Constitutional Law II Digested Cases

Article III (Sections 12 to 22)

Article XIII (Section 17(4), Section 18
Article XIV (Section 5)
Custodial Investigation ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
Art. III, Sec. 12 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Miranda vs. Arizona , 384 US , 436 (1966) ...................................................................................................................... 4
People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001 .......................................................................................................... 5
People v. Del Rosario G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999 ........................................................................................................ 7
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992) ....................................................................................................................... 8
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) ...................................................................................................................... 9
Administrative Investigations.............................................................................................................................................. 10
People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 10
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316 (1997) ......................................................................... 11
Police Lineup ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Gamboa vs.Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)........................................................................................................................ 12
People v. Escordial, G.R. 138934, January 16, 2002 ...................................................................................................... 13
People vs. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002 ...................................................................................... 15
Cases before January 17, 1973 not applicable ................................................................................................................... 16
Magtoto vs.Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975) ..................................................................................................................... 16
Requirement of Competent & Independent Counsel ........................................................................................................... 17
People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994) .................................................................................................................... 17
People v. Quidato, G.R. 11401, October 1, 1998............................................................................................................ 18
People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997] ......................................................................................................... 19
People v. Labtan, GR. No. 12793, December 8, 1999 .................................................................................................... 21
People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002] ................................................................................................ 22
People vs. Tomaquin [G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004] ................................................................................................. 24
People v. Bagnate, G.R. No. 133685-86 May 20, 2004 .................................................................................................. 25
Counsel of Choice ............................................................................................................................................................... 26
People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000] ....................................................................................................... 26
People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994] ....................................................................................................... 27
Counsels presence required in entire proceedings ............................................................................................................ 29
People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001] ........................................................................................................... 29
Confession to Newsmen ...................................................................................................................................................... 31
People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997] .............................................................................................................. 31
People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001] ....................................................................................................... 33
People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000].............................................................................................................. 34
People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004] .................................................................................................... 36
Other Confessions............................................................................................................................................................... 38
People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997] ........................................................................................................... 38
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) ......................................................................................................................... 40
People vs. Lugod, G.R. 136253, 21 February 2001 ........................................................................................................ 41
Re-enactment ...................................................................................................................................................................... 43
People vs. Luvendino, G.R. 69971, 3 July 1992 ............................................................................................................. 43
Right to Bail ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45
When right may be invoked ................................................................................................................................................. 45
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945) ......................................................................................................... 45
People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968) .................................................................................................................. 46
Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997 ............................................................................ 47
Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000 ...................................................................................................... 48
Government v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. 148571, December 17, 2002 ............................................................................. 50
Procedure for bail .............................................................................................................................................................. 51
Paderanga v. Drilon, 247 SCRA 741, (1995) ................................................................................................................. 51
Page 1 of 155

Go v. Bongolan. A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999 ............................................................................................................... 53

People v. Gako, G.R. 135045, December 15, 2000 ........................................................................................................ 55
Bail on appeal..................................................................................................................................................................... 57
People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993) ....................................................................................................................... 57
Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599. February 23, 2000 .............................................................................................. 58
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 114350, January 16, 1997 .......................................................................................... 60
Standards for fixing bail ..................................................................................................................................................... 61
VILLASEOR v ABANO ............................................................................................................................................. 61
De la Camara v Enage .................................................................................................................................................... 63
Almeda v Villaluz .......................................................................................................................................................... 64
Yap v CA ....................................................................................................................................................................... 66
Cabanero v Canon .......................................................................................................................................................... 67
Victory Liner v. Bellosillo .............................................................................................................................................. 68
Rights of the Accused ......................................................................................................................................................... 70
Presumption of Innocence .................................................................................................................................................. 70
People v Dramayo .......................................................................................................................................................... 70
Dumlao v COMELEC .................................................................................................................................................... 72
People v Mingoa............................................................................................................................................................. 73
Feeder Intl Line v CA ................................................................................................................................................... 74
Right to be heard personally or by counsel ......................................................................................................................... 76
People v Holgado ........................................................................................................................................................... 76
Delgado v CA ................................................................................................................................................................. 77
People v Baluyot ............................................................................................................................................................ 78
Libuit v People ............................................................................................................................................................... 80
Moslares v CA................................................................................................................................................................ 82
Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation ...................................................................................................... 83
People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37, 29 January 2002] .......................................................................................................... 83
People vs. Valdesancho [GR 137051-52, 30 May 2001] ................................................................................................ 85
People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002] ........................................................................................................ 86
People vs. Ostia [GR 131804, 26 February 2003] .......................................................................................................... 88
People v. Cachapero [ G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004 ]............................................................................................... 90
Right to speedy, impartial and public trial .......................................................................................................................... 91
Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924] ............................................................................................................ 91
Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995] ....................................................................................................... 92
Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973] .......................................................................................................... 93
Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000] ....................................................................................................... 95
Right to confront witnesses ................................................................................................................................................. 96
United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918] ............................................................................................... 96
Right to secure attendance of witnesses .............................................................................................................................. 97
People vs. de Luna [GR 77969, 22 June 1989] ............................................................................................................... 97
Right to be present during trial ........................................................................................................................................... 98
People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006 ............................................................................. 98
Aquino vs. Military Commission No.2 [GR L-37364, 9 May 1975] .............................................................................. 99
People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] .............................................................................................................. 101
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases ............................................................................................................................... 102
Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 130191, 27 April 1998] ............................................................................................. 102
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan ; 159 SCRA 70 (1988) ......................................................................................................... 104
Privilege against Self-Incrimination ................................................................................................................................. 105
United States vs. Tan Teh, 23 Phil. 145 (1912) ............................................................................................................ 105
United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917) ................................................................................................... 106
People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950] .......................................................................................................... 107
Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) .................................................................................................................... 108
Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937) .................................................................................................................. 109
Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929) ........................................................................................................................ 110
People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994) .................................................................................................................... 111
Page 2 of 155

People v. Rondero, GR. No. 125687, December 9, 1999 ............................................................................................. 112

People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025 February 17, 2000 ........................................................................................... 113
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969) .................................................................................. 114
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985) ............................................................................................................... 115
Involuntary servitude ........................................................................................................................................................ 117
Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979) .......................................................................................................... 117
Imprisonment for debt ...................................................................................................................................................... 118
Sura vs. Martin, 26 SCRA 286 (1969).......................................................................................................................... 118
People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726 (1992) ................................................................................................................... 119
In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003 ........................................................... 120
Double Jeopardy ............................................................................................................................................................... 121
People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968) .................................................................................................................. 121
Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] ............................................................................................................ 122
PSB v. Bermoy ............................................................................................................................................................. 123
Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme .................................................................................................................................... 124
People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993] ...................................................................................................... 125
Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] ............................................................................................................. 127
Argel v Pascua .............................................................................................................................................................. 128
People vs. Bocar ........................................................................................................................................................... 129
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan........................................................................................................................................... 130
People vs. Grospe ......................................................................................................................................................... 133
People vs. Santiago....................................................................................................................................................... 134
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987] .............................................................. 135
People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987] ............................................................................ 136
Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] ............................................................................................. 137
People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] .......................................................................................................... 138
Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970).................................................................................................................... 140
People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972) ....................................................................................................................... 141
Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994) ......................................................................................................................... 143
ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ....................................................................................... 144
Section 17 (4) ................................................................................................................................................................... 144
CHR Employees v. CHR 496 SCRA 226 .................................................................................................................... 144
SECTION 18. ................................................................................................................................................................... 145
Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991) ........................................................................................................................ 145
EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights..................................................................................................................... 146
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ............................................................................................. 147
ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS CULTURE AND SPORTS ........................ 148
Section 5. .......................................................................................................................................................................... 148
Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee ............................................................................................. 148
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON. DANIEL ALFONSO ............................................................ 149
Lupangco v. CA ........................................................................................................................................................... 151
University of San Carlos v. CA .................................................................................................................................... 152
Capitol Medical Center vs CA ...................................................................................................................................... 153
Reyes v. CA ................................................................................................................................................................. 154
TAN vs. CA ................................................................................................................................................................. 155

Page 3 of 155

Custodial Investigation
Art. III, Sec. 12
Miranda vs. Arizona , 384 US , 436 (1966)
FACTS:
On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not her real name) was kidnapped and raped while walking home after work in
Phoenix, Arizona. She accused Ernesto Miranda of the crime after picking him out of a lineup. He was arrested and taken
to an interrogation room where after three hours he signed a written confession to the crimes. The paper on which he
wrote his confession stated that the information was given voluntarily and that he understood his rights. However, no
specific rights were listed on the paper.
Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court based largely on the written confession. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years
for both crimes to be served concurrently. However, his attorney felt that his confession should not be admissible due to
the fact that he was not warned of his right to have an attorney represent him or that his statement could be used against
him. Therefore, he appealed the case for Miranda. The Arizona State Supreme Court did not agree that the confession had
been coerced, and therefore upheld the conviction. From there, his attorneys, with the assistance of the American Civil
Liberties Union, appealed to the US Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their
protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment.
RULING:
The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they
demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." The Court
noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that
"the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the
necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have
counsel present during interrogations.
At first, the attorneys for Miranda attempted to argue that his rights had been violated as he had not been given an attorney
during the confession, citing the Sixth Amendment. However, the Court focused on the rights guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment including that of protection against self-incrimination. The Majority Opinion written by Warren stated that
"without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would otherwise do so freely." Miranda was not released from prison, however, because he had also been convicted of
robbery which was not affected by the decision. He was retried for the crimes of rape and kidnapping without the written
evidence and found guilty a second time.

Page 4 of 155

People v. Lugod, G.R. 136253, February 21, 2001

Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her husband
(Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her
body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house.
She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely
answered the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still
there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no
answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the
backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench
outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said
slippers did not belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for
help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She also
reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their
search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the search,
Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was
thereafter ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a
black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave
the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he
went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of
slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first,
the accused denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he
admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been
informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime
Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when
they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the
body of Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the
assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugods confession and subsequent act of pointing the location of the Nairubes body may be used
against him as evidence.
Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford
to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended
to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing
and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill
of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime
committed may be. In the same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in
violation of the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus
not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he
told the truth. Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police
force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople
were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and
taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was
highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's
claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his
alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had
Page 5 of 155

bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod
cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that several
persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the
rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony
of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving
Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The
combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion that Lugod raped
and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses,
merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing
more. Lugod was acquitted.

Page 6 of 155

People v. Del Rosario G.R. 127755, April 14, 1999

Facts:
On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General
Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about 1 meters in front of him was a
tricycle driven by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing
a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her to the
ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken
by the man was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the bag. The
armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase
and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police
headquarters and reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his
team proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who
in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May
1996.
On the way to the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the holduppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded
to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m.
After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of
these were happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already
gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back
to the police station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May
1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on 16 Ma y
1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.
Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas
Edward Coliseum but was directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the
robbery homicide occurred. He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities
about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however,
he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez,
Santos, and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and
killed her. While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large. Thus, only del Rosario was tried.
The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and
to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:
Whether or not del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was invited for questioning
at the house of the barangay captain.
Held:
Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited" for questioning at the
house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware
thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect
in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his
right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible
against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia
Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a
dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario
was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the
same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he
only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a
whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
Page 7 of 155

People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992)

Facts:
The death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police Station where Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara
and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, are assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and
Dayao proceeded to the scene of the crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased
Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the
incident and were informed that the deceased was with 2 companions, on the previous night, one of whom was Ramon
Bolanos who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the
following morning, 23 June1990. When Alcantara and Dayao apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where Bolanos was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the
police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos
accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive," after he was asked by the
police if he killed the victim. Bolanos was charged for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 14, under Criminal Case 1831-M-90. The trial court, even if the alleged oral admission of Bolanos was given
without the assistance of counsel when it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station,
found Bolanos guilty of the crime charged and imposed on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00. The Office of the Solicitor General threafter filed a Manifestation (in lieu of
Appellee's Brief), claiming that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos
while on board the police patrol jeep.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep may be used to prove
Bolanos guilt.
Held:
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where
formal investigation may have been conducted, Bolanos should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families. Considering the clear requirements of the
Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the
alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides Bolanos's
conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under
review.

Page 8 of 155

People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)

Facts:
Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending that his
conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an
extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond
reasonable ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.
Held:
The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven
in the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of Miranda rights and within
lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.

Page 9 of 155

Administrative Investigations
People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales
of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by
it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos
stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted
that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a
compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded
not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of
accused.
Held:
No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his
statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self
incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which
involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted
in court.

Page 10 of 155

Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316 (1997)

Facts:
Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to 15 November 1992, took a maternity
leave for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15 December 1992) and reassumed her position on 16 December 1992, until her
resignation on 31 August 1993. On 1 September 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of officer in charge. It
was during her tenure on 8 August 1994, that an onthe-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division
of the Office of Court Administrator. In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions were discovered.
One involved a manager's check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858, wherein
Entero Villarica, on 7 August 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to Malla instead of
handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 13-92. When asked to explain where the
P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that Dizon would demand the delivery of
the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further questioning by the examining team, however, Malla admitted
that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Edelita Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Nieva Mercado,
and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband
and the remaining balance for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and
Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively.
On the other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that they were being implicated in the
anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal
account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid.
Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took
place, when Malla was no longer employed with the court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of
the transactions.
Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado, court employees of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pila, Laguna were charged in a memorandum report by the Office of Court Administrator dated 16 August
1994, for misappropriating funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica and Felicidad Domingo in Civil Case 858. On 5
October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the memorandum report as an administrative complaint
(Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989). In addition, a second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial
records outside the court premises. The Court decided to include this matter in the original complaint earlier docketed as
AM MTJ-94-989 in a resolution dated 6 March 1995.
Issue:
Whether Malla's constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit dated 14 September 1994 before the
Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.
Held:
The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only during "custodial
investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation
conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."
Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in
the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from
Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal
Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said
check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. During the investigation, Malla
repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial amount of the P240,000.00 for her
personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her. By
repeating her confession in open court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.

Page 11 of 155

Police Lineup
Gamboa vs.Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was
identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit
on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
Held:
No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Page 12 of 155

People v. Escordial, G.R. 138934, January 16, 2002

Facts:
At around 8 p.m. of 27 December 1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark Lucena were playing inside a jeepney
parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia
2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting
inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an accident. The man was later identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as
Anthony Escordial. Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday, Erma
Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man
had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. Michelle and
Teresa were awakened thereafter. The man was able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle. After
getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He
blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. The man succeeded in inserting
his penis into Michelle's vagina. Although Michelle was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no
cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands
on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and
that she saw the man's face because of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. After he had
finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three women. After a while, the man told Michelle he
wanted to have sex with her again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and said it
would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and
then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and returned to
her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women not to report the matter
to anyone or he would kill them. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help
until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and
robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported the
incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the attacker, but she told them that she
could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around the
Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for
investigation. But, at Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their
attacker. Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal.
Michelle was again taken to the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape. They
were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 p.m. The following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco went
around Margarita Extension and learned about the children playing on the street around the time the intruder entered the
boarding house. The description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two
houses away from the boarding house. On 2 January 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break
Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the caf. When interviewed
by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that Escordial was his helper and that the latter had gone home
on 27 December 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the information furnished by
Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to
Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3 January 1997 and asked the assistance of the
police there to locate Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra police to
accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found Escordial at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the
police station for questioning. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further investigation. At the Bacolod
police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether Escordial was
the same person they saw on the night of the incident.
They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They picked
Escordial out of four people who were inside the jail cell. Escordial was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case
97-18117. He was also charged with robbery with rape in Criminal Case 97-18118. When arraigned on 25 February 1997,
Escordial pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999, the trial
court rendered a decision, finding Escordial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, the
commission of which being attended by three aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime; (2) that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and (3) that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in
the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The court sentenced
Escordial to the maximum penalty of death, and condemned him to pay Darunday the sum of P3,650.00, representing the
Page 13 of 155

money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs. Escordial
appealed.
Issue:
Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station made after the start of the custodial
investigation, may be used in court.
Held:
While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained
any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory which was used in evidence against him. No uncounseled
statement was obtained from Escordial which should have been excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial
was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although Escordial
made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court
identification of Escordial by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver,
Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the previous cases are different inasmuch as
Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible
perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted
by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness
from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been
recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police lineup, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa
Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when
Escordial did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against
him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible
for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of the primary illegality.'"

Page 14 of 155

People vs. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002

Facts:
On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran, Barangay South Triangle,
Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had earlier gone. As she was walking by the gate of the company
compound where they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo was being mauled by a group of
men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia
and five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him.
It was then that Niel picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateos head with it. Then,
Lito approached Mateos side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the
East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito
Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding Piedad and Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances present, and sentenced each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held
solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00. Richard Palma was
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and Garcia appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed; that Piedad
should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a confrontation with the alleged witnesses and
immediately singled out by the police as suspects.
Held:
The claim by the defense that Piedads pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more
theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the
other hand, knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons
whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused
were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the
crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the
police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which
requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the
prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason
to doubt the veracity of Luzs and Fidels testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed
Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateos death.
Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her husband and who
eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Luz was right beside her husband
when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible
for the attack. She was only a foot away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand was
identified by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb 5
meters away from the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of the
criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative
illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the lack of
counsel during the pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any extrajudicial
confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have been suspects, they were
certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Piedad
and Garcia were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police never
allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.

Page 15 of 155

Cases before January 17, 1973 not applicable

Magtoto vs.Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975)
Facts:
No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court
of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in
GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo
Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of
First Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the
confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of
their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.
Held:
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in
effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be
given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the
accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance
with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not
informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed
at the time. The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by
Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of
his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel,"
impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right
granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical
background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained
person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence,
has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this
constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It
may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many
criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in accordance with the
rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a
disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is
convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

Page 16 of 155

Requirement of Competent & Independent Counsel

People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994)
Facts:
The accused was charged of robbery with homicide. During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial
confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was provided with one in the
person of Atty. Zena, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement admitting the shooting of the
victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of custodial investigation.
Held:
No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since the authorities failed to provide him counsel during
the interrogation and he was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel. Furthermore, the counsel to
be provided to the accused should be one who is impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused cannot
afford to have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused with
municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty
of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure to meet the requisites of due process for
conducting custodial investigation.

Page 17 of 155

People v. Quidato, G.R. 11401, October 1, 1998

Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a widower, Bernardo lived
alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned 16 hectares of coconut land in the area.
On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went
to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who
thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr. went back to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00 p.m. of 17
September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter. Upon
Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo Jr.'s house, he saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer.
Bernardo Jr. thereafter proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after
the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door, asking
his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then
hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they
found none; so, the 3 of them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by Bernardo Jr.'s son, who had gone
there to call his Lolo for breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and
learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested
by the police. Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988,
the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised
them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the
absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the
testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers
to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom.
Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional
rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the
veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits.
On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Davao. A
murder case was likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita
brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases were tried jointly. The Malita brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea during
trial and were accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried on merits. After due trial and on 2 March 1994,
the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered judgment finding Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for the death
of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.
Issue:
Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a counsel in a later day, is admissible
as evidence against the accused.
Held:
The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not
presented on the witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these
affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to
affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his coaccused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. Likewise, the
manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were
voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita
brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence
of counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's (accuseds wife) testimony, as well as of
Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable
to Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.

Page 18 of 155

People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997]

Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed
from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a
collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check payable to Doris Wolf. The check
was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back
portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his account. On September 11, Temporas
asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But
Pons failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to
collect the amount borrowed but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons
also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him for estafa before the
NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to
the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4
September 1987, the body of 23-year-old Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His
head was severed from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the
jeepney, was recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified the
body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to
Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor
(deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI.
Upon investigation, an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of the jeepney
and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren
Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was disposed
of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and
Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine partly
dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to
Manila. From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the team learned
that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they were killed. Because
Januario and Canape volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite who could
be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team
traveled with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28 March 1988. At the Taft Avenue
head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar,
who was "just around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the
statement of Januario while Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed
by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their coaccused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act
6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos
remained at large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal
Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed
upon them the supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay jointly and severally,
but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a)
P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the
costs of the proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunars presence as counsel in the custodial investigations satisfies the requirements of Article III,
section 12 (1).
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario and Canape is, however, not a guarantee
that their respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than
"competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial
investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances
described by the prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the
Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
Page 19 of 155

confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar might have really
been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the
same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing
a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he
could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with
the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked
whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right
to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights
to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn statement,
which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony
of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted
more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights. The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and
Canape's constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution.
They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of
facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence
against the person so admitting.

