Belyca Corp v.

Calleja-Ferrer (1988)
Paras, J.

Bureau of labor Relations: Granted the certification election. Denied

BELYCAs MR.

ISSUES:
SUMMARY: BELYCA Corporation is engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the
planting of agricultural crops. ALU seeks direct
1. Was the
proposed
bargaining
unit (ALU-TUCP) an
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees
of its
livestock
and agro division.
bargaining
unit? YES
However, BELYCA claims that the bargaining unit must include all its workers (i.e.appropriate
not only piggery
and poultry
but also
cinemas and supermarkets) to prevent the creation of fragmented bargaining units from a single one.

The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an

DOCTRINE: The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether
or not it is
fundamentally
the combination
appropriate
bargaining
unit.
which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
o The Court cited Rothenberg a proper bargaining unit
The test of proper grouping of employees is the COMMUNITY AND MUTUALITY OF INTEREST/
SUBSTANTIAL-MUTUAL-INTEREST
maybe
said to be a group of employees of a given
TEST.
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
Democratic Labor v. Cebu Stevedoring: The constituency of an appropriate bargaining unit
is of
based
on 1) will
ofthe
employees;
2)
body
employees,
which
collective interests
of all the
affinity and unity of employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties
or similarity
of compensation
and
employees,
consistent
with equity to
the employer,
working conditions; 3) prior collective bargaining history; 4) employment status, such asindicate
temporary,
seasonal
to be best
suitedand
to serve reciprocal rights and
probationary employees
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law (Rothenberg in Labor Relations, p.
482).
FACTS:

Jurisprudence provides the constituency and the test of a proper

Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed a petition for direct certification

collective bargaining unit.
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ALL the rank-and-file
A. Factors considered in Democratic Labor v. Cebu Stevedoring:
employees of BELYCA Corporation (Livestock and Agro- Division), or
"(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of
in case of doubt of the unions majority representation, for the
employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
issuance of an order authorizing the holding of a certificate
duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
election.
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment

ALU:
status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
o a) there is no CBA between BELYCA and any other existing
employees"
legitimate labor union;
B. In Democratic Labor v. Cebu Stevedoring, the Court
o b) no certification election was held within the 12 months
emphasized the importance of the fourth factor:
prior to the filing of the petition;
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and
o c) more than a majority of BELYCAs rank-and-file
probationary
employees in the proposed bargaining unit or 183 as of the
C. The test of proper grouping of employees when it comes to
date of the filing, have signed membership with ALU.
bargaining unit is the COMMUNITY AND MUTUALITY OF

BELYCA:
INTEREST.
o a) due to the nature of its business, very few of its

In Alhambra v. Alhambra Employees, the Court

employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority are
applied the substantial-mutual-interest test/
seasonal and causal and regular employees;
community and mutuality of interest test when it
o b) that of the toal 138 rank-and-file employees who
ordered the formation of a separate appropriate
authorized and supported the filing of the petition, 14-no
collective bargaining unit because of the lack of
longer working; 4-resigned; 6-withdrew their membership;
mutuality of interest among different groups: the
5-validly retrenched; 100-abandoned their work;
employees in the administrative, sales and
o c) the statutory requirement for holding a certification
dispensary departments perform work which has
nothing to do with production and maintenance,
election has not been complied with by the union
unlike those in the raw leaf, cigar, cigarette,
o The bargaining unit must include all the workers in
packing and engineering and garage
its integrated business concerns ranging from
departments
piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as

In PLASLU v. CIR, which reiterated the rulings in

not split a single bargaining unit into fragmented
bargaining unit.
Democratic Labor and Alhambra, it was held that
the factors to be considered are: 1) employment
Labor Arbiter: Granted the certification election.

status and 2) unity of employees interest such as

substantial similarity of work and duties.

There is a substantial difference between the work

performed by musicians and that of other persons
who participate in the production of a film which
suffice to show that they constitute a proper
bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 1 SCRA 132 [1961]).
D. In any event, whether importance is focused on the
employment status or the mutuality of interest of the
employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure
to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights (Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)

In the case at bar, the employees of the livestock and agro division
of BELYCA perform work entirely different from those performed by
employees in the supermarts and cinema.
o Among others, the noted differences are: their working
conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. Due
to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro
division is engaged very few of its employees in the
division are permanent, the overwhelming majority of
which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees.
o Definitely, they have very little in common with the
employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the
employees of BELYCA in its integrated business concerns
cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest.
o Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestockagro division constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both
requirements of classification according to employment
status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties
which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights.

2. Was the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the

employees in the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a
certification election, complied with? YES

It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205

employees of BELYCA have expressed their written consent to the
certification election or more than a majority of the rank and file
employees and workers; much more than the required 30% and
over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive

Order No. 111 and applicable only to unorganized establishments

under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which BELYCA belongs.
o Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory
requirement is met, the Director of Labor Relations has no
choice but to call a certification election.
o Any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the
petition for holding a certification election cannot be a bar
to its being granted. In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees' withdrawal
from union membership taking place after the filing of the
petition for certification election will not affect said petition.

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only

exception is where the employer has to file a petition for
certification election pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code
because the latter was requested to bargain collectively. But
thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process
ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander.
o There is no showing that the instant case falls under the
above mentioned exception.
o However, it will be noted that BELYCA from the outset has
actively participated and consistently taken the position of
adversary in the petition for direct certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative and/or certification
election filed by respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU)TUCP to the extent of filing petition for certiorari in this
Court.

RULING: PETITION DENIED. BLR AFFIRMED.

University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja (1992)

Narvasa, C.J.:
FACTS:

The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP)

filed a petition for certification election with the BLR.
o
It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 membersmore
than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic
personnel of four UP campuses (Diliman, Manila, Los Baos,
and Visayas).
o
UP did not object to the petition.

Another labor union, the All UP Workers Union (All UP) filed a motion
for intervention.
o
It alleged that its membership covers both academic and nonacademic personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file
employees in one union.
o
It assented to the holding of the certification election provided
the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined.
o
It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension
and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching
personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational
unit.

UPs General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions
one for the non-academic/administrative, and one for the academic
personnel.

BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should

embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees.
o
No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic
personnel separate from academic personnel.
o
The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and its
IRRs:
Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise require.

SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as

policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature
shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government
employees;

1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;

2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline
employees.
o

She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rankand-file employees, teaching and non-teaching.
At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term
rank-and-file. It claimed that there were some teaching and nono

It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:

o
Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
o
Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or
higher.
The University claims that these employees perform supervisory
functions and are vested with effective recommendatory powers. As to
the professors, UP notes that these academic staff are members of the
University Council, a policy-making body.
ONAPUP did not oppose UPs classification. All UP remained firm in its
stance to unite all the rank-and-file employees under a single
organizational unit.
BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are
rank-and-file employees.
o
Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:

High Level Employee is one whose functions are normally considered policy
determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential in nature.
A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:

Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit

may refer to:
xxx
d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
General intent of the EO is not to fragmentize the employer
unit, as can be gleaned from the definition of the term
accredited employees organization, which refers to:
x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in
these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an organizational unit
headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such as x x x
state colleges and universities.

teaching employees whose functions were in fact managerial and

policy-determining.
It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of
EO 180:

A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy- making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely,
prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student
admission and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of
Regents the conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over
students.
On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level
employees refers to labor-related policies like hiring, firing, discipline,
labor standards and benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.
MR filed by UP was denied.

ISSUES + RULING:
Are the professors, associate professors and assistant professors high-level
employees? NO.

The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.

The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which the

academic personnel purportedly perform their supervisory functions, is
actually tasked to:

1.

Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of

policies, rules, standards or general guidelines as formulated by
the University Academic Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard
to recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, tenure, staff
development, and promotion of the faculty and other academic
personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available
funds for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the
members of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered
by this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made
by the Department Chairman and/or the DAPC (Department
Academic Personnel Committee).
On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board performs
the following functions:
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the
CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the
selection, compensation, and promotion of members of the
academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on
academic promotions and on other matters affecting faculty status
and welfare.
It is clear that the high-level employees are those who comprise the
UAPB. These would refer to the deans, assistants for academic affairs,
and the chief of personnel. They formulate rules, polices and standards
respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the
academic staff.
The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely recommendatory.
Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
dismiss, assign or discipline employees rests with the Board of
Regents.
It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be considered highlevel employees, because not all of them are members of the
DAPC/UAPB. They must be appointed or elected.
Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the
professors to the status of high-level employees.
o
The actions of such council are always subject to the approval
of the Board of Regents.
o
In addition, the policy-determining functions of the University
Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those governing the
relationship between the University and its students, and not
the University as an employer and the professors as
employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest results
in the professors being members of the University Council and
being classified as rank-and-file employees.

Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit separate and

distinct from that of the non-academic employees of UP? YES.

Bargaining unit a group of employees of a given employer, comprised

of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law.
Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit.
Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an appropriate bargaining unit.
This was retained in the Labor Code.
Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for guidance.
o
Rothenberg:
1. Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
2. Affinity and unit of employees interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions;
3. Prior collective bargaining history; and
4. Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and
probationary employees.
10th Annual Report of the NLRB:
1. History, extent and type of organization of employees;
2. History of their collective bargaining;
3. History, extent and type of organization of employees in
other plants of the same employer, or other employers in
the same industry;
4. The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the
employees;
5. The desires of the employees;
6. The eligibility of the employees for membership in the
union/s involved; and
7. The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the
employers organization, management and operation.
BASIC TEST: A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of
employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
Test applied: community or mutuality of interests test.
In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two
general classes:
o
Firstnon-academicjanitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers,
chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and
o
Secondacademicfull professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors, research, extension and
professorial staff.
It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common
with the University clerks and other non-academic employees as
regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions,
compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual
pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the
nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel

dictate the separation of these two categories of employees for

purposes of collective bargaining.
DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.

Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas

July 23, 2013| Peralta, J.
By: Arrow
SUMMARY:
Petition for certiorari with regards to the decision of the Secretary that there
should be 2 separate bargaining units for those teaching and non-teaching
personnel. Court held that the Secretarys decision was based on facts, law and
jurisprudence pointing to the need for 2 separate bargaining units for those
teaching and non-teaching personnel due to substantial difference in interests.
DOCTRINE: (4-fold Test)
The commingling of supervisory employees and rank-and-file employees in one
labor organization does not affect the latter's legitimacy and its right to file a
petition for certification election. The legal personality of the Union, cannot be
collaterally attacked in certification election proceedings by petitioner school
which, as employer, is generally a bystander in the proceedings.
Law and jurisprudence, provide that the commonality or mutuality of
interest is the most fundamental standard of an appropriate
bargaining unit. This standard requires that the employees in an asserted
bargaining unit be similarly situated in their terms and conditions of
employment relations. This commonality or mutuality may be
appreciated with greater certainty if their areas of differences with
other groups of employees are considered.
FACTS:
PCE was filed by PIGLAS (teachers and employees union of Holy Child), claiming
to represent over 120 employees of the said institution.
Holy Child filed a comment and position paper to said petition, stating that of
the employees who signed to support the petition, fourteen (14) already
resigned and six (6) signed twice. Petitioner raised that members of private
respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a mixture of
managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees as three (3) are viceprincipals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are
coordinators but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel
as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being
in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an
illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for
certification election, as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union; and an inappropriate bargaining unit
for want of community or mutuality of interest, as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger
(Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment and De La Salle University
Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma.
Private respondent,
1. countered that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that some of
the employees included in the petition for certification election holds
managerial and supervisory positions.
2.

Assuming it to be true, Section 11 (II), Rule XI of DOLE Department

Order (D.O.) No. 9, Series of 1997, provided for specific instances in
which a petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed by

the Med-Arbiter and that mixture of employees is not one of those

enumerated. Private respondent pointed out that questions pertaining
to qualifications of employees may be threshed out in the inclusionexclusion proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification election,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule XII of D.O. No. 9.
3.

In Re: Globe Machine and Stamping Company: the will of petitioners

employees should be respected as they had manifested their desire to
be represented by only one bargaining unit. To back up the formation
of a single employer unit, private respondent asserted that even if the
teachers may receive additional pay for an advisory class and for
holding additional loads, petitioners academic and non-academic
personnel have similar working conditions. It cited Laguna College v.
Court of Industrial Relations, as well as the case of a union in West
Negros College in Bacolod City, which allegedly represented both
academic and non-academic employees.

Med-Arbiter: Denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the
unit which private respondent sought to represent is inappropriate.
SOLE: ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of
two separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching
personnel
CA: Dismissed petition, As to the purported commingling of managerial,
supervisory, and rank-and-file employees in private respondents membership,
it held that the Toyota ruling is inapplicable because the vice-principals,
department head, and coordinators are neither supervisory nor managerial
employees. Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel,
the CA agreed with petitioner that the nature of the formers work does not
coincide with that of the latter.

ISSUES/HELD:
WON a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the
labor organizations membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rankand-file employees. NO
WON PCE should have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is
not qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor
organization, the basic qualification of which is the representation of an
appropriate bargaining unit. NO
RATIO:
1. See case for evolution of jurisprudence regarding legal effects of
commingling of supervisory employees with rank and file employees in
the same union. Bottomline is that the jurisprudence has reiterated
that the alleged inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor
organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization. This was due to DO No. 9 which applies in this case which
does not provide for any legal effects and instead requires a mere
description of the bargaining unit. This is an abandonment of the old
Toyota and Dunlop rulings which provided that such labor organization

had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a

bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rankand-file employees among its members.

academic personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees,

is the set-up that will best assure to all the employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.

Also following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super, it must be
stressed that petitioner cannot collaterally attack the legitimacy of private
respondent by praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification election
(bystander doctrine).

Combining two disparate groups of employees under a single collective

bargaining unit may deny one group of employees the appropriate
representation for purposes of collective bargaining; in a situation where
the teaching personnel are more numerous and largely have better academic
preparations, the interests of the non-teaching personnel may simply be
relegated to the background and may possibly be sacrificed in the
interests of the dominant majority. In short, a ruling to the contrary may
have the effect of denying a distinct class of employees the right to meaningful
self-organization because of their lesser collective bargaining presence.

Also the determination of whether union membership comprises managerial

and/or supervisory employees is a factual issue that is best left for resolution in
the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, which has not yet happened in this case so
still premature to pass upon. The rule that factual findings of labor officials, who
are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only with respect but even finality by the courts when
supported by substantial evidence.
2.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the

proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the unions certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally.

On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of

employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and
what unit would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency, the
Court, in the seminal case of Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring
Company, Inc., mentioned several factors that should be considered, to wit: (1)
will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest,
such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees.
Law and jurisprudence, provide that the commonality or mutuality of
interest is the most fundamental standard of an appropriate
bargaining unit. This standard requires that the employees in an asserted
bargaining unit be similarly situated in their terms and conditions of
employment relations. This commonality or mutuality may be
appreciated with greater certainty if their areas of differences with
other groups of employees are considered.
In UP v. Ferrer-Calleja, it was held that 2 separate bargaining unit was
warranted because, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of
the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working conditions of
the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these two
categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of
two separate bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank- and-file non-

Distinctions between teaching personnel and non-teaching personnel:

1. The teaching personnel are more concerned with promoting and
ensuring a healthy learning environment for students, while nonteaching personnel are involved in the management and running of the
school.
2. Teaching personnel are paid a basic salary and additional pay for
advisory class and additional load, while non-teaching personnel are
only paid a basic salary.
3. In terms of working hours, the non-teaching personnel (maintenance)
render an additional 12 workday on a Saturday.
4. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools categorically provides
that the employment of teaching and non-teaching academic
personnel shall be governed by such rules as may from time to time be
promulgated in coordination with one another by the Department of
Education while the conditions of employment of non- academic, nonteaching personnel shall be governed by the appropriate labor laws
and regulations.
These facts convinced the Secretary of Labor that because of the dominance of
the distinctions which she appreciated as questions of facts based on her
labor relations expertise the collective bargaining interests of the
employees would be best served if two separate bargaining units
would be recognized, namely, the teaching and the non-teaching
units.In making this recognition, she was duly supported by law and
jurisprudence, citing and relying as she did on our ruling in University of the
Philippines.

Kiok Loy v. NLRC1

Jan 22, 1986 | Cuevas J.
By: Justin

SUMMARY: Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (UNION) won in the certification

election as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (COMPANY). The Union submitted its
proposals to the Company and requested for its counter-proposals, but the
company ignored the requests. The case was submitted to NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. While the case was in NLRC, the Company asked for several
postponements on several occasions. One day, when the Company asked for
another postponement, the Labor Arbiter denied the request and considered
the case submitted for resolution. The NLRC declared the Company guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Sec. (g) Art. 248 (now 249) of PD
442, as amended.

In deciding whether or not the company is guilty of unjustified refusal to

bargain, the court took into consideration its attitude and over-all acts
throughout the bargaining process. The Court ruled that the Union has a valid
cause to complain against the companys attitude indicative of the failure to
follow what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith.Collective
bargaining, which is defined as negotiations towards a collective
agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor
Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and
management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial
peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and
is characterized as a legal obligation.
In this case, it was pointed out that the company made no counter-proposal
whatsoever. The companys conduct conclusively indicates lack of a sincere
desire to negotiate. As stated in Bradman v CIR: While the law does not
compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both
parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable
effort to reach a common ground of agreement. The Company is guilty and its
petition should be dismissed.
FACTS:

In a certification election, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (UNION)

won and was certified by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden
Ice Cream Plant (COMPANY). The Company filed an MR which was
denied.

The Union furnished the Company with 2 copies of its proposed

bargaining agreement along with a request for a copy of the
Company's counter-proposals. Eliciting no response from the company,
however, the Union reiterated its request for collective bargaining
negotiations. These 2 requests were ignored by the company.

1 KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA
(KILUSAN),

Seeing no other alternative to bring the Company to the bargaining

table, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) on the ground of unresolved economic issues in
collective bargaining.
During the 30-day statutory cooling-off period, conciliation proceedings
followed but an amicable settlement was not reached. BLR certified to
the case to NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to PD 823, as
amended.
April 29, 1979 - The labor arbiter set the initial hearing, but the same
was cancelled and reset to another date for failure of the parties to
submit their respective position papers.
The Union subsequently submitted its position paper. On the other
hand, the company, instead of submitting its own position paper,
requested for a resetting which was granted.
The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the withdrawal of
the Companys counsel of record, Atty. Rodolfo Dela Cruz.
o
Atty. Fortunanto Panganiban formally entered his appearance
as counsel and requested for another postponement allegedly
for the purpose of acquainting himself with the case. The
company was only able to submit its position paper on May 28,
1979. (17 days after the date the case was reset to)
June 7, 1979 the case was called for hearing, but the Companys
representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined, failed to
appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested for another postponement
(Note: this is the 4th time the Company asked the court for
postponement)
This request was denied by the labor arbiter, ruling that the Company
has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore,
considered the case submitted for resolution. Labor Arbiter Andres
Fidelino submitted its report to the NLRC.
[NLRC] declared Sweden Ice Cream Plant guilty of unjustified refusal to
bargain, in violation of Sec. (g) Art. 248 (now 249) of PD 442, as
amended. Further, the NLRC found the Unions draft proposal for a
collective bargaining agreement reasonable, and declared the same to
be the collective agreement which should govern the relationship
between the parties.
Sweden Ice Cream Plant filed a Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRC
decision. SC initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit, but the
same was given due course upon MR by the Company.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON THE COMPANY IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. (YES)
Collective bargaining, which is defined as negotiations towards a
collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under
the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between
labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable
industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and
the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.
o
Art. 249 (g) of the Labor Code even makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of
work, and all other terms and conditions of employment

including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question

arising under such an agreement and executing a contract
incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.
Although its a mutual obligation for the parties to bargain, the employer is
not bound to initiate contract negotiation. The following jurisdictional
preconditions need to be present in order to set the mechanics of collective
bargaining in motion:
1) Possession of the status of majority representation of the
employees' representative in accordance with any of the means
of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
2) proof of majority representation;
3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor
Code
Taking into consideration the over-all conduct of the company in relation to
the negotiation, the Union has a valid cause to complaint against the
companys attitude indicative of the failure to follow what is enjoined by
the Labor Code to bargain in good faith.
In this case, it has been established that;

respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent;

it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy

of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the
Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered
and unacted upon; and

the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever, all of

which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate
Such refusal to make counter proposal, in relation to the entire bargaining
process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the
unions request for a counter-proposal is left unanswered. Besides, the
Companys approach and attitude (stalling through a series of
postponements, non-appearance at hearings, and undue delay in
submitting financial statements) lead to no other conclusion except that it
is unwilling to negotiate.
[Herald Deliver Carriers Union (PAFLU) v Herald Publications]: "unfair labor
practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer, after
having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning
Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said
proposal.
This was reiterated anew in [Bradman v CIR] wherein it was further ruled
that: "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it
does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an
open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement

2. WON THE COMPANY WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. (NO)

-

Companys contention that it was denied procedural due process is

bereft of any legal and factual support. As discussed above, the moves
and overall behavior of the Company were in total derogation of the
policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards
expediting settlement of economic disputes.

3. WON THE CBA APPROVED BY NLRC IS NULL AND VOID (NO)

Company contends that CBA is null and void because: 1) it lacks the
companys consent and; 2) the company will face the prospect of
closing down since it has to pay a staggering amount of economic
benefits
Court said: Such a stand and the evidence in support thereof should
have been presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper
forum for the purpose.

Courts closing remarks: Although its not obligatory upon either side to
accept/agree to the proposals of the other, an erring party should not be
tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations
by going through empty gestures.
Dispositive: PETITION DISMISSED.

TABIGUE v. INTERCO
December 23, 2009 || J. Carpio Morales
By: Rose Ann
SUMMARY:
Tabigue et al filed a notice of preventive mediation against INTERCO. The parties
failed to settle. It was elevated to Voluntary arbitration. However, INTERCO provided
a letter by the union president stating that Tabigue et al are not authorized. The
case did not proceed to voluntary arbitration due to this. CA and SC upheld this. The
petitioners were not authorized to represent the union, hence voluntary arbitration
shall not prosper.
DOCTRINE:
The parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the
grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by
parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company
shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present
grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.
FACTS:
Petitioners Juanito Tabigue and 19 employees of International Copra Export
Corporation (INTERCO) filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the DOLENCMB
against INTERCO for violation of CBA and failure to sit on the grievance
conference/meeting.
It was elevated to voluntary arbitration after the parties failed to reach a settlement.
NCMB set a date for them to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator.
Before they could meet, INTERCO presented before the NCMB a letter of Genaro TAN,
president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union which Tabigue et al are
members.
The letter addressed to plant manager Engr. Paterno C. TANGENTE stated that
Tabigue et al are not duly authorized by the board or the officers to represent the
union, hence... all actions, representations or agreements made by these people
with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union.
INTERCO moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners sent Tan
and Tangente a Notice to Arbitrate. No settlement reached. NCMB Director Teodorico
O. Yosores wrote petitioner Alex Bibat and Tangente regarding the lack of willingness
of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which is a pre-requisite to submit
the case. Under the CBA, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary
arbitration. Since Tan informed INTERCO that the union had not authorized the
petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary
arbitration.
The NCMB Director concluded that the demand of petitioners to submit the issues to
voluntary arbitration cannot be granted. MR denied.
CA denied appeal as the NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency but merely a
conciliatory body. The NCMBs decisions or that of its authorized officer cannot be
appealed either through Rule 43 or Rule 65 of the ROC. Other infirmities were noted
like insufficient docket fees, decision of NCMB not certified, and incomplete

verification and non-forum shopping. CA denied MR. Petition for Review on Certiorari
with SC.
Petitioners:
The case falls within the revised procedural guidelines in the conduct of voluntary
arbitration proceedings. NCMB is a quasi-judicial agency. Its decisions are appealable
to the CA. Labor cases are not resolved by technicalities.
ISSUE
WON the case can proceed to voluntary arbitration notwithstanding the lack of
authority of Tabigue et al from the union. No.
RATIO
[Procedural] CA has no jurisdiction; NCMB not a QJA
Sec 7 of Rule 43 of ROC provides that failure to comply with the requirements
regarding the payment of docket fees, etc shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition. Even if this is relaxed, the CAs decision would be sustained. Sec 9
(3) of BP129 provides that the CA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.
An agency exercises judicial function where it has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. As per NCMBs
functions under Sec 22 of EO 126 (Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment), it cannot be considered a quasi-judicial agency.
[Substantive] Voluntary arbitration cannot proceed
Petitioners argument that unsettled grievances should be referred to voluntary
arbitration as per the CBA does not lie. The CBA states:
In case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or implementation of this
Agreement or any matter affecting the relations of Labor and Management, the
UNION and the COMPANY agree to exhaust all possibilities of conciliation through
the grievance machinery. The committee shall resolve all problems submitted to it
within fifteen (15) days after the problems have been discussed by the members. If
the dispute or grievance cannot be settled by the Committee, or if the committee
failed to act on the matter within the period of fifteen (15) days herein stipulated,
the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit the issue to Voluntary Arbitration.
Selection of the arbitrator shall be made within seven (7) days from the date of
notification by the aggrieved party. The Arbitrator shall be selected by lottery from
four (4) qualified individuals nominated by in equal numbers by both parties taken
from the list of Arbitrators prepared by the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). If the Company and the Union representatives within ten (10)
days fail to agree on the Arbitrator, the NCMB shall name the Arbitrator. The
decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties. However, the
Arbitrator shall not have the authority to change any provisions of the Agreement.
The cost of arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties.
Tabigue et al have not been duly authorized to represent the union. As held in Atlas
Farms, Inc. v. NLRC:
x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name
or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and
if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the
voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only

disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
The SC also did not agree with the petitioners that Art. 255 of the LC (an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer) is an exception to the exclusiveness of the
representative role of the labor organization/union. The right of any employee or
group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer does not
imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao Sept

22 2010 | Peralta, J.
By: Paola
FACTS:
Employer (respondent): Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao
Registered Union: Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEUNFL)
Unregistered Union and actually the Federation NFL (petitioner): Insular Hotel
Employees Union-NFL (IHEU-NFL)
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Nov. 6, 2000: Respondent Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao sent the DOLE a
Notice of Suspension of Operations for a period of 6 months due to severe
and serious business losses.
Domy Rojas, the President of DIHFEUNFL (Union 1) sent respondent a number of
letters asking management to reconsider its decision.
Rojas intimated that the members of the Union were determined to keep their
jobs and were willing to help respondent by suspending re-negotiations of the
CBA, and reducing employee benefits such as:
a. Suspension of the CBA for 10 years, No strike no lock-out shall be
enforced.
b. Pay all the employees their benefits due, and put the length of service
to zero with a minimum hiring rate. Payment of benefits may be on a
staggered basis or as available.
c. Night premium and holiday pays shall be according to law. Overtime
hours rendered shall be offsetted as practiced.
d. Reduce the sick leaves and vacation leaves to 15 days/15days.
e. Emergency leave and birthday off are hereby waived.
f.
Duty meal allowance is fixed at P30.00 only. No more midnight snacks
and double meal allowance. The cook drinks be stopped as practiced.
g. We will shoulder 50% of the group health insurance and family medical
allowance be reduced to 1,500.00 instead of 3,000.00.
h. The practice of bringing home our uniforms for laundry be continued.
i.
Fixed manning shall be implemented, the rest of manpower
requirements maybe sourced thru WAP and casual hiring. Manpower
for fixed manning shall be 145 rank-and-file union members.
j.
Union will cooperate fully on strict implementation of house rules in
order to attain desired productivity and discipline. The union will not
tolerate problem members.
k. The union in its desire to be of utmost service would adopt multitasking for the hotel to be more competitive.
Jan. 2001: the Union, through Rojas, submitted to respondent a Manifesto
concretizing their earlier proposals.
After series of negotiations, the respondent and Union signed a MOA for
the re-opening of the hotel subject to the concessions made by the
Union in their Manifesto.
Respondent downsized its manpower structure to 100 (from 145) rank-and-file
employees in accordance with the MOA and a new pay scale was made.
Retained employees individually signed a "Reconfirmation of Employment
which embodied the new terms and conditions of their continued employment.
Each employee was assisted by Rojas who co-signed the document.
June 15, 2001: Hotel resumed its business operations.
Aug. 22, 2002: Darius Joves and Debbie Planas, claiming to be local
officers of the National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed a Notice of
Mediation before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). The issue raised was the "Diminution of wages and other benefits
through unlawful MOA.

a.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

In the Notice it was stated that the union involved was DARIUS
JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS et al, National Federation of Labor
Aug. 29, 2002: NCMB called Joves and respondent to a preliminary conference.
In said conference, the Submission Agreement signed by respondent and Joves,
assisted by Atty. Cullo, wherein they chose the accredited voluntary arbitrator
(AVA Olvida), Joves indicated that he represented IHEU-NFL instead of
NFL.
a. To support his authority to file, Joves presented several SPA (from union
members) w/c were not notarized and undated.
Sept. 2, 2002 or 4 days after, respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion for a
Second Preliminary Conference" that the persons who filed the instant
complaint in the name of IHEU-NFL had no authority to represent the Union.
During the 2nd conference, Cullo confirmed that the case was filed not
by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL. When asked to present his authority from
NFL, Cullo admitted that the case was filed by 79 individual employees and
members of the Union named in SPAs.
Respondent filed a motion to withdraw from the proceedings arguing
that the persons who signed the complaint were not the authorized
representatives of the Union indicated in the Submission Agreement
nor were they parties to the MOA.
AVA Olvida denied the motion to withdraw.
a. He ruled that proper party complainant was actually the IHEU-NFL as
the union and not NFL and the other members
b. However, since the NFL is the mother federation of the local union, and
signatory to the existing CBA, it can represent the union, the officers,
the members or union and officers or members.
Cullo, in his pleadings, now started using the caption Insular Hotel
Employess Union-NFL, Complainant.
Respondent demanded inhibition of Olvida for his bias and prejudice. Olvida
complied and voluntarily inhibited himself out of delicadeza. It likewise
reiterated its statance that the members had no standing to file notice of
mediation.
New AVA was selected. AVA Montejo (Olvidas replacement) decided in favor of
Cullo,
a. Declaring the MOA in question as invalid as it is contrary to law and
public policy;
b. Declaring that there is a diminution of the wages and other benefits of
the Union members and officers under the said invalid MOA.
c. Ordering respondent management to immediately reinstate the
workers wage rates and other benefits that they were receiving and
enjoying before the signing of the invalid MOA;
d. Ordering the management respondent to pay attorneys fees.

18. Upon appeal, CA reversed and declared the MOA valid and enforceable. MR
denied hence this petition.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
W/N the accredited voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction because the Notice
of Mediation does not mention the name of the local union but only of the
affiliate federation (NFL). NO, complaint for mediation was not filed by the
Union.

A review of the development of the case shows that there has been much
confusion as to the identity of the party which filed the case against respondent.

In the Notice of Mediation filed before the NCMB, it stated that the
union involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. AL., National
Federation of Labor."
o
In the Submission Agreement, however, it stated that the union
involved was IHEU-NFL
While it is undisputed that a submission agreement was signed by respondent
and IHEU-NFL, then represented by Joves and Cullo, this Court finds that there
are two circumstances which affect its validity:
1. the Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no authority to do
so;
2. that respondent had persistently voiced out its objection questioning
the authority of Joves, Cullo and the individual members of the Union to
file the complaint before the NCMB.
Under Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure, only a
certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or
request for preventive mediation.
Cullo himself admitted, in a number of pleadings, that the case was
filed not by the Union but by the NFL and individual members of the
Union. Therefore, the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed
before it.
Even though respondent signed a Submission Agreement, it had immediately
manifested after 4 days its desire to withdraw from the proceedings after it
became apparent that the Union had no part in the complaint.
Respondent cannot be estopped in raising the jurisdictional issue, because it is
basic that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
o

W/N the individual employees and members of the UNION had standing to
file the complaint before the NCMB. NO

Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation citing Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC
is instructive:
Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or
designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary
arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently, only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
W/N the federation NFL had standing to file the complaint before the
NCMB. NO

In Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. v. DOLE, SC pronounced that

o
A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it
is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its
creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest
the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the
mother federation the license to act independently of the local
union.

Even granting that petitioner Union was affiliated with NFL, still the relationship
between that of the local union and the affiliated labor federation or national
union with is that of an agency, where the local is the principal and the
federation the agency. Being merely an agent of the local union, NFL
should have presented its authority to file the Notice of Mediation.

As provided under the NCMB Manual of Procedures, only a certified or duly

recognized bargaining representative and an employer may file a notice of

mediation, declare a strike or lockout or request preventive mediation. The CBA

recognizes that DIHFEU-NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative of all
permanent employees.
o
The inclusion of the word "NFL" after the name of the local union
merely stresses that the local union is NFL's affiliate. It does notmean
that the local union cannot stand on its own. The local union owes its
creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to
the federation to which it belongs. The spring cannot rise higher than
its source, so to speak.
RE: IHEU-NFL:
o
It is not a registered labor organization but respondent is estopped
from questioning its existence since it did not raise this issue before
the NCMB

W/N respondent was really suffering from serious losses. YES

Cullos reliance on the denial by the Wage Board of respondents petition from
exemption from a Wage Order is misplaced since said petition was denied
because the financial statements then submitted by respondents were not
audited.

In this case, respondent submitted its audited financial statements which show
that for the years 1998, 1999, until September 30, 2000, its total operating
losses amounted to P48,409,385.00. Based on the foregoing, the CA was not
without basis when it declared that respondent was suffering from impending
financial distress.
W/N the MOA was an invalid dimunition of benefits prohibited under Art.
100. NO

The prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits set out in Article

100 of the Labor Code is specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at
the time of the promulgation of the Labor Code. Article 100 does not, in other
words, purport to apply to situations arising after the promulgation date of the
Labor Code.

Even assuming arguendo that Article 100 applies to the case at bar, this Court
agrees with respondent that the same does not prohibit a union from offering
and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees.

In Rivera v. Espiritu, Court ruled that right to free collective bargaining,

after all, includes the right to suspend it. In said case, it was held that:
o
A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or
the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement
reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement.
o
The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management
relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial
peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic
and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
the purpose which it is intended to serve.
o
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary
collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of
the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the
peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting
industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure
o
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of
PALs ground employees, which voluntarily entered into the CBA with

PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year
suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right
to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining,
after all, includes the right to suspend it

Lastly, this Court is not unmindful of the fact that DIHFEU-NFL's Constitution and
By-Laws specifically provides that "the results of the collective bargaining
negotiations shall be subject to ratification and approval by majority vote of the
Union members at a meeting convened, or by plebiscite held for such special
purpose."
o
Accordingly, there was no need for the MOA to be ratified by the
members of the Union (because not a CBA)
o
However, despite this non-ratification, EEs individually signed contracts
denominated as "Reconfirmation of Employment with the assistance
by their president, Rojas. Therefore EEs are aware of the MOA.
o
87 union members signed said Reconfirmation contract and 71 of them
are allegedly being represented by Cullo. Court notes that contract was
freely entered into by the EEs and MOA is deemed impliedly ratified by
them,
o
Having enjoyed the benefit under said contract and MOA (not losing
their jobs) it would now be iniquitous for them to renege on their
agreement.

Petition DENIED

Divine Word University of Tacloban v SoLE and Divine Word

University Employees Union-ALU
September 11, 1992 | Romero, J.
By: Cate Alegre
SUMMARY: The university refused to acknowledge the proposals of the
union, but instead filed a petition for certification election (questioning the
validity of the union.) SC held that while the union was partly at fault for
not making collective bargaining proposals sooner, the university through
its actions evidently had no intention of bargaining with it.
DOCTRINE: The university may not validly assert that its consent should
be a primordial consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less
than its inaction which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever
rights it could have asserted as an employer.
FACTS:

Sep. 6, 1984, Divine Word University

Employees Union (Union) was certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the Divine Word University (DWU).
March 7, 1985 The Union submitted its collective bargaining
proposals. DWU requested a preliminary conference, but the
Unions resigned vice president Brigido Urminita withdrew the CBA
proposals. The preliminary conference was then cancelled.
March 11 1988 - after almost 3 years, the Union, now affiliated with
the Associated Labor Union (ALU), requested a conference with
DWU to continue the collective bargaining negotiations. DWU
remained silent
The Union filed with the NCMB a notice of strike (grounds:
bargaining deadlock and ULP, specifically, refusal to bargain,
discrimination and coercion of employees)
This led to conferences and the May 10 agreement between the
parties where the union will submit CBA proposals and parties will
determine the members of the bargaining unit
However before the May 10 agreement as concluded, DWU filed a
petition for certification election (PCE) with the DOLE. When
the Union submitted its bargaining proposals, DWU ignored them.
SoLE Drilon assumed jurisdiction and ordered all workers to report
back to work within 24 hours and the management to accept them
o SAME DAY: Med-Arbiter Milado acted on the PCE and issued
an order directing the conduct of a certification election to
be participated by the union and no union. This was held
in abeyance by the Sec. of Labor.
SoLE: the non-conclusion of a CBA within 1 year doesnt
automatically authorize the holding of a certification election when
it appears that a bargaining deadlock issue has been submitted to
conciliation. It barred the Med-Arbiter from entertaining the PCE
and ordered the parties to enter into a CBA by adopting the Unions
proposals

DWU filed and MR and the Union filed a second notice of strike
(grounds: violation of return-to-work order and ULP)
Acting SoLE dela Serna dismissed the MR
o The Unions proposals were not validly withdrawn and only
3/8 members of the Executive Board of the Union signed
the withdrawal. Hence DWU is not exculpated from the
duty to bargain with the Union
o The surreptitious filing of the petition, and cunningly
entering into an agreement which required the union to
submit a renewed CBA proposal is patently negotiating in
bad faith. The university should have timely raised the
issue of representation if it believed that such issue was
valid.
o DWU should be in default and the SoLE may rightfully
impose the Unions CBA proposals

ISSUES/HELD:
WON the CBA proposals can be unilaterally imposed in this case? YES
RATIO:

Art. 258 of the LC and Rule V Book V Sec. 3 of the IRR states that:
in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer
who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for
certification election any time except upon a clear showing
that one of these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed
within 1 year from the date of issuance of a final certification
election result; or (b) when a bargaining deadlock had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.

While the petition for certification election was filed by the

university in a timely manner (after almost 4 years from the time of
the certification election), the Secretary of Labor found that a
bargaining deadlock existed.

There is a deadlock when there is a "complete blocking or

stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces; as,
the deadlock of a jury or legislature." The word is synonymous with
the word impasse, which "presupposes reasonable effort at good
faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude
in agreement between the parties."

There was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" on

the part of the university. Its indifferent attitude towards
collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties
to arrive at an agreement. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the
part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts. This
is clear from Art. 250(a)2 of the LC.

2 ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other
party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than 10 calendar
days from receipt of such notice. xxx

An hour before the start of the May 10 conference, it

surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election to
preempt the conference
o Belated questioning of the status of the said union. In the
May 10 agreement, the university agreed "to sit down and
determine the number of employees that will represent
their bargaining unit." This clearly indicates that the
university recognized the union as the bargaining
representative of the employees and is, therefore,
estopped from questioning the majority status of the said
union.

BUT the Union was not entirely blameless. It remained

passive for 3 years. Only after it affiliated with ALU that it, through
ALU, requested a conference for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
o The May 10 Agreement may as well be considered
the written notice to bargain under Art. 250(a) which
set the motion for collective bargaining.
HOWEVER SC is not inclined to rule that there has been a
deadlock in the collective bargaining process.
o There has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining" on the part of the university.
o While the Court recognizes that technically, the university
has the right to file the petition for certification election as
there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its
prayer that the herein assailed Orders be annulled would
put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.

Hence, the universitys contention that the unions proposals

may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a
collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent
of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit.

SC applied Kiok Loy v. NLRC3 since the facts therein have also been
established in this case: (a) the union is the duly certified
bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and
submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the university
made no counter proposal whatsoever
o "a company's refusal to make counter proposal if
considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the
Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered."
o

3 SC upheld the order of the NLRC declaring the union's draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement
which should govern the relationship between the parties.

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES

AND FACULTY OF LETRAN
G.R. No. 141471| September 18, 2000| Kapunan.
Digest by Ian.
Summary: The union filed a case for ULP against Letran when the latter
refused to bargain/ re-negotiate the CBA in lieu of a petition for certification
election filed by rival union. The SC ruled against Letran and held that the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify
the suspension of the negotiation by the employer. The petition must
comply with the provisions of the Labor Code. The SC also held that there
was ULP when Letran unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a
new CBA. Lastly, Letran was held in violation of the employees right to
self-organization when it terminated the union president.
Facts:
1. December 1992- union initiated a renegotiation of its CBA with
Letran for the last 2 years of the CBAs 5-year life from 1989-94.
2. The new officers wanted to continue the renegotiation but Letran
refused, claiming that the CBA was already prepared for signing by
the parties. The disputed CBA was submitted to a referendum but
this was rejected by the union members.
3. Letran then accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith
before the NLRC. The LA ruled in favor of petitioner but this was
reversed by the NLRC.
4. January 1996- union notified the NCMB of its intention to strike due
to Letrans non-compliance with the NLRC order to:
a. Delete the name of Atty. Federico Leyness as the unions
legal counsel; and
b. Engage in bargaining
5. January 18, 1996- parties agreed to disregard the CBA and start
negotiation on a new 5-year CBA starting 1994-1999. The unions
proposals were submitted to the Board of Trustees for its approval.
Further, the unions president, Eleanor Ambas was informed that
her shift was changed from M-F to Tue-Sat. Ambas protested and
requested manangement to submit the issue to a grievance
machinery under the old CBA.
6. March 13, 1996- due to petitioners inaction, the union filed a
notice of strike.
7. March 27, 1996- before the NCMB the parties met to discuss the
grounds rules for the negotiation.
8. March 29, 1996- union received a letter from Letran dismissing
Ambas for insubordination. The union amended its notice of strike
to include Ambas dismissal.
9. April 20, 1996- both parties again discussed the ground rules for
the CBA renegotiation but petitioner stopped the negotiations after
it purportedly received information that a new group of employees
had filed a petition for certification election.
10. June 18, 1996- union finally struck. SOLE assumed jurisdiction and
ordered employees to get back to work and for Letran to accept

them back. Striking members were admitted except Ambas. SOLE

declared Letran guilty of ULP.
Issue: WON Letran is guilty of ULP.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
1. The duty to bargain is defined under Article 2524. Noteworthy in
the definision is the requirement on both parties of the
performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, the union lived up to this
requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner
on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways
and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
2. Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is
obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals
presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals
were submitted bythe union, petitioner still had not made any
counterproposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted
the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996.
Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of
Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its excuse
for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 5 of
the Labor Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining.
3. The company's refusal to make counterproposal to the union's
proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer
did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining
proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to
bargain collectively. In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show
a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair
labor practice.
4. The claim of the petitioner that there was a pending petition for
certification election is unavailing. In order to allow the employer to
validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid
petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation
issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election
does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition
for certification election must be filed during the sixtyday freedom
4 Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.

The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of

a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and
executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel
any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
5 Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other
party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such notice.

5.

6.
7.

8.

alleged

period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 19891994. The petition for certification election by ACEC, allegedly a
legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the
petition was filed outside the sixtyday freedom period. Hence, the
filing thereof was barred by the existence of a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the
petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the
ongoing negotiation.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the union
president, we hold that the dismissal was effected in violation of
the employees' right to self organization.
To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union president
was terminated for cause, allegedly for insubordination for her
failure to comply with the new working schedule assigned to her,
and pursuant to its managerial prerogative to discipline and/or
dismiss its employees. While we recognize the right of the
employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or
authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must
be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets
of equity and fair play.The employer's right to terminate the
services of an employee for just or authorized cause must be
exercised in good faith. More importantly, it must not amount to
interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to selforganization because it would amount to, as in
this case, unlawful labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor
Code.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to
no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the
union of a leader who would fight for the right of her coworkers at
the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time of her dismissal, had
been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact,
she was a recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten
(10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday.
However, things began to change when she was elected as union
president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA. Thus, it
was when she was the union president and during the period of
tense and difficult negotiations when her work schedule was
altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When
she did not budge, although her schedule was changed, she was
outrightly dismissed for
insubordination.

General Milling Corp. v. CA

February 11, 2004 | Quisumbing, J.
By: Jadd
SUMMARY:
Two months before the 1988 CBA expired, GMC received union withdrawal
letters from GMC-ILU members. GMC-ILU sent a proposed CBA 1 day before
the expiration. GMC did not send a counter-proposal. GMC also refused to
act on the union's request for grievance procedures after GMC dismissed a
union member for incompetence. The union filed a ULP complaint for
refusal to bargain collectively, interference with the right to selforganization, and discrimination. The LA dismissed the complaint and
recommended a petition for certification election. The NLRC initially set
aside the LA's decision and ordered GMC to abide by the proposed CBA
draft from the expiration of the 1988 CBA. However, the NLRC granted
GMC's MR and reversed itself. The CA reinstated the first NLRC decision
ordering GMC to abide by the proposed CBA draft. SC denied GMC's
petition for certiorari, holding that the CA could impose the terms of the
draft CBA because fairness, equity, and social justice would be defeated if
the old terms subsisted due to GMC's delaying tactics. GMC was also found
to be guilty of the ULPs of refusing to collectively bargain and interfering
with the right to self-organization.
DOCTRINE:
A proposed draft CBA may be imposed where a party abuses the grace
period by purposely delaying the bargaining process and the terms are
found to be reasonable.
The old CBA subsists until a new one is agreed upon except where there is
bad faith, such as the abuse of the grace period by purposely delaying the
bargaining process.
FACTS:

Parties:
o Petitioner GMC (General Milling Corporation)
o Respondents:

Public Respondent Court of Appeals

Private Respondents:

The Union GMC-ILU (General Milling

Corporation-Independent Labor Union)

Rito Mangubat Union officer

April 28, 1989 GMC and the union concluded a CBA.

o Includes provision for a 3-year representation term.
o Effectivity 3 years retroacting to December 1, 1988
o Expiry November 30, 1991

As early as October 1991 GMC received letters (collective and

individual) from workers stating their withdrawal from the union
due to religious affiliation and personal differences.

November 29, 1991 (1 day before expiration) The union sent a

proposed CBA and requested for a counter-proposal w/in 10 days.

GMC did not send a counter-proposal.

December 16, 1991 GMC wrote to 2 union officers (Rito Mangubat
and Victor Lastimoso) explaining that it felt no basis to negotiate
with a non-existent union but also expressing willingness to
dialogue on common concerns.
December 19, 1991 Rito and Victor wrote a letter of this date,
disclaiming any mass disaffiliation or resignation, and submitted a
manifesto signed by union members to the effect that they did not
withdraw.
January 13, 1992 GMC dismissed a union member (Marcia
Tumbiga) for incompetence.
o Despite the unions protest and request for grievance
procedures, GMC told them to refer to the December 16,
1991 Letter.
July 2, 1992 The union filed a ULP complaint for: (1) refusal to
bargain collectively; (2) interfering with the right to selforganization; and (3) discrimination.
LA dismissed the complaint and recommended a petition for
certification election.
January 30, 1998 NLRC set aside the LAs decision, ordering GMC
to abide by the proposed CBA draft beginning from the end of the
first CBA.
October 6, 1998 NLRC reversed itself and granted GMCs MR.
July 19, 2000 CA granted the unions petition for certiorari and
reinstated the first NLRC decision.
GMC goes up to the SC through a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES/HELD:
1) (Topical) WON the CA had jurisdiction to impose the terms of the
draft CBA for 2 years beginning from the expiration of the prior
one. YES
2) WON GMC is guilty of the ULP of refusing to collectively bargain
and/or interference with the right to self-organization YES (both)
RATIO:
1) Yes, a proposed draft CBA may be imposed where a party abuses
the grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process
because it would be contrary to fairness, equity, and social justice
to allow the old CBAs terms and conditions to subsist despite the
employers delaying the negotiations.
A) General Rule Status quo: Old CBA subsists until new one
agreed upon.
1. Statutory Basis Labor Code Art. 259 (then Art. 253)
2. Limitation This presupposes that there is no bad faith (in
other words, all other things are equal.)
3. Exception Deviating from this rule is warranted where a
party abuses the grace period by purposely delaying the
bargaining process.
a) Illustrative cases:

1.

Kiok Loy v. NLRC (1986):

a. Situation Sweden Ice Cream Plant
refused to submit any counter proposal
to the certified bargaining agent's
proposed CBA.
b. Holding The employer lost the right to
bargain, and the SC imposed the
proposed CBA terms.
c. Delays postponements, nonappearance, undue delay in submitting
documents
2. Divine Word University of Tacloban v. SOLE
(1992):
a. Holding SC upheld CBAs unilateral
imposition because the employers own
acts led to it forfeiting whatever rights
it had as an employer.
b) In this case:
1. It would be unfair to the union and its
members if the old terms subsisted for the
remaining 2 years.
2. The employer delayed negotiations,
violating its duty to collectively bargain, so
it lost its right to negotiate on the proposed
draft CBA.
3. Even if the instant case differs from the 2
illustrative cases in that there was no preexisting CBA in them, the rationale still
applies because holding otherwise would
amount to letting GMC have its cake and
eat it too.
4. Substantial evidence supports the CAs
affirmation of the NLRCs findings that the
proposed terms were reasonable.
B) On the acceptance of proposals:
1. Generally, parties are not obliged to accept or agree to the
others proposals.
2. However, erring parties should not be allowed to resort
with impunity to feign negotiations with empty gestures.
(Citing Divine Word University of Tacloban v. SOLE, 1992)
a. Basis Equity and fair play.
2) Yes, GMC committed the ULPs of: (1) failing its duty to collectively
bargain because it failed to make a timely reply without sufficient
justification; and (2) interfering with the right to self-organization
because the letters of withdrawal came out during the cases
pendency at the LA level.
A) On the duty to collectively bargain:
1. Test Depends on the facts of the case, particularly the
impact of all acts as a whole. (Citing Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. NLRC,
1997)

2.

3.
4.

5.

Concept Found in Art. 258 and 259 (then 252 only): The
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for negotiating an
agreement.
Procedure Found in Labor Code Art. 256 (then 250).
a. Nature Mandatory because of the state interest in
industrial peace.
In this case: GMC
i. Failed to make a timely reply.
ii. Had a flimsy excuse since its feeling that
the union no longer represented the
workers turned out to be baseless.
GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal indicated bad
faith.
A) On the interference with the right to selforganization The CA correctly held that
the timing of the letters showed an
attempt to cast doubt on the unions
status.
1. The letters were dated February to
June of 1993, during the pendency
of the case with the LA.6

6 But I dont know what the Court made of the earlier letters (See Fact Bullet #3).

FVC Labor Union Philippine Transport and General Workers

Organization v. Sama-samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC
Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations
November 27, 2009 | Brion
By: Kiko del Valle
SUMMARY: FVCLU-PTGWO and FVC amended the CBA extending its fiveyear term for four months. Nine days before the expiry of the original fiveyear term, SANAMA-SIGLO filed a petition for certification election.
DOCTRINE: While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original fiveyear term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or
term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions
exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of the abovequoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond
five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the
workplace parties to agree upon.
FACTS:
FVCLU-PTGWO the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated (company) signed a fiveyear CBA with the company from February 1, 2001 to May 31, 2003.
At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA,
FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA
and modified, among other provisions, the CBAs duration. Article XXV,
Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA provides that this re-negotiation
agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31,
2003 thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4)
months.
Nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originallyagreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away
from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent SamaSamang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and
General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before DOLE a petition
for certification election (PCE) for the same rank-and-file unit covered by
the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA.

had been ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of whom later
organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election
applicant. Since these SANAMA-SIGLO members fully accepted and in fact
received the benefits arising from the amendments, the Acting Secretary
rationalized that they also accepted the extended term of the CBA and
cannot now file a petition for certification election based on the original
CBA expiration date. SANAMA-SIGLO moved for the reconsideration which
the SOLE denied.
SANAMA-SIGLO appealed to the CA. CA found the petition meritorious,
ruling that while the parties may renegotiate the other provisions
(economic and non-economic) of the CBA, this should not affect the fiveyear representation aspect of the original CBA. If the duration of the
renegotiated agreement does not coincide with but rather exceeds the
original five-year term, the same will not adversely affect the right of
another union to challenge the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent within sixty (60) days before the lapse of the original five (5) year
term of the CBA.
FVCLU-PTGWO appealed to the SC, contending that the extension of the
CBA term also changed the unions exclusive bargaining representation
status and effectively moved the reckoning point of the 60-day freedom
period from January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.
Subsequently, SANAMA-SIGLO manifested that they are abandoning their
desire to contest the representative status of FVCLU-PTGWO since the July
2006 CA Decision.
ISSUES/HELD:
WON the petition for certification election filed by SANAMA-SIGLO was filed
beyond the 60-day period to contest the representative status of FVCLUPTGWO?
RATIO:
While SANAMA-SIGLO has manifested its abandonment of its challenge to
the exclusive bargaining representation status of FVCLU-PTGWO, we deem
it necessary to resolve the issue as it will inevitably recur in the future.
Article 253-A of the Labor Code provides:

FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the PCE on the ground that the

certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or
outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA.
The Mediation Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed
outside the 60-day period.
SANAMA-SIGLO appealed to DOLE. DOLE sustained SANAMA-SIGLOs
position that the filing of the petition on January 21, 2003 was within 60days from the January 30, 2003 expiration of the original CBA term. DOLE
ordered the conduct of certification election. FVCLU-PTGWO moved for
reconsideration which DOLE granted. DOLE held that the amended CBA

xxx No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent

bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the
sixty day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year
term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. xxx
Book V, Rule VIII of the IRR of the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 14. Denial of the petition; grounds. The Med-Arbiter may dismiss the
petition on any of the following grounds:

xxxx
(b) the petition was filed before or after the freedom period of a duly
registered collective bargaining agreement; provided that the sixty-day
period based on the original collective bargaining agreement shall not be
affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement.
While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term
together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in
excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive
collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted
Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years
and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace
parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with
a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by
amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective
only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration of the CBAs first five years.
In San Miguel Corp. Employees Union PTGWO, et al. v. Confesor, San Miguel
Corp., Magnolia Corp. and San Miguel Foods, Inc.:
In the event however, that the parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a
renegotiated contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not
coincide with the said five-year term and said agreement is ratified by
majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the subject contract is
valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties. The same will
however not adversely affect the right of another union to challenge the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent within sixty (60) days
before the lapse of the original five (5) year term of the CBA.
The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the
FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining representation status which remained
effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of January
30, 2003. Thus, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file a petition for
certification election and its petition was seasonably filed.
SC however did not order the conduct of a petition for certification election
because of the manifestation of SANAMA-SIGLO abandon its challenge to
the exclusive majority statues of PTGWO.

ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L11745 | October 31, 1960
FACTS: [ULP]

Royal Interocean Lines, is a foreign corporation licensed to do business

in the Philippines, with head office in Hongkong. Its branch office in
Manila employed respondent Ermidia A. Mariano who had worked for
the petitioner since January 5, 1932, until her discharge on October 23,
1953.

October, 1953: the respondent and the manager of the Manila Branch
(Kamerling) developed strained relationship that led the former
to lodge with the managing director in Hongkong a complaint against
Kamerling.

The latter, with the approval of the head office in Hongkong,

dismissed the respondent on October 23, 1953.

She charged the petitioner and Kamerling with unfair labor practice
under section 4 (a), subsection 5 Republic Act No. 875

Court of Industrial Relations held the petitioner and Kamerling guilty

thereof and ordered the respondent's reinstatement, with backpay
from the date of her dismissal. The petitioner has appealed by way of
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner is guilty of ULP? NO
RATIO:

The pertinent legal provision is section 4 (a), subsection 5, of Republic

Act No. 875 which reads as follows:
o Sec. 4 Unfair Labor Practice, (a) It shall be unfair practice for an
employer: . . . (5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for
having given or

The Court of Industrial relations has construed the foregoing as

including all cases where an employee is dismissed, discharged or
otherwise prejudiced or discriminated against by reason of the filing,
by the latter with the court or elsewhere of any charge against his
employer.

Section 4 (a) subsection 5, is part of the MagnaCharta of Labor which

has these underlying purposes:
o 1 The experience under Commonwealth Act No. 213 which now
regulates the subject, has shown the need for further
safeguards to the rights of workers to organize.
o The attached bill seeks to provide these safeguards, following the
pattern of United States 7 3 National Labor Relations Act with
suitable modifications demanded by local conditions. (Secs. 48.).
The bill will prevent unfair labor practices on the part of the
employers including not only acts of antiunion discrimination but
also those which are involved in the making of company unions.

The bill protects the workers in the process of organization

and before as well as after the union is registered with the
Department of Labor.
The provisions of sections 1 and 3 are the bases for the protection of
the laborers' right to selforganization, and the enumeration in section 4
(of unfair labor practices), are nothing more than a detailed description
of an employer's acts that may interfere with the right to selforganization and collective bargaining.
The American courts, in interpreting the provision of the Wagner Act
similar to section 4 (a), subsection 5, said:
o The statute goes no further than to safeguard the right of
employees to selforganization and to select
representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining
or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their
employer. That is fundamental right. Employees have as clear a
right to organize and select their representatives for lawful
purpose as the respondent has to organize its business and select
its own officers and agents.
Despite the employee's right to selforganization, the employer
therefore still retains his inherent right to discipline his employees. his
normal prerogative to hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is directed
only against the use of the right to employ or discharge as an
instrument of discrimination, interference or oppression because of
one's labor or union activities.
Under subsection 5 of section 4 (a), the employee's (1) having filed
charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give
testimony, are modified by "under this Act" appearing after the last
item. In other words, the three acts must have reference to the
employees' right to self organization and collective bargaining,
because the element of unfair labor practice is interference in such
right.
As the respondent's dismissal had no relation to union activities
and the charges filed by her against the petitioner had nothing to do
with or did not arise from her union activities, the appealed decision is
hereby reversed and the directness for the respondent's reinstatement
with back pay revoked.
o

Ermidia Mariano v. The Royal Interocean Lines (Koninkijke Java-ChinaPakitvaart Lijnen N. V. Amsterdam) and J. V. Kamerling
27 February 1961; Padilla, J.
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon
I. Facts (from a stipulation of facts)
1. Mariano was employed by Royal Interocean Lines as stenographertypist and filing clerk from 5 January 1932 until the outbreak of the
war on 8 December 1941, when the employment was interrupted,
and from 1 March 1948 until 23 October 1953, when she was
dismissed.
At the time of her dismissal, she was receiving a basic
salary of P312 and a high cost of living allowance of P206,
or a total of P518 a month.
2. On 5 October 1953 she had sent a letter to the managing directors
in HK, coursed through its manager for the Phil., Kamerling,
complaining against the latter's "inconsiderate and untactful
attitude" towards the employees under him and the clients in the
Phil.
On 19 October 1953 Kamerling advised Mariano that her
letter had been forwarded to the managing directors of the
appellant company in HK;
In view of the contents and tenor of her letter, the
managing directors believed with him that it was
impossible to retain her;
Despite the fact that they were justified in dismissing her
and that she was not entitled to any compensation, out of
generosity and in consideration of her length of service,
the company was willing to grant her a sum equivalent to
three months salary;
In order not to adversely affect her chances of future
employment with other firms, it was suggested that she
hand in a formal letter of resignation effective 31 October,
otherwise she would be dismissed; and that should they
not hear from her in writing until noon of 23 October, she
would be considered dismissed.
3. On 23 October 1953 Mariano sent a letter stating that she was
"compelled to hand this letter of resignation severing my services
from the Royal Interocean Lines effective October 31st, 1963, much
to my dislike and disappointment after being in their employment
for almost twenty-two (22) years". However, the company refused
to accept her letter and on the same date sent a letter dismissing
her. She sought reconsideration of her dismissal from HK but
received no answer to any of her five letters.

4.

5.

6.

7.

On 19 December 1953 the company finally tendered an offer of

compromise settlement whereby she would be paid the sum of
P3,108 equivalent to six months salary, provided that she would
sign a quit claim.
Not satisfied, Mariano brought this action for recovery of damages
in the total sum of P107,002.58 and for other just and equitable
relief.
The acting chief prosecutor of the CIR, at the Mariano's instance,
filed a complaint for ULP for having dismissed her from the service
"for the reason that she wrote a letter to the Managing Directors in
HK complaining against the Kamerling's attitude and behavior to
her and other employees." and for refusing to reinstate her to her
former position.
CIR found the company guilty and ordered reinstatement with
backpay. Company filed this petition for certiorari to review with
the SC.

8.
II. Issues
Whether the company was guilty of unfair labor practice in having
dismissed the Mariano because she had filed charges against Kamerling
not connected with or necessarily arising from union activities.
III. Holding
The judgment is reversed, but the company is ordered to pay P3,108,
without interest. No pronouncements as to costs.
IV. Ratio
1. 4(a), subsection 5, of RA 875 reads as follows: "It shall be unfair
labor practice for an employer to dismiss, discharge, or otherwise
prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed
charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under
this Act."
2. Considering the policy behind the enactment of the statute, it is
readily discoverable that the provisions of 1 and 3 are the bases
for the protection of the laborers right to self-organization, and the
enumeration in 4 (of unfair labor practices), are nothing more than
a detailed description of an employer's acts that may interfere with
the right of self-organization and collective bargaining.
3. Despite the right to self-organization, the employer still retains his
inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal prerogative to
hire or dismiss them. The prohibition is directed only against the
use of the right to employ or discharge as an instrument of
discrimination, interference or oppression because of one's labor or
union activities.
4. The employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given

5.

testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by

"under this Act" appearing after the last item. The three acts must
have reference to the employee's right to self-organization and
collective bargaining, because ULP is interference in such right. It
would be redundant to repeat "under this Act" after each
enumeration connected by the disjunctive conjunction "or."
Considering that the dismissal is "not connected with or necessarily
arising from union activities" and does not constitute unfair labor
practice, Mariano has no cause of action. Nevertheless, as the
dismissal was without cause, because her inefficiency as the
ground or reason for her dismissal as claimed is belied by the
successive increases of her compensation, the amount of P3,108
for six months salary should be paid to her.

FRANCISCO SALUNGA v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

September 27, 1967 | C.J. Concepcion
By: Perry
SUMMARY:
The petitioner dissatisfied with the way the Union was being run due to,
what he believed to be, several illegal or irregular disbursements of union
funds, tendered his resignation from the Union. The Union then informed
the Company of such resignation and sought to compel the Company to
dismiss the petitioner by virtue of his resignation from the Union. The
Company then told the petitioner that resigning from the Union would
result in the termination of his employment. Petitioner then wrote to the
Union seeking to withdraw or revoke his resignation. However, this
withdrawal of resignation was not accepted by the Union, which eventually
resulted in his dismissal. Petitioner then filed an ULP case against the
Union, the Union officers and the Company.
The SC found the Union and the Union officers guilty of ULP and acquitted
the Company. It ruled that generally, membership in voluntary associations
cannot be compelled by the state. However, with regard to labor unions,
the privilege of choosing its members is qualified because it is imbued with
public interest. Therefore, the courts may compel the Union to reinstate
Petitioner as a member of the Union.
FACTS:
The petitioner was an employee of the Company and a member of the
Union. Both parties, entered into a CBA which provided, among others, a
closed-shop agreement. Sometime in 1961, the petitioner, due to his
dissatisfaction with the way the Union was being run, filed his resignation
from the Union, which accepted it. The Union then transmitted it to the
Company and requested the immediate implementation of the closed-shop
agreement. The Company then informed the petitioner that his resignation
from the Union would result in the termination of his employment. Upon
being informed of that fact, the petitioner sought to withdraw his
resignation from the Union. This request for withdrawal was however, not
accepted by the Union and it sought to compel the company to terminate
the employment of the petitioner.
The petitioner appealed the decision of the Union of not accepting the
withdrawal of his resignation to the National President but his appeal was
not given due course. Eventually, the petitioner was dismissed causing him
to file ULP charges against the Union, its officers, and the Company. The
trial judge found all parties charged guilty of ULP. On appeal to the CIR en
banc, the decision of the trial judge was reversed. Hence, this petition with
the SC.
ISSUE / HELD:
WON the Courts may compel the Union to reinstate the petitioner as its
member. YES.

RULING:
Although generally, a State may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations to admit thereto any given individual, because membership
therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of
labor, either in a given locality, or as regards a particular employer with
which it has a closed-shop agreement.
The closed-shop agreement and the union shop cause the admission
requirements of the trade union to become affected with public interest.
Likewise, a closed-shop, or union shop, or maintenance of membership
clauses, cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected
with public interest.
Therefore, such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified
applicants for membership and a closed-shop provision would not justify
the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of
and employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership,
without any reasonable ground. Needless to say, if said unions may be
compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications,
with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power
when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing
to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation,
which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke
the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and cannot
arbitrarily be denied readmission.
As to the Company, the court found that the former is not guilty of ULP
because it deferred the discharge of petitioner and informed him of the
consequences of his actions. The Company gave due regard to the
petitioners plight and was not unfair to the petitioner. It did not merely
show commendable understanding and sympathy towards the petitioner
but even tried to help him. The Company cannot be blamed for the
petitioners dismissal as it had the right to rely on the decision of the Union
of not accepting the readmission of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the CIR en banc is REVERSED.

HACIENDA FATIMA and/or VILLEGAS & SEGURA v NATIONAL

FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS (NFSW)
January 28, 2003|Panganiban| By Ron San Juan
Summary:
Hacienda workers organized themselves into a union. Petitioners refused
to sit down with the union for the purpose of collective bargaining. Instead,
petitioners did not give the workers work for more than a month. Union
filed for illegal dismissal and ULP. SC held that the workers are regular
employees, hence, can only be dismissed for cause. SC also held that the
acts of petitioners constitute ULP.
Doctrine:
The respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements
resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of
armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of
union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did
not want a union in their hacienda a clear interference in the right of
workers to self-organization.
Facts:

Petitioners did not look with favor workers having organized

themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union NFSW was
certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification
elections, petitioner under the pretext that the result was on appeal,
refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a
CBA. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not
given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a
strike which was however settled upon the signing of a MOA.

However, alleging that NFSW failed to load the fifteen wagons,

petitioners reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain
collectively. Instead, petitioners employed all means including the use
of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the
premises.

Moreover, starting September 1991, petitioners did not any more give
work assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a
strike. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another MOA
was signed by the complainants and petitioners which provides.

Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met for a Conciliation

Meeting. When petitioners again reneged on its commitment,
complainants filed the present complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP.

Petitioners: argued respondents refused to work and being choosy in

the kind of work they have to perform. They are seasonal workers, not
regular.

LA ruled for petitioners. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed NLRC.

Issues/Held:
Whether or not the respondent workers were illegally dismissed. (YES)

Respondents were regular employees as provided by Article 280 of

the Labor Code. For respondents to be excluded from those

classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform

work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also
been employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence
proves the existence of the first, but not of the second,
condition. The fact that respondents repeatedly worked as
sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by
the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more
than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular
employment is applicable.
Herein respondents, having performed the same tasks for
petitioners every season for several years, are considered the
latters regular employees for their respective tasks. Petitioners
eventual refusal to use their services -- even if they were ready,
able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were
available -- and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks
originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of
the latter.
Having failed to provide just cause for termination, petitioners
illegally dismissed the respondents.

Whether or not petitioners were guilty of ULP. (YES)

Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of

economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who
withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the
organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and
members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want
a union in their hacienda a clear interference in the right of workers
to self-organization.

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it
the sanction of moral and exemplary damages.

Progressive Development Corp. vs CIR

November 29, 1977 | Fernandez, J.
Sam

desperate attempt to unduly delay the proceedings for certification

election.
CIR: found PDC guilty of ULP

SUMMARY: Complainant-employees that were members of ACEA were

discriminated against by PDC by not giving them their working schedules,
lessening their number of working days and eventually dismissing them
from their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from ACEA
and join the Progressive Employees Union (a union allegedly setup by
PDC).
FACTS:
In September 1962, Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a
legitimate labor organization in behalf of forty-eight (48) members,
instituted a case ULP for unfair labor practice in the Court of Industrial
Relations against Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), a domestic
business entity operating the Araneta Coliseum, Jorge Araneta, Judy A.
Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as officers of the corporation
PDC and Progressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor organization existing
in the PDC.
The complaint alleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to
disauthorize the counsel of the complainant ACEA from appearing in a
union conference with the respondents, petitioners herein; that the
supervisors of PDC encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the
Progressive Employees Union (PEU) and coerced the employees,
particularly the individual complainants, to disaffiliate from the
complainant union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and August
1962 the respondents, petitioners herein, discriminated against the
individual complainants by either not giving them their working schedules,
lessening their number of working days and eventually dismissing them
from their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their
union and join the Progressive Employees Union.
PDC: the individual complainants were merely casuals or temporary
employees and their services depended on the availability of work as
ushers, usherettes, guards and janitors when there were shows,
performances or exhibits at the Araneta Coliseum. They alleged that they
did not interfere with the complainant union and in fact they met and
conferred with said union's counsel; that they did not initiate nor assist the
PEU; that they did not discriminate against the individual complainants nor
dismiss them as said complainants were only casuals or temporary
employees.
Union: Denied that the officers and supervisors of the corporation PDC
initiated and assisted in its formation and claimed that its organization is
the joint efforts of the overwhelming majority of the employees and
laborers of the corporation PDC, free from any undue influence,
interference and/or intimidation from any party. The PEU claimed that the
institution of the unfair labor practice case by the complainants is a

ISSUES/HELD:
W/N PDC was guilty of Unfair Labor Practices (through their union busting
activites)? YES.
RATIO:
It appears that the individual complainants, during show days, were always
scheduled to work until June 1962 when they were not included in the
schedule anymore. This virtually amounted to dismissal, without prior
notice. Their not being included in the list of schedule since June 1962
could only be the result of petitioners' earlier threat of dismissal should
said complainants refuse to heed petitioners' admonition for them to resign
from the ACEA.
From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were
dismissed because they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum
Employees Association and to affiliate with the Progressive Employees
Union which was being aided and abetted by the Progressive Development
Corporation.
The assertion of the petitioner Progressive Development Corporation and
its officials that they have nothing to do with the formation of the
Progressive Employees Union is not supported by the facts of record.
The President then of the Progressive Employees Union was Jose Generoso,
Jr., Stage Manager of the Progressive Development Corporation. The stage
Manager, Generoso, has supervisory power over the twenty-two (22)
employees under him. Generoso was then the No. 2 man in the Araneta
Coliseum, being an assistant of the Director of said Coliseum. While the
Progressive Employees Union was allegedly organized on June 26, 1962, it
was only on July 11, 1962 that its existence was publicly announced when
the management of the petitioner corporation refused to meet with the
Araneta Coliseum Employees Association. The Progressive Employees
Union never collected dues from its members and all their members are
now regular employees and are still working in the construction unit of the
Philippine Development Corporation. There is evidence that the Progressive
Employees Union became inactive after the death of Atty. Reonista the
former counsel of the Progressive Development Corporation. This shows
that the Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the
petitioner corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum Employees
Association and to stave off the latter's recognition.

Manila Mandarin Employees Union v NLRC, Melba C. Beloncio

G.R. No. 76898; 29 September 1987; Gutierrez, Jr., J.
By: Dudday
FACTS:
1. Private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, an employee of Manila
Mandarin Hotel since 1976 and was the assistant head waitress at the
hotels coffee shop, was expelled from the Manila Mandarin Employees
Union for acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The
charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark
to a waitress who happened to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala
sa Union ninyo." The remark was made in the course of a heated
discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant
waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work. The union demanded
the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union
security clause7 of their collective bargaining agreement and the
Manila Mandarin Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave
effective August 10, 1984.
2. Two days before the effective date of her forced leave, Beloncio filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against herein
Petitioner Union and Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch. Petitioner-Union filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action.
3. LA denied the motion to dismiss and decided in favor of Beloncio. It
held that the Union was guilty of ULP when it demanded Beloncios
separation. NLRC modified the LAs decision and ordered the Union to
pay the wages and fringe benefits of Beloncio from the time she was
placed on forced leave until she is actually reinstated, and for Manila
Mandarin Hotel was ordered to reinstate Beloncio and to pay her
whatever service charges may be due her during that period which
amount would be held in escrow by the hotel.
ISSUES
1. Whether NLRC has no jurisdiction over the present controversy
because the same involves intra-union conflicts NLRC HAS
JURISDICTION
2. Whether NLRC erred in ruling that Petitioner Union committed ULP
and is liable to pay Private Respondent - NO

2.

RULING AND RATIO

1. NLRC has jurisdiction over the present controversy because the
same involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining

7 Section 2. Dismissals.xxx xxx xx

b) Members of the Union who cease to be such members and/or who fail to maintain their membership in
good standing therein by reason of their resignation from the Union and/or by reason of their expulsion from
the Union in accordance with the Constitution and ByLaws of the Union, for nonpayment of union dues and
other assessment for organizing, joining or forming another labor organization shall, upon written notice of
such cessation of membership or failure to maintain membership in the Union and upon written demand to the
company by the Union, be dismissed from employment by the Company after complying with the requisite due
process requirement

agreement provisions and whether or not there was an illegal

dismissal.
Under the CBA, membership in the union may be lost through
expulsion only if there is nonpayment of dues or a member organizes,
joins, or forms another labor organization.
As correctly explained by the Labor Arbiter, "(I)f the only question is
the legality of the expulsion of Beloncio from the Union undoubtedly,
the question is one cognizable by the BLR (Bureau of Labor Relations).
But, the question extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or steps
leading thereto. Necessarily, when the hotel decides the recommended
dismissal, its acts would be subject to scrutiny. Particularly, it will be
asked whether it violates or not the existing CBA. Certainly, violations
of the CBA would be unfair labor practice."
Article 250 of the Labor Code provides it is considered as an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any
ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which
membership or continuation of membership is made available to other
members.
Reading Article 250 with Article 217 of the Labor Code which provides
that Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide ULP cases and the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction thereto, it becomes pretty obvious that the case falls
squarely within the NLRC jurisdiction.

There is no error in the questioned decision. The Petitioner-Union is

guilty of unfair labor practice for which they must be held liable.
The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave
were it not for the union's insistence and demand to the extent that
because of the failure of the hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the
union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor practice. The hotel was
then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop payment of
her salary from September 1, 1984.
The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains a union
security clause a closedshop agreement. A closedshop agreement is
an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only
members of the contracting union who must continue to remain
members in good standing to keep their jobs. By holding out to loyal
members a promise of employment in the closedshop, it welds group
solidarity.
While the Court has held in numerous cases that a closed-shop
agreement is a valid form of union security, union security clauses are
also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and legality.
Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an
employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of
responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness. A union member
may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for

personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closedshop

agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and
whimsicality.
This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her
best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so
as to serve hotel customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and
cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and
other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to customers, and
disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should have disciplined its
erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship
to a member who was only doing her work for the best interests of the
employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve.

Petition dismissed. NLRC affirmed.

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC

Narvasa, J.
Unfair Labor Practice
FACTS
The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions"
affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation
allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the
Wage Rationalization Act.

Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as
"Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500
employees of San Miguel Corporation, presented to the company a
"demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the
workers') wages."
o In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d)
of RA 6727 which reads as follows: (d) . . . Where the
application of the increases in the wage rates under this
Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws
in the wage structure within an establishment and gives
rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled
voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a
deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through
compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having
jurisdiction over the workplace. It shall be mandatory for
the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide any
dispute arising under this Section within twenty (20)
calendar days from the time said dispute is formally
submitted to it for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute
arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay
the applicability of the increase in the wage rates
prescribed under this Section.
Union claims that "demand was ignored
When SMC rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION, the
members , on their own accord, refused to render overtime
services
The workers involved also issued a joint notice: SAMA-SAMANG
PAHAYAG: KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY
PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY
NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS
WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG
SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION.
The Union's position was that the workers' refuse "to work beyond
eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16, 1989" as a legitimate
means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages
brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640
and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees.
o That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was
implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid
workers ,all members of IBM .

This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work

and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused
substantial losses to SMC. These losses occurred despite
such measures taken by SMC as organizing "a third shift
composed of regular employees and some contractuals,"
and appeals "to the Union members, through letters and
memoranda and dialogues with their plant delegates and
shop stewards," to adhere to the existing work schedule.
SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its
members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to
terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards.
Then on December 8, 1989, on the claim that its action in the
Arbitration Branch had as yet "yielded no relief," SMC filed another
complaint against the Union and members thereof, this time
directly with the National labor Relations Commission, "to enjoin
and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for the
issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order.
TRO was issued, but case remained pending.
o

ISSUE/RULING
Whether the workers' abandonment of the regular work schedule
and their deliberate and wilful reductoon of the plant's production
efficiency is a slowdown, which is an illegal and unprotected
concerted activity. YES

Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is

that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their
legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended,
declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free
trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . (w)orkers shall
have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection."
A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit
and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of
employers.
The more common of these concerted activities as far as
employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of
work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the
marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making
known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the
concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and
to persuade others to a like refusal.
On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may
licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish
work on account of a labor dispute, In this connection, the same
Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor
organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout,

consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be

recognized and respected."
The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality
of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed
therefor.
It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may
be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular
instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an
establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed
wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and
comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby
implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities
as modes of settlement of the issue.
o The provision states that . . the employer and the union
shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute
arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the
grievance procedure under their collective bargaining
agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary
arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in
writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10)
calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to
voluntary arbitration. In cases where there are no collective
agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and
workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any
dispute arising therefrom shall be settled through the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains
unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation,
shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory
for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide
the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time
said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration. The
pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall
not in any way delay the applicability of any increase in
prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or
Wage Order. x x x
xxx
xxx
o The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage
distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or
abitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted
activities of the employees or management, is made clear
in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment12 pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 13 of the Act.13 Section 16, Chapter I of
these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that
wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties
and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that,
"Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground
for a strike/lockout."

Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC

and the Union also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other
similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving
disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating
that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of
any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance
procedure and ultimately by arbitration.
o The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike
or otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities
for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of
wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue
"involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of
employment and/or employer-employee relations."
o The partial strike or concerted refusal by the Union
members to follow the five-year-old work schedule which
they had therefore been observing, resorted to as a means
of coercing correction of "wage distortions," was therefore
forbidden by law and contract and, on this account, illegal.

Case remanded.

San Miguel Corp v. NLRC and San Miguel Corp Employees UnionPTGWO (1999)

During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the

employees were redeployed, while others accepted early
retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the
parties proceeded to Step 3 of the grievance procedure.

In a meeting on October 26, 1990, SMC informed the union that if

by October 30, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be
redeployed, their services would be terminated on November 2.

Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a rep of the union, declared that there
was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock.

November 7, 1990, the union filed with the National Conciliation

and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE a notice of strike on the
following
grounds: a) bargaining
deadlock; b) union
busting; c) gross
violation
of
the
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance
procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent with a list of
vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was
appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration
award. Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of
strike but the NCMB failed to act on the motion.

PURISIMA, J.

July 1990, San Miguel Corporation, alleging financial losses, shut

down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant,
listed as follows: seventeen(17) employees in the Business
Logistics Division (BLD), seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations
Center (AOC), and eighteen (18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying
Station (Magnolia-MBS.)

The union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched
employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to
the other divisions of the company.

The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5

and 8, Article VIII of the parties 1990 Collective Bargaining
Agreement.8

8 Sec.5. Processing of Grievance. - Should a grievance arise, an earnest effort shall be made to settle the
grievance expeditiously in accordance with the following procedures:Step 1. - The individual employee
concerned and the Union Directors, or the Union Steward shall, first take up the employees grievance orally
with his immediate superior. If no satisfactory agreement or adjustment of the grievance is reached, the
grievance shall, within twenty (20) working days from the occurrence of the cause or event which gave rise to
the grievance, be filed in writing with the Department Manager or the next level superior who shall render his
decision within ten (10) working days from the receipt of the written grievance. A copy of the decision shall be
furnished the Plant Personnel Officer.

deemed accepted by the employee.

The Conciliation Board shall meet on the grievance in such dates as shall be designated by the
Division/Business Unit Manager or his representative. In every Division/Business Unit, Grievance Meetings of
the Conciliation Board shall be scheduled at least once a month.
The Conciliation Board shall have fifteen (15) working days from the date of submission of the grievance for
resolution within which to decide on the grievance.

Step 2. - If the decision in Step 1 is rejected, the employee concerned may elevate or appeal this in writing to
the Plant Manager/Director or his duly authorized representative within twenty (20) working days from the
receipt of the Decision of the Department Manager. Otherwise, the decision in Step 1 shall be deemed
accepted by the employee.

SEC. 6. Conciliation Board. - There shall be a conciliation Board per Business Unit or Division. Every
Conciliation Board shall be composed of not more than five (5) representatives each from the Company and
the Union. Management and the Union may be assisted by their respective legal counsels.

The Plant Manager/Director assisted by the Plant Personnel Officer shall determine the necessity of
conducting grievance meetings. If necessary, the Plant Manager/Director and the Plant Personnel Officer shall
meet the employee concerned and the Union Director/Steward on such date(s) as may be designated by the
Plant Manager. In every plant/office, Grievance Meetings shall be scheduled at least twice a month.

In every Division/Business Unit, the names of the Company and Union representatives to the Conciliation
Board shall be submitted to the Division/Business Unit Manager not later than January of every year. The
Conciliation Board members shall act as such for one (1) year until removed by the Company or the Union, as
the case may be.

The Plant Manager shall give his written comments and decision within ten (10) working days after his receipt
of such grievance or the date of submission of the grievance for resolution, as the case may be.A copy of his
Decision shall be furnished the Employee Relations Directorate.

Sec. 8. Submission to Arbitration. - If the employee or Union is not satisfied with the Decision of the
Conciliation Board and desires to submit the grievance to arbitration, the employee or the Union shall serve
notice of such intention to the Company within fifteen (15) working days after receipt of the Boards decision. If
no such written notice is received by the Company within fifteen (15) working days, the grievance shall be
considered settled on the basis of the companys position and shall no longer be available for arbitration.

Step 3. - If no satisfactory adjustment is arrived at Step 2, the employee may appeal the Decision to the
Conciliation Board as provided under Section 6 hereof, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of receipt
of the decision of the Plant Manager/Director or his designate. Otherwise, the decision in Step 2 shall be

SMC asked to dismiss the notice of strike given by union and for it
to comply with the provisions of the SBA on grievance machinery,
arbitration, and the no-strike clause.

NLRC dismissed the SMC complaint, hence this certiorari petition.

ISSUE: WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing SMCs complaint?- YES

See Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V
the Labor Code.9 In the case under consideration, the grounds relied
upon by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. The
grounds appear more illusory than real.

Collective Bargaining Deadlock- the situation between the labor and

the management of the company where there is failure in the collective
bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate.
o

Re: alleged violation of the CBA, such a violation is chargeable against

the union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, it violated the
mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the

recognized management prerogatives.

This situation is non-existent in the present case since there is

a Board assigned on Step 3 of the grievance machinery to
resolve the conflicting views of the parties.

Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five

representatives each from the company and the union to
decide the conflict, union declared a deadlock & filed a notice
of strike.

It failed to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery

and arbitration proceedings provided in the CBA, thus the
notice of strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and
the union ordered to proceed with the grievance and
arbitration proceedings.

9 Section 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. -- A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining
deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and
shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union
disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.

Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co: the strike staged by the
union is illegal for not complying with the grievance procedure
provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The main
purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in the
settlement of their disputes is to prevent a strike. This
procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is to
achieve its objective. x x x strikes held in violation of
the terms contained in the collective bargaining
agreement are illegal, especially when they provide for
conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be
strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be
achieved.

The union does not question the validity of the business move
of petitioner.

It is presumed that SMC acted in good faith. In fact, it

redeployed most of the employees involved; such that from an
original 17 excess employees in BLD, 15 were successfully
redeployed. In AOC, out of the 17 original excess, 15 were
redeployed. In the Magnolia - Manila Buying Station, out of 18
employees, 6 were redeployed and only 12 were terminated.

SMC having evinced its willingness to negotiate the fate of the

remaining employees affected, there is no ground to sustain
the notice of strike of the private respondent union.

NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint of

petitioner SMC for the dismissal of the notice of strike, issuance of a
temporary restraining order, and an order compelling the respondent
union to settle the dispute under the grievance machinery of their CBA.

DISPOSITIVE: PETITION GRANTED. 3rd Step of Grievance Procedure

to commence.

San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa

(IBM)
G.R. No. 119293
June 10, 2003
Azcuna, J.
FACTS:

Petitioner SMC and respondent IBM, the exclusive bargaining agent

of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a CBA
under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and
arbitration proceedings.10 It also included a mutually enforceable
no-strike no-lockout agreement.11

10
11

April 11, 1994 IBM, through its VP Colomeda, filed with the NCMB
a notice of strike against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1)
illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation
of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union
members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union
officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union
officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.
Next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time though its
President Galvez raising similar ground.
Galvez group requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike
with that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter opposed,
alleging that Galvez lacks authority in filing the same.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with

Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised nonstrikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are
separate and distinct from each other.

NCMB Director Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are nonstrikeable grounds. He issued an order converting their notices of
strike into preventive mediation.

May 16, 1994 Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of
holding a strike vote. This was opposed by petitioner. Colomeda
group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which
favored the holding of a strike. The strike paralyzed the operations
of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 M in daily
lost production.

May 23, 1994 Galvez group filed its second notice of strike. NCMB
however found the grounds to be mere amplifications of those
alleged in the first notice.

Petitioner filed with the NLRC a Petition for Injunction. NLRC

resolved to issue a TRO directing free ingress and egress from
petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to
peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.

Petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with

IBM, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work
in exchange of good faith talks. The MOA, signed in the presence of
DOLE officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their
dispute will continue and will not be affected in any manner
whatsoever by the agreement. The picket lines ended and work
was then resumed.

November 29, 1994 NLRC issued the challenged decision,

denying SMCs petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It
found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no
longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful
acts.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
(1) WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce,
by injunction, the parties reciprocal obligations to submit to
arbitration and not to strike. YES.
(2) WON NLRC gravely abused its discretion in withholding injunction
which is the only immediate and effective substitute for the
disastrous economic warfare that arbitration is designed to avoid.
YES.
HOLDING/RATIO:

Article 254 of the LC provides that no temporary or permanent

injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out
of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity
except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264.
o

Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code
expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to enjoin or
restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the performance
of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not
restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any
decision in favor of such party.

The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor

organization or the employer engages in any of the
prohibited activities enumerated in Article 264.

In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive

mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable.
Such order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the
dispute amicably, and in line with the state policy of favoring
voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. In accordance with the
IRR of the LC, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the
notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v.
Drilon, where the Court declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid
notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice
therein into a preventive mediation case.

Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at bar,

when the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation, respondent had
thereupon lost the notices of strike it had filed. Subsequently,
however, it still defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation
was ongoing, and notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB
warning it of its lack of notice of strike.

Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant

violation of the IRR, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain
collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or
disrupting the proceedings.

The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner

sought recourse from the public respondent. The NLRC issued a
TRO only for free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, but
did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself. It ignored the fatal lack of
notice of strike.

after the unions manifestation with the NLRC that there existed no
threat of commission of prohibited activities.

In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to

enjoin the respondents strike. A strike is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to
improve the terms and conditions of their employment. However,
to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. One of
the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
IRR prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB.
Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement
of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the
lack of which shall render a strike illegal.

Moreover ruled that there was a lack of factual basis in issuing the
injunction. Contrary to the NLRCs finding, the Court finds that at
the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to
revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being
circulated by the IBM-NCR Council which led the union. These flyers
categorically declared: Ipaalala nyo sa management na hindi
iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay
pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line. These flyers were not
denied by respondent, and were dated June 19, 1994, just a day

12

Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code

explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first having filed
the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be
prevented through an injunction in accordance with Article 254.
Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief
to prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike.

Also noteworthy is public respondents disregard of petitioners

argument pointing out the unions failure to observe the CBA
provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the case of San Miguel
Corp. v. NLRC, we ruled that the union therein violated the
mandatory provisions of the CBA when it filed a notice of strike
without availing of the remedies prescribed therein.

As in the abovecited case, petitioner herein evinced its willingness

to negotiate with the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC
to compel observance of the grievance and arbitration
proceedings. Respondent however resorted to force without
exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement
of the aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for
the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long
ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective
bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for
conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly
adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. 12

As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in

the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar
strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on
unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case at bar alleged
unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would
entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor arbiters.
Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of
strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.

The Court cannot sanction IBMs brazen disregard of legal

requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of
promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states
commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. Trade
unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by
our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of
judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business
enterprise.

Baptista v Villanueva
July 31, 2013 | Mendoza, J.
By: AP
SUMMARY:
Petitioners were expelled from their union because they violated a
provision in their Constitution and By-laws which prohibit filing of case in
court before all internal remedies are exhausted. They were expelled from
the union, then terminated by RPN pursuant to the CBA union security
clause. They then filed a ULP case against respondent. LA in their favour.
NLRC, CA and SC ruled for respondents.
DOCTRINE: (4-fold Test)
Workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to
organize their administration and activities and to formulate their
programs; RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies within the
organization.
FACTS:
Petitioners were former union members of Radio Phil Network Employees
Union (RPNEU) which was the SEBA of RPN while respondents are elected
officers and members of the same.
Petitioners filed a complaint for impeachment of their union president
before the executive board of RPN. This was eventually abandoned. They
later re-lodged the impeachment complaint, this time, against all union
officers and members of RPNEU before the DOLE. They also filed various
petitions for an audit.
3 complaints were later filed against them before the unions Committee
on Grievance and Investigation (Committee) for alleged violation of the
unions Constitution and By-Law. It was alleged, inter alia, that they
violated Article IX, Section 2.5 for urging or advocating that a member start
an action in any court of justice or external investigative body against the
Union or its officer without first exhausting all internal remedies open to
him or available in accordance with the CBL.
After investigation, the committee recommended their expulsion to the
unions Board of Directors. They were then expelled.
The union then informed RPN of the expulsion and requested the
management to serve them notices of termination in compliance with their
CBAs union security clause. They were then terminated.
Petitioner filed 3 complaints for ULP against respondents questioning their
expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from
employment.

LA: ruled in their favour and adjudged respondents guilty of ULP pursuant
to Article 249(a) and (b) of the Labor Code. It clarified, however, that only
union officers of the union should be held responsible so it exonerated 6 of
original defendants who were mere union members.
NLRC: reversed LA. It dismissed the ULP charge for lack of merit. NLRC
found that petitioners filed a suit calling for the impeachment of the
officers and members of the Executive Board of RPNEU without first
resorting to internal remedies available under its own Constitution and ByLaws.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUES/HELD:
WON respondents are guilty of ULP. NO
RATIO:
ULP concept imbedded in article 247 of LC.
commission of acts that transgress the workers right to organize;
As specified in Articles 248 and 249 of the Labor Code, the
prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to selforganization and to the observance of a CBA; Absent the said vital
elements, the acts complained, although seemingly unjust, would not
constitute ULP.
Petitioners: Procedure that should have been followed by the
respondents in resolving the charges against them was Article XVII,
Settlement of Internal Disputes of their Constitution and By-Laws,
specifically, Section 232
Said rule requires members to put their grievance in writing to be
submitted to their union president, who shall strive to have the parties
settle their differences amicably. Petitioners maintain that any form of
grievance would be referred only to the committee upon failure of the
parties to settle amicably
SC: Disagreed
Based on RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against
petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but violations that demand
proper investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for their
expulsion from the union;
As such, Article X on Investigation Procedures and Appeal Process
where any charge against any member or officer shall be submitted to the
Board of Directors which shall refer it (if necessary) to the committee which
shall forward its finding and recommendation to the board, was properly
applied.
Any procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee deemed
cured when petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard;
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the

accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due

process;
Essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side;
Re: Opportunity to personally face and confront accusers
Mere absence of a one-onone confrontation between the
petitioners and their complainants does not automatically affect the
validity of the proceedings before the Committee.
Not all cases necessitate a trial-type hearing;
No ULP
Well settled: workers and employers organizations shall have the
right to draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their representatives
in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to
formulate their programs;
Here: RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies within the
organization;
Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the
unions Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for
impeachment against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE
without first exhausting all internal remedies available within their
organization;
o
petitioners expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt
to curtail or restrict their right to organize, but was triggered by the
commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of
the unions Constitution and By-Laws;
Onus probandi (for ULP charge to prosper) rests upon the party
alleging it to prove or substantiate such claims by the requisite
quantum of evidence
In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion is required;
Indubitable that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor
practice should materially relate to the workers' right to self-organization;
Here: petitioners failed to discharge the burden required to prove
the charge of ULP against the respondents;
o
Petitioners were not able to establish how they were restrained or
coerced by their union in a way that curtailed their right to selforganization.
o
The records likewise failed to sufficiently show that the
respondents unduly persuaded management into discriminating against
petitioners. other than to bring to its attention their expulsion from the
union, which in turn, resulted in the implementation of their CBA' s union
security clause.

T&H Shopfitters Corp. V. T&H Shopfitters Corp. Workers Union 13

February 26, 2014| MENDOZA, J.
By: Justin
SUMMARY:
FACTS:

On September 7, 2004, the T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen

Corporation workers union (THS-GQ Union) filed their Complaint for Unfair
Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, with
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, against T&H Shopfitters
Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation before the Labor
Arbiter (LA).

1st CAUSE: In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents

and other employees of held their first formal meeting on November 23,
2003 to discuss the formation of a union. The following day, seventeen (17)
employees were barred from entering petitioners factory premises located
in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters
warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its
expansion. Afterwards, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly
ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.

Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular
work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform
their functions. Respondents sought the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. Subsequently, an agreement between
petitioners and THS-GQ Union was reached. Petitioners agreed to give
priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments.
Respondents averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its
commitment but instead hired contractual workers. Instead, Respondents
claimed that the work weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were
drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.

2nd CAUSE: On March 24, 2004, THS-GQ Union filed a petition for
certification election and an order was issued to hold the certification
election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen.

On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for
its employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were
purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a
certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against
the union in the forthcoming certification election.

When the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004, the
employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in
Zambales to cast their votes. The remaining employees situated at the
SBFZ plant cast their votes as well. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by
petitioners, the votes for no union prevailed.

3rD CAUSE: A memorandum was issued by petitioner Ben Huang (Huang),

Director for Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of the

13 T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION, STINNES HUANG, BEN HUANG

and ROGELIO MADRIAGA, Petitioners, vs.
T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, ELPIDIO ZALDIVAR, DARI OS
GONZALES, WILLIAM DOMINGO, BOBBY CASTILLO, JIMMY M. PASCUA, GERMANO M. BAJO, RICO L.
MANZANO, ALLAN L. CALLORINA, ROMEO BLANCO, GILBERT M. GARCIA, CARLOS F. GERILLO,
EDUARDO A. GRANDE, EDILBRANDO MARTICIO, VIVENCIO SUSANO, ROLANDO GARCIA, JR.,
MICHAEL FABABIER, ROWELL MADRIAGA, PRESNIL TOLENTINO, MARVIN VENTURA, FRANCISCO
RIVARES, PLACIDO TOLENTINO and ROLANDO ROMERO, Respondents.

lease contract between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales
and announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan,
Zambales.
When the respondents, visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was
a talahiban or grassland. The said union officers and members were made
to work as grass cutters in Cabangan, under the supervision of a certain
Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Due to these circumstances, the
employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. The other
employees who likewise failed to report in Cabangan were meted out with
suspension.
In its defense, Petitioners also stress that they cannot be held liable for ULP
for the reason that there is no employer-employee relationship between the
former and respondents. Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to
implement an enforced rotation of work assignments for respondents was a
management prerogative permitted by law, justified due to the decrease in
orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to
avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational
basis. It explains that its failure to present concrete proof of its decreasing
orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative assertion. It also
asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good
faith and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos.
It was of the impression that the employees, who opposed its economic
measures, were merely motivated by spite in filing the complaint for ULP
against it.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not ULP acts were committed by petitioners against
respondents.
ULP were committed by petitioners against respondents.Petitioners are being
accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of Article 257 (formerly Article
248) of the Labor Code,13 to wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an
employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization;
xxxx
To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when
such will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization;
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. x x x

The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to

Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the
scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer
of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the
field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center;
4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents
functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as
grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for
union members, taken together, reasonably support an inference that,
indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict respondents free exercise of
their right to self-organization.

The Court is of the considered view that petitioners undisputed actions

prior and immediately before the scheduled certification election, while

seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in

selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
Dispositive: CA Ruling Affirmed. Except: ATTYs fees deleted