
With the denial of its motion to reconsider the aforesaid Decision, petitioner
found its way to this Court via the present petition.
The petition is not visited by merit.
From a cursory reading of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable
conclusion would be that the benefits under R.A. No.809 and P.D. No. 621 have
been superseded by those granted under the new law. This substitution,
however, appears to be qualified by Section 14[17] which disallows substitution
if its effect would be to diminish or reduce whatever financial benefits the
sugar farm workers are receiving under existing laws at the time of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6289.
How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpreted in light of the
qualification under Section 14 of the same Act?
Petitioner insists that the word substitution in Section 12 should be taken in
its literal sense considering that the intention of Congress to effect a
substitution of benefits is clear and unequivocal. Under this interpretation of
unqualified substitution, the sugar farm workers in the subject milling district
will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against
the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 and
R.A. No. 809.
So also, invoking the Opinion[18] It is believed that the benefits conferred upon
labor by RA 809 have been superseded by those granted to it under RA
6982. This conclusion is inescapable from a reading of Section 12 of the latter
law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the production-sharing
scheme decreed in RA 809 cannot remain in force upon the effectivity of the
new production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982; otherwise, sugar
workers would be receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously.
The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982
is qualified by Section 14 of the latter. This section provides that if the effect of
such substitution will be to diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards
sugar industry laborers are receiving under RA 809, then such workers shall
continue to be entitled to the benefits provided in such law. Expressed
otherwise the production-sharing scheme in RA 6982 does not apply to sugar
industry workers in milling districts where its application would be financially
disadvantageous to them, in which case the existing production-sharing
agreement based on RA 809 shall still govern. (Opinion No. 115, S. 1992 dated
September 2, 1992, signed by Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon.)18 of the
Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends, in the alternative, that the application
of R.A. No. 809 can be maintained but in no case should the benefits
thereunder be implemented in addition to R.A. No. 6982. Applying this
interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers would amount
toP30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by the public respondent
(that the benefits conferred by R.A. No.6982 should complement those granted
by R.A. No. 809 which cannot be superseded by the former Act since Section 14
thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the total workers benefit would be as
follows:
R.A. No. 809
P30,590,086.92
R.A. No. 6982
__,583,145.61
P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should
be construed in connection with every other part so as to produce a
10
foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar farm worker. Hence,
through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always
provided for an increase in wages and benefits. The reason is obvious. Amidst
the rapidly changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the
industry, the sugar worker can hardly cope with his meager income to lean on.
Equally wanting of merit is the alleged double recovery under the
interpretation subscribed by the public respondent. Note that had not R.A. No.
6982 been enacted, sugar farmworkers would be entitled to a total a share
of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621; whereas under the
alternative view of the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92)
granted by R.A. No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A.
No. 6982, sugar farm workers stand to lose the difference of P2,233,258.56,
from a total of P32,823,345.18 which they were entitled before RA 6982 took
effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous construction cannot be
countenanced, being violative of the non-diminution principle under Section 14
of R.A. No. 6982.
In view of the foregoing, the addition of the monetary rewards under R.A. No.
6982 to the benefits granted by R.A. No. 809, is what is called for in the case
under consideration. While it is true that addition is different from
substitution, the circumstances involving subject milling districts (where the
sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary
advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise,
the workers would suffer a diminution of benefits. Therefore, the increase of
monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as a consequence of
such interpretation, is merely incidental to the application of the nondiminution policy of R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which should be liberally
construed to further its purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincing the interpretation proposed by private
respondent BISCOM. While maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and
P.D. No. 621 (where the total share of the workers is P32,823,345.18),
and disregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to the sugar farm
workers, to the mind of the Court, the assailed construction of the public
respondent (where the total share of the workers is P36,173,232.53), would be
more in keeping with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living
condition of workers in the sugar industry. Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
[26]
11
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of
February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February
21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
12
net share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the
landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either party
shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the
general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine
and forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the
discretion of the Court. ... *
We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held
in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant
case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code
of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as
implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was
already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may
be rationalized in this manner:
The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share
tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the
harvests.chanrobles virtual law library
The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law
(except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the
leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions
indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced
in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or
part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.chanrobles virtual law library
Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more
raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed
in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian
Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on
September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa
lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this
case.chanrobles virtual law library
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy
throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically
converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the
entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated
the tenant from the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316
interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding
until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential
Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping
and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that,
as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.chanrobles
virtual law library
All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace
the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are
concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without
notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law,
had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is
already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that
Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore
pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual
law library
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all
that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was
contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford,
Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).chanrobles virtual law
library
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute,
and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former
statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative
declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and
whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles
virtual law library
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs.
Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs.
Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil.
431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252,
254).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtual law library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Endnotes:
* Appellees' contention that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over
the offense because inferior courts have jurisdiction over offense in which the
penalty is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more
three thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment and that it is the
Muoz municipal court that has jurisdiction is wrong. The Court of First Instance
has concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior court in mm in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of-more
than two hundred pesos (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law).
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
13
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education,
in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez
in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile
of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban,
her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC
is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
14
I.
IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION
/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEING
RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING
WAY BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARY STANDARDIZATION LAW (R.A.
6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAME LAW (R.A.
6758) OR IS OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS;
II.
IN FAILING TO REALIZE AND CONSIDER THAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE
PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
BENEFIT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF COMPENSATION PROSCRIBED
UNDER EXISTING LAWS AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III.
IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED NTA EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER
SAID SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT AND COAs
DISALLOWANCE THEREOF IS AN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH RIGHT.
Petitioners raise the pivotal issues: (1) whether or not the social amelioration
or educational assistance benefit given to the individual petitioners prior to
enactment of R.A. 6758 is authorized under the law, (2) whether or not the
disallowance of the said benefit is tantamount to diminution of pay,
and (3) whether or not the individual petitioners have acquired a vested right
thereover.
First Issue:
Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Subparagraphs 4.1, 5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the
Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 6758.
A. Sections 12 and 17 of R. A. 6758, read:
Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances,
except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign
service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation
not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such
other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or
employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed
into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the
National Government.
while
Section 17. Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently
receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those
absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of
which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount
of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall received [sic] in the future.
15
5.4.9
Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently
entitled to the same;
5.4.10
Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized
for personnel stationed abroad;
5.4.11
Night Differential of personnel on night duty;
5.4.12
Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the
rate as prescribed in their respective Charters;
5.4.13
Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
5.4.14
Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial
bodies and Committees; and
5.4.15
Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign
and local travel outside of their official station;
5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise Integrated into the basic
salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989
subject to the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate
authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative
issuances are as follows:
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy;
5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy;
5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
5.5.5 Childrens Allowance;
5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
5.5.7 Meal Subsidy;
5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9 Tellers Allowance.
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of
compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not
mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above shall be
discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such
allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners maintain that since they have been receiving the social
amelioration or educational assistance benefit before July 1, 1989, when R.A.
No. 6758 took effect, and the benefit was not integrated into their standardized
salary rate, they are entitled to receive it even after the effectivity of the said
Act.[6] They base their claim on the second sentence of Section 12 and on
Section 17 of the Salary Standardization Law which, for the sake of
thoroughness and clarity of discussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to
wit:
Second Sentence of Section 12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only
as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall
continue to be authorized;
xxx
Section 17: Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently
receiving salaries and additional compensation /fringe benefits including those
absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of
which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall
continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as
16
(1) RATA;
(2) Uniform and Clothing allowances;
(3) Hazard pay;
(4) Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special
projects or inter-agency undertakings;
(5) Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who
are of acknowledged authorities in their fields of specialization;
(6) Honoraria for lectures and resource persons or speakers;
(7) Overtime pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
(8) Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence allowance of marine officers
and crew on board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations,
and of hospital personnel who attend directly to patients and who by nature of
their duties are required to wear uniforms;
(9) Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently entitled to
the same;
(10) Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized for
personnel stationed abroad;
(11) Night differential of personnel on night duty;
(12) Per Diems of members of the governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate
as prescribed in their respective Charters;
(13) Flying pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
(14) Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members or Staff of collegial
bodies and Committees; and
(15) Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and
local travel outside of their official station.
In addition, sub-paragraph 5.5 of the same Implementing Rules provides for the
other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated into the basic salary
and allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to
the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate authorization either
from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative issuances, as follows:
(1) Rice Subsidy;
(2) Sugar Subsidy;
(3) Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
(4) Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
(5) Childrens Allowances;
(6) Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
(7) Meal Subsidy;
(8) Longevity Pay; and
(9) Tellers Allowance.
On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is awarded by the
government in order to encourage the beneficiaries to pursue further studies
and to help them underwrite the expenses for the education of their children
and dependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the nature of financial
assistance and not of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not
necessary while for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not only that, the
former is basically an incentive wage which is defined as a bonus or
other payment made to employees in addition to guaranteed hourly
wages[9] while the latter cannot be reckoned with as abonus or additional
income, strictly speaking.
It is indeed decisively clear that the benefits mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 12 and sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10 are entirely different
17
Gleanable from the wordings of the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No.
6758 is the intention of Congress to prevent any diminution of the pay and
benefits being received by incumbents at the time of the enactment of the
Salary Standardization Law. Verily, disallowing any such benefit is against the
spirit of the Statute and is inconsistent with the principle of equity which
regards the spirit and not the letter...[15] of the law. Hence, while it cannot be
said that the NTA employees have acquired a vested right over the educational
assistance in dispute as it is always subject to availability of funds,
[16]
nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds are available as in the case
under consideration, would be violative of the principle of equity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; the assailed COA Decision No.