Page 20 of 155

People v. Labtan, GR. No. 12793, December 8, 1999

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the national highway at Barangay
Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando
Labtan y Daquihon took away, through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and
twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all
amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camamanan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in
cash money. In the course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an
information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide
(as per 16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993 was filed against Feliciano and
Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty
to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan
de Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
by direct participation in the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of
P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and
to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and
twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to
pay the cost. The trial court convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial.
Feliciano appealed.
Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel.
Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the
Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of
22 April 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that
he had not been apprised of his right to counsel. Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel;
inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the killing of jeepney driver
Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to
Feliciano the consequences of his action that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he
could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty. Chavezs independence as counsel is suspect he is regularly
engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the services of counsel.
He even received money from the police as payment for his services.

Page 21 of 155

People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002]

Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao,
Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, 6 year old John Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of
Samus father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2 September 1996,
Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional
Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he received an order from his superior to investigate the murder of
the two victims. Their office had received a telephone call from a local barangay official informing them of the victims
deaths. Arriving at the victims residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his
team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the
crime scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his superior,
Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty
slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported
missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B. Llorera. The victims bodies were brought to the Funeraria Seerez de
Mesa in Calamba. On that same day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an
acquaintance of Samus, happened to meet Samus at Sammy Pachecas house in the same barangay where Samus asked
Ponciano to accompany him to Poncianos wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Poncianos wife was mad at first but upon
Poncianos prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, Samus
received another P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group
received information that Samus was the principal suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the
residence of spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team
composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00
P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house,
which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside, they saw Samus crawling
on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an
injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on Samus who, while
trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente
Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the
morning of 11 September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. SPO3
Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and
witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same day, PNP Fingerprint
Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from Samus. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints found
at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned
them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two separate Informations were filed on 27 November 1996, charging Samus (in
Criminal Case 5015-96-C) with homicide for the death of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years old), and (in
Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with murder for the death of one John Ardee Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on
28 May 1997, Samus, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide (Criminal Case
5015-96- C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up
to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi the amount
of P50,000.00 for her death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. The trial court
also found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (Criminal Case 5016- 96-C), sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for his
death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.
Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial
investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that Samus was
subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating
that it was only the media that had questioned Samus, and that they were merely present during the interview. However,
an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage
inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed Samus, the
uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they
themselves investigated Samus and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the
Page 22 of 155

Affidavits they executed on 11 September 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even
if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule it out
because of Samus' failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the
assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of Pontaos testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which Samus
identified during his testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present
additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

Page 23 of 155

People vs. Tomaquin [G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004]

Facts: The accused-appelant was charged with murder. On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge, and trial thereafter ensued. After trial, accused was found guilty
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence, aside from appellants extrajudicial
confession, was mainly circumstantial.
Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Appellant questions
the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Accused-appellant contends
that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of a barangay captain, is
admissible in evidence against him.
Held: No. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The words competent and independent counsel in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the
need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on
the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.
A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all
times.
In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In applying the
provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant.
In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict
with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his
jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed
his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one
who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Page 24 of 155

People v. Bagnate, G.R. No. 133685-86 May 20, 2004

FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 for killing his grandmother, Aurea
Brona and rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875 for killing and raping his niece, Rosalie Rayala. Accused was
convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession. The RTC, aside from the punishment of death penalty awarded
P50,000.00 each to the victim.
Appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. SPO2 Ambion informed him in the Bicol
dialect of his constitutional rights. The accused acknowledged that he clearly understood it. When appellant told SPO2
Ambion that he is willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again informed appellant of his rights, and asked him further if he
wants to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in Manila. He availed his Constitutional right of
being assisted by a competent counsel. Since he does not have his own counsel, he was provided with one in the person
of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte whom the appellant accepted.
Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave the investigation room and
conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined
appellant to see if he was physically harmed by the policemen and found none.
Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation was then conducted in the Bicol
dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking the questions. The accused confessed on killing his grandmother and so as raping and
killing his niece. After typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained the contents
thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon.
The next day, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge
Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of the
confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant
the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them. Judge
Base inspected appellants body and asked him if he was forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still
willing to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base
asked him to sign the confession again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed his signature.
Accused was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession during custodial investigation.
ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right of the appellant to have a competent and independent counsel was
violated thereby rendering his extra judicial confession inadmissible
HELD: Held: No, the failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to
admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial confession.
What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an accused without having been
informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his
own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was
not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or
any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an
accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is
incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he
was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his
guilt in the commission of a crime.
The modifier "competent and independent" stresses the need to assure the accused under the uniquely stressful conditions
of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. To
be "competent" and "independent" it is only required for a lawyer to be: (1) Willing to fully safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
.

Page 25 of 155

Counsel of Choice
People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]
First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie Balao in Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja, Tuguegarao Municipal Health Officer, the victim
was found to have sustained 7 gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing
wounds on the left arm and back. Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of
Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza.
The police received information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police Station because of other
criminal charges. So elements of the Tuguegarao police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch
the suspects. Only Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station. Gallardo and Columna
were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On August 18, 1991, they were investigated by Police Investigator
SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal.
During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the
statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the jurat
of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal. On 7 November
1991, on the basis of the sworn confessions of the accused, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information charging the accused with murder. On 2 December 1991, all three
accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. In due course, the trial court found them guilty of murder for the
treacherous killing of Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in solidum the heirs
of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as moral damages. Gallardo,
Columna and Micate appealed.
Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal requirement that a competent
and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.
Held: The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly apprised of their
Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. while the initial choice of the lawyer in
cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. Herein, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused
themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were
asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them.
The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and
protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty. Velasco acted properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and
informed the accused of their Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements
given by the accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers
to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.

Page 26 of 155

People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur
Facts: It was around 6:40 p.m. of 17 July 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City succumbed to a single bullet on
his side of his face fired by a gunman from an unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while the former was walking at the VIP
parking lot of the Victory Liner Compound at Caloocan City. The gun man continued walking at the same time holding
his gun with two hands trying to cock it. After walking a few meters, the gun man tucked the gun in his right waist and
began running away. Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos and about four other men (among them, Ruel Ganiola and
Michael Estapia, both porters) chased the gun man. When the gun man was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted
at the policeman conducting traffic in the area and pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc. Napoleon Francia,
shouted at the gun man, who stopped and raised his hands. Pfc. Francia then confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun
man. Afterwards, Pfc. Francia, Councilman Motos and others brought the gun man to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters aboard a passenger jeep. The gun man was identified later as Elias Barasina y Laynesa. Barasina was
charged for violation of Preisdential Decree 1866 (illegal possession of firearms). Barasina, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe"
(true names, real identities and present whereabouts of the last two mentioned accused, still unknown) were also charge
for the crime of murder. When haled to respond to the inculpations, Barasina was indifferent in entering any plea, thus the
plea of not guilty to the two criminal charges was entered by the trial court in his behalf. In the course of the trial,
Barasina, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy, i.e. in jeopardy of being convicted
of two offenses Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms. In an Order, dated 17 August 1989, the Court denied the
Motion to Quash. On trial, one of the principal defenses set up by Barasina was that he was mauled, maltreated and forced
to sign two documents by the Caloocan policemen while he was inside a small cell inside the Caloocan City Police
Headquarters. He identified those 2 documents, the "Paalala", dated 18 July 1988, and his statement dated 18 July 1988.
He further claimed that he never read any of those documents and that he was not assisted by any lawyer during their
execution, and that he does not know of any Atty. Abelardo Torres. He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated 22 July
1988. On 28 February 1990, the trial court found Barasina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Par. 1 of
P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm); and (2) Murder, and sentenced him (1) as a result of his conviction under PD
1866 to suffer imprisonment of 17 Years, 4 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to 20 Years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs, and (2) as a result of his conviction of Murder, to suffer
imprisonment of 10 Years and 1 Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum to 18 Years, 8 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The trial court also directed Barasina to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Fiscal Lino Mayo, the amount of P61,000.00 representing the funeral and burial expenses of the victim and the amount of
P500 ,000.00 representing the moral damages suffered by his widow and the loss of income as a result of the victim's
death at the age of 50 years. On 29 December 1992, the Court of Appeals (de Pano, Elbias, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting on
the appeal interposed by Barasina, rendered a decision increasing the penalties imposed on Barasina to reclusion perpetua
for each of the two crimes committed. The records do not show that the case was certified by the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure although the records of the case
were forwarded to to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals on 11 May 1993 after the assailed decision was
promulgated on 29 December 1992. In any event, the appeal was later accepted by the Supreme Court and Barasina was
thereupon required to file his brief following which the Solicitor General filed a brief for the People.
Issue: Whether the admissions made in the custodial investigation attended to by Atty. Abelardo Torres, a lawyer which
Barasina did not expressly choose as counsel to assist him therein, are inadmissible.
Held: Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person undergoing investigation reads
"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were
added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where,
during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and
therefore beholden to the military. Yet, the apprehension of the human rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires
belief in the present inasmuch as there was no indication below that Barasina did in fact choose Atty. Romeo Mendoza to
assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of other lawyers (The hiring of
Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial investigation appears to be an afterthought). Withal, the
word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of
Page 27 of 155

a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for
one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the charter.

Page 28 of 155

Counsels presence required in entire proceedings

People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001]
En Banc, Per Curiam: 13 concur, 1 out of town on official business, 1 on leave
Facts: At 6:00 p.m. on 6 January 1996, at Benjamin Morial's house at Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern Leyte,
Gabriel Guilao (62 years old) saw Nonelito Abion slapped Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by Edwin
Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon. Leonardo Morial stood outside the house. Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas'
grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's garden, and later heard the crushing sound of a stone against
flesh. Abinon and the two Morials stayed in the house for about 10 minutes after the killing the victims. Thereafter, they
departed and headed towards the nearby houses. Benjamin Morial, Paula's common-law husband, who was in neighboring
Barangay Maria Clara (7 kilometers away from Barangay Cagnituan) when the incident took place, arrived at Barangay
Cagnituan at around 4:00 p.m. the next day. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's name when he was some 5
meters from the house. There was no answer. Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There, he
found the clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside down. Someone had
ransacked their house. Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help.
Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, including barangay kagawads Patricio Abion and Rufino Guilao, rushed
to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the
house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send
someone to report the incident to the police. Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao
hurried to Benjamin's house. He revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that Edwin
Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about
what he knew for fear that they would all be killed since the Abions were "saturated in their place." Gabriel heeded
Benjamin's advice. The police arrived at around 10:00 p.m. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with four other police officers,
investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other
hand, had a contusion on the right side of his head. Beside him were two stones. After examining the victims' wounds, the
police officers, along with Benjamin Morial, proceeded to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00
was missing from the moneybox. Other than the cash, nothing else was missing. Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to
the officers his three suspects, the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin
Morial into custody and not to include Nonelito Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay
captain of 22 years, he knew that the Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that
Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abion
and invited the two to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. Leonardo Morial told
SPO4 Fernandez that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are
many lawyers in their municipality and named some of them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers
mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented.
SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar. At about 8:00 a.m. of 9 January 1996, Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived. After
being introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing
to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements
that he may give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily.
According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez
conducted the investigation in Cebuano. Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the
material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The
investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the
questions in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused
and the document containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was
in the police station for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation. At about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m., Leonardo
and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated
while he was away and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not
harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its contents conformed to the
answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the
document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo
replied in the positive and signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort. Edwin Morial,
Leonardo Morial (@ Carding) and Nonelito Abion (@ Noly) were charged with robery with homicide. Upon
arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial court rendered a decision convicting all
the three accused for the crime of robbery with homicide, as defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294
Page 29 of 155

(1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced (1) Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion to suffer the supreme penalty of
death by lethal injection; and (2) Edwin Morial, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
the civil aspect of the case, the court held the three accused libale jointly and severally (1) to indemnify the heirs of Paula
Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2) to indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (3) to indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual
damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses; (4) to pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of
P60,000.00 for each death; and (5) to restitute or restore to Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed. The court
also ordered them to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Leonardo Morilas extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the material points were tackled
when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.
Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during
the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from
the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he
knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that Leonardo and his companions committed the crime. Neither can
Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material
points," referring to the three accused's respective participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial
investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination indeed, "in
every phase of the investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of RA 7438 requires that
"[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last
paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of
Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters
so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be
continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he
failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence.
The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the
custodial investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his
"coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of the
proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier
"competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence
requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors
and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right.That the extra -judicial
confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial
was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible
in evidence against him.

Page 30 of 155

Confession to Newsmen
People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997]
Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20
years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a striped
blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and
more than P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed
to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house.
Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the
unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled
Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped
the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete
block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the
fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of
Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck.
Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby
house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed
the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there
but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of
pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet Tshirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to
locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a
police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought
him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the
pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was
merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police
took Andan to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Andan
went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags
which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other
suspects holding the bags. By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of the
Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show
them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying
he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the
mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Andan was detained
at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment, however, Andan entered a plea of "not
guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act 7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Page 31 of 155

Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as evidence against
Andan.
Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police
arrested Andan, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the
two bags recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.
In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex
Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview
was recorded on video and showed that Andan made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his
wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on
25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan
to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed
his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect
the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.

Page 32 of 155

People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]

Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@
Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on
the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to
stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby
Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and
bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive
medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino
and Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their
apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and
Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by
the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3
Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was interviewed
by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his
nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan,
where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila.
They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with
him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown
over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over
TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped
confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the
Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P72,725.35 as actual damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly
in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
sympathetic with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's
guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra -judicial confessions and place them beyond
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped
confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: "we should never
presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains
suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a
difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted
confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution."

Page 33 of 155

People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur
Facts: On 5 August 1994, the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay
Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, 15 years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset,
Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who 3 days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo
Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources
pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon
invited the 2 suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly
linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. On 10 August 1994, Ordoo and Medina returned to the police
station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the
police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not
at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the investigation because there were no
practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the
statements of the 2 accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own
dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their
acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation
was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La
Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their
participation in the crime. After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his
signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession. Pacito
Ordoo narrated his story in the afternoon. At the end of his narration Ordoo affixed his thumbmark on his statement in
lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write. Thereafter, Medina and Ordoo were detained at the Santol police
station. News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that
Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the interview, which
was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events
surrounding their commission thereof. According to Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime was so great but
his repentance came too late. He and Ordoo hoped that the parents of Shirley Victore would forgive them. Upon
conclusion of the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped interview on
the air. The same interview was played again on the air the following morning and was heard by thousands of listeners. A
couple of days later, the police brought the 2 accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance
and counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his constitutional
rights and, even though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and
answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading
them to defer the affixing of their second signature/thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the 2 separately went back to
Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional rights, explained the
contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of
Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if they had been
coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely and
voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista
finally asked Ordoo and Medina to affix their signatures/thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe
the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of
the MTC staff who witnessed the signing. Ordono and Medina were charged for rape with homicide. On arraignment, in a
complete turnabout, the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. On 11 December 1997, the trial court adjudged Ordoo and Medina
guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy, and imposed upon each of them 2 death penalties on
the basis of their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the custodial investigation made in the presence of the municipal mayor, parish priest, etc. and/or the
taped interview containing the accuseds confessions are admissible as evidence.
Held: Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station
to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such
point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their
rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability
Page 34 of 155

of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La
Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing
with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the
credit of the police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of
their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the
investigation. In the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the
accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The
apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must
be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused
emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the
assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days later does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that
the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions
of their admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still
came several days too late. It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. The second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of
the accused on their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed
one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and
later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with
the constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The
standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused therefore fell short of the
standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite, the taped interview was offered to form part of
the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made and to prove through electronic device the
voluntary admissions by the 2 accused that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance
on the ground that its integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with.
However, as Roland Almoite testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the voices therein
were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances,
the Court is inclined to admit the authenticity of the taped interview. A review of the contents of the tape as included in
Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police
officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced
the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were around since the interview
was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where
the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite
to conduct an interview. The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect
to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements
made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of
an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law
enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional
rights. Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the 2 accused to
the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In relation to
this, the admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered and substantiated by
the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.

Page 35 of 155

People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004]

En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 13 concur
Facts: Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp., with principal place
of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore
Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations
was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit
boards. The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to
see what was on the other side. On 22 March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on
duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as
he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser
checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the
part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later, at around 10:00 a.m.,
Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises (kalabugan) coming from the Keyser
Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did
not pay much attention to the sound. At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his
duties when he saw Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly
told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage
dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The
police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was being
dispatched to the scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide
Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them
was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were immediately met by Campos, who informed them that
Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the
gates securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys.
This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo,
who was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim
was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and
chopped torso of Keyser. The victims head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. When the police asked how he did it,
according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic
foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters
saw. Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime.
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his coemployees. He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP
Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising Guillermo about his
constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keysers remains. The Antipolo police then turned over
the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
Keysers death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by
two TV reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both
interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Guillermo admitted to David that he committed the crime and never
gave it second thought. He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut
up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated
that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him like an animal. Both Abelgas and
David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their respective
interviews with him. On 23 March 1998, Guillermo was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of
murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. When arraigned on 3 April 1998, Guillermo, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge. On 23 April 1998, however, Guillermo moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and
prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on 28 April 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by
counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal Case 98-14724), found Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The court also ordered Guillermo to pay the mother of the
victim P50,000.00 for death indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory damages,
Page 36 of 155

P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 plus P3,000 per court appearance as
attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Guillermos confession to the police officers, to the security guard of Greatmore Corp., and to the
newsmen are admissible as evidence.
Held: The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser
at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. The investigating officer
made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating
officer was aware of Guillermos right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one
on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation.
Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of Guillermos confession to SPO1 Reyes at the
Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial
investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to
having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the
slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Herein, Guillermo admitted
the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the
security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his
employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not rebutted by the defense, and thus
Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Further, when interviewed on separate
occasions by the media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously
admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of
GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters were acting as media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were
not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The
interviews also took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in
Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and
admissible in evidence.

Page 37 of 155

Other Confessions
People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997]
First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to Bangkok, Thailand, to
canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez followed Immaculata about a week later (04 March 1990).
Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the Union
Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the apartment of one Lito Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in
Bangkok. On 14 March 1990, Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound flight PR731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats 2A and No. 54D. Gomez was on the same flight. He checked-in two
golfbags, and he was issued interline claim tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags
with the interline baggage room for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight
058 scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit rack baggage along
with other pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight. Well before flight time on 15 March 1990,
Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs
Collector Edgardo de Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his security officer,
a certain Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon the ticket and
passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed
Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in at the interline baggage room. At the interline baggage room,
Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo, a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage
handling section, and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and plane ticket.
Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released, upon the approval of a
customs examiner named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge the release, Dumag affixed his
signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL
check-in counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the
name "Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for
Gomez. Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the
travel papers of Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from the aircraft. At
around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to the check-in counter for a security check-up.
The x-ray machine showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the information to Capt.
Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force Security Command
("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get the
golfbags pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that something was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico reported
the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray
machine. The unidentified dark masses having been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued
bottom zipper of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an approximate size of 1" x 6" x 4,"
containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination
by the PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs
personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the crime of
transporting 20 kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags. Also charged, with
having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade
arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-in-charge of the then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark
Air Force Base turned over custody of Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila.
The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for
Hongkong reportedly to get some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after buying the car spare
parts, David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David, Immaculata
was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration Office, requesting for his
travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an expired visa, then turned over to the police
authorities and finally to the court which decreed his imprisonment. In the Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by
NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case. He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of
counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila.
Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme
Page 38 of 155

Court from their conviction, only Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a "manifestation
of withdrawal of appeal" to which the Solicitor General interposed no objection. The Court would only thus consider the
appeal of Immaculata.
Issue: Whether Immaculatas uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong is admissible as evidence in
the Philippines.
Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong during his
incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court, a word could be said about the manner in
which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to
counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the
affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the investigation
forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which
requires the assistance of counsel to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that
the sworn statement was executed in a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional
rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.

