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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 29, NO. 1, JANUARY 2014

European Electricity Market Integration With Mixed

Market DesignsPart I: Formulation
Pandelis N. Biskas, Member, IEEE, Dimitris I. Chatzigiannis, Student Member, IEEE, and
Anastasios G. Bakirtzis, Senior Member, IEEE

AbstractThe integration of the day-ahead electricity markets

in Europe shall lead to one multi-area market that will substitute
the local/national ones. In view of the target model that will
be enforced in all European markets in conjunction with their
forthcoming coupling/integration, a centralized market splitting
algorithm is implemented in this paper, respecting the standard
market regulatory framework of power exchanges (PXs) and
power pools, including 1) block offers/bids, linked block offers/bids, flexible hourly offers/bids and convertible block offers
in power exchanges and 2) unit technical/commitment constraints
and system operating constraints in power pools. The problem
is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
model, which can be solved using commercial MILP solvers. The
performance and computational requirements of an implementation in pan-European level is presented in the companion paper;
the model is tested in terms of problem solvability to its limits,
considering a day-ahead market clearing time threshold equal to
one hour.

Set of hourly complex orders submitted

to European PXs, where hco includes
for flexible hourly offers,
for flexible hourly bids and
for converted hourly offers
transformed from the convertible block
offers within the market clearing process;
.
3) Common:
Set of bidding areas (or pricing areas) in
Europe.
Set of synchronous areas in Europe.
Set of dispatch or trading periods of the trading
day (typically one hour).
Set of steps of the priced energy offer
or priced load declaration, where
: set
of steps of priced energy offers concerning
domestic production, : set of steps of the
import agents priced energy offers,
: set
of steps of the priced load bids concerning
domestic demand, : set of steps of the export
agents priced load bids.
Set of agents bidding for imports in bidding
area .
Set of agents bidding for exports in bidding
area .
Set of interconnections and inter-zonal
corridors;
(for AC and
DC interconnections and inter-zonal corridors,
respectively).

Index TermsInternal electricity market, market splitting,

mixed integer linear programming, power exchange, power pool.

NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
1) Power Pools:
Set of generating units in bidding area .
Set of demand entities (load representatives) in
bidding area .
2) Power Exchanges:
Set of participants registered in European PXs.
Set of participants registered in bidding area .
Set of complex orders submitted to European
includes
for block
PXs, where
for blocks bids,
for
offers,
for linked block
linked block offers,
for convertible block
bids and
.
offers;

B. Parameters
1) Power Pools:

Manuscript received May 15, 2012; revised November 24, 2012 and January
31, 2013; accepted February 04, 2013. Date of publication March 26, 2013; date
of current version December 16, 2013. This work was supported by the Greek
State Scholarships Foundation. Paper no. TPWRS-00505-2012.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 54124 Thessaloniki, Greece
(e-mail: pbiskas@auth.gr; dichatzi@ee.auth.gr; bakiana@eng.auth.gr).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2013.2245923
0885-8950 2013 IEEE

Price-quantity pair of step of priced energy

offer of unit in dispatch period , in /MWh
and MWh.
Price-quantity pair of step of priced load bid
of load in dispatch period , in /MWh and
MWh.
Total injection of renewable energy sources
(RES), including mandatory hydro injection, in
bidding area in dispatch period , in MWh.

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2) Power Exchanges:
Price-quantity pair for step of hourly energy
selling offer of participant in trading period
, in /MWh and MWh. Offer prices must
be monotonically increasing within the same
energy offer:
.
Price-quantity pair for step of hourly energy
purchasing bid of participant in trading period
, in /MWh and MWh. Bid prices must be
monotonically decreasing within the same
energy bid:
.
Offer/bid price-quantity pair of complex order
of participant , in /MWh and MWh.
Starting (ending) time for complex order of
participant .
Price-quantity pair of hourly complex order
of participant .
Incidence matrix linking the linked block offer
to the block offer (when equal to 1).
Incidence matrix linking the linked block bid
to the block bid (when equal to 1).
Incidence matrix linking the linked block offer
to the linked block offer
(when equal
to 1).
Incidence matrix linking the linked block bid
to the linked block bid
(when equal to 1).

2) Power Exchanges:
Energy sold from step of hourly energy selling
offer of participant in trading period , in MWh.
Energy purchased from step of hourly energy
purchasing bid of participant in trading period ,
in MWh.
Clearing status of complex order of participant ,
where
(
if cleared; 0 otherwise).
Clearing status of hourly complex order
of
participant in trading period , where
(=1 if cleared; 0 otherwise).
3) Common:
Cleared quantity of step of import agent priced
energy offer for interconnection in dispatch period
, in MWh.
Cleared quantity of step of export agent priced
load bid for interconnection in dispatch period ,
in MWh.
Net energy injection to area during trading period
, in MWh.
Net energy injection to synchronous area
during
trading period , in MWh.
Flow in interconnection or inter-zonal corridor
(connecting area to area
in trading period , in
MW.
D. Functions
1) Power Pools:

3) Common:
Price-quantity pair of step of priced energy
offer of import agent in interconnection in
dispatch period , in /MWh and MWh.
Price-quantity pair of step of priced load
bid of export agent in interconnection in
dispatch period , in /MWh and MWh.
Available transmission capacity (ATC) on
the interconnection from bidding area to
bidding area in trading period , in MW.
Power transfer distribution factor on
interconnection (or inter-zonal corridor) for
an energy transfer from area to area in
trading period , in p.u.
Constant equal to 1 if the from (to) bus
of DC link belongs to bidding area ; 0
otherwise.

C. Variables
1) Power Pools:

Energy offer cost function of generation unit

dispatch period , in .
Utility function (as bid) of demand entity
dispatch period , in .

in

2) Power Exchanges:
Energy offer cost function of participant in trading
period , in .
Energy load utility function of participant in trading
period , in .
Cost function for complex order of participant ,
in , where
.
Utility function for complex order of participant
, in , where
.
Cost function for hourly complex order
of
participant , in , where
.
Utility function for hourly complex order
of participant in trading period , in , where
.
Function denoting cleared quantity of complex order
of participant in trading period (
for hours
outside the interval
, and when the complex
order
is not cleared)

Cleared quantity of step of the generating unit

priced energy offer in dispatch period , in MWh.
Cleared quantity of step of demand entity
load bid in dispatch period , in MWh.

priced

Commitment status of unit during dispatch period .

in

where
, with
the unit step function. Note that
is a linear
function of variable
since the product
is a time varying parameter.

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 29, NO. 1, JANUARY 2014

3) Common:
Energy offer cost function from import agent in
dispatch period , in .
Utility function of export agent in dispatch period
, in .
I. INTRODUCTION

HE route towards an efficient cross-border congestion

management in Europe leads to the creation of a truly
competitive Internal Electricity Market (IEM), which requires
the full integration of the participating national and regional
markets. The evolution of this integration route has led to an
initiative taken by most PXs in Europe, called Price Coupling
of regions (PCR) [1]. This initiative was focused on the
delivery of a common European price coupling solution (with
associated algorithms, systems, procedures and inter-PX co-operation arrangements). The basic principles are 1) one single
algorithm, 2) decentralized operation, and 3) decentralized
governance. Recently, the European regulators (ACER) have
issued the draft Framework Guidelines on capacity allocation
and congestion management (Framework Guidelines) [2],
prescribing the so-called target model for market integration.
ENTSO-E should formulate a legally binding European Network Code for day-ahead markets within 2012, in compliance
with the principles set out in the Framework Guidelines. Under
the proposed timetable for the development of market coupling,
the day-ahead coupling arrangements should be completed
by January 2015. The overall European market will be even
greater than the joint and common market of Midwest ISO and
PJM [3]. This indicates how ambitious the target of a single
electricity market in Europe really is.
Most transactions in Europe are settled on over-the-counter
(OTC) markets, which usually co-exist with voluntary power
exchanges (unbundled systems) with a purely economic
clearing of the submitted offers and bids. The Greek wholesale electricity market design follows the integrated system
approach [4], since it is based around the operation of a
mandatory pool solving a unit commitment problem with
co-optimization of energy and reserves. The day-ahead optimization problem takes into account system constraints
(inter-zonal flows and reserve requirements), as well as all
unit technical constraints (technical minimum constraint, minimum up/down times, the unit reserve capabilities, start-up and
shut-down sequence constraints, etc.). Ireland also operates
a mandatory pool in the day-ahead market, whereas Poland
operates a pool-based market running a bid-based security
constrained unit commitment [5]. This diversity in the market
design is a great challenge for power pools, to find a way of
coupling with the other European markets, without altering
the basic features of their market scheme, considering that the
central-European countries lobbying is far more powerful and
strongly influencing the design of the Framework Guidelines
and market coupling initiatives.
The importance of developing regional electricity markets
in Europe has been highlighted in the literature, and many researchers have studied market coupling solutions [6][19] that

