Issuing Oct Process

SECtion. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.
After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of
dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present
to the court the pertinent instruments together with a subdivision plan
approved by the Director of Lands in case
of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties,
shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be
issued in the name of the person to whom
the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
A. Dealings with the land while its registration is pending.
Section 22 allows land subject of registration to be dealt with after the filing of the
application and before the issuance of decree. The land may be sold or otherwise
encumbered, but whatever may be the nature of the transaction, the interested party
should submit to the court the pertinent instruments evidencing the transaction to
be considered in the final adjudication of the case. The applicant or the parties to the
transaction may file the corresponding motion or manifestation, indicating the relief
desired. In case of transfer of a portion of the land, the corresponding subdivision plan,
approved by the Director of Lands, should also be presented. Upon notice to the parties,
the court shall: (a) order the land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance
created by such instruments, or (b) order that the decree of registration be issued in the
name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed.
It should be noted that the adjudication of land in a land registration or cadastral
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility, until after one year
from the entry of the final decree prepared by the Land Registration Authority. As long
as the final decree has not been entered, and the one-year period has not elapsed from
such entry, the title is not deemed finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control of the court.18 Hence, transactions
affecting the property pending registration should be made known to the court for
appropriate consideration. Section 22 should be differentiated from Section 19 which
refers to amendments to the application by joinder, substitution or discontinuance of
the parties. On the other hand, Section 108 involves amendments after entry of the
certificate of title. Section 22 does not require amendment of the application, it being
sufficient that the court, by motion or other appropriate pleading, be presented with
the instruments evidencing the transaction, and the approved subdivision plan where a
portion of the land is conveyed to another.
B. Land may be registered in favor of a total stranger
The application of Section 22 is illustrated in the case of Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals,19 arising from the following facts:
Petitioner filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a
residential house thereon, situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. During the pendency of the
case, petitioner sold said parcels to respondents, subject to the vendors usufructuary
rights. The instrument of sale was presented to the court. The court rendered a decision
ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the respondents. The
corresponding decree and title were issued to them. Thereafter, petitioner filed an
urgent motion for reconsideration praying that the decision and decree be set aside and
the title cancelled, on the ground that respondents (vendees) had failed to pay the
purchase price of the lands. The registration court set aside its decision. It held that it
did not have jurisdiction to order registration in the names of respondents who were not
parties to the application for registration. The court ordered registration in the name of
petitioner. Respondents went to the Court of Appeals which reversed the order of the
trial court. In the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that that the registration court could
not legally order the registration of the land in the names of the vendees-respondents
since they were neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration
case.
The Court disagreed, holding as follows:
Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act (Section 23, Property
Registration Decree) which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject
matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom
the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time
between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of
title, thus
xxxxxxxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land,
subject matter of an application for registration, to be dealt with, i.e., to be disposed of
or encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the application and the
issuance of the decree of title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition
or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the interested party for the court
to either order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the
person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. The law does not
require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the buyer or
the person to whom the property has been conveyed for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the buyer or the person to whom the property has been conveyed be a
party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court
by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation
with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements
have been complied with.
SEC. 39. Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title.

After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has
become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment,
issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send,
within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment
and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,
nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall
cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and
duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The
decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and
filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original
certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be
sent, together with the owners duplicate certificate, to the Register of
Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.
Process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Within 15 days from finality of order of judgment directing registration of title

court to order Land registration Admin to issue decree of registration and
certificate of title;
Clerk of court will send order of court & copies of judgment;
Administrator to issue decree of registration & original & duplicate of OCT
signed by Administrator, entered & file decree of registration in LRA;
Send to Register of Deeds original & duplicate of title & certificate for entry
in his registration book;
Enter in record book, dated, signed, numbered & sealed take effect upon
date of entry;
Register of Deeds to send notice to registered owner ready for delivery after
payment of fees;
Register of Deeds shall send duplicate & note on each certificate of title to
whom it is issued;
Original copy to be filed in Register of Deeds; bound in consecutive order.
A. Statement of personal circumstances

SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate.
Every certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose
interests make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil
status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as
their citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered

belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both
spouses.
Contents of a certificate of title.
Every certificate of title shall contain the following entries:
(a) full names of all persons whose interest make up the full ownership in the land;
(b) civil status;
(c) names of their respective spouses, if married;
(d) citizenship; and
(e) residence and postal address. If the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, the
title shall be issued in the names of both spouses.It should be noted that an original
certificate of title, issued in accordance with the decree, merely confirms a pre-existing
title. The original certificate of title does not establish the time of acquisition of the
property by the registered owner.57
B. Entry of original certificate of title.
SEC. 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title.
Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate
copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his
record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the
Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall
take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall
forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his owners
duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.
The certificate of title issued for the first time after initial registration
proceedings is known as the Original Certificate of Title. Any subsequent title issued
pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument affecting the property covered by
the original certificate of title is known as the Transfer Certificate of Title. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration.26 It shall set forth the
full names of all persons whose interests make up the ownership of the land, their civil
status, and names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship,
residence and postal address. If the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall
be issued in the names of both spouses.27 The transfer certificate of title shall show the
number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it
was originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the original
certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in which it is found.
Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate copy of the certificate
of title, he shall enter the same in the record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed
and sealed with the seal of his office. The certificate of title shall take effect upon the
date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall then send notice by mail to the
registered owner informing him that his owners duplicate is ready for delivery.
C. The Owners Certificate of Title
SEC. 41. Owners duplicate certificate of title.
The owners duplicate certificate of title shall be delivered to the
registered owner or to his duly authorized representative. If two or more
persons are registered owners, one owners duplicate certificate may be
issued for the whole land, or if the co-owners so desire, a separate duplicate
may be issued to each of them in like form, but all outstanding certificates
of title so issued shall be surrendered whenever the Register of Deeds shall
register any subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or
part thereof or any interest therein. The Register of Deeds shall note on
each certificate of title a statement as to whom a copy thereof was issued.
Issuance of the owners duplicate certificate.
The owners duplicate certificate of title shall be delivered to the registered owner
or his duly authorized representative. If two or more persons are the registered owners,
one owners duplicate may be issued for the whole land, or if the co-owners so desire, a
separate duplicate may be issued to each of them in like form, but all outstanding
certificates of title so issued shall be surrendered whenever the Register of Deeds shall
register any subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or part thereof or
any interest therein. The Register of Deeds shall note on each certificate of title a
statement as to whom a copy thereof was issued. The duplicate certificates of title may
either be the duplicate original certificate or duplicate transfer certificate. The registered
owner may claim his owners duplicate certificate from the Register of Deeds upon
payment of the proper fees. It has been ruled that the heirs, as co-owners, shall each
have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir
may therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
A certificate of title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance forty-three
years later to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the
Register of Deeds to cancel the title preceding it.
D. Registration Book
SEC. 42. Registration Books.
The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in
the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order
together with similar certificates of title and shall constitute the
registration book for titled properties.
Upon entry of the original certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall file the
same in a registration book provided for the purpose. The same shall be bound and filed
in consecutive order with other certificates of title.
E. Transfer Certificate of Title
SEC. 43. Transfer Certificate of Title.
The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by the
Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument
relating to the same land shall be in like form, entitled Transfer Certificate
of Title, and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall show the
number of the next previous certificate covering the same land
and also the fact that it was originally registered, giving the record number,
the number of the original certificate of title, and the volume and page of
the registration book in which the latter is found.
The transfer certificate of title which may be issued pursuant to any voluntary or
involuntary instrument shall be in like form as the original and titled Transfer
Certificate of Title. The original is kept in the office of the Register of Deeds while the
owners duplicate is delivered to the party concerned.
F. Several certificates covering the same land
The transfer certificate of title shall indicate the number of the next previous
certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was originally registered,
giving the record number, number of the original certificate of title, and the volume and
page of the registration book in which it is filed.
i.
Co-owned land; All co-owners duplicate must be surrendered
Balbin v. ROD, 28 SCRA 12 (1969)

Instances when the ROD may validly deny registration of a voluntary instrument:
1.
Where there are more than 1 copy of the owners duplicate certificate of title
and not all such copies are presented to the ROD;
2.
3.
Where the voluntary instrument bears on its face an infirmity;

Where the validity of the instrument sought to be registered is in issue in a
pending court suit;
a.
b.
Notice of pending suit must be given to parties;

Registration may be suspended.
G.R. No. L-20611
May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta
No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a
duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be
annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one
Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548,
appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in
favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided
portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different
buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658.
Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided
portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this
Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710
square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to
succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument:
xxx
xxx
January 25, 1955, ...

xxx
Entry No. 5659.
Sale of portion.
portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ...
and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument:
Entry No. 5660.
June 9, 1953. ...

