Professional Documents
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jwe.2015.22
Abstrak
Kami menyediakan mini-sejarah segmen kerajinan bir dari industri pembuatan bir AS dengan tertentupenekanan ular pada produser-pengusaha tetapi juga pelopor lain yang terlibat dalam promosi dan
pemasaran kerajinan bir yang membuat kontribusi untuk pembuatan bir itu. Berbeda dengan lebih
komoditas seperti bir yang diproduksi oleh macrobrewers di Amerika Serikat, output dari segmen
kerajinan lebih mirip dengan diferensiasi produk dan fragmentasi dalam industri anggur. Kami
mengembangkan database yang melacak munculnya kerajinan bir menggunakan berbagai ukuran
statistik dari output, jumlah produsen, konsentrasi dalam segmen tersebut, dan membandingkan output
dengan yang dari segmen makro dan impor industri. Mengintegrasikan database kami ke dalam
perangkat lunak Sistem Informasi Geografis memungkinkan kita untuk memetakan penyebaran kerajinan
segmen bir dari akar tunggang di San Francisco di seluruh Amerika Serikat. Akhirnya, kami
menggunakan analisis regresi untuk mengeksplorasi variabel yang mempengaruhi pendatang dan
kerajinan bir produksi di tingkat negara dari tahun 1980 sampai 2012. Kami menggunakan estimasi Tobit
untuk tion produksi dan estimasi binomial negatif untuk jumlah bir. Kami juga menganalisis apakah efek
strategis (misalnya, lokasi dekat bersaing produsen bir) menjelaskan pilihan lokasi produsen kerajinan bir.
(JEL Klasifikasi: L26, L66, N82,
R12).Kata kunci: Kerajinan bir segmen, Fritz Maytag, rumah pembuatan bir, microbrewery, HHI,
pilihan lokasional
I.
Pendahuluankalimat pembuka yang paling terkenal di seluruh sastra adalah:
"Pada awal, Allah ..." Dalam menulis tentang kerajinan bir, garis pembukaan pas
akan: "Pada awalnya, Fritz
* Penulis terima Alexander McGlothlin dan Christopher Brainerd untuk bantuan penelitian, John dan
Karen Gabriel untuk membantu dengan pemetaan, Anand Swaminathan untuk menyediakan data
brewpub, dan Orley Ashenfelter untuk dorongan untuk mengambil studi ini. Mereka juga menghargai
komentar membantu dari James Adams, Anita McGahan, Todd Pugatch, FM Scherer, dan peserta
American Association of Wine ekonom 2014 konferensi. Bantuan keuangan dari Marshall Jevons Fund
sangat kami hargai. aDepartment Ekonomi, Universitas Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; e-mail:
kenelzinga@yahoo.com. bDepartment Ekonomi, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon; e-mail:
ctremblay@oregonstate.edu. cDepartment Ekonomi, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon; e-mail:.
Maytag ... "Maytag tidak, ex nihilo, membuat minuman malt baru. Bahkan,
perusahaan pembuatan bir Maytag, jangkar uap Beer Company, telah ada sejak
tahun 1896, jauh sebelum ia mengambil kepemilikan perusahaan di tahun 1965.
inovasi Maytag adalah di menyusun kembali sebuah perusahaan memudar dan
produk sekarat. Dalam perjalanan melakukannya, ia dipersonifikasikan "awal"
dari segmen kerajinan bir dari minuman malt industri-industri rokok. Meskipun
upaya perintis Maytag berlangsung di Amerika Serikat, pengaruhnya di pasar
untuk bir telah global. Maytag dan lain-lain yang mengikuti menggerogoti
hipotesis bahwa industri bir AS ditakdirkan untuk memiliki struktur pasar yang
sangat terkonsentrasi, output homogen (misalnya, lager beer), dan akan insuterisolasi dari prospek pendatang baru ke pasar.
Makalah ini dapat disamakan dengan bangku berkaki tiga. Masing-masing dari
tiga kaki dapat dibaca secara terpisah dari dua lainnya, tetapi bersama-sama
mereka memiliki kesatuan sisting con- ekonomi sejarah, statistik, dan geografi.