are applied mainly to the Central-Western European region. In

[6], the Centralized Market Coupling method is applied to a
network consisting of several areas, through an iterative procedure. The results are compared with the ones achieved by a
single pool, simulated by means of a market splitting method. A
linear optimization problem through the usage of power transfer
distribution factors (PTDFs) is used in [7] for the presentation of
a combined network and market model. PTDFs are also utilized
in [8], where the authors focus on the allocation of cross border
transmission capacity based upon the coordinated auctioning
method proposed by the European TSOs (currently ENTSO-E).
In [9], the possibility of using the Trilateral Market Coupling
algorithm in a five-market system is investigated, whereas the
need for price coordination between power exchanges, so that
prices can correctly give locational signals for network development, generation and consumption is thoroughly discussed in
[10]. In [11] a single period market coupling simulator is presented. The electricity markets of eight (8) European countries
are simulated through this project, while the market coupling
algorithm is implemented in commercial software based on the
principles of locational marginal pricing.
Moreover, several publications have depicted market coupling procedures in specific countries. For example, in [12] a
market simulator was developed in order to evaluate the Iberian
Electricity Market prices and the interconnection capacity between Portugal and Spain. Papers [13], [14], and [15] deal with
the interconnection between Germany and West/East Denmark,
and an analysis of the auction prices at the cross-border auction
between these two countries is presented. Finally, relevant
issues to the integration of the Italian with other European
electricity markets are thoroughly presented in [16], while the
authors urge for further empirical studies in order to quantify
the expected costs and benefits of any integration and estimate
the advantages and disadvantages of any necessary changes
in market design. Finally, in [17][19] the concept of countertrading operations under a market coupling regime is discussed.
The authors utilize a generalized Nash equilibrium in order
to highlight the inefficiencies that arise in market coupling
from the uncoordinated organization of the counter-trading
operations.
In this paper a centralized market splitting algorithm is implemented, respecting the standard market regulatory framework
imposed in power pools and power exchanges. The market
splitting approach is implemented in a Europe-wide level,
comprising three power pools (indicatively chosen as Greece,
Ireland and Poland) and 22 power exchanges (indicatively
chosen as Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, Germany,
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Iberian PX with Spain and
Portugal, U.K., Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Slovakia,
Croatia, Slovenia, Italy and Nordpool with Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Finland) comprising thirty nine bidding areas
(since Italy, Norway, Denmark and Sweden have 6, 5, 2 and
4 bidding areas, respectively). The standard market regulatory
framework imposed in power exchanges and power pools is
respected in each local/national market, including 1) block
offers/bids, linked block offers/bids, flexible hourly offers/bids
and convertible block offers in power exchanges and 2) unit

BISKAS et al.: EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET INTEGRATION WITH MIXED MARKET DESIGNSPART I: FORMULATION

technical/commitment constraints and system operating constraints in power pools. The performance and computational
requirements of this implementation are presented in the
companion paper; the model is tested in terms of problem solvability to its limits, considering a day-ahead market clearing
time threshold equal to one hour.
The innovative features of this paper as compared to the current literature are the following:
1) A central market splitting approach is implemented, respecting the standard market regulatory framework of
power exchanges and power pools. To the best of the
authors knowledge, there is no current literature referring
to market coupling/splitting between markets with significant diversity in their design and in such an extent.
2) The full PX problem (with all complex orders) is presented analytically as a MILP model, including the formulation of complex orders with the respective binary
variables.
In the companion paper benchmarking is performed to quantify the extent to which the market splitting approach could be
possibly applied to the pan-European electricity market.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
A. Power PoolUnit Commitment Problem
In a power pool, a range of market design rules exist
throughout the world (especially in the U.S.) for the day-ahead
market, the most complicated involving a co-optimization of
energy and reserves within a unit commitment model, with full
representation of the unit start-up (hot, warm and cold) and
shut-down processes, along with the system operating constraints [20], [21]. In such a configuration, each unit submits a
complex bid, comprising an energy offer, a reserve offer and a
declaration with its techno-economic data, including its start-up
and shut-down time-periods and costs.
The day-ahead market clearing problem of a power pool
for bidding area is modeled as a mathematical optimization
problem as follows:

(1)
subject to the following constraints:

(2)

(3)
where
(4)

461

The first term of objective (1) represents the as-bid cost functions of the generating units comprising the energy cost defined
by the product of the corresponding cleared quantity-price pairs
plus additional cost terms for the start-up/shut-down sequences
and for the procurement of ancillary services [20], [21]. The
last three terms of (1) are the as-bid costs of import agents,
and the as-bid utility functions of load and export agents, all
defined by the product of the corresponding cleared quantityprice pairs. Constraint (2) expresses the power balance equation, and constraints (3) express the available transmission capacity (ATC) constraints on the interconnections (considering
netting). Equation (4) defines the net injection (also called
net position) of bidding area .
It should be noted that the import and export offers included
in (1)(3) correspond to the use of daily Physical Transmission
Rights (PTRs) acquired through explicit daily auctions by the
traders (import/export agents). Explicit daily auctions are currently applied in most interconnections throughout Europe, but
they shall be substituted by implicit auctioning of PTRs within
the market coupling/splitting when the Target Model will be
applied. This is the reason that import/export offers appear in
the power pool (here) and power exchange formulations (in
Section II-B), but they do not appear in the single European
model presented below in Section II-C.
Apart from the above constraints, there exist the upper/lower
bound constraints of the problem continuous variables, the
system reserve requirement constraints for all types of reserve
(primary, secondary and tertiary), and unit technical and operational constraints (simple and inter-temporal constraints, which
model the various operating phases, the minimum up/down
constraints, initial conditions, etc.). All these constraints are
well-known and have been analytically described in [20] and
[21]; thus, they are not repeated here. The intra-area transmission constraints are ignored in this study. The problem is
formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
model as in [20] and [21].
B. Power Exchange Problem
In PXs there are two ways of submitting energy offers and
bids: 1) either on unit basis (e.g., in Italy), or 2) as portfolio
bidding (e.g., in France). The latter implies that each participant
(producer, demand entity, trader) submits one hourly portfolio
offer/bid curve, internalizing all technical and cost elements of
his production facilities or demand forward contracts or trading
contracts. The PX day-ahead market is cleared based upon all
submitted portfolio offer/bid curves.
In addition to hourly single or portfolio offers/bids, most
PXs in Europe allow market participants to submit complex
bid schedules (called block offers/bids or block orders)
that introduce inter-temporal constraints and mimic some of
the unit technical constraints and multi-period cost structures.
The following types of block orders are tradable in the Central
Western European (CWE) region [22] and in Nord Pool Spot
(NPS) day-ahead market [23]:
1) User-defined block offers/bids: A user-defined block
offer/bid consists of a fixed price limit (for selling or
purchasing energy, respectively) and a volume for a

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user-defined number of consecutive hours. The market

participants are allowed to define their preferred block
periods (start, end). Block offers/bids are fill-or-kill orders, namely they are accepted or rejected in their entirety,
depending on a) either the average hourly market clearing
price (MCP) within the actual block period (in the NPS),
b) or the weighted (with the corresponding cleared quantities) average MCP within the actual block period. Block
offers are extremely helpful to portfolio managers with
production assets, who should commit their units under
certain economic (profit) circumstances. These orders are
tradable in both CWE and NPS.
2) Fixed block offers/bids: They are similar to the user-defined block offers/bids mentioned above, except that the
block periods (start, end) are pre-defined (by the PX) and
fixed. These orders are tradable in NPS. It should be noted
that even though the user-defined and fixed blocks are different in the way participants submit their block offers and
bids, they have no effect in the way that the Market Operator inserts the data in the optimization algorithm. In both
cases, the Market Operator inserts a block offer/bid with
specific starting and ending time, without taking into consideration whether these data (starting, ending period) were
defined by the participant or by the Market Operator. As
a result, these two methods lead to the same type of constraint in the overall optimization problem.
3) Linked block offers/bids: The clearing of these orders is
conditional and related to the clearing of their associated
block order (called parent block). There are two ways to
associate linked block orders with their parents: a) with
a tower-like parental relationship, each parent having up
to one linked block, as shown in Fig. 1, or b) with many
parallel parental relationships in each prioritization level,
as shown in Fig. 2. These orders are tradable in NPS, where
up to five block bids can be linked in a tower-like configuration, and up to two linked blocks per parent are
allowed at the same prioritization level [24]. These orders
are tradable in NPS.
4) Flexible hourly offers/bids: They are fill-or-kill orders
that are accepted only on one trading period (typically
hour) of the day; i.e., the flexible hourly offers are cleared
at the hour with the highest MCP. These orders are tradable in NPS.
5) Convertible block offers: They are similar to block offers,
except that they are eligible for conversion to hourly offers
when a) not cleared as a block at the problem solution,
and b) the maximum clearing price has been reached in
at least one hour in the specified block period [23]. The
market participant indicates for each block offer whether
it is convertible, and in that case states the hourly price in
the event of conversion. These orders are tradable in NPS.
The fixed block offers/bids are similar in terms of simulation
with the user-defined block offers; thus, only the latter are included in the problem formulation presented here.
The presence of block orders complicates the clearing of electricity auctions. In addition to constrained continuous variables
for hourly orders, a market clearing problem with blocks requires the inclusion of binary variables, in order to model all-or-

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 29, NO. 1, JANUARY 2014

Fig. 1. Tower-like parental relationships.

Fig. 2. Parallel parental relationships in each prioritization level.

nothing constraints on block orders. This leads to the formulation of mixed-integer optimization problems.
The PX problem can be modeled as a mathematical optimization problem as follows:

(5)
subject to the following constraints:
(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

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(11)

(12)

(13)
(14)
(15)
where:
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)

(20)
(21)
(22)

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The objective function of the optimization problem (5) comprises the total offer cost minus the total load utility. The presented formulation is valid for both cases of offer format:
1) in unit basis (as in Italy), in which case denotes each unit
of each market participant, and
2) with portfolio-based offers, in which case denotes each
market participant.
Equation (6) and constraint (7) are identical to (2) and constraints (3) of a power pool, respectively. Constraints (8)(9) express the bid limits of the simple hourly offers/bids. Constraints
(10)(11) express the relationship between the linked block orders and their parent orders, (12)(13) are utilized only for
the modeling of the tower-like relationship between the linked
block orders (Fig. 1), whereas constraints (14)(15) present the
clearing conditions for flexible hourly offers/bids.
Equations (16)(19) express the energy cost/utility functions
of simple offers/bids for generation, demand, imports and exports, respectively, which are included in the objective function and are defined by the product of the corresponding cleared
quantity-price pairs. Equations (20)(27) present the computation of the cost and utility functions of the block offers/bids,
which are included in the problem objective function; in these
equations the cleared quantity (q) is substituted by the offered
quantity Q, since they represent all-or-nothing offers/bids. Finally, (28) is similar to (4) for power pools, denoting the net injection of bidding area cleared through a PX.
It should be noted that the above formulation of the PX dayahead market clearing with the binary variables representation for
complex orders is novel; according to the authors best knowledge, it has not been presented in the current literature, neither
in the commercial packages clearing PXs in Europe [24][27].
C. Single Europe-Wide Market-Splitting Problem

(23)

(24)

(25)
(26)

(27)

(28)

Under market splitting, there is a single pricing algorithm that

jointly determines market prices, generation volumes and interconnector flows (for the capacity given to day-ahead market) for
each coupled market.
A Central Coupling Office or Super MO should be
responsible for solving the centralized, Europe-wide market
splitting problem. The formulated problem is a combination of
the two problems, comprising the full set of constraints of a
power pool and a PX, with the differences and additions noted
in (29)(31) at the top of the next page.
Equation (29) is the objective function of the single Europewide market-splitting problem. The objective function is the
combination of objective functions (1) and (5), excluding the
cost functions of import agents and the utility functions of export agents, as already discussed in Section II-A. It should be
noted that (30) is valid only for AC interconnections, since the
power flow of DC lines can be directly controlled by the respective System Operators. Whenever two power systems are
interconnected through DC lines only, they operate asynchronously, each defining a separate synchronous area. The pan-European power system is divided by the existing DC links in five
synchronous areas, namely, continental Europe, Nordpool, England, Ireland and the island of Sardinia (in Italy). A reference
(slack) area
must be defined by the Super MO for each
synchronous area sa, for the computation of the PTDFs used in

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(29)

(30)
(31)

(30) in each synchronous area. The PTDFs are computed using

the admittances of the AC interconnections and inter-zonal corridors [28]. In our implementation a single admittance matrix is
used for the entire European system; the reference bus of each
synchronous area is grounded by adding a large admittance to
the diagonal entry of the pan-European admittance matrix corresponding to this bus. In reality, each synchronous area will
independently solve its own power flow.
The power balance equation (2) is valid for power pools,
whereas the respective (6) is valid for PXs. It should be noted
that a power balance equation is formulated for each synchronous area, as follows:

(32)
Equation (31) replaces (3) and (7) of the respective power
pool and power exchange subproblems, whereas (32) replaces
the respective power balance equation (2) and (6).
It should be noted that the flows of the DC lines are independent decision variables, modeled as equal and opposite injections at the DC line from and to buses, and are thus calculated from the solution of the optimization problem.
Since there is one power balance equation per synchronous
area, the MCP on bidding area in trading period
, is computed as follows [28], [29]:

(33)
where
is the Lagrange multiplier of the power balance
equation of the synchronous area where area belongs (32) in
trading period , which denotes the MCP of the reference area,
and
are the Lagrange multipliers associated with a sub-set
of the interconnection flow constraints (31), corresponding only
to the AC lines.

The calculation of dual (or shadow) prices in MILP is an area

of great interest and research focus, since their economic interpretation is not always clear and remains problematic, compared
to well-defined prices obtained from LP problems. The reason
is the presence of indivisibilities and non-convexities, such as
start-up/shut-down procedures and cost, or minimum up/down
time constraints. Recent studies toward the calculation of average shadow prices for integer resource availability, explicit
pricing of integral activities and definition of unique shadow
prices have been presented in [30], [31], and [32], respectively.
Dual prices presented in our results refer to the power balance
equation per synchronous area (32). These prices are directly
obtained from the GAMS/CPLEX solution, where they are calculated after the solution of the MILP, by fixing all integer variables to their optimal values and re-solving the LP version of
the problem. Thus, they should be interpreted as referring to the
continuous decisions, as determined by the final LP solution,
given the state of first-stage integer decisions.
It should be noted that this formulation is perfectly compatible with the flow-based market coupling concept proposed by
ETSO and EuroPEX at the 11th meeting of the Florence Forum
in September 2004 [33].
III. CONCLUSION
In the first part of this two-paper series, a centralized marketsplitting approach has been implemented, for the clearing of the
European wide electricity market. The proposed approach respects the standard regulatory framework of power exchanges
and power pools, including 1) block offers/bids, linked block
offers/bids, flexible hourly offers/bids and convertible block offers in power exchanges and 2) unit technical/commitment constraints and system operating constraints in power pools. In the
second part, the solution algorithm of this market-splitting approach is presented, while the accompanying case studies verify
the applicability of the proposed model for the solution of the
pan-European day-ahead electricity market clearing problem.

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Pandelis N. Biskas (S01M04) was born in Serres,

Greece, in March 1977. He received the Dipl.Eng.
and Ph.D. degrees from the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, in 1999 and
2003, respectively.
From March 2005 until July 2009, he was a power
system specialist at the Hellenic TSO, Market Operation Department. Currently, he is a Lecturer at the
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. His
research interests are in power system operation and control, electricity market
operational and regulatory issues, and transmission pricing.

Dimitris I. Chatzigiannis (S09) received the Dipl.

Eng. degree from the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, in 2009, where he is
currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree.
His research interests are in power system operation and planning, electricity market coupling,
and optimization theory and applications in power
systems.

Anastasios G. Bakirtzis (S77M79SM95) received the Dipl.Eng. degree from the Department of
Electrical Engineering, National Technical University, Athens, Greece, in 1979 and the M.S.E.E. and
Ph.D. degrees from Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, GA, USA, in 1981 and 1984, respectively.
Since 1986, he has been with the Electrical Engineering Department, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, where he is currently a
Professor. His research interests are in power system
operation, planning, and economics.