PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.

968 July 24, 1976

ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, one of the major goals of the government is to establish a more enlightened and
humane correctional systems that will promote the reformation of offenders and thereby reduce the
incidence of recidivism;
WHEREAS, the confinement of all offenders prisons and other institutions with rehabilitation
programs constitutes an onerous drain on the financial resources of the country; and
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide a less costly alternative to the imprisonment of offenders who
are likely to respond to individualized, community-based treatment programs;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:
Section 1. Title and Scope of the Decree. This Decree shall be known as the Probation Law of
1976. It shall apply to all offenders except those entitled to the benefits under the provisions of
Presidential Decree numbered Six Hundred and three and similar laws.
Section 2. Purpose. This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.
Section 3. Meaning of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, be construed thus:
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation
officer.
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or
supervises a probationer or both.
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed
a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior
investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.
Section 6. Form of Investigation Report. The investigation report to be submitted by the probation
officer under Section 5 hereof shall be in the form prescribed by the Probation Administrator and
approved by the Secretary of Justice.
Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. The probation officer shall submit to the
court the investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said
court to conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five
days after receipt of said report.
Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may
be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case
where no bail was filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the
release of the defendant on recognize the custody of a responsible member of the community who
shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In determining whether an offender may be
placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents,
environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and
community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by
his commitment to an institution; or
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another
crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos;

(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree
became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the court shall contain
conditions requiring that the probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified
by said officer.
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) meet his family responsibilities;
(c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the
prior written approval of the probation officer;
(d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and
remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;
(e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
(f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons
on probation;
(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;
(h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;
(i) permit to probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place or
work;
(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without its prior written
approval; or
(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly
restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.
Section 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.

Section 12. Modification of Condition of Probation. During the period of probation, the court may,
upon application of either the probationer or the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or
period of probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or the probation officer of the filing
such an application so as to give both parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.
The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer of any change in the period
or conditions of probation.
Section 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. The probationer and his probation program
shall be under the control of the court who placed him on probation subject to actual supervision and
visitation by a probation officer.
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court,
control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of that
place, and in such a case, a copy of the probation order, the investigation report and other pertinent
records shall be furnished said Executive Judge. Thereafter, the Executive Judge to whom
jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was
previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.
Section 14. Period of Probation.
(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more
than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not
exceed six years.
(b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be
more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate
established, in Article thirty-nine of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Section 15. Arrest of Probationer; Subsequent Disposition. At any time during probation, the court
may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation.
The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a
hearing, which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. The defendant may be
admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail of
persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. If the
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions
thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed. An
order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be
appealable.
Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon consideration of the
report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the
probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted.

The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.
Section 17. Confidentiality of Records. The investigation report and the supervision history of a
probationer obtained under this Decree shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly or
indirectly to anyone other than the Probation Administration or the court concerned, except that the
court, in its discretion, may permit the probationer of his attorney to inspect the aforementioned
documents or parts thereof whenever the best interest of the probationer make such disclosure
desirable or helpful: Provided, Further, That, any government office or agency engaged in the
correction or rehabilitation of offenders may, if necessary, obtain copies of said documents for its
official use from the proper court or the Administration.
Section 18. The Probation Administration. There is hereby created under the Department of Justice
an agency to be known as the Probation Administration herein referred to as the Administration,
which shall exercise general supervision over all probationers.
The Administration shall have such staff, operating units and personnel as may be necessary for the
proper execution of its functions.
Section 19. Probation Administration. The Administration shall be headed by the Probation
Administrator, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator, who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines. He shall hold office during good behavior and shall not be removed except for
cause.
The Administrator shall receive an annual salary of at least forty thousand pesos. His powers and
duties shall be to:
(a) act as the executive officer of the Administration;
(b) exercise supervision and control over all probation officers;
(c) make annual reports to the Secretary of Justice, in such form as the latter may prescribe,
concerning the operation, administration and improvement of the probation system;
(d) promulgate, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, the necessary rules
relative to the methods and procedures of the probation process;
(e) recommend to the Secretary of Justice the appointment of the subordinate personnel of
his Administration and other offices established in this Decree; and
(f) generally, perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be necessary or
incidental to achieve the objectives of this Decree.
Section 20. Assistant Probation Administrator. There shall be an Assistant Probation Administrator
who shall assist the Administrator perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the latter and
as may be provided by law. In the absence of the Administrator, he shall act as head of the
Administration.

He shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall receive an annual salary of at
least thirty-six thousand pesos.
Section 21. Qualifications of the Administrator and Assistant Probation Administrator. To be eligible
for Appointment as Administrator or Assistant Probation Administrator, a person must be at least
thirty-five years of age, holder of a master's degree or its equivalent in either criminology, social
work, corrections, penology, psychology, sociology, public administration, law, police science, police
administration, or related fields, and should have at least five years of supervisory experience, or be
a member of the Philippine Bar with at least seven years of supervisory experience.
Section 22. Regional Office; Regional Probation Officer. The Administration shall have regional
offices organized in accordance with the field service area patterns established under the Integrated
Reorganization Plan.
Such regional offices shall be headed by a Regional Probation Officer who shall be appointed by
President of the Philippines in accordance with the Integrated Reorganization Plan and upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The Regional Probation Officer shall exercise supervision and control over all probation officer within
his jurisdiction and such duties as may assigned to him by the Administrator. He shall have an
annual salary of at least twenty-four thousand pesos.
He shall, whenever necessary, be assisted by an Assistant Regional Probation Officer who shall also
be appointed by the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice,
with an annual salary of at least twenty thousand pesos.
Section 23. Provincial and City Probation Officers. There shall be at least one probation officer in
each province and city who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of
the Administrator and in accordance with civil service law and rules.
The Provincial or City Probation Officer shall receive an annual salary of at least eighteen thousand
four hundred pesos.
His duties shall be to:
(a) investigate all persons referred to him for investigation by the proper court or the
Administrator;
(b) instruct all probationers under his supervision of that of the probation aide on the terms
and conditions of their probations;
(c) keep himself informed of the conduct and condition of probationers under his charge and
use all suitable methods to bring about an improvement in their conduct and conditions;
(d) maintain a detailed record of his work and submit such written reports as may be required
by the Administration or the court having jurisdiction over the probationer under his
supervision;

(e) prepare a list of qualified residents of the province or city where he is assigned who are
willing to act as probation aides;
(f) supervise the training of probation aides and oversee the latter's supervision of
probationers;
(g) exercise supervision and control over all field assistants, probation aides and other
personnel; and
(h) perform such duties as may be assigned by the court or the Administration.
Section 24. Miscellaneous Powers of Provincial and City Probation Officers. Provincial or City
Probation Officers shall have the authority within their territorial jurisdiction to administer oaths and
acknowledgments and to take depositions in connection with their duties and functions under this
Decree. They shall also have, with respect to probationers under their care, the powers of police
officer.
Section 25. Qualifications of Regional, Assistant Regional, Provincial, and City Probation Officers.
No person shall be appointed Regional or Assistant Regional or Provincial or City Probation Officer
unless he possesses at least a bachelor's degree with a major in social work, sociology, psychology,
criminology, penology, corrections, police science, administration, or related fields and has at least
three years of experience in work requiring any of the abovementioned disciplines, or is a member of
the Philippine Bar with at least three years of supervisory experience.
Whenever practicable, the Provincial or City Probation Officer shall be appointed from among
qualified residents of the province or city where he will be assigned to work.
Section 26. Organization. Within twelve months from the approval of this Decree, the Secretary of
Justice shall organize the administrative structure of the Administration and the other agencies
created herein. During said period, he shall also determine the staffing patterns of the regional,
provincial and city probation offices with the end in view of achieving maximum efficiency and
economy in the operations of the probation system.
Section 27. Field Assistants, Subordinate Personnel, Provincial or City Probation Officers shall be
assisted by such field assistants and subordinate personnel as may be necessary to enable them to
carry out their duties effectively.
Section 28. Probation Aides. To assist the Provincial or City Probation Officers in the supervision of
probationers, the Probation Administrator may appoint citizens of good repute and probity to act as
probation aides.
Probation Aides shall not receive any regular compensation for services except for reasonable travel
allowance. They shall hold office for such period as may be determined by the Probation
Administrator. Their qualifications and maximum case loads shall be provided in the rules
promulgated pursuant to this Decree.

Section 29. Violation of Confidential Nature of Probation Records. The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to six years and a fine ranging from hundred to six thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who violates Section 17 hereof.
Section 30. Appropriations. There is hereby authorized the appropriation of the sum of Six Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos or so much as may be necessary, out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Decree. Thereafter, the
amount of at least Ten Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos or so much as may be necessary shall
be included in the annual appropriations of the national government.
Section 31. Repealing Clause. All provisions of existing laws, orders and regulations contrary to or
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 32. Separability of Provisions. If any part, section or provision of this Decree shall be held
invalid or unconstitutional, no other parts, sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby.
Section 33. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon its approval: Provided, However, That, the
application of its substantive provisions concerning the grant of probation shall only take effect
twelve months after the certification by the Secretary of Justice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court that the administrative structure of the Probation Administration and of the other agencies has
been organized.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 24th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-six.
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 February 14, 2001
TO : ALL JUDGES
SUBJECT : CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 ON THE PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING CHECK LAW.
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding the operation of Administrative
Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000. In particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of
Judges to:
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused who is found guilty of violating the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering
that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038,
18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case
of the accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions
of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations
of B.P. Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests
of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its
session of 13 February 2001.
The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court Administrator shall immediately cause the implementation of
this Administrative Circular.
This Administrative Circular shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation not later than 20 February 2001.
Issued this 14th day of February, 2001.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 08-2008

TO: ALL JUDGES
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel, committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition,
or any similar means, with prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods or fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
In the following cases, the Court opted to impose only a fine on the person convicted of the crime of
libel:
In Fernando Sazon v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 1 the Court modified the
penalty imposed upon petitioner, an officer of a homeowners association, for the crime of libel from
imprisonment and fine in the amount of P200.00, to fine only of P3,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the reason that he wrote the libelous article merely to defend
his honor against the malicious messages that earlier circulated around the subdivision, which he
thought was the handiwork of the private complainant.

In Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,2 where the crime involved is
slander by deed, the Court modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner, an ordinary government
employee, from imprisonment to fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, on the ground that the latter committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to
a perceived provocation.
In Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,3 the Court deleted the penalty
of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner, a local politician, but maintained the penalty of fine of
P4,0000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each of the (5) cases of libel, on
the ground that the intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have
agitated petitioner into writing his open letter; and that incomplete privileged communication should
be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of
official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.
In Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose Pieraz, 4 the Court opted to
impose upon petitioner, a lawyer, the penalty of fine only for the crime of libel considering that it was
his first offense and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or
moral duty to his client when wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.
The foregoing cases indicate an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather
than imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set
by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in
mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of
justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary
imprisonment.
The Court Administrator shall cause the immediate dissemination of this Administrative Circular to all
courts and judges concerned.
This Administrative Circular, approved by the Supreme Court En Banc in A.M. No. 08-1-17 SC at its
session of 22 January 2008 shall take effect upon its issuance.
Issued this 25th day of January 2008.
G.R. No. 210972, March 19, 2016

ROGER ALLEN BIGLER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LINDA SUSAN PATRICIA E.
BARRETO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 16, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated January 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119160, which
affirmed in toto the Order4 dated November 3, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 99-2439 denying petitioner Roger Allen Bigler's (petitioner) Urgent Omnibus
Motion (To: [1] Reopen proceedings and allow Accused to file his Notice of Appeal; [2] Recall the Warrant of
Arrest dated 22 May 2006), thus, rendering final and unappealable the RTC's Decision 5 dated November 25,
2003 convicting petitioner of the crime of Libel.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Libel before the RTC for allegedly maligning his former spouse,
private respondent Linda Susan Patricia E. Barreto, through a letter sent to her lawyer purportedly
containing various malicious and defamatory imputations against her. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge, and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 6 On November 21, 2003, petitioner's counsel, Capuyan
Quimpo & Salazar, filed a Withdrawal of Appearance 7 and requested therein that "all notices, legal processes,
and pleadings intended for petitioner be sent to his address at Portofmo, Small La Laguna, Sabang, Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro or to his new counsel who shall enter an appearance in due time."
In a Decision8 dated November 25, 2003, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Libel and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1)
year, eight (8) months, and twenty one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days,
and to pay the costs of suit.9 Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,10which was, however, denied
in an Order11 dated May 22, 2006. On even date, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against
petitioner.12 Consequently, he was arrested and taken into custody on October 8, 2010. 13
Following his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion 14 dated October 13, 2010 praying that the
RTC: (a) reopen the criminal proceedings against him; (b) allow him to file a notice of appeal; and (c) recall
the Warrant of Arrest issued against him. In said Motion, petitioner questioned the validity of the
promulgation of the RTC Decision convicting him of Libel, claiming that he never received notice of the same
and that he was not present during such promulgation. 15 He likewise questioned the validity of the service of
the Order dated May 22, 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration, maintaining that he never received a
copy thereof.16 In this relation, petitioner likewise filed a Notice of Appeal 17 dated October 22, 2010, claiming
that he only knew of the RTC's Order dated May 22, 2006 on October 11, 2010.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order18 dated November 3, 2010, the RTC denied petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion and, likewise,
denied due course to his Notice of Appeal.19
The RTC found that the Notice of Promulgation was sent to petitioner's address through registered mail and
was even received by a certain Sally Tanyag, his employee. In this relation, the RTC held that petitioner is
estopped from feigning ignorance of the judgment of conviction against him and the promulgation of such
judgment, considering that: (a) the RTC's Order dated January 27, 2004 clearly stated that "the subject
judgment was promulgated by reading the same and furnishing [a] copy thereof to accused who was duly
assisted by Atty. Danilo Macalino;" and (b) he caused the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 9, 2004 as evidenced by the Verification attached to the said Motion which bore his signature. 20
Further, the RTC found as immaterial petitioner's contention that he did not receive the Order dated May 22,
2006, considering that he filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2004 only on February 13,
2004, or two (2) days beyond the prescribed 15-day period reckoned from the promulgation of the RTC
order on January 27, 2004. Hence, the RTC concluded that its Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of
Libel had long attained finality.21

Petitioner moved for reconsideration22 but was denied in an Order23 dated March 8, 2011. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari24 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated May 16, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that while the service of
the Notice of Promulgation via registered mail was indeed a slight deviation from Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires personal service to the accused or through his counsel, such
departure from the rules was completely justifiable given that petitioner's previous counsel withdrew its
representation shortly before the judgment was set for promulgation. In any event, the CA opined that
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of such promulgation as records reveal that he was present thereat.
Further, the CA agreed with the RTC that petitioner's filing of his Motion for Reconsideration was made out of
time, thus, rendering the guilty verdict against him final and executory.26
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,27 which was, however, denied in a Resolution28dated
January 21, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC
finding that: (a) the promulgation of the judgment of conviction against petitioner was valid; and (b)
petitioner belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration, thus, rendering said judgment final and executory.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction was valid, as records reveal that petitioner, assisted by Atty.
Danilo Macalino, attended the same. Similarly, the courts a quo both found that petitioner belatedly filed his
motion for reconsideration assailing said judgment of conviction, thus, rendering such judgment final and
executory. Undoubtedly, these are findings of fact which cannot be touched upon in the instant petition.
It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of
law. Questions of fact are not reviewable,29 absent any of the exceptions recognized by case law.30 This rule
is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of
respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise
affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. 31Hence, absent any clear showing of
abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court, 32 as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel. Applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Unfortunately, the Decision dated November
25, 2003 of the RTC convicting petitioner of the said crime - which had long become final and executory sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, eight (8) months, and
twenty one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be
struck down.33 Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has
the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.34
In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of

conviction,35 the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because
they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein
petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes
upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or
excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. 36
In sum, petitioner should only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 16, 2013 and the Resolution
dated January 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119160 are herebyAFFIRMED. However,
in the interest of substantial justice, the Decision dated November 25, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 99-2439 is MODIFIED,sentencing herein petitioner Roger Allen
Bigler to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

cralawla

G.R. No. 160610

August 14, 2009

JUDELIO COBARRUBIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIAL FORMER
SECOND DIVISION, and HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Acting Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Resolutions dated 10 March 2003 and 9 October 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72315.
The Facts
In 1994, petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged with Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No.
94-5036), Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038), Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), and
Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 94-5037).
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges and trial followed.
On 20 March 2001, Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
City, Branch 255 (trial court), issued an Order,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037, and
these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for further trial.

SO ORDERED.3
The prosecution did not appeal the trial courts Order. On 5 July 2001, petitioner filed with the trial
court a Motion for Correction of Clerical Error,4 alleging that in the dispositive portion of the Order,
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 should have been dismissed instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037,
which should have been the case set for further trial. Petitioner maintained that there was a
typographical error in the dispositive portion considering that in the body of the Order, the trial court
ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the
charges for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
On 26 February 2002, respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda 5 denied the motion, holding
that the alleged error was substantial in nature which affected the very merit of the case. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, which respondent Judge denied on 23 July 2002.
On 21 August 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner sought to
set aside the Orders dated 26 February 2002 and 23 July 2002 of respondent Judge.
On 23 August 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to submit with the petition
a clear duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated 23 July 2002, and for
failure of petitioners counsel to indicate his current official receipt number and date of payment of
the current Integrated Bar of the Philippines membership dues, pursuant to SC Bar Matter No. 287. 6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals granted. In a Resolution dated 11
December 2002, the Court of Appeals directed petitioner to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent. On 10 March 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to
comply with the resolution.7 On 19 March 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Petition, which the Court of Appeals dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner contends that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF A TECHNICALITY, DESPITE THE
PETITIONERS COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RESOLUTION DATED 11 DECEMBER 2002.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION CONSIDERING THE MERITS THEREOF AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER.8
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
Compliance with the Formal Requirements
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to comply with the resolution
directing him to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent . The Court of Appeals held that

the petition was prosecuted manifestly for delay, which is a ground for dismissal under Section 8,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.9
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provides that rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Thus, in several cases, the Court has ruled against the dismissal of petitions
or appeals based solely on technicalities especially when there was subsequent substantial
compliance with the formal requirements.10
In this case, the Court finds the petitioners failure to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent not so grave as to warrant dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner rectified his error
by moving for reconsideration and filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of the
Philippines as respondent.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos,11 where the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals failed
to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the
petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA
case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not
a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.12(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Court of Appeals should have granted petitioners motion for reconsideration and
given due course to the petition in view of petitioners subsequent compliance by filing an Amended
Petition, impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent. Technicalities may be set aside
when the strict and rigid application of the rules will frustrate rather than promote justice. 13
Conflict Between the Fallo and the Body of the Order
Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals, the Court will resolve the issue raised by
petitioner in order to prevent further delay in the resolution of the case.
Petitioners main contention is that there is a clerical error in the fallo or the dispositive
portion of Judge Alumbres Order dated 20 March 2001, which should have dismissed
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, considering that in the body
of the order, the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 945036) and Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038). However, respondent Acting Judge Maceda,
who was assigned to the trial court after Judge Alumbres retired, denied petitioners motion
for correction, holding that the alleged error was substantial in nature.