95 - 108 is SET ASIDE, and the disallowance in question LIFTED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
18
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of
power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The
DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay[3] and Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we held
that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scotys
Department Store v. Micaller[5] we struck down a law granting the then Court of
Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the
Industrial Peace Act.
Petitioners also cite Rule II, 5 and Rule XIII, 1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
in support of their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators
may only be appealed to the DARAB. These rules provide:
Rule II 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders,
decisions, and other dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform
adjudicators].
Rule XIII, 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order
or decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of
the parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period
of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if
the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed
by the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or
adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal.
Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the
New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994,
now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an
agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the
Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the
new rules provides:
11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power
vested in the courts.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and
the compensation to be paid for their taking.[6] Through notice sent to the
landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In
case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is
held[7] and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the
central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the
land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to
19
the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian
Court.[8]This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation
cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents
case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court
to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as
a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. [9] It would
subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest
original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make
the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision
of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary
to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is
only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be
paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this
question.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON.
ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO 184861, JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. Afterwards, private respondent, together with her husband, filed a
complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private
respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as
for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the inferior court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f prejudicial question in Civil
Case No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree
with private respondents argument that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during
the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in the
provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a
civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded the filing of the civil case.
20
of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order
and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA,
RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor
was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 337593Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and
Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges
on municipal waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal
the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible,
effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law
cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue
purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and
for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding
of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter
21
Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the
eight -seatCity Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig.
The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one
of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the
Court to challenge Catubigs eligibility for officeon the averment of non-age.
Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented
his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months
and
22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and
24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1,
1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned
as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or
the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same.
Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The
judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig
appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed
not by R.A.170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter
alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years
later.
R .A . 170, as amended
Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than
twenty- three
years of age. xxx"
R .A .2 2 5 9
Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at
least
twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election
and is a qualified voter.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended,
has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259
Decision:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of whether or not
a special law has been repealed or amended by one
or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the
Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Co ngress show
beyond doubt that its members intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of
special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except
those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof.
In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in consistent
with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.
Section 1of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the
Philippines,
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila,
Cavite, Trece
Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the
City of Baguio, thusshowing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from
the provisions of said Act are
subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in
Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly
precluded to vote for provincial officials. Since Dagupan City is removed from
the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision
on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are
not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what
the legislative body has expressly ordained.It is accordingly held that
respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he
took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.
City of Manila vs Genaro Teotico
22 SCRA 267 Civil Law - Torts and Damages Liability of municipal
corporations in certain cases
In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in
P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries
upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code
the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city
treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on
appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of
Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila
states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the
city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall
prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident
happened in national highway.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law;
that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general
law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the
22
negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city
from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but
merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities,
and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or supervision.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the Citys motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a
national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the
road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the Citys
control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the
defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have
control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged
that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the citys roads, P.
Burgos included.
City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to
the contrary, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate,
distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and power shall be 25 of their
gross receipts.
Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law
or other special law, the province may impose a tax on business enjoying a
franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annul receipts.
RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the legislature intended
to withdraw all tax exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is
made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code, when it provides that unless
otherwise provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn
upon the effectivity of the Code.
Lagman v City of Manila (QUICO)
Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version)
Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service
Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed
routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight.
Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the
name and style of Marco Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger
buses along his authorized line.
On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in
pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no.
4986, entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the
City of Manila, and for other purposes, which the city mayor approved. The
pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;
Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of
Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the
best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx
Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no.
4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that
regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested,
under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also
contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact
Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted
by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.
Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails
over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as
amended)?
Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later
enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as
amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former
and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of
C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after
notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute
vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or
control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or
prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred
upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission
under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the
said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon
the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to
the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section
18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an
exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not
favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception
to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against
petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
23
paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. The Board
informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to
repurchase.
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the
property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a
certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover,
the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member
of the GSIS. It wasnt given due consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested
the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they
filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public
bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to
acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or
elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to
compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in
determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to its
members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive to the
needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board could exercise
discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase the
subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the
whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs
of its members.
With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court
also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period
imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell
the property since the property belongs to him (the board as well)
The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the subject property was
not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the
petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject
property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were repeatedly unable
to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager, the
observation was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right.
The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their
requests and the GSIS cant be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted
24
since they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply
with the GSIS terms of repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS
terms.
DECLARADOR VS. GUBATON G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006
Facts:
A 17 years old minor was proven to have committed a crime of murder with
evident premeditation and abuse of strength of stabbing 15 times a teacher,
wife of the petitioner, in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas,
Capiz but the sentenced is suspended by the Judge automatically. A petition
that the suspension of sentenced was not proper because the minor is
disqualified as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in suspending the sentence of a minor of a
crime committed punishable by death.
Held: Crime committed by minor, below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, will be automatically suspended without a need for
application except when the youthful offender was disqualified on any one of
the following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions, (2) to one who is convicted for an
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted
for an offense by the Military Tribunals. In the case at bar, the youthful
offenders crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, by death or
life imprisonment thus the benefit of automatic suspension of sentence is not
applicable.
Liability
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank) and his teacher-in-charge at
the Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly
subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have
been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School
and during school hours.
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government & Chairman, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner,
NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional
Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; and MARIO
VALDEZ,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court[1] to set aside the decision (in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995[2] of
public respondent National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due
course for lack of jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review filed by
25
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the Regional
Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become final and executory after
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for
Reconsideration is filed within said period.
A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision
rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that
the same is filed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in
question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground
of prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon
the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel
where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office. The said
provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or removal
or dismissal from office. x x x
(2) The Secretaries x x x shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. x x x In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
Department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case, the same
shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision
covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners; consequently, they should have
appealed to the CSC. It also advances the view that the instant petition should
have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course,
for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners appeal from and petition for review of
the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies.
I
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 [16] provides for the finality of disciplinary
actions against members of the PNP as follows:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon
a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary
action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided,
further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving
demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or
26
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That
failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period
shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the
filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (Italics supplied)
The
last
proviso
of
this
section
is
restated
in
Section
23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III
of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB
Decisions. The NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide the
appealed cases within sixty (60) days from receipt of the entire records of the
case from the PNP summary dismissal authority. However, failure of the
NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said
period renders the decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of
an appeal by the respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government. The decision rendered by the NAPOLCOM
National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an appealed case shall be final and
executory unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is filed within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, in which case, it shall become final and executory
upon receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the aforesaid
board denying, modifying or affirming the decision.
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to
decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed
decision becomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to the right
of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said
provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a
decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions
of the RAB rendered within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of
the section is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein
that explicitly bars any further appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of
government officials and employees must then be inquired into considering
that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be
national in scope and civilian in character, [17] it is now a part, as a bureau, of
the reorganizedDILG.[18] As such, it falls within the definition of the civil
service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. [19] For this reason,
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where
the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission,
the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987
promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules
provide as follows:
In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990,
the provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations
implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[22]
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the
appealed decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of theDILG. Likewise, if
the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may
still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabadas appeal was addressed to the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government x x x as
Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission, [23] while De
Guzmans petition for review was addressed to the Honorable Secretary,
Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chairman, National
Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.[24]
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary
of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the
other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition
for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as
Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the
jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction
because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. x x x
xxx xxx
xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed
27
upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits. x x x
This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction
only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary
actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief
of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over
decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue,
through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995decision denying
due course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada
and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5,
Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOMMemorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these
rules suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of the RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is flawed because it
would allow a ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an
appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of
1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for
the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of theDILG Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to annual and set aside the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 March
1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration
before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with. [25]
II
The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is
premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus
untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the
one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada
and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal
would have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim
in their Reply to the Comment of theOSG that their case falls within the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the
petitioners relating to the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
instant
petition
is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a letter) of the National Police
Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government isDIRECTED to RESOLVE with
reasonable
dispatch
the
appeal
and
petition
for
review
of
28
arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the
sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained
of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of
P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be enjoined
from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private
respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of their
taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published in
accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of
the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its
passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the
City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and
accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective manner. As
special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the private
respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that the
collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the
refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable; that petitioners
Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the
City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private
respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality
of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious
filing of the claim against them, in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and at the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits of
the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on June
15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360
entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a
sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of
Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto
on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated places
by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents voluntarily
paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on February
15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the City Treasurer who denied the
same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that
Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the
year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the
petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their taxes
to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna,
P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from
the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the
sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga,
took effect in the quarter of the year of its approval, that is in July 1970,
invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as
the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that "Each
approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after the 10th
day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They
contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City
of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his
approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City
Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 305, said ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following
its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance
itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary
to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the
same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the
ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance
is deemed approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the
City Mayor with his veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June
25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from
June 25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that
Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under
Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly
provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360
could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its
passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as
earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the
ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it
shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners
to support their stand that the ordinance in question took effect in the year of
its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that
is more relevant because it is the provision that specifically refers to effectivity
of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed to have
superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in
so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360
became effective and enforceable in 1971, the year following the year of its
approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.A municipal license
tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year,
but an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the
quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is
one which changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts
of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance
No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in
the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the next succeeding
year after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect
and became enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly apparent conflict
between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really such a conflict in
the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal
ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal
license tax already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely
29
new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall
be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
December of any year after the next succeeding year. This means that the
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a
municipal license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next
succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by
the new ordinance. This is different from the second type of a municipal
ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted
during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any subsequent
quarter. We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which
changes a municipal license tax already in existence and an ordinance creating
an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9
which reads:
Section 9 All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or
parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the
same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently
intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise
itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new
statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and
stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation ...