Page 39 of 155

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)

Facts: After obtaining information that a murder suspect was being held in jail on an unrelated charge, police placed an
undercover agent in jail with the suspect. The agent engaged the suspect in conversations, and the suspect then made
incriminating statements about the murder. The trial court granted the respondent Lloyd Perkinss motion to suppress the
statements made at the jail at his murder trial, and the appellate court affirmed. The state of Illinois was granted certiorari.
Issue: Are Miranda warnings required when an undercover agent is asking questions that could elicit an incriminating
result?
Held: No. Reverse the appellate courts decision affirming the suppression of the statements.
The Fifth Amendment privilege versus self-incrimination is not implicated when a suspect is not aware they are speaking
to law enforcement, and then gives incriminating statements, thus admit the statements into evidence.
There is no convergence here between custody and official interrogation, thus admit the statements made to the
undercover agent.
This is different from the situations where Miranda warnings are necessary since the suspect was motivated only by his
desire to impress his fellow inmates, had no reason to think that the agent had legal authority to force the suspect to give
testimony, and showed no signs of being intimidated.
Sixth Amendment right to counsel concerns do not apply since no charges had been filed at the time of interrogation.
Dissent: Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented on grounds that Miranda also included protections versus police deception,
and thus the ignorance of the agents real identity did not eliminating the compulsive nature of the exchange. Also, he
believed this clouded the doctrine of Miranda, and established a large loophole for law enforcement in infringing on
suspects Fifth Amendment rights.
Concurrence: Justice William Brennan agreed with the result, but believed that if the suspect had invoked Miranda on
the unrelated charges, he might be able to challenge the statements coming into evidence. Also he may have invoked Sixth
Amendment rights earlier had he been formally charged on the unrelated charge. There also may even have been a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as a result of the polices deception.
Discussion: The key factor for the majority in this case ending up with the result that it did was that there was not much
that was coercive about this questioning. The dissent however, emphasizes that the intent of the officers is to be examined
in a Miranda inquiry, even though here the majority focuses on the evaluating the resultant situation. Some commentators
think that this case has been wrongly decided if the point of Miranda is to give suspects equivalent information and the
opportunity to obtain counsel.

Page 40 of 155

People vs. Lugod, G.R. 136253, 21 February 2001

Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her husband
(Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her
body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down the stairs of their house.
She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely
answered the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were still
there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no
answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the
backdoor to see if Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench
outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said
slippers did not belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for
help.
Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She also reported
the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for
Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team. During the search, Alma Diaz
found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered
to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt
with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02
Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house
of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the
black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused
denied that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been informed that
the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and the
townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of Nairube. It was only when they brought
Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the body of
Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the assistance
of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual
damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugods confession and subsequent act of pointing the location of the Nairubes body may be used against
him as evidence.
Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford
to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended
to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing
and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill
of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime
committed may be. In the same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in
violation of the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus
not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he
told the truth. Furthermore, when ugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police
force as well as nearly 100 of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople
were antagonistic towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and
taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was
highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive
Page 41 of 155

atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited Lugod in the jail cell, he
noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the
confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution is
the fact that several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other
occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively
as well as the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16
September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are
circumstantial in nature.The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical
conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the
crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.

Page 42 of 155

Re-enactment
People vs. Luvendino, G.R. 69971, 3 July 1992
Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig,
Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student. She would
usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic day, she would not reach home alive. On that
particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was
told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent
on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a street in the village.
Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the
latter's promise to send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig Police Station to
report his daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him that a search party would be mounted presently. Panfilo
returned home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search ended in
a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from the Capcap residence, where lay
the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her
underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was
rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple
injuries indicated the victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa showed that
the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March
1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and
Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against all the accused
but only Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It appears that Luvendino reenacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene, where pictures were taken by a
photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin
ko po na kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty.
Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial. On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision
finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the
amountof P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in:
a. Not holding that his demonstration or re-enactment of the crime as well as his subsequent written
admission of guilt as inadmissible for having been made without the benefit of counsel.
b. According credence to the identification and other statements made by the prosecution witness Bayani
Cemitara
c. Allowing Luvendinos counsel before the trial court to continue as such notwithstanding such counsels
express mental reservations
Held:
a. The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during the reenactment of the crime by Luvendino. The reenactment was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of
Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial court found that the
accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police
headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself, however, states that the reenactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that
before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional rights including,
specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under
these circumstances, the Court must decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
b. Next is the extrajudicial confession of appellant. He claimed that it was extracted because of the beating of the
policemen and that a chain had been wrapped around his neck. The court disbelieved such claim since he was not
examined for his claim of maltreatment, he did not institute any criminal action against his alleged intimidators, it could
not have been missed by his lawyer and his mother. The court ruled that were the confessant failed to present any
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of confession, the extrajudicial confession may
be admitted. Also, he claimed he was not inform of his constitutional rights before extraction was given by him or
extracted from him. First, he was informed by Police Sgt. Galang before he commenced investigation. Second, the
written extrajudicial confession itself stated Ludevino was informed of his constitutional rights and that he was waiving
Page 43 of 155

those rights. Third, he first signed his extrajudicial statement at the police department and that later, when he was brought
to the office of the Provincial Fiscal Mateo, where he subscribed to or signed once more the same document, this time
under oath, in the presence of his mother and Atty. Eustacio Flores.
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on April 26, 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and it was reiterated in People v. Galit. The
Morales-Galit doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in
Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers prior to April 26, 1983, the date of promulgation of
Morales.
c. Second error was that the trial court had erred in believing the testimony of prosection Cemitara. It is well-settled rule
that the assessments by a trial court of the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses who testified before it are to be
accorded great respect by appellate courts. Appellant presented no evidence to show any personal grudge on the part of
Cemitara against Luvendino, nor any evidence of any ill motive weighty enough to have moved Cemitara falsely testify
for the prosecution.
d. Third principal assignment of error, that he had been deprived of due process because he was represented or continued
to be represented, by a lawyer who had manifested mental reservations. Atty. Sardillo himself did not insist on
withdrawing as defense counsel. If appellant Ludevino in trut had entertained substantial doubts as to the sincerity or
capability or impartiality of his lawyer, he could have easily terminated the services of that counsel and retained a new
one or sought from the trial court the appointment of counsel de officio. Instead, appellant continued to retain the services
of Atty. Sardillo until the trial court rendered its decision and that Atty. Sardillo continued to represent appellant
Luvendino as defense counsel with reasonable competence.

Page 44 of 155

Right to Bail
When right may be invoked
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945)
Facts: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army,
to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29
December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is
now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since
October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government. On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her
husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order
No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act
punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the
aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer having
official custody of her person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge
of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division
of the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the
recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon.
Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the same
"in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors
recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court,
through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari
and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information is filed against him?
Held: Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information
has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise
deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can
invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed
against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this
guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence
of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal
complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the
proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more
favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this
presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained.

Page 45 of 155

People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)

FACTS: The accused were charged for murder. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the
defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the
regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the
same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. Bail was granted
on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial court granted bail without allowing
the prosecution to present their other witnesses?
HELD: YES. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued in
violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void.
The courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the
courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five
defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by
the prosecution. They only contain the courts conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in
form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.

Page 46 of 155

Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997

Facts: A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri,
Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v.
Duerme, et al., Criminal Case 07-893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for murder); (2)
he reduced the bailbond granted by the provincial prosecutor from P180,000 to P30,000 without hearing (Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond of
P14,800 in a homicide case (Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors spreading
that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siribans house to get the envelop. The Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the
complainant that would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the judge.
Issue: Whether Judge Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in
Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866.
Held: As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise
required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it
against the accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination
and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07-874 was subsequently dismissed by Judge
Alameda does not completely exculpate Judge Catral. The judge is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor
and the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for
determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The procedural lapse of the judge is
aggravated by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be
arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. The right to bail can only be availed of by a person who
is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a
petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866 without having
conducted the requisite hearing.

Page 47 of 155

Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000

Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had
been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room 308
of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie,
who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie
and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Article III,
5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides
in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein
Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."
On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual
prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless,
Lavides filed separate applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving
Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under detention
until further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to
post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On
20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-9770550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on
23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.
On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to
the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set
on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's
order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the
conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two
more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16
May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases.
He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so,
his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these
cases before the bail can be granted.
Held: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for
the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
Page 48 of 155

position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime
and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's
constitutional rights.

Page 49 of 155

Government v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. 148571, December 17, 2002

Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels requested
the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for Extradition was filed with the
RTC, but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed
that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez
submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed
to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing and the court directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Issue:
WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Held:
As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.

Page 50 of 155

Procedure for bail

Paderanga v. Drilon, 247 SCRA 741, (1995)
Facts: On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information as a coconspirator in the
crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of
Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which
Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar
Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate
slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe
Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained
at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime.
In an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his former
employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of
the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on
20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon the
inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department
of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for
purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the
new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a
second amended information dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to
the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello
III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19 April
1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him. The trial of the base was all set to
start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga
through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for
hearing on 5 November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong.
On 5 November 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then confined at the
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were
submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and
that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo,
on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State
prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they
were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor
Abejo announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5
November 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, 6 November
1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he
also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly
received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its
omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail, and whether the
trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutors evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or
grant the application of bail, respectively.
Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and
Page 51 of 155

legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the
trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact,
an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being
"confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then
confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of
the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it
would have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or
placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge
that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial court has reasons to believe that
the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature
of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application. No irregularity, in the context of procedural due
process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A review of the
transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March
1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all means to convince itself
of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the
requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the
court conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then
and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

Page 52 of 155

Go v. Bongolan. A.M. 99-1464, July 26, 1999

Facts: On 10 November 1997, at 6:30 p.m. at Partelo Street, Bangued, Abra, Jaime Balmores, Butch Reynaldo, PO1
Rolando Molina, Edgardo Cacal, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 kidnapped Samuel Go and brought him outside
the province of Abra by the ue of a Nissan Sentra, Super Saloon bearing fictitious plate UGG 652 and transferred Go at
Pidigan, Abra to a Toyota Taxi bearing Plate PVB 169 with markings "Naple Leaf" on both sides and were intercepted by
San Esteban PNP at San Esteban, Ilocos Sur where they recovered Go. On 13 November 1997, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Abra filed an information against Balmores, et. al. charging them with kidnapping (Criminal
Case 97-123). The case was assigned to Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra presided by Judge Benjamin A.
Bongolan. Since kidnapping with ransom is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution recommended no
bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. On 5 January 1998, then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona created a
panel of prosecutors, consisting of Regional State Prosecutor of Region I Virgilio Manipud, Provincial Prosecutor of
Ilocos Sur Jessica Villoria, and Provincial Prosecutor of Abra Rodor Gayao, to handle the investigation and prosecution of
the case.
When trial commenced, the prosecution panel presented its witnesses consisting of Samuel Go, the kidnap victim, Alfredo
Go, an alleged previous victim who was released after paying a P500,000.00 ransom money, the Chief of Police of San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur, the Senior Inspector of the PNP Provincial Command in Abra, and a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. After their testimonies, Balmores filed a "Motion for the Amendment of the Information and for the Fixing
of the Bail" alleging that the evidence presented did not show that the kidnapping was for ransom. He asked the
prosecution to amend the information from kidnapping with ransom to simple kidnapping to bring it within the ambit of
bailable offenses and enable him to post bail as a matter of right. On 20 May 1998, Judge Bongolan issued an Order (1)
denying the Motion to Amend the Information, but (2) allowing Balmores to substantiate his "Motion to Fix Bail" and (3)
allowing Cacal and Molina to submit their own motion for admission to bail with accompanying memorandum. Pursuant
to the order, Molina and Cacal filed their "Motion for Bail with Memorandum Thereof" which reiterated the claim of
Balmores that the prosecution failed to prove kidnapping for ransom.
The prosecution, in its "Opposition to Motion to Bail" dated June 2, 1998, maintained that it has established that the
accused committed kidnapping with ransom and that the Motion to bail is "prematurely filed since they (sic) are still in the
process of presenting further evidence to prove that the crime had been committed by the accused." The next day, 3 June
1998, Judge Bongolan issued his Order granting the two applications for bail. Judge Bongolan gave the prosecution 10
days to file its Motion for Reconsideration which was submitted on 11 June 1998. It was accompanied by a request to the
Branch 2 Clerk of Court to set the motion for hearing on 23 June 1998 at 9:00 a.m. However, before the prosecution could
submit said motion, the accused were already released. It appears that in the morning of 10 June 1998, the bondsmen
arrived in Branch 2 and did not find Judge Bongolan. They proceeded to see Judge Alberto Benesa, who was then Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 1 and designated pairing Judge of Branch 2. The bondsmen presented Judge Benesa with a
copy of Judge Bongolan's Order granting bail and fixing the amount at P50,000.00 for each of the accused. Upon seeing
that Judge Bongolan already approved the Motion for Bail, Judge Benesa issued his order releasing the accused. On 23
June 1998, the date set for the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution informed Judge Bongolan that
the accused had already been released by Judge Benesa. Judge Bongolan stated that he was not aware of their release as
he was in the hospital when the release order was issued. In the afternoon of 23 June 1998, Judge Bongolan issued his
Order denying the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration. An administrative case was filed against Judges Benjamin A.
Bongolan and Alberto Benesa for usurpation and abuse of authority, rendition of unjust order and ignorance of the law in
granting bail to several accused charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue: Whether it is necessary for the prosecution to present all its witness ebfore the judge could resolve the motion for
bail, and whether the judge should set a bail hearing even if the Provincial Prosecutor did not interpose an objection to the
grant of bail.
Held: A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by showing
that evidence of guilt is strong. The prosecution was caught off guard in the regular hearing of 20 May 1998, when Atty.
Astudillo sprang on it a Motion to Amend the Information and Fix Bail. When asked by Judge Bongolan whether the
prosecution would present additional evidence, Prosecutor Gayao responded in the negative. Subsequently, however, the
prosecution changed its mind when it stated in its Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for admission to bail would
be premature since it has additional witnesses to present. In his Comment, Judge Bongolan contends that it is not
Page 53 of 155

necessary for the prosecution to present all its witnesses before he could resolve the motion for bail. The stance cannot be
sustained. The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course
of a regular trial. If the prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
The records show that the prosecution was supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses on 4 June 1998 when Judge
Bongolan prematurely resolved the motion.
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to
protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a
magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of discretion. Further, Judge
Bongolan fixed the bail at P50,000.00 without showing its reasonableness. The judge should have set the petition for bail
hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for fixing the amount of bail, even if the Provincial
Prosecutor would not interpose an objection to the grant of bail. Furthermore, the release of the accused was done in haste
by Judge Benesa. If Benesa examined the records of the case, he would have discovered that the prosecution was given by
Judge Bongolan, 10 days from 3 June 1988 within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration from his Order granting bail
to the accused. Without the 10 day period having lapsed, Judge Benesa ordered the release of the accused. Again, the
prosecution was denied its day in court.

Page 54 of 155

People v. Gako, G.R. 135045, December 15, 2000

Facts: Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial
Confession implicating therein Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan. On 9 July
1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go, charging them with the
murder of Galan, Sr. (Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a
hospital was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to
cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On 6 August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the prosecution
having cross examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
On 15 July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding
Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. On 20
November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a
speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its Decision dated 18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals
annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to
another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated
26 June 1995, the criminal case was set anew for trial.
The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and
Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13
February 1997, Go filed a Petition for Bail. On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the prosecution presented de la Pea
who was acquitted in 1993. De la Pea testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to
testify on. On 21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed urging his arrest because he was out of
the intensive care unit. The motion of the prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was
denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea. The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as
presiding judge. Hearing resumed. On 26 September 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was
filed praying for the arrest of Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On 10 November 1997, Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go. On 11 November 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement
Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of Go.
On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court dated 10 November 1997,
the order which granted bail to Go.
On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the offended party
because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is short
of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment. On 15 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated 10 November 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read. On 1
December 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a was filed to
determine if the medical findings on Go were not exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako,
Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the prosecutions Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on the confinement of Go,
and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998,
Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10 November 1997; (2)
Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received this order on 10
February
1998. On 20 March 1998, Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP 471460)
before the Court of Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of Judge Gako, Jr. and then acting
Presiding Judge de la Pea. The petition was signed by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with
the conformity of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. On 26 March 1998, the
Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the
petition was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2) that the certification on
non-forum shopping was signed by counsel for Galan, not by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through counsel,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution indicating that the OSG was going to adopt her petition. On the
same date, the OSG manifested before the Court of Appeals that it was joining Galan in her petition and was adopting her
Page 55 of 155

petition as its own. On 18 June 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration
of Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also
reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency. The OSG received
copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was
dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari.
Issue: Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the voluminous
records of the case, without necessarily hearing the prosecution.
Held: The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the
requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be
conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary,
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to
persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence
of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the
law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos
right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge
Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even
bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous records of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the
crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present
its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another compelling reason why a
hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00
is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a
substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is
granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judges findings were based on the summary clinical
report of Dr. Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical
report when 9 had already passed from the time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for
Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting bail when the defense failed to present a more
recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would
endanger his life.

Page 56 of 155

Bail on appeal
People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993)
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year
old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the
accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of
bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail.
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds right to bail violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence
of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither
a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.

Page 57 of 155

Maguddatu v. CA, G.R. No. 139599. February 23, 2000

Facts: Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun Maguddatu
and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the
killing of Jose S. Pascual. On 23 October 1985, Maguddatu, et. al. filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that
the prosecution's evidence is not strong. After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated 20 December
1985, granting Maguddatu, et. al.'s motion for bail and fixing the amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day,
Maguddatu, et. al. posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. On 6 January 1987, AFISCO Insurance filed a
motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of Maguddatu, et. al.'s bail bond because of the latter's failure to
renew the same upon its expiration on 20 December 1986. There is no showing, however, of any action by the court on
said motion. On 2 January 1998, the trial court convicted Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu,
together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of 8 years of Prision Mayor medium, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on 19 February 1998, the trial court issued an
order for the immediate arrest of Maguddatu, et. al. and their commitment to the custody of proper authorities.
While remaining at large, Maguddatu, et. al., on 27 February 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction
for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court does
nor appear to have resolved the motion for bail pending appeal. Instead, it forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals.
On 8 January 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause within 10 days from
notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit themselves
to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from which they seek relief in the meantime that no bail has
yet been approved for their temporary liberty and, further considering that the approval of the same is discretionary and
not to be presumed; and in the meanwhile, the Station Commanders of the Manila Police Station, Manila and the Makati
Police Station, Makati City to file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional trial Court, Branch 64, Makati
City on 19 February 1998 in Criminal Case 12010. A Compliance and Motion, dated 8 February 1999, filed by
Maguddatu, et. al. explained their failure to submit to the proper authorities. Despite the compliance and motion filed by
Maguddatu, et. al., they remained at large. on 23 June 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question
denying Maguddatu, et. al.' application for bail and ordering their arrest. Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution,
Maguddatu, et. al. brought the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. Pending resolution of the
petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, dated 8 September 1999, declaring that the appeal filed is deemed
abandoned and dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124, New Rules on Criminal
Procedure, and thus ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City to issue warrants of arrest for the
immediate apprehension and service of sentence of Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu.
Issue: Whether Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail during the whole duration their case is on appeal.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two
warnings from the Court of Appeals, Maguddatu, et. al. had remained at large. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to
bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release
and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance and Motion dated 8
February 1999, came short of an unconditional submission to the court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Further, the
trial court correctly denied Maguddatu, et. al.' motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their conviction, under
their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, provides that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of
the bondsman." The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal
(Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that
the bail" shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner canceled, until the
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it." This amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure from the old rules which
then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus
even during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on
the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. From the record, it appears that the
Page 58 of 155

bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in the trial court on 6 January 1987 for the cancellation of
petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman
was, thus, foreclosed. Furthermore, pursuant to the same Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon
the court's discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. However, such bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be canceled if the penalty imposed is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5 is present. Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al. violated the
conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite
due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the
Court of Appeals, constitutes violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed
to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation,
praying for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration.
Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their application for bail would be granted as a matter of course
precisely because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice. It
has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.