Sale of portion.
portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of
Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu
thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument:
February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an
additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No.
548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres
Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th
day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's
copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the
Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April
10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner
observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof
on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from
the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's
duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in
addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three coowner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees
that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the
point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these
titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want
to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing
section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall
be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this
provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not
required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or
interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-coowners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their
favor was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that
there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered
owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the
corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of
the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly
observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of
those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed
until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies
of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely
affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not
on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of
the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions,
particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if
different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of
Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the
action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of
the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor,
Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a
liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its
implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse
may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of
future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of
the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio
Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration,
namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more
than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had
sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC
No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the
land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed
by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of
that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by
filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and
that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
Footnotes
*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons. Where
two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or otherwise, one
owner's duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole land, or a separate duplicate
may be issued to each for his undivided share.
ii.
Previous Adjudication
G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA
MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by
his father, Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO, MERCEDES,
CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all surnamed CONSOLACION,
respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land
located in Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon,
Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision, ordering the
registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang),
Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less 200
hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion
(72, Record on Appeal). The decision became final and executory. A decree and an
original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on
the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the
unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the
Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was
verified by the Acting Director of Forestry.
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing on the merits, Judge Agana denied
the petition in his order of September 8, 1970. That order was served upon the assistant
provincial fiscal on September 16, 1970 and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the
Bureau of Forestry, on November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only on
September 2, 1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order. Twenty-two days
thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor General appealed from that order and filed a
motion for extension of time within which to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was
given due course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court through Justices Asuncion,
Porfirio V. Sison and Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970 order had
allegedly long become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this
Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the appeal of the State from the trial
court's 1970 order of denial was seasonably made. The Appellate Court held that the
service of the order on Dispo, as special attorney, was binding on the Solicitor General's
Office. Consequently, the record on appeal, which was filed after thirty days from the
service of the order upon Dispo, was filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the
time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from
the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. These
representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide whether an appeal
should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by Solicitor General Barredo, approved by
Secretary of Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should consult the Solicitor
General on all questions, legal and factual, regarding the case. The question of whether
an appeal should be made could only be decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and titles was filed by Solicitor General
Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia
Sempio-Diy. Consequently, the Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final
order disposing of the petition and should not be bound by the service on his surrogates,
the special counsel and the fiscal (Republic vs. Polo, L-49247, March 13, 1979, 89 SCRA
33; Republic vs. Mendoza, L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539).
The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time, the Solicitor General's Office
was late in filing the amendments to it is of no moment. In exceptional cases, like the
instant case, the interest of justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453).
In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because public
forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision void, the
Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents (Gov't. of the
U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 975, 980; Bachrach Motor Co. vs.
Unson, 50 Phil. 981, 990; Go Tian An vs. Republic, 124 Phil. 472, 475; Republic vs.
Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 186, 191-192).
Now, as to the merits of the case. It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area
registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor
susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by
Director of Forestry Florencio Tamesis on July 6, 1940, as per Land Classification Map
No. 1386, Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit C-Annulment, and as shown in
the report and testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden (Exh. BAnnulment; 7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria recommended that the title of the Maxino
spouses be annulled (Exh. B-Annulment).
The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per Land
Classification Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, Exhibit 1-A-Director of
Forestry, and as shown in paragraph 6 of the report of Forester Emerson B. Abraham
who recommended that the opposition to the registration entered by the Director be
sustained (Exh. 1-Director of Forestry; Exh. Q, Report of Land Investigator Serapion
Bauzon).
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous
composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona
pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land
(pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks. *
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares and
the actual area of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks which is 970
hectares as surveyed in 1959 (Exh. D). We have no hesitation in saying that the
composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The trial court grievously erred in
applying to this case the rule that the area comprised in the boundaries should prevail
over that stated in the moniments of title.
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks
mentioned in the composition title really refer to the Banguian and Mamba creeks. This
would mean that the actual area claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, not 970
(Exh. B-Annulment; 27-30 tsn March 5, 1970).
That would also explain why in the document, Exhibit H, presented by the Maxinos,
mention is made of "paligawang 'Manba' ".
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the sale
executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh.
F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by his two children Maria and Lucila.
On September 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an extrajudicial settlement of
Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves, executed an
" absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. F), the wife of
applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and the grandson of Prudencio
Tesalona.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim". It is stated therein that in
consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto the said
Vendee" the 29-hectare land described in the composition title (Exh. F).
As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were not certain that their title was good, it
was stipulated as an "express condition" that the said vendors had no obligation of
warranty for "the premises hereby sold by them, the Vendee hereby expressly releasing
the Vendor(s) from all duty of defending the Vendee against all persons now claiming,
or who may hereafter claim, to have a better right and title thereto, and assuming all the
risk of eviction by superior title" (Exh. F).
It was further stipulated "that in the event that any third person shall succeed in
establishing right or title to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to that of
the grantor and in lawfully dispossessing the Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall not be
entitled to reimbursement from the Vendor of the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS
which constitutes the consideration for these presents, or of any part thereof, or to
damages" (Exh. F).
The Maxinos contend that Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title (as
distinguished from an onerous adjustment title) should prevail in determining the
Identity of the disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light of the notorious
discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now
claimed as the real area (885 hectares for Lot 1 and 84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not
involved in this case).
The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his gratuitous adjustment title granted
him possessory rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares but not ownership
over 970 hectares of grazing land. As to the requirements for an adjustment proceeding
under the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, where the area in hectares, not the
boundaries, is important, see Ventura, Land Registration and Mortgages, pp. 1719.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title justified the considerable increase
in area. They have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970
hectares. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a
different land was covered thereby. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located
in Barrio Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated that the land was located in Barrio
Cambuga, now Anonang.
His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose boundaries are not the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and the lands of Maximo
Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and Felix Aguilles, with an area of 120 hectares (Exh. I). On
the other hand, his 1919 and 1921 tax declarations are for land with the same boundaries
but with an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. I-2 and I-3).
The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the boundaries Campalacio and Yamay
Creeks but the area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, a far cry from the 970
hectares as surveyed (Exh. I-4, I-5 and I-6).
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director of
Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Director of Lands vs. Salazar,
G. R. No. 50340, December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1199; Director
of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).
The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for the applicants. Applicant Prudencio
Maxino testified that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of more than seventy
hectares (8 tsn Jan. 11, 1961). He purchased the lot from his aunt and mother, as shown
in the deed of September 24, 1935, Exhibit F (9).
He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as Yamay Creek (13). The land was
grazing or pasture land (15). Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5 tsn March 6,
1961). He did not know that the land had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he bought
it (6). He came to know the area of the land when it was surveyed. He was not present
when it was surveyed (6).
Another witness, Fortunato Naadiego, 76, testified that the land was possessed during
the Spanish regime by his stepfather, Pedro Tesalona, the owner, not Prudencio
Tesalona, the holder of the adjustment title (11).
Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198). The
instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands,
60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was
fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to registration. As to void
composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda vs. Commanding General, 6 Phil.
573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February
16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the decision of the Appellate Court and the
decision of Judge Del Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are reversed and set aside. The
application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Footnotes
*
"DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION CIVIL DE FILIPINAS y por su
delegacion el jefe de la provincia de Tayabas.
"Por cuanto D. Prudencio Tesalona natural, vecino y principal del pueblo de Mulanay de
esta provincia ha solicitado la composicion con el Estado del terreno realengo que posee
en el barrio Ilamado Yamay, pasto de animales de la jurisdiccion del pueblo de Mulanay
de esta provincia, siendo sus limites y cabida los siguientes:
"l. a PARCELA. Radica en el sitio arriba indicado mide una superficie de veintinueve
hectares, cincuenta areas y setenta y cinco centiareas. Limita al Norte Estero
Campalacio; al Este estero Yamay; al Sur estero Yamay y al Oeste estero Campalacio.
"Y como por resolucion de la Junta local de fecha doce del actual le ha sido adjudicada al
interesado por composicion gratuita la propiedad de dicho terreno, con arreglo al Real
Decreto de 26 de Diciembre de 1884, y habiendo presentado el papel sellado ... se une al
mismo debidamente inutilizado, expido el presente TITULO para que en virtud del
mismo se haya y tenga por dueno legitimo del terreno expresado a D. Prudencio
Tesalona natural vecino y principal de dicho pueblo de Mulanay.
"Este titulo se inscribirit en la Escribania de la provincia y en el Juzgado receptor
encargado hoy dia del Registro de la propiedad.
"Dado en Tayabas ill treinta de Julio de mil ochocientos ochenta y ocho.
"El Jefe de la provincia SGD. Illegible"
(Portion regarding stamps and registration omitted)
iii. Defective Title vs. Unblemished Title