. 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same
subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect
they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to be in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of
persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are
in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that
later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments
and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed
to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old
and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new
provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when
the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative
will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is
not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by
applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code
when the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or
repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the problem
refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2
of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the
graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and
sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of
Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls
within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be
refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for
the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City
RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and
furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on
granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners
MR, hence the instant petition.
Ramirez vs. CA
Issue:
30
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the
conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to
impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to
31
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22
requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias
Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission
in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in
the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly
premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular
for lack of autho
rity on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the
approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular
No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as
to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative
rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative
agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
FACT:
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging
businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was
established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the
majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be
transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises
Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)
alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs
timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged
and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE
appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency,
Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda
found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co
requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay
the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a
writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the
Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the
Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the
original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the
issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only
without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently
without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs
constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of
Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an
32
opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI
was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the
Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable
upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient
conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis
merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or
impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the
encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister
disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The
liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative
proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of
fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA
(Davide, Jr., 1996)
A search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served at any time
within 10 days. If its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the
same may be continued the following day or days until completed, provided it
is within the 10 day period.
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID),acting on
information that a huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang
lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber
coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990,RTC
Valenzuela issued a search warrant. On same day, the team seized from the
lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber, and various
species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumber yard
and placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession of
seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because
Mustang Lumber failed to produce required documents upon demand. Upon
recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran suspended Mustang
Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor of the govt the seized articles.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles,and questioned
the validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure
on April 1 is valid as it comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure
is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April 4seizure was also valid
pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang lumber
filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid.
(1) April 1 search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant. (2*) The search on April 4 was a
continuation of the search on April 3 done under and by virtue of the search
warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126Sec
9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of 10 days. Hence, it could be served
at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day or days
until completed, provided it is still within the 10-day period.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. CA did not commit any reversible error in
affirming RTC judgment. Search and seizure done was valid
.CASE DIGEST BY Agee Romero***There were other issues in the case: the
owner of Mustang Lumber was charged with violation of the Forestry Reform
Code. Mustang lumber movedto quash the information on the ground that the
facts comprising the charge did not amount to a criminal offense (subject
matter of the information islumber, which is neither timber nor other forest
product under Forestry Reform Code and hence, possession thereof w/o the
required legal documents is not prohibited) and to suspend the proceedings
pending the outcome of the formal challenge of Mustang Lumber regarding the
legality of the seizure. Lengthy discussion on the meaning of lumber. But SC
held that the information validly charged an offense because lumber is
included in the term timber.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally
Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the
Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR
707 which states that donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners
or companies or corporations owned and
controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by Section 56 of the
Revised Election
Code.
The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46
of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and
other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other
contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly
situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special
election. Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint with the COMELEC assailing the
validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of
the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or
to influence in any manner any elections.The prohibited active intervention of
foreigners there under may consist of:(1) aiding any candidate, directly or
33
indirectly, in any election;(2) taking part in any election; and (3) influencing in
any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that
contributions by foreigners to the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the
purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not made in aid or
support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the
allocation of space for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any
way influence the result of the election, ... .He then filed an appeal with the
Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary
to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on
Elections or in grave abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of
preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was issued as
COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, and any candidate; as
well as the terms aid, take part, andinfluence, as contemplated In
Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other meanings
Held:
The term any elections definitely comprehends or applies to election of
delegates Constitutional Convention. Foreigner, on
the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or
organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election
Code, broadening the application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to
natural
persons only. Any candidate likewise comprehends some candidates or all
candidates. The terms aid, to take part, andinfluence, were also
construed in their general sense with aid referring to to support, to help, to
assist or to strengthen or
to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in;
and "influence" means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be
able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behaviour
of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to
affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act
upon physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert
or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by
modifications, feelings or conduct. There is nothing in the Revised Election
Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different meaning to the
aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general
sense. There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning
of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general
meaning, unless it is expressed that they have acquired a special and
restricted meaning. Hence, in
this case, generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but
the effect that all candidates benefit from the contribution amounts to an
assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one candidate. Allowing
such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the
laws protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the
COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the
Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be
given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections.
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731
promulgated respectively on August 13, 1970 and September17, 1970 are
therefore declared illegal and null and void.
G.R. No. L-28360 January 27, 1983
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO C. MENOR, as Acting General Manager of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, and MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PRE-QUALIFICATION, NAWASA, defendants-appellants.
Nicolas T. Benedicto, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gov't. Corporate Counsel for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the requirement of a tax clearance certificate as a
prerequisite for taking part in public biddings or contracts to sell supplies to
any government agency.
Judge Cloribel of the Court of First Instance of Manila in his decision dated
March 1, 1967 in Civil Case No. 66750, a mandamus case, ordered the Acting
General Manager of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and the
members of the Committee on Pre-Qualification to allow C & C Commercial
Corporation to participate as a qualified bidder in the public bidding for the
supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes to the Nawasa in spite of the fact
that it had a pending tax case and had no tax clearance certificate.
By virtue of that judgment, which became final because the Nawasa did not
appeal, C & C Commercial Corporation took part in the bidding. When the bids
were opened on May 18, 1967, it was found to be the lowest bidder.
In a letter dated July 25, 1967, Antonio C. Menor, the acting general manager
of the Nawasa, required C & C Commercial Corporation to submit the tax
clearance certificate required in Presidential Administrative Order No, 66 dated
June 26, 1967, 63 0. G. 6391, which reads as follows:
34
Realizing that the appeal would delay the award and that another bidder might
be given the contract, C & C Commercial Corporation filed in the lower court
another petition for mandamus dated November 21, 1967 wherein it prayed
that the Nawasa Board of Directors, its Committee of Awards and Menor, its
acting general manager, be restrained from awarding the contract to another
bidder and that they be ordered to award the contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation (pp. 29-30, Rollo).
That case, Civil Case No. 71346, was assigned to Judge Francisco Geronimo. In
his order dated January 8, 1968, he denied the motion of C & C Commercial
Corporation for a preliminary injunction. He said that the injunction would be
inimical to the public interest (p. 37, Rollo).
The Government Corporate Counsel in a manifestation dated January 15, 1968
apprised the lower court that the Nawasa board of directors in its resolution
dated January 11, 1968 awarded the contract to Regal Trading Corporation as
the "lowest complying bidder" (p. 38, Rollo).
Menor in his letter of January 16, 1968 forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for examination and review the contract entered into between the
Nawasa and Regal Trading Corporation, acting in behalf of the Sumitomo Shoji
Kaisha, Ltd., for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes worth
$387,814.72 (p. 41, Rollo). The Presidential Economic Staff and the Office of
the President approved the contract (p. 64, Rollo).
Unable to get an injunction from Judge Geronimo, C & C Commercial
Corporation sought recourse in this Court. In its ex parte motion of January 28,
1968, it asked this Court to enjoin the implementation of the said contract (p.
16, Rollo).
The Nawasa opposed the motion on the ground that there was nothing more to
be enjoined. Its counsel revealed in its opposition what C & C Commercial
Corporation had suppressed: the fact that after Judge Geronimo had denied its
petition for injunction C & C Commercial Corporation instituted another action
(the third case) in the Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal (presided over by
Judge Pedro Navarro), docketed as Civil Case No. 10572, wherein it sought a
declaration of the nullity of the award to Regal Trading Corporation.
Judge Navarro in his order dated February 7, 1968 restrained Menor, the
Nawasa, the Committee of Awards and Regal Trading Corporation "from going
through" with the said contract and from opening the corresponding letter of
credit until the injunction incident is resolved (pp. 58-59 and 80-81, Rollo).
35
In contrast, this Court in its resolution of March 18, 1968 denied C & C
Commercial Corporation's aforementioned motion for the issuance of an
injunction. As the parties herein had already submitted their briefs, the appeal
was submitted for decision. The issue is the propriety of Judge Cloribel's order
compelling the Nawasa officials to award the said contract to C & C Commercial
Corporation.
It may be argued that the issue had become moot because the contract had
already been awarded to Regal Trading Corporation in 1968 and at this late
hour it can be presumed that the contract had been fully performed and
implemented. Nevertheless, a ruling on the contentions of C & C Commercial
Corporation is necessary, according to the Government Corporate Counsel, "if
only to make the appellee-corporation stop playing around with our courts" (p.
70, Rollo). For the guidance of the bench and bar, we have to resolve the legal
issues raised by the Nawasa.
The trial court erred in holding that Administrative Order No. 66 could not be
given a retroactive effect to the bid of C & C Commercial Corporation which
allegedly had been allowed to bid in prior transactions with the Nawasa in spite
of its pending tax case,
It erred because Administrative Order No. 66 (promulgated after Judge Cloribel
had rendered his decision of March 1, 1967) covers not only the bidding but
also the "execution of any contract with" the lowest bidder. In this case, at the
time the said order was issued, no award had as yet been made and when the
award was to be made, the said order was already in force.