For a clearer understanding of the issue, the pertinent portions of the Order dated 20 March 2001
are hereunder quoted:
On the first and second charges of Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038) and Frustrated Homicide
(Criminal Case No. 94-5036), did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt in killing Edwin S. Martinez and the wounding of Decampong "without any just motive"?
To the mind of the Court, the prosecution failed in this regard.
What is derogatory to the cases of the prosecution is the Resolution dated July 7, 1994 of the
Department of Justice issued after a thorough preliminary investigation conducted by an
investigating panel composed of State Prosecutor Philip I. Kimpo and Prosecution Attorney Emelie
Fe M. delos Santos, duly approved by then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo.
The pertinent portions of the said Resolution is quoted as follows:
xxx
xxx
"After hitting SI Martinez, respondent Cobarrubias, still seated, pointed his gun towards agent
Decampong and an exchange of gun fire ensued leaving both of them wounded. Agent Decampong
was hit on his right shoulder while respondent suffered wound on his "left thigh". (p. 4 Resolution).
It is, therefore, very clear that it was Decampong who first fired at the accused from outside when he
(accused) was seated inside his car. It is very difficult to believe the story of the prosecution that the
exchange of fire between the accused and the NBI agents happened while the accused was seated
inside the car.
In fact, the Resolution of the Department of Justice attest to the fact that the accused was not the
aggressor.
Pertinent portion of the Resolution (Exh. 2, 2-A & 2-B, 7/13/95 session) is quoted, thus:
"There is no treachery in the instant case as respondent was not the aggressor. Respondent did not
attack the victim (Martinez) but only fired at the latter upon seeing him approaching his car with a
gun in his hand, while announcing their being NBI agents and advising respondent and his
companion not to move. Hence, it cannot be said that respondent employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (RPC, Art. 14, par. 16).
In other words, for alevosia to apply, the killer must be the aggressor and he must deliberately and
consciously adopt and employ a non-risky mode of execution that would insure the successful
consummation of his criminal act. As ruled by the High Court, there is no treachery if the killing was
committed at the moment (People vs. Gutierrez, 113 SCRA 155; People vs. de Castro, L-38989, Oct.
29, 1982, 117 SCRA 1014; People vs. Magaddatu, L-36446, Sept. 9, 1983, 124 SCRA 594; or if the
attack cannot be sudden and unprovoked or unexpected (People v. Atienza, 115 SCRA 379 (1982);
If no time was left for the accused to deliberate on the mode of attack or to prepare for the manner
by which he could kill the deceased with the full assurance that it would be improbable or hard for
the latter to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. De Jesus, L-58505, Nov. 19, 1982, 18 SCRA 516;
Or the attack is unplanned (People vs. Manalang, L-471-36-37, July 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 583).

Neither is there evident premeditation in this case for the same reason that herein respondent was
not the aggressor or attacker in the shooting incident or "encounter." Under the facts of the case, it is
clear that respondent never planned in killing the victim.
Therefore, he could not have cling to a supposed determination as there was no determination at all
to speak of."
(P. 8 & 9 Resolution dated
July 7, 1994, DOJ Emphasis
Supplied)
"Not being the aggressor," it is apropos that the accused did not incite, much less, provoke the
shooting. Decampong admitted while being cross examined that the accused "withdrew" or "ran
away" after being hit on the left thigh, which will fortify the conclusion that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the accused.
The elements of self-defense are (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. (People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471).
The unlawful aggression, by way of the sudden blocking of the car of the accused, and the
unexpected shot hitting the accused on the left thigh, came from the agents. There was no sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused as he was merely inside his car when he was shot.
In People versus Mallari, 212 SCRA 777, the Supreme Court ruled that there can be no evident premeditation without proof of planning. Evident pre-meditation must be established beyond reasonable
doubt and must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which
indicate deliberate planning. (People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227).
Witness: (Norman Decampong)
"Together with Special Investigation [sic] Edwin Martinez, we ran towards Doa Manuela Subdivision
while the accused together with . . . I was not able to notice the two companions ran away."
(P. 44 TSN, Nov. 3, 1994)
With respect to the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms (P.D. 1866) and Violation of Election
Code on Comelec Gun Ban (Sec. 261(q) Election Code), the Court needs these charges to be
disputed by countervailing evidence of the accused. It is premature to rule on these charges at the
moment without any evidence to the contrary. Thus, Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should
be set for the reception of the defense evidence.
xxx
It is aciomatic [sic] that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People vs.
Lapinoso, G.R. No. 122507, Feb. 25, 1999). Proof beyond reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprecedented mind. In criminal cases, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof, as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty (People vs.
Datukon Bansil, G.R. No. 120163, March 10, 1999).

On the whole, the meager evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as to the guilt of the
accused. It does not pass the test of moral certainty and is inefficient to rebut the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037, and
these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for further trial.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis supplied)
It is clearly stated in the body of the assailed Order that the trial court held that the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038)
and Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5036), thus:
On the first and second charges of Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038) and Frustrated Homicide
(Criminal Case No. 94-5036), did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt in killing Edwin S. Martinez and the wounding of Decampong "without any just motive"?
To the mind of the Court, the prosecution failed in this regard.15 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the basis for such ruling.
As regards the two other charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Criminal Case No. 94-5037) and Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), the trial court held that it
was still premature to rule on these charges and that further evidence was needed, thus:
With respect to the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms (P.D. 1866) and Violation of Election
Code on Comelec Gun Ban (Sec. 261(q) Election Code), the Court needs these charges to be
disputed by countervailing evidence of the accused. It is premature to rule on these charges at the
moment without any evidence to the contrary. Thus, Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should
be set for the reception of the defense evidence.16 (Emphasis supplied)
1avvphi1

However, the trial court inadvertently designated the wrong criminal case number to the charge for
Illegal Possession of Firearms. Instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, the trial court erroneously
wrote Criminal Case No. 94-5038, which is the criminal case number of the charge for Homicide.
Unfortunately, this error was repeated in the dispositive portion of the Order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037, and
these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for further trial.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis supplied)

In the dispositive portion, the trial court erroneously dismissed Criminal Case No. 94-5037 which
refers to the charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866, while
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 which refers to the charge for Homicide was set for further trial.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the
body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order and
becomes the subject of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or
conclusions of the court ordering nothing.18 However, where one can clearly and unquestionably
conclude from the body of the decision that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body
of the decision will prevail.19 Thus, in Spouses Rebuldea v. Intermediate Appellate Court,20 the Court
held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it corrected the dispositive portion of
its decision to make it conform to the body of the decision, and to rectify the clerical errors which
interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee.
In this case, considering the clear finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, while
the two other charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of the Omnibus Election Code
require further evidence, it is only just and proper to correct the dispositive portion to reflect the exact
findings and conclusions of the trial court. Thus, in accordance with the findings of the trial court,
Criminal Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated Homicide) and Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide)
should be dismissed, while Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession of Firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866) and Criminal Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166) should be set for further
trial.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Resolutions dated 10 March 2003 and 9 October 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72315 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dispositive
portion of the Order dated 20 March 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255,
is CORRECTED to conform to the body of the Order by dismissing Criminal Case No. 94-5036
(Frustrated Homicide) and Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide), and setting for further trial
Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866) and
Criminal Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102826. March 17, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO LABAO alias KA RUDY, and
CESAR VILLANUEVA Y MIGUEL, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; REQUISITE FOR VALIDITY THEREOF. We have consistently
ruled that for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency
of the judge who signed it. Thus, a decision penned by a judge after his retirement cannot be validly
promulgated; it cannot acquire a binding effect as it is null and void.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:

It is settled doctrine long cherished since 1917 1 that a decision cannot be validly prepared and
signed, much less promulgated, by a judge after he has retired. This notwithstanding, Judge
Florentino F. Calica of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Br. 11, rendered the judgment
under review two and a half (2-1/2) months after he left the Bench and his successor-in-office, Judge
Hilarion L. Aquino, promulgated the same two (2) months thereafter.
In the case before Us, accused-appellants Rodolfo Labao and Cesar Villanueva were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, with the crime of robbery with homicide. After
pleading not guilty on arraignment, the case was tried until it was submitted for decision before
Judge Calica on 30 April 1991 (Crim. Case No. XI-202-T).
Earlier on 12 April 1991, Judge Calica applied for optional retirement under R.A. 910, as amended
by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438. As required under S.C. Circular No. 16 dated 2 December 1986, he
specified in his application 16 June 1991 as the date of effectivity of his retirement. For the guidance
of all members, officials and employees of the judiciary, We quote hereunder pertinent portions of
S.C. Circular No. 16 in filing applications for optional retirement:
"1. All applications for optional retirement shall specify the date of effectivity thereof and not leave
the same effective 'upon approval of the Court.'
"2. All such applications, together with all the necessary documents in support thereof, shall be filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator at least two (2) months prior to its effective date, either
personally or by special delivery.
"3. Within one (1) month following the filing of his application, the applicant must inquire and verify
from the Court Administrator as to the status of his application.
"4. When the specified date of retirement is reached, without the applicant receiving any notice of
approval or denial of his application, he shall cease working and discharging his functions, unless
directed otherwise" (emphasis supplied).
On 30 May 1991, We approved the retirement of Judge Calica effective 16 June 1991, the date he
had earlier indicated in his application. Whether he received Our resolution approving his optional
retirement prior to its effectivity is of no moment considering that under Circular 16 he was supposed
to inquire and verify the status of his application for retirement from the Court Administrator within
one (1) month following the filing of his application (par. 3), and that should he not receive any notice
of approval or denial of his application on the requested date of effectivity of his retirement, he
should have automatically ceased working or discharging his functions unless directed otherwise
(par. 4).
Strangely, on 4 September 1991 or about two and a half (2-1/2) months after the effectivity of his
retirement, Judge Calica decided Crim. Case No. XI-202-T finding accused-appellants guilty of
robbery with homicide and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. On 5 November 1991, Judge
Hilarion L. Aquino, who was designated Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 11 vacated by the retiring
Judge under Administrative Order No. 87-91, promulgated the decision of 4 September 1991 written
by Judge Calica.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant appeal by the accused is the validity of the decision
penned by Judge Calica on 4 September 1991 after he had retired from office on 16 June 1991. A
corollary issue may also be raised: assuming that Judge Calica signed his decision before his
effective date of retirement, could it have been validly promulgated afterwards by his successor in
office? In this regard, even the Solicitor General prays in his "Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's

Brief" that the decision of the retired judge be set aside and that the record of the case be remanded
to the trial court for the preparation and promulgation of a new decision.
We have consistently ruled that for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and promulgated
during the incumbency of the judge who signed it 2 . Thus, a decision penned by a judge after his
retirement cannot be validly promulgated; it cannot acquire a binding effect as it is null and void 3 .
Verily, when Judge Calica optionally retired on 16 June 1991 he ceased to be a judge of the court
where he sat in judgment. Consequently, with him also "retired" all his authority to decide any case,
i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon. In other words, he had lost entirely his power
and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Judge Florentino F. Calica in Crim. Case No XI-202-T is declared null
and void having been issued and promulgated after his retirement. This case is ordered remanded to
the court of origin for adjudication and promulgation of a new decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-29777-83 March 26, 1971
GREGORIO SOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Mario R. Silva for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition of Gregorio Solis for review on certiorari of the decision and orders rendered by respondent
Court of Appeals, in its Cases CA-G.R. Nos. 14811-R to 14817-R entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Gregorio Solis, et al.," affirming his conviction by former Judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur.
Petitioner Gregorio Solis and several other co-accused were indicted, tried and found guilty of
malversation of public funds in Criminal Cases Nos. 2510-2516 of the Court of First Instance, of
Camarines Sur. The judgment was penned and signed on 19 June 1954 by the Honorable Jose N.
Leuterio, then Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur.
All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation of the judgment on 19 June 1954, but
no court proceeding was had on that day, as the President of the Philippines had declared it a
special public holiday.
On 20 June 1954, Republic Act No. 1186, which abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large,
took effect without Executive approval.
On 21 June 1954, the defendants appeared before the court; this time, the court was presided over
by Honorable Perfecto R. Palacio, judge of another sala of the court. Judge Palacio promulgated the
judgment of Judge Leuterio, against the objections of herein petitioner.

Petitioner Solis appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals and the cases were docketed therein
as CA-G.R. Nos. 14811-R to 14817-R. In said appellate court, he raised in issue and attacked the
validity of the promulgation of the judgment of the lower court, for having been made by another
judge after the incumbency of the judge who rendered it had ceased.
The Solicitor-General's brief, in the Court of Appeals, agreed that the promulgation was illegal and
void.
Nevertheless, on 20 November 1965, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, modifying
petitioner's sentence in CA-G.R. No. 14811-R, acquitting him in CA-G.R. No. 14812-R and CA-G.R.
No. 14813-R, and affirming the lower court's decision in CA-G.R. Nos. 14814-R to 14817-R; but
petitioner's new counsel were not served a copy of the appellate court's decision. What they
received was a notification, almost three (3) years later, that is, on 25 August 1968, from the
bondsman of petitioner, informing them that the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur had issued
an order for petitioner Solis to appear therein for execution of judgment in the criminal cases.
It was only on 5 September 1968 that petitioner's counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals'
decision.
On 29 August 1968, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Court of Appeals asking it to restrain
the lower court from executing the decision, to order the recall of the records, and to cause the
service of the decision of the Court of Appeals on petitioner's counsel. Acting thereon, the Court of
Appeals directed its Deputy Clerk of Court to send a telegram to the lower court to suspend
execution of sentence, required its Judgment Section to immediately serve a copy of the decision,
and to explain within ten (10) days why no copy had been served on petitioner's counsel; but the
Court of Appeals did not order the recall of the records.
On 21 September, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for the recall of the records but
granted him a period of twenty (20) days to file his motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Thereupon, notwithstanding the absence of the records in the Court of Appeals, petitioner submitted
his motion for reconsideration. It was denied on 28 October 1968.
Hence, on 11 November 1968, appellant Solis interposed in this Court the present petition for review,
squarely presenting the issue of the invalidity of the decision of the Court of First Instance and of the
legality of the actuation petitions of the Court of Appeals in remanding the records even before
service of copy of its decision on petitioner's counsel and in arbitrarily refusing to have the record
recalled while the case was still pending before it.
The present case of certiorari was considered submitted for decision without respondents' brief, 1 as
the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that "the only consistent stand that the People can adopt is
to agree with petitioner's posture." 2
Upon the facts heretofore stated, the judgment of trial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated (on
21 June 1954) one (1) day after his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished (on 20 June 1954) by
Republic Act 1186. The judgment is, therefore, void, for it is now firmly established in our
jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently
ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had
been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office; 3 or
when the term of office of the judge has ended; 4 or when he has left the Bench; 5 or after the judge had
vacated his post in view of the abolition of his position as Judge-at-Large under Republic Act 1186; 6 or
after the cessation or termination of his incumbency as such judge. Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules
of Court, allowing the dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence, applies only

to the physical absence of the judge, being construed to mean that the decision of the judge may be
promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court. 7 A sentence has been
set aside where the judge who presided in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had been extended
an ad interim appointment to the Court of First Instance of Manila, to which position he qualified before
the judgment was filed with the Clerk of the former court. 8 Nullity likewise attached to a dismissal order
when the temporary assignment of the judge that rendered it had been terminated before the order was
issued, because a new judge for the same court qualified. 9

The main ground upon which the Court of Appeals held the contested judgment of the Court of First
Instance to be valid is that "since the approval of Republic Act 1186, effective 20 June 1954, was not
yet publicly or generally known on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered as a
judge de facto of said court and the promulgation of his appealed decision on said date is valid and
legally effective." 10 This is a misapplication of the doctrine laid down in the very case cited by the Court
of Appeals. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, a judge de facto was defined as one who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there
exists some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time (37
Phil. on page 192); but it is "essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually
acting under some color of right" (case cit. on page 190). In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not
actually act or perform or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated as he had
ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge. The other cases
cited by the Court of Appeals (Regala v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684; U.S.
v. Abalos, 1 Phil. 73) were similarly misapplied, as said decisions refer to the acts of a de facto judge, not
to a case where he did not act.
It follows that the Court of Appeals' decision can not stand, there being no validly promulgated
judgment of the trial court from which an appeal could be taken. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to pass upon the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in prematurely remanding the
records to the court of origin and later refusing to recall the same.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur are hereby voided and set aside. The
record of the criminal cases are hereby ordered returned to the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, for new adjudication by the judge presiding therein, in accordance with the evidence already
introduced, and for further proceeding conformable to law. No costs.
lwph1.t

G.R. No. L-48817

January 22, 1943

JUANA YAP DAES, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
WE KO (alias KUA), respondent.
Antonio C. Bengson and Jesus P. Morfe for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo y Padagas and Jose Lesaca for respondent.
BOCOBO, J.:
The petitioners, who are respectively the widow and children of Pedro Basa, brought an action under
Act No. 1874 for damages in the amount of P2,000 for the death of said Basa while working for the
respondent.
It appears that the respondent was having some repairs done on his house. He engaged Basa to
take from the river to his residence four logs which were needed, at a compensation of P1.20 per

log. The deceased engaged three persons to help him. They succeeded in loading three of the logs
on carts furnished by the respondent, but as they were trying to load the fourth log, it slipped down,
and hit Basa, killing him.
The Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals held that Basa
was not an "employee" of respondent within the purview of Act No. 1874, and dismissed the case.
Basa had been engaged to do one particular thing and was not subject to respondent's direction, the
Court of Appeals said That Court also held it was immaterial that at other times Basa had performed
odd jobs for respondent and that latter had loaned the deceased two carts on which to load the logs.
We believe the Court of Appeals erred. Act No. 1874 does not require that the work should be more
or less permanent. It is enough that the laborer is engaged to do any job for another person. The
temporary or occasional character of the work is immaterial, for two reasons:
1. Act No. 1874 uses the term "employee" without any distinction between occasional or permanent
employees.Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. It is significant that while the
Workmen's Compensation Act (No. 3428) specifically excludes purely casual employment, Act No.
1874 on the other hand does not. It is thus plain that Act No. 1874 which applies only to mishaps in
small industries and other activities in which the gross annual income is less than P20,000, is
intended to safeguard all laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their employment.
Finespun distinctions would fritter away the salutary substance of this law.
2. Act No. 1874 being remedial legislation, envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must not be so
limited as to defeat this paramount objective, unless its terms clearly warrant such restrictive
interpretation.
However, the Court of Appeals made no finding of facts on the proximate cause of the slipping of the
log which killed Basa. Was the misfortune due to the defective condition of the carts furnished by the
respondent? Was the respondent remiss in regard to Basa's safety? Was the deceased exercising
due care at the time? Without a specific finding by the Court of Appeals on these points, we cannot
decide on respondent's liability under Act No. 1874. It is true that Act No. 2473 raises a presumption
of neglect on the part of the employer, but the scanty statement of facts in the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hardly sufficient to create such presumption.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, but the case shall be remanded
to that court which should make findings as above indicated, and render decision accordingly,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575

January 31, 2005

YOLANDA S. REYES, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARVIN B. MANGINO, Municipal Trial Court, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Yolanda S. Reyes filed a verified Affidavit-Complaint
dated January 16, 1998 charging Judge Marvin B. Mangino with gross ignorance of the law,
extortion, graft and corruption, fraud and deception, relative to Criminal Case No. 200-97 entitled

"People of the Philippines v. Spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes," for other deceits punishable under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The complainant averred that she was one of the accused in the said case. Upon receipt of the
criminal complaint and after the filing of an ex-parte motion for the conduct of preliminary
investigation, the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest and a writ of preliminary attachment.
No preliminary investigation was, however, conducted. This prompted the complainant to post a
cash bond, to file an ex-parte motion for the lifting of the preliminary attachment and to request the
court to conduct a preliminary investigation. The respondent Judge merely directed the private
prosecutor to oppose or comment on the motion, instead of setting the case for preliminary
investigation as required under Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The complainant also
alleged that the respondent Judge convinced her and her husband not to pursue the issue of the
absence of preliminary investigation and the lack of jurisdiction of the court, on the assurance that he
would dismiss the case after their arraignment; double jeopardy would then set in, to their
advantage.
The complainant further narrated that at 11:00 a.m. of September 18, 1997, the respondent and two
unidentified companions went to their residence in Norzagaray, Bulacan. Only their secretary, Chona
Guzman, happened to be there. She entertained and gave the visitors some snacks. Chona
Guzman contacted her through radio. The complainant was apparently in Manila attending a
conference at the Department of Public Works and Highways, and Ms. Guzman informed her that
the respondent Judge and his two companions were waiting for her. The respondent then spoke to
the complainant and told her that he wanted to see her regarding the case, and suggested that they
meet at the lobby of the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m. The complainant acquiesced, and immediately
contacted her lawyer, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia at his office in Intramuros, Manila, to inform him of the
impending meeting with the respondent Judge. The complainant narrated the succeeding events
that transpired as follows:
19. That at the scheduled place and time, I came together with my counsel Atty. Wilfredo T.
Garcia. I also instructed my Liaison Officer Nida Diokno to proceed at the said place to bring
some money for expenses. At the Manila Hotel lobby, we met Judge Marvin Mangino, who
came ahead of us and seated at the sofa with an unidentified male companion. He again
assured us of his commitment to dismiss the case in our favor and this will happen
immediately after the prosecution had rested their case. He further advised my counsel to file
immediately a Demurrer to Evidence which will be his legal basis for dismissing the case. He
further told us that in order not to detect his biases in our favor, he proposed that the
Demurrer to Evidence will be dismissed first, and after that he advised us not to present our
evidence or defense anymore and let the case be submitted for early decision on the basis
of demurrer to evidence on file.
20. That with Judge Marvin Manginos personal commitment and assurances done in the
presence of my counsel, my Liaison Officer Nida Diokno, who all saw and heard Judge
Marvin Mangino of his promises and assurances, Judge Mangino whispered to me for a
"little representation" that he needs, considering that he is on an official business for three (3)
days to attend the conference of judges at Subic and he just beg (sic) off that day so that he
could see and talk to me personally about our case.
21. That I agreed to give him that "little representation" in the amount of P20,000.00, which I
placed inside a white envelope in P1,000.00 peso bill denomination. This matter of giving
money happened at around 3:00 p.m. after we had taken our snacks at the coffee shop of
the Manila Hotel, as witnessed by our counsel and Ms. Diokno.