Page 59 of 155

Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 114350, January 16, 1997

Facts: The accused, with three others, was charged with murder on two counts. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as
the evidence of guilt was strong. At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual
"escapee". By virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge, accused was escorted out of prison to appear before said
judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of the
accused therein. While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double
murder now charged against him. The lower court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
on two counts. Obosa filed a bailbond, which the lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order
of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on the same day
notwithstanding that, as hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double murder, accused Obosa was
serving a prison term for robbery. CA cancelled the petitioners bail bond and nullified the trial court's order which
granted bail to petitioner.
Issue: Whether the accused may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense.
Ruling: An appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the
fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding
penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of
instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely
tempted to flee. On appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may be increased and may
once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is
ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it
had done so in this case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such
determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether
petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While the accused, after conviction, may upon
application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail
should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the
majesty of the law and the administration of justice. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused,
who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution
in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital
offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to
leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate
court's sound discretion. It inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal
confinement as well as his prior convictions. The instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Page 60 of 155

Standards for fixing bail

VILLASEOR v ABANO
G.R. No. L-23599, September 29, 1967
SANCHEZ, J.:
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal charged Reynaldo C. Villaseor for the murder of Boac police sergeant Alfonso Madla
before the Court of First Instance of Marinduque (Criminal Case 2299). Villaseor was, on motion, admitted to a
P60,000.00 bail. The amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of Villaseor's wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On 29
May 1964, Villaseor posted a property bond, was set at provisional liberty. Before arraignment on the murder charge,
however, the Provincial Fiscal amended the information. This time he accused Villaseor with "Direct Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder." On 7 August 1964, the judge sua sponte (Judge Maximo Abao) cancelled
Villaseor's bond, and ordered his immediate arrest. On Villaseor's motion to reconsider, the judge, on 9 September
1964, after hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00. On 15 September 1964,
on Villaseor's motion that the original bond previously given be reinstated, the judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in
real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying
therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years." On 1 October
1964, Villaseor came to the Supreme Court on certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether the P60,000.00-bond fixed by judge transgress the constitutional injunction that "excessive bail shall not
be required, in light of the fact that the accused is a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary of
P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five.
Held: To be read with the constitutional precept, that "excessive bail shall not be required, is Section 12, Rule 114, Rules
of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the bail,
and that "defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called upon to
furnish." Along with the court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount therefor, and, as
stated, to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is excessive "lays with the court to determine." In the
matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for which bail is required. The definition
of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives this purpose "the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." And, in amplification thereof, Section 2 of the same rule states that the
condition of the bail is that "defendant shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to
which it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of First Instance upon
application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the
appellate court may render, or that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the
court to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof." Expressions in varying
language spell out in a general way the principles governing bail fixing. One is that the amount should be high enough to
assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Another
is that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused," and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right
to freedom from unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular accused,
"should all be balanced in one equation. The inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain amount, by itself, does not
make the amount excessive. For, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to turn to for
premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would fall into the category of excessive bail; and, he "would
be entitled to be discharged on his own recognizance." So it is, that experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail
fixing, which may be summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty
for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of
the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. But, at
bottom, in bail fixing, "the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the
probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment." Importance then is the possible penalty
that may be meted. Of course, penalty depends to a great extent upon the gravity of the offense. Here, Villasenor is
charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may
call for the imposition of capital punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated 5 July 1946 of the Department of Justice, reiterated
in Circular 48 of 18 July 1963, directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless
Page 61 of 155

circumstances warrant a higher penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has already received the Court's imprimature
in Edao vs. Cea (GR L-6821, 10 May 1954). The Court is unprepared to downgrade this method of computation, what
with a compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate. The Court thus find no discernible abuse of
discretion, given the facts and the law, when the judge fixed Villasenor's bail at P60,000.00.

Page 62 of 155

De la Camara v Enage
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2, September 17, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and
detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November
1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and
another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting
from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the
lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968.
He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on 10 July 1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for
bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had
the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00
for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12
August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the
Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property,
would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained
adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had
escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough to
discourage the accused from fleeing.
Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the
Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been
more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set
at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can
give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but
at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must
have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he
were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of
expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.

Page 63 of 155

Almeda v Villaluz
G.R. No. L-31665, August 6, 1975
CASTRO, J.:
Facts: Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villaluz.
The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the
judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing of 18 February 1970, Almeda asked the trial court
to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral
motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on
the part of Almeda. At the same hearing, the city fiscal of Pasay City (Fiscal Gregorio Pineda), thru his assistant,
reiterated his oral motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of
recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such
an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend
should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed amendment would place
him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless
granted the fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the
assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same
on the back of the document. Almeda forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double jeopardy,
but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open court. Almeda filed the present special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the insistence of a cash bond, over any other surety, renders the recomended bail excessive.
Held: Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The
purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at
the trial. The accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and may not be denied even where the
accused has previously escaped detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because the
imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. "Where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking
bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise
our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." Herein, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered
in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does
not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman
the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit
standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the
court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or
acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court,
and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him
his constitutional right to bail. Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only
upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose
of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty
on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is
authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the
attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option
to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise
acceptable sureties and insists that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond. The court is not
without devices with which to meet the situation, considering that Almeda's past record that is the range of his career in
crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. First, it could increase the amount of the
bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the
purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the
latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an
Page 64 of 155

accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial
court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give
bail: (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the character and reputation of the accused;
(5) the health of the accused; (6) the character and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance
or non-appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. It is not amiss, at this point, to
remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their
reputation, solvency and promptitude. Aside from the other precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should see to it
that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
Bondsmen who cannot make good their undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this
jurisdiction.

Page 65 of 155

Yap v CA
G.R. No. 14152, June 6, 2001
GONZAGAREYES, J.:
Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of
estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional,
as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 17 February 1999. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap filed
with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the
last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor
General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain
to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and
private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right
against excessive bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999, upheld the recommendation of
the Solicitor General. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by the
court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged.
Held: The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on appeal. The court stated that it was
doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of the
country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount
of bail at P5,500,000.00. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could
render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano, the Court made the pronouncement that it will not
hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail,
effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section
9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of
the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c)
Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight
of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i)
The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is
on bail. Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is
certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to
an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his
movements. Herein, where Yap was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of
Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him. Under the
circumstances, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may
be meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial
of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of
which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction
of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

Page 66 of 155

Cabanero v Canon
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1369, September 20, 2001
PARDO, J.:
Facts: A certain Jaime Caal accused Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabaero's son, Jessie D. Cabaero, of entering Caals
farmland and harvesting falcata trees valued at P3,191.00. The chief of police filed the case with the 7th MCTC Hinatuan
Tagbina, with station at Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, presided over by Judge Antonio K. Caon. The Judge conducted a
preliminary investigation of the case to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On 1 October
1998, Judge Caon issued a warrant of arrest not only against Jessie Cabaero but also against Guillerma D. Cabaero for
covering up for her son. On 15 October 1998, policemen arrested Guillerma and detained her at the Hinatuan Municipal
Jail. To secure her temporary liberty, she posted bail, which could not be issued and approved in her name because she
was not an accused in Criminal Case 4036-H. The judge pegged the bail at P30,000.00. On 16 October 1998, Guillerma
was released. Incidentally, on 7 October 1998, when her son was arrested, he also posted bail amounting to P30,000.00. In
a complaint dated 16 September 1999, Mrs. Guillerma D. Cabaero charged Judge Antonio K. Caon, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Hinatuan-Tagbina, at Hinatuan, Surigao Del Sur with partiality, issuance of unjust interlocutory orders and
grave abuse of discretion relative to Criminal Case 4036-H (People vs. Jessie Cabaero, for qualified theft), alleging that
considering the value of the property allegedly stolen, the bail required was excessive. On 24 April 2000, the judge died.
Issue: Whether Judge Caon imposed excessive bail in the case of qualified theft.
Held: Judge Caon erred in ordering the arrest of Guillerma D. Cabaero. She was not included as one of the respondents
in the criminal case filed by the chief of police of Hinatuan. The judgess interpretation of his powers under the Revised
Rules of Court was far-fetched. The judge also imposed excessive bail. Under Department Circular 4, the 1996 Bail Bond
Guide for the National Prosecution Service for the offense of qualified theft, if the value of the property stolen is more
than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00, the bail recommended is P24,000.00. Herein, the monetary value of the
falcata trees cut into logs is P3,1991.40. The bail of P30,000 is not proportionate to the amount stolen. When the law
transgressed is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Antonio K.
Caon was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000.00, to be taken from his retirement benefits in view of his
demise.

Page 67 of 155

Victory Liner v. Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321, March 10, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Facts: Judge Reynaldo Bellosilo was the presiding Judge of Orani, Bataan MCTC an dating Judge in Dinalupihan,
Hermosa Bataan. On March 2, 2000 one of the bus of Victory Liner was cruising along the national highway of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales who died a day after. Victory Liner
Bus Inc. shouldered the funeral and burial of Marciana Morales and on March 6, 2000 entered into an agreement with the
heirs of Marciana Morales.
On March 14, 2000 upon the payment of VLI to the heirs of Marciana Morales they executed PINAGSAMANG
SALAYSAY between VLI and the heirs though their authorized representative Faustina M. Antonio executed Release
of Claim and affidavit of Desistance in favour of VLI and Reino dela Cruz, driver of VLI. However, on March 3, 2000, 2
of the sons of Marciana Morales who are also a signatories in the executed agreement with VLI already filed a criminal
case against the driver Rieno dela Cruz of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On March 13, 2000
after the preliminary examination, Judge Bellosillo ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest of Dela Cruz and fixed his
bail of 50k in cash and ordered the Chief of Police of Bataan to impound the bus involved in the accident which could be
released only upon posting bail of 50k. On March 30, 2000, VLI paid cash bond under protest and upon showing the
official receipt to the chief of police the impounded of bus was released. Again, the Judge ordered the Chief of Police to
explain in writing why did they released the bus without court order. The bus was re-impounded and on April 18, 2000 by
virtue of Judge Bellosillos order.
On June 20, 2000 VLI filed with Office of the Court of Administration against Judge Reynaldo Belosillo claiming his
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for impounding the Bus and required VLI to post bond for the release , GRAVELY
ABUSE HIS AUTHORITY when it revoked the surety bond of driver Edwin Serrano, RENDERED UNJUST AND
OPPRESSIVE ORDER when he ordered the bail to be increased from 50k to 350 k and required it to be posted in cash,
GUILTY OF INACATION for failing to resolve the petition of VLI despite of the time lapse .
The respondent justifes his action in his comment, that the bail he required for VLI was to pay the damages by way of
subsidiary liability in case of insolvency, the cash requirement for bail according to him was required for it was the prayer
of the prosecution and it is his discretion as Judge as to what for of payment of the bail as per the Rules of Court., the
increase bail from 50k to 350k was ordered because the driver was already a fugititive.
Issue: Whether the imposition of cash bond and requiring the accused to pay in cash tantamount to grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, excessive bail , unjust and oppressive?
Held: The Supreme Court held that Judge Bellosillo was wrong in increasing the bail bond of driver Serrano
unconscionably from 50k to 350k . Although Serrano and Dela Cruz was regular worker of VLI they are not capable of
paying cash bond of 50k and 350k respectively. The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody that right
to bail except offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua provides, that in fixing the amount of bail, the Judge must
primarily consider the following factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

financial ability of the accused to post bail

nature and circumstance of the offenses
penalty for the offense charged
Character and reputation of the accused
The weight of evidence against the accused
Age and health of the accused
Probability of the accused appearing in trial
Forfeiture of the bonds
The fact that the accused was a fugitive when arrested
The pendency of the cases in which the accused is under bond

The amount of bail should, therefore be reasonable at all times. It must be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose. Excessive bail should not be
Page 68 of 155

required. The Rules of Court allowed the payment of Bail bond in cash in lieu of surety bond, but the choice belong to the
accused.
Moreover under 2000 Bail Bond Guide of DOJ, crimes of Reckless Imprudence resulting in homicide and with violation
of LTO Traffic Code, bail shall be 30k regardless of the number of deaths.
The Supreme Court charge Judge Bellosillo guilty for ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive bail
bonds on Dela Cruz and Serranos case and respondent Judge was ordered to pay a fine of 10k FROM HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFIT.

Page 69 of 155

Rights of the Accused

Presumption of Innocence
People v Dramayo
G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: In the morning of 9 January 1964, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito
Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police, to shed light
on a robbery committed in Nogaliza's house 5 days before. The response was decidedly in the negative as they themselves
were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least 2 individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 p.m. of the same
day, while they were in the house of Priolo Billona, Dramayo invited all those present including Francisco Billona,
Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It
was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the
robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were
to station themselves nearby. Soon Nogaliza was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It
was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also,
who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared
undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that
he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon
noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his
daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo, et. al. were charged for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The lower court found
Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder, qualified by the
circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not convicted as, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal
being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted.
Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.
Issue: Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused have been acquitted due to
reasonable doubt.
Held: The starting point is the presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which is a right safeguarded both
Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Dramayo and Ecubin were not even called upon then to offer evidence on
their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their
guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need,
therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one
of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only
did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It cannot be denied that
the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but
by the Supreme Court as to the culpability of Dramayo and Ecubin. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other
hand, required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and Ecubin, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other
two who testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The judgment of conviction
should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of Dramayo and Ecubin, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest
credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their
rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been
a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, Dramayo and Ecubin would
have been acquitted likewise just because the other 5 defendants were not similarly sentenced. There had been cases
where the Supreme Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy
Page 70 of 155

likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a
moral certainly having arisen as to their culpability.

Page 71 of 155

Dumlao v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Facts: A Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed by Patricio Dumlao,
Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa 51, 52, and
53 for being Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides that "In
addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XIIC of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which
are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective
provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the
law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." Dumlao alleged that the afore
cited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Section 7 of BP 51,
which provides that "Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office
for a term of 6 years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980"; Section 4 of BP 52, which provides that
"any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact"; Section 1 and Section
6 of BP 52. In addition to the said provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also questioned the accreditation of some political
parties by the COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination."
Issue: Whether Section 4, BP 52, which disqualifies elective candidates who have been charged in civil and/or military
tribunals, is valid.
Held: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence. Although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie
evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being
infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. The
first paragraph of Section 4, BP 52, on the other hand, is valid. However, that portion of the second paragraph of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court
or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and
void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

Page 72 of 155

People v Mingoa
G.R. No. L-5371, March 26, 1953
REYES, J.:
Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon,
and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was
prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to
the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with
him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in
court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding
penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it
involved a constitutional question.
Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on
constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a
law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain
facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden
of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme
court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951).
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer
has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a
natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statuteestablishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present
evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most
natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do.
Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he
even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first
tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss
many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that
Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

Page 73 of 155

Feeder Intl Line v CA

G.R. No. 94262, May 31, 1991
REGALADO, J.:
Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping
Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil
consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the
vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came
to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information,
the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team
found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the
port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder International Line PTE Ltd,
through its agent Feeder International (Phils.) Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure
and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture
proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17 March 1987, the District
Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found
guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic
of the Philippines. Feeder International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated 13 May
1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International
filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax
Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner
from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed a petition for review of the
Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's decision in Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned
decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having been
denied on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition.
Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can invoke the right to be presumed
innocent.
Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by
Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive
analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and
forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction
of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from
Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which
is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted
importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer
nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture
of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke
the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least
an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said
vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of illegal
importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed
by the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings
Page 74 of 155

of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great
weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.

Page 75 of 155

Right to be heard personally or by counsel

People v Holgado
G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950
MORAN, C.J.:
Facts: Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." On 8 May 1948, the day set for the trial, Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a lawyer. Two
days later, or on 10 May 1948, the trial court rendered judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the penalty
of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree, as minimum, or 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor to 20 years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. Holgado appealed.
Issue: Whether the duties required of the trial court when the accused has no counsel were complied with.
Held: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was
not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without
absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of
Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform
the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the court
must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him
a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that
said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The
trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure
one or to assign an attorney de oficio. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own. Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment
and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.

Page 76 of 155

Delgado v CA
G.R. No. L-46392, November 10, 1986
PARAS, J.:
Facts: Emma R. Delgado -- together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino
Bautista (at large) -- was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving
one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States. All the accused (except Catalino
Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Delgado was assisted and represented by her
counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On 13 December 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence,
said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for
postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal
objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at Delgado's
behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation
of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the
trial court, dated 20 March 1974, finding Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents, and sentencing
each to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 6 years, also
of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the offended party Erlinda Ruedas in the amount of P7,431.00. Each was further ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, the complainant moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings.
Tortona did not appeal from the decision. Capistrano and Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of
"whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained." On 6
December 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to Delgado and
reversing the judgment as to Capistrano. On 27 December 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on 1 February
1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment. Believing that there was
irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as Delgado was not informed or notified of said decision by
her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado filed on 17 February 1977 with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the
Decision." The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 April 1977. On 11 May 1977 an
Order was issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of Delgado and the confiscation of her bond
for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on 11 May 1977. On 27 May 1977, Delgado filed a Motion for the
Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc.. and prayed that she be granted a
new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel (Yco not being a member
of the Philippine Bar). On 3 June 1977, the Court of Appeals denied Delgado's motion. Delgado filed a petition for
"Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction" with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial, inasmuch as Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgados counsel, is not a
member of the Philippine bar.
Held: A accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf
will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a
denial of due process. Herein, since Delgados "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a real lawyer, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court for new trial.

Page 77 of 155

People v Baluyot
G.R. No. L-32752-3, January 31, 1977
MAKASIAR, J:
Facts: On 6 August 1970, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y
Narca and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot robbed money from Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola, then driving a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate 14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9345s/69), to the damage and prejudice
of Sureta. They stabbed Sureta, hitting him n the neck, thereby inflicting serious wounds (stab wounds), which directly
caused the death of Sureta. Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos, Bulacan (Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit,
presiding). Upon arraignment on 28 September 1970, all the accused, assisted by attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres,
pleaded not guilty to the information. The following day September 29 when the case was called for trial, the
prosecution started presenting its evidence. The accused were assisted by the same attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres,
who manifested that he was appearing as counsel for the accused in that day's trial only. Trial was continued the following
day, 30 September 1970. The accused were this time assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Godofredo Linsangan.
Thereafter, the continuation of the trial was reset for 7 October 1970. At this hearing, the accused were assisted by another
counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the accused informed it that they
had no lawyer. Then the trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what his pleasure was, and the latter requested that he
be given a few minutes within which to confer with the accused. The trial court gave him 20 minutes within which to
"consummate" his conference. Accordingly, when the session was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte manifested that "after
conferring with the accused, they intimated their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to substitute in lieu
thereof the plea of guilty to the offense charged." Without inquiring from the prosecution what its stand was on the motion
of counsel for the accused, the trial court, addressing itself to all the accused said "You have heard the manifestations of
counsel. Do you now affirm the truthfulness and correctness of the manifestation of counsel to the effect that you now
desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with that of guilty to the offense charged?"
All of the accused replied in the affirmative. When asked whether the accused were ready to hear their sentence, the latter
replied in the affimative. Then and there, and without much ado, the trial court dictated in open court its decision
convicting Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each and all of them to
death, "with the other accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said heirs by way of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00,
proportionately; and similarly, to proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings." Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether it is sufficient for the trial court to ask the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after
they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea.
Held: Similar to the identical case of People vs. Ricalde (L-34673, January 30, 1973), it is held that previous decisions
have repeatedly warned against the danger of the plea of guilty being improvidently entered in capital cases. The Court
has uniformly stressed the importance of the trial court's receiving evidence notwithstanding the plea of guilty in order
that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused. The Court has time and
time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of inevitable conviction. Herein, the trial court did not
even ascertain for itself whether the accused completely understood the precise nature of the charge and the meaning of
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the commission of the
crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood the nature and gravity of the charge to
which they were pleading guilty. The trial court did not conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational
attainment, especially considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures on the statements they gave to the Malolos
Police Force tends to show that they have very little or scanty education. Moreover, after the arraignment, trial was held
on three dates and on each day the accused were assisted by 3 different counsel de oficio. In the hearing of 7 October
1970 the day the decision under review was rendered the counsel de oficio who assisted the accused was designated
by the trial court only after the case was called for trial, i.e., after the accused had informed the trial court that they did not
have a lawyer. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that said counsel de oficio proceeded to trial
without first fully investigating the facts of the case and that his interview with the accused, even if it lasted for 20
minutes as the record insinuates, was not, and could not have been sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp,
much less a comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the case. Incidentally, under the Rules of Court, whenever
an attorney de oficio is employed or assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he shall be given a reasonable
Page 78 of 155

time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than
2 days in case of trial. The record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a "good cause" to justify the trial court in
shortening the trial fixed by the Rules. The trial court cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed towards
trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to the accused not only the nature and meaning of the
accusation and the full import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning in layman's language of the aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court did not even consult the testimonies
of the 3 State witnesses namely, the doctor and the police officers who took down the statements of the accused
who testified during the first and second hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the degree of the penalty
that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the accused. What the trial court did was only to ask the
accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of
their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea. In short, the trial court did not even inform the accused that their plea
of guilty might mean death for all of them.