3. Moreover, it was not the ministerial duty of the Nawasa officials to award the
contract to C & C Commercial Corporation even if it was the lowest bidder, The
Nawasa in its addendum No.1 to the invitation to bid dated July 6, 1966
reserved the right "to reject the bid of any bidder" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
We hold that Judge Cloribel acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing his erroneous order, directing that the Nawasa officials
should award the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation. The order is
erroneous and void for the following reasons:
Therefore, a bidder whose bid is rejected has no cause for complaint nor a right
to dispute the award to another bidder (Esguerra & Sons vs. Aytona, 114 Phil.
1189; Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, L-27072, July 31, 1968,
24 SCRA 491).
1. The said order was an amendment of a judgment that had already been
satisfied. The case was closed and terminated. Judge Cloribel had no right and
authority to issue such an order after he had lost jurisdiction over the case. The
award of the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation was not the lis mota in
the mandamus case before Judge Cloribel. It was an extraneous matter that
could not have been injected into that case nor resolved therein. What was in
issue was whether C & C Commercial Corporation should be allowed to take
part in the bidding even if it had no tax clearance certificate.
2. The Nawasa was justified in not awarding the contract- to C & C Commercial
Corporation because it had no tax clearance certificate. It had a pending tax
case in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The award to C & C Commercial
Corporation would be in gross contravention of Administrative Order No. 66.
That was the ruling in Nawasa vs. Reyes, L-28597, February 29, 1968, 22 SCRA
905, where the bidder was also the appellee herein, C & C Commercial
Corporation. It was held therein that C & C Commercial Corporation was
disqualified under the said order to take part in the bidding to supply the
Nawasa with steel pipes because it had "tremendous tax liabilities".
Under Administrative Order No. 66, the Nawasa officials would be subject to
administrative disciplinary action if they awarded the contract to C & C
Commercial Corporation in spite of its unsettled tax liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order is reversed and set aside with costs against
C & C Commercial Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro
Manila was considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and
they were aided by judges who should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
36
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
66750 filed by the C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the
NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court ordered the NAWASA to allow the
plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in the bidding for
the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for
the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes
due with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as
illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory,
and in compliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff
corporation which thereupon submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could
make any award of the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided
against him or involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the
government, to participate in public bidding or in any contract with the
government or any of its subdivision, branches or instrumentalities including
government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which NAWASA
refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to
file a motion praying that defendants award the contract called for to said
plaintiff being the lowest responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court
ordered the defendants to award the contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court
observing in its Order dated August 23, 1967, that the plaintiff is "the lowest
bidder and practically the only one who can furnish a Filipino or local product
under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants
contended that the matter of award of the contract was not included in the
Decision dated March 1, 1967; that Administrative Order No. 66 of the
President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 applies to the contract called
for; and that the matter of the award of the contract in question rests on the
absolute discretion of the defendants, taking into consideration all the
circumstances attendant thereto. 5 This motion having been denied,
defendants took the present recourse to have the Order dated August 23, 1967
of th lower court set aside.
The only issues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for short) are:
(1) whether or not the award of the contract in question may be deemed to
have been included in the judgment of the Court of First Instance dated March
1, 1967, or inferred therefrom; and (2) whether or not Administrative Order No.
66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines applies in the instant
case.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated March 1, 1967
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered granting the relief prayed for by ordering the
defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among
the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of
locally manufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of
different sizes from 12" to 24" diameter, without costs or
damages.
In accordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short)
submitted its bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have
been the lowest responsible bidder, appellee was not forthwith given the final
award of the corresponding contract because, as stated earlier, the President of
the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Administrative Order No. 66
pertinent provisions of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order the disqualification of any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in
court pending or finally decided against him or it involving nonpayment of any tax, duty, or undertaking with the Government,
to participate in public biddings or in any contract with the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, until after such case or cases are terminated in
his or its favor, or unless the Secretary of Finance shall certify,
that such cases are pending and not decided 'without fault on
the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bond for
payment of taxes that may be assessed against him.
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities and local
governments, shall impose this condition and shall require in
addition, the latest certified copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation
Form -No. 19.65 E-I and BIR Tax Clearance Form No. 17.61 as
prerequisite to participation in any public biddings orexecution
of any contract with them. Violation of this Order shall be a
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis supplied)
37
What appellant Antonio C. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did was
to address a letter to appellee on July 25, 1967, requesting it to comply within
ten (10) days from receipt of the letter with the requirements of the
presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proof of said
compliance. 6
On the same date, July 25, 1967, plaintiff filed a "Motion" with the court below
for the issuance of an order to compel appellants to "award the contract called
for in the aforementioned bidding" in its favor. To the motion, appellants filed
an opposition, despite which, the lower court issued the questioned Order of
August 23, 1967.
The main contention of appellants in seeking the setting aside of the
aforementioned questioned order is that the subject thereof is not included in,
or inferred from, the judgment of March 1, 1967 which merely "ordered
appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified bidders."
Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already satisfied when appellants prequalified the appellee and allowed it to tender its bid, and that nothing more is
to be done under the judgment.
It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of
judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or
final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of action or special proceeding, litigation
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necesarry thereto.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question
was not "so adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its
dispositive portion to adjudging only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee
contends otherwise and maintains that the awarding of the contract to it is
necessarily implied from and included in the order in the judgment declaring it
qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel
appellants to allow it to take part in the bidding in question, appellee
necessarily meant to be also awarded the corresponding contract if its bid is
found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest bidder" under
the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee
to enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that
appellee is found to be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not
made in its favor, without any valid reason to reject any or all bids as is
generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated by
appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No.
66, after the judgment has become final and even already executed, at least
insofar as it ordered appellants to allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident
from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10) days within which to
comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is complied
with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned
requirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to
court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposed on it (appellee)
the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order No.
66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When
the lower court decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so
take part in the public bidding in question, the judgment must take precedence
over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become
final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person,
natural or juridical, who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from
participating in public biddings or any contract with the Government or any of
its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily
includes the award to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the
lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the bidding would be a meaningless
exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for appellee.1wph1.t The
judgment has become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the judgment
38
has become "property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of
law. This is exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the
Philippines would do if it is made to apply to the instant case, for while the
Court, by final judgment, qualified appellee to participate in the bidding, the
Administrative Order would disqualify said party. This would be an illegal
interference on the power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed,
if only on reliance of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New
Constitution for reasons I have set forth at length in Malacora vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submitted
more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur. I wish to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro
Manila was considerably delayed because contractors filed baseless suits and
they were aided by judges who should have known better.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
66750 filed by the C & C Commercial Corporation principally against the
NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court ordered the NAWASA to allow the
plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualified bidders in the bidding for
the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
complaint was filed because of the imposition of a requirement by NAWASA for
the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes
due with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as
illegal. 2
Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final and executory,
and in compliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff
corporation which thereupon submitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could
make any award of the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines
promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or
juridical, with a pending case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, or criminal or civil case in court, pending or finally decided
against him or involving non-payment of any tax, duty or undertaking with the
government, to participate in public bidding or in any contract with the
government or any of its subdivision, branches or instrumentalities including
39
It is at this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of
judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or
final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
as follows:
(a) . . .
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of action or special proceeding, litigation
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necesarry thereto.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract in question
was not "so adjudged" in the judgment of March 1, 1967 which limited its
dispositive portion to adjudging only the pre-qualification of appellee. Appellee
contends otherwise and maintains that the awarding of the contract to it is
necessarily implied from and included in the order in the judgment declaring it
qualified to take part in the bidding.
I find merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel
appellants to allow it to take part in the bidding in question, appellee
necessarily meant to be also awarded the corresponding contract if its bid is
found to be the lowest within the meaning of the term "lowest bidder" under
the law and jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering appellants to allow appellee
to enter its bid would be empty and meaningless if despite the fact that
appellee is found to be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not
made in its favor, without any valid reason to reject any or all bids as is
generally set forth in all invitations to bid. No valid reason is intimidated by
appellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No.
66, after the judgment has become final and even already executed, at least
insofar as it ordered appellants to allow appellee to enter its bid. This is evident
from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10) days within which to
40
comply with its provision, indicating that if the requirement thereof is complied
with by appellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the lowest bidder.
For obvious reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned
requirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to
court and filed Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposed on it (appellee)
the same or similar requirements as those found in Administrative Order No.
66, in order to have itself declared qualified to take part in the bidding. When
the lower court decided in favor of appellee by declaring it to be qualified to so
take part in the public bidding in question, the judgment must take precedence
over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become
final.