22. Thereafter, the prosecution finished the presentation of their evidence and rested their
case. My counsel, Atty. Garcia, then submitted his Demurrer to Evidence which, after
submission, Judge Marvin Mangino ordered the denial of the same on the ground of
prohibited pleadings or motions. Such order of the court is actually erroneous, because the
rules on summary procedure do not include Demurrer to Evidence as one of those
prohibitive pleadings. Such order by Judge Marvin Mangino will show his gross ignorance of
the law. Copy of the said Order dated October 20, 1997 is hereto attached as Annex "L" and
copy of the Demurrer to Evidence as Annexes "M," "M-1" to "M-5."
23. That relying in good faith on Judge Marvin Manginos assurances and promises that he
would eventually dismiss the case on the arguments raised at the Demurrer to Evidence,
and this was coupled by the fact that Judge Marvin Mangino even called me at our residence
in Bulacan to convey his assurances of the dismissal of the case. He even suggested not to
appear anymore and just file the manifestation of not presenting anymore our defense
evidence pursuant to the proposed strategy he laid out. Then my counsel submitted the said
Manifestation dated October 29, 1997. Copy of the said Manifestation is hereto attached as
Annex "N."
24. That on October 29, 1997, the court issued an order noting the absence of the accused
and the manifestation filed by our counsel of not filing any defense evidence other than the
Demurrer to Evidence, Motion to Dismiss and our respective Counter-Affidavits as our
defense evidences. Copy of the said Court Order is hereto attached as Annex "O."
25. That prior to that, there is an earlier order of the court dated October 27, 1997, stating
that both accused and counsel failed to appear. Whereupon, the prosecution moved that this
case be deemed submitted for decision based on the evidence obtained. Which order will
show that we were made to believe that Judge Marvin Mangino is following to the letter his
proposal that we dont have to appear and have the case submitted for decision without any
presentation of defense evidence. Copy of said Order is hereto attached as Annex "P."
26. That on November 12, 1997, a Notice of Promulgation of Judgment was sent by Judge
Marvin Mangino to my counsel Atty. Garcia and Private Prosecutor Atty. Teddy Macapagal,
setting the promulgation on November 24, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. Copy of the said notice is
hereto attached as Annex "Q."
27. That again on November 24, 1997, Judge Marvin Mangino called up and relayed to us
not to appear anymore, as he would be waiting for an additional sum of money in the amount
of P40,000.00 in cash, as part of the "goodwill money" for the favor that he would be giving
to us.
28. That on November 27, 1997, heeding the advice of Judge Marvin Mangino to bring
the P40,000.00 cash, I sent the same through Mr. Ruel de Castro, my counsels liaison
officer, who delivered the money at Judge Marvin Manginos chamber office. Upon receipt of
the money, he promised Mr. de Castro that he would just send the copy of the decision
through mail, as it is no longer practical that he should promulgate the decision in open
court. The matter of giving the P40,000.00 is contained in the affidavit of Mr. Ruel de Castro,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annexes "R" to "R-1."
29. That having received the amount of P40,000.00 plus the P20,000.00 initially requested
when he visited our residence in Norzagaray, Bulacan, my husband and I waited for the
promulgation of judgment through mail as promised by Judge Marvin Mangino.

30. That on December 23, 1997, surprise of all surprises, I received a copy of the Decision
through mail, stating that my husband and I were found guilty of the crime of Other Deceits
and liable to pay the civil liability of P7,969,033.62. These were totally contrary to the
promises and sweet words of Judge Marvin Mangino who has deceived, tricked and fooled
us to get our trust and money with the total amount ofP60,000.00.
The complainant averred that the promulgation of judgment in the said case was a direct violation of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires the promulgation of
judgment to be read in the presence of the accused. Moreover, the order of conviction was bereft of
truth, factual and legal basis, and was issued in violation of their right to due process.
The respondent Judge denied the complainants allegations in his Comment 1 dated April 16, 1998.
Contrary to the allegations of the complainant, due process of law was applied in the instant case.
The respondent explained that there was a valid criminal complaint and preliminary examination
considering that there was an application for a writ of attachment, a supersedeas bond for the said
writ, as well as for the accused. There was, likewise, an arraignment, a pre-trial conference, and,
thereafter, trial on the merits, where the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
for the prosecution. While hearing was set for the accused-complainant to present her evidence, she
failed to do so.
The respondent Judge, however, admitted that on the promulgation date of the decision, only the
prosecutor, the complainant, the private prosecutor and the counsel for the accused appeared, and
agreed among themselves that they would just receive copies of the decision. The respondent
stressed that the accused filed an appeal, which was given due course, and the records, thereafter,
forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac for review.
The respondent insisted that he only had the opportunity to talk with the parties and their respective
counsels at the scheduled pre-trial conference. He claimed that the complainants allegations were
false, considering that even the latters counsel would know that the practice of making "assurances"
to a party is a breach of professional ethics and worse, a contemptuous one. 2
The administrative matter was referred to Executive Judge Arsenio P. Adriano, Regional Trial Court,
Tarlac, Tarlac, for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
The Executive Judge, thereafter, submitted a Report dated February 14, 2001 and made the
following findings:
With respect to the charge of gross ignorance, the judgment of conviction by Judge Mangino was
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, presided by the undersigned. The undersigned
rendered a decision acquitting the spouses Felix and Yolanda Reyes. A copy of the decision is
attached with the records (Pages 122 to 125). This decision therefore contains the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the undersigned which need not be repeated herein.
With respect to the charge of extortion, graft and corruption, complainant Yolanda Reyes alleged that
Judge Marvin Mangino received from her P60,000.00 in consideration of a favorable decision or
acquittal.
Judge Mangino went to her house at Norzagaray, Bulacan on September 18, 1997 but since she
was in Manila, they agreed to meet at the Manila Hotel, at 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Judge
Mangino received the P20,000.00 while at the Manila Hotel.

Judge Mangino also received the sum of P40,000.00 from Ruel de Castro, the liaison officer of Atty.
Wilfredo Garcia, then the lawyer of complainant.
To disprove the charge, Judge Mangino alleged that he could not be at the Manila Hotel at 2:00 p.m.
of September 18, 1997 because he solemnized two marriages at 10:00 a.m. of that day. He could
not have reached Manila Hotel by 2:00 p.m. since he has to travel from Tarlac City to Manila after the
solemnization of the marriages. The marriage contracts were submitted as pages 65 and 66 of the
records.
The undersigned set the hearing on February 5 and 12, 2001 but only respondent appeared. The
complainant did not appear although her lawyer, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia received the notice personally
on January 18, 2001, as shown by his signature on the face of the notice.
The undersigned also wrote letters to the contracting parties appearing in the marriage contracts
namely:
1.-Ricky Quinto
Dulce David
San Manuel, Tarlac City
2.-Vicente Lagadi, Jr.
Balete, Tarlac City
It is the intention of the undersigned to verify from them as to whether or not their marriages were
solemnized by the respondent Judge on September 18, 1997.
Since they have not appeared before the undersigned as of February 12, 2001, the undersigned
personally went to see them at their residences.
The undersigned learned startling revelations. Spouses Ricky Quinto and Dulce David affirmed
before the undersigned that they were married on September 4, 1997 solemnized by the respondent
Judge and not on September 18, 1997. They were positive that it was not on September 18, 1997
but on September 4, 1997 that was why they were wondering why when they received the copy of
the marriage contract, which was given to them sometime after September 4, 1997. Dulce David
even invited the attention of her co-teachers on the error. She thought it was a mere typographical
error.
1awphi1.nt

Vicente Lagadi, Jr. and his mother Carmen Gabriel told the undersigned that the date of the
marriage of Vicente Jr. and Eliza Bustamante is August 27, 1997 because this is the birthday of Eliza
Bustamante. It is not September 18, 1997 as stated in the marriage contract. Vicente Jr. noticed the
error because they received a copy of the marriage contract sometime after the marriage. He also
thought that it was a mere typographical error. Vicente Jr. also showed me the birth certificate of his
daughter and the date of his marriage with Eliza Bustamante as appearing therein is August 27,
1997.
The undersigned already received derogatory informations about Judge Mangino. It is known that he
solemnizes marriages even before the licenses are issued. Probably in this case, he placed the date
of the marriages as September 18, 1997 because that was the time he went to Manila and received

the P20,000.00 from the complainant. He did this to provide him with a ready alibi because he
expected to be sued by complainant as he never really intended to acquit her.
With these informations gathered personally by the undersigned, it is not therefore true that Judge
Mangino solemnized two marriages on September 18, 1997 because he went to Manila to meet the
complainant and to receive the P20,000.00.
Further, the presence of Judge Mangino at the Manila Hotel on September 18, 1997 was affirmed by
Atty. Wilfredo Garcia and one who is a lawyer will not easily attest to it if it is not true. The law office
of Atty. Wilfredo Garcia is near the Manila Hotel and he came there upon the request of complainant.
No transcript of the testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David and Vicente Lagadi, Jr. was taken
because they were hesitant to talk. Only after the undersigned assured them that whatever they will
tell will be treated with utmost confidentiality that they started to talk. 4
The Executive Judge then recommended that the respondent Judge be dismissed from the service.
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the said report to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for recommendation. The OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose
P. Perez, opined that considering the gravity of the offense charged, the Executive Judge should
have exerted earnest efforts to compel the attendance of the complainant and the witnesses during
the scheduled hearings.5 Pursuant to his recommendation, the case was referred back to Executive
Judge Adriano for a more thorough investigation.6
In his Report filed with the OCA on September 10, 2001, the Executive Judge made the following
findings:
The undersigned set the investigation to August 20 and 27, 2001 both at 10:00 a.m., so that notice
was sent to Mrs. Yolanda Reyes, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia and Judge Marvin Mangino. On August 20,
2001, only Judge Mangino appeared. He stated that since he already submitted a counter-affidavit,
he has nothing more to add to it. At the expense of the undersigned, the process server of the Court
was requested to serve the notice to the complainant. It was revealed that the complainant did not
receive the previous notices sent to her because the municipal officials of Norzagaray, Bulacan are
her political opponents.
1awphi1.nt

The undersigned sent another notice to Judge Mangino because of the assurance of Mrs. Reyes
that she will attend the setting of August 27, 2001. Judge Mangino did not appear on said date. Only
Mrs. Yolanda Reyes and Atty. Wilfredo Garcia appeared. The undersigned conducted clarificatory
questioning on said date and the transcript of stenographic notes is attached herewith.
FINDINGS:
In view of the previous report submitted by the undersigned dated February 14, 2001, and the
detailed findings of the Honorable Court Administrator dated May 11, 2001, in his Memorandum
addressed to Hon. Jose A.R. Melo, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, there is nothing more
that the undersigned could add.
The undersigned is now more convinced that the respondent Judge Mangino, indeed, demanded
and received money from the complainant. Mrs. Yolanda Reyes has no reason to proceed with this
administrative case considering that she was already acquitted of the charge before the respondent
judge (Decision, pages 122 to 125 of the Records). She was only motivated by the truth of her

charge. In the same manner, Atty. Wilfredo Garcia, has no sinister motive to testify for the
complainant, being a brother in the law profession. His testimony that he was at the Manila Hotel on
September 18, 1997 and he saw the respondent Judge received the money from the complainant is
worthy of belief.
The undersigned complied with the instruction of Honorable Deputy Court Administrator Jose Perez
that the investigation be private and confidential. To repeat, the undersigned did not reduce the
testimonies of Ricky Quinto, Dulce David. Said spouses were assured of the confidentiality of the
investigation. The other party whose marriage was solemnized allegedly by Judge Mangino on
September 18, 1997, Mr. Vicente Lagadi, Jr. also was reluctant to narrate the truth that the date of
his marriage was August 27, 1997 and not September 18, 1997.
Also, Mrs. Reyes said something that respondent Judge attended on that date, September 18, 1997.
It could be the conference for Municipal Trial Court Judges but the undersigned has no way of
verifying this. Probably, the Court Administrator has a record of that conference and the names of
the Judges who attended the said conference. This will corroborate the claim of the complainant that
Judge Mangino was in Manila on said date and he even attended the conference for MTC judges
elsewhere.
The Executive Judge reiterated his previous recommendation that the respondent be dismissed from
the service.
We do not agree. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.7 Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr .,8 a
case involving a lawyer accused of blackmail and extortion who was exonerated of the charges
against him for lack of evidence, is instructive on this point. The Court ruled therein that it is enough
for the respondent to deny complicity in the alleged blackmail or extortion, without more, for he is not
under obligation to prove his negative averment, much less disprove what has not been proven by
the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. 9 Expounding further, the Court
stressed
It is all too obvious from the foregoing that there is a dearth of evidence which would in any way
prove the commission of blackmail and extortion, much less incriminate respondent for those
offenses. Even the baseless postulations in the affidavits would certainly not carry the day for
complainants in view of their lack of evidentiary value. It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the
affidavits; hence, it is imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of
thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the
proceedings for being inadmissible and hearsay, as in this case.10
Indeed, considering that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, the
complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. 11 Inasmuch as
what is imputed against the respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it
would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial.12
In this case, the complainant could have easily gathered enough extrinsic evidence, such as
testimonies of waiters, restaurant employees, or other disinterested witnesses, to prove the alleged
meeting with the respondent Judge. She did not even present a receipt of the expenses she incurred
when she and the respondent judge took "snacks" at the coffee shop near the lobby of the Manila

Hotel to at least prove that she had been there on September 18, 1997. Moreover, if the respondent
had, indeed, made corrupt overtures and blatantly demanded money from the complainant, good
sense would dictate that the matter be immediately reported to the authorities to set up entrapment
operations against the culprit.13 The Court further notes that the complainant even failed to present
her liaison officer Nida Diokno, her secretary Chona Guzman, or her counsels liaison officer Ruel de
Castro to testify as to the particulars of the alleged extortion incident.
As a member of the bar, the complainants counsel should know that even in administrative cases,
the Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The
judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be
faulted, competent evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character.14 Thus, the
ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is
the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials
apply.15
Anent the conviction of the complainant and her husband in Criminal Case No. 200-97, the rule is
that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent
to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. 16 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 17As we held in Balsamo v. Suan :18
l^vvphi1.net

[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He
cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court
for review and correction. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good
faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. 19
Hence, the respondent cannot be held administratively liable on that ground.
However, the Court finds that the respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in not
requiring the presence of the accused during the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No.
200-97, as admitted by him in his Comment on the complaint.
There are two instances when judgment may be promulgated even without the personal presence of
the accused: (1) when the judgment is for a light offense, in which case, the counsel for the accused
or a representative may stand for him; and (2) in cases where despite due notice to the accused or
his bondsman or warden and counsel, the accused failed to appear at the promulgation of the
decision. The evident purpose of this latter exception is to afford the offended party the opportunity
to enforce the award of civil indemnity which could not otherwise be effected if the decision cannot
be pronounced on account of the absence of the accused. 20 Criminal Case No. 200-97 does not fall
under any of the exceptions, since the accused therein were charged and convicted of other deceits
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which is a less grave felony, the imposable penalty
beingarresto mayor.

It bears stressing the importance of the promulgation of decisions in criminal cases, considering that
a judgment or sentence does not become a judgment or sentence in law until the same has been
read or announced to the defendant or has become part of the record of the court. 21 Parenthetically,
when there is no valid promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal accrues. 22
Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is expected to be "the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence" to maintain public confidence in the legal system. He
should so behave at all times as to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.23 When questionable orders are issued by a magistrate of law, casting doubt as to his
integrity and impartiality, the erring judge must be sanctioned therefor, keeping in mind that the
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary, and, as such,
must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof,24 in accordance with Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino is FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184091

January 31, 2011

EDWARD GARRICK VILLENA and PERCIVAL DOROJA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOMAR B. DEGERON, CHRISTIAN DANDAN, and ELIZABETH
BORCELIS,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Resolutions dated April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103224.
The antecedents
Petitioners Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edward Garrick Villena and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Percival
Doroja, together with PO2 Nicomedes Lambas (PO2 Lambas), PO3 Dan Fermalino (PO3
Fermalino),4 Police Chief Inspector Jovem C. Bocalbos, PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao (PO3 Macalinao),
PO1 Alvaro Yumang (PO1 Yumang), and Imelda Borcelis, were indicted for the crime of robbery
(extortion)5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pias City. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-0025.
After arraignment, where the accused all pled "not guilty," and pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioners failed to appear before the trial court to adduce evidence in their defense. It was only
PO3 Macalinao who appeared before the court to present his evidence.
On August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision6 convicting petitioners, together with PO2
Lambas, PO3 Fermalino, PO3 Macalinao, and PO1 Yumang, of the crime charged.

During the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to appear
despite proper notices to them at their addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners, the
promulgation was made pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued warrants of arrest against them.
On October 11, 2007, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos, filed their
separate notices of appeal before the RTC. In the said notices, they explained that they failed to
attend the promulgation of judgment because they did not receive any notice thereof because they
were transferred to another police station.7
In the Order8 dated November 20, 2007, the RTC denied due course to petitioners notices of appeal.
The RTC ratiocinated in this wise
Case record shows that the Decision of the court dated August 29, 2007 was promulgated on
September 3, 2007. The appropriate notices and subpoenas were duly sent to the accused but [they
were] returned with the notation that they are no longer residing at their given address/es. In the
present case, all three accused raised the excuse that they were not notified of the setting of the
promulgation. The Court finds this ground unmeritorious since the accused have the obligation to
inform the Court of the changes in their address in order that the orders, notices and other court
processes may be properly sent to them. In any case, the counsels on record for the accused
Macalinao, Doroja and Villena were duly notified of the scheduled hearings and promulgation of
judgment.
Moreover, with the non-appearance of the accused-movants during the presentation of defense
evidence and on the scheduled promulgation of the decision, the Court already issued a Warrant of
Arrest against the three accused. This means that they have lost their standing in court and unless
they surrender or submit to the jurisdiction of the court, they are deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court. (People v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. Nos. 107297-98, December 19, 2000,
citing People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79, 87-88 [1991]).
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Notices of Appeal filed by accused PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao, PO1 Percival
Doroja and P/Insp. Edward Garrick Villena are hereby DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Reconsider the November 20,
2007 Order.9Petitioners likewise filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order of November
20, 2007).10
Resolving the said motions, the RTC issued its Order11 dated February 8, 2008, granting the prayer
for reconsideration of PO3 Macalinao, giving his notice of appeal due course. However, the said
Order denied herein petitioners motion, for failure to adduce any valid excuse or compelling
justification for the reconsideration, reversal, and setting aside of the November 20, 2007 Order. The
RTC found
x x x In the case of accused Reynaldo Macalinao, it is pristinely clear from the case records that he
has been actually attending the scheduled hearings of the case since its inception. He was also the
only one, among the police officers accused in this case, who testified in Court in defense of the
charges leveled against him.