G.R. No. 105027 April 22, 1994
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG, ALBERT
CHUA and SPS. EDUARDO SOLIS and GLORIA VICTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. respondents.
Bayani L. Bernardo for other petitioners.
Lourdes P. San Diego and Romeo R. Bringas for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 petition for review by certiorari of the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated December 24, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 13540. 1
The controlling facts supported by the records are stated in the Decision under review,
viz:
The objects of the controversy are several portions of a large tract of land located in the
municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. The large tract of land is claimed to be originally owned
by one Juan Cuenca y Francisco, who had it surveyed way back in 1911. The land itself is
traversed by railroad tracks dividing the land into two (2) parcels. On February 21, 1922,
Juan Cuenca was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 (Exhibit "H") covering the
two parcels, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 was later
reconstituted as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9, containing the technical descriptions of Lots 1
and 2.
On April 14, 1928, a separate original certificate of title for Lot 1, referring to the parcel
north of the railroad tracks, was issued to Juan Cuenca as O.C.T. No. (1898) RO-58
(Exhibit "Z"). Lot 1 itself was divided into thirteen (13) parcels, eleven (11) of which were
described therein as situated in the barrios of Talaba, Zapote, and Malicsi, while two (2)
parcels were situated in the poblacion of Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon the demise of Juan Cuenca, an action for partition of his properties was filed by
Jose Cuenca, one of the surviving heirs. On February 21, 1969, a project of partition was
approved by the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit "EEE"), and on April 10, 1969,
the court ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue individual
titles for twelve (12) parcels of Lot 2 (Exhibit "GG). Three (3) parcels thereof: Lot 2-A, 2K, and 2- L, were titled (T.C.T. Nos. 35963, 35973 and 35974, respectively) and
registered in the name of Juan Cuenca (Exhibits "K", "TTT-1" and "TTT-2") on April 21,
1969. All three titles stated that the lands covered therein were originally registered as
O.C.T. No. RO-9 on February 21, 1922 (Exhibits "K", "G" and "H").
Lot 2-A of Juan Cuenca was later subdivided into seven (7) lots in 1969. Of these seven
subdivided parcels, one parcel (Lot 2-A-3) was adjudicated to his heir, Pura Cuenca,
who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41505 on February 24, 1970 (Exhibit
"L). The said T.C.T. No. 41505 states that the land covered therein was originally
registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof. One other parcel (Lot 2A-4) was adjudicated to another heir, Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41506 (Annex "M") on February 24, 1970. Likewise, T.C.T. No.
41506 stated that the land covered therein was originally registered as Original
Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was
cancelled by virtue thereof.
We interpose at this point the observation that although the transfer certificates of title
issued to Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands covered therein were originally
registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, hence, referring to Lot 1 located at the northern portion of
Juan Cuenca's large tract of land, the technical description appearing in said transfer
certificates of title were taken or lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2,
referring to the southern portion of the original tract of land.
In the meantime, Lots 2-K and 2-L (T.C.T. Nos. 35973 and 35974) in the name of Juan
Cuenca, were consolidated and, in turn, were subdivided into eight (8) lots. Lot 4 was
adjudicated to Pura Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41498 (Exhibit "TTT-5") on
February 24, 1970. Lot 3 was adjudicated to Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No.
41497 (Exhibit "TTT-4") on the same date. Lot 6 was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, who
was issued T.C.T. No. 41501 with the inscription therein that the land covered by said
titles were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that T.C.T. No.
RO-58-I was cancelled thereby, referring to Lot 1 of the original tract. However, the
technical descriptions inscribed therein were lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9
covering Lot 2 of the original tract of land.
Upon the deaths of Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca, the administrators of their respective
testate estates were given authority by the court to dispose of some parcels of land. Lot
2-A-3 of Pura Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No. 41505, and Lot 2-A-4 of Ladislaw Cuenca
covered by T.C.T. No. 41506, were eventually sold to herein appellee Lorenzana Food
Corporation on February 4, 1977 (Annexes, "OOO", "CCC" and "UU-1"). Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41505 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88468 issued to, and
registered in favor of, Lorenzana Food Corporation (Annex "D"). Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 41506 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88467 (Exhibit "2") on February 18, 1977.
Both T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468 also stated that the lands covered therein were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, but contained portions of the technical
description appearing in O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9.
On the other hand, Lot 3 of the consolidated Lots 2-K and 2-L, as part of the testate
estate of Ladislaw Cuenca, was sold to herein appellee Jimmy Chua Chi Leong. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 104248 (Exhibit "A") was issued to and registered in his name on
May 9, 1979, cancelling T.C.T. No. 41497. Lot 4, being part of the testate estate of Pura
Cuenca, was sold to Albert Chua, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-104249 on May 9, 1979
(Exhibit "B"), cancelling T.C.T. No. 41498. Lot 6 was sold by Jose Cuenca to Eduardo
Solis, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-94389, cancelling T.C.T. No. T-41501. Common to
the titles of Jimmy Chua Ching Leong, Albert Chua and Eduardo Solis is the inscription
that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14,
1928.
Another common feature of all these succeeding titles is the description that the
property therein described is situated in the barrio of Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite. Looking
back, the records show that the original tract of land owned by Juan Cuenca was
bounded on the north by Calle Real de Talaba, on the south and southeast by Sapa Niog,
and on the west, by Calle Niog. As mentioned earlier, the land was divided into two (2)
by the railroad tracks running from and going to east and west. The area located north
of the railroad tracks, bordering Calle Real de Talaba was later titled as O.C.T. (1898)
50-58, said parcel straddling the barrios of Talaba, Zapote and Milicsi, as well as the
poblacion proper.
On the other hand, the portion located south of the railroad tracks was designated as Lot
2. Traversing this land is what used to be a national road, now called the Aguinaldo
Highway, linking Tagaytay City to Metro Manila. This parcel was later titled as O.C.T.
No. (1020) RO-9. The sub-divided parcels aforementioned, by their technical
descriptions are located at the south to southeast portions of Lot 2, bounded on the
south, by Sapa Niog and Calle Niog on the west. Nevertheless, the said parcels were
described as situated in the barrio of Talaba.
The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels were being
claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego, Incorporated. B.E. San Diego's claim was
based on two (2) titles registered in its name. The first parcel was covered under T.C.T.
No. T-17621 (Annex "C") issued on March 2, 1966, which originated from O.C.T. No. 0490 registered on December 22, 1965. The said title described "a parcel of land Plan
Psu-211245, pursuant to L.R.C. Case No. N-467, (LRC) Record No. N-27923, situated in
the Barrio of Niog, Municipality of Bacoor." The second parcel was titled under O.C.T.
No. 0-644, registered on January 5, 1967, pursuant to LRC Case No. N-557, (LRC)
Record No. N-30647, describing "a parcel of land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-223920), situated in
Barrio of Niog." (Exhibit "9").
All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the subject
properties, three (3) civil suits for quieting of title were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch XIX. The first case, docketed as BCV-80-17 was filed by
Lorenzana Food Corporation versus B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, and other
defendants. The second civil case, BCV-81-18, was filed by Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and
Albert Chua, also against B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al., as defendants. The last case, BCV83-79 was filed by B.E. San Diego, Inc., against spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, as
defendants.
In Civil Case No. BCV-80-17, Lorenzana Food Corporation claimed exclusive ownership
over the two (2) parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468, issued to it on
February 18, 1977. Lorenzana Food Corporation alleged that it took immediate
possession of the said property and even contracted to prepare the land for
development. It is alleged that it was only years later that Lorenzana Food Corporation
learned that B.E. San Diego, Inc. was claiming ownership over portions of the said
parcels by virtue of O.C.T. No. 0-644. It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention
that the O.C.T. No. 0-644, in B.E. San Diego's name is null and void because Lorenzana
Food Corporation's title emanated from an O.C.T. issued more than thirty-nine (39)
years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original certificate of title.
In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of owner of the subject
property for more than fifty (50) years prior to Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase
of the two (2) parcels. It also argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-644 was not
null and void since it was issued upon application and proper proceedings in (LRC) Case
No. N-557 and N-30647, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. Pursuant to
its issuance, the said property was declared by B.E. San Diego for tax purposes (Exhibits
"Q" and "5-F") since June 22, 1966.
B.E. San Diego claims it bought the subject property from Teodora Dominguez on
February 6, 1966 (Exhibit "5-D") and the absolute deed of sale was submitted in (LRC)
Case No. N-577. It was further argued that Lorenzana Food Corporation was
erroneously claiming the subject property because of Lorenzana's titled property is
described to be located in Barrio Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's property is situated in
Barrio Niog. Denying that Lorenzana Food Corporation's predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject property, B.E. San Diego claimed that in 1979, by force,
intimidation, threat, stealth, and strategy, Lorenzana Food Corporation entered and
occupied the subject property, despite barbed wire fencing with warning signs, and
security guards posted by B.E. San Diego.
In Civil Case No. BCV-81-18, plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua claim
ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from the heirs of Juan Cuenca,