Page 79 of 155

Libuit v People
G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and
brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or operated by
Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused Joel, once in possession of
the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite
repeated demands to return the said car to the owner, accused refused.
It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for repair at the Paeng
Motorworks operated by the Joel. The car was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who
assured the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor shop.
When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the engine was inside
the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out because it also needed repairs. Joel and Bautista assured him
that they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundos house after two weeks. However, Joel failed to
deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that
his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had sold the cars differential
and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.
Joel testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew from the case after
his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services
of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, court issued
an order striking from the records Joel's direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence already on record.
Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court. CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel of his right to
counsel as he was represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said counsel withdrew, the trial
court allowed the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. It
ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent
hearings.
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?
Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to
appear for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ
the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to
arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. When the time for the presentation of evidence for the
defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed dutybound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after his initial crossexamination, the trial court granted the motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another
counsel.
The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient
legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment
Page 80 of 155

upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of Joel's counsel may even be taken as a
deliberate attempt to delay the courts proceedings.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court,
which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had
been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself. We think that such liberality removes any doubt
that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition is denied.

Page 81 of 155

Moslares v CA
G.R. No. 129744, June 26, 1998
MELO, J.:
Facts: On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc.
which were thereupon registered under his name, under the name of Manila Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued Philippine Bank of
Communications Check 841644 dated 24 May 1991 in the amount of P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said
check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares was charged for violation of
Batas Pambansa 22 and for Estafa. The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at the instance of
Moslares or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September 1995, the scheduled date of the presentation
of evidence by Moslares, he failed to appear, but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero,
who claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial
court set the promulgation of the decision on 30 October 1995. On 9 October 1995, Moslares filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Re-Trial. However, on 26 October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares did not
attend during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. The Court set the presentation of
evidence for the defense 19 times, 4 of which were cancelled on the ground that there was a typhoon and the public
prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila.
Subject cases were submitted for decision 4 times for failure of the accused to present evidence but was lifted in the
interest of justice upon motion of the accused. He changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case
submitted for decision for failure of the accused to present his evidence in order to gain a delay." The court therein found
Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal Case 92-0100), and
sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for each criminal case. On 30 October 1995, the trial court proceeded
to promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14 November 1995, Moslares filed a notice of appeal which
was denied due course by the lower court in its assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower court, relying on the case
of People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have waived his right to appeal. On 14 February
1996, Moslares filed a petition for relief from judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14 March 1996,
Moslares filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which treated the petition as one for certiorari. Moslares
also filed on 3 October 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented. On 29 November 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration
subsequently filed by Moslares were denied. Moslares filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Moslareshas waived his right to present evidence
Held: While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that
Moslares had waived said right in the present case. The postponements sought by Moslares and counsel appear to be
justified and were not vexatious and oppressive. The intention and the willingness of Moslares to present evidence can be
gleaned from the fact that he had already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although
this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and his counsel, Moslares' confinement at a
hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial are
given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has
been recognized and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right
of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right. It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the
trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares' evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of
postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant
of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy
disposition of the case but at the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded
with the promulgation of decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right to appear in court to present his
evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a
decision of the lower court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due process.

Page 82 of 155

Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation

People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37, 29 January 2002]
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts: Gina Marie Mobley, together with her companion Helen Kathleen Tennican, both American nationals, were
exchange students at the Chengdu University of Science and Technology in Chengdu, Sichuan, China. Gina was taking up
Biology. Helen was also a Biology major and took Chinese Studies as an additional course. Both were enrolled at the
Pacific Lutheran University at Tacoma, Washington, where Gina was a university scholar. Having heard of the renowned
Filipino hospitality from their Filipino-American friends, Gina and Helen decided to spend their semestral break in the
Philippines. They arrived in the country on 10 January 1994. In the afternoon of 12 January 1994, they were driven from
their hotel to the Philippine Rabbit Bus terminal in Dau, Pampanga, where they were supposed to take a ride to Baguio
City. While waiting for their bus, they went to a Shakeys Pizza Parlor near the terminal. Gina and Helen took the table
near the comfort room, while Bryan Dy y La Madrid and Giovan Bernardino y Garcia, who are brothers-in-law, and their
driver Rizal, were seated at the next table. With them was their driver, Rizal. Bryan and Giovan offered the girls a ride to
Baguio City, which eventually, was accepted by Helen and Gina, thinking that they could save some money besides the
thought that the boys looked nice and trustworthy. They left Shakeys at 7:30 p.m. and boarded a white 1991 four-door
Mitsubishi sedan. Rizal took the wheel, while Bryan sat at the front passenger seat. Helen, Gina and Giovan stayed on the
back seat, in that order. Before proceeding to Baguio, they stopped at a residential area where Bryan delivered some
papers and picked up some jackets. The group arrived in Baguio City at 10:45 p.m., proceeding first to the house of
Bryans uncle, but shortly afterwards, looked for another place to stay. They went to the Terraces Hotel, the Baden
Powell, and the Benguet Pines Tourist Inn to check the rates and the rooms. They checked in at the Benguet Pines Tourist
Inn at 11:00 p.m. They got two rooms on opposite sides of the corridor on the second floor. After a while, Bryan and
Giovan asked the girls out for some drinks and dancing at the Songs Jazz Bar along Session Road. While at the Songs
Jazz Bar, Helen drank a margarita, tequila and blowjob with plenty of water. Gina drank Singaporean sling, blowjob and
half a glass of Giovans mai tai. Bryan drank just one shot of tequila while Giovan drank half a glass of mai tai. After the
group left Songs Jazz Bar, Giovan drove to a convenience store on the pretext that he was thirsty and wanted to buy cola
drinks. Giovan and Bryan alighted and returned after some 10 minutes with Giovan carrying 3 plastic cups of Sprite or
Seven-Up and Bryan, two cups and a plastic bag containing Chinese food with small lemons to be squeezed on it. Bryan
gave Helen and Gina a cup each. Helen and Gina drank from the cups. Meanwhile, as they were drinking their cola drinks,
Giovan drove the group to Club John Hay where he told the guards at the gate that they were just going to check on the
Clubs billeting rates. They parked in front of the billeting office. Gina was then about to finish her cola drink when she
felt something gritty in it which stuck into her teeth; they were like small particles. She spat them back into the cup and
dumped out the remaining contents of the cup outside the car and thereafter gave the cup to Giovan who threw it into a
trash can. Gina commented out loud about the gritty substance in her drink and related that in China they often found
strange things in their food. There was no word from the boys. Helen finished her drink and then handed the empty cup to
Giovan who likewise threw it into a trash can. After leaving Club John Hay, the group returned to their hotel. Gina and
Helen appeared to have been drugged, as they were disoriented by the events thereafter. Helen felt that someone was
violating her personal space before she became unconscious. Gina remembered that Giovan forcefully kissed her and
inserted two fingers in her vagina before someone else entered her room; finding Bryan attempting to have carnal
knowledge with her, she did oral sex on Bryan to prevent him from penetrating her before she passed out. Gina woke up
at 3:00 p.m. feeling groggy and confused. She opened her purse to get money to pay for the room, but found that her
US$290.00, P2,000.00, 300 yuan and US$200.00 travellers check were all missing. Only her US $100.00 travellers
check was left. She tried to wake Helen up but the latter only rolled over. Gina ran downstairs and met Hilda, a hotel desk
girl, who asked her if she was alright. Gina cried and told her that she had been robbed. Hilda said she will call the police.
Gina returned to their room to wake up Helen but the latter still did not wake up. After sometime, Gina again went
downstairs and was introduced to 5 or 6 members of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). She told them that she was
robbed and sexually molested and narrated to them what had happened. Bryan and Giovan were charged with Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Cases 12600-R, and 12601-R. The two cases were tried jointly. Bryan and Giovan
refused to be arraigned and enter a plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered on their behalf. During the trial, and
based on the set of facts provided by the private prosecutor, the entries in Ginas journal and the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the preliminary examination conducted by the trial court in the afternoon of January 26 and 27, 1994,
Dr. Hernandez opined that Gina and Helen were drugged, possibly with lorazepam or ativan, which is a benzodiazepine.
On 16 March 1994, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Bryan and Giovan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness as charged. In Criminal Case 12600 (rape), the court sentenced Bryan to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as
Page 83 of 155

maximum (appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender); and Giovan to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
20 years and 1 DAY of reclusion perpetua, as maximum (appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender). Both were ordered to pay Gina Marie Mobley in the amounts of: P50,000.00 for her being raped, P12,195.00
(the equivalent of US$450.00 dollars at the exchange rate of P27.10 to US$1.00) as actual damages, and P500,000.00 as
moral damages, plus costs. In Criminal Case 12601-R (acts of lasciviousness), the Court sentenced Bryan to suffer a
straight penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor; and Giovan to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. Both were ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally Gina Marie Mobley in the amount of P100,000.00 for and as moral damages, plus costs; and
furthermore, pay, jointly and severally, the offended party attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00 in the two cases.
Bryan and Giovan filed separate appeals.
Issue: Whether the alleged lack of arraignment nullifies the proceedings against Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino.
Held: Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the
defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf. However, it
becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
information. The reason proffered by Bryan and Giovan for their refusal to be arraigned, i.e., that to do so would
supposedly constitute a waiver of their right to appeal the resolutions of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice, appears
to be specious. Evidently, Bryan and Giovan only wanted the trial court to suspend the arraignment to enable them to
exhaust their remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice. However, Bryan and Giovan had no valid ground to move that
their arraignment be held in abeyance, considering that at that time they had not filed a petition for review of the
prosecutors resolution before the Department of Justice. It is also important to stress that to nullify the proceedings had
before the court a quo would set a dangerous precedent. For, all that an accused would do is to refuse to be arraigned and
then proceed to trial, and if found guilty would just invoke the absence of arraignment to set aside the proceedings had in
the trial court. Such practice would run counter to the purpose and spirit of our rules of procedure which is: to help
achieve an orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Nonetheless, Bryan and Giovan were substantially informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutors resolution
maintaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language
or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to Bryan and Giovan.
Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the
complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk and deny the charges against them. The
conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature
and cause of the accusations against them. Interestingly, after the arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed
invalidity or defect thereof. Rather, Bryan and Giovan and their counsel vigorously and fully participated in the trial of the
case. Bryan and Giovan are clearly estopped to question the alleged invalidity of or infirmity in their arraignment. By
actively participating in the trial of the case, they have effectively waived whatever procedural error there was in their
arraignment. In short, whatever was the defect in their arraignment was substantially cured by their own omission and
subsequent actions.

Page 84 of 155

People vs. Valdesancho [GR 137051-52, 30 May 2001]

Puno, J.:
Facts: Vicente Valdesancho y Delmo is the husband of Elvie's sister, Erlinda Valdesancho. Elvie and her two younger brothers,
Erick and Eddie, lived with their brother in the mountains of Barangay Minayutan, Famy, Laguna. In 1994, however, Elvie's
mother, Leonida Basco, requested the spouses Erlinda and Valdesancho to let Elvie, Erick and Eddie live in their house in San
Antonio, Mabitac, Laguna. The three were going to study in Barangay San Antonio. They resided with the accused from 24
June 1994 to June 1995. Elvie was then 14 years old and in Grade 1 at the Barangay San Antonio School. The first incident of
rape happened in the early morning of 15 August 1994. Elvie was in the house of Valdesancho while Erlinda was then in
Manila. Valdesancho succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Elvie, subsequent to Valdesancho's order to powder his back.
Valdesancho warned her not to reveal the dastardly act to anybody, otherwise he would kill her and her family. All this time,
Elvie's brothers were sleeping in the other room. The second incident of rape happened in the evening of 16 August 1994. Elvie
was in the house of Valdesancho studying. He called Elvie to his room and ordered her to look under the bed for a chick.
Valdesancho again had carnal knowledge of her against her will. Again, Valdesancho threatened Elvie not to report the incident
to anybody, otherwise he would kill her and her family. Elvie kept her harrowing experience to herself for fear that Valdesancho
would carry out his threat. In September 1995, however, when Elvie was already residing with her brother and mother in
Barangay Minayutan, Famy, Laguna, she reported the rape incidents to her Tiya Soling. She was fearful that Valdesancho might
rape her again. Although she no longer lived with Valdesancho, the latter stayed in their (Elvie's) house in Barangay Minayutan
for less than a month in September 1995 and he gave her malicious looks. Tiya Soling reported the rape incidents to Elvie's
mother who verified the story from Elvie herself. On 15 January 1996, Elvie executed a sworn statement at the Mabitac Police
Station narrating the rape incidents. On 27 March 1996, two informations were filed against Valdesancho. In Criminal Case S1964, the information reads "That on or about August 15, 1994 at Sitio Mahabang Parang, Barangay Nanguma, Municipality of
Mabitac, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs
and by means of force and violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Elvie B. Basco, 15 years old, single (,) against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. Contrary to law." In
Criminal Case S-1965, the information reads "That on or about the evening of August 16, 1994 at Sitio Mahabang Parang,
Barangay Nanguma, Municipality of Mabitac, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd designs and by means of force and violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Elvie B. Basco, 15 years of age, single (,) against her will and consent and to her
damage and prejudice. Contrary to law." Valdesancho denied the rape charges leveled against him. He contends that Elvie, with
the assistance of her mother Leonida, filed the instant cases against him because of the serious quarrel between his wife,
Erlinda, and Leonida spurred by Leonida's relationship with a lesbian named Melita Flores. The trial court upheld the
prosecution's story. The court found Valdesancho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "rape" committed against
Elvie Basco, in the 2 informations for rape, and sentenced him to 2 Reclusion Perpetua; to pay the victim the sum of
P100,000.00 for moral damages in the two (2) cases; and to pay the cost. Valdesancho appealed.
Issue: Whether Valdesancho was denied due process when he was convicted for rapes alleged committed August 15 and 16,
1993, when the information alleged such rapes were committed on August 15 and 16, 1994.
Held: Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without
due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which took effect on 1 December 2000, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict an accused for an offense not alleged
in the complaint or information violates such right. Herein, the informations in Criminal Cases S-1964 and S-1965 charged
Valdesancho with rape committed against Elvie Basco on 15 August 1994 and 16 August 1994, respectively. All evidence of
the prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by Valdesancho on these dates. Valdesancho interposed the defense of
alibi. He proved that on these dates he was in the town of Sta. Maria helping a friend butcher a pig for the town fiesta. He also
proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie, was no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She already transferred to
Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where she was in Grade 2. Despite the parties' evidence, the trial court convicted Valdesancho for
allegedly raping Elvie on August 15 and 16, 1993. Without doubt, the accused was not given any chance to prove where he was
on August 15 and 16, 1993. What he did was to prove where he was on August 15 and 16, 1994 for the informations charged
him with rapes on those specific dates. He had no opportunity to defend himself on the rapes allegedly committed on the earlier
dates. This is plain denial of due process.

Page 85 of 155

People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002]

Davide Jr., C.J.:
Facts: At 1:00 p.m. of 29 August 1997, SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, arriving at the house of Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio in
Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna,found the house in disarray. He saw a naked woman lying dead on a wooden bed
with both hands and feet tied from behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The dead woman was Wendy Alcalde, and the
dead child was Arwin Alcalde. Some clothes and a puppy were also burned. Avendao and his team recovered a piece of
steel near Wendys face and empty bottles of gin and Royal Tru-Orange on top of the cabinet. They took pictures of the
dead bodies and caused the entry of the incident in the police blotter. He learned later that Arnel's two daughters, Bernalyn
and Erica, had been rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived at the crime scene. On
24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed before the trial court two informations against
Arnel for parricide, committed against his wife Wendy and his 11-month old son Arwin, and two informations for
frustrated parricide, committed against his two daughters Bernalyn and Erica the before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
28, Santa Cruz, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, Arnel, who was assisted by a counsel de parte,
refused to speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea of not
guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and
jointly tried. The witnesses initially presented by the prosecution were SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, Dr. Nilo Pempengco, Dr.
June Mendoza, and Salud Suillan. After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed
a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense, through
counsel de parte Atty. Renato B. Vasquez, Sr., filed a demurrer to evidence based on the grounds that (a) The accused has
not been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not an iota of
incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and presented by the prosecution during the trial; and
(c) The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any evidence or contrary
presumption. In its Order of 22 May 1998, the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the dates for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4 June 1998, Atty. Vasquez informed the
court that the defense opted not to present evidence for Arnels defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its Comment on the manifestation and prayed for the re-opening
of the presentation of prosecutions evidence for the purpose of proving that Arnel was at the scene of the crime. In its
Order of 21 August 1998, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense questioned
the propriety of the said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. In its resolution of 17 December
1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, and for the
further reason that the order sought to be set aside was interlocutory in character and could not, therefore, be the subject of
a petition for certiorari; and that even granting that the exception applied, the trial court committed no capriciousness in
issuing the assailed order. The prosecution thereafter presented SPO1 Neptali de la Cruz and Jose Alcalde as additional
witnesses. After the prosecution finally rested its case, the trial court set on 8 October 1998 the presentation of the
evidence for the defense. However, on 7 October 1998, counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of
his inability to communicate with Arnel because of Arnels out of touch of the world behavior. Atty. Vasquez
manifested that the defense was constrained to submit the case for decision. In its decision of 30 April 1999, the trial court
found that the prosecutions evidence has duly established a succession of circumstantial evidence that leads to the
inescapable conclusion that Arnel committed the crimes charged. The court found Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt
(Criminal Cases SC-6651 and SC- 6654) for the killing of Wendy and Arwin, and imposed upon him the penalty of death
in both cases. Likewise, the court found Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated parricide
(Criminal Cases SC-6652 and SC-6653), after considering the severity of the wounds suffered by his daughters Bernalyn
and Erika. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether arraignment may be had when the accused is suffering from an unsound mental health.
Held: The failure of Arnels counsel de parte to ask for the suspension of his arraignment on the ground that Arnel was
suffering from an unsound mental health did not amount to a waiver of such right. It must be recalled that Arnels
arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which reads "The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears
to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary,
his confinement for such purpose." Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the accused be filed for the
suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a
Page 86 of 155

suspension of arraignment. True, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a motion by the
proper party, but this new requirement of motion by the proper party could not be applied to these cases because the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000. Besides,
a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such right. Unfortunately, Arnel was
apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by Arnel at
the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or
discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to
investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make
a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of
detention until his faculties are recovered. Moreover, the aforementioned Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the
suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the accused should it appear that he is of unsound mind. In
these cases, the trial court should have ascertained Arnels mental state instead of proceeding with his arraignment and its
subsequent proceedings. The physical and outward manifestations of Arnel at the time of his arraignment, which were
brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered Arnel
unfit to be arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases. The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in
assuming that Arnel was in full possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against him. The
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries
with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare
for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully
satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. Under the circumstances in
these cases, the trial court gravely failed in this regard.