Moreover, the Court, after a second look at the records finds that his failure to attend the
promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007 (of the Decision dated August 29, 2007) was due to
an excusable and justifiable reason. As stated in his Manifestation/Motion on the Subpoena dated
August 29, 2007, the basis for his non-appearance was for the reason that he was transferred from
Raxa Bago, Tondo, Police Station (PS-1) to Police Station 11, Meisic located at Felipe II, Binondo,
Manila, since July 26, 2006, as evidenced by [the] Certification dated September 19, 2007 issued by
P/Insp. Ricardo Tibay Tangunan, Chief Administration Section.
We cannot say the same thing for the other two (2) accused, namely, PO1 Percival Doroja and
P/Insp. Edward Garrick Villena as they have not manifested nor informed the Court of the cause of
their non-appearances despite notices and subpoenas sent to them nor sought for the lifting of the
Bench Warrant issued against them unlike accused Reynaldo Macalinao. Also, it can be keenly
observed that they both failed to appear in several if not most of the hearings set by the Court since
the commencement of the trial of the instant case against them. Noteworthy of such nonappearances in court despite due notices and subpoenas are the scheduled hearings on November
23, 2005, February 8, 2006, February 15 and 22, 2006, April 26, 2006, May 10, 2006, June 21,
2006, September 20, 2006, October 11 and 25, 2006, November 29, 2006, January 24, 2007,
February 26, 2007, March 14 and 19, 2007, April 25, 2007 and the promulgation of judgment on
September 3, 2007.
From all the foregoing actions during the trial of this instant criminal case, and after their conviction
by this Court, it is only accused PO3 Reynaldo Macalinao who had shown sufficient interest in
defending his case. The records show no unusual and deliberate delay caused by him in the trial of
the criminal case.
As to the other two accused, it can[not] be gainsaid that they have not proffered any cogent and
excusable reason to justify their non-appearance during the aforesaid dates and they only asked for
judicial leniency, which this Court cannot give. They have only themselves to be blamed. 12
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition13 for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. The CA, in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2008, initially dismissed the
petition for not being accompanied with clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of
the questioned Orders. Petitioners thus moved to reconsider the April 30, 2008 Resolution.
In the August 1, 2008 Resolution,15 even as it took into account the merits of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the CA nevertheless resolved to deny the same for failure to show prima facie
evidence of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Hence, this petition ascribing error
to the CA in dismissing their petition and in not finding grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for
denying their notices of appeal.
Petitioners now argue that the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of their respective notices
of appeal since they already contained the required manifestation and information as to the cause of
their non-appearance on the scheduled promulgation on September 3, 2007, i.e., lack of notice.
According to them, their notices of appeal have substantially complied with the requirement of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and have effectively placed them under the RTCs
jurisdiction. They allege further that their motion for reconsideration should have been considered by
the CA since they have offered the explanations that their failure to appear during the promulgation
of judgment was due to the change of their respective addresses, and that their former counsel of
record did not inform them of the need to notify the RTC thereof, much less properly advise them of
the current status of the proceedings. As regards their failure to move for the lifting of the bench
warrants issued for their arrest, petitioners asseverate that the Rules of Court do not provide for
such a requirement before they could avail of the remedies they seek.

The petition is without merit.

While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial
court thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the
notice of appeal could validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this
case, petitioners have lost their standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial
and, more importantly, during the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners insist that their failure to attend the promulgation of judgment was due to the lack of
notice of the date thereof, allegedly because they were transferred to another police station. Notably,
however, petitioners did not proffer any documentary and convincing proof of their supposed
transfer, not even to inform the court as to which police station they were transferred. In contrast,
their fellow accused PO3 Macalinao submitted to the RTC a Certification issued by P/Insp. Ricardo
Tibay Tangunan, Chief of the Philippine National Police Administrative Section, evidencing his
transfer from Police Station (PS-1), Raxa Bago, Tondo Manila to Police Station 11, Meisic in
Binondo, Manila. Petitioners were duty bound to inform the RTC of their transfer, assuming its truth,
so that notices may be sent to their respective new mailing addresses. They were remiss in the
discharge of this responsibility.
Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already substantial compliance with
the requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
We differ. Said provision states
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated
by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have the authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond
pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and
resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused
was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons

for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. 16
Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose
the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment(a) the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these
remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation
of judgment. If the trial court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be
allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified
and allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of conviction. 17
Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining
their absence during the promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender,
despite the fact that said notices were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported
date when their new counsel personally secured a copy of the judgment of conviction from the RTC.
The term "surrender" under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby
a convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer
the consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notices of appeal cannot suffice as a
physical and voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners
valid surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent
compliance with these requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from their
conviction, were properly denied due course.
Even if petitioners notices of appeal were given due course, the CA would only be constrained to
dismiss their appeal. This is because petitioners, who had standing warrants of arrest but did not
move to have them lifted, are considered fugitives from justice. Since it is safe to assume that they
were out on bail during trial, petitioners were deemed to have jumped bail when they failed to appear
at the promulgation of their sentence. This is a ground for dismissal of an appeal under Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which provides
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.The Court of Appeals may,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.18
Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in the case of petitioners), or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. 19
What is more, the judgment of conviction against petitioners had already acquired finality. Under
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, they had only 15 days from the date of promulgation of
judgment within which to surrender and to file the required motion for leave of court to avail of the
remedies against the judgment. As the judgment was promulgated on September 3, 2007,
petitioners had only until September 18, 2007 to comply with the mandatory requirements of the said
rule.
1wphi1

This Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103224 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212865

July 15, 2015

HORACIO SALVADOR, Petitioner,

vs.
LISA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal proposes to undo the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No.
131486, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the respondent's petition for certiorari and
nullified the orders dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Pasay City respectively giving due course to the petitioner's notice of appeal, and allowing him to
post bail for his provisional liberty; and the resolution the CA promulgated on June 4, 2014 denying
his Motion for Reconsideration.
1

Antecedents
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa penalized under
Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR. On
March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for
the deferment of the promulgation inasmuch as the petitioner was then suffering from
hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision, and
disposed as follows:
3

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both spouses are further ordered to
indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of Pl 7,371, 780.00 with interest of eight percent (8%) per
annum until fully paid, plus the amount of P50,000.00, as and by way of moral damages, and
.P.50,000 as attorney's fees.
xxxx
Costs against accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended on April 7, 2011, or
eight days from the promulgation of the judgment finding him guilty.
7

The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April 13, 2011, and attached
thereto the medical certificate dated March 3 0, 2011 purportedly issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A.
David, certifying that the petitioner had submitted himself to a medical consultation at the Rizal
Medical Center on March 30, 2011 and had been found to be suffering from hypertension.
8

10

In his order dated July 1, 2011, RTC Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz initially denied the petitioner's
Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 120
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
11

Thereafter, the respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR,
filed her Motion for Execution dated July 29, 2011 praying for the issuance of the writ of execution on
the civil aspect.
12

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order. Judge Dela Cruz granted the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011, thereby giving due course to his notice
of appeal.
13

14

On October 27, 2011, the RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for Execution, issued another
order, to wit:
15

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the subject Motion for Execution and Motion to Commit the Person
of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence
are both granted and hereby orders as follows:
1) Let Writ of Execution issue to implement the following, to wit:
a) Indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with interest of 8% per
annum until fully paid;
b) Pay the victim Lisa Chua P.50,000.00 as moral damages and P.50,000 as
attorney's fees.
2) The Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence is hereby granted without prejudice to the
appropriate action of the Executive Judge where the accused is detained pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 68-2005.
16

On its part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its Motion for
Reconsideration against the order issued on October 26, 2011, attaching to the motion the affidavit
executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David affirming that he had not examined the petitioner on March
30, 2011; that he had not issued any medical certificate in favor of the petitioner; that his name of
Paolo had been misspelled Paulo in the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the
signature appearing in the medical certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical Center did not
officially issue the medical certificate in question.
17

18

The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and prayed that he be
allowed to post bail pending appeal. He submitted another medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma.
Concepcion Santos-Enriquez, an OB-Gynecologist, to the effect that she had seen the petitioner on
19

20

March 28, 2011 for headache and dizziness; and that she had advised him to see a cardiologist
because of his elevated blood pressure.
Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was re-raffled to Judge Francisco G. Mendiola,
Presiding Judge of Branch 115, due to Judge Dela Cruz's inhibition. In his order dated August 8,
2013, Judge Mendiola denied the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, and fixed bail of
F80,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner. Consequently, the respondent commenced a
special civil action for certiorari in the CA to nullify the October 26, 2011 order (giving due course to
the petitioner's notice of appeal), and the August 8, 2013 order (allowing him to post bail for his
provisional liberty).
21

22

23

In the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, the CA granted the respondent's certiorari
petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 giving due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and
allowing him to post bail, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. The Order dated July 1, 2011 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

24

The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution promulgated on June 4,
2014.
25

Issues
Hence, this appeal, whereby the petitioner contends that the CA erred in rendering its December 12,
2013 decision because: (1) the respondent had no legal personality to challenge the assailed orders
of the RTC because only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could appeal in a criminal case in
behalf of the State; (2) she had no legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA because
her Motion for Execution in respect of the civil aspect of the criminal case had already been granted
by the RTC; and (3) his hypertension on the date of the promulgation of the decision by the RTC
constituted a justifiable cause for him to regain the right to avail himself of the remedies under the
Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.
The issues are, therefore: (1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal case had
the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders of the R TC despite
the lack of consent of the OSG; and (2) whether the petitioner had lost his standing in court for his
failure to appear at the promulgation of his conviction.
Ruling of the Court
We DENY the petition for its lack of merit.
1.
The respondent had legal standing to assail
the questioned orders through certiorari

The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and in
the CA. This is explicitly provided in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code, viz.:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers x x x. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxxx
The Court has stressed that the People of the Philippines, being the real party in interest in every
criminal proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in criminal proceedings in the CA or in
this Court. Yet, this rule admits of exceptions, for as pronounced in Rodriguez v. Gadiane:
26

27

A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. In a long line of
cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private
offended party or complainant.
As early as in the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action
of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Apropos thereto is the case cited by
petitioner, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, wherein it was categorically stated that the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant.
It was further held in De la Rosa that the complainant has such an interest in the civil aspect of the
case that he may file a special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court
on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. He should do so and prosecute it in his name as such complainant. In the
same vein, the cases of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Chua v. Court
of Appeals adhere to the doctrines mentioned above.
Yet, although the respondent's Motion for Execution had already been granted by the RTC, the CA
still held that she. continued to have an interest in the litigation, observing as follows:
x x x [W]ith the public respondents' questioned Orders both granting him leave to appeal the
Decision dated March 30, 2011, the whole case is rendered open for review by Us, including the civil
aspect of the case. An appeal throws the case open for review. Under Section 11, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties.
A mere cursory reading of the herein Petition will readily reveal that petitioner desires to question the
propriety of public respondents' ruling giving due course to private respondent's appeal and

subsequently allowing him to post bail. We do not, however, perceive the same as a procedural
misstep thus divesting the petitioner the personality to file the instant Petition. We still lean towards
giving due course to the instant Petition in the interest of substantial justice and considering what to
Us are abuse of discretion committed by public respondents resulting to denial of due process. As
ordained by the Supreme Court in Carmencita G. Carino vs. Merlin De Castro, there can be cases
where a private offended party is allowed to prosecute as an aggrieved party in the interest of
substantial justice for a party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
As to whether or not there was a clear disregard of basic precepts pertaining to an accused who did
not appear for promulgation of judgment despite notice is a query of substance both factual and
legal.
28

We affirm the CA's holding on the respondent's legal standing to institute the special civil action for
certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC. For sure, her interest in the criminal
case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for Execution because the questioned orders
opened the possibility of defeating the judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify his
conviction. She remained an aggrieved party like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she
had as much right as anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary
procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her substantial
interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it wanted to, she would be
reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate proceedings. Moreover, we would violate
her fundamental right to due process of law if we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set
aside the improperly resurrected appeal of the petitioner.
2.
Petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
xxxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be done in
absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to
him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final. The accused who
fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies available under
29

the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However,
the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself of these
remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating
therein the reason for his absence. Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he should .be allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order
finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of
conviction.
30

Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of the judgment
in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was mandatory because the offense of which he was
found guilty was not a light felony or offense. He was charged with and actually found guilty of
estafa, and meted the indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Based on the records, the
promulgation of the judgment was on March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14,
2011 within which to meet the mandatory requirements under Section 6, supra.
31

In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of Court, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached thereto the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he did not thereby establish that his absence had
been for a justifiable cause because the purported issuer himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly
impugned the credibility of this certificate by denying to have issued the certificate, and to have
examined the petitioner on March 30, 2011, or to have signed the certificate, or that the Rizal
Medical Center issued the certificate. The petitioner later submitted another medicate certificate,
which, aside from being belatedly issued, went unsupported and unauthenticated by the testimony of
the alleged issuing physician, who turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly discredited
the certificates.
32

Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly excused his absence
from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other requirement of Section 6, supra, to
surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender used in the rule visibly necessitated his
physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the
verdict against him.
33

In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner to have lost his
standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6, supra. His failure to fulfill the
requirements rendered the conviction final and immutable. He ought to be reminded that the right to
appeal, being neither a natural right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that
should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law establishing the
right; otherwise, it is lost.
34

35

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180761

August 9, 2010

ROMAN GARCES, Petitioner,

vs.

SIMPLICIO HERNANDEZ, JR., CANDIDO HERNANDEZ, ROSITA HERNANDEZ, and JEFFREY

MANGUBAT,*Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari bears, in the main, on the issue of whether respondents
who were charged with but acquitted of murder are civilly liable to the heirs of Rustico Garces (the
victim).
In its November 10, 2004 Decision1 acquitting respondent of murder, Branch 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City discoursed.
It is stated that the guilt of an accused rests solely on the strength of the Prosecutions evidence and
does not depend on the weakness of the evidence of the Defense. Moreover, such guilt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that can be arrived at by the Court in
convicting the accused. Physical and testimonial evidence presented by the Prosecution have failed
to elicit in the mind of the Court the conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held
criminally liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a matter of fact, the physical evidence
in his case instead of strengthening only weakened its case.
Moreover, it is noted that not one of the accused went into hiding even though they have acquired
knowledge about the death of Rustico. Instead, Simplicio Sr., Candido and Simplicio Hernandez Jr.
voluntarily went with the police investigators on the night of August 13, 2000. As the oft repeated
dictum states ["]the guilty fleeth while the innocent is as brave as a lion". And, with respect to
accused Rosita Hernandez, she appears to have been arrested in Cuta, Batangas City. She must
have been visiting her husband and children at the Provincial Jail of Batangas located in Cuta,
Batangas City on March 5, 2000 when it happened. These actuations of the accused
eloquently speak of their innocence in the face of unreliable evidence presented by the
Prosecution.2(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After the promulgation of judgment, Atty. Florentino H. Garces entered his appearance as counsel
for the father of the victim, Roman Garces (petitioner), and filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
trial courts decision respecting respondents civil liability.3 The trial court dismissed the motion in this
wise:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration dated December 9, 2004 filed by Atty. Florentino H. Garces,
it is to be stated at the very outset that said Counsel appears to have no legal personality to file the
motion. The records do not show that he was Counsel of record for the Private Prosecution
and neither [was] the motion signed by the [Provincial] Prosecutor.
As regards the manifestation on the right of the private Prosecution to claim civil damages where the
acquittal of the accused was based on grounds of reasonable doubt, suffice it to state that while
such right subsists in favor of the Private Prosecution, the matter should be properly prosecuted in
an appropriate separate civil action and not in the same criminal case which gave rise to such
right.4 (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration5 was dismissed by the trial court for being
moot and academic.6
Petitioner assailed the trial courts denial of his motions via Certiorari 7 before the Court of Appeals
which dismissed it for lack of merit,8 viz:
x x x [P]etitioner argues that the fact that the prosecutor did not sign the motion for reconsideration is
of no moment since what is sought to be reconsidered involves only the civil liability of private
respondents. We agree.
xxxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot entertain the petition.
It is settled that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Nonetheless, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the offended party, despite a
judgment of acquittal, is afforded the remedy of appeal.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the judgment of the trial court acquitting private
respondents is already final. What petitioner is assailing is the failure of public respondent to rule on
the civil liability of private respondents. However, while an appeal appears to have been open and
available, petitioner, without any justifiable reason, did not resort to this remedy. This is a fatal
procedural lapse. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is plain and unambiguous in
providing that the remedy of certiorari may be availed of only when "there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."9 (emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
At all events, the appellate court held that, even on the merits, petitioners certiorari would not lie on
the following ratiocination:
xxxx
While physical evidence was submitted, primarily a gun, empty bullet shells recovered near the body
of Rustico, the slug recovered from the body of Rustico, the traces of blood and the strands of hair
recovered at the house of private respondents these failed to point to private respondents as the
perpetrators of the killing. The gun recovered was never established to have belonged to any of the
private respondents. Furthermore, the ballistics examination failed to confirm that the slug recovered
from the body of Rustico came from the same gun. As for the traces of blood and strands of hair,
these were never established to have come from Rustico.
As for the testimonial evidence, We find no reason to disagree with the finding of public respondent
giving no credence to the testimonies of Miguel Jovello and Jefferson Garcia. Both Jovello and
Garcia testified that they saw Simplicio, Jr. and Candido at around eleven oclock (11:00) in the
morning of August 13, 2000 traversing the barangay road while carrying the dead body of Rustico
with Simplicio, Sr. and Rosita walking with them. Indeed, as observed by public respondent, if such
fact actually happened, there should have been many witnesses who could have testified to this
event. Besides, settled is the rule that to be credible, testimonial evidence should not only come from
the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible. In this case, the said testimonies are
inconsistent with human nature. It is unbelievable that private respondents would kill Rustico and
then expose themselves to prosecution by parading the evidence of their crime in public and in

broad daylight. While petitioner claims that "the events transpired in an insolated place within a
desolate town", no evidence was offered to prove such claim. 10 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, petitioner filed the present petition11 which contends that
I
CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WAS THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILED OF BY PETITIONER GARCES IN ASSAILING THE ACTS
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ANTONA WHICH WERE COMMITTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS MORE THAN A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD SUPPORTING THE CLAIMS OF PETITIONER
GARCES AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.12 (capitalization and emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unlessthe offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
x x x x (italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
In his Petition for Certiorari13 before the appellate court, petitioner admitted that he "did not waive the
civil action or reserve the right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action."14Petitioners remedy then was, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, to appeal
within the reglementary period the trial courts decision, which was silent on the civil aspect of the
case.
Technicality aside, on the merits, the petition just the same fails. Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court provides:
1avvph!1

SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission,; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the immediately-quoted rule, a trial court, in case of acquittal of an accused, is to state
whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove his guilt or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and in either case, it shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. From the earlier-quoted portion of the decision of the trial court,
however, particularly the following portions:
In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that can be arrived at by the Court in
convicting the accused. Physical and testimonial evidence presented by the Prosecution have failed
to elicit in the mind of the Court the conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held
criminally liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a matter of fact, the physical evidence
in his case instead of strengthening only weakened its case.
x x x These actuations of the accused eloquently speak of their innocence in the face of
unreliable evidence presented by the Prosecution15 (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
the Court finds that the acts or omissions from which the civil liability of respondents might arise did
not exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 167710

June 5, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO
LACABA,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the Resolutions1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who
were at-large.2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of which reads:

That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in the evening, in Barangay
Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, all the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another,
motivated by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL
MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby,
thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as
the Honorable Court shall determine.3
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while
their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed
a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence was not strong. 4
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the
time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios moved that the
venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila.
Consequently, the case was transferred to the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The
case was re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9,
and 11 before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila.5
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court deferred the resolution of
respondents motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present evidence. Thereafter, the
hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr.
Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the prosecutions evidence to prove treachery and evident
premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents motion for bail. A
motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41110,
which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a
Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the CA
together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to
immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be
immediately executory.7 As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not. 8
However, upon respondents motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated September
4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We noted that, in view of the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court in connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition
of its decision. Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, including
the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a
Decision9 dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused JOVEN DE
GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no
modifying circumstance attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.

The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or
archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying
that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered
acquitting them based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all accused solely on the
biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of
the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence adduced by
the defense, which was amply corroborated on material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the prosecution to present
rebuttal evidence renders the position of the defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary finding of treachery of
the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction despite the fact that
the guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 10
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the
reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to
become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for
reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court. 11
Acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order 12 dated April 15, 2004
modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of
Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its decision and finds
accused DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt,
as principal of the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them
to an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum,
to TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be
credited with the full period of their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.
1avvphi1

Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt. They are likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.13

Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order
arguing that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the "Joint Motion
for Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking of Ms.
Durans written statement of the events she witnessed is understandable considering that
Joven de Grano was the mayor of the municipality where the crime was committed and that
another accused, Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion and giving due course to
Estanislaos notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor,
with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition 15 for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and
deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the
right to move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly
erroneous.16
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the
State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the
accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.17
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,18 arguing that the verification and certification
portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved
party. Also, the petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor General. 19
On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.20Petitioner explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure the conformity of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A
day after filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSGs conformity in a letter 21 dated
January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather than affixing its
belated conformity, it would rather await the initial resolution of the CA.22 Also, so as not to preempt
the action of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor
to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the verification
and certification of the petition having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner explained
that private complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor

Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition should she be given ample time to travel to
Manila.23
However, in a Resolution24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the petitioner on the
same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition was dismissed outright by the
CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only
photocopies and not certified true copies. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 In addition to the justifications it raised in its
earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition was not only signed by
the private prosecutor, it was also signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the
criminal proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the certified true copies of
the assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead of the one it submitted. To
rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed Orders. 26 This was opposed by
the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 27
lawphi1

Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the private
prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution29 denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from
appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the
case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on
the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the name of the offended
party; and worse, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was
signed not by the private offended party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by
the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no
showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND

THAT THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED
BY THE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.30
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the respondents
appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after promulgation of the
judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies
against the decision, stating the reasons for their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to
take cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section
6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without
jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to
such void Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition
for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG
manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the filing of the
petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA given the OSG ample time to file the necessary
pleading, the petition would not have been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said
office.32
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner invokes a liberal
application of the Rules for private complainants failure to personally sign it. Petitioner maintains
that out of extreme fear arising from the unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was
reluctant to travel to Manila. After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took
refuge in the Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required. Since the period for
filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it could not be filed without the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was left with no option but so sign it,
instead of allowing the deadline to pass without filing the petition. 33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and certification
of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as the representative of
the State.34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning the order of acquittal is
not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to
the OSGs contention, respondents Joven and Domingos absence during the promulgation of the
Decision dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint
Motion for Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present during the
promulgation.35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the promulgation of
the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation of the said
Decision. Thus, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of
Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion. 36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it was not instituted
by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the verification and certification
portion thereof was not signed by private complainant Teresita. 37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should be dismissed, since
the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the OSG, not private
complainant.