as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-104248 and T-104249, issued on
January 20 and 30, 1979, respectively. B.E. San Diego, for its part, claimed the property
by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621 issued on March 2, 1966, which
cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 0-490 originally issued to Teodora
Dominguez, who sold the same property to B.E. San Diego. Again, B.E. San Diego
argued that, as appearing in their respective titles, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong's and Albert
Chua's properties were located in Barrio Talaba while that of B.E. San Diego was located
in Barrio Niog.
The last case, BCV-83-79 was initiated by B.E. San Diego against the Solis spouses who,
according to the former, unlawfully entered a portion of its property titled under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621. The Solis spouses, meanwhile, claim the said
portion by virtue of their Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389, issued pursuant to
their purchase of said portion from Jose Cuenca.
In light of these factual findings, the respondent court decided in favor of the private
respondent, B.E. San Diego, Inc. It rejected petitioners' titles because of the following
defects, viz:
(a)
The appellees' (petitioners) titles are annotated with the inscription that the land
described therein was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the technical
descriptions found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
(b)
The appellees (petitioners) titles state that the properties are located in the barrio
of Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the Barrio of Niog.
On the other hand, it found the titles of private respondent unblemished by any defect.
It also considered in private respondent's favor its open, adverse and continuous
possession of the disputed land since 1966. The respondent court gave little weight to
the verification survey of Felipe Venezuela, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the
Bureau of Lands favoring the claims of the petitioners on the ground that the "survey
was just based on the technical descriptions appearing in the opposing parties' titles." 2
The dispositive portion of the disputed Decision decreed: 3
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Joint Decision dated July 15,
1986 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering:
1.
The nullification and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-88467
and T-88468 in the name of appellee Lorenzana Food Corporation, and dismissing Civil
Case No. BCV-80-17;
2.
The nullification and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-104248
and T-104249 in the names of appellees Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, and
dismissing Civil Case No. BCV-81-18; and
3.
The nullification and cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-94389 in
the names of appellees-spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis, who are hereby ordered to
immediately vacate the subject property.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners assail the Decision in this petition for review on certiorari as having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Lorenzana Food Corporation and the
spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria Victa raise the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the decision of the lower court to uphold the validity of the land
titles of private respondent in spite of the fact that these were issued some forty six (46)
years later than the titles of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest.
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law and grave abuse of
discretion in giving more significance to the annotation than the technical description in
identifying the lots in dispute.
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous conclusion of facts,
amounting to reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in holding in its
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration that petitioners failed to
make proper correction of their titles.
IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
pass judgment on the liabilities of the estate of Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca,
predecessors-in-interest (sellers) of the petitioners.
Petitioners Albert Chua and Jimmy Chua Chi contend:
1.
In the face of its own admission that petitioners (including Albert Chua and
Jimmy Chua Chi Leong) "can trace their titles as having been originally registered on
February 21, 1922', the respondent Court of Appeals obviously erred and gravely abused
its discretion in nullifying and ordering the cancellation of petitioners" transfer
certificates of title and dismissing their complaints (including those of Albert Chua and
Jimmy Chua Chi Leong), and in upholding private respondent's title.
2.
The respondent Court gravely erred and abused its discretion in finding that
petitioners' titles (including Albert Chua's and Jimmy Chua Chi Leong's) are annotated
with the inscription that the land described therein was originally registered under OCT
No. 1898, but the technical description found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020)
RO-9.
3.
The mother title of petitioners' lots is Original Certificate of Title No. (1020) RO9 and not 1898.
4.
The respondent court gravely erred and abused its discretion in not finding that
private respondent's title is rooted in a fake or spurious title.
5.
The respondent court gravely erred and abused its discretion in discrediting the
verification survey conducted by Engr. Felipe Venezuela, Chief of the Technical Service
Section of the Bureau of Lands, who was commissioned to conduct said survey, by order
of the Court, which confirmed the fact that petitioners' lots originated from Lot 2, Psu1075, covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9 and that they are overlapped by the lots of
respondent, as evidenced by his Report (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2").
6.
Even private respondent expressly admitted that based on the technical
descriptions of the lots of petitioners, three are overlappings of said lots and
respondent's lots, and the respondent court gravely erred and abused its discretion in
holding otherwise.
7.
The entries in the second paragraph of petitioners' titles are mere clerical errors
which can not defeat the fact that petitioners' titles originated from Lot 2, Psu-1075,
covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9.
8.
The respondent court's holding that there could be no overlapping because in
petitioners' titles it appears that their lots are situated in Barrio Talaba, while its lots are
situated in Barrio Niog, is devoid of merit.
We find no merit in the petition.
A perusal of the petition will reveal that it does not raise any question of law of sufficient
significance to warrant the interposition of the power of review of this court. Neither
does the petition demonstrate that the disputed Decision is anchored on factual findings
so grossly misappreciated by the respondent court, as to result in a wanton distortion
and denial of the legal rights of petitioners.
The case at bench started as actions to quiet petitioners' titles over certain parcels of
land filed against private respondent. 4 The disputed lots are in the possession of the
private respondent who has consistently paid their taxes since 1966. The lots are located
in barrio Niog, municipality of Bacoor, province of Cavite. They are covered by private
respondent's titles, TCT No. T-17621 and OCT No. 0-644. As noted by the respondent
court, the titles of private respondent are ". . . not blemished by any defect and were
regularly issued."
Private respondent's titles were assailed by the petitioners. They allegedly cast a cloud of
doubt on their titles. Petitioners' evidence showed that their titles were derived from the
original title of Juan F. Cuenca issued on February 21, 1922. The origin of their titles was
traced by Eng. Felipe Venezuela of the Bureau of Lands.
The basic question is whether petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving
the superiority of their titles over the titles of the private respondent. The respondent
court found the quantum and quality of evidence presented by the petitioners
insufficient. We find no compelling reason to reverse this ruling. The defects appearing
on the face of the titles of the petitioners are too glaring to escape the naked eye. These
are recited in detail in the Resolution of the former Special Sixth Division of the
respondent court thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr., 5 when it denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration, to wit:
From the evidence, the appellees derived their titles from the defective titles of their
vendors, namely Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca. Although the titles issued to Pura and
Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands covered therein were originally registered as OCT
No. 1898 hence referring to Lot 1 located at the northern portion of Juan Cuenca's large
tract of land, the technical descriptions appearing in the certificates of titles were taken
or lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2, referring to the southern portion of
the original tract of land. The land covered by OCT No. 1898 is not the land covered by
the title of the appellees Lorenzana, because the title of the lot was derived from OCT
No. 1898 but its technical description was drawn from OCT No. 1020. The land covered
by OCT No. 1898 is located in the northern portion of the land covered by OCT No.
1020.
The title of the appellant's predecessors-in-interest showed that the land acquired by the
appellant and for which title was issued in the appellant's name was described in said
title as being located in Barrio Niog, while the appellees' title described the property
covered by their title as located in Barrio Talaba. But appellees claim a parcel of land
that is located in Barrio Niog. These two barrios of the town of Bacoor, Cavite, are
located poles apart and were never one and the same town in the history of the province.
The appellees are claiming property not located in the barrio as described in the
technical description.
To be sure, these defects were judicially admitted by the petitioners. They attached their
defective titles to their complaints in the trial court. As aforestated, their titles showed
on their very face that they covered lots located in barrio Talaba, municipality of Bacoor
whereas the lots of private respondent are in barrio Niog of the same municipality. The
two barrios are one and a half kilometers away from each other. Likewise, the face of
their titles show that they emanated from OCT No. 1898 or from Lot 1 constituting the
northern portion of Juan Cuenca's property before its subdivision. Nonetheless, the
technical descriptions of the lots appearing in their titles were lifted from OCT No.
(1020) RO-9 or from Lot 2 forming the southern portion of Juan Cuenca's land. No less
than petitioners' witness, Eng. Venezuela, confirmed these blatant defects when he
testified, thus:
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ:
Q
(to the witness)
You said you referred to these titles in connection with your verification?
WITNESS:
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Now, I presume you also saw the matters stated in the second paragraph of the
first page of the titles, I am referring . . . particularly to the fact that as stated in both of
these titles, this land was originally registered on April 14, 1928 as Original Certificate of
Title 1898 pursuant to Decree No. 338259 LRC Record No. 29214, did you notice those?
WITNESS:
A
I noticed that, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)