As may be seen, the presidential administrative order disqualified a person,
natural or juridical, who has a pending tax case, administrative or judicial, from
participating in public biddings or any contract with the Government or any of
its subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily
includes the award to him of the corresponding contract, if found to be the
lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the bidding would be a meaningless
exercise and the judgment, an empty victory for appellee. The judgment has
become the "law of the case," and in a true sense, the judgment has become
"property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of law. This is
exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines
would do if it is made to apply to the instant case, for while the Court, by final
judgment, qualified appellee to participate in the bidding, the Administrative
Order would disqualify said party. This would be an illegal interference on the
power of the judiciary.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealed from, affirmed,
if only on reliance of the provision of Section 11, Article X of the New
Constitution for reasons I have set forth at length in Malacora vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submitted
more than eighteen (18) months before the instant case could be decided.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1985)Ponente: Makasiar,
C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169)
Facts:
April 28, 1965 - Island Savings Bank (ISB) approvedthe loan application for
P80,000 of Sulpicio Tolentino, who, asa security for the loan, also executed a
real estate mortgageover his 100-ha land. The approved loan application called
for P80,000 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments for a period of 3 years,
with 12% interest.May 22, 1965 a mere P17,000 partial release of theloan
was made by ISB, and Tolentino and his wife Editasigned a promissory note for
P17,000 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of
execution of thecontract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.An advance
interest for the P80,000 loan covering a6-mo period amounting to P4,800was
deducted from the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded to
Tolentinoon July 23, 1965, after being informed by ISB that there wasno fund
yet available for the release of the P63,000 balance.Aug. 13, 1965 the
Monetary Board of the CentralBank issued Resolution No. 1049, which
prohibited ISB frommaking new loans and investments, after finding that it
wassuffering liquidity problems.June 14, 1968 the Monetary Board
issuedResolution No. 967, which prohibited ISB from doing business in the
Philippines, after finding that it failed to put upthe required capital to restore its
solvency.Aug. 1, 1968 ISB, in view of non-payment of theP17,000 covered by
the promissory note, filed an applicationfor the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgagecovering the 100-ha land; and the sheriff scheduled
auction.Tolentino filed a petition with the CFI for injunction,specific
performance or rescission and damages with preliminary injunction, alleging
that since ISB failed to deliver the P63,000 remaining balance of the loan, he is
entitled tospecific performance by ordering ISB to deliver it with interestof 12%
per annum from April 28, 1965, and if said balancecannot be delivered, to
rescind the real estate mortgage.CFI issued a TRO enjoining ISB from
continuingwith the foreclosure of the mortgage, however, after
findingTolentinos petition unmeritorious, ordered the latter to payISB P17,000
plus legal interest and legal charges and liftingthe TRO so the sheriff may
proceed with the foreclosure.CA, on appeal by Tolentino, modified CFIs
decision byaffirming dismissal of Tolentinos petition for specific performance,
but ruled that ISB can neither foreclose themortgage nor collect the
P17,000loan.
SC: The parties, in the P80,000 loan agreement,undertook reciprocal
obligations, wherein theobligation/promise of each party is the consideration
for thatof the other; and when one party has performed or is ready andwilling
to perform his part of the contract, the other party whohas not performed or is
not ready and willing to performincurs in delay (Art. 1169, CC).When Tolentino
executed a real estate mortgage, hesignified his willingness to pay the P80,000
loan, and fromsuch date, the obligation of ISB to furnish the loan accrued.Thus,
ISBs delay started on April 28, 1965 and lasted 3 yearsor when Resolution No.
967 was issued prohibiting ISB fromdoing further
business
, which madit legally impossiblefrom ISB to furnish the P63,000 of the
loan.Resolution No. 1049 cannot interrupt the default of ISBin complying with
its obligation to release the P63,000 balance because it merely prohibited ISB
from making new loans andinvestments, not from releasing the balance of
loanagreements previously contracted.The mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an
engagementdoes not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does
itconstitute any defense to a decree of specific performance; andthe mere fact
of insolvency of a debtor is never an excuse for the nonfulfillment of an
obligation, but instead, is taken as a breach of contract.The fact that Tolentino
demanded and accepted the refundof the pre-deducted interest cannot be
taken as a waiver of hisright to collect the P63,000 balance. The act of ISB in
askingfor the advance interest was improper considering that onlyP17,000 out
41
NO.
Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case to
the Supreme Court.
42
mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term shall in prescribing
the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters
Issue:
receipt of the court order setting the time for Initial Hearing. While concededly
WON the venue of action was improper (CFI of Pampanga)? NO, it made use of
the word may, hence only directory.
Issue:
W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory.
Held:
It is mandatory. The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
Held:
It is well settled that the word may is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term may
be connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. May is an auxillary
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
The stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By
the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and
exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga. They merely agreed to
submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right to seek
recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance
with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
Facts:
43
44
13
15
to the
45
On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the
aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant
to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment 16in which the Solicitor General took a legal
position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close
examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious
analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent
to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this
Honorable Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications
Commission as a collegial body;
(b) restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from
arrogating unto himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner
Bell Telecom's application under NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as
void; [and]
(e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.
17
18
46
47
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. 22 On the same
day, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion 23 echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R Nos.
126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion 24 reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse
to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in
behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse
the Solicitor General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the
NTC to file its own comment in G.R No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R Nos.
126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion 25 praying that the latter's petition in G.R No. 126526 be
adopted as their comment in the consolidated cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the
fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial
agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC
acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission
each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any
incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider
the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is
now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man
commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the
collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only
one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body
even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the
respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the
NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936,
the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146
which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While
providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service
Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it
clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the
Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to
him by the Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA
2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and
emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service
Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The
amendment provided that contested cases and all cases
involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
signed, into law, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and
approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn,
created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the
PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of
three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
. . . The Board of Communications shall be
composed of a full time Chairman who shall be
of unquestioned integrity and recognized
prominence in previous public and/or private
employment; two full-time members who shall
be competent on all aspects of
communications, preferably one of whom shall
be a lawyer and the other an economist . . .
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its "Rules of
Procedure and Practice" in connection with applications and
proceedings before it.
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No.
546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of
48
49
50
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the
final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC because
the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General.
Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors' cause could not be significantly
affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not
into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the
issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the
same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the
commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of
private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises
to be the most technologically advanced telephone service in the country. This
court is not in any way concerned with whether or not private respondent
BellTel's project proposal is technically feasible or financially viable, and this
court should not, in fact, delve into these matters which are patently outside of
its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was
the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed
grave abuse of discretion, and so we must review and ascertain the correctness
of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this score, and this score
alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of
indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent
appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en
banc and forthwith grant private respondent BellTel's application for a
provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the
second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered
by respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety
of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a
case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As
to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office
of the special civil action ofmandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after
all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar,
Dumlao and Perez to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working
51
draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply
ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body, and the subject of
the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working draft
which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent
BellTel's application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of
Appeals, however, did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application.
This is understandable since every commissioner of the three-man NTC has a
vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTel's application and
the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the
members of the commission of their individual discretion in private respondent
BellTel's case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed
with the consideration of private respondent BellTel's application for provisional
authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since December, 1994. With
the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay action on the said
application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate any and all
NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals' order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel's application for a
provisional authority, attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order granting
provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the latter
through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single piece of
evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working
draft. In private respondent BellTel's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged that said
working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of
the NTC. 27 Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. Edgardo
Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. 28 The working draft
is attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by
any person for any stated purpose. 29
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the
Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses
of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
I
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral,
the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay, to wit:
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be
diverted from the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the
NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more
52
53
54
Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis
to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of
the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might
be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition
of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
GMCR,
COMMISSIONER
SIMEON
L.
KINTANAR,
NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.BELL
TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en
banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and
Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge
Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional
Authority. This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time
of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted
a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications
service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised
applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for
local exchange carrier service [4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International
Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal
awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private
respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent
BellTel the right, privilege and authority to
carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and
between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this
purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless
telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive
systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added
services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile,
control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and all other
telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be
made available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or
construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and receiving
stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines,
cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out
the purposes of this franchise.[5]
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second
Application[6] praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined
nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone
exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and
fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was
docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposed
to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most modern
55
BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q.
Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon
Kintanar.
While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three
members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation,
petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding
procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and
promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in
the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since
only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as
the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the
NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have
allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually
constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying
for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on
May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the
Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference was explicitly made to the
findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was
also made of the aforementioned working draft of the order granting a
provisional authority to BellTel, which draft was made by the Legal Department
of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May
12, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition[13] to the aforestated two motions
of private respondent BellTel.
Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory
Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding
that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least
for the initial two (2) years.
On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a
Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve) [14] In said motion,
private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the
order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the
ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority
out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer,
private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that
as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of
the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application
merits due/favorable consideration.[9]
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez
affixed their signatures and the date, 4/6/95.
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two
members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working
draft[10] of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent
56
On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed
by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the
aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant
to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate
court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment [16] in which the Solicitor General took
a legal position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close
examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious
analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent
to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
1. The Court of Appeals, in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93 and
the Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral attack on a
law which was nowhere called for in the pleadings of the parties nor is
authorized by the Rules of Court.
(a)
declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a
collegial body;
(b)
restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating unto
himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c)
order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms
application under NTC-94-229;
(d)
(e)
2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the Commission
is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were a
spin off from the defunct Public Service Commission were created as a collegial
body. The law that created EO 546 erased the collegial character of the
proceedings before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it
considered evidence not formally offered or incorporated into the records of the
case; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner-appellant nor on
the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties3.1
CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the fact that
Charters of other regulatory agencies expressly made them collegial while this
express provision was absent in NTCs charter.
3.2
CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 prevails and
[requires] collegiality.
3.3
The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed by her and her 2
deputies are in no way indicative of collegiality and should not be considered
as having any persuasive effect xxx.
3.4
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications
Rules of Practice and Procedures.
57
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment. [22] On the
same
day,
the
NTC
and
Commissioner
Kintanar
filed
a
Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R.
Nos. 126496 and 126526.