The petition is meritorious.

Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical objections raised by
respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a
liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition
have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective.38Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the certification
requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. 39 However,
this Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 40 Not being jurisdictional, it
can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals41 and Wee v. Galvez,42 the Court noted that the petitioners were
already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification by their authorized representatives
was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,43 the Court upheld
substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked,
as the parties case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging and Development
Corporation,44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all the
required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case constitute
compelling reasons for allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals45 and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by
the party who executed the same. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners here must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the
court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the
certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.46
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for private
complainants failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of extreme fear
that private complainant failed to personally sign the certification. It is to be noted that when
Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the witness protection program and
was in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition.
Moreover, as maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the verification and
certification, instead of allowing the period to file the petition to pass without it being filed. A
relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances, is justified. The
requirement was thus substantially complied with.

As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,47 when a strict and literal
application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules will not be given premium if it would impede rather than serve the best
interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,48 that the signature of the
Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the
CA or with this Court is substantial compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering
that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real
party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.49
Also, respondents contention that there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in
the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG
instructed the private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue
the case. In its 1st Indorsement dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed
the petition to the Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions 50 for extension of time
to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment 51on respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.52 Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement, conformity, and participation of the
OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the CA, via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier
findings convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and
downgrading the convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that
all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the
Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA was
the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and
Joven despite the fact that they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.53 An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same
was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.54
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due

process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 55 In which event, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the
accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint
or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent. 56
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct
an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the
trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually
placed in jeopardy.58Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not
violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may
appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived.60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the
Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of
the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated
by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by
the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused
was tried in absentiabecause he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. 61
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in
the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from
notice.62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present.
Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant
disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at
large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration
with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a
motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo
have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country,
or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases,
it cannot be the source of an acquittal.64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the
Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment.
Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading
his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription
against double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer be
tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again to
ascertain if the trial court was correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of
one party or the other.65 The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not
include a review of the RTCs evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. 66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the Rules, the
finality of respondents acquittal and their co-accuseds conviction of homicide instead of murder
would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from an
attempt to uphold the accuseds treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not

evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and warrants this Courts corrective
action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot hide behind
such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the validity of the assailed
Order of the RTC, but was based on technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws
and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law
from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. 67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
"a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." 68 It bears stressing that
competence is one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the Rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and
the court the duty to be proficient in the law.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and April 5,
2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven
de Grano, are ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for
possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the Order dated April
15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77

March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170,
24195-24196,1questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as
follows:
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three
counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given
period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall

building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they
did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this
Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the
same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of
the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused,
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer
of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted x x x. 3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioners
Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground
that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea
bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely
affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the
amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the

defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pretrial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of
this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution
already presented several witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining
may be made,i.e., that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and
that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an

exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused.12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court, 14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor
with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In
his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373,
377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court
could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the
record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a
plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise
of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. TheSandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the
seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far
outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the
laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."17
1avvphi1

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer.
However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea
offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity
jurisdiction Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.18

and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007,
approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused,
Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the
prosecution of the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea
bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of
"not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser
offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in
the offense charged, which is Plunder.21
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not
be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its
Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by
the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover,
the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After
all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed
as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account
by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 24

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima facieevidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that
once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable
officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. 27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other,
to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And
vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.28
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation
against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still
be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to
render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting
within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in
this case. Unlike Estradawhich involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a

whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in
comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a
discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the
imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004
are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea
Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175319

January 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee

vs.
JOSELITO NOQUE y GOMEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The illicit trade and use of dangerous drugs destroys the moral fiber of society. It has eroded and
disrupted family life, increased the transmission of sexually related diseases, resulted in permanent
and fatal damage to the physical and mental health, and wasted dreams, opportunities and hopes
for a better future. As an ardent sentinel of the peoples rights and welfare, this Court shall not
hesitate to dispense justice on people who engage in such an activity.1 The commitment to this end
is exemplified in this appeal.
The Charges
The appeal stems from two Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which
were subsequently docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459, and raffled to
Branch 35 of said court. The Information in Criminal Case No. 01-189458 charging appellant Joselito
Noque y Gomez with violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21 (e), (f), (m), (o),
Article 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1683 and as
further amended by RA 7659 reads:
That on or about January 30, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute 2.779 (two point seven seven nine grams) and 2.729 (two point seven two nine grams) of
white crystalline substance known as shabu containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.
Contrary to law.2

On the other hand, the Information in Criminal Case No. 01-189459 contains the following
accusatory allegations for violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of
RA 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 179 and as further amended by RA 7659:
That on or about January 30, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being
authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control (six seven nine point two one
five grams) 679.215 grams of white crystalline substance known as shabu containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
thereof.
Contrary to law.3
During his arraignment on July 23, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Pre-trial
conference was conducted and upon its termination a joint trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
At 9 oclock in the evening of January 30, 2001, a confidential informant of
Senior Police Officer 4 (SPO4) Norberto Murillo, went to Police Station No. 4 of the Western Police
District (WPD) to tip off on the drug trafficking activities of the appellant in Malate, Manila. SP04
Murillo immediately directed Police Officers (POs) Christian Balais (Balais) and Dionisio Borca
(Borca) to conduct surveillance in the area mentioned by the informant. The surveillance confirmed
appellants illegal operations being conducted at No. 630 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila.
Thereafter, SP04 Murillo formed and led a buy-bust team with POs Balais, Borca, Ramon Pablo,
Roberto Godoy, Edgardo Book, Bernard Mino, Rodante Bollotano, and Melchor Barolo as members.
PO1 Balais was designated as poseur-buyer and was provided with 10 pieces of 100 peso bills as
buy-bust money.
The buy-bust team, together with the informant, proceeded to the aforementioned address and upon
arrival thereat, positioned themselves outside the appellants house. PO1 Balais and the informant
thereafter called out the appellant, who welcomed the two and brought them to his bedroom. The
informant asked the appellant if he had P1,000.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" then pointed to PO1 Balais as the actual buyer. When PO1 Balais handed the marked
money to the appellant, the latter brought out from under a table a "pranela" bag from which he took
two plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. The informant
slipped out of the house as the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team that the sale had been
consummated.
After seeing the informant leave, the team entered appellants house. SPO4 Murillo frisked the
appellant and recovered the buy-bust money. He also confiscated the "pranela" bag that contained a
large quantity of crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. The two persons who were in a "pot
session" with the appellant at the time of the raid were likewise arrested and brought to the WPD
Station No. 9 for investigation.
The seized articles were taken to the police station and submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination to determine the chemical composition of the crystalline substance. Police Inspector
(P/Insp.) and Forensic Chemical Officer Miladenia Tapan examined one self-sealing transparent
plastic bag with markings "JNG" containing 679.215 grams of white crystalline granules; and two
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance, pre-marked

"JNG-1" weighing 2.779 grams and "JNG-2"weighing 2.729 grams. The qualitative examinations
yielded positive results for ephedrine, a regulated drug.
Version of the Defense
The appellant gave a different version of the events that transpired. He testified that he was in his
house in the evening of January 23, 2001 when six policemen led by SPO4 Murillo entered and
arrested an unidentified occupant of the room next to his. The arresting team returned after 30
minutes and apprehended another person. When they came back the third time, they took him with
them to WPD Station No. 9 where his wallet, belt and shoes were taken. While under detention,
SPO4 Murillo ordered him to admit selling illegal substances but he refused. He was released on
January 26, 2001 only to be rearrested at around 9 oclock in the evening on January 30, 2001 when
SPO4 Murillo and his team returned to his house and took him at gunpoint to the police station
where he was detained for 24 hours. Police officers presented him later to Mayor Lito Atienza and
General Avelino Razon for a press conference.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision4 dated February 28, 2003, the trial court convicted the appellant of both charges. It
declared that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established with moral certainty his guilt for
committing the crimes in the manner narrated in the Informations. The testimonies of police officers
that they caught appellant in flagrante delicto of selling and possessing a dangerous drug are clear
and positive evidence that deserve more evidentiary weight than appellants defenses of denial and
frame-up, which are mere negative and self-serving assertions unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The trial court also ruled that it cannot deviate from the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the police officers since no ill motives were
ascribed to them that would entice them to testify falsely against the appellant.
The trial court also held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the
drug seized from the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, is a precursor of
methamphetamine, i.e.,methamphetamine is an element of, and is present in ephedrine. Ephedrine
is the raw material while methamphetamine is its refined product. Both drugs have the same
chemical formula except for the presence of a single atom of oxygen which when removed by means
of chemical reaction changes ephedrine to methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the
appellant can be convicted of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. The
trial court further held that under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a variance in the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved shall result in the conviction for the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
In determining the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride upon which the proper imposable
penalty on the appellant must be based, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of prosecution
witness, P/Insp. Tapan that a gram of ephedrine would produce gram of methamphetamine when
refined.5
Conformably, the methamphetamine contents of 5.508 grams6 of ephedrine in Criminal Case No. 01189458 would be 2.754 grams. Moreover, the methamphetamine contents of 679.215 grams of
ephedrine in Criminal Case No. 01-189459 would be 339.6075 grams.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

In Criminal Case No. 01-189458, pronouncing accused JOSELITO NOQUE y GOMEZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling a net quantity of 2.754 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without authority of law, penalized under Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing the said accused to the indeterminate penalty ranging from four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 01-189459, pronouncing the same accused JOSELITO NOQUE y GOMEZ
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of a net quantity of 339.6075 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride without license or prescription, penalized under Section 16 in
relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing the said accused to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00, plus the costs.
In the service of his sentences, the full time during which the accused had been under preventive
imprisonment should be credited in his favor provided that he had agreed voluntarily in writing to
abide with the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoner. Otherwise, he should be
credited with four-fifths (4/5) only of the time he had been under preventive imprisonment.
Exhibits "B" and "C" are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. Within ten (10)
days following the promulgation of this judgment, the Branch Clerk of this Court, is ordered to turn
over, under proper receipt, the regulated drug involved in these cases to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment. It held that the designations in the Informations are for
violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425 that define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of regulated drugs. While the allegations in the Informations refer to unauthorized
sale and possession of "shabu" or methamphetamine hydrochloride, and not of ephedrine, the
allegations are however immediately followed by the qualifying phrase "which is a regulated drug."
Stated differently, the CA held that the designations and allegations in the informations are for the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. There being no dispute that
ephedrine is a regulated drug, pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988, issued by the
Dangerous Drugs Board on March 17, 1988, the CA ruled that the appellant is deemed to have been
sufficiently informed of the nature of the crime with which he is accused. The fact that the chemical
structures of ephedrine and methamphetamine are the same except for the presence of an atom of
oxygen in the former strengthens this ruling.8
However, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 01-189458. It
held that in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances in this case, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period, ranging from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum. Thus, the dispositive
portion of the Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 28, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 01189458, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.9
Our Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The prosecutions evidence satisfactorily proved that appellant is guilty of illegal sale of a dangerous
drug.
The prosecution successfully proved that appellant violated Section 15, Article III of RA 6425. The
prosecutions evidence established the concurrence of the elements of an illegal sale of a dangerous
drug, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.10
In the instant case, the police officers conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving confirmed
surveillance reports that the appellant was engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous drugs at No. 630
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. PO1 Balais, the designated poseur-buyer of the buy-bust team,
personally identified the appellant as the person who volunteered to sell to him P1,000.00 worth of
white crystalline substance alleged to be shabu. The police officer received this illegal merchandise
after giving the appellant the marked money as payment. Undoubtedly, the appellant is guilty of
selling a dangerous drug.
The prosecutions evidence satisfactorily proved that appellant illegally possessed a dangerous
drug.
The prosecution was also successful in proving that appellant violated Section 16, Article III of RA
6425. It adduced evidence that established the presence of the elements of illegal possession of a
dangerous drug. It showed that (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or an object identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
appellant was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. 11
The police buy-bust team apprehended the appellant for the sale of a white crystalline substance
then proceeded to search the premises. They found a large quantity of the same substance inside
the bag that contained the two sachets of the regulated drug sold to PO1 Balais. Appellant did not
offer any explanation why he is in custody of the said substance. Neither did the appellant present
any authorization to possess the same. "Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain
the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi."12 With the burden of evidence shifted to the
appellant, it was his duty to explain his innocence on the regulated drug seized from his person.
However, as already mentioned, he did not offer any excuse or explanation regarding his possession
thereof.
There is no evidence showing that the police officers are actuated by ill motives.
Likewise to be considered against the appellant is his failure to present evidence imputing evil
motive on the part of the police officers who participated in the entrapment operation to testify falsely
against him. "Where there is no evidence that the principal witness of the prosecution was actuated
by ill or devious motive, the testimony is entitled to full faith and credit." 13
Appellants right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations was not violated.

The only issue raised by the appellant in this petition is that his conviction for the sale and
possession of shabu, despite the fact that what was established and proven was the sale and
possession of ephedrine, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusations against him since the charges in the Informations are for selling and possessing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
We agree with the findings of the CA and the trial court, as well as the testimony of the forensic
chemical officer, that the drug known as ephedrine has a central nervous stimulating effect similar to
that of methamphetamine. In fact, ephedrine is an important precursor used in the clandestine
synthesis of methamphetamine, which in crystallized form is methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thus, on March 17, 1988, pursuant to Section 20(8) of RA 6425, as amended, the Dangerous Drugs
Board in its Board Regulation No. 2, S. 1988, classified as regulated drug all raw materials of
ephedrine, as well as preparations containing the said drug. The chemical formula of ephedrine is
C10 H15 NO, whereas that of methamphetamine is C10 H15 N. The only difference between
ephedrine and methamphetamine is the presence of a single atom of oxygen in the former. The
removal of the oxygen in ephedrine will produce methamphetamine. With ephedrine containing fifty
percent (50%) of methamphetamine hydrochloride if the oxygen content in the former is removed,
the nearly 680 grams of ephedrine seized from the appellant contains about 340 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Moreover, as correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the Informations are for violations
of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and
possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and
possession of "shabu" or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the
qualifying phrase "which is a regulated drug". Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in
the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs.
Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board
Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.
The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, 14 can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved.
Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate,
a minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense,
nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot
be pleaded as a ground for acquittal.15 In other words, his right to be informed of the charges against
him has not been violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly
informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. 16
The Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 01-189458, appellant is found guilty of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425, as amended. We explained in People v. Isnani17 that:
Under Section 15, Article III in relation to the second paragraph of Sections 20 and 21 of Article IV of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the imposable penalty of illegal
sale of a regulated drug (shabu), less than 200 grams, as in this case, is prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable
penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram

to 49.25 grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua

The quantity of shabu involved is 0.060 grams. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Sections 20
and 21 of Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 (for unauthorized
sale of less than 200 grams of shabu) and considering our ruling in the above case, the imposable
penalty is prision correccional.
1avvphi1

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the maximum period is prision correccional
in its medium period which has a duration of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
The minimum period is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor,
the duration of which is 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, appellant should be sentenced to 6
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 4 months and 1 days of prision correctional in its
medium period, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 01-189458, the quantity of the prohibited drug seized from appellant is 2.754
grams. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court to
six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
As regards Criminal Case No. 01-189459, Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, provides
for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription. Section 20 of RA 6425, as amended, further provides that the penalty imposed for the
offense under Section 16, Article III shall be applied if the dangerous drug involved is 200 grams or
more of shabu. In this case, the appellant was found in illegal possession of 339.6075 grams of
prohibited drug. Therefore, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 to appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00684 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151258

December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified
and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D.
Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question
of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and
the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning
the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012. The Court modified the assailed judgments of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of
Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight
physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.
1

Also, we upheld another CA Decision in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto
Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial
was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:
4

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run,"

which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by
two Aquilans; and the "Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of
which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
1avvphi1

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,
De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted,as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum ofP30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution. Villa reiterates her previous arguments that
the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right
within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the
original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the
prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial
trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the
delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
7

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et
al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed
the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been
equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It
argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was
so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a
malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought.
9

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may
also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al.
should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed
to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al., filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their
criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately
applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal
liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have
already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and
terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various
dates in January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as
the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 and, upon their
completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.
10

11

12

13

To support their claims, respondents attached certified true copies of their respective Applications
for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CAG.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived
their right to appeal and applied for probation.
14

ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our
Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of
Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CAs dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal, and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right
against double jeopardy. Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CAs Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice." Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.
15

16

17

18

19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioners arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case
and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments
raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for
Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSGs theory that even if the act complained of was born
of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs
done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisin correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent
to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: Our Revised
Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. Thus,
it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary
that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
20

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victims death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who

chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with
the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be
applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the
one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by
a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved and the OSG agrees that the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions, respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty
of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of
the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no
longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People to support their contention that the
CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
21

22

23

The OSG counters that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an
appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
24

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases
supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy
if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accuseds waiver of the right to appeal as when applying for probation makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is
worth reiterating:
25

26

27

28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and
resources are once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. The reasoning behind the
exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:
29

30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decisions error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden a very heavy one is
on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to
act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason

of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Courts Decision in Tan
may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for
the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil
action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is
whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is
nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a reevaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the courts jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before
the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment
therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case
before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a
particular case or matter before it. That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce
a judgment, impose a punishment, and enforce or suspend the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.
31

32

33

The OSG questions the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case.
The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
34

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.
Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide
was Branch 121 not Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC. Neither the judge of Branch 130 in
his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
35

authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to
the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.
36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose
the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation
law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings
were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted
the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal
action has been properly instituted. If a party appeals the trial courts judgment or final
order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed
insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other partys time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease including the authority to order execution pending appeal the moment
the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the
appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case
before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot
be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
37

38

39

40

41

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue
of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense
charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others: after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a
withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. If the case was previously appealed to the CA,
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which
shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. The court of
origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the
court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof, including the convicts applications for probation.
42

43

44

45

46

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the
case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA and the records were still with that court. The CA
settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court. In September 2002, or
almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications, the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with
the CA and this Court. Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a
Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. We noted the petition and then required respondents
to file a comment thereon. After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda. The records of the case remained with the
CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.
56

57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,
place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law
oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately
admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate
and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
58

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained thus:
59

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by
all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government
of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this
end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
within them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. It points
out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
60

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction. In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with the issue of
61

62

whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within
the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of
eight years of prisin mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1
year, 8 months and 21 days of prisin correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that
Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its
various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere
reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals and
Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted
by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to
slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence
fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.
63

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC
Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from
their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan applicable, viz:
64

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
(Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as
a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against
them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of
the Revised Penal Code:
65

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is
as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits
that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the
execution of the sentence," and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out
in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:
66

67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of
the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for
his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People, we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:
68

69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the
trial courts judgment even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made
to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation.
Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).
Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is
a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC
doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got
was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
1wphi1

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisin correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al.,
we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted
of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms
and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom.
Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their
antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of
the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any
of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the
interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as
maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the phrase "and one (1) day,"
which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
70

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as maximum. In
this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal
penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory
penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25
and 27 thereof. The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the
ISL. This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" imposed, not to the "prison sentence" set by a
court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct
sets of accessory penalties for the same offense. The two penalties are only relevant insofar as
setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole
and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.
71

72

73

74

75

76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccionalin its

medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to
the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within
the aforementioned range. Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and
Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty of four years and two months of prisin
correccional. Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisin correccional
automatically carries with it the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisin Correccional
Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisin correccional shall carry with it that of suspension
from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
77

78

79

80

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL;
that is, for four years and two months or until they have served their sentence in accordance with
law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.
81

82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of
the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the
exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that
office; and (c) to hold any public office. Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment. The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if
expressly remitted in a pardon.
83

84

85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:
86

87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from
the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with
her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does
not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and
154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding
that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire
probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection
thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato
Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view
of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, without prejudice to their remaining
civil liability, if any.
88

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194390

August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22,
2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty
of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
1

Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information, which reads:
4

That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio
M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of Malabon City,
having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and committing the
offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false
statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his
C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document, which he
submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25
therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully

well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in answer to the
question of whether there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault
upon an agent ofa person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.
6

Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was
likewise filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman
found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and
dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio, the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23,
2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevillas administrative
liability.
7

On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
vis--visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did
not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his
staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house.
Ataround two oclock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his
PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five oclock that
afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he
filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla
claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he
failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case,
Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City
Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on
July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevillas staff would then need to use the typewriter, they
would just use the typewriter inside Torres office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza
preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
8

WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public

Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of
prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.