Q
In the report that you submitted to this Court on your verification survey, we find
in paragraph 8, No, paragraph 4, subparagraph f, the following statement which I read,
"THAT AS PER TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS APPEARING ON TCT NO. 88467 AND
TCT NO. 88468 REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF. . . . . . LORENZANA FOOD
CORPORATION, THE PROPERTY FALLS IN THE BARRIO OF NIOG, BACOOR,
CAVITE," CONTRADICTING TO THE LOCATION STATED IN THE TITLE WHICH IS
BARRIO TALABA, I READ FURTHER, "IT MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID
TITLE ORIGINATED FROM ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE NO TITLE NO. 1898
DECREED UNDER NO. 338259 WHICH IS ACTUALLY LOCATED IN BARRIO
TALABA, BACOOR, CAVITE.
MY QUESTION IS, BARRIO TALABA AND BARRIO NIOG ARE DIFFERENT
BARRIOS?
WITNESS:
A
YES, SIR.
Q
And you have apparently noticed that the statement contained in the second
paragraph of the title of plaintiff stating that the land supposed to be covered by said
titles is derived from OCT No. 1898?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Are we to understand that the land covered by OCT No. 1898 is not the same land
covered by the titles of the Lorenzana?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A
In a sense it is not actually, the title OCT 1898 is located on northern portion of
OCT No. 1020, in fact I made here a working sheet showing the titles, the one Original
Certificate of Title 1020 and Original Certificate .... of Title 1898 and I have here a sketch
plan of the positions. ... .
xxx
xxx
xxx
BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)
Q
You are mentioned OCT No. 1898 and OCT No. 1020, you will tell the Court of
these two (2) titles cover different parcels of land?
WITNESS:
A
As per my sketch sheet plan, Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 is located at the
southern portion of the Original of Title No. 1898, meaning to say that they are far apart
from each other.
Q
Now, this technical description that you utilized to plot the land described in the
title or titles of the plaintiff, which title did you use, 1898 or 1020?
A
I just followed the title as issued, as ordered by the Court.
I based my verification based on the title as required by the Court.