58
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service
Commission (PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public
Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that
the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner
could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service
Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public
Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment
provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law,
Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated
Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications (BOC)
in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of
three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
x x x The Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman
who shall be of unquestioned integrity and recognized prominence in previous
public and/or private employment; two full-time members who shall be
competent on all aspects of communications, preferably one of whom shall be
a lawyer and the other an economist x x x
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and Practice
in connection with applications and proceedings before it.
then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of the NTC
was authorized by law. x x x
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x
x. However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We
find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not
correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a
collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in
deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But
the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of
the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of
Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15]
of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc:
x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions
and resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall
be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision
or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings,
decisions and resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the
decision on the merit of the case so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman
of the Board.
x x x
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating
the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications,
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that -x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an
economist. x x x
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x x
x. However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and
Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. In the
meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the
NTC which rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-participative in
the task of decision-making. This prompted the then Minister of Transportation
and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinion of the then
Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC was a collegial body
or not. On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion x x x to the
effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the
Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a
member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon,
or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which case the
concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a
valid Decision x x x. While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure
was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however,
the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure
before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No. 546. This
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA
200 when it declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the
Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x
govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now
respondent NTC. x x x
In the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National
Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717, the Supreme Court applied and
cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC x x x.
59
Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its
predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.
Respondents Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is
vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is
antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order No.
546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:
[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform
some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus
Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed
and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a
public nature or service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is
persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with board (State Ex.
Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109
Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily discerned
from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is
composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners x x x not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word and is
not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the
law. It means in addition to (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus
Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and, whether
it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as
binding together and as relating to one another x x x.
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed x x x. If it was the intention of President Marcos to
constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of a
commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a
commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is
composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the
two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission
composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together
in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions,
conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC
and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word deputy to
designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate
against the collegiality of the NTC. x x x The collegiality of the NTC cannot be
disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership
thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without
functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the
NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x
x. Even then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement
opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek
refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno x x x. It was only
when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar was
designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flipflapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his Department Order
No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases pending
with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before
the NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof x x x.
xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their
argument x x x because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a
collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents pose tenuous. For, it can likewise
be argued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the
existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming the same.
xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x
declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law
and thus null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside. [26]
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that
respondent appellate courts act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 11-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner Benedicto
on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars and
an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the courts power to nullify
administrative regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative
regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first
place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are
on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to
law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are
absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a
ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are
an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
60
61
THE FACTS
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified
FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the
doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies
to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have
the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is
on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they
were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
THE ISSUES
2.
62
that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify
the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3.
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme
only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of
the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2,
2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive,
the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply
to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the
DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with
the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.]
4.
5.
6.
YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these
qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of
63
the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders
of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of
shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220
total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so
as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is
nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special,
different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the
amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks
the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A
political question is not subject to review by the Court.
64
65
66
67
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner
is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be
known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t
Floresca vs. Phillex Mining
68
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win in the lower court
whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA
should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the
book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the
law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of
the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
69
question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has
passed.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution #
13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all
the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116,
1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which
stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up
to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the
provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of
office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The
petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of
petitioner without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of
the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject
to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is
undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention
of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where
there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term
rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of
his term to hold such office.
CORPORATION, petitioner,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
70
71
The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC
wants to apply in its entirety to the private respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. The terms and
conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned
and controlled corporations shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries
shall be standardized by the National Assembly as
provided for in the New Constitution. However, there
shall be reduction of existing wages, benefits and other
terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by
them at the time of the adoption of the Code.
72
73
all
the
74
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the
Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service
employment. Conceivably,all government-owned or controlled corporations
could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporation
under the general law. The constitutional amendment including such
corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.
It may be asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civil
Service should it not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My answer is, not
necessarily. For it may well be that the National Housing Corporation is in
limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be
"government-owned or controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar
proceedings:
SO ORDERED.
Philippine
Associated
Corporation
Separate Opinions
It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for
the Commissioner of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the
constitutional provisions on the Civil Service in respect of government-owned
or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons stated therein,
that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special
law; it was organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law Act No. 1459 entitled,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER
WHICH SUCH CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has
been replaced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 known as The New Corporation
Code.] In the fight of my opinion, the National Housing Corporation is not
covered by the Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the Labor Code? I am not
prepared to answer this question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that
whether or not a corporation is "government-owned or controlled" depends
upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be "government-owned or
controlled" for one purpose but not for another. In other words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or
controlled."
Smelting
and
Refining
QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the above-named
corporation is government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, series of 1976, for
the Commissioner of Civil Service who wanted to know the scope of the
constitutional provisions on the Civil Service in respect of government-owned
or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons stated therein,
that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special
law; it was organized pursuant to the Corpotation Law Act No. 1459 entitled,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
75
WILLARD, J.:
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary An Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms,
and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the
provisions of this Act.
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person
any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles
virtualawlibrary Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to
firearms in possession of persons who have secured a license therefor
or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act.
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of Act No.
1780, committed as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully,
and criminally, had in his possession and concealed about his person a
deadly weapon, to wit: chanrobles virtualawlibrary One (1) iron bar,
about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end and a
string on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed
and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the
Philippine Commission.
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the Government
has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that
Philippine
Associated
Corporation
Smelting
and
Refining
DECISION
76
latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in
the view of the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a
violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners
argue that they are regular employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are
necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondents main business,
steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to
private respondent NSC.
HELD: NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions
affirmed.
differentials.
On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of more than six (6) years should
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It
affirmed the Labor Arbiters holding that petitioners were project employees
since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five
Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the
time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to
petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal
qualify them as regular employees, the Supreme Court believed this claim is
without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as
project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or
legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second paragraph of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who
has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee,
relates to casual employees, not to project employees.
77
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan at San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissing the petition for
mandamus in Civil Case No. SCC-182. 1
In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan),
instituted against the City of San Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San
Carlos City and the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer of
San Carlos City, a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City
Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos,
from the time of its creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a
third class city; that Republic Act No. 5967 which became effective on June 21,
1969 provides that the basic salaries of city judges of second and third class
cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the petitioner was then actually
receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which P350.00 was the share of the
national government and P650.00 is the share of the city government, which
salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City Judge of a third
class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary
actually being received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said
act shall be paid by the city government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the
filing of the petition on January 21, 1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary
78
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos
per annum;
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge, and for second and third class
cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand five hundred
pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for other
cities, the city judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than
that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the
salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per
month less than that of the city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 5967 would be interpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the
salary of the city judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the
salaries of City Judges at rate very much higher than that of a City Mayor
(particularly in the case of second and third class cities) would be rendered
totally useless." The petitioner submitted "that since the principal intention of
the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the
salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of said Section 7 should give way
to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21,
1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a third class city; that the petitioner as
city judge received an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of
San Carlos City received an annual salary of P13,200.00 which was exactly
P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became
Republic Act No. 5967, the following discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I recall
that there will be some cities where the city judges will receive
salaries higher than those of the mayors. And in all charters,
Your Honor, the city judge is considered a department head
theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It would not be fair for
the purposes of public administration that a city department
head should receive a salary higher than that of the chief
executive of the city.
79
It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in
enacting Republic Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not
be higher than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause "Provided,
however, That the salary of a city judge shall be at least P100.00 per month
less than that of the city mayor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the
salary of city judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute.
When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of
the statute the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it
is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an
annual salary of P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide
for an annual salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of the said
city.
HELD:
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed
its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision
appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No.
106719. September 21, 1993
TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
Ponente: QUIASON, J.
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same
did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its
own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it
w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and copetitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing
the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint
filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
80
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to
aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that
has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said
conditions have not been met in the instant case
People vs. MagallanesG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed
against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend
the suspension of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to
suspension, as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction
and cooperation of P/Col.
Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the
PNP, with Police Inspector Abetos
cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan,
Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez,Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to
abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with theuse of
a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident
premeditation, treachery and nocturnity.The other accused secretly buried the
victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a feeof
P500.00 each.The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty
and filed motions for bail. Theprosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the
alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After theprosecution
rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the
reception of evidence wassuspended because of the motions for inhibition of
judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarilyinhibited himself
and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the
transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial
court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the
informations do notstate that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motionfor the Transfer of
Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same
was denied.The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later
inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the
refusal of the judge totransfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private
respondents were required to comment on the petition andissued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with
the trial of thecase.
ISSUE:
81
Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers
HELD:
The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of
the commencement of theaction. When the informations in the cases were
filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan wasP.D. 1861 ,
which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving: 1)violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to theiroffice,
where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00.If the penalty for the
offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court or theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court.Jurisdiction is also
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan
has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of taking advantage of
his position is not sufficient to bringthe offenses within the definition of
offenses committed in relation to public office. It is considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its
jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A.
1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a)
when the public officers rank i
s classified as Grade 27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers
involved occupy a position classified as Grade 27 or higher. Accused Torres,
who is highest in rank among the accused, only has a rank classified as Grade
18.
Republic vs Migrino
Vera vs Cuevas
People vs Echaves
Noscitor
Sociis
Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January
28 1961
FACTS:
higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation.
Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the
enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet
begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED
82
Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The
general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the
petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%
statutes object and purpose. The rule, however, is applicable only to cases
special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass
where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to
in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not
that the term stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a number of articles that
may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of
the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term stabilizer and
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
flavors mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those
limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not
the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition
for review.
ISSUE:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v Social Security Commision
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).
HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.
RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term
stabilizer and flavors as used in the law refers only to those materials
actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is
based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that general
terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
83
HELD:
No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is
not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would
thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term employer is
sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or
entities not organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact that it
contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing
check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven
years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four
months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He appealed to the Court of Appeals
which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as
minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum. 2
Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having
appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent judge,
who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the
petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:
(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed, and
(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.