There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not appear
to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.

The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public
document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS,
Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the
Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his
PDS that there was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevillas PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC. Thus:
10

11

Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case
against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman
in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had not been a
candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served
ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question 29, in
the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998.
Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS was
haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with malicious
intent to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of
narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS without
verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government officer,
who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city.
Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the
said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless
Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x.
12

Sevillas motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
October 22, 2010.
13

Hence, this appeal.

In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony
of falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that
was filed against him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony,
i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted
of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which
is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him be violated.

Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Courts resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against
him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article
171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayans designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence,
punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document.
However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, the Court explained that:
14

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the
penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
15

Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, the Court clarified that:
16

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrecklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like;
when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or
simple imprudence causing damages to property."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. (Emphasis ours) Thus,
the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
17

Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs
the merit of the instant appeal. Sevillas appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the
offense charged in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution.
The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof
the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of
public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be
resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is
necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals, has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative.
Thus:
18

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough
falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful
act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said,
counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily includedin the offense
charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the
idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in
our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was
charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals
found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks inquestion,
appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to
assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not
willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. (Emphasis ours)
19

Thus, Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional
felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of
falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted
of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Courts disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan is instructive. In Sarep, the
petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was
then filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the
accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the
accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person.
The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayans disposition, held that:
20

1wphi1

We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he
did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs.
Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed
the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment
were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for
falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza,
14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to
a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from
criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in
order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise
offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude

orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such
mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660,
May 24, 1966).
21

Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in
falsification of public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four
( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90626 August 18, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO ALCORIZA LASCUNA, ROSITA DIONISIO VILLENA, CELSO CANO ALGOBA and
PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY, accused. PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joel Angelo C. Cruz for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused Ricardo Alcoriza Lascuna, Rosita Dionisio Villena, Celso Cano Algoba and Placido Aquilino
Palangoy 1were charged on 16 January 1989 with robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in an information 2 with the following
accusatory portion:
That on or about the 16th day of October, 1988, in the municipality of Malolos,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with Danilo Lagasca who is still at large and against
whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been completed by the Municipal Trial
Court of Malolos, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them toys, cash,
assorted clothes, wrist watches and valuable documents worth P4,900.00 all
belonging to Luisa A. Villena, to the damage and prejudice of the said Luisa A.
Villena in the total amount of P4,900.00; that by reason or on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, with Danilo Lagasca who is still at large as
aforesaid, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill one Honesto Altiche, attack, assault and strangle the
said Honesto Altiche, thereby resulting to his death; did then and there wilfully,

unlawfully and feloniously, with force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of Luisa A. Villena against her will; did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strangle the said Luisa A. Villena,
inflicting on her slight physical injuries which required medical attendance and
incapacitated her from, performing her customary labor for a period of nine (9) days.
Contrary to law.
Each of the four accused pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned on 1 February 1989. 3
On 10 February 1989, the trial court directed the assistant public prosecutor to amend the
information by including Danilo Lagasca as co-accused. 4
On 17 March 1989, after the principal prosecution witness, Luisa Villena y Altiche, had completed
her testimony on direct examination, accused Ricardo Lascuna and Celso Algoba sought leave of
court to change their not guilty plea to guilty. The trial court granted the request, re-arraigned them
and issued an order 5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment, of conviction is imposed upon the accused Ricardo
Alcoriza Lascuna and Celso Cano Algoba by (sic) proof beyond reasonable doubt
are found guilty and they are sentenced to a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day to
20 years.
SO ORDERED.
Thereupon, trial proceeded against accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy. Aside from Luisa
Villena y Altiche, the other witnesses presented by the prosecution were Patrolmen Felicito de Belen,
Oscar Enriquez and Jose Marcelino, Jr. of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Dr. Juanito Sacdalan, Dr. Rolando Victoria, Dr. Isadora Gatbonton and Eduardo Vinuya, a neighbor
of the victims. The defense, on the other hand, presented Celso Algoba who was by then already
serving sentence, Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy. Accused Ricardo Lascuna, who was likewise
serving sentence, was subpoenaed but failed to appear. Apparently, on 26 July 1989, he escaped
from detention. 6
The prosecution's evidence establishes the following facts:
Luisa Villena y Altiche, together with her eight-month-old daughter and brother Honesto Altiche, was
in her house at Bgy. Cofradia, Malolos, Bulacan on the night of 16 October 1988. Honesto was
staying with her since her husband was working abroad. While both Honesto and Luisa were
watching a television show at around 7:00 o'clock, the latter's sister-in-law, Rosita Villena, knocked
on the door of the house. When Luisa opened the door, Rosita came in with her daughter and four
strangers, three of whom the former later identified in court as the accused Celso Algoba, Ricardo
Lascuna and Placido Palangoy. The fourth person, identified as Danilo Lagasca, was not present in
court. Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo Lagasca were both carrying knives which they poked at Luisa
and Honesto while, Celso Algoba and Placido Palangoy started ransacking the house. Luisa and her
brother were then gagged and their hands and feet were tied. 7 Both were herded inside the bedroom
where Luisa was raped by Ricardo Lascuna while Honesto was asked to turn his back. Thereafter, Luisa
was dragged into the kitchen 8where she heard her brother, who was still inside the bedroom with Danilo
Lagasca and Ricardo Lascuna, start moaning. She then lost consciousness and was left for dead after
being strangled with pieces of cloth. Before this, however, Luisa noticed that Rosita Villena was the
person giving out instructions to her co-accused. Luisa claims that she was able to recognize the persons
who entered her house since they stayed there from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1998 up to

2:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. Based on what she heard from them, it appears that the
accused could not leave earlier because of a checkpoint in the area. It was only after regaining
consciousness at around 3:00 o'clock that same morning that Luisa was able to free herself. Upon doing
so, she proceeded to the bedroom where she found her brother who was already dead. She also
discovered that an instamatic camera, a man's gold ring, a gold wrist watch, assorted clothes, a ladies'
gold ring, P400.00 in cash and a pair of toy walkie-talkies were missing. All told, her loss amounted to
P4,900.00. 9 Luisa then sought the help of a neighbor, Eduardo Vinuya. Vinuya brought her to his house
and, together with his cousin and nephew, later proceeded to her house; upon reaching the house, they
discovered its kitchen and living room in disarray. Inside the bedroom, they found the body of Honesto
with an electric cord tied around his neck. They immediately reported the crime to the barangay captain of
Cofradia and the police authorities. 10 As a result thereof, a police team was dispatched to the scene of
the crime. At around 6:00 o'clock that same morning, Luisa Villena was questioned in the police station
where she revealed that one of the persons who entered her house was her sister-in-law, Rosita Villena.
A police team was thus dispatched to apprehend the latter in Bgy. Ibayo, Marilao, Bulacan. While being
ferried to the station in the police car, Rosita, when asked who her companions were, implicated Celso
Algoba her live-in partner a certain Dong, Placido (Palangoy) and Danny (Danilo Lagasca). She
then led the policemen to the latter's respective houses. With the exception of Danilo Lagasca who was
able to escape, the other accused were apprehended and brought to the police station where they were
identified by Luisa. 11 At the station, accused Palangoy was wearing a polo shirt and a pair of pants
(Exhibits "F-2" and "F-3") which were among the items taken from Luisa's house. 12

Pat. Jose Marcelino, Jr., a member of the team dispatched to the crime scene, prepared a sketch of
the house where the crime was committed. He likewise stated that the house was in disarray when
he entered it and that the body of Luisa's brother was inside the bedroom with its hands bound
together by an electric cord; an electric, cord was also coiled around its neck. For her part, accused
Rosita Villena admitted participating in the commission of the crime but such admission was not
reduced to writing. 13
The autopsy, of Honesto Altiche's body, conducted by Dr. Juanito Sacdalan, Municipal Health Officer
of Malolos, Bulacan, revealed that there were marks on the neck and wrists of the victim. Honesto's
death was attributed to "[A]spyxia (sic) due to occluded trachea and esophagus" and the breaking of
the trachea as a result of strangulation. 14
On the other hand, Dr. Rolando, Victoria found abrasions in the neck of Luisa Villena 15 while Dr.
Isadora Gatbonton's internal examination revealed "a normal looking external genitalia; labia minora and
majora; clitoris were all intact with superficial abrasion 0-3 cm. over the posterior fourchette; negative
bleeding; . . . nagative (sic) tenderness, negative abnormal discharge (sic); . . . negative
spermatozoa." 16 Dr. Gatbonton declared that the superficial abrasion "could possibly be secondary to
irritation wherein a patient has a tendency to scratching (sic) so that abrasion is brought about and
another possible cause is violent (sic) attempt of penetration or insertion of any object." 17
Testifying for the defense, Celso Algoba admitted that he robbed Luisa Villena's house on 16
October 1989 together with Ricardo Lascuna, Danilo Lagasca and another person whose name he
does hot know. Celso, however, denied that Rosita Villenahis live-in partnerand accused Placido
Palangoy were with them at the time. According to him, Rosita was in their apartment in Marilao,
Bulacan at the time of the commission of the crime. While claiming to have no knowledge of Luisa's
rape, Algoba declared that Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo Lagasca strangled the latter and killed
Honesto Altiche. When presented with an item recovered from Placido Palangoy, Algoba stated that
he sold the same to the latter for P60.00. 18
For her part, Rosita Villena denied any participation in the crime. She testified that she was at home
with her daughter on the night of 16 October 1988 and that when she woke up at 7:00 o'clock the
next morning, some, policemen arrived, searched their things and took the toy walkie-talkies from
them. She averred that it was Celso who brought the said toy walkie-talkies home and recounted to

her the robbery staged in the house of Luisa Villena. Although she wanted to report the matter to the
authorities, Rosita desisted because Celso threatened her. 19 Placido Palangoy also denied
participating in the commission of the crime. He claimed that on the night of 16 October 1988, he was
washing his child's diapers upon orders of his wife. After doing so, he went to sleep. The next morning,
after hanging the diapers out to dry and taking a bath, he was approached by a stranger who sold him
clothes for P60.00. A few moments later, the same stranger returned to Palangoy's house with some
policemen. Palangoy was thereupon brought to the police station with three other men; in the station, they
were confronted by a lady who declared that they were the persons who robbed her house. 20
On 21 August 1989, immediately after accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy had finished
testifying and the prosecution had announced that it had no rebuttal evidence to present, the trial
judge declared:
COURT:
Promulgation of Judgment.
By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds both accused, Rosita Villena and
Placido Palangoy guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, Rape and Serious
Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and applying Art. 294
paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount of
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 21
Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a 10-page decision,
follows:

22

the dispositive portion of which reads as

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rosita Dionisio Villena and Placido Aquino
Palanggoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua)
in accordance with Art. 294, pars. 1 and 2, and to indemnify the family of the
deceased the amount of P30,000.00 each.
Accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy filed their notice of appeal on 23 August 1989. 23 The
records of the case were, however, erroneously forwarded to the Court of Appeals which, upon orders of
the Presiding Justice thereof, properly transmitted the same to this Court on 30 October 1989. 24 We
accepted the appeal on 29 May 1991. 25
On 16 March 1992, accused-appellant Rosita Villena filed a motion to withdraw her appeal 26 which
this Court granted on 3 March 1991. 27 In view thereof, this decision concerns only the accused Placido
Palangoy, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant.
In his Brief, the appellant avers that the RTC erred:
1.1
. . . IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ACCUSED'S ALLEGED ADMISSION OF GUILT
1.2

. . . IN HOLDING AGAINST APPELLANT PLACIDO PALANGGOY THAT HE WAS

WEARING THE PANTS AND SHIRT TAKEN FROM THE VILLENA HOUSEHOLD AT
THE TIME OF (HIS) APPREHENSION
1.3
. . . IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO PLACIDO PALANGGOY'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI
1.4
. . . IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST LUISA VILLENA
1.5
. . . IN HOLDING AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT PALANGGOY THAT THE
HOMICIDE AND RAPE WAS (sic) PART OF THE CONSPIRACY
1.6
. . . IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 13, PAR. 3 OR 10 (OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE) AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE (sic) FOR ACCUSED-APPELLANT
1.7
. . . THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT HIS (sic) RIGHT TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY DISPLAYING MANIFEST BIAS AGAINST
ACCUSED AND PREJUDGING THE CASE.
Subject to the observations and modifications hereinafter indicated, we are left with no choice but to
affirm the judgment of conviction.
The first assigned error results from a misreading of the challenged decision for as correctly
contended by the appellee, the appellant's conviction is not based on the admissions of the accused
Rosita Villena. It appears that the appellant's conclusion proceeds from the trial court's summary of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found under the sub-heading PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE. It is to be observed that the court's own findings of fact, capsulized under the subheading FINDINGS AND FACTS, do not even make any reference to any admission made by the
appellant.
At the bottom of the second imputed error lies the issue of the sufficiency of the appellant's
explanation of his possession of the pair of "maong" pants and polo shirt which were among the
personal items taken from Luisa Villena's house on the night of the incident. The appellant claims to
have purchased the same from Celso Algoba in the morning of 17 October 1988 while he (appellant)
was drying his child's diapers. We are not persuaded at all by this concocted story. At the police
station's information section where he was seen by Luisa Villena wearing the said items of clothing,
the appellant did not even volunteer the information that Celso had sold the clothes to him. The latter
only offered his explanation when he testified in court. As hereinafter discussed, he was positively
identified by Luisa Villena as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. Thus, he miserably failed to
overcome the presumption that a person found to be in possession of the effects belonging to a
person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, death of the person and the
robbery committed. 28

In his third assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due weight to his alibi and
contends that he was not positively and clearly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime; he
avers that Luisa Villena did not single him out from a police line-up. Moreover, he claims that Luisa
Villena did not know, with the exception of Rosita Villena her sister-in-law, any of the accused
before they were presented to her. Again, we are not persuaded. In the first place, while it is true that
Rosita was the only person whom Luisa knew by name, it does not necessarily follow that the latter
could not identify the rest of the accused. In fact, Luisa did Just that at the police station and in court
during trial. Secondly, it was Rosita Villena who revealed the identities of her co-accused and even
led the police team to the latter's houses where they, with the exception of Danilo Lagasca, were
apprehended.
There is no doubt in our minds that Luisa Villena was able to positively identify the appellant when
he was inside her house since he and his co-accused stayed there from 7:00 o'clock in the evening
of 16 October 1988 to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. In fact, she remembered the
appellant very well because while the latter was inside the house, he changed into the very pair of
maong pants and polo shirt which he was wearing when apprehended. 29 It is a fundamental juridical
dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 30
Appellant's arguments in support of his fourth assigned error are no more persuasive than those
invoked to buttress the earlier errors. We cannot agree with his proposition that the evidence
presented does not support the trial court's conclusion that rape was committed. According to him,
the details of the alleged sexual assault were applied only through the leading and misleading
questions propounded by the court to the witnesses. Dr. Victoria, the physician who examined Luisa
in the morning after the incident, testified that the latter did not complain to him that she had been
raped; on the other hand, Dr. Gatbonton, the obstetrician who examined Luisa in the afternoon,
could not say whether the latter was raped or not. Hence, the appellant concludes that any doubt
should be resolved in his favor.
Luisa Villena satisfactorily explained that she did not initially report the rape committed against her
because she was ashamed to admit it. 31 When she testified in open court, however, she did not waver
in her account of the assault on her. In fact, the overzealous defense counsel elicited, during crossexamination, further details on how the despicable deed was consummated:
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
Q How can the accused Lascuna be able to rape you when you said
that your brother was beside you and your child who may be one
year old beside (sic) you?
A What can my brother do, he was tied up?
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
Q Assuming that your brother did not do anything but your child is
beside you, is it not?
A Ricardo Lascuna made me lie down and he was thrusting the knife
on my neck, sir.
Q And you did not struggle, is it not?

A I was struggling, sir, but what can I do I am just a woman and I

have a weaker strength (sic). 32
It is settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that she had indeed been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis of the victims testimony. 33 There is no reason for Luisa Villena
to claim that she had been raped if it was not true. Considering a Filipina's inbred modesty and antipathy
in airing publicly things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that Luisa would undergo the expense,
trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation such action
would indubitably invite and allow the examination of her private part if she had not been raped and her
motive was other than to bring to justice the person who committed the crime. 34
While it is true that the examining obstetrician declared that she was not sure whether Luisa had
actually been raped, the former nevertheless admitted that it was possible that she was.
And even if the trial court had indeed asked "leading and misleading questions," it is now too late for
the appellant to raise his objection thereto in this appeal. His counsel should have interposed the
appropriate objections to such questions at the time they were asked.
In support of his fifth assigned error, the appellant contends that granting, arguendo, that he was
indeed one of the malefactors, the trial court nonetheless erred in finding him guilty of rape and
homicide since no evidence was presented to show his participation in or knowledge of the
commission thereof. He adds that the doctrine in this jurisdiction that when the homicide takes
place as a consequence of or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are
guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless proof is presented that the accused
tried to prevent the killing should not be applied to him since he could not have prevented
someone from doing something which he (appellant) was not even aware of in the first place.
Such reasoning is terribly flawed. The general rule is that whenever a homicide is committed as a
consequence, or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of
the crime of robbery with homicide, although some did not actually take part in the
homicide. 35 Besides, it is difficult to believe that the appellant was not aware of the killing of Honesto
Altiche. Luisa Villena's house was not large enough to allow any of the accused to have his privacy as the
same is a mere one bedroom affair, with a sala and kitchen which have no partitions at all. 36 During the
seven hours that they were inside Luisa's house, each of them had access to all the areas therein. When
Honesto was killed, the bedroom door was even ajar. 37 It is likewise not believable that the appellant did
not know that Luisa was also strangled because this was done in the kitchen.
For his sixth ascribed error, the appellant would have us credit him with the mitigating circumstances
described under either paragraph 3 or 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, 38 he asseverates
that if such circumstances are not appreciated in his favor, an injustice would result since a light sentence
was meted out to Ricardo Lascuna, Luisa's actual rapist.
Paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender at
the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act, and not to his intention during
the planning stage. 39 Thus, while it may be argued that the agreement was only to rob the victims, the
perpetrators' acts at the time of the incident show that the conspiracy not only contemplated the
commission of the robbery, but also the elimination of any witnesses to the crime. Therefore, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in favor of
the appellant. Besides, conspiracy having been proven in this case, the act of one is the act of all.
Corollarily, the circumstance of "analogous circumstances" cannot find application in the instant case.