Q
THE QUESTION IS, ACCORDING TO YOU .... VERIFICATION, THE LAND
BEING CLAIMED BY THE PLAINTIFF, IS IT COVERED BY 1898 OR 1020?
WITNESS:
A
WELL, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR ON THE TITLE THAT IT WAS TAKEN FROM
OCT 1898.
Q
I will not argue to that fact that the title of Lorenzana was taken from 1898 but I
am asking you the plotting of the technical description as described on the title of the
plaintiff is referring to a land covered by original certificate of title 1898 or 1020?
A
It is very clear on my plan that the two (2) titles of Lorenzana happened to fall to
Original Certificate of Title No. 1020.
Q
IN OTHER WORDS, IF WE GO BY THE TITLE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT
THIS TITLE OF THE LORENZANAS WAS DERIVED FROM 1898 BUT THE
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ..... WAS FROM ANOTHER TITLE SPECIFICALLY 1020?
WITNESS:
A
YES, SIR, BY USING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION (pp. 34-35, 37-40, 41-43,
tsn, 12-9-80, bold letters supplied).
His attempt to reconcile the defects and inconsistencies appearing on the faces of
petitioners' titles did not impress the respondent court and neither are we. His opinion
lacks authoritativeness for his verification survey was not made on the land itself. It was
a mere table survey based on the defective titles themselves.
Petitioners would minimize the import of the defects in their titles by describing them as
"clerical." The plea does not persuade for the self-contradictions in petitioners' titles
infract their integrity. Errors that relate to the lots' mother title, their technical
descriptions and their locations cannot be dismissed as clerical and harmless in
character. With these errors, the titles of the petitioners do not deserve the sanctity
given to torrens title. These errors precisely created and cast the cloud of doubt over
petitioners' titles and precipitated the case at bench.
Petitioners also missed the thrust of the assailed Decision with their argument that the
respondent court gave more importance to the misleading annotations in their titles
rather than to their technical descriptions. In pointing out the discrepancies in
petitioners' titles, the respondent court was simply stressing that these titles cannot be
upheld against the unblemished titles of the private respondent. The case at bench is not
one where petitioners are correcting the defects in their titles by reconciling the
annotations therein and the technical descriptions of the lots. Rather, the case involves
actions for quieting of titles where petitioners are urging that their error-filled titles
should be adjudged as superior to the regularly issued titles of the private respondent.
Petitioners would also oust private respondent from the lots it has occupied from 1966
and whose taxes it has paid since then.
In a last swing against the disputed Decision, petitioners contend that the respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to pass judgment on the
liabilities of the estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw Cuenca, their predecessors-ininterest. The contention deserves scant attention. The records show that the trial court
dismissed petitioners' Complaint against the Estates of Pura Cuenca and Ladislaw
Cuenca in Civil Cases No. BCV-80-17 and BCV-81-18. They alleged that the said Estates
breached their warranties as sellers of the subject lots. Petitioners Lorenzana Food
Corporation as well as Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua did not appeal the
dismissal of their Complaints against these Estates. The dismissal has become final and
petitioners cannot resurrect the Estates' alleged liability in this petition for review on
certiorari.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is DISMISSED there being no showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in deciding CA-G.R. CV
No. 13540. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1
Sixth Division composed of Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr., (Chairman),
Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr., (ponente) and Filemon H. Mendoza, (member).
2
At page 13, Decision.
3
It reversed the Joint Decision dated July 15, 1986 of the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite,
Br. 19 in Civil Cases No. BCV-83-17, BCV-81-18 and BCV-83-79.
4
Except Civil Case No. BCV-83-49 where the private respondent was the one who
sought to quiet his title vis-a-vis the title of the spouses Solis.
5.
Jr.
Concurred by Associate Justices Alfredo Marigomen and Quirino D. Abad Santos,
iv. Overlapping titles. A landowner loses his right to claim that his property has been
encroached when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time the alleged
encroachment was made. A Torrens Certificate of Title, complete and valid on its face
may not be defeated by another Torrens certificate of Title which, on its face, is irregular
and which contain defective technical description. No verification survey conducted.
G.R. No. 152445
CAMBRIDGE REALTY AND
RESOURCES CORP., Petitioner,
- versus ERIDANUS DEVELOPMENT, INC.
and CHITON REALTY CORP., Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 4, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 17, 2001 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51967 reversing and setting aside the October
10, 1995 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Civil Case
Nos. Q-89-2636 and Q-89-2750, which dismissed the complaints filed by respondents
Eridanus Development Inc. (ERIDANUS) and Chiton Realty Corporation (CHITON)
against petitioner Cambridge Realty and Resources Corporation (CAMBRIDGE). Also
assailed is the March 1, 2002 Resolution[4] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square meter lot, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 367213 (the CAMBRIDGE title/property),[6] in
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-38481 (the ERIDANUS
title/property),[7] in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. A portion of the covering title
thereof partially reads, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___23rd__
day of ______________, in the year nineteen hundred and ____Veinte____ in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___Rizal___, Volume ___T27___, page ___, as Original Certificate of Title No. __________, pursuant to Decree
No. __Case no. 917__, issued in L.R.C. ___________ Record No. ____________,
in the name of ______________.
This certificate is a transfer from __Trans.__ Certificate of Title No. __346380/T1736__ which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is
concerned.
On the other hand, respondent CHITON is the registered owner of a 2,563 square meter
lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 12667 (the CHITON
title/property),[8] in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. A portion of the covering title
thereof reads in part, as follows:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___23rd__
day of _____Sept._____, in the year nineteen hundred and ____veinte____ in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___Rizal___, Volume ___T27___, page _6__, as Original Certificate of Title No. __________, pursuant to
Decree No. __Case no. 917__, issued in L.R.C. ___________ Record No.
____________, in the name of ______________.
concerned.
The CAMBRIDGE title has a covering title that reads in part, thus
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the ___21st__
day of ___August___, in the year nineteen hundred and ____seven____ in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of ___RIZAL___, Volume
___A-4___, page __56_, as Original (sic) of Title No. _____355____, pursuant to
Decree No. __1425__, issued in L.R.C. Rec. No. ____917___.
concerned.[9]
The foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay Valencia, Quezon City,
and constitute the subject matter of the present controversy.
Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 362[10] was issued under Act 496 (The Land
Registration Act) by virtue of Decree of Registration 1425, GLRO No. 917, based on the
original survey conducted on November 17, 1906. It was subdivided into three portions:
Lots 27-A, 27-B and 27-C. Lot 27-C was titled in the name of Rafael Reyes, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 5506[11] issued on September 23, 1920. TCT
5506, in turn, appears to have been transferred in the name of Susana Realty, Inc.
(SUSANA) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18250.[12] TCT 18250 was then
subdivided into eight (8) lots, of which the ERIDANUS lot is claimed to be Lot 3 thereof
and CHITONs is Lot 4.
The subdivision of TCT 18250 (or Lot 27-C) was claimed to have been made by geodetic
surveyor Jaime V. Nerit (Nerit). Nerit said he began computing the boundaries based on
the SUSANA title. He noticed that the tie point[13] of the property was not fixed and
there were no fixed or permanent markers, so he conducted research and obtained from
the Bureau of Lands the approved consolidated subdivision plan of an adjoining
property, Gilmore Townhouses[14] located on the western side and owned by Ayala
Investments and Development Corporation (the AYALA property) which had fixed
monuments to which Nerit could establish and connect with those of TCT 18250. He
found a fixed tie point therein, BLLM 1, Marikina[15] (S. 6819 W. Pt. 6785 from BLLM
Marikina I, Marikina, Rizal), and from there he next computed the relation between
corner 1 as described in the technical description of TCT 18250, and corner 1 as
described in that of the Ayala property. In this manner, Nerit said he was able to
establish the position of respondents property and prepare the subdivision plan of TCT
18250, which was subsequently approved by the Land Registration Commission.[16]
Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 355[17] was registered under Act 496 on August
21, 1907, based on the original survey conducted on June 16 to August 16, 1907. It was
registered in the name of La Compania Agricola de Ultramar (AGRICOLA). Lot 21
thereof was subdivided and a portion thereof Lot 21-A was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 578,[18] from which TCT 367213, the CAMBRIDGE title,
was allegedly derived.
On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to enjoin CAMBRIDGE
from pursuing the planned subdivision and development of its property, which
ERIDANUS claims encroached upon its own. The Complaint prays for a writ of
injunction; the removal of an alleged encroaching wall CAMBRIDGE constructed; that
the encroached portion be vacated and surrendered to it; that it be paid P3,500.00 per
month, from the time of filing of the complaint to surrender of possession, as reasonable
value for the use and occupation by CAMBRIDGE of the encroached portion; and
litigation expenses, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
On June 15, 1989, CHITON instituted Civil Case No. Q-89-2750, with a similar prayer
for relief as in Civil Case No. Q-89-2636, except that CHITON seeks a lower monthly
charge of P1,700.00 for the use and occupation of the alleged encroached portion, and a
lesser amount for attorneys fees.
Both complaints were subsequently consolidated in Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 upon
motion of CHITON.
The civil complaints were triggered by a previous verification survey conducted on
respondents respective properties, where the results allegedly showed that the
CAMBRIDGE property encroached or overlapped upon respondents lots, to the extent