84
insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law
should be applied.
The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed." According to him, the State has shown
serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as shown by
various measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing
checks.
The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for
probation, is that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by
his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial court and the
affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals.
For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the
offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the
offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established,
such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in
society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as
to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed
with hardened criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as
within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him
that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his
fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him.
If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with,
not the prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission of the
offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong
obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through
bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He would thereby add
to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to
probation. Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature
thereof are those against national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other
crimes being those punished by more than six years imprisonment.
Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for
disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the
nature of the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid
down by the law in determining who may be granted probation. That crime
would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of estafa,
which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for which is generally
separated by a thin line from mere civil liability.
For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit
an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must be served
that will act as deterrent to protect society. In protecting society, the family of
the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser
extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost sight of, it
being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as
measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so
We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has
not shown repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found
guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision
of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for
insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or at
least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of
probation.1wph1.t The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well
worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within
the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took by which to
achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach, petitioner cannot
be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation benefits.
Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of
appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied for probation,
made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.
The penalty imposed by respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of
the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the
law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have
them applied for probation even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the
penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals
petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith?
Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification
for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We
find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied
in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving
the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in the case of Balleta Jr. vs.
Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by the
Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant
petition for probation.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside,
and petitioner is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms
and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by the
probation officer.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
85
24SEP
and this was interpreted by Mayor Samson as to include the position of Asst.
Sec. to the Mayor.
Issue:
Legality of Administrative Order No. 3
Held:
Secretary to the Mayor and Asst. Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and
distinct positions. One is of higher category and rank than the other. The
functions strictly attributable to a secretary, is not automatically vested or
transferred to an assistant secretary, because the latter simply assists or aids
the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
CATU VS RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was
owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who
are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar,
respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall
within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While
RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being
a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA
7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to
practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.
86
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act
and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oathand/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
G.R. No. L-32441
DOMINADOR
GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of
the
Philippine
Islands,
and
the
BOARD
OF
MEDICAL
EXAMINERS
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
Jose
Varela
Calderon
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.
for
appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
1. Annulling and setting aside the aforementioned investigation
proceedings, and particularly the decision of the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated March 30,
1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license to practice
medicine and surgery.
2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status
before the investigation and the decision of March 30, 1926,
that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an
adverse decision.
3. Ordering said defendants to issue in favor of the plaintiff a
license for the practice of medicine and surgery in the
Philippine Islands, such as he had prior to the investigation and
adverse decision.
4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and
6, bill of exemptions.)
The defendants answered with a general denial and prayed that the complaint
be dismissed.
After trial the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint with
costs against the plaintiff.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred:
1. In holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of
Manila was authorized to appear and institute administrative
proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
2. In not holding that Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix, of the City
of Manila, had personality nor power to institute administrative
proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of
Medical Examiners of the Philippines.
3. In admitting in its decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381,
known as the Opium Law, is valid.
87
Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more than one
subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill.
Our opinion is that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not
foreign to the end pursued in said Act, and that in view in the provision of said
section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one
subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physician or dentist who
prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the
use of said drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to attain the
purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it is
one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view. Such punishment is not
the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means
employed to regulate the use of opium.
6. In not holding that section 9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed,
even on the supposition that it was valid.
7. In rendering the judgment appealed from.
8. In denying the motion for avoidance, and for a new trial, filed
by appellant.
The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against
the plaintiff, preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila,
who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the
Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the
matter.
According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111,
the procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the
following:
Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of registration shall
be begun by filing a written charge or charges against the
accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or
persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners
itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges.
Said charges shall be filed with the executive officer of the
Board of Medical Examiners and a copy thereof, together with
written notice of the time and place when they will be heared
and determined, shall be served upon the accused or his
counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for
said hearing. (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)
The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by
any specified person; it even permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to
require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From the wording of the law
we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges
referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges
were filed by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not
deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and
to take the proper action according to law.
The appellant contends in his third and fourth assignments of error that section
9 of Act No. 2381 is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since
said section is foreign to the subject of said Act, in violation of section 3 of the
In passing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power
expressly granted by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, for the protection
of the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine
Islands.
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE
UPON THE SUBJECT. The Philippine Legislature is expressly
authorized by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1905, to adopt
legislation upon the importation and sale of opium in the
Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to
protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people
of the Philippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the
police power of the State. (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35
Phil., 56.)
And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381
relative to the physicians and dentist are simply detailes and means conducive
to the ultimate purpose of said Act, which details and means need not be
stated in the title of the Act for the very reason that properly speaking, they
are not foreign matter.
The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when
a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its
title. To require every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided
for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be
unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible.
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.)
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not
to the details of the act. The subject must be single; the
provisions, to accomplished the object involved in that subject,
may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a statute will
be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or
indirectly, to the same subject, have natural connection, and
88
89
Malcolm,
Ostrand,
Johns
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said
and
Villa-Real,
JJ.,
concur.
Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the
Javellana vs Tayo
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case
has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the
absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The
attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as
there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the
proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant
public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal
Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the
time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the dulyelected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of
90
that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered
the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty,
not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial
Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
91
Facts:
January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce
planes which forwarded such message to Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of
the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the
radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in
terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of
1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the
babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered
that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz
merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax the same word to be used
by the newspapers who covered the same
January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by
Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of
Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and
food and clothing being scarce
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the "January News Quiz" made
reference to Cruz as a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. Called it Hoax of
the year
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a
different person of the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business
man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 published statements correcting their misprint and
explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan
13th issues deadline
Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded
P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)
CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue:
WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the
wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in relation to the hoax of the year?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to
P1,000.00
Ratio:
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its
face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is "malicious defamation, expressed
either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a
libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person."
o In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture being published beside the
article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
2.
Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim
any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
State interest in press freedom citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of
public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official
actsof course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to
have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
Last word on the subject Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given
leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy
Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)
Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out
the responsibility arising from the publication of the original article
Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!
4.
o
o
o
Dissent: Dizon, J.
Manila Chronicle should be absolved because:
No evidence of actual malice
The article does not ascribe anything immoral or any moral turpitude to Cruz
The negligence performed by Manila Chronicle is this case should be
considered excusable negligence
G.R. No. L-10690
1.
92
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in Case No. 215 Pampanga (later transferred to the Court of Agrarian
Relations which denied reconsideration of the Industrial Court's decision)
authorizing the ejectment of petitioners from their respective landholdings, and
their replacement by other tenants of their landlord's choice.
It appears that petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel
Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in
barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida Blanca, Pampanga, under tenancy
contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July 27, 1954,
respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the
ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54
and 1954-55, they did not personally perform the principal work of plowing and
harrowing on their respective landholdings, but entrusted said work to other
persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the
farm work themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied respondent's claims,
and alleged that they were the ones working the land although at times, they
were helped by their children and sons-in-law; and that respondent filed the
ejectment action against them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts
with her on the 45-55 sharing basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.
After trial, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped either
by their sons, sons-in-law, or grandsons, on their landholdings; held that a
contract of tenancy is personal in nature and can not be entrusted to a son,
son-in-law or grandson, especially where there is a specific prohibition in the
tenancy contracts against allowing third persons to do the principal phases of
farming for the tenants; and authorized petitioners' ejectment and replacement
by other tenants. The case was later transferred to the Court of Agrarian
Relations upon its creation where petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Industrial Court's judgement, which was denied. Hence, their present
appeal.
The lower court found that the "third persons" referred to by respondent
Alvendia to whom petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of plowing and
harrowing on their respective landholdings were either their sons-in-law or
grandsons who were not, however, dependent upon them for support and were
living separately from them. The issue, therefore, is whether petitioners
violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to
such relatives.
Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant" as:
. . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system;
93
(a) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow and prepare the land
to be planted, and likewise, he is the one to plant and fence the
seedbed. With respect to this work, the LANDLORD shall not
spend for anything, but she has the power to tell or order the
TENANT when to plow, harrow, or what to do pertaining, the
tenant's work.
The above provision contains no prohibition for the tenant to accept assistance
from the members of his family in the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting,
or fencing of his landholding. It simply enumerates the exact duties expected
of the tenant by his landlord; and the tenant is referred to as "the one" to
perform these duties, only, to distinguish his obligations from those of his
landlord. We see nothing in farming tasks that requires individual specialized
skill. Besides, it is a fact that petitioners Galang and Santos were already 74
and 64, respectively, when respondent signed the tenancy contracts with them
in 1953. Respondent's having accepted petitioners Galang and Santos as her
tenants in spite of their advanced age not only disproves her claim that they
are already too old to perform their duties as tenants, but proves that she had
impliedly agreed that these petitioners would be helped by their families in
their farm work, since respondent must have realized that at their advanced
age, these petitioners could not by themselves alone perform all the farm work
without family assistance.
The decision appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the ejectment action
filed by respondent against petitioners dismissed, with costs against
respondent Felisa Alvendia. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953,
which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of
P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953.
Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused
to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No.
879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the
antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the same for
settlement refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section
2 of Republic Act No. 879.
HELD:
Florentino v. PNB
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent;
that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a
comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
FACTS:
from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction,
to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine
National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner
Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured
94
Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the
obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved.
Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2
of the Amendatory Act No. 897.