We find, however, the straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years imposed on Ricardo
Lascuna and Celso Algoba after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty, to be
erroneous. The penalty for robbery with homicide under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since, as hereinafter discussed, the rape
committed against Luisa aggravated the crime, the imposable penalty would have been death had
its imposition not been prohibited by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly,
the penalty that should have been imposed upon them is reclusion perpetua. Additionally, both
should have been made civilly liable for their acts. While we are not concerned here with accused
Lascuna and Algoba as the judgment against them has become final by their service of sentence,
the trial court's mistake in imposing the said penalty on the two cannot now benefit the appellant.
Finally, we find ourselves unable to accommodate the appellant in his last assigned error. He claims
that he was denied due process because the trial judge displayed manifest bias and prejudice
against him by asking questions which led witnesses to a preconceived notion of what the facts are,
and of promulgating a judgment "right in the hearing when the defense presented its case and within
seconds after both sides rested their cases.40
While the trial court's decision leaves much to be desired, we cannot agree with the appellant's
sweeping conclusion. The questions propounded by the trial judge merely sought to clarify important
matters. Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the
results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling the attention of such counsel to points at issue that are overlooked,
directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarifying
ambiguous remarks by witnesses and so on. 41
It is true that as earlier adverted to, the trial court orally "promulgated" its judgment by dictating the
same to the stenographer on 21 August 1989 after the completion of the testimonies of both Rosita
Villena and the appellant and the prosecutor's manifestation that no rebuttal evidence was to be
presented. Thus:
COURT:
Promulgation of Judgment.
By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds both accused, Rosita Villena and
Placido Palanggoy guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, Rape and Serious
Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and applying Art. 294
paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount of
P30,000.00. 42
Such behavior does not manifest bias or prejudice per se for in view of the fact that the parties did
not opt to submit their respective memoranda, the court forthwith considered the case submitted for
decision. A trial judge who has painstakingly listened to the testimonies of the witnesses, taken notes
of such testimonies and meticulously observed the latter's deportment and manner of testifying may
logically be presumed to have properly made up his mind on what the decision should be. What may
therefore remain for him is the actual writing of the decision. Judges are not required to await the
transcription of the stenographic notes before they can render their decisions; 43 if this were so, there
would be undue delays in the criminal justice system with judges easily finding justification for failing to
comply with the mandatory period to decide cases. Hence, the promulgation of judgment by a Judge who,
on the same hour, had first considered the case submitted for his decision, does not ipso factowarrant a

presumption of bias. This is true in the instant case where our own review of the evidence sustains
beyond reasonable doubt the judgment of conviction.

It must, however, be stressed here that the "verbal" judgment promulgated by the trial court was
incomplete as it does not contain findings of fact and is not signed by the Judge. The Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 44 In criminal cases, Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court requires that a "judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based." Be that as it may, the
infirmity was corrected by the trial court itself when it subsequently issued a full-blown Judgment dated
21 August 1989 which contains a summary of the evidence for the parties, findings of fact and the
signature of the Judge. The records do not, however, yield any proof that this full-blown Judgment was
promulgated. Such a promulgation was necessary considering that the sentence dictated by the trial
judge on 21 August 1989 is not similar in all respects to the dispositive portion of the full-blown decision.
In view of the fact that in the Notice of Appeal, the appellant explicitly refers to the Judgment dated 21
August, 1989, it is logical to presume that the same was properly promulgated.
In any event, we take this opportunity to advise Judges to strictly comply with the rules on the form
of judgments and their rendition.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the crime committed was erroneously
designated as robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries, The proper designation is robbery
with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it
is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which applies, the rape to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. 45 The physical injuries inflicted on Luisa Villena and the
killing of Honesto Villena should be merged in the composite, integrated whole that is, robbery with
homicide it being clear that both the killing and physical injuries were perpetrated with the end in view
of removing all opposition to the robbery, suppressing the relevant evidence or both. 46
Once again, we note in this case the imposition by a trial judge of the penalty of "life imprisonment
(reclusion perpetua)" in a manner that would make the former seem equivalent to or synonymous
with the latter. Not only have we repeated in a number of cases that the two penalties are not
synonymous, we have likewise advised Judges to apply the appropriate penalty and even warned
them against lapsing into the same error. 47 All trial judges should seriously take heed of our
pronouncement on this matter.
We also observe that the trial court failed to order the accused to pay the offended party actual
damages in the amount of P4,900.00 representing the cash and the value of the articles taken by
them.
Finally, conformably with the current policy of this Court, moral damages in the amount of
P40,000.00 should be awarded to the rape victim, Luisa Villena y Altiche while the indemnity for the
death of Honesto Altiche should be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Criminal Case No. 105-M-89 is AFFIRMED subject to the above modifications. As modified,
Appellant PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY (or PALANGGOY) is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by
rape under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all its accessories, indemnify the heirs of Honesto Altiche in
the amount of P50,000.00 and pay Luisa Villena y Altiche the sums of P4,900.00 as actual damages
and P40,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188560

December 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricky Alfredo y Norman, which affirmed an
earlier decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. 01-CR-4213 and 01-CR-4214of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 62 in La Trinidad, Benguet. The RTC found accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y
Norman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which
read:
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 3 a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA],
a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On June 21, 2001, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son,
BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3 James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang. On the other hand,
the defense presented as its witnesses accused-appellant himself; his mother, Remina; his sister,
Margaret; Hover Cotdi; Jona Canuto; and Pina Mendoza. 6
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with her
family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden. On April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB,
returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet to harvest sayote. The following
day, or on April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night,
she and her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed. 7
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the walls
of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then inquired who the person was, but nobody
answered. Instead, the light was switched off. After a few minutes, the light was switched on
again.8 Thereafter, a male voice shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten
kayo iti bala!"9 AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo
nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa"10 AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just then, the male
voice said, "Pabitaken kayo iti bala."11 AAA cried out of fear.12
Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp placed on top of the
table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the door opened, she saw accusedappellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight. AAA did not immediately recognize accusedappellant, as his hair was long and was covering his face. She invited him to come inside the shack,
but the latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill. 13 Helpless and terrified, AAA
obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.14
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop. Thereafter, accusedappellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove her clothes. When she
refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she also attempted to
stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again
ordered to walk uphill.15
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant ordered AAA to
stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant then
bent down and spread open AAAs legs. After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAAs naked
body, accused-appellant removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves. 16
Accused-appellant also held AAAs breast, as well as the other parts of her body. He shifted the
flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks up and down. AAA cried as she felt
severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant stood up and directed the beam of the
flashlight on her after he was satisfied.17
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis into her vagina
and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood up and lit a
cigarette.18
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis in the latters
vagina. His penis, however, has already softened. Frustrated, accused-appellant knelt and inserted
his fingers in her vagina. After removing his fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches

long and the size of a small finger in diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied,
accused-appellant removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina. 19
After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAAs vagina, he went on top of her again,
pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs. Subsequently,
accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the authorities. Immediately
after, he left her at the scene.20
Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up and went back
to the shack where she immediately woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded to the highway
and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. She also went to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet the
following day to report the incident to the police authorities. 21
Upon medical examination, Dr. Ged-ang found that AAA had a subconjunctival hemorrhage on the
right eye and multiple head injuries, which may have been caused by force such as a blow, a punch,
or a hard object hitting the eye. There was also tenderness on the upper part of the back of AAA, as
well as on her left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left flank area or at the left side of the
waist, and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh. Moreover, there were also multiple linear
abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of her forearms and legs caused by sharp
objects with rough surface.22
Apart from the external examination, Dr. Ged-ang also conducted an internal examination of the
genitalia of AAA. Dr. Ged-ang found that there was confluent abrasion on the left and medial aspects
of her labia minora about five centimeters long and a confluent circular abrasion caused by a blunt,
rough object that has been forcibly introduced into the genitalia. 23
Version of the Defense
In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant was allegedly working in the sayote plantation
near his house. At noontime, he went home to eat his lunch. After having lunch, his mother told him
to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the edge of the road. Accused-appellant went to the
place where the pile of harvested sayote was placed. However, when he reached that place, he
claimed that he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his mother and placing them in a sack. 24
Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant shouted at her, prompting AAA to run away
with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they left, accused-appellant started placing the
harvested sayote in the sack. He was able to fill eight sacks. Remembering that his mother told him
that he would be able to fill 10 sacks all in all, accused-appellant went to the shack of AAA after
bringing the eight sacks near the road. He suspected that she and her son were the ones who took
the two missing sacks of sayote.25
When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son were staying, accused-appellant allegedly saw
them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of sayote with the name of his father
printed on it. For this reason, accused-appellant got mad and told AAA to go away and leave the
place because what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would wait for
Hover Cotdi, the owner of the sayote plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to leave. All this
time, accused-appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening voice. Nonetheless,
while he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there. 26
Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote belonged to his family,
although he decided not to take them back anymore. He supposedly left after five oclock in the
afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven oclock in the evening. During this time, all his

family members were watching television on Channel 3. Accused-appellant joined them in watching
a Tagalog movie. He then allegedly went to bed at 10 oclock in the evening, while his parents
continued to watch television until 11 oclock in the evening. 27
The following morning, on April 29, 2001, accused-appellant woke up between six to seven oclock in
the morning. After having breakfast, he helped his mother clean the sayote farm. At around eight
oclock in the morning, he saw AAA by the road waiting for a ride with a baggage placed in a carton
box. His mother then went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving accused-appellant behind. He
claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything. 28
Ruling of the Trial Court
Between the two conflicting versions of the incident, the trial court gave credence to the version of
the prosecution and rendered its Decision dated February 17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty
of two counts of rape. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua including all the accessory penalties imposed by law.
The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in Criminal Case
No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as maximum.
For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way
of civil indemnity and the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden
of Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Ricky Alfredo y Norman to
the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen
(15) days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his
information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.29
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,30 modifying the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Court to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to
the CA.
On August 17, 2006, accused-appellant filed his Brief for Accused-Appellant, 31 while the People of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee 32 on
January 18, 2007.
Ruling of the Appellate Court

As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated September 30, 2008, affirmed the judgment of
conviction by the trial court.33
Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated March 19, 2009.34
On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 35 from the CA Decision dated
September 30, 2008.
In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009,36 we notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. On November 9, 2009, the People of the
Philippines manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it believed that all the issues
involved in the present controversy have been succinctly discussed in the Brief for the Appellee.37 On
the other hand, on January 26, 2010, accused-appellant filed his supplemental brief.
The Issues
Accused-appellant contends in his supplemental brief that:
I.
BY THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE LATTER HAS NO OTHER PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE EXCEPT
ALIBI THAT SHOULD NOT JUST BE BRUSHED ASIDE IF THERE ARE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENSIES IN THE CLAIMS OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION;
II.
THE DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT HEAVILY RELIED ON THE
DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL WHEN
THE PONENTE OF THE DECISION DID NOT HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE
WITNESSES;
III.
THE THEN AND THERE CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS UNLIKELY TO YIELD A
GUILTY VERDICT.38
The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense
In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that he could not offer any other defense
except denial and alibi, as he could not distort the truth that he was in his house at the time of the
alleged rape in the evening of April 28, 2001 up to the wee hours of April 29, 2001. He contends that
although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal cases, consideration should also be
given to the fact that denial becomes the most plausible line of defense considering the nature of the
crime of rape where normally only two persons are involved. 39

It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in
another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.40
A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant failed to present
convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only about 150 meters away from the
shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001. Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for
accused-appellant to be present on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was
said to have been committed.
Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles
in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.41 It is evidence negative in nature and selfserving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify
on clear and positive evidence.42 Thus, there being no strong and credible evidence adduced to
overcome the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.
In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been corroborated by his mother,
Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because accusedappellant was positively identified by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi becomes
more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or her
relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms,43 and not by credible persons.44
As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the latter is
superior
Accused-appellant contends also that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and in the latters respective affidavits, to wit: (1) whether accused-appellants
penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were
already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack. 45
AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several
times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened.46 On the other hand, AAA stated
in her affidavit that "the suspect ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started to
light and view my whole naked body while removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis [sic]
on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not errect [sic]." 47 There is no inconsistency between AAAs
testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that she failed to state in her affidavit that before
accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into AAAs vagina, he had already
succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between AAAs affidavit stating that she came to know of
accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his
face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the shack, AAA was "not
then sure" but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant "because of his hair." 48 In
other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the culprit while they were still in
the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight illuminated his
face while they were on the mountain.49
Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being
taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by
the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally considered to be
inferior to the testimony given in open court.50

The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who rendered
judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is different
from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position to render a
judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the
occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of
the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is
sufficient to support its conclusion.51 As this Court held in People v. Competente:
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory
perusal of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that
it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from
the Court carefully passed upon.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete.
Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt
After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied that the prosecutions
evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 53Nonetheless, it is also
worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often
only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus. 54
In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rapeone under paragraph 1(a)
of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under par. 2 of Art. 266-A.
Pertinently, the elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are the following: (1) that
the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act
is accomplished by using force or intimidation.55
On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code are as follows: (1)
that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is committed by
inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished
by using force or intimidation, among others.56
Notably, the prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of the foregoing elements. When
AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the incident that transpired in
the evening of April 28, 2001 and early morning of April 29, 2001. AAA categorically asserted that

accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her and even sexually assaulted her against her will with
the use of force, threat, or intimidation.
Particularly, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son with bullets if
they do not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant thereafter forcibly pulled her hair and
dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for her life. Nonetheless, accused-appellant boxed her
every time she did not yield to his demands. He boxed her thighs forcing AAA to sit, and he
threatened to box her if she moves while he carried out his bestial desires. 57
AAA testified further that after accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually assaulted her. He
inserted his fingers into her vagina and then he tried to pierce the same with a twig. Subsequently,
he inserted his flashlight into her vagina.58 AAA was too weak to stop him. She had struggled to free
herself from accused-appellant from the moment she was dragged from the shack until they reached
the mountains. However, accused-appellant still prevailed over her. Notably, AAA was six months
pregnant at that time. She was frightened and hopeless.59
Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Ged-ang corroborated the
testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution
of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the
case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable
corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.60
Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place where accusedappellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAAs son, BBB, testified as to how
accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of April 28, 2001, how he was able to identify
accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned home in
the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for a dirty white
jacket she was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all over her body. All
these are consistent with the testimony of AAA.61
All told, we accordingly sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Award of Damages
The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified. For rape under Art. 266-A,
par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity
and PhP 50,000 as moral damages. However, for rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par.
2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as
moral damages.62
We explained in People v. Cristobal that "for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the
accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the
institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others
from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is warranted." 63 Notably, there were
instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating
circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded
exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not
alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not

alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if
an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary
damages. x x x
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary
damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not
been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the
Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application
of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of
Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v.
Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the
Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and
People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after
the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages
taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a
crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is
enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way
as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the
main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court
imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual

behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused
in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino
Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo
Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to
elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
1avvphi1

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article
2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in
her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats
the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages to set a public
example or correction for the public good."64 (Emphasis supplied.)
Concomitantly, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 should be awarded for each count
of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.65
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise
ordered to pay PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175602

January 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the
crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the
State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on January 20, 2005 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, andP50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification
that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
costs of suit.1

The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez
filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwins appeal closed and terminated.2 Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three
counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson,
alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him several times with a gun,
hitting him on his face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his
back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the States evidence of guilt as follows:

On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the
canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband,
Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased Moises Sayson,
a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the
betting station. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, Estrellas other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito)
and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrellas family
and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 36, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and
Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked
the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to
customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to
reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises
from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mothers warning. He went out and
advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of
the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin na kita?" Moises replied
"huwag." Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even
after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his
brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell.
Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a
burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10,
TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10,
TSN, February 6, 2001).6
In turn, the appellants brief filed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) rendered the version of the
accused, to wit:
xxx [A]t about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on
(a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of
barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street when
Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwins) way. Jun Sayson poked a
gun at accused Edwin, shouting, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita. The latter raised both his hands
and said Wag kuya Jun, maawa ka.
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was walking when his
way was likewise blocked but this time, by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their
stepfather. Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardos) hands at his back while his (Joseltios) stepfather
held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was
positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that
he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she
heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped firing.
Accused Eduardos son approached him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his
service firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus
Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice. He was told
to take a rest and go back on (sic) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He
surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise

surrendered (TSN dated 05 February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp.
2-18, 1 September 2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4; 18
February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25). 7
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to
suffer reclusion perpetuafor each count of murder.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.9
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the States witnesses by pointing to
inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between
the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.10
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide due
to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the States witnesses (Susan Sayson, Marites Sayson and
Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as they transpired; and that they wrongly identified the
two accused as the persons who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were
themselves the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdezs insistence, holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the testimonies of witnesses
Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that a perusal of Estrellas testimony would cast doubt on
her statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants claimed
that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words
"Gusto mo unahin na kita?" The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who
shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being incredible. They
said that Susan testified that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not
speak; yet she was still able to give her statement on the same day the incident allegedly happened.
The accused-appellants also said that Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away
from them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but that, "interestingly,"
she only learned from her husband Joselito that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain
Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported failure to see
who between the accused-appellants threatened Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin kita?"
and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was
preventing him from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms.
Estrella categorically stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle on
March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellants for
the simple reason that they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants) father is her
"cumpadre." When the incident happened, the accused-appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10)
meters away from where she and her son Moises were standing. She also saw with her own
eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately [9]
shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.11

Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial courts findings of fact, its calibration of the
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the
Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CAs findings.12 The justification for this is
that trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand
observation of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The
only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the trial courts assessment of credibility arises
upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case.13 No such fact or circumstance has been brought
to the Courts attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free
testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies
noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed.14 To properly appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the
individual words or phrases alone but seek out the whole impression or effect of what has been said
and done.15
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the aggressors who had
attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated during the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from
the gun of Ferdinand (one of the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim);
that he played dead to avoid being shot at again, and walked away with his terrified son only after
the way was clear for them to leave; and that he heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third
victim) grappled for control of a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and
Ferdinand.16
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful
aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for determination based on the evidence
on record.17 The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts
and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily
attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of
the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises: Gusto mo unahin
na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises,
causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that
Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head,
spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot
Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three
victims were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence.
Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the
head;18 that two gunshot wounds entered Joselitos back and the right side of his neck; 19 and that
Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. 20 Also, Dr.
Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the
points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. 21 Given that physical
evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put
together,22 the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered
the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
1avvphi1

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.23 Proof of the actual agreement to commit
the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. 24 Herein,
both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which
they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting
by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert
to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at
Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other.
It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he
have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal
acts.25 Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly
inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community
of interest.26
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of
treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending
party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 27 It encompasses a wide variety
of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is
also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for
the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and

essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on
various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of
the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment,
for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short,
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the
details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement
of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court
fittingly said in United States v. Lim San: 30
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit
a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a
real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the
name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts
alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the
introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The
allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance
between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense

proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. 31 In
that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.32
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal.33 There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its
medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision
mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes
the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by
finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the
late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140243. December 14, 2000]

MARILYN C. PASCUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
What constitutes a valid promulgation in absentia? In case of such promulgation,
when does the accused's right to appeal accrue?
Before us is a petition that calls for a ruling on the aforestated issues, particularly
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 and its
order dated September 28, 1999 denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner which questioned
the legality of the orders dated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 issued by Branch
153 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig
City.