of 357 square meters for ERIDANUS and 177 square meters for CHITON.
Upon motion of the respondents, surveyors from the Survey Division of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Lands Management Services conducted
a relocation survey of the subject properties, pursuant to an Order of the trial court
dated May 8, 1992. On February 10, 1993, they prepared a two-page Report,[19] finding
in part thus
1. That the Verification/Relocation Survey has been conducted on October 1, 2 and
November 5, 1992.
2. At the outset, corresponding Technical Descriptions along the two (2) properties TCT
18250 and TCT 367213, supposedly common to both has already a difference of 3
degrees 10 minutes (3-0-00) as described on their respective titles inspite of the
deficiency of TCT No. 18250 (Susana Realty Inc.) for not having any tie line.
3. That a subdivision of the lot covered by TCT No. 18250 under (LRC) Psd-335633 had
been approved, June 19, 1986 referring to Lot 27-C, Psd -13458 as the source which
records when researched could not be made available at hand, has established its tie
line.
4. That the lot covered by TCT No. 367213 (Cambridge Realty and Resource
Corporation) has also been subdivided under Psd-13-005784 approved by the Lands
Management Services of this Region last May 3, 1988.
5. That the Technical Descriptions of TCT No. 367213 under Psd-13-005784 boundary
referred from Lot 1, Sub-Block 1-A, Psd-225 was also researched and could not be made
available at hand.
xxxx
8. Party litigants has not paid corresponding survey deposit in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,600.00).
xxxx
(signed)
ELPIDIO T. DE LARA
Chief, Technical Services Section
The trial court received the evidence of both parties, which in the main consisted of the
expert testimonies of practicing private geodetic surveyors. Thus, respondents, as
plaintiffs a quo, presented Nerit, who claimed to have conducted a survey of the
respondents properties, as well as a study of the CAMBRIDGE property and its alleged
predecessor title (TCT 578). He testified that in the course of his work, he found out that
the CAMBRIDGE property overlapped that of ERIDANUS at the north with a distance
of eight (8) linear meters;[20] that although the CAMBRIDGE property was formerly a
portion of TCT 578, the former does not conform to the latter;[21] that when it was
segregated from TCT 578, the bearings on the side abutting the respondents property
were altered;[22] that TCT 578 was issued in 1907, yet the original survey of the
property covered by the CAMBRIDGE title was made in 1920;[23] that there is no
record of the subdivision plan of the CAMBRIDGE lot;[24] and that it does not appear
that the CAMBRIDGE lot came from TCT 578 (despite stating previously that the former
used to be a portion of the latter).[25]
On cross-examination, Nerit stated that there is no basis for him to say that the
CAMBRIDGE lot came from TCT 578,[26] because there is nothing in the title thereof
that indicates that it was derived from the latter;[27] that when he first surveyed the
SUSANA property (TCT 18250) in 1960, he did not discover any overlapping, and he did
so only in 1990;[28] that he found out that there was a discrepancy between the tie point
in the respondents titles and their predecessors, the SUSANA title;[29] that the tie point
of the SUSANA property was just a PLS monument (i.e., technically, there is no tie point
meaning that the propertys geographical position could not be found, such that there
could be no starting point for the conduct of a survey), which he could not rely on for the
survey;[30] so, he had to find a solution by creating a new one, BLLM 1 Marikina.[31]
Likewise, Nerit testified on cross-examination that there is no evidence to show that the
CAMBRIDGE property was derived from OCT 355 (the AGRICOLA property, or the
mother title);[32] that the CAMBRIDGE property came from TCT 578 but the common
azimuth of the two titles do not conform to each other;[33] that the overlapping of titles
could have occurred during the original survey of the CAMBRIDGE property on
November 10, 1920;[34] that when he conducted the subdivision survey of the SUSANA
property (TCT 18250), he certified that he did not find any overlapping;[35] that the
blank spaces in the SUSANA title[36] were mere typographical errors or inadvertent
mistakes;[37] that, knowing that these blank spaces existed, he did not endeavor to
determine the reasons or causes thereof.[38]
On re-direct examination, Nerit testified that as to the respondents properties,
notwithstanding that they have no tie points, the boundaries thereof may still be
determined and identified.[39] Nerit made a sketch of how he went about changing the
floating (or not fixed) tie point to a fixed one.[40]
Respondents next presented Engineer Oliver A. Morales, a licensed appraiser of real
estate properties, for the purpose of establishing the fair market value of the ERIDANUS
and CHITON properties in connection with the prayer for indemnification of fair rental
value for the use of the alleged encroached property.
Respondents thereafter presented Ernesto Vidal, Clerk III of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, who testified that he was specifically sent to testify in court by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, and he brought with him the original copies of OCTs 362 and 355 on file
with the Registry. Said titles, however, have been rendered, by the passage of time,
incapable of being read and deciphered for the most part.
Another witness, Elpidio T. De Lara, geodetic engineer and Chief (Engineer IV) of the
Technical Services Sector of the Land Management Services, DENR, has been with the
office since 1960 and had served as chief of the Technical Services Sector for five (5)
years at the time of the taking of his testimony. He testified that he conducted an actual
verification survey of the CAMBRIDGE, ERIDANUS and CHITON properties on
October 1, 2, and November 5, 1992;[41] in connection therewith, he prepared a
relocation/verification plan[42] which was duly approved by his superiors; he found out
that there is an overlapping of the boundaries of the petitioner and respondents
properties.[43]
De Lara likewise testified that in the preparation of the relocation plan, he used as basis
the SUSANA title for the respondents properties, and for the petitioner, the
CAMBRIDGE title;[44] but that with regard to the SUSANA title, there is no tie point;
[45] there being no tie point, it would be difficult and impossible to make a relocation
plan;[46] being so, respondents properties were plotted on the basis of the technical
descriptions in the title of an adjoining property, the AYALA property;[47] that if he
plotted the respondents properties on the basis of the common boundary (lines 1 to 2)
between the adjacent AYALA and SUSANA properties as stated in the technical
description of the SUSANA title, there would be no overlapping of boundaries between
petitioner and respondents titles;[48] on the other hand, if the survey were conducted
based on the respondents respective titles which do not have a tie line or tie point, there
would be an overlap;[49] interestingly, he claims that he discovered an overlapping but
that it is a technical overlapping. Thus:
Atty. Bilog:
Did you research on the title of the plaintiffs and defendant, have you examined this title
TCT No. 18250?
A Yes, your honor.
xxxx
Q This TCT No. 18250, showing to you this copy of TCT No. 18250 which has been
previously marked as Exhibit O for the plaintiffs and as Exhibit 1 for the defendant, will
you look at this title and point to us, what is the reference point of the property
described on this title?
xxxx
Q Is there a reference point or tie point?
A Well, actually, there is no reference point
Q So, if you had used this title, Exhibit O, for the plaintiff in the plotting of this
relocation plan, marked as Exhibit 11 for the defendant, you would not be able to plot on
this Exhibit 11, the property of the plaintiff because the title of the plaintiff has no
reference point or tie point?
Witness:
A But you can do this through its adjoining properties, on the basis of this title.
Q Witness did not answer my question, your honor
Court What is the purpose of having reference or tie point?...Is it essential?
Atty. Bilog:
Very essential, your honor.
Court (to the witness)
Q Without it, as the Court gathers from your answer, it would be difficult and impossible
for you to make the relocation plan?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you make a relocation plan, as you did in this Exhibit 11, you used the technical
description of other properties?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Is that an accepted alternative?
A Yes, your honor, this determine the corresponding relations
Atty. Bilog
Q Without thinking of the question of overlapping, when you are supposed to plot in the
relocation plan the property of the plaintiff, the plaintiffs property is not connected to
any tie line or tie point in the description of the title?
A I cannot use the common point, this is connected with the corresponding tie line, sir.
Q The technical descriptions which you narrated belong to other surveys?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that survey which is now in your possession, the plaintiffs property is adjacent to
other property?
A It is not actually adjacent to this property except this portion, sir.
Court:
Witness pointing to lines between 1 and 2 on Exhibit Y and 11 within the plan of
plaintiffs property.
Q Now, these lines between 1 and 2, representing perimeter or boundary, that is
adjacent to the boundary of an adjoining property and this survey was used for plotting
this relocation plan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this line between 1 and 2 of plaintiffs property, in any way described in the
technical description of the property, this survey is also used in this relocation plan?
A It is prescribed, sir.
Q Now, you are talking about common boundary line, what do you mean by common
boundary line, will you point in this plan, what is this common boundary line?
A The two surveys coincide with each other or tangent with each other, sir.
Q Can you point out to this plan, what is the common boundary?
A 1 and 2 of the plaintiffs technical description and 16 and 15, sir.
(Witness pointing to the figure on the plan)
Q Why do you say it is a common boundary?
A Well, the technical description of the plaintiffs title and the adjacent property which is
the Ayala property are the same
Q You are saying that they are common?
A Yes, common sir.
xxxx
A It is a common boundary as the survey stated, sir.
xxxx
Q Can you say, in a reasonable certainty that the boundaries, which you are referring to
point 1 and 2 of plaintiffs TCT No. 18250 is a common boundary with that of Ayala
property that you are stating?
A It is a common boundary otherwise, you will not
Q Now, Mr. Witness, if you will only plotted (sic) the plaintiffs property on the basis of
the technical description of TCT 18250, in this relocation plan, there would be no
overlapping of boundaries between plaintiffs and defendants properties?
Atty. Barcelona
Objection, your honor.
Atty. Bilog
Assuming, your honor, he is an expert
Court
Yes, he is an expert, he knows that
Atty. Bilog
There would be no overlapping, is it not?
A As stated in the survey, the overlapping of the property has already been discovered
but it is a technical overlapping, sir.
Atty. Bilog
I move that the testimony be strickened off the record, your honor, it is not responsive
Court
Just answer yes or no?
A Yes, sir.
Q When the intention is to determine the degrees of overlapping of the two adjoining
properties, can you not use the technical descriptions contained in their respective TCTs
for that purpose?
A If we use it
Court
They will overlap, is that what you want to say?
A They will overlap, your honor because the plaintiffs property does not carry the tie line
or tie point, your honor.[50]
Another geodetic engineer, William G. Lim, was presented by the respondents. He
stated that he performed a verification survey of the respondents properties, using as
basis the SUSANA title, TCT 578, and the technical description of the CAMBRIDGE
property.[51] He likewise testified that, for the survey of respondents properties, he used
as tie point 1 Marikina Rizal.[52] He prepared a verification survey plan (Exh. BB) duly
approved by the proper government authority.[53]
On cross-examination, Lim testified that the reference point for the respondents
properties for purposes of survey was N. 60 gds. 2330E., 23.69 m.s. de un mojon de
concreto marcado PLS yes mismo punto 86 de la parcela No. 21;[54] that said reference
point was located in the intersection of the road and could no longer be located, or it
could have been lost or destroyed, and because the BLLM reference point already exists;
[55] that in surveying the respondents properties, he used instead as reference point
BLLM 1, not the PLS monument, because the government has been requiring that all
subdivisions or surveys now should be tied with approved tie lines of the BLLM;[56]
that if the property has no tie point or reference point, the surveyor may tie the same to
the nearest reference point of other adjoining lots that have a tie point;[57] that even if
the property has no reference point, its exact location could be determined in a survey;
[58] that even if there is no reference point or BLLM monument, an overlapping of
properties could still be detected on the basis of the title alone.[59]
On re-direct examination, Lim testified that he conducted at least two surveys on the
ERIDANUS and CHITON properties, and for the first survey he found a difference in
the overlap by the CAMBRIDGE lot of about 21 or 22 square meters compared to the
552 square meter overlap found by De Lara;[60] that with regard to the tie line, a
change thereof does not affect the location of the surveyed property;[61] that when the
reference point or tie point is changed, the azimuth lines and azimuth tie lines of the
property are likewise changed, but not the location thereof.[62] In his written report,
however, Lim computes the CAMBRIDGE overlap at 541 sq. m.[63]
The petitioner, as defendant a quo, presented geodetic engineer Emilia Rivera Sison,
who testified that the ERIDANUS and CHITON titles lack material data in their
covering titles, such that it appears that they did not undergo proper registration
proceedings and that they do not have a mother title;[64] the CAMBRIDGE title, on the
other hand, has a complete covering title, showing that it has a mother title (OCT 355)
and that it underwent registration proceedings;[65] that it is impossible to plot the
relative position of the ERIDANUS and CHITON properties using the SUSANA title
because the tie point appearing in the latter title is a PLS which has no known
geographic position, or is floating, which means that the property could not be located
in a fixed place;[66] that Engr. Lims verification survey plan (Exh. BB) did not use tie
points, nor did it indicate what titles were plotted therein as to show the fact of
overlapping, since the said plan could not be compared with the titles plotted therein.
[67]
Sison further testified that when she conducted a fixed survey of the properties in
question, she found CAMBRIDGE to be in possession of the alleged overlapping portion,
and that there was an existing adobe stone wall, which appeared to be old, within the
claimed overlapping portion. She also saw townhouse units belonging to CAMBRIDGE
on said portion.[68]
On cross-examination, Sison testified that as a surveyor, she would tie the properties she
surveys to a BLLM reference (tie) point by computing the same to the nearest property
that already has a reference (tie) point, in cases where the property she is surveying has
no tie (reference) point;[69] but that when a tie point is changed, an overlapping is
caused;[70] that it was error for the respondents surveyors to have conducted their
respective surveys without thorough research and without securing the titles to
adjoining properties, as well as following certain processes of computation;[71] that she
conducted these processes of computation on the SUSANA title, and she found that the
technical description thereof contains an error, such that its actual area is either smaller
or bigger, making reference to the said SUSANA title as an open polygon in surveying
parlance, which means that the technical description is not correct (i.e., the polygon
should close, and when it does, the technical description is then presumed to be
correct).[72]
On October 10, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaints;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim, except that plaintiffs shall pay to defendant attorneys
fees of P50,000.00; and
3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[73]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and finding the appeal to be
meritorious, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the lower court with the direction to:
(1) allow the plaintiffs-appellants to elect whether to (a) appropriate as its own the
buildings and improvements on the encroached property, subject to payment of
indemnity or (b) oblige the defendant-appellee to pay the fair market value of the
encroached property, within the time the lower court shall fix;
(2) if the plaintiffs-appellants shall elect to oblige the defendant-appellee to pay the fair
market value of the encroached property, to refer the matter to a commissioner who
shall be appointed by the lower court to receive evidence on the fair market value of the
encroached property;
(3) if the value of the land is considerably more than that of the building and
improvements, and the defendant-appellee cannot be obliged to buy the land pursuant
to Article 448 of the New Civil Code, and the plaintiffs-appellants also do not choose to
appropriate the buildings or improvements after proper indemnity, the lower court shall
order the defendant-appellee to pay reasonable rent as agreed upon by the parties. In
case of disagreement on the terms of the lease, the lower court shall fix the terms
thereof; and
(4) to render judgment on the basis of the election of the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[74]
On March 1, 2002, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration; hence,
this petition based on the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO PROVE OVERLAP AND
ENCROACHMENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTY ON RESPONDENTS PROPERTIES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE TIE POINT OF A REGISTERED PROPERTY MAY BE
ALTERED WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND WITHOUT
OBSERVING THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 389 OF THE MANUAL OF LAND
SURVEYS IN THE PHILIPPINES, SECTION 108 OF P.D. 1529, AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND/OR THE

APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IS SUFFICIENT TO VALIDATE A
SURVEY PLAN AND/OR AMENDED TECHICAL DESCRIPTION WHICH DID NOT
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF LAW.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, COMPLETE AND VALID
ON ITS FACE MAY BE DEFEATED BY ANOTHER TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
WHICH, ON ITS FACE, IS IRREGULAR, AND WHICH CONTAINS DEFECTIVE
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION.
A review of the factual backdrop is proper for the resolution of the issues presented. The
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are ordinarily not subject to review by this Court
as they are deemed conclusive; but not when the findings of fact of the trial and
appellate courts are conflicting.[75]
There is one serious flaw that the trial court committed: its failure to require the courtappointed surveyors considering that there are quite a number of irregularities in the
certificates of title of the parties to conduct an extensive investigation of the titles of the
parties.
The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of
geodetic engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial
court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis
of the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and
experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles
is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions.[76]
It was the duty of the trial court, considering the magnitude and extent of the issues
presented and the questions that arose from a careful examination of the parties
respective certificates of title, to have required the appointed surveyors of the DENR to
investigate and trace the parties respective titles, conduct a comprehensive survey, study
and analysis of the boundaries, distances and bearings thereof, and submit an
exhaustive report thereon. Given their expertise and experience, they would have been
able to satisfactorily perform the required task. Yet the court did not. As a matter of fact,
the services of the government surveyors were not even secured by court initiative; the
trial court even threatened to do away with the testimonies of the state surveyors when
their presence in court could not be guaranteed. It was through the auspices of the
respondents that they were brought to court. To make matters worse, the parties did not
even pay the required fees for the survey; the court did not compel them.
In overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the court to appoint
a surveyor from the government land agencies the Land Registration Authority or the
DENR to act as commissioner. Given that the trial court here did not, we are now left to
make do with the two-page report of the state surveyors and decide the case with what
evidence is made available to us by the parties respective expert witnesses as well, which
for the most part must be received with caution as their testimonies are understandably
self-serving.
The crux of the matter, however, lies in ascertaining whether there really is overlapping
of boundaries of the properties of the movants for intervention and that of the private
respondent. As We scrutinize carefully the claim of each party based on survey readings
and plottings appearing on the plans submitted as annexes, We find that the same have
not passed the rigid test of accuracy and authenticity as should be determined by
precision instruments duly verified by accredited surveyors. Indeed, each claim may
appear to be as good and self-serving as the other. And since the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, the veracity and correctness of the alleged overlapping is better left to
those scientifically qualified, trained and experienced and whose integrity is beyond
question and dispute.[77] (Italics supplied)
The present petition calls only for the settlement of the overlapping issue, barring direct
and collateral attacks on each of the parties respective certificates of title, which require
different proceedings for the ventilation thereof.[78]
The trial court, in dismissing the case, held primarily that respondents failed to
overcome the burden of establishing their claim of overlapping. It stated that the
respondents titles whose tie points are based on mere PLS monuments (which are not
fixed, and are therefore not in accordance with Sec. 36 of the Manual for Land Surveys
in the Philippines[79]) cannot prevail as against the petitioners, which has a fixed tie or
reference point. Simply put, a PLS monument is not one of the reference points
enumerated in Section 36 of the Manual, and cannot be used to defeat petitioners title.
Secondly, the trial court held that Nerit, given his training and expertise as surveyor,
should have detected the overlap if there was one in his 1960 survey of TCT 18250, and
not suddenly discover it only in 1990. Thirdly, the presence of the old adobe wall as
early as the 1960s and the absence of any protest or objection from Nerit or the
Madrigals (then owner of the SUSANA title) militate against the present claim of
overlap and encroachment.
The appellate court, however, found that there is an encroachment, and the cause
thereof may be traced to a change in the technical description of the petitioners title
(which was derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November 10, 1920. The
appellate court held that the respective northeastern boundaries of the ERIDANUS,
CHITON and CAMBRIDGE titles should be S.21deg.5655E but the CAMBRIDGE title
indicates N.25 deg. 07W. Yet TCT 578 carries the same bearing as the ERIDANUS and
CHITON properties, S.21deg.5655E. This change in the technical description, according
to the appellate court, caused the encroachment by the petitioners property on the
respondents land. The appellate court ratiocinated that it was precisely for this reason
that in 1960, Nerit found no encroachment during his subdivision survey of the
SUSANA lot: because TCT 578 still carried the bearing S.21deg.5655E. When he
conducted his 1990 survey, which among others included the petitioners title (with the
new and different bearing N.25 deg. 07W) as basis, he naturally found an overlap.
What the trial and appellate courts overlooked, however, was that out of the four expert
witnesses presented, three of them (the government surveyor De Lara, respondents
witness Lim, and petitioners witness Sison) categorically admitted that a change in the
tie or reference point results in an overlap; or, more accurately, that a change in the tie
or reference point has a corresponding effect on the survey.
What has been made clear by the law and practice is that PLS monuments have given
way to Bureau of Lands Location Monument (BLLM) No. 1, which shall always be used
as the tie point.[80] In so doing (disregarding PLS monuments for the BLLM), such
process somehow affects the integrity of the survey.
Thus, De Lara testified that if he plotted the respondents properties on the basis of the
common boundary (lines 1 to 2) between the adjacent AYALA and SUSANA properties
as stated in the technical description of the SUSANA title, there would be no overlapping
of boundaries between petitioners and respondents titles;[81] on the other hand, if the
survey were conducted based on the respondents respective titles which do not have a
tie line or tie point, there would be an overlap.[82] De Lara claims, moreover, that the
alleged encroachment is really a technical overlapping.[83] Lim, on the other hand,
testified on re-direct examination that when the reference point or tie point is changed,
the azimuth lines and azimuth tie lines of the (respondents) property are likewise
changed, but not the location thereof.[84] Sison, witness for the petitioner, testified on
cross-examination that when a tie point is changed, an overlapping is caused.[85]
A case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not
accurate, verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may be
proved successfully, for obvious reasons. In the wake of the majority expert opinion that
by changing the tie or reference point from a PLS to a BLLM 1 monument, a
corresponding effect on the survey occurs which can include a change in boundaries
and, at worst, an overlap the Court is not prepared to declare that an accurate survey of
the respondents properties has been made as to be a proper basis of the present claim of
encroachment or overlap.
Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the CAMBRIDGE property
from S.21deg.5655E in TCT 578 to N.25 deg. 07W in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an
overlap of respondents properties. This has not been sufficiently shown by respondents
evidence to be the cause of the overlap. Respondents key witness Nerit does not believe
that the CAMBRIDGE title was a derivative of TCT 578, because there is nothing in the
title thereof which indicates that it was derived from the latter; he was ambivalent, if not
ambiguous, and definitely far from categorical, in this respect.[86] State surveyor De
Laras testimony and Report inconclusive and incomplete as it is does not help or
indicate any. Likewise, a thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar
boundary and bearings with the CAMBRIDGE title. Finally, the CAMBRIDGE title
explicitly declares that it is derived from TCT No. 363717/T-1823, and not TCT 578.
Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE title is a derivative of
TCT 578, the conclusion that a change in the technical description of the former as
compared to that of the latter is the reason for the overlap, simply does not follow. The
appellate court is in clear error.
Finally, we agree with the trial courts observation that the continuous presence of the
old adobe wall diminishes the case for the respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall
became an ungainly sight for respondents. Previous owners of what now constitutes the
respondents respective lots did not complain of its presence. The wall appears to have
been built in the 1960s, and yet the Madrigals (SUSANA title owners) did not complain
about it; if they did, Nerit would have known and testified to the same since he was
responsible for the subdivision of the lot. Only respondents complain about it now. In
one overlapping of boundaries case,[87] the Court held that a land owner may not now
claim that his property has been encroached upon when his predecessor did not register
any objections at the time the monuments were being placed on the claimed encroached
area; nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of said monuments at
the time.
Courts exist to dispense justice through the determination of the truth to conflicting
claims. A party comes to court equipped with the tools that will convince the court that
his position is more viable than the others. He may not hesitate to employ any method,
means or artifice of persuasion that will sway the sympathies of the court in his favor. As
we have said before, indeed, each claim may appear to be as good and self-serving as the
other.[88]
In the quest for truth, a court often encounters concerns that necessitate not only the
application of the various principles of law, but likewise precepts of the exact sciences,
various disciplines of study or fields of human endeavour about which the judge may not
be knowledgeable or skilled, and which concerns he is not prepared to resolve, unless
with the aid and intervention of or through the medium of learned and experienced
disinterested experts.
An example lies precisely in the area of land boundary disputes. The first step in the
resolution of such cases is for the court to direct the proper government agency
concerned (the Land Registration Authority,[89] or LRA, or the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, or DENR) to conduct a verification or relocation
survey and submit a report to the court,[90] or constitute a panel of commissioners for
the purpose
In every land dispute, the aim of the courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain
inviolate the Torrens system of land registration, as well as to uphold the law; a
resolution of the parties dispute is merely a necessary consequence. Taking this to mind,
we cannot grant the respondents prayer without violating the very principles of the
Torrens system. They have failed to lay the proper foundation for their claim of overlap.
This is precisely the reason why the trial court should have officially appointed a
commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the
parties: so that a thorough investigation, study and analysis of the parties titles could be
made in order to provide, in a comprehensive report, the necessary information that will
guide it in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the determination of the
case to a consideration of the parties more often than not self-serving evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, in Civil Case Nos. Q-89-2636 and Q-89-2750
dismissing the complaints filed by respondents is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
iv. Overlapping Titles. A Landowner loses his right to claim that his property has been
encroached when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time the alleged
encroachment was made. A Torrens certificate of title complete and valid on it face may
not be defeated by another Torrens certificate of title which on its face, is irregular

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SECtion. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.

SEC. 39. Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title.

Within 15 days from finality of order of judgment directing registration of title

A. Statement of personal circumstances

their citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered

Co-owned land; All co-owners duplicate must be surrendered

Balbin v. ROD, 28 SCRA 12 (1969)

Where the voluntary instrument bears on its face an infirmity;

Notice of pending suit must be given to parties;

G.R. No. L-20611

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

January 25, 1955, ...

Entry No. 5659.

June 9, 1953. ...

February 12, 1952. ...

G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985

iii. Defective Title vs. Unblemished Title

(to the witness)

I noticed that, sir.

BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)

BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (To the witness)

I just followed the title as issued, as ordered by the Court.

I based my verification based on the title as required by the Court.

At page 13, Decision.

Concurred by Associate Justices Alfredo Marigomen and Quirino D. Abad Santos,

CAMBRIDGE property encroached or overlapped upon respondents lots, to the extent

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND/OR THE

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

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