Page 87 of 155

People vs. Ostia [GR 131804, 26 February 2003]

Callejo Sr., J.:
Facts: The Spouses Ponciano Onato and Edita Onato resided with their 4-year old daughter, Beverly Onato, in Sitio
Mactang, Barangay Ilo, Sto. Nio, Samar. Ponciano was a fisherman and a farmer but was employed by Tito Soria in his
buy-and-sell of fish business. Roberto Ostia, a co-worker of Ponciano, resided in the poblacion of Sto. Nio. On 13 May
1995, a Saturday, at about 7:00 p.m., Rufo Legaspi (a carpenter, a Barangay Tanod, and a neighbor of Ponciano) was
seated near his house, resting before retiring for the evening, when he saw Roberto, with Beverly perched on his right
shoulder, walking towards the direction of the poblacion. Robertos left hand was holding the right hand of Mary Donoso,
a 9-year old playmate of Beverly. The trio were in animated conversation on their way towards the poblacion. After the
lapse of an hour or so, Edita noticed that Beverly had not yet returned to their house. She went out of the house to look for
her daughter. Rufo told Edita that earlier he saw Beverly perched on the shoulder of Roberto on their way towards the
direction of the poblacion. Thereafter, Roberto sauntered by; however, Beverly was no longer with him. Puzzled, Edita
inquired from Roberto where Beverly was. Instead of responding, Roberto fled. Edita was flustered. Rufo, who witnessed
the incident, advised Edita to report the incident to the police authorities. Edita rushed back home and woke up Ponciano.
She told her husband that Beverly had been taken by Roberto and that Beverly had not yet returned home. The couple
rushed from their house and reported the incident to the police authorities. With the help of their neighbors and police
officers Manuel Toribio and Dodong Espino, the couple looked for Beverly but failed to locate her. They resumed their
search the next day, 14 May 1995, and, at 3:00 p.m., they found Beverly sprawled in a grassy portion below a copra kiln
about 120 meters away from the house of the Onato couple and about 15 meters from the nearest house. Beverly was
already dead. Pictures of Beverly were taken where her body was found. Lorenzo Bernabe, the Municipal Sanitary
Inspector who had been trained by the District Hospital to perform autopsies in the absence of the Municipal District
Officer (Dr. Renato Ortiz), performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Beverly. On 18 May 1995, a criminal complaint for
rape with homicide was filed by Ponciano against Roberto with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and after the requisite
preliminary investigation, an Information charging Roberto with Rape with Homicide was filed on 7 December 1995 with
Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City which reads "That on or about the 13th day of May, 1995, at
about 7:00 oclock in the evening, at Sitio Mactang, Barangay Ilo, Municipality of Sto. Nio, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge against a minor four
(4) years old girl, BEVERLY ONATO, without the latters consent and against her will, and thereafter, with deliberate
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict upon the said Beverly Onato fatal wounds on
the different parts of her body, which caused her untimely death. Contrary to law." On the date set for his arraignment,
Roberto appeared without counsel. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Artemio Apostol as counsel de oficio of
Roberto. Said counsel prayed for the resetting of the arraignment to 30 January 1996 to enable him to secure a copy of the
necropsy report and study the case intelligently. The court granted the motion. During the arraignment of Roberto on 30
January 1996, he, through his counsel de oficio, manifested to the court that he was willing to plead guilty to the lesser
offense of murder. However, the public prosecutor prayed for a continuance so that he could consult the provincial
prosecutor and the father of the victim, Ponciano, on the offer of Roberto. The arraignment of Roberto was reset to 29
February 1996, on which date, he, through his counsel de oficio, moved that a reinvestigation be conducted by the public
prosecutor. The motion was granted by the trial court. However, despite notice from the office of the public prosecutor,
Roberto failed to adduce controverting evidence. On motion of the prosecution, the arraignment of Roberto was set on 9
August 1996. When arraigned on said date, Roberto, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of Not
Guilty to the charge of rape with homicide. Trial ensued. During the trial set on 6 May 1997, Roberto, through counsel,
moved that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty to rape with homicide and to enter a plea of guilty to murder.
Ponciano, the father of Beverly, and the public prosecutor agreed to Robertos pleading guilty to murder. On 19 May
1997, Roberto, per Certificate of Re-arraignment signed by the Branch Clerk of Court, was re-arraigned for the lesser
offense of murder and pleaded guilty thereto. The court then informed Roberto that the penalty for murder was reclusion
perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and that the court may impose the death penalty on him depending on the
circumstances found by the trial court. When trial resumed on 22 May 1997, for the prosecution to continue presenting its
evidence, Roberto took the witness stand to answer more questions from the court. During the trial on 26 May 1997, the
prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence. The court admitted all the prosecutions documentary evidence
without any objection from Roberto. The latter did not anymore adduce any testimonial and documentary evidence in his
behalf and on said date, the court issued an order declaring that the case was submitted for its decision. On 25 August
1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding Roberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder with the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation and with the generic aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of confidence
Page 88 of 155

considering that Roberto and Ponciano were co-workers, (b) nighttime considering that Beverly was killed in the evening
and (c) despoblado considering that the nearest house to the situs criminis was 14 meters. The court sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death, to pay the costs, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Beverly Onato in the amount of
P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic appeal.
Issue: Whether the trial court porperly informed the accused of the nature of the charges against him.
Held: The trial court is required to probe thoroughly into the reasons as well as the facts and circumstances for the change
of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged
as well as the nature and effect of qualifying circumstances, generic aggravating circumstances and mitigating
circumstances in the commission thereof; and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the crime
for which he would plead guilty to. Herein, the Information was merely read and translated to Ostia in the waray dialect
which he understood. The trial court informed Ostia that by pleading guilty, he admitted all the facts alleged in the
Information and that the court would no longer conduct any trial but that it would impose on him the proper penalty for
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a heinous crime under RA 7659 punishable by two
indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death and that either of said penalties may be imposed on him
depending upon the circumstances which may ultimately be appreciated by the court. When asked by the trial court if he
pleaded guilty on his own volition, and if nobody forced, threatened or coerced him into admitting having killed Beverly,
Ostia answered that he admitted having killed Beverly on his own free will. Thus, the trial court failed to comply with its
duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that Ostia did not even know how to read and
write. In fact, he merely affixed his thumbmark on the Waiver of Right to a Preliminary Investigation. The trial court
failed to explain to Ostia (a) the nature of murder and the elements thereof; (b) that killing Beverly, a four-year old girl,
constituted treachery, a qualifying circumstance; Ostia being unlettered could not be presumed to understand the
requisites of treachery, a highly technical legal term; (c) the nature and effect of a qualifying aggravating circumstance in
the killing of Beverly and its effect on the penalty that may be imposed on him; (d) what heinous crimes are and the
meaning and import of indivisible penalties; (e) the specific circumstances which may be considered by the court in the
imposition of reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (f) whether his plea of guilty after the prosecution had commenced
presenting its evidence may still be considered by the trial court as a mitigating circumstance; (g) the nature of civil
liabilities that he may be ordered to pay and the amounts thereof. The trial court even failed to probe into the reasons for
Ostias change of plea from not guilty of rape with homicide to guilty of murder and for his failure to adduce
evidence during the reinvestigation of the case despite having been granted the right to do so by the trial court. The trial
court did not even bother inquiring from Ostia whether he sought the advice of his counsel before pleading guilty to
murder and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his behalf to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission
of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding the improvident plea of
guilty of Ostia, the Court found it unnecessary to remand the case to the trial court. This is so because independent of
Ostias plea of guilty and his testimony admitting liability for Beverlys death, the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
albeit circumstantial, established the guilt of Ostia for murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Page 89 of 155

People v. Cachapero [ G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004 ]

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years old, went to play with Lorena
Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. During that occasion,
appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis
into her sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her parents because he might be scolded. On September
2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class in Reading to her Grade I and II students. While they
were reading the word tagtuyot or saluyot, one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was sexually
abused by Manong Larry. She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind.
She confronted Anna and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face with her two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers
had a conference, after which they decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.
Issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of private complainant which
is full of inconsistencies.
Held: Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that the Information was fatally defective for
failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his right to be
properly informed of the charge against him.We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This
being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed sometime in March 1998 which, according to private
complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school year. Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation
sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that
the information must state, among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense. Moreover, objections as
to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the present appellant found the
Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly
informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform
with the prescribed form. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal
defect in the Information. By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the defense,
appellants counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore, the defense never objected to the presentation of the
prosecution evidence proving that the offense had been committed in March 1998. Appellant has not shown that he was
deprived of a proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said, therefore, that his constitutionally
protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.

Page 90 of 155

Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924]
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five
information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than
on 8 different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than 1 year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether mandamus will ie to compel the dismissal of the information in light of delays in the trial of the case.
Held: The Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order
that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her
consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon the appropriate
information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to
set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal
obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
Thus, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. Hence, the
Supreme Court ordered the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas to abstain from further attempts to prosecute Conde pursuant to
informations, and dismissed the charges pending before the justice of the of Lucena, Tayabas.

Page 91 of 155

Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995]

Quiason, J.:
Facts: In 1985, Jaime C. Dacanay was the vice-president of the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). In
1986, a criminal complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983
and 1984 by NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the principal officers of the said corporation including
Dacanay. On 10 October 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the resolution of the team of Special Prosecutors who
investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie evidence against Dacanay and his co-accused to warrant the filing of
an information with Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The corresponding
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On November 20, Dacabat filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew
the same. On 14 October 1988, a resolution was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P. Gervacio and Robert E.
Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the complaint against Dacanay and his co-accused for lack of sufficient evidence
and the withdrawal of the information filed in court. The resolution was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose
Ferrer. On 6 January 1989, the resolution issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was reviewed by special Prosecutor
Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its disapproval. The recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia was approved by
Acting Special Prosecutor Jose F. Guerrero and by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. On February 22, Jose Unson,
Dacanay's co-accused, filed a motion to quash the information in the Sandiganbayan. The motion was adopted by
Dacanay. On December 12, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration filed
by Unson and adopted by Dacanay was denied. On 3 April 1991, Dacanay filed a motion for immediate and separate trial
invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial. On April 23, the People of the Philippines opposed the said motion on
the ground that a separate trial for Dacanay would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding. In a resolution dated 24
April 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion. On June 6, Dacanay filed a motion for reconsideration setting
forth as grounds therefor his advanced age and the protection of his reputation. On July 9, the People of the Philippines
filed a comment to Dacanay's motion for reconsideration and alleged that the parties should first await the resolution of
the petition for certiorari filed by his co-accused Jose Unson with the Supreme Court. In a resolution dated 6 August 1991,
the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion for reconsideration. Dacanay filed the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether Dacanay is entitled to a separate trial.
Held: Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states: "When two or more accused are
jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or
any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused." The resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the
Government (due to a repetition of the presentation of the same evidence) cannot be given preference over the right to
speedy trial and the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. This is particularly true
in Dacanay's case where the prosecutors' opposition to the request for separate trial was based on the ground that the
principal accused in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused
cannot be placed under arrest because he remains outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason
should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial. A separate trial is in consonance with the right
of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2) of
Article III thereof. Herein, it has been 8 years since the information against Dacanay was filed, but the case against him
has yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced Dacanay, who is now more than 73 years of age.

Page 92 of 155

Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973]

Fernando, J.:
Facts: In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by Judge Gregorio N. Garcia, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations all dated 16 January 1968, 8 criminal actions against Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and
Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case F109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case
F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case F-109197, for maltreatment; (2)
Criminal Case F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against
Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the
Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case F-109200, for slander. The trial of the cases
was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20; May 4 and 11; June 1, 15, 22, and 29; and August 3 and 10,
1968. All 14 trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the
parties and the Court upon the insistence of Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the
cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual
criminal trial days. The trial of the cases in question were held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in
the chambers of Judge Garcia. During all 14 days of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused were at all
times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day when Atty. Consengco, representing Calo and Carbonnel,
was absent. This was on 20 April 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and Carbonnel crossexamined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel,
asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco,
submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges
against the latter. The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on 23 September 1968. This was postponed to 28
September 1968, at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to
1 October 1968, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also
entered his appearance as counsel for Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon
and supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. Early in the morning of 1 October 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru
their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. After proceedings
duly had, Judge Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order declaring that the constitutional and statutory rights of the
accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the public; and ordering the
city court Judge (Garcia) "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered
already in the criminal cases in question pending in his Court, until further orders of the CFI. A motion for reconsideration
proving unavailing, Garcia and Lorenzana on 28 January 1969, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by means of a
suit for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the conduct of the trial inside the Judges air-conditioned chambers, rather than the usual open court,
render the proceedings violative of the constitutional mandate for public trial.
Held: The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of the petition explicitly enumerated the
right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner, and thus serve as a deterrence to arbitrariness. There is no ambiguity in the
words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural
due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is
posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There
is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized
as "offensive to decency or public morals." Still, herein, when the trial was held on Saturdays and in the air-conditioned
chambers of the City Judge for the convenience of the parties and of the Judge, the proceedings were not violative of the
Page 93 of 155

right to public trial. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room
allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with
what offense he may be charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least 14 hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling the apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional
command. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on
procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the
general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the
occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more
considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied
whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his
demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because,
it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.

Page 94 of 155

Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000]

Mendoza, J.:
Facts: According to Soriano, Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, who were members of the Caloocan police, barged
into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, shortly after midnight on 7 November 1991, looking for
Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Ruel Garcia gave Soriano fist blows on the face 4 times with his left hand,
while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" (You son of a
bitch chief"). Although there were 4 barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and
Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of Soriano because they were held at bay by Pedro
Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Soriano was treated for his
injuries in the hospital. On the other hand, Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He alleged that he went to the
barangay hall in the evening of 6 November 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested for figuring in
a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo, and beaten up by Soriano. As Garcia saw Soriano near the door of the
barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latter's arrest. Apparently thinking that
Garcia was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, Soriano angrily told Garcia to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis
dito" (Your being a policeman doesn't pull strings here"). When Garcia insisted on going inside the barangay hall, Soriano
blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Garcia also pushed Soriano, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and
injure himself. All the time, Garcia claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent's uncle, Pedro Garcia,
then arrived and took him home. Garcia was charged with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, for direct
assault (Criminal Case C- 40740). on 26 August 1992, before Garcia's arraignment, she called the parties and their
counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, to which Soriano refused. The hearing on 15 September
1992 was postponed to September 16 to allow Garcias counsel to prepare for the case. On 15 March 1993, the trial court
acquitted Garcia. In acquitting Garcia, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that Soriano did not resist or even
say anything when Garcia allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to
his aid. She thought that if Soriano had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a
contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. The judge also excluded from
the evidence the testimonies of Soriano and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not
been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, 534 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Soriano filed a
petition for certiorari, alleging that the decision is void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether the judge was biased in trying to make the parties arrive at an amicable settlement , and allowing Garcias
counsel to postpone the hearing on the 16 September 1992 instead of 15 September 1992.
Held: It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough evidence to prove the
charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office
to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of
bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Herein, the judge's efforts to have the parties arrive at an
amicable settlement is not evidence of partiality for Garcia. She could have been motivated by factors other than a desire
to clear Garcia of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her court docket or in setting a good example considering that
Soriano and Garcia were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenance of peace and order in the
community. As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after 3 weeks to give garcia more time to persuade
Soriano to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling
cases who assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the 15 September 1992
hearing, on the other hand, was made to give Garcia's counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and
prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of Garcia, it was for the purpose of assisting the
latter at the arraignment because the regular counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case.
A postponement to the next day, 16 September 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve
resetting the case since 16 September 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial dates.Nor is there any
showing that the judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision acquitting
Garcia shows that the same was made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense.
Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily based on her
appreciation of the eligibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.

Page 95 of 155

Right to confront witnesses

United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918]
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated
in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to
look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to
the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20,
encountered Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found the carabao tied in front of
the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by
Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of Javier. Javier was charged for stealing the carabao before the justice of
the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of sergeant Presca,
now deceased, was presented in court by the prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was identified. Javier alleged
that the lower court erred in admitting said sworn statement as evidence.
Issue: Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by a person now deceased, is inadmissible in as much as the
accused is not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author thereof.
Held: The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to meet
the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states taht "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as
facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it
the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question
and answer under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the
Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a
witness deceased, given in a former action between the same relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception
provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is
also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part
of the preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, the sworn statement was improperly received in evidence in
the lower court. Still, although the Court could find this to be reversible error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a
new trial. The Court however is convinced that this would gain the accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the
owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused,
is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Page 96 of 155

Right to secure attendance of witnesses

People vs. de Luna [GR 77969, 22 June 1989]
Gancayco, J.:
Facts: Patrick de Luna was charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, under the
following information, "That on or about the 17th day of December 1986, at about 7:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with deliberate intent, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Tricia
by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries:
'Cardio respiratory arrest, secondary to severe multiple injuries, traumatic.' and as a consequence of said injuries Tricia
died in the next day. Contrary to law." De Luna, assisted by Counsel-de-Oficio Atty. David Ompoc, when arraigned on 23
December 1986, entered a plea of guilty with the qualification that "hindi ko sinasadya." The accused allegedly waived his
right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for the court the degree of culpability of the accused
under the present charge. The trial court, on 23 December 1986, rendered the decision convicting de Luna of the crime of
Murder, and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of
P30,000.00. de Luna appealed.
Issue: Whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, when the accused pleaded guilty
during the arraignment.
Held: The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of
the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the
complaint or information. While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the
aggravating and qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification stated by de Luna as regards his plea of
guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its
consequences. Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect of the technical language used in the
information qualifying the acts constituting the offense. In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission
of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the
court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under the circumstances of the case, de Luna's qualified plea
of guilty is not a valid plea of guilty. While the Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an accused to
enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances, considering, however,
the gravity of the offense charged, the more prudent course for the trial court to follow is to reject the plea made by de
Luna and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence. When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf. Thus, after a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the
accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.

Page 97 of 155

Right to be present during trial

People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006
Facts: Sometime in 1989, Rufina Chua met respondent Wilfred Chiok. He represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an
expert in the stock market. He then encouraged Rufina to invest her money in stocks, requesting her to designate him as her
stockbroker. On respondent's prodding, she agreed. For several years, respondent acted as Rufina's stockbroker. She made a
profit out of their transactions, prompting her to trust respondent in handling her stock investments. In 1995, respondent
encouraged Rufina to purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her earning. Hence, in June 1995, she entrusted to him the
amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited the amount of P7,100,000.00 in
respondent's account. With respect to the remaining P2,463,900.00, she personally gave it to him. Thereupon, he told her to wait
for one week A week elapsed, but she did not hear from him. Upon her inquiry, he advised her to wait for another week, but still
there was no news from him. Finally, when she was able to contact him, he admitted that he spent the money. At any rate, he
issued two checks as payment but when she deposited them in the drawee bank, they were dishonored for insufficient funds. In
a letter dated October 25, 1995, Rufina demanded payment from respondent, but this remained unheeded. Upon inquiry, Rufina
came to know that respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. Immediately,
she caused the filing of an information for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 109927. During the arraignment, respondent, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
and posted bail. Trial ensued. Respondent denied the charge against him. He testified that he was not an employee of Bernard
Securities, Inc.; that he buys and sells U.S. dollars and that Rufina used to buy dollars from him; that what actually existed
between them was an unregistered partnership; and that he received the amount of P9,563,900.00 as her investment in their
partnership. After the presentation of the parties' evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999.
However, respondent and his counsel failed to appear on said date. The promulgation was re-set to February 1, 1999. On
February 1, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. During the promulgation of the
judgment, respondent and his counsel failed to appear despite notice. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Bail on the ground that there is an indication that respondent might flee or commit another crime.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the arrest of respondent.
Held: The trial court correctly cancelled respondent's bail because of his failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment
despite notice. He violated the condition of his bail that he must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that
court or the Rules.[2] Simply stated, he jumped bail. As such, his arrest, as ordered by the trial court, is proper.[3] This is in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides in part, thus:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the court in which it was rendered. x x x
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring
him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. x x x
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The last paragraph of Section 6 quoted above authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of respondent's
failure to appear despite notice. It bears stressing that the rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the
situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.
Here, respondent tried in vain to subvert the judicial process by not appearing during the promulgation of judgment. Thus, he
lost his remedies against the judgment. In fact, he cannot challenge successfully the cancellation of his bail by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the arrest of respondent. Its declaration that respondent might flee or commit
another crime is conjectural utterly lacks merit. Respondent already demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice.