The antecedent facts may be briefly chronicled as follows:

Petitioner was charged under 26 Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. The Informations alleged that in 1989, petitioner issued 26 Philippine National Bank
(PNB) checks to apply on account or for value in favor of Lucita Lopez with the
knowledge that at the time of issue, petitioner did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the face value of the checks in full. Upon
presentment of the subject checks, they were dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered on February 17, 1998, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, and hereby sentences her to suffer ONE (1) YEAR
imprisonment in each case and to pay the private complainant, LUCITA
LOPEZ in the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P605,000.00), Philippine Currency without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 41, Rollo.)
The judgment was initially scheduled for promulgation on March 31, 1998. However,
considering that the presiding judge was on leave, the promulgation was reset to May 5,
1998.
When the case was called on May 5, 1998, Public Prosecutor Rogelio C. Sescon
and defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias appeared and manifested their readiness for
the promulgation of judgment, although the latter intimated that petitioner would be
late. Hence, the case was set for second call. After the lapse of two hours, petitioner still
had not appeared. The trial court again asked the public prosecutor and the defense
counsel if they were ready for the promulgation of judgment. Both responded in the
affirmative. The dispositive portion of the decision was thus read in open
court. Afterwards, the public prosecutor, the defense counsel, and private complainant
Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the subject decision by
signing at the back of the original copy of the decision on file with the record of the case.
Forthwith, the public prosecutor moved for the forfeiture of the cash bond posted by
petitioner as well as for the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. Acting on the motion,
the trial court issued, also on May 5, 1998, the following order:

When this case was called for the promulgation of judgment, the accused
failed to appear despite due notice. Upon motion of the Public Prosecutor, that
the cash bond posted for her provisional liberty be forfeited in favor of the
government, being well-taken, the same is hereby granted. Likewise, let a
warrant of arrest be issued against her.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitioner within 15
days from May 5, 1998.
On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial
court, sent through a private messengerial firm. On the same date, without terminating
the services of her counsel of record, Atty. Marcelino Arias, the one who received the
copy of the judgment of conviction, petitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty.
Rolando Bernardo, filed an urgent omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and
confiscation of bail bond, as well as to set anew the promulgation of the subject decision
on the following allegations: that petitioner failed to appear before the trial court on the
scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she failed to get the notices
sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City; that she had no
intention of evading the processes of the trial court; that in February 1998, she
transferred residence to Olongapo City by reason of an ejectment case filed against her
by her landlord concerning her former residence in Quezon City; and that due to the
abrupt dislocation of their family life as a result of the transfer of their residence to
Olongapo City, there were important matters that she overlooked such as the filing of a
notice of change of address to inform the trial court of her new place of residence.
The motion was set for hearing on June 11, 1998 but on said date, neither petitioner
nor assisting counsel was present. On June 22, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig filed its comment on the motion for
reconsideration arguing that: the promulgation of the subject decision was made by the
trial court on May 5, 1998 in the presence of the accused's (herein petitioner's) counsel;
that the subject decision is already final and executory, there having been no appeal
interposed by the accused within the reglementary period; that there is no such thing as
repromulgation of a decision; that before the accused could ask for relief from the trial
court, she, being a convict, should submit herself first to the lawful order thereof, that is,
to surrender to the police authorities.
On June 22, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's urgent
omnibus motion and notice of appeal for lack of merit, mentioning that its February 17,
1998 decision had already become final and executory. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration, this time assisted by another lawyer, Atty. Romulo San Juan. The
motion was set for hearing on July 8, 1998 but on said hearing date, neither petitioner
nor Atty. San Juan appeared. Instead, Atty. Porfirio Bautista appeared as collaborating
counsel of Atty. San Juan. When asked if he knew petitioner's counsel of record, Atty.
Bautista could not answer.
On July 17, 1998, Attys. San Juan and Bautista as counsel for petitioner, filed a
motion for inhibition of the presiding judge. The motion was set for hearing on July 28,
1998. Once again, petitioner failed to appear although Atty. Bautista did. On October 8,
1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and inhibition.
On December 14, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of
the June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 orders of the trial court. At first, the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution dated December 29, 1998 dismissing the petition
for certiorari, for failure to contain an explanation why the respondent therein was not
personally served a copy of the petition.However, upon reconsideration, said petition
was reinstated.
After an exchange of pleadings, on June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the
decision assailed herein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, the instant petition on the basis of the following grounds: (1) that petitioner
was not properly notified of the date of promulgation and therefore, there was no valid
promulgation; hence petitioner's period to appeal has not commenced; (2) that the
promulgation in absentia of the judgment against petitioner was not made in the manner
set out in the last paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which then provided that promulgation in absentia shall consist in the
recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served
upon the accused or counsel; (3) that the decision of the trial court is contrary to
applicable laws and that it disregarded factual evidence and instead resorted to make a
conclusion based on conjectures, presumptions, and misapprehension of facts.
The resolution of the instant petition is dependent on the proper interpretation of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment --The judgment is promulgated by

reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment

may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the
court that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall
have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond
pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at
the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat
the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal
docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the
judgment is for conviction and the accuseds failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who
may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his
counsel. (Italics supplied)
Incidentally, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
took effect December 1, 2000 adds more requirements but retains the essence of the
former Section 6, to wit:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading

it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction isfor a light offense the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge
is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city the judgment
may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the
court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall
have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond
pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at

the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because
he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his
last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last
known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He
shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if
he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Italics supplied)
Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of the
decision of the court (Jacinto, Sr., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Revised
Rules of Court [Criminal Procedure], 1994 ed., p. 521). In a criminal case, promulgation
of the decision cannot take place until after the clerk receives it and enters it into the
criminal docket. It follows that when the judge mails a decision through the clerk of
court, it is not promulgated on the date of mailing but after the clerk of court enters the
same in the criminal docket (Ibid., citing People v. Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 5825
[1956]).
According to the first paragraph of Section 6 of the aforesaid Rule (of both the 1985
and 2000 versions), the presence in person of the accused at the promulgation of
judgment is mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in
which case the accused may appear through counsel or representative. Under the third
paragraph of the former and present Section 6, any accused, regardless of the gravity
of the offense charged against him, must be given notice of the promulgation of
judgment and the requirement of his presence.He must appear in person or in the case
of one facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. The
present Section 6 adds that if the accused was tried in absentiabecause he jumped bail
or escaped from prison, notice of promulgation shall be served at his last known
address.
Significantly, both versions of said section set forth the rules that become operative
if the accused fails to appear at the promulgation despite due notice: (a) promulgation
shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof

shall be served upon the accused at his last known address or through his counsel; and
(b) if the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused.
Here lies the difference in the two versions of the section. The old rule automatically
gives the accused 15 days from notice (of the decision) to him or his counsel within
which to appeal.In the new rule, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable
cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However,
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
15 days from notice.
It thus appears that the judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the
presence of the accused, except where it is for a light offense, in which case it may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative (Dimson v. Elepao, 99 Phil.
733 [1956]), and except where the judgment is for acquittal, in which case the presence
of the accused is not necessary(Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al., 96 Phil. 31
[1954]). Notably, one of the conditions of the bail given for the provisional liberty of an
accused in a criminal case is that he shall surrender himself (or the bondsman shall
surrender the accused) for execution of the final judgment (Section 2[d], Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, it follows that it is the responsibility of the
accused to make himself available to the court upon promulgation of a judgment of
conviction, and such presence is secured by his bail bond. This amplifies the need for
the presence of the accused during the promulgation of a judgment of conviction,
especially if it is for a grave offense. Obviously, a judgment of conviction cannot be
executed --and the sentence meted to the accused cannot be served --without his
presence. Besides, where there is no promulgation of the judgment, the right to appeal
does not accrue (People v. ]aranilla, 55 SCRA 565 [1974]).
Jurisprudence further dictates that the absence of counsel during the promulgation
will not result in a violation of any substantial right of the accused, and will not affect the
validity of the promulgation of the judgment (Bernardo v. Abeto, CA-G. R. No. 6076, 31
January 1940;Gonzales v. Judge, 186 SCRA 101 [1990]).
In the vintage case of Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al (supra), the Court citing U. S. v.
Beecham, (28 Phil. 258 [1914]), stated the reasons for requiring the attendance of the
accused in case of conviction for a grave or less grave offense, to wit:

...The common law required, when any corporal punishment was to be

inflicted on the defendant, that he should be personally present before the
court at the time of pronouncing the sentence. (1 Chitty's Crim. Law [5th

Am. ed.], 693, 696.) Reasons given for this are, that the defendant may be
identified by the court as the real party adjudged to be punished (Holt,
399); that the defendant may have a chance to plead or move in arrest of
judgment (King vs. Speke, 3 Salk., 358); that he may have an opportunity
to say what he can say why judgment should not be given against him (2
Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 401, 402); and that the example of the
defendants, who have been guilty of misdemeanors of a gross and public
kind, being brought up for the animadversion of the court and the open
denunciation of punishment, may tend to deter others from the
commission of similar offenses (Chitty's Crim. Law [5th ed.], 693, 696) ***.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regardless of the gravity of the offense,
promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. The only essential
elements for its validity are: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket;
and (b) that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel.
Let us examine the validity of the May 5, 1998 promulgation which took place in the
case at bar. The dispositive portion of the decision convicting petitioner was read in
open court, after which the public prosecutor, the defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias,
and private complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies
of the decision by affixing their signatures at the back of the original of the decision on
file with the record of the case. Atty. Arias failed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen
days from receipt of the decision. Is it proper to rule that the period within which to file
an appeal has lapsed?
In Florendo v. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 325 [1994]), the facts are parallel to
those of the instant case. We held -

In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of
petitioner on June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within
which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of
time.
It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the
proceedings are made of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with
the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal
docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner does not question non-compliance
of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
(At p. 329.)

Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non- receipt of the
notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change
of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides, promulgation could
be properly done even in her absence, subject to the service of a copy of the decision
upon her or her counsel and the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
However, in line with petitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented
evidence sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty as regards the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket of the court.Attached to the petition is a piece of evidence that cannot be
ignored by this Court -- a certification dated October 26, 1998 signed by the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that this Office has not yet been furnished, as of this
date, with copies of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 85283-306 and
86064-65, entitled People of the Philippines versus Marilyn C. Pascua, which
were assigned to Branch 153 of this Court.
This certification is issued upon request of Romulo D. San Juan and Porfirio
Bautista, both counsels for the accused.
City of Pasig, October 26, 1998, 1:30 p.m.
(Sgd.) GREGORIO P. SUBONG, JR.
Administrative Officer I In-Charge
Criminal Cases Unit
(Sgd.) GRACE S. BELVIS
Clerk of Court
(p. 61, Record.)
We take judicial notice of said certification and hold that in view thereof, we cannot
presume substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the
criminal docket. And in the absence of such compliance, there can be no valid
promulgation. Without the same, the February 17, 1998 decision could not attain finality

and become executory. This means that the 15-day period within which to interpose an
appeal did not even commence.
What is the significance of the recording of the judgment with the criminal docket of
the court? By analogy, let us apply the principles of civil law on registration.
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are
unanimous on the meaning of the term to register as "to enter in a register; to record
formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list" (Po Sun Tun vs. Prize and Provincial
Government of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192 [1929]). In general, registration refers to any entry
made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict
sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation,
it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the
right of ownership and other real rights (Ibid.). Simply stated, registration is made for the
purpose of notification (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 ed., p. 653,
citing Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin, 49 O.G. 179 [1952]).
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is
sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and
annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed,
contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act, it must be performed in any case and, if
it is not done, it may be ordered performed by a court of justice (Cruz, The Law of Public
Officers, 1997 ed., p. 102). In fact, the public officer having this ministerial duty has no
choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular duty imposed by law. Its
purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons. It operates as a notice of the deed,
contract, or instrument to others, but neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties. If the purpose of registration is merely
to give notice, then questions regarding the effects or invalidity of instruments are
expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect of the
instruments litigated afterwards (Seron vs. Hon. Rodriguez, etc., and Seron, 110 Phil..
548 [1960]; Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co., et al. vs. Reyes, et al., 92 Phil. 177
[1952]; Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco Vda. De Cruz, 95 Phil. 818
[1954]; Samanilla vs. Cajucom, et al.,107 Phil. 432 [1960]).
Applying the above-mentioned principles to the instant case, we are prompted to
further examine the provisions on promulgation in absentia.
As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the rules allow promulgation of
judgmentin absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be subverted
by the accused jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make
promulgation in absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever
he may be, can be notified of the judgment rendered against him. As discussed earlier,

the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be served in the absence of the
accused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the absent accused know
of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by the Rules are: (1) the act of
giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or registering the judgment in the
criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally mentions first showing its
importance; and (2) the act of serving a copy thereof upon the accused (at his last
known address) or his counsel. In a scenario where the whereabouts of the accused are
unknown (as when he is at large), the recording satisfies the requirement of notifying
the accused of the decision wherever he may be.
Thus, on May 5, 1998, although the second kind of notification was satisfied when
defense counsel Atty. Arias received a copy of the February 17, 1998 decision, the
solemn and operative act of recording was not done, making the promulgation in
absentia invalid. This being so, the period to appeal did not begin to run.
The next matter we have to consider is the effect of the service of a copy of the
judgment upon petitioner, who admits having received a copy thereof on June 17,
1998. Did the 15-day period to appeal begin to run on said date of receipt?
We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does
not in any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in
the criminal docket later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not
validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation which was invalid at the time it was
conducted. The express mention in the provision of both requirements for a valid
promulgation in absentia clearly means that they indeed must concur.
Finally, as regards the third argument, we agree with the Solicitor General that
matters of sufficiency of evidence may not be passed upon in the herein
proceedings. The instant petition assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 17,
1999 and its order dated September 28, 1999 both of which concern the orders of the
trial court dated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998, in essence ruling that petitioner's
notice of appeal dated June 19, 1998 was filed out of time. The petition is not directed
against February 17, 1998 decision of the trial court which convicted petitioner on 26
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Hence, this is not the proper time to rule
on the merits of Criminal Cases No. 85283-306/86064-65. There is, rather, a need to
remand the matter to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision. Significantly,
it is not what petitioner describes as "repromulgation" since promulgation was not validly
made, and hence, as if not conducted. The requisites of the remedy of appeal shall
the_n apply from that point.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 1999
decision and the September 28, 1999 order of the Court of Appeals are hereby set
aside. The instant case is hereby remanded to the trial court for proper promulgation of

its decision in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182855

June 5, 2013

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE
JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through
its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM,
PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Alexander Adonis (Adonis), praying that the Court directs respondent
Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent), Director of the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm, to
have the body of the former brought before this Court and in the alternative, praying for the
application of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,2 which imposes the penalty of
a fine instead of imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. 3
Antecedent Facts
In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
(RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He was
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor
maximum, as minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium, as maximum penalty.4 He began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons
and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.5
A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against Adonis
by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14. 6
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge
on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. The said
document was received by the City Parole and Probation Office of Davao on May 2, 2008. 7
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the subject
of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties
in Libel Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a Motion to
Reopen Case (With Leave of Court),8 praying for his immediate release from detention and for the
modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said Circular.

On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved for
his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding Judge George Omelio
in open court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,000.9 Subsequently on even date
and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an undertaking,10 the trial court issued an Order directing the
Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some
other crimes or offenses."11 On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent,12 but the
release of Adonis was not effected.
On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason. 13
The respondent consequently filed his Comment.14 Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008 an Urgent
Motion to Resolve15 and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion, 16 reiterating all his
previous prayers.
On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the Court that
Adonis had been released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions
set forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the City Parole and Probation Officer of
Davao.17
The Courts Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The
writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an
effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for
those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person
is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. 18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of
Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6)
others, on December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole
when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case,
however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. 20 Notably,
at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch
14.21 In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending.
The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for
the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.
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Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, citing
Fermin v. People,22 where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than imprisonment
under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January
25, 2008 and provides the "guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition of
penalties in libel cases." The pertinent portions read as follows:
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set
by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in
mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
a fame alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary
imprisonment.23 (Emphasis ours)
A clear reading of the Administration Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular can not be given retroactive
effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument
considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become final and executory; and he
had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence. Eventually, he was released from
confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 137560

January 19, 2000

IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA

MARIA CRUZ y GONZAGA and DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari was filed by
David Cruz y Gonzaga questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16944
which dismissed his appeal from the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167,
Pasig, Metro Manila for failure to file appellant's brief. The petition for habeas corpus was filed by
David Cruz's mother, Maria Cruz y Gonzaga, against respondents Superintendent of the National
Penitentiary and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.1

Petitioner David Cruz y Gonzaga was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig,
Metro Manila with a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He
allegedly sold to another person on April 11, 1992 dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 2.70 grams.
On September 23, 1993, the trial court found David Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
him to suffer life imprisonment with all the accessory penalties of the law and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and the costs.
David Cruz seasonably appealed to this Court. The First Division accepted his appeal and the case
was docketed as G.R. No. 113390. Meanwhile, David Cruz was transferred from the Municipal Jail to
the New Bilibid Prisons. His counsel of record, Atty. Carmelo L. Arcilla, was notified and required to
file the appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from notice. The notice was, however, returned
unserved.
On October 3, 1994, we issued a Resolution referring the appeal to the Court of Appeals in view of
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 and the promulgation of the case of People v. Martin Simon y
Sunga.2 We noted that as the quantity of the marijuana involved in the case was less than 750
grams, the imposable penalty on the appellant was not life imprisonment but one within the range
of prision correccional to reclusion temporal, in accordance with the People v. Simon y Sunga ruling.
A second notice to file appellant's brief was sent to the new address of David Cruz's counsel, as
furnished by Cruz. The notice was again returned unserved.
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On September 19, 1995, David Cruz filed with us an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal." Attached
to the motion was the Indorsement of Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva, Bureau of Corrections,
stating that the legal effects of the Motion were adequately explained to Cruz. The motion was
referred to the Court of Appeals.
On October 24, 1995, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, issued a Resolution holding in
abeyance its resolution on the motion to withdraw appeal "until the situation is explained to him by
the Director, National [sic] Bilibid Prison." The Director was ordered to submit a written report,
together with the reply of David Cruz, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. In the same
Resolution, the Court of Appeals also noted that:
The penalty imposable for the offense charged against David Cruz, considering the quantity
of the prohibited drug involved, is 6 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, pursuant to the Sunga
case.
By 1996, David Cruz shall have served the maximum penalty imposable. We seriously doubt
if this was explained to him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.3
No report was submitted by the Director, New Bilibid Prisons.4
A third notice to file appellant's brief was sent to David Cruz's counsel which he received on June 8,
1996. Despite this receipt, no appellant's brief was filed.

On September 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution declaring David Cruz's
appeal as abandoned and dismissed the same. The dispositive portion of this Resolution reads as
follows:
For failure to file appellant's brief despite receipt by accused-appellant's counsel on June 8,
1996 of the notice to do so, the court resolved to consider the appeal ABANDONED and
accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.5
This Resolution became final and executory on October 14, 1996, Judgment was entered on April 1,
1997.6 In 1998, petitioner Maria Cruz sought the assistance of the Office of Legal Aid of the
University of the Philippines College of Law. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners claim that:
I. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner's
appeal abandoned despite its October 24, 1995 Resolution.
II. The correct penalty to be imposed should be determined in a new trial.
III. There is no lawful writ or process which justifies petitioner's restraint of liberty.7
The petition for certiorari must be dismissed.
Respondent Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the appeal of petitioner David Cruz as
abandoned and dismissed. Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The appellate court
may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except
in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal.8
An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or upon the
court's own motion, if the appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The only exception
is when the appellant is represented by counsel de oficio.
Petitioner David Cruz was represented not by counsel de oficio, but by counsel of his own choice.
His lawyer, Atty. Carmelo Arcilla, was counsel de parte before the trial court, before this Court on
appeal, and before the Court of Appeals. There is nothing in the records that would show that Atty.
Arcilla withdrew his representation of petitioner. On the contrary, the notice from the Court of Appeals
requiring the filing of the appellant's brief was received by Atty. Arcilla. And despite this receipt, still
no appellant's brief was filed. It was more than three (3) months later that the appellate court issued
the questioned Resolution. By dismissing David Cruz's appeal, the Court of Appeals acted within its
discretion.

A new trial to determine his penalty cannot be granted petitioner. A motion for new trial may be
granted by the Court of Appeals only on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to the
accused's defense. This is clear from Section 14, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 14. Motion for new trial. At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes
final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material
to his defense, the motion to conform to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 121.
Maria Cruz's petition for habeas corpus, on the other hand, must be granted. Her son, David, was
tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its
accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On
December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 took effect. This law amended provisions of
several penal laws, including the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Before R.A. No. 7659, Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 provided:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the. victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.
With the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, Section 4, Article II now reads:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
The penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed.
R.A. No. 7659 also added the following provision:
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instrument of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;

xxx

xxx

xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death."
Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more
of indian hemp or marijuana" became punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.9 The penalty for
the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon the quantity" of the drug.
In the 1994 case of People v. Simon y Sunga,10 we held that for drugs with quantities weighing 750
grams or more, and for drugs with quantities weighing below 750 grams, reclusion perpetua could
not be imposed twice.11The penalty of "prision correccional to reclusion perpetua" for drug offenses
where the quantity involved is less than those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 17 of
R.A. 7659 was construed as "prision correccional toreclusion temporal." This was the range of the
imposable penalty for drugs weighing less than 750 grams and the proper penalty depended on the
quantity of the drug involved. If the drug weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
is prision correccional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor; and from 500 grams to 749
grams, reclusion temporal.12
In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The
imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served
six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision
correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the
Solicitor General as already illegal.13 David Cruz should therefore be released from prison without
further delay.
An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the
person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the
officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of
such person.14 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty.15
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately. The
Director, Bureau of Corrections, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for the discharge of
DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA from confinement and RELEASE him, unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause, and to make due return of the writ. With costs de oficio.
FURTHER, in view of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's appeal on the ground of
abandonment for failure to file appellant's brief, Atty. Carmelo L. Arcilla is hereby ordered to explain

within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this decision why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him by this Court.
SO ORDERED.

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