Vol. 16, No.

12

July 26, 2016

Ethnic Opposition to Irans Regime Is on the Rise

Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall

Irans Ethnic Diversity (U.S. Institute of Peace)

Since June 2016, Iran has been enduring terror attacks and assassinations by ethnicopposition elements operating within its territory and adjacent to it.

Attacks on Iranian petroleum infrastructure in Ahvaz are a reaction to Irans ongoing

repressive policy against the Arab minority in Ahvaz, including the ongoing arrests,
trials, executions, and expulsions of young people in that area.

There are currently six to seven million Kurds living in Iran. Although they are part of
the Iranian state, they may be distinguished from the Shiite minority by language
and religion (most Kurds are Sunnis).

The Arab Sunni fighters targeting of the oil facilities, if it gains momentum, could
pose a problem for Iran just as it is trying to renew oil exports after the lifting of
sanctions. Attacks on energy infrastructure for gas and oil could foster an unsafe,
unstable environment for international energy companies.

Irans security forces have been cracking down on the Arabs, augmenting this
populations discontent along with its separatist aspirations.

The Iranian regime, which so far has been spared the regional repercussions of the
Arab Spring or Islamic Awakening as the regime calls it is now starting to feel the
effects.

Since June 2016 and to a lesser extent before then as well, Iran has been enduring terror
attacks and assassinations by ethnic-opposition elements operating within its territory
and adjacent to it. These include Kurds in the north and near the Iraqi border, Salafi
Sunnis near Irans eastern border with Pakistan, and Sunni Arabs in the Khuzestan
province near the Iraqi border in the southwest.

The Growing Arab Opposition

Early in June, a Sunni group called Suqour al-Ahvaz (Hawks of Ahvaz) took responsibility
for an explosion that caused a fire at the Bou-Ali-Sina Petrochemical Complex in BandarE Mahshahr, Khuzestan.1, 2 Iran denied their boast and claimed it was a leak that had led
to the explosion.3 The complex where the explosion occurred is known for protest
demonstrations over the difficult employment conditions there.
The group also issued a statement calling for
continued resistance to the Iranian occupation
of Arab lands, which had crossed a red line.
The statement also said the explosion was a
reaction to Irans repressive policy against the
Arab minority in Ahvaz, including ongoing
arrests, trials, executions, and expulsions of
young people in the area, and warned of
further attacks on vital infrastructures and
strategic facilities in Iran. The groups spokesman said this was a new tactic aimed at
damaging the Iranian economy, which thrives at the expense of the people of Ahvaz
who live under the poverty threshold.
Furthermore, in an appeal to a target audience in Arab countries that is fearful of Iran,
the group emphasized that it condemned Irans involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia and averred that it also intended to take action in the Iranian

3
interior and to continue the legitimate struggle until the Arab people of Ahvaz receive
their full rights to their land.4
On July 11, the group said it had attacked another oil facility in the area.5 It was the gas
and liquid gas pipeline of the Marun Oil and Gas Exploitation Company at the Marun oil
field in Khuzestan. One worker was killed and another wounded. 6 Subsequently, a state
of emergency was reported in Ahvaz.7
On July 17, 2016, the al-Farouq Battalion of Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation
of Ahvaz (ASMLA) targeted oil pipelines in the Johar as-Sabaa' (Haftkel) district (75km
northeast of Ahvaz). According to the groups statement, the perpetrators managed to
escape despite IRGC efforts to capture them. ASMLA reported that IRGC set up a
security cordon around the area.8
A commander in the al-Faruq Battalions said that that the operation came in response
to the ongoing transgressions of the Persian occupation state against the Arab people of
Ahvaz and the spreading sectarian strife and immoral intervention in the affairs of
neighboring countries including Saudi Arabia. He threatened further attacks, adding that
the al-Faruq Battalions performed a careful study of the strategic target points on the oil
pipelines stretching from the Johar as-Sabaa' area to the inside of Iran, and they had
managed to infiltrate the security cordon on this important economic region and
successfully carry out this special attack.9

The sabotaged Bou-Ali-Sina Petrochemical Complex in Bandar-E Mahshahr, Khuzestan

Social media reacted to the attacks with the hashtag #TheAhvazisshakeIran trending on
Twitter and praising the resistance. The Elaph newspaper claims that the ASMLA
recently warned that they will begin targeting foreign oil companies that work with Iran,
and that invest in the oil of the Ahvaz region.10

4
In March, ASMALA called on all international oil companies not to legitimize and
collaborate with the Iranian regimes oppression of the Ahwazi people by rushing to
invest in the Iranian oil sector following the lifting of international sanctions. ASMLA
stressed that the profits attained by the Iranian regime from the sale of the oil and gas
resources in Ahwaz are used both in the brutal oppression of the Ahwazi people, who
are denied any share in or profit from their own resources, and in funding terrorist
entities which actively work to destabilize security and stability in the Arab world and
elsewhere.11

Long live Arab Ahwaz (Twitter)

12

Over three million Arabs live in oil-rich Khuzestan. Unemployment has risen and air
pollution is measured at very high levels. If the attack was indeed perpetrated by this
group, then the Arab opposition has dealt a very hard blow to Irans oil and gas industry.
In mid-June, another Sunni opposition group, the Arab Struggle Movement for the
Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), announced that it had attacked an oil pipeline in the
Zarqan area of Khuzestan. The group claimed it had also carried out additional, similar
attacks. Its military wing, the Martyr Mohye al-Din al-Nasir Battalions, posted a short
video showing the pipeline that was blown up and asserted that the attack was a
reaction to Iranian security forces activities in the area.
The statement issued by the group read:
In conjunction with the 11th anniversary of the founding of ASMLA, the Martyr
Razi al-Zarqani Battalion conducted a special operation targeting oil pipelines in
the Zarqan area of the provincial capital [that] crippled the flow of oil from
Ahvaz toward Tehran [dubbed the capital of the occupation]. [T]he targeting
of the main oil pipelines came in response to the arbitrary Persian occupation
arrests against Ahvazi activists as well as its continuing crimes against the
rights of the Arab Ahvazi people and its profaning of the Arab nation. The
Martyr Mohye al-Din al-Nasir Battalions will continue its special operations

5
against the centers of the occupation state and its oil installations until the
liberation of the last inch of Ahvazi soil.
The Iranian media gave the event almost zero coverage, and Iranian security forces
imposed a closure on the area where it had occurred.

Global Jihad
In eastern Iran near the Pakistani border, groups
affiliated with global jihad continue to act against the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Border
Guard Command forces stationed in the area,
sometimes hitting them hard. In June the global-jihad
group Jaish al-Adl attacked Iranian forces operating in
the Sistan and Balochistan Province. Ansar al-Furqan, a
jihadi organization active in the Balochistan area,
claimed it had killed dozens of Iranian soldiers in a
suicide bombing13 in the city of Khash.14 Near the
Pakistani border in Sistan and Balochistan, five members
of the Border Guard Command were killed in a clash
with armed Sunni elements who fled back into
Pakistan.15

The Iranian Kurds

Along with the intensified activity of the separatist forces in Khuzestan and the jihadi
groups along the Pakistani and Afghani borders, June also saw stepped-up activity by
the Kurdish opposition in Iran. In June, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
attacked IRGC patrols along the Iran-Iraq border in the area of Oshnavieh and Sarvabad,
cities that neighbor the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. Several IRGC members and
Kurdish fighters were killed in the clashes.16 In another incident in June some fighters of
another Kurdish group, PartiyaJiyana Azad a Kurdistan (PJAK), were killed. The PJAK has
links with the Turkish PKK near the city of Sardasht along the Iraqi border.
Currently, six to seven million Kurds live in Iran. Although they are part of the Iranian
state, they are distinct from the Shiite minority in several major regards, including
language and religion (most Kurds are Sunnis). The Kurds, who are mainly concentrated
along the Iraqi border, are poor compared to Iranians who live in the large cities. At the
end of May 2016, President Hassan Rouhani visited some Kurdish areas and promised
that centers for the study of the Kurdish language would be established and that
Kurdish-populated parts of northwestern Iran would be developed after years of
neglect:17 According to Rouhani,
The Islamic Republic of Iran heed [sic] the problems of its diverse people; our
security now is far more than the territories located beyond the borders but

6
having the same ethnic population; Kurds enjoy better situation [sic] in terms of
security than their counterparts in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria; it is an honor for the
Islamic Republic not to succumb to religion and ethnicity in providing its people
with the same level of development and welfare.
The KDPI has long striven for independence in the Kurdish regions of northern Iran. The
increased activity stems from growing awareness of possible Kurdish independence in
Syria along the Turkish border, and of the freedom and relative independence enjoyed
by Kurds in northern Iraq. The groups military arm, which numbers thousands of
fighters, is based in northern Iraq but has not been absorbed by the Kurdish population
there. The KDPI is trying to pursue an independent agenda but appears to be caught
between conflicting interests; to some extent, the Kurdish groups in the four main
countries with sizable Kurdish populations (Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) are waging
struggles against each other.

Irans Ethnic Diversity (U.S. Institute of Peace)

For example, the Kurds in northern Iraqs Kurdish enclave are trying to maintain open
channels for oil exportation both to Turkey and Iran and certainly, do not want to open
a front with Iran despite the KDPIs growing military activity. Likewise, the Kurds in
northern Iraq are maintaining a careful policy of nonintervention in Turkeys difficult
and bloody struggle against the PKK, which sometimes includes Turkish bombing of
Kurdish targets in northern Iraq. Iran, too, in the wake of clashes with the KDPI, has
threatened that the IRGC will not hesitate to act against terrorists in their main
strongholds in northern Iraq if they do not cease their activity, saying that they will be
targeted wherever they are.18
In sum, last month Iran had to deal with subversive activity though so far of low
intensity by a number of ethnic elements on all its borders in the northwest, the
southwest, and the east of the country. The Arabs (in Khuzestan) and the Kurds are

7
trying to pursue a separatist national agenda, and they are inspired by the geostrategic
changes in the Middle East and the efforts to reshape it.
The Arab Sunni fighters targeting of the oil facilities, if it gains momentum, could pose a
problem for Iran just as it is trying to renew its oil exports after the lifting of sanctions.
Attacks on energy infrastructure for gas and oil could foster an unsafe, unstable
environment for international energy companies. Such companies are in any case
concerned about Irans intention to renew contracts using the buyback system, which is
more beneficial for a state than for foreign companies. Iran has been reporting little on
the attacks on its energy infrastructure, which have mainly been occurring in the
Khuzestan province. Meanwhile, Irans security forces have been cracking down on the
Arab minority there augmenting this populations discontent along with its separatist
aspirations.
It may be early to envision the mounting ethnic-religious protest in Iran causing a
substantial change in the regimes behavior. It is, however, clear that the Iranian regime,
which so far has been spared the regional repercussions of the Arab Spring or Islamic
Awakening as the regime calls it is now starting to feel its effects.
***
IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an expert on strategic issues with a focus on
Iran, terrorism, and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs and at Alcyon Risk Advisors.
***
Notes

http://www.shana.ir/fa/newsagency/pictorial/264440;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KVMDGYVH8N8
2

http://www.arabi21.co/story/919480/%D8%B5%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9
3

http://www.shana.ir/fa/newsagency/264365/%d9%86%d8%b4%d8%aa%db%8c%d8%af%d8%b1-%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%af-900%d9%be%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b2%d8%a7%db%8c%d9%84%db%8c%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%a8-%d8%a2%d8%aa%d8%b4-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b2%db%8c%d9%be%d8%aa%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b4%db%8c%d9%85%db%8c%d8%a8%d9%88%d8%b9%d9%84%db%8c-%d8%b3%db%8c%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%af
4

https://justpaste.it/w0dq

https://twitter.com/JAna__AlaAM/status/752612135885209600

http://www.shana.ir/en/newsagency/264746/Pipeline-Blast-in-Marun-Kills-1-Injures-Another

https://twitter.com/alhosam511/status/752498208966868992

http://www.albawaba.com/news/ahwazi-arab-resistance-blow-iranian-pipeline-863908

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=584986431680996&id=422489744597333

10

http://elaph.com/Web/News/2016/7/1099323.html?entry=Iran

11

http://ahwazna.net/en189_Ahwazi_movement_calls_on_intl_firms_not_to_partner_in_Irans_crimes_.html
12

https://twitter.com/popk999/status/751907997257961473

13

https://twitter.com/Al_Maqal_Pubs/status/742611565124325376

14

https://sabq.org/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81-%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%87
15

http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/06/473906/Iran-border-guards-terrorists-Sistan-Baluchestan
16

http://www.azernews.az/region/98078.html

17

http://en.mehrnews.com/news/117008/Rouhani-unveils-largest-industrial-complex-in-westernIran
18

http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/06/26/1115831/irgc-to-target-terrorists-positionswherever-they-are-commander

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