Page 98 of 155

Aquino vs. Military Commission No.2 [GR L-37364, 9 May 1975]

Aquino, J.:
Facts: Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was arrested on 23 September
1972, pursuant to General Order 2-A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political and state power in
the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio in Rizal province. On 25 September
1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus in which he questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his
arrest and detention. The Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it, and required the Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philipines, the Secretary of National Defense, etc. to file their respective answers, after which the
case was heard. Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda. Aquino's last Reply memorandum was dated 30
November 1972. On 17 September 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of martial law
and the arrest and detention of Aquino. The original petition in the case was filed on 23 August 1973. It sought to restrain
the Military Commission from proceeding with the hearing and trial of Aquino on 27 August 1973. Because of the
urgency of the petition, the Supreme Court called a hearing on Sunday, August 26, on the question of whether with its
membership of only 9 Justices, it had a quorum to take cognizance of the petition in view of the constitutional questions
involved. At that hearing, the Court asked the parties to agree to seek from the Military Commission a postponement of
Aquino's trial the following day. The purpose was to relieve the Court of the pressure of having to decide the question of
quorum without adequate time to do so. When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened the following day,
however, Aquino questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings
even as he discharged both his defense counsel of choice and his military defense counsel. The proceedings were
thereupon adjourned to another day. In the meantime, for Aquino's assurance, a Special Committee, composed of a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court, to be designated by the Chief Justice, as Chairman, and four (4) members to be designated
respectively by petitioner, the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary
of National Defense, was created to reinvestigate the charges against Aquino. The Secretaries of Justice and National
Defense designated their representatives but Aquino refused to name his. The Chief Justice asked former Justice J. B. L.
Reyes but the latter declined, as he also declined in his capacity as President of the IBP to designate a representative to the
Committee. As a result, with only two of its members designated, the Special Committee has not been able to function.
On 4 September 1973, a supplemental petition alleging the creation of the Special Committee and questioning the legality
of its creation was filed. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Secretary of Justice were included as
respondents. Subsequently, the Court resolved to require the respondents to file their answer and on 21 August 1974,
within the extended period granted by the Court, respondents, with, the exception of the Chief Justice, filed their answer
to the supplemental petition. Thereafter, Aquino was required to file a reply and was granted additional time after the
lapse of the original period, but instead of doing so, Aquino asked for the admission of a second supplemental petition
challenging the continued enforcement of martial law in the Philippines, in the light of Presidential statements to the effect
that with the coming into force of the new Constitution on 17 January 1973, martial law was "technically and legally"
lifted. To this petition respondents answered. Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral
argument as per Resolution of the Supreme Court on 14 January 1975. On 24 March 1975, Aquino filed an "Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission
be prohibited from proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated 10 March 1975, the same being
illegal, until further orders from the Supreme Court. On 14 April 1975, the Supreme Court issued a restraining order
against Military Commission No. 2, restraining it from further proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its
Order dated 10 March 1975 until the matter is heard and further orders are issued. When the case was called for hearing,
Aquino's counsel presented to this Court a motion to withdraw the petition, as well as all other pending matters and/or
incidents in connection therewith. Respondents' counsel interposed objections to the granting of the aforesaid motion to
withdraw. After the hearing, the Supreme Court Resolved: "(a) to require the Solicitor General to furnish the Court as well
as the petitioner and the latter's counsel, with copies of the transcript of all the stenographic notes taken at the hearing
before the Military Commission No. 2 for the perpetuation of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution in various
criminal cases filed against herein petitioner, within five (5) days from today; (b) to request the Solicitor General and the
AFP Judge Advocate General to make the necessary arrangements for the petitioner to confer with his counsel on matters
connected with the aforementioned motion to withdraw; (c) to allow counsel for the petitioner, if they so desire, to file a
manifestation in amplification of the aforesaid motion to withdraw, within ten (10) days from the date they confer with the
petitioner, and thereafter to allow the Solicitor General to file a counter-manifestation within ten (10) days from receipt of
a copy thereof; and (d) to consider the case submitted for decision after submission by both parties of their respective
pleadings on the motion to withdraw." Subsequently, the parties manifested their compliance.
Page 99 of 155

Issue: Whether Aquino may waive his right to be present during the hearings before the Military Commission.
Held: As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if such waiver is
not against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony,
involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of
modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." There are, for instance, certain rights secured to the
individual by the fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in
person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet
the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial
trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all
of these rights may be waived. Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." Thus, considering the
provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there
appears, therefore, no logical reason why Aquino, although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from
waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right was conferred upon
him for his protection and benefit. Further, Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for
the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the
deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver," Similarly, Presidential Decree 328 expressly
provides that "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver."
Herein, then, Aquino has the full right to waive his presence at said proceedings. Since only 6 Justices (Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino) are of the view that Aquino may waive his right to be present at
all stages of the proceedings while 5 Justices (Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra, Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in agreement
that he may so waive such right, except when he is to be identified, the result is that the Military Commission's Order
requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified, in the sense that Aquino's presence
shall be required only in the instance just indicated.

Page 100 of 155

People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986]

Cruz, J.:
Facts: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of
Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled
the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia
under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the
accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.
Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.
Held: Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the
disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avancea (32 OG 713) required his presence at
certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained
at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus
operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he
had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in
absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction
provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is
unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution
intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a
waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure
to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Page 101 of 155

Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 130191, 27 April 1998]
Kapunan, J.:
Facts: In 1990, the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city government of Davao. The goal of
said project was to make Davao City a leading center for computer systems and technology development. It also aimed to
provide consultancy and training services and to assist all local government units in Mindanao set up their respective
computer systems. To implement the project, a Computerization Program Committee, composed of the following was
formed: Atty. Benjamin C. de Guzman (City Administrator) as Chairman; and Mr. Jorge Silvosa (Acting City Treasurer),
Atty. Victorino Advincula (City Councilor), Mr. Alexis Almendras (City Councilor), Atty. Onofre Francisco (City Legal
Officer), Mr. Rufino Ambrocio, Jr. (Chief of Internal Control Office), and Atty. Mariano Kintanar (COA Resident
Auditor) as members. The Committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar computers manufactured by Goldstar
Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc.
(SPI), the total contract cost amounting to P11,656,810.00. On 5 November 1990, the City Council (Sangguniang
Panlungsod) of Davao unanimously passed Resolution 1402 and Ordinance 173 approving the proposed contract for
computerization between Davao City and SPI. The Sanggunian, likewise, authorized the City Mayor (Rodrigo R. Duterte)
to sign the said contract for and in behalf of Davao City. On the same day, the Sanggunian issued Resolution 1403 and
Ordinance 174, the General Fund Supplemental Budget 07 for CY 1990 appropriating P3,000,000.00 for the city's
computerization project. Sometime in February 1991, a complaint (Civil Case 20,550-91), was instituted before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12 by Dean Pilar Braga, Hospicio C. Conanan, Jr. and Korsung Dabaw
Foundation, Inc. against the Duterte, de Guzman, the City Council, various city officials and SPI for the judicial
declaration of nullity of the resolutions and ordinances and the computer contract executed pursuant thereto with SPI. On
22 February 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a proposal to Duterte for the cancellation of the
computerization contract. Consequently, on 8 April 1991, the Sanggunian issued Resolution 449 and Ordinance 53
accepting Goldstar's offer to cancel the computerization contract provided the latter return the advance payment of
P1,748,521.58 to the City Treasurer's Office within a period of 1 month. On 6 May 1991, Duterte, in behalf of Davao
City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly refunded. The city government, intent on
pursuing its computerization plan, following the recommendation of Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit,
sought the assistance of the National Computer Center (NCC). The NCC recommended the acquisition of Philips
computers in the amount of P15,792,150.00. Davao City complied with the NCC's advice and hence, was finally able to
obtain the needed computers. On 1 August 1991, the Anti-Graft League-Davao City Chapter, through one Miguel C.
Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Duterte and de Guzman, the City
Treasurer, City Auditor, the whole city government of Davao and SPI, alleging that the latter, in entering into the
computerization contract, violated RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), PD 1445 (Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code and other pertinent penal laws (OMB-391-1768). On 14 October 1991, Judge Paul T. Arcangel, issued an Order dismissing Civil Case 20,550-91. On 12
November 1991, Graft Investigator Manriquez issued an order in OMB-3-91-1768 directing Jorge Silvosa (City
Treasurer), Mariano Kintanar (City Auditor) and Manuel T. Asis of SPI to file in 10 days their respective verified pointby-point comment under oath upon every allegation of the complaint in Civil Case 20,550-91. On 4 December 1991, the
Ombudsman received the affidavits of the Special Audit Team but failed to furnish Duterte, et. al. copies thereof. On 18
February 1992, Duterte, et. al. submitted a manifestation adopting the comments filed by Jorge Silvosa and Mariano
Kintanar dated 25 November 1991 and 17 January 1992, respectively. Four years after, or on 22 February 1996, Duterte,
et.al. received a copy of a Memorandum prepared by Special Prosecution Officer I, Lemuel M. De Guzman dated 8
February 1996 addressed to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto regarding OMB-MIN-90-0425 and OMB-3-91-1768.
Instead of the charges of malversation, violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 177, Revised Penal Code,
Prosecutor De Guzman recommended that Duterte, et. al. be charged under Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 "for having entered into
a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, the elements of profit, unwarranted benefits or loss
to government being immaterial." Accordingly, Duterte, et. al. were charged before the Sandiganbayan in an information
dated 8 February 1996 (Criminal Case 23193). On 27 February 1996, Duterte, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration
and on 29 March 1996, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that, among others, "petitioners were
deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their case." On 19 March
1996, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution denying Duterte, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration. On 18 June 1997, Duterte,
et. al. filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 27 June 1997. On 15 July 1997,
Duterte, et. al. moved for reconsideration of the above order but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan for lack of
Page 102 of 155

merit in its Resolution dated 5 August 1997. Duterte and de Guzman filed a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there was unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted preliminary investigation.
Held: Compounding the deprivation of Duterte's and de Guzman's right to a preliminary investigation was the undue and
unreasonable delay in the termination of the irregularly conducted preliminary investigation. Their manifestation adopting
the comments of their co-respondents was filed on 18 February 1992. However, it was only on 22 February 1996 or 4
years later, that they received a memorandum dated 8 February 1996 submitted by Special Prosecutor Officer I Lemuel
M. De Guzman recommending the filing of information against them for violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The inordinate delay in the conduct of the "preliminary investigation" infringed upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case. Further, the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases does not come into play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no
such distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may have been a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, the particular facts
of each case must be taken into consideration in the grant of the relief sought. Duterte, et. al. herein could not have urged
the speedy resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case is the fact that Duterte, et. al. were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits
which is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, they, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which could
justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay the many layers of review that the
case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing. The
incident herein does not involve complicated factual and legal issues, especially in view of the fact that the subject
computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the AntiGraft League filed its
complaint. The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on Duterte, et. al.'s three motions for extension of time to file
comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the delay was not caused by the motions for extension. The delay
occurred after petitioners filed their comment. Between 1992 to 1996, Duterte, et. al. were under no obligation to make
any move because there was no preliminary investigation within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to
speak of in the first place. Hence, the petition was granted.

Page 103 of 155

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan ; 159 SCRA 70 (1988)

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC
until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around
two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition
by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section
3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for
receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was
made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to
life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counteraffidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period
for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Page 104 of 155

Privilege against Self-Incrimination

United States vs. Tan Teh, 23 Phil. 145 (1912)
Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the
victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers.
Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had
happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and
was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of
the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that
the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein.
Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said
evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against selfincrimination.
Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither
compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his
objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the
same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.

Page 105 of 155

United States vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917)

Facts: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong appears to have been
convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service.
Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself.
Issue: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the morphine was forced from his
mouth.
Held: By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]),
following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a
prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court;
or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of
the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in
the commission of a crime.

Page 106 of 155

People vs. Otadora [GR L-2154, 26 April 1950]

Facts: Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia Carreon (sister of Hilaria) filed in August 1946, a criminal complaint for serious
threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos. These were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was later
withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators. In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of
some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil complaint for partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon.
This suit was set for hearing on 24 June 1947. Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April 1947, through
Amando Garbo. Thereafter they conversed on several occasions. In the early part of May 1947, she saw him going to
barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would
give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed,
better conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) Hilario supplied the gun, procured from one
Benigno Baltonado. Hilaria also gave Otadora a bolo, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco Galos, a hat and a
flashlight. Early in the morning of 16 June 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their
house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of 21 June 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while
preparing to escape to Camotes Islands, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement wherein he
implicated Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime.
On 25 June 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against Otadora and Carreon in the justice of the peace court of
Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on
3 September 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked
for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the first witness for the prosecution. Hilaria Carreon's
criminal connection with the bloody affair was collaborated, among others, by Otodoras possession of the pants of
Francisco Galos and the latter's hat. When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and
the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. Hilaria Carreon was found guilty and
sentenced to death and other accessory penalties. Otadora, who confessed, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Hilaria
Carreon appealed.
Issue: Whether Galos fitting of the pants is contrary to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.
Held: When Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on, and the judge found that it fitted
him perfectly; this gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional protection against selfincrimination had been erroneously disregarded. No timely objection was made, however, upon that specific ground. It is
doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any. Measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement
that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

Page 107 of 155

Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)

Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First
Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her
body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to
obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in
contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is
pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every
person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's
sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be
invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to
the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice
of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of
delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which
on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the
Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule
with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an
examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the
patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family
doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Page 108 of 155

Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)

Facts: In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor- General against
Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in support
of his defense, the six letters. He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's. Bermudez denied that the letters
were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted that three others were in her own handwriting. As Castillo believed that the three
letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the
case and as he was determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he required her to copy them in her own
handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to
which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the three other letters
and the other letters already in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The
investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying Castillo's petition.
As Castillo did not agree to the decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator
and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel Bermudez to furnish new
specimens of her handwriting by copying the 6 letters for that purpose.
Issue: Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillos possession which were allegedly in her
handwriting.
Held: The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it
is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by
one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any
condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a
real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
Thus, Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her.

Page 109 of 155

Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refusedto write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the
respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter
should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against
himself
within the scope and meaning of
the
constitutional provision under examination.
Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in
one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to
obtain aspecimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.

Page 110 of 155

People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 (1994)

Facts: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went to the office of the National Capital Region
NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) and proceeded to the desk of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano. Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3
Oliver Tugade, SPO2 Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco Matundan, and PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by Capt. Miano
to a briefing. The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a certain "Jon-Jon" (later identified as Carlos Tranca
y Arellano) was selling shabu along Kalayaan Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust team
with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur- buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the
support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 and which had been dusted
with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the target
area. At the corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer spotted Tranca, who was standing in front of
the house, and pointed him out to the team members. The team then circled back and alighted from their vehicles. As
planned, Sgt. Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of the team took vantage points so as to observe
the operation and close in at the opportune time. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to Tranca and told the latter that
his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered in
the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare, tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In
illegal drug parlance, "piso" means one hundred pesos) Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn
handed to Tranca the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it
was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then
closed in on Tranca. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested Tranca. Upon interrogation by Capt.
Miano, Tranca voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked money . Tranca was handcuffed and
taken to the NARCOM headquarters. On 7 May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of
the Physical Identification Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of
Tranca and a P100 bill with serial number SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the
presence of fluorescent powder thereon. She likewise exposed the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and discovered
flourescent power on his hands, face and on the opening of the left -side pocket of the white shorts that he was then
wearing. In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Tranca was charged
with the violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Criminal Case 2574) . The case was assigned to Branch 136 of the said court. Tranca pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca denied the allegations against him and contended that he was framed by the
police officers. On 23 March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision finding Tranca guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court. The defense contends that the rights of Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was
made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination.
Issue: Whether the subjection of Trancas body to ultraviolet powder violates Trancas right against self-incrimination.
Held: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of Tranca's body
to ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.

Page 111 of 155

People v. Rondero, GR. No. 125687, December 9, 1999

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victims father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9
year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of
homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair
for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victims right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained
undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his
express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional
right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellants hair strands can be admitted as evidence against
him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence
against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, forwhat is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They
were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the police
officers, after arresting her husband in
their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state
should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against
illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

Page 112 of 155

People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025 February 17, 2000

Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug,
Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed
Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the
kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him,
the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a
kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde.
Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed
them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Exkagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and
nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the
missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back
to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away
from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know,
I did not do anything to her." To the question,"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and
countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the
toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde
was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia
Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the
disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out.
Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here
already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building.
On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of
Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to
you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved
more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken
without any counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial conference. On 12 February
1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the
negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28
February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against self- incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against selfincrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence
of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was
contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
Page 113 of 155

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record
his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged
that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of
discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and
interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when aquestion calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by
respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the
well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as
well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption
of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished
according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in
line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.

Page 114 of 155

Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)

Facts: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of the
Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to
allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad
hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in
it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major
General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.
Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored
by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon.
Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After
conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for
murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando
Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino
on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and
one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution
represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission
of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding
Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be
rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate
motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said
motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad
hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been
required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being
resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the
opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised
therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other
documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes,
among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have
been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the
same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced
by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman
moved for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding
before the Agrava Board.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal
intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding
the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they
may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its
sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their
conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to
counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the
course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those
suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify
and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing
Page 115 of 155

investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver
and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time
they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the
right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave
them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and
protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered,
they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the
provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes
no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not
to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred
constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and
their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence
to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the
constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against
them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence
of a grant of immunity by law.

Page 116 of 155

Involuntary servitude
Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1979)
Facts: Petitioner was assigned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva Ecija. After said
appointment, he was employed in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance Commission.
After he had ceased to be a court stenographer, the CA required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases
decided by Gapan Court which had been appealed. Because of his failure to comply with the resolutions of the CA, he
was declared in contempt of the court. Arrested and incarcerated until he could submit a complete transcript of his noted
in the said cases. Petitioner contends that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court
stenographer would transgress the rule against involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution). He was
averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of
transcribing his notes. (He filed his petition in forma pauperis).
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners contention is tenable?
Held:
No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another or the condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
That situation does not obtain in this case.
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in
contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys
the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a
stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of
Justice.
In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was an employee of the
Insurance Commission. During the time that he made the transcription, he received his salary as such employee.

Page 117 of 155

Imprisonment for debt

Sura vs. Martin, 26 SCRA 286 (1969)
Facts: Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son and to provide
support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision. A writ of
execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The Sheriff's return of service stated: "The judgment debtor is
jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor
has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For failure to satisfy the writ of execution,
plaintiff's counsel prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The trial court granted the prayer and
ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Martin.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the decision
requiring him to support his natural son due to insolvency were violative of his constitutional right against imprisonment
for debt.
2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to be considered indirect contempt.
Held:
1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his arrest and imprisonment for
failure to satisfy the judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.
2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a judgment to pay past and
future support are illegal because such judgment is a final disposition of the case and is declaratory of the rights or
obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a judgment considered as
indirect contempt refers to a special judgment which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as that which
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real or personal property
which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings.
Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was
directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor. The writ of execution was,
therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment
debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the
writ. (Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)

Page 118 of 155

People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726 (1992)

Facts: Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash the Information of the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a
memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling that B.P.
22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22
Held:
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written
across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition
concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to
be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any
other
check.
A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check as
"a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted
by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of
indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the
issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.
A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by
the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private
arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of
B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted
to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks
changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of
memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in
commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To
determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the
faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in
trade and in banking communities.

Page 119 of 155

In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003
FACTS:
Benjamin and the other petitioners are tenants of Berlito Taripe on a lot located in Paranaque City. It appears that the
property was included in the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution, and Partition pending before
the sala of Judge Fortunito Madrona, for the settlement of estate of the late Anselma P. Allers filed by Eleuteria. On
October 5, 1999, the probate court ordered the lessees, herein Benjamin and the other petitioners to pay monthly rentals to
Eleuteria, the duly appointed Special Administratrix. Copies of the order were furnished Benjamin by registered mail.
Five months later, Elueteria filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution to enforce the October 5, 1999 order. The writ
was duly issued, and the Sheriff conferred with lessees, who informed him that they already paid three months advance
rental to Taripe. On August 4, 2000, Elueteria filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they should not be cited
in indirect contempt of court for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court, which the trial court granted,
giving Benjamin and the others 20 days from receipt to explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt of court.
After six months, the petitioners wrote the trial court, informing it that they are freezing the rental payments as they were
in a quandary as to whom it should be paid. Elueteria then filed a motion to cite Benjamin, et. al in contempt, which
motion was set for hearing. The trial court granted the motion, declared them in indirect contempt of court, ordered them
to pay a fine of P30,000.00, and ordered their imprisonment until such time that they paid their monthly rentals.
Again, Benjamin et. al wrote the trial court, asking it to lift the indirect contempt, and explained that their failure to attend
was due to financial constraint, they being ordinary construction workers, and living on minimum wages, and their failure
to pay the rentals was due to their quandary as to whom to remit it.
Eleuteria thereafter filed a motion for issuance of warrant of arrest against Benjamin, which the trial court granted. On
December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen.
Benjamin, et. al, thus filed a petition for issuance of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals, which ordered their
temporary release. However, after hearing, their petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they elevated their
case to the Supreme Court, holding that the indirect contempt citation issued by the court was improper, and the order to
imprison them for non-payment of rentals unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not they can be imprisoned for non-payment of rentals?
RULING:
The Supreme Court:
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person
shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal
offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as
recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to
whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Page 120 of 155

Double Jeopardy
People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968)
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said
motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in
having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.