Leg pertama merupakan mini-sejarah segmen kerajinan bir di Amerika Serikatdari asal-usulnya ke folio pelabuhan yang sekarang ribu penjual. Leg kedua
adalah analisis statistik dari kerajinan bir di Amerika Serikat dan melacak
pertumbuhan dari tahun 1979 ke 2012. leg ketiga adalah latihan dalam geografi
ekonomi dan menggambarkan penyebaran kerajinan bir dari akar tunggang di
San Francisco untuk cabang di tempat lain.
istilah "kerajinan bir" (atau "kerajinan bir segmen") adalah ekspresi
portmanteau yang manfaat membongkar. Dalam sejarah kerajinan bir, Tom
Acitelli mendefinisikan kerajinan pembuatan bir dengan cara ini:
Jenis pembuatan bir termasuk setiap kecil, tempat pembuatan bir yang dimiliki secara
independen yang menganut tra- praktek pembuatan bir ditional dan bahan-bahan. Bir kerajinan
yang berbeda dari bir regional dan nasional yang lebih besar, yang sering menggunakan bahanbahan non-tradisional dan minuman pada skala jauh lebih luas. (. 2013, p xv)
seluruhnya terbuat atau sebagian besar dari malt, dan tidak diencerkan dengan tambahan
berarti seperti jagung atau beras. (Brewers Association, p. 3) 1
1Even kerajinan bir menemukan mendefinisikan segmen bermasalah. Pada tahun 2014, kelompok
perdagangan bir kerajinan ', Asosiasi Brewers, berubah definisi untuk menyertakan penggunaan terbatas
tambahan berarti seperti jagung atau beras dalam proses pembuatan bir. Definisi memungkinkan
perusahaan-perusahaan baru seperti Yuengling dan Straub mendefinisikan diri mereka sebagai bir
kerajinan (Brewers Association, 2014)FA:.
Untuk banyak konsumen, kerajinan bir dikaitkan dengan skala kecil dari cility
pembuatan bir Microbreweries dan brewpubs.2 Rumah pembuatan bir adalah
contoh ekstrim dari produksi skala kecil dan integrasi vertikal. Dalam taksonomi
kerajinan bir duction pro, ada juga adalah nanobrewery, yang, tidak seperti bir
rumah, brews bir untuk dijual kembali, tetapi pada skala yang sangat kecil
(kapasitas tiga barel atau kurang; Woodske 2012, p 3.).
kode pajak federal mendefinisikan kerajinan bir dengan ukuran unit produksi.
Sebelum tahun 1978, cukai federal pada bir adalah $ 9,00 / barel. Pada tahun
1978, Kongres mengurangi pungutan pada bir kecil untuk $ 7,00 / barrel untuk
pertama 60.000 barel yang diproduksi oleh Eries brew- dengan kurang dari 2 juta
barel di total penjualan tahunan. Ini adalah rejeki nomplok bagi bir kerajinan. .
Pada saat itu, tidak ada yang bisa membayangkan output yang suatu hari nanti
kerajinan bir pernah akan pendekatan (apalagi melebihi) topi 2 juta barel
Cara lain untuk mendefinisikan kerajinan bir untuk membandingkan kerajinan
bir untuk apa yang bukan: "Big Beer "(atau" MillCoorWeiser "), bir diproduksi oleh
Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI) dan MillerCoors, dua produsen utama minuman
malt di Amerika Serikat. ABI adalah kombinasi dari perusahaan pembuatan bir
Belgia InBev dan Anheuser-Busch, yang diakuisisi pada 2008. MillerCoors
adalah perusahaan patungan antara Coors dan Miller, yang berlangsung pada
tahun 2007. flagship brand ABI di Amerika Serikat adalah Budweiser (dan produk
dan paket yang ditawarkan di bawah nama merek). MillerCoors memiliki dua
merek utama: Miller dan Coors (dan produk dan usia paket-ditawarkan di bawah
nama mereka) 0,3
ABI dan MillerCoors gabungan memiliki pangsa pasar (SOM) dari penjualan
bir di Amerika Serikat dari 73% di 2.013,4 By Sebaliknya, segmen kerajinan bir
memiliki kurang dari 10% dari pasar bir domestik (lihat Tabel 1). ABI dan
MillerCoors dapat dianggap sebagai memproduksi sungai bir. Menurut metafora
ini, segmen kerajinan bir menghasilkan aliran kecil. Tapi itu "aliran kecil" perlu
dimasukkan ke dalam perspektif, karena kerajinan bir Penjualan growing.5 bir
dengan Budweiser, Miller dan Coors merek telah datar atau menurun dalam