People v. Tamani
G.R. Nos: L-22160 & L-22161
Facts: On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of
consummated and attempted murder. On
February 25, 1963, Tamanis counsel received a copy of the decision and
consequently filed for a motion
for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the
lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered
mail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed
the lower courts decision.
Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending
that the appeal should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day
period of appeal from the date of notice and not from the date of promulgation.
Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47 days late.
2
Issue: Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of
promulgation or from the date of notice of the decision. Held: Appeal was
dismissed. The 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation.
Ratio: Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6.
When appeal to be taken
.
an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of
the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or
his attorney.
3
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February
25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's
counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in
section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while the word
"notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is
sanctioned by the rule of
reddendo singula singulis
: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's
counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and not 11
days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58
days late.
Mapa v. Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case Digest
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
FACTS:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable
in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do
so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that
the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the
four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of
the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends
that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision plans.
ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957
through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the
contracts of sale incorrect.
HELD:
95
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause
7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of
default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted
long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those
provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the
developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or
condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to
facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a
conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.
Chua v. CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case Digest
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers
those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive
officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive
years
of government
service
as
of
the
date
of
separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with
Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by
the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee
the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
is
excluded
from
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the
equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to
sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be
denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those
covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary
implication in deciding this case.
G.R. No. L-5127
PEDRO
BATUNGBAKAL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as
Auditor General of the Philippines,defendants-appellants.
96
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
97
formerly occupied by him and requested that his back salary be paid to him as
soon as possible.
On February 15, 1960, the Auditor General returned the papers of Batungbakal
of the NDC with the following statement:
On November 17, 1950, the Acting General Manager of the NDC wrote to the
Secretary of Economic Coordination transmitting excerpts from the minutes of
the meeting of the NDC held on November 8, 1950, for his final approval at the
same time informing Batugbakal's counsel of his action.
In a memorandum to the Auditor General dated December 29, 1950, the Chief
Law Officer, after discussing the fact of the case of Batungbakal stated his
opinion that the action of the Board of Directors of the NDC authorizing the
payment of back salaries to Batungbakal was legally justified for the reason
that Batungbakal had not been suspended and dismissed for cause, and that
as an employee of the NDc which is an agency of the Government he could not
be removed except for cause. The Senior Attorney of the same office in another
memorandum to the Auditor General on the same matter said that he had an
interview with counsel of Batungbakal regarding the latter's claim for back
salary, and made reference to efforts of the Auditor's office towards a
compromise and stated his belief that the full back salary of Batungbakal could
legally be paid by the Government because it covered a period of only three
years, and that there was a precedent to support it, namely, that of Severo Yap,
former Superintendent of the of about of Prisons who was paid his back salary
for a period of about five years during his suspension, and he expressed his
belief that the office may not insist on further compromise.
On February 7, 1951, the Auditor General by his 2nd indorsement returned to
the Administrator of Economic Coordination the resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors of the NDC on November 8, 1950, authorizing the payment
to Batungbakal of the sum of P7,820 as back salary from December 31, 1946 to
October 31, 1950 with the following comment and recommendation:
This office finds no specific provision of law under which
payment to Mr. Batungbakal of the aforesaid amount of P7,820
may be authorized. The provisions of section 260 of the
Revised Administrative Code which authorizes payment to a
suspended employee of his full salary corresponding to the
whole period of his suspension upon his exoneration or
reinstatement may not be applied in the instant case because,
as will be noted from the facts stated in the within letter of Mr.
Batungbakal, dated October 2, 1950, he was not merely
suspended from office but also dismissed from the service.
98
The defendants each filed an answer. Hearing was had on the preliminary issue
raised by the Auditor General in his answer to the effect that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's cause of action against the Auditor General
whose decisions are appealable only to the President of the Philippines or to
Supreme Court defending on whether the aggrieved party is a government
officer or a private person, citing Article XI, section 3, of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act 327, and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Auditor General
further claimed that his right and duty to appoint personnel and to approve
accounts was discretionary on his part and could not be limited or compelled
by mandamus.
Ruling, that the court had jurisdiction, it ordered the case to be tried on its
merits. After trial the lower court presided by Judge Fidel Ibaez rendered the
decision now appealed from as related at the beginning of this opinion.
To determine the right of plaintiff Batungbakal to reinstatement and to back
salaries, it is necessary to ascertain his status as an employee. Altho his salary
was paid by the NDC, nevertheless, he was appointed by the Auditor General
who under section 548 of the Administrative Code, is ex officio auditor of
corporations like the NDC wherein the Government of the Philippines owns the
majority stock. As such ex officio auditor, the Auditor General is authorized to
appoint his representative in the said corporation as well as to appoint and fix
the salary and the number of personnel to assist said representative in said
work. Batungbakal was such employee in the office of the comptroller or
auditor of the NDC, under the control of the Auditor General. Although after the
reorganization of the NDC it became the practice for the NDC itself to appoint
personnel in the office of the comptroller or company auditor, nevertheless, the
practice cannot override or supplant the legal provisions of the law, much lees
affect the status of such personnel.
In an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice in his second indorsement of
July 27, 1949, requested by the Auditor General, the said Secretary said that
the auditor General controlled corporations referring to the Cebu Portland
Cement Co. (which has the same status as the NDC as well as their
subordinates are not corporate employees but agents of the Government and
therefore they are embraced in the civil service. According to the Secretary of
Justice this view was shared by the Commissioner of Civil Service himself.
Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law." Section 694 of the Administrative Code has a similar provision.
Interpreting these two laws, basis and statutory, we have held in the case
of Lacson vs. Romero,1 G.R. No. L-3081, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778 and De los Santos
vs. Mallari2 G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1952, that a civil service official may
not be removed from office except for cause. We have here a case of a civil
service employee, suspended and later dismissed without case as shown by
the fact that after a reinvestigation he was exonerated and found guiltless of
the charges of gross negligence filed against him, and was even recommended
for reinstatement by the Government Committee that investigated him. In
other words, his suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only
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of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself. To remedy the evil and
wrong committed, the least that could be done is to restore to him the office
and post of which he had been illegally deprived, and to include in that remedy
or redress payment of the salary which he should have received during this
period of illegal suspension and dismissal is far from unreasonable and unjust.
asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. And the
payment of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement,
this, aside from the parallel and analogy which may be found in section 260,
paragraph 1, Revised Administrative Code which provides for the payment of
back salary upon reinstatement.
But the Auditor General contends that under the law which gives him right to
appoint the personnel in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC, he has full
discretion to appoint or not to appoint any person in that office; that as Auditor
General vested by the Constitution and section 584 of the Administrative Code
with jurisdiction over the accounts of the Government including claims against
it, he also has full discretion to grant or withhold back salaries corresponding to
the period of suspension or dismissal of an employee appointed by him. It is
also claimed that to reinstate Batungbakal to his former position would mean
the removal without cause of the present incumbent. We cannot agree with
Auditor General. His theory and contention if accepted and followed would lead
to an unfortunate and intolerable situation, incongruous with basic principles of
justice and the constitutional protection of civil service employees against
Government abuse and unjustified suspension or removal. Without reference to
the present Auditor General, let us imagine in the future an arbitrary and
wrong-minded Auditor General dismissing an employee from his office or in an
office under his control, without cause, and later appointing another person to
the same position. Such dismissed employee may establish to the satisfaction
of the Government and the courts that he was innocent and was dismissed
without reason or cause, and yet under the theory afore-mentioned, such
dismissed employee is utterly helpless and without redress because his
reinstatement and the payment of his back salary are wholly within the Auditor
General's discretion which may not be controlled by mandamus to say nothing
of the fact that having already filed the position, there is no vacancy to which
the dismissed employee may be re-appointed. The unreasonables and fallacy
of the theory and contention above-mentioned is patently revealed and
brought home by the case just imagined.
It is further argued that Batungbakal not having appealed from the decision of
the Auditor General denying his claim to reisntatement and payment of back
salary, as provided by Article XI, section 3, of the Constitution, the Jones Law,
section 255, Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 327, section
2 thereof, and Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, said decision has become final
and conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, and he may
not resort to the courts. This same question was raised and decided in the case
of Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil., 866, where it was held that the failure to
appeal from the Auditor's decision does not affect claimant's right of redress in
the Courts, and that although the Organic Act provides that the "decision of the
Auditor shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branches of the
Government," said Organic ACt does not provide that said decision shall be
final and conclusive upon either the Legislature or the Judiciary.
When a citizen after due hearing establishes his right in court, said right is
paramount and must be given force and effect. The way must be cleared for its
enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as well as administrative,
must give away.
Having proven that he (the plaintiff) had been suspended and dismissed
without cause, contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, his
reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty
whose performance may be controlled and enjoined by mandamus.3 There is
no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not being directed to perform an
act which he may or may not execute according to his discretion. He is being
As for the contention that for the Auditor General to reinstate the plaintiff
would be tantamount to compelling him to dismiss without cause the present
incumbent who was appointed after plaintiff's dismissal, suffice it to say that in
so doing, neither injustice nor violation of law would be committed. Inasmuch
as Batungbakal was illegally suspended and dismissed, legally speaking, his
position never became vacant, hence there was no vacancy to which the
present incumbent could be permanently appointed. In other words, the
present incumbent's occupancy of or tenure in said post is temporary and
precarios and does not come within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. But, assuming for the moment that the incumbent's tenure were
permanent and that said tenure fell under the protection of the Constitution,
still, his being made to leave the post to give way to the plaintiff's superior
right, may yet be considered as removal for cause, not unlike a case of quo
warranto where a respondent incumbent is ousted by court order to give way
to the successful party or petitioner.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.
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