Page 121 of 155

Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950]

Second Division, Moran (CJ): 6 concur
Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated homicide,
for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds
on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him
from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On
29 December 1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day
Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and
on the following day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with consummated homicide.
Melo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further
entertaining the amended information.
Issue: Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accuseds right against double
jeopardy.
Held: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial." Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one
for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second
jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Further, when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and greater
offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

Page 122 of 155

PSB v. Bermoy
G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents Pedrito and Gloria
Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial
Court. Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court was correct in granting
the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But
even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on
petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Thus this petition. The Solicitor
General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c)

The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in
double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of
evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of
respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal
Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if
the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of
evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts
are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

Page 123 of 155

Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme

[GR L-54904, 29 January 1988]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical injuries and
sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court
said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial.
The certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was
needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any
vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not agree.
Through their counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by registered mail on 2
February 1980. It was denied on 28 February 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18
March 1980. On 20 March1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting
fiscal and the private prosecutor. After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo N.
Firme (Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union) dismissed the appeal on14
April 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied on 12 May 1980. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the
defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United
States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4
vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the
purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently
applied since then in this jurisdiction. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then
can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a
"bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical
injuries, of which the accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The
petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the
judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore
null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely
an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error
that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. In fine, thus,
however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order,
such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

Page 124 of 155

People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993]

First Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases 7396 and
7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and
Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and
Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left
fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR 101557), and by striking Teresa with
wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558).
On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned.
They all pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not
guilty." On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel
for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused for
reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor. On
12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the
latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice,
Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9 February
1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor
to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused
were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). On 13 May 1991, after
pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was
opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor
Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations; and, whether the first
jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has
previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring
the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same
offense. It is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed
against Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted
that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is whether
the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did
was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the
accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there
was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations. While it
may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was
the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses
Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves
from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the accused in the
above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their
dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in
cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best
interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded from questioning the
discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would
be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof
of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such
cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint,
Page 125 of 155

or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e.,
(a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and,
(c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of
double jeopardy must prevail.

Page 126 of 155

Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999]

First Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 8 June 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate
officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979,
amounting to P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. On 11
September 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990, the trial court
denied the prosecutions motion for reconsideration. On 10 January 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321 and Q-91-17322), against Jose and Petronila Tupaz for the
same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case Q-91-17321 was raffled to
Branch 105, presided over by Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided over by
Judge Antonio P. Solano. On 25 September 991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of P1,000.00 each, for their
provisional liberty. On 6 November 1991, the Tupazes filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a
motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against
the Tupazes pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on 11 November 1991, Judge
Solano denied the motion. In the meantime, on 25 July 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City. Subsequently,
Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which
Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August 1994. On 5 September 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R.
Fernandez stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and no cogent reasons existed to alter,
modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and
recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. On 20 September 1994, the trial court (Branch 105)
arraigned Petronila Tupaz in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. On 17
October 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file
amended information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense, to wit:
on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter. Despite opposition of the accused, on 2 March 1995, the trial court
granted the motion and admitted the amended information. Petronilia was not re-arraigned on the amended information, as
the amendment was only on a matter of form. On 5 December 1995, Petronilia filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial court granted the
motion in its order dated 13 December 1995. On 15 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court granted the motion for
consolidation. On 20 May 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion for
withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On
28 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate
information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable
mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case Q-91- 17321 was identical to Criminal
Case Q-90-12896, wherein Petronilia was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax, amounting to
P346,879.29. Over the objections of Petronilia, on 6 August 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105,
granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. On 24 September 1996,
Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial court denied the motion.
Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposes Petronilia Tupaz to double
jeopardy.
Held: The reinstatement of the information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in
double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in
which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. Herein, there was a valid complaint filed against her
to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
Petronilias consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as
to the accuseds conformity. As Petronilias consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded
as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the information against Petronilia in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.
Page 127 of 155

Argel v Pascua
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 8.20.01
FACTS: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said
Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there
was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when
she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.
ISSUE: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.
RULING: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless
of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its
promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Page 128 of 155

People vs. Bocar

[GR L-27935, 16 August 1985]
Second Division, Makasiar (J): 5 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the
crime of theft, committed as "That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of
dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B.
BAEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty." Proceedings were had on 7
July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar (Branch XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to
the complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order dismissing the
case, holding that the case is more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the
lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On 18 July 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for
reconsideration"; and on 8 August 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for
reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said
order was received by the City Fiscal's Office on 11 August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the CFI order of 7 July 1967.
Issue: Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Held: The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. Verily, no evidence in
law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court. The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal
order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit.
Thus, the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as "Former conviction or
acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information." Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e)
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

Page 129 of 155

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan

144 SCRA 43 G.R. No.72670
September 12, 1986
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at
the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an
assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity
was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman,
and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the
ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence
shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot.
Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases
before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day
period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the
prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such
action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of
acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed
the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the
extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial
Page 130 of 155

where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A
conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and
after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way
out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a
scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a
public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired
gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner
consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused
are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks
after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was
in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by
virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and
their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President
Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of
one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.
Page 131 of 155

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.

Page 132 of 155

People vs. Grospe

[GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988]
Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur
Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. On 13 June 1983,
Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check 19040865 in the sum of
P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was
forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC
Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which
is the SMC depository bank. On 8 July 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for
"insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. On 18 June 1983, Parulan likewise
issued PDB Check 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC
Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the
SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer
thereat and who, in turn, deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On 8 July 1983,
the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in
Santa Maria, Bulacan. In Criminal Case 2800 of the RTC Pampanga, he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP 22) for having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20 in favor of SMC ([PDB] Check
19040865) but which was dishonored for having been drawn against "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated
demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. In Criminal Case
2813 of the same Court, Parulan was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for
having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC (PDB Check 19040872) in payment
of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated
demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two cases were
tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. The trial court, through the
Hon Nathaniel M. Grospe (Presiding Judge, Branch 44, RTC Pampanga) rendered judgment dismissing the cases for lack
of jurisdiction, and ordered the cancellation of the bail bond posted by the accused. Hence, the special civil action for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the present petition for certiorari places the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense.
Held: The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by the Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctible by
Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule
that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave
abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the
Trial Court null and void. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of the Judge does not
place the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon the Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial
jurisdiction" over the cases.
Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case
based on the same offense. The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to
have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double
jeopardy.

Page 133 of 155

People vs. Santiago

[GR 80778, 20 June 1989]
First Division, Gancayco (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 2 June 1987 an information for violation of PD 772 was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with
the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among
others, "That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said property, by then and there constructing his/her
house therein for residential purposes, without the consent and against the will of the said offended party." Upon
arraignment, Rosario pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held on 14 August 1987 wherein Rosario informed
the court that she has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the subject land. On 27 October 1978, the
decision was rendered by Judge Pedro T. Santiago (Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City) acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the counsel for the private offended party,
the University of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, in behalf of the People of the Philippines. The petition seeks
to render null and void the decision for want of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on
the merits.
Issue: Whether double jeopardy has set in in this case.
Held: The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to have its day in court. The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure on the land
belonging to U.P. At the pretrial, U.P. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its
property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land.
However, as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title
could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the structure of accused was
built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial
on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by the
accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure
illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis. Indeed, the observation of
respondent judge in the questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates
that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of
the accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or
even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a
criminal case. Hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. There is double
jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant
had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without
his express consent. In fine, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The decision
that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent
jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is
the mandate of the rules. Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in in this case.

Page 134 of 155

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double
jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with
personnel of BatangasElectric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search
and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric
wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the
walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the plants electric meter. The case wasdismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed
nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and
prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City
Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting
damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first
offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation ofelectrical devices without the approval and necessary
authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed
to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different
crime charged against the 1st complainant against Mr. Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged
against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the
Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in
the case of Yap vs Lutero,the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is
punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the
case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of
double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if
the offensescharged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second
charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against
the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint
against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

Page 135 of 155

People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 concur with reservation, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave
Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11,
Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City
Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases, the City Fiscal amended the information
in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA 3060), by alleging that the accused,
"conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in
color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment,
which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview,
examination and censorship, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon
Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring
and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly
exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and
immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally
naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious positions, among
other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon
Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a
motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. The motion was
denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7 August 1972. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as
Gonzales moved for postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. On 15 November 1972,
Gonzales
moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without however, substituting or entering
another plea. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972,
Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case F- 147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according
to him, also pending against him Criminal Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the information allegedly contains
the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the City Court dismissed
the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case F147347, Gonzales changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of RA 3060. He was accordingly
sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10 February 1973, the People filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20
January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F- 147348. This was however denied by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973,
and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code,
constitutes double jeopardy.
Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or
is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations
with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of RA
3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include
or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and
immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved
would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows their essential
difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is
presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is
an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here
involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same
evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.

Page 136 of 155

Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990]

En Banc, Paras (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous
with the delivery of the products, he issued 9 checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine National
Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already closed. Thereafter,
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the
oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. Nierras was charged for for estafa under Article 315
(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387) and
similarly for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa 22 (Criminal Cases 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085,
4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125). In both sets of criminal cases, Nierras entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before
the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to
be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by Judge Auxencio
C. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17 September 1981. Nierras filed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether Nierras may be held liable for the 9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22, and separately also be held
liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing
checks.
Held: Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and,
second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2d)
Revised Penal Code, but are not required in BP 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives
rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence
punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a
drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation,
while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and
different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while
violation of BP 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4)
violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of BP 22 are mala prohibita. furthermore,
Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that "Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code." While the filing of the two sets of Information under
the provisions of BP 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical
acts committed by Nierras, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may
give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one
law and another law, there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity
of elements in the 2 offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the 2 sets of information does not itself give rise to double
jeopardy.

Page 137 of 155

People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992]

Facts: On 24 August 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended. The
penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine ranging from
P6,000 to P12,000. The information against him reads: "That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an
aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. Contrary to law." During the arraignment, Manuel entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On 21 November 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On 9 January 1991, Manuel's counsel
verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a fine ranging from P600 to P4,000 shall be imposed upon any
pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required
under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, Judge Martin S.
Villarama Jr. issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the
promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991. On said date, the Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to 18
February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, Manuel
filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On 18 February 1991, the Judge issued another order postponing the
promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give Manuel further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor.
On 20 February 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the
grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on 21 November 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of Manuel
of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time
which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On 21 February 1991, Manuel filed his Reply to
Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules
on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. Subsequently, on 25 February 1991, the Judge rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Forthwith, the
prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. The
prosecutor filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies
to the accused's change of plea in the preent case.
Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the
law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter, as provided by Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, Section 2 thereof, which provides that "The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy." However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Herein, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such
situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before
it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public
will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the judge's acceptance of Manuel's
change of plea is improper and irregular. Further, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the
Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The right against double
jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
Page 138 of 155

offended party consent to the accused's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel cannot claim this
privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c), Rule 117 which states that
"the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty to
the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule, Manuel could
still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of
consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of
his change of plea was irregular and improper.

Page 139 of 155

Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970)

Facts: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming to be a duly recognized and existing nonstock and non- profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of
Section 8 of RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, "Kay
Villegas Kami" avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, and that
in paragraph 11 of said petition, it intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention
who will propagate its ideology. "Kay Villegas kami" actually impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground
that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Issue: Whether Section 8 of RA 6132 is in the nature of an ex-post facto law.
Held: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4)
alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty
or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional
inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation
of any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs.
8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on 24 August 1970.

Page 140 of 155

People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms
of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless
of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is
in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that
due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court.
Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It
punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of
guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is
also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having
the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership
renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The
members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the
basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL
justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of
the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses
that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are
weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

Page 141 of 155

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/
evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

Page 142 of 155

Wright vs. CA, 235 SCRA 341 (1994)

Facts: Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition
on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both
States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been
complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Held: Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or
criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived
under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are (1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an
offense when committed; (2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; (3)
statutes which prescribe greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, (4) laws which alter the rules of evidence
so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that
the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there
is absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

Page 143 of 155

ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 17 (4)
CHR Employees v. CHR 496 SCRA 226
Facts: RA 8522 or the General Appropriations Act of 1998 provided special provisions applicable to all Constitutional
Offices. The Commission on Human Rights through then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette Recina and Commissioner
Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and Jorge R. Coquia upgraded or raised the salaries
(A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047 September, 1998) and collapsed
vacant positions (A98-062 November 1998) without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
The petitioners Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) through its then President Marcial A.
Sanchez, Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals alleging that they have locus standi because the reorganization
demoralizes the rank and file employees and will only benefit those in top positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA)
exempted the CHR from the Salary Standardization Law.
Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR empowers them to reclassify, adjust salaries and collapse vacant
positions without the approval of DBM?
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and
other incentives be given in adherence to the policies and guidelines in accordance with applicable laws. The mandate of
the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XVII to wit: shall assist the
President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals
having budgetary or organizational implications. Furthermore, Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of
Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy.a

Page 144 of 155

SECTION 18.
Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein
private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters
attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to
appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the
CSC on said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Page 145 of 155

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take
possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without
permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the
same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten
years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA
bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to
desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift
the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was
denied by the Commission (CHR). Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that
its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it
is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection.
Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human
rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.
Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission
on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT.
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor
even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district],
or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules
of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
Page 146 of 155

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined
only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were
not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also
prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo,
et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section
18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of
human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the
SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 901580

Page 147 of 155

ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS CULTURE AND SPORTS
Section 5.
Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee
L-40779
November 28,
Facts:
1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in Theology;
2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-1976
respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission
in their school reason in the letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class.
3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was
final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School4. Petitioner then subsequently made
inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she
was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfil their requirements
for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five
years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it
would entail only about two years more.5. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in
the current semester
Issue:
Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion inallowing petitioner to continue studying
or not?
Held:
Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit.Petitioner cannot compel
the mandamus to admit her into further studies since therespondent had no clear duty to admit the petitioner. That
respondent Fr. Lambino andLoyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the petitioner or not.Factors
that were considered are academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and nature of Loyola School of
Theology as a seminary

Page 148 of 155

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON. DANIEL ALFONSO

FACTS:
-Petitioners BME, the government agency which supervises and regulates the countrys medical colleges, Sec.
Quisimbing, chairman of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports prayed for a writ of certiorari to nullify the
order of herein Respondent Judge Alfonso in Civil case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of Pet. Order of closure of
Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation Inc(the college). -The college was founded on 1981 for the
purpose of producing physicians who will emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes of health. -However,
because of the unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao, the college was established in Antipolo, Rizal, given a
temporary permit to operate instead of the originally proposed location in Zamboanga City. Antipolo was adopted as its
permanent site and the name was changed to Rizal College of Medicine. -In 1985, DECS & BME authorized the
Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all Medical Schools in the Philippines. -The report showed that
the college fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. Further, the team of inspectors cited
the ff. Grounds among others: (a)the College was not fulfilling its purpose due inappropriate location (b)lack of university
affiliation for balance humanistic and scientific education (c)absence of philosophy based hospitals for students training
(d)more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach full time -The school disputed these findings as biased and
discriminatory and requested BME to send another team of doctors for re-evaluation. 2Nd team confirmed the previous
findings and recommended the phase-out of the school. -There were third and fourth evaluations but the college failed
both and was rendered inadequate in all aspects. -The DECS recommended the college for closure but somehow the
college succeeded to have the Board form yet another team of inspectors but although the findings show that there were
major efforts to improve the college, it is still rendered inadequate and recommended for closure w/ provisions to disperse
its students to other medical schools. -Mr. Victor Sumulong(chairman of BOT), upon learning the same proposed a
gradual phase-out so as not to dislocate the students and minimized financial losses
ALLOWED to operate until May 1989. -The college appealed the decision to the OP, but the Executive Secretary found
no reason to disturb the contested decision
AFFIRMED! -The college filed civil case No. 1385 applying for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its
implementation
APPROVED! (by Judge Alfonso holding that there were no evidence supporting the findings in the June 18, 1988
report, and that contrary to the findings, the laboratory and library areas were big enough and operations in the base
hospital was going smoothly.) -Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WON Judge Alfonso acted with grave abuse of discretion in substituting his judgment to for the members/evaluators.
YES! It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and
discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass
judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts.There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
(2)WON NMCS ORDER No. 5 has been violated? NO! It was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year
period therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation.
The subsequent evaluations are merely to confirm the facts of the 1st evaluation in 1985. Notwithstanding the absence of
an explicit grant of opportunity for the college to comply with certain requirements, the lapse of over three years must be
deemed as substantial compliance with the relied provision.
(3)WON the college was denied due process of law? NO! It holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the College
was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the
inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when
it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because
of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and reevaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the order of
closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to
seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
Page 149 of 155

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by
remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so
that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or
grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the
theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical
institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not
that power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order issued
by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

Page 150 of 155

Lupangco v. CA
GR NO 77372 April 21 1988
Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held: It is not constitutional. The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth.

Page 151 of 155

University of San Carlos v. CA

FACTS: Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during the first
semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C."
(Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she had
completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in her new course. As a
commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of
Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to
determine if she could graduate with honors.
So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture
121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letter was referred to the
President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors. The
secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to
make it liable for damages.
Held: Granting of honors - Schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is
within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

Page 152 of 155

Capitol Medical Center vs CA

FACTS: The petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (or CMCI), a hospital corporation, organized, opened, and operated
the Capitol Medical Center College (CMCC or "the College") beside its hospital, the Capitol Medical Center (hereafter
"the Hospital") in Quezon City. It offered a four-year nursing course, a two-year midwifery course, and a two-year
medical secretarial course. In the first semester of the school year 1987-88, 900 students were enrolled in various courses
in the college.
Half-way through the first semester in 1987, the college faculty, led by the Dean of Nursing, demanded that they be
granted vacation and sick leave privileges similar to those enjoyed by hospital personnel. Dialogues were held but no
agreement was reached between the faculty and the school administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma NavaretteClemente, who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board.
At a meeting of the CMCI Board on September 15, 1987, Dr. Clemente reported the deteriorating relationship between the
CMCC administration and the teachers, which, from a simple disagreement, had degenerated into open hostility. She
feared that the situation may give rise to mass action by the students, because the faculty, exercising their moral influence
over the students, had enlisted the latter's sympathy and support for their cause.
The Board resolved to authorize her, as president of the College, to close it at the end of the first semester if the
antagonism of the faculty and students toward the college administration should become uncontrollable.
ISSUE: Whether a school after due notice to the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, closed at the end of the first
semester of the school year 1987-1988, because its teachers and students declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and
take examinations, may be forced to reopen by the courts at the instance of the striking students.
Held:
The Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down the school because of problems emanating from a
labor dispute between the school and its faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no clear legal right to demand the
reopening of the school.

Page 153 of 155

Reyes v. CA
FACTS: Respondent-students (students, for brevity) as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was
the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as
approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cutoff score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon
appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996th resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24,
1987. Subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an
investigation on the student's case and recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile rating
ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for
them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BOR (Board of Regents) has the power over Admission Requirements
HELD: No. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UCs approval; The
right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council; The UC has the final say
in the admission requirements provided that it conforms with the law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event
the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to
step in and to correct the anomaly.

Page 154 of 155

TAN vs. CA
FACTS: Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School ("Grace Christian") applied with the then
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for the School Year
(SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted, yearly increments in tuition fees
from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. On 18 December 1986, Grace Christian received a notice
from the MECS that its fee-increase application had been definitely approved on 10 November 1986.
Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly alarmed by what they perceived
to be the deterioration despite the periodic fee increases in academic standards and physical facilities of the school,
formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers Association ("Association"). The Association, composed of a
majority of the parents (despite its name, no faculty member sits on the executive committee) demanded: (a) recognition
as an organization; and (b) representation in Grace Christian's policy-making process, viz., faculty selection and
improvement of the physical plant. Feeling that their demands had been largely ignored, the Association in October 1985
asked for a formal dialogue with the school administration. During a heated exchange in this dialogue, one of the
petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace Christian's vice-principal, and later
spat on the latter.
On 23 September 1986, Grace Christian had been granted provisional authority by the MECS to impose a fifteen percent
(15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987. Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group of parents lobbied with
the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the enrollment period for the second semester of SY
1986-1987, a number of parents, among them petitioners (comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19 member
executive committee, of the Association) refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn refused to receive
these parents' payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase) tuition fee for that semester. On 16
December 1986, Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved increased tuition fee for the
second semester.
From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally outside the school gates.
Banners and placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent animosity between the Association (or
some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners first came out with statements in the print and
broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some
of the petitioners, armed with video-cameras, forced their way into the school premises and interrupted a class in session,
urging students therein to speak using the allotted class hour against school policies. Some of the students walked
out of their classrooms to join their parents in the rally outside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the freedom to choose its students.
HELD: Private schools are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State, but they may also have the right
to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.

Page 155 of 155