beberapa tahun terakhir. Untuk menggambarkan: 2003-2013, ABI ini SOM
menurun dari 49,6% menjadi 45,6% dari pengiriman industri; bahwa dari
MillerCoors
2Microbreweries menjual output mereka ke vendor hilir (yaitu, distributor atau pengecer); brewpubs yang
ver- tically terintegrasi dan menjual langsung kepada konsumen pada titik produksi (yaitu, restoran atau
bar). 3Sebab analisis ekonomi yang fokus pada Big Beer, lihat Elzinga (2009), Tremblay dan Tremblay
(2005, 2007). Untuk studi Anheuser-Busch dan Coors, lihat Baum (2000) dan MacIntosh (2011). Untuk
beasiswa ekonomi baru pada industri bir di seluruh dunia, melihat Poelmans dan Swinnen (2011), Protz
(2009), dan Swinnen (2011). 4Unless dikutip sebaliknya, semua angka yang diambil baik dari database
dikembangkan untuk penelitian ini atau dari 2014 Beer Industri Update, diterbitkan oleh Wawasan Beer
Marketer. 5ABI dan MillerCoors telah mengambil catatan. Dengan produksi dari apa yang beberapa
panggilan "merek hantu," kedua pemimpin industri telah menghasilkan merek baru yang dipasarkan dan
harga sebagai kerajinan bir. Anheuser-Busch mulai ini pada tahun 1994 dengan nya Elk Mountain Ale dan
kemudian mereknya Red Wolf. Miller didirikan anak perusahaan Plank Road Brewery untuk fokus pada
produk kerajinan bir. Hantu merek yang paling sukses dikembangkan oleh Coors: Blue Moon. Satu
pencarian label Blue Moon sia-sia untuk setiap referensi untuk asalnya ini merek sebagai Big Beer.
menyebutkan. Selain itu, dua ahli kimia memainkan peran penting dalam
pengembangan kerajinan bir.
Maytag telah menjadi konsumen dari Anchor Steam Beer ketika ia mendengar
perusahaan akan pergi gelap. Penutupan akan berarti kematian pembuatan bir
terakhir di Amerika Serikat memproduksi apa yang sekarang akan disebut
kerajinan bir. Maytag membeli aset jangkar Brewing Company pada tahun 1965.
Menurut Acitelli (2013), perusahaan memiliki satu karyawan pada saat (p. 4),
ketika Maytag mulai belajar seni dan ilmu pembuatan bir untuk membangkitkan
perusahaan dan melakukan tugas mar- marketing merek ke rekening on-premise
di San Francisco Bay Area.6
Sementara bir kerajinan lainnya yang mengikuti Maytag membuat kontribusi
penting untuk pengembangan segmen, Maytag layak encomia selama lebih dari
menjadi yang pertama untuk membangun kerajinan bir brewery.7 Selain
menghidupkan kembali bir uap, Maytag diseduh pertama Amerika India Pale Ale
(IPA), "membawa kembali porter tradisional, menghidupkan kembali kebiasaan
liburan bir dibumbui, menciptakan pertama Amerika barley wine, dan diseduh
pertama Amerika bir gandum sejak Larangan "(Fritz Busur Out, 2010). Maytag
juga diakui di awal bahwa operasi kecil tak pernah bisa menyamai efisiensi
biaya, fasilitas pembuatan bir skala besar modern. Untuk menutupi tinggi
produksi per unit dan biaya kemasan, ia tahu bahwa bir harus menjual dengan
harga eceran yang cocok dengan merek impor yang mahal. Tugas adalah untuk
membuat bir yang akan bernilai lilin. Dalam proses ini, Maytag menginspirasi
orang lain untuk berbaris di belakangnya. Delapan penting "orang lain" yang
dikutip di bawah di kelompok tiga, tiga, dan dua.
A. Awal Brewers
Jika Jack McAuliffe belum seperti seorang tukang las yang sangat baik, kerajinan
segmen bir mungkin berbeda hari ini. McAuliffe mengambil bir pembuatan
keterampilan yang ia telah dikembangkan sebagai pembuat bir rumah dan
dikombinasikan dengan bakatnya untuk pengelasan, pelatihan sebagai seorang
insinyur, dan pengalamannya sebagai seorang tukang listrik untuk membentuk
New Albion Brewing Company pada tahun 1976, sedikit lebih dari satu dekade
setelah awal jangkar uap Beer. Merangsang transisi McAuliffe dari rumah
pembuatan bir produksi, DALAM resmi berskala kecil kunjungan ke operasi
Maytag.
Setelah menetap di Sonoma, California, McAuliffe adalah salah satu yang
pertama untuk mengakui permintaan untuk kerajinan bir sebagai minuman untuk
dipasangkan dengan makanan, yang merupakan bisnis
6Anchor Steam Beer teknis adalah bir, tapi resep membuat rasa yang berbeda dari lager. Acitelli de- ahli
Taurat itu sebagai memiliki "citrusy finish" dan "ale-seperti dimulut lebih berat" (2013, p. 5). 7Some
berpendapat bahwa jangkar Brewing bukan microbrewery pertama karena itu adalah pembuatan bir
direvitalisasi daripada pembentukan baru. Kami berpikir bahwa ini kontribusi terlalu undervalues Maytag.
Misalnya, pada tahun 1983 keberhasilan dari Anchor Brewing menyebabkan lebih dari 100 orang untuk
menghubungi Maytag untuk saran tentang membuka microbrewery baru. Untuk diskusi lebih lanjut, lihat
Elzinga (2011) dan Tremblay dan Tremblay (2005, pp. 114-115).
Company ini hampir 2,3 juta barel pada 2013 dengan mudah melebihi tutup
untuk pembebasan pajak dirancang untuk membantu segmen kerajinan bir,
memungkinkan Koch untuk bergabung dengan Billionaires Index Bloomberg
melenguh tahun follow.
8The Boston Beer Company tidak sendirian dalam segmen kerajinan menggunakan bir kontrak. Schlafly
cerdik pasar itu sendiri sebagai "Brewery milik Amerika terbesar di Missouri" -following acqui- sition
Anheuser-Busch InBev oleh. Tapi sementara Schlafly dalam botol diproduksi di Saint Louis, Schlafly
dalam kaleng diseduh dan dikemas di bawah kontrak dengan Stevens Point Brewing Company di
Wisconsin.
B. Awal Promotor
Jika Fritz Maytag adalah Yohanes Pembaptis kerajinan bir-suara menangis di
wilderness- tiga orang membawa pesan dari kerajinan bir untuk audiens yang
lebih luas. Mereka melakukannya tidak dengan memulai pabrik kerajinan, seperti
yang telah dilakukan oleh Maytag, McAuliffe, Grossman, dan Koch. Sebaliknya
mereka mendorong permintaan untuk kerajinan bir. Tiga yang pantas disebutkan
adalah Fred Eckhardt, Charles Papazian, dan Michael Jackson.
Stimulasi permintaan untuk kerajinan pembuatan bir dicapai melalui
menyebarkan informasi dari informasi tentang (1) pembuatan bir rumah, yang
disapih banyak konsumen bir jauh dari produk lager dari Big Beer; (2) kerajinan
bir produksi; dan (3) bir sebagai konsumsi yang baik serius untuk dipasangkan
dengan makanan, bukan sebagai cairan yang memuaskan dahaga di hari yang
panas atau ditawarkan buzz murah.
Rumah pembuatan bir tetap seperti pengenalan penting untuk pembelian comkerajinan secara komersial diproduksi bir bahwa Asosiasi Brewers (asosiasi
perdagangan untuk bir kerajinan) mempromosikan American Association
Homebrewers. Satu hampir tidak bisa membayangkan Nike mempromosikan
seni dan kerajinan membuat sepatu olahraga di rumah.
Setelah kunjungan ke brewery Maytag, Fred Eckhardt mulai menyeduh bir
kerajinan di rumah yang dirancang untuk meniru kualitas jangkar uap. Selain
rumah pembuatan bir untuk konsumsi sendiri, Eckhardt diajarkan rumah
pembuatan bir kepada orang lain dan keluar dari ini datang bukunya, A Treatise
on Lager Beers, yang diterbitkan pada tahun 1970 (yang dipengaruhi Ken
Grossman). Ribuan eksemplar buku ini terjual; yang cakupannya penyebaran
praktek rumah pembuatan bir menyebabkan pada gilirannya untuk pembalikan
hukum negara banyak (jarang ditegakkan) yang melarang rumah pembuatan bir.
Kami tidak mengetahui adanya industri AS dimana produksi rumah
menyebabkan lebih komersial start-up dari terjadi di kerajinan bir. Mereka yang
terlibat dalam rumah pembuatan bir berubah preferensi bir mereka; mereka
menjadi lebih mungkin untuk memilih merek bir kerajinan ketika mengkonsumsi
pada premis. Rumah pembuatan bir berkenalan banyak konsumen dengan rasa
dan organolep- kualitas tic berbagai jenis bir. Hal ini juga menyebabkan pionir
seperti Jim McAuliffe dan Ken Grossman untuk memulai usaha komersial
mereka sendiri.
Seperti Eckhardt, Charles Papazian tidak penghasil kerajinan bir, melainkan,
Masalah pertama Zymurgy diterbitkan pada tahun 1978, tahun yang sama di
mana Kongres psikotropika dilegalkan proses peragian bir di rumah. Sebelum
tahun 1978, rumah bir dan moters pro- rumah pembuatan bir tidak punya alasan
untuk takut penggerebekan di rumah mereka dengan pihak yang berwenang
federal. Tapi matinya undang-undang ini yang tersisa dari Larangan itu sinyal
sosial yang rumah produksi dan konsumsi bir tidak noda ilegalitas.
Organisasi Papazian ini dari Great American Beer Festival, pertama kali
diadakan pada tahun 1982 di Boulder, itu pertanda kerajinan bir promosi. Orangorang datang untuk mencicipi bir dan dibayar untuk melakukannya. Festival bir
adalah pembuka mata bagi pejabat kota karena kegiatan sosial yang berpusat
pada kerajinan bir tidak berubah menjadi perkelahian mabuk atau acara-acara
untuk kerusakan properti nicipal mukosa. Ini konsisten dengan apa yang
Papazian diamati ketika dia adalah seorang University of Virginia mahasiswa
bereksperimen dengan bir yg dibuat sendiri: siswa yang minum bir kerajinan
"mendapat bahagia, tidak bodoh" (Acitelli, 2013, p 56.)Amerika-nya.
The Great Beer Festival dan keturunan tidak seperti istirahat kuliah musim
semi di kota tepi pantai. Festival bir membawa orang-orang dari luar kota dengan
pendapatan tionary discre- untuk dihabiskan tidak hanya pada kerajinan bir tetapi
juga restoran dan penginapan. Hari ini, ada kota akan menolak aplikasi untuk
festival bir. Memang, industri kecil telah bermunculan untuk mengatur dan
mempromosikan festival ini.
Penulis Michael Jackson menjadi bir apa Robert Parker Jr adalah anggur.
Buku Jackson, The World Panduan untuk Beer (1988), adalah orang pertama
yang mencapai dience au- luas tentang selera berbeda bir. Mengomentari
penjualan fenomenal buku Jackson, Acitelli menggambarkan Jackson cara ini:
"Beer di abad kedua puluh telah piper nya" (2013, p 47.). Meskipun buku
Jackson bukanlah tentang industri kerajinan bir yang baru lahir masih-di Amerika
Serikat (buku ini diterbitkan pada waktu yang sama yang McAuliffe mulai New
Albion Brewing Company), Jackson memang memberi menyebutkan
menguntungkan ke Anchor perusahaan Steam Beer Maytag. 10 tulisan Jackson
berkenalan jutaan pembaca dengan apa yang disebut "gaya bir" -beers dari Asia,
Eropa, dan Karibia dibahas dan dijelaskan. Pada saat itu pembaca Amerika
datang untuk memahami bir selain Big Beer, segmen kerajinan mulai untuk
meningkatkan dalam rangka memberikan bir ini. Jackson, yang reputasinya
sudah mendunia, kadang-kadang memberikan kontribusi untuk Zymurgy dan
C. The Brewmeister
Selain tiga bir dan tiga promotor baru saja dijelaskan, dua orang lainnya
memainkan peran penting dalam segmen kerajinan bir, meskipun mereka tidak
pengusaha dan tidak pernah dioperasikan kerajinan pembuatan bir. Salah
satunya adalah seorang profesor, Michael Lewis, dan yang lain adalah birkonsultan, Joseph Owades. Keduanya teknis terlatih dan ilmiah berpengalaman
dalam penerapan kimia untuk pembuatan bir. Kedua sangat mempengaruhi
dorongan terhadap kerajinan pembuatan bir di Amerika Serikat.
Pada tahun 1970, Lewis dipekerjakan sebagai profesor ilmu pembuatan bir di
University of California Davis (Acitelli, 2013, hlm. 21-22). Dia secara teknis
terlatih dalam ology microbi- dan biokimia. Lewis tahu pembuatan bir adalah
sebuah seni, tapi ia juga tahu itu sebuah ilmu. Waktu dan lokasi
pengangkatannya akademisnya adalah kebetulan. Lima tahun sebelumnya,
Maytag telah membeli jangkar uap Brewing, tidak jauh, di San Francisco. Lewis
ditawarkan McAuliffe saran teknis tentang cara untuk memulai operasi kerajinan
pembuatan bir. Kemudian, Lewis meninggalkan UC-Davis untuk mengajarkan
ilmu dan produksi kerajinan bir di situs di New Albion Brewery Company.
Joseph Owades adalah brewmeister yang bereputasi tinggi di kedua Big Beer
dan kerajinan bir. Terkait dengan Pusat Studi Brewing, Owades berpengaruh
dalam kimia yang menghasilkan cahaya (atau dikurangi kalori) bir. Miller Lite,
Bud Light, dan Coors Light menjadi merek kelas berat di MillCoorWeiser. Ini saja
akan menempatkan Owades di aula industri bir of fame. Tapi di sisi kerajinan
jalan, Owades juga memiliki peran penting. Pertama, dia adalah seorang
konsultan untuk Maytag. Kedua, ia dikreditkan dengan ide pembuatan bir virtual
untuk melayani sektor kerajinan (Acitelli, 2013, hlm. 94-95). Owades menasihati
Matthew Reich (di Old New York Brewing Company) untuk terlibat dalam
pembuatan bir kontrak dengan bir besar, daerah yang memiliki kelebihan
kapasitas. Bir akan diseduh sesuai dengan resep Reich / Owades. Tapi Reich
tidak harus datang dengan sumber daya ekonomi untuk membiayai peralatan
modal. Dengan model bisnis ini, kerajinan bir bisa menjual bir dengan biaya
marjinal.
Seperti disebutkan sebelumnya, model kontrak bisnis bir ternyata menjadi
tambang emas bagi Jim Koch dan Boston Beer Company, yang menjadi
kerajinan bir terbesar sebelum pernah memiliki sebuah peralatan modal. Owades
juga berpengaruh dalam de- menandatangani resep pembuatan bir untuk merek
Seperti terlihat pada Tabel 1, setelah usaha perintis dari Fritz Maytag pada
tahun 1965, tindak-on tingkat lambat. Pada 1983, Amerika Serikat hanya 14 bir
kerajinan, brewpubs ing hitung- dan bir kontrak (setengah dari mereka di
California). Pertumbuhan eksplosif dalam pendatang baru yang belum terjadi.
Seperti disebutkan dalam Bagian II, hanya segelintir orang yang "hadir pada saat
penciptaan." Tapi seperti kerajinan bir menjadi lebih mapan di paruh kedua abad
kedua puluh, mereka yang mengikuti sekarang angka dalam ribuan. Mereka
menambahkan tanda tangan rasa baru, kemasan baru (misalnya, Pete Jahat Ale
adalah kaleng di pertengahan 1990-an, tapi kaleng yang diterima secara umum
di segmen kerajinan satu dekade kemudian), dan, seperti yang kita tampilkan,
dispersi grafis jauh lebih geografis di . pasokan
kita mulai deskripsi statistik kami segmen dengan sederhana metrik: jumlah bir
dari waktu ke waktu. Gambar 1 membandingkan jumlah bir kerajinan dengan
jumlah bir atau bir makro besar produsen dari 1947 hingga Juni 2013. Jumlah
macrobrewers terus menurun selama periode tersebut. Alasan untuk ini pola
keluar termasuk perang iklan dan perubahan teknologi skala-menambah yang
menginvestasikannya kembali dipaksa oleh homogenisasi bir Amerika dari tahun
1950 hingga tahun 1970-an (Elzinga, 2009; Tremblay dan Tremblay, 2005).
Brewers yang diproduksi hubungan kuantitas produk besar bir mampu
mengambil keuntungan dari skala ekonomi. Skala dan ing pasar-keuntungan dari
macro yang lebih besar menyebabkan kematian akhir dari sebagian besar bir
regional yang lebih kecil bir lager tradisional. Ada 421 makro pada tahun 1947;
only 20 remained by 2006, one of the most dramatic transformations of an
American indus- try on record.
By 1985, the number of craft brewers (37) exceeded the number of
macrobrewers (34). From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the number of craft
brewers increased exponentially. Figure 2 plots the annual growth rate of the
number of craft brewers and shows a rate of more than 16% from 1984 to 1996.
Rapid growth came to an end in the late 1990s, when the craft segment
experienced a shakeout. The number of craft brewers declined by approximately
10%, from 1,625 in 1998 to 1,469 in 2000. The primary reasons for the decline
were distribution bottlenecks and the production of poor-quality products by
brewers who rushed to enter the market in the mid-1990s (Tremblay and
Tremblay, 2005, 2011). At the time, it was trendy to be in the craft beer business,
but achieving consistent product quality required serious brewing skills. After the
decline, the number of craft brewers remained relatively constant until 2010,
when it began to climb again. Craft brewers numbered 1,750 in 2010 and 2,483
by June 2013.
Continued entry has influenced the overall structure of the craft segment.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the national four-firm concentration ratio and the
Herfindahl- Hirschman index (HHI) of craft brewers. Although the market is
regional and not national, these figures still provide interesting information:
continued entry reduced overall concentration. In 1979, the four-firm
concentration ratio was 100%. Since the late 1980s, the four-firm concentration
ratio has remained at about 40%, and the HHI has been less than 1,000.
One reason for the early success of the craft segment is the homogenization of
the lager beer produced by the macrobrewers. Beginning in the 1950s, the
macros began to produce lighter and lighter styles of beer.13 This culminated in
1974, with Miller's successful introduction of Miller Lite, which had a third fewer
calories and 1015 percent less alcohol than traditional macro lager beer. Miller
Lite was such a remark- able success that all the major macrobrewers soon
followed with their own brands of light beer.
The growth in the market share of the light beer segment is often overlooked
because of the growth of the craft beer segment and the publicity it has received.
But light beer represents a parallel transforming event in the industry. Light beer
began with a 0.4% share of the market (SOM) in 1984, which grew to 22% in
1985 and 43% in 2000 (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005, pp. 138139). The Miller,
Coors, and Budweiser brands were so similarly reduced in alcohol and caloric
content that one brand was nearly indistinguishable from another, thus the
designa- tion MillCoorWeiser.
Because the macros bet on consumers who preferred milder beer, the door
was opened for craft brewers, who produced darker lagers and ales (which
include light ales, porters, and stouts). Imported brands also benefited from the
homogeni- zation of macro beer, especially the darker lagers and ales from the
United Kingdom. Imported beers in these styles are close competitors with craft
beers.
Figure 5 plots the SOM of the craft and import segments of the US beer
market. Before 1970, the share held by imports was less than 0.7%. Craft beer
production was inconsequential. Over 99% of the beer consumed in the United
States was the tradi- tional lager beer from the macros. Imported and craft beer
gradually gained in pop- ularity, causing macros' share to fall to 80% by 2012.
The consumption of imported beer rose first, because the only darker beers
available in most parts of the country were imported. By 1988, imports' SOM
reached 5% for the first time.
Although many new craft brewers entered the market in the 1980s, they had
very small operations. From 1986 to 1995, total beer demand was fairly constant,
ranging from 188 million to 190 million barrels. In 1986 the craft segment
accounted for less than 0.6% of the total. By contrast, that year, Anchor Brewing
produced 38,000 barrels. Of the remaining 90 craft brewers, none produced
more than 10,000 barrels. As the expression goes, they were indeed small
beer.
But by 1995, the number of craft brewers had increased to 977, and the scale
of the leading craft brewers had increased substantially. The larger craft brewers,
such as Sierra Nevada and Anchor, produced 200,000 and 103,000 barrels,
respectively.
13Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) provide several reasons for the homogenization of macro beer.
Consumer demand for lower-calorie foods and beverages increased in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition,
changes in technology and the advent of national television advertising gave an advantage to mass
produc- ers that brewed large quantities of a single style of beer.
The two largest contract-craft brewers, Boston and McKenzie River, produced
948,000 and 490,000 barrels, respectively. The SOM of the craft segment
reached 2% by 1995 and experienced very little growth during the shakeout of
the late 1990s, but has grown rapidly since 2005. By 2012, the SOM was 13.3%
for imports and 6.4% for craft beer. If one had read only the popular press about
the beer industry, one would guess that these figures were reversed. But craft
continues to be in the shadow of imports, in large part because of the success of
imports from Mexico.
Although the SOM of the craft segment was small in the 1990s, its continued
growth gained the attention of the macrobrewers. In response, the major macros
entered the craft segment through acquisition. Anheuser-Busch acquired a partial
share of the Redhook Brewing Company in 1994 and the Widmer Brothers
Brewing Company in 1997. Miller purchased a partial interest in the Celis and the
Shipyard brewing companies in 1995. This arrangement gave the craft brewers
access to broader distribution networks, but linking with a major corporate brewer
did not sit well with consumers who preferred to buy locally produced beer. Debra
Tropp (2014) provides several reasons some consumers prefer to pur- chase
locally produced food: it has purportedly higher quality, doing so supports local
business, and its production involves less use of fossil fuels.
Another response by the macros to the growth of the craft segment was to
intro- duce their own craft style brands but market them without the
macrobrewery's name on the packaging. In the 1990s, pale versions of craft style
beer were introduced by
256 Craft Beer in the United States
Anheuser-Busch under the Elk Mountain name, Miller under Plank Road, and
Coors under Blue Moon. Known as phantom or faux craft beers, these
products are not generally accepted by consumers as legitimate craft beers.14
The notable ex- ception is Blue Moon, which has annual sales of over 1 million
barrels.
The homogenization of macrobrewery beer is only one reason for the early
success of craft (and imported) beer (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2011). Another is
the con- tinued growth in personal income. A 2009 survey of beer drinkers found
that high-income consumers are more likely to buy craft beer (Beer Marketer's
Insights, 2010, pp. 310318). For these consumers, growing personal income
increases the demand for craft beer.
In addition, growth in personal income increases consumer demand for variety
(Silberberg, 1985). The homogenization of big beer provoked some consumers
to search for new styles and taste signatures in beer. Carroll and Swaminathan
(2000) argue that greater economic prosperity increases consumer demand for
locally produced products. Craft beer attempts to identify itself as locally
produced.
Small-scale production comes at a cost because there are substantial
economies of scale associated with beer production and packaging.
Nevertheless, local brewers have lower transportation costs and, although the
evidence is not clear, may pay lower wages as well. We are not aware of any
craft brewers whose labor force is unionized.
Changes in laws and regulations also have contributed to craft beer growth. Or,
to put it differently, laws and regulations that once would have thwarted the
growth of the craft beer segment are being whittled away, albeit slowly.15 With
respect to this topic, tax rates favorable to craft brewers occupy center stage.
At the national level, the 1977 change in the excise tax rate on beer gave a
sizable tax break to smaller brewers. In 2001, taxes account for about 5% of the
cost of goods sold for the average small craft brewer and nearly 30% for the
macrobrewers (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2005, pp. 118119). At the state level, 15
states gave a tax break to smaller brewers (Brewers Almanac, 2009).16 Another
factor is the legaliza- tion of home brewing. The art of making good beer requires
experience, and most early craft brewers gained experience from home brewing.
On October 14, 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed a bill that made home
brewing legal, effective
14Keeping this information from consumers is more difficult today, because there are many Internet sites
on beer that reveal a brand's parent company. 15Craft brewer Steve Hindy's Opinion piece in the New
York Times (2014) illustrates the frustration in the craft segment with particular state regulations. 16They
are Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
February 1, 1979. Both the tax break and the legalization of home brewing
facilitat- ed the birth of the craft segment.
Changes in state laws and regulations also aided the craft segment. Although
federal law made home brewing legal in 1979, states still retained the right to
limit alcohol production and consumption. For example, Bert Grant opened the
first brewpub in Yakima, Washington, in 1981, not realizing it was illegal at that
time because his business model violated the three-tiered distribution system
required by that state's codes (Acitelli, 2013, pp. 8485). The Washington State
legislature le- galized brewpubs in 1982, in view of the public support for doing so
and the realiza- tion that the brewer-independent distributor-independent retailer
regulatory model made brewpubs per se illegal. This induced other states to
follow suit, as seen in Table 2. Continuing differences remain as to how states
treat craft beer, and they are addressed in Section 3.
beer that is produced under contract by a macrobrewer. 18It might appear that the more populated states
are producing more beer. Production per capita may have made sense early on but not today. Early on,
when craft producers were neighborhood producers, produc- tion and consumption were tightly linked.
But with the large craft producers, such as Boston, production
tnirpniruolo C , enilnoruolo C - 7 . gi F
before home brewing became legal (Acitelli, 2013, p. 68). Most home brewers
made darker or heavier-style beers and ales, suggesting that a demand for
variety existed, at least among some Californians. Thus, it was fortuitous that
Maytag started his craft brewery in San Francisco, rather than another part of the
country. He was, as the saying goes, in the right place at the right time.
Home brewing was illegal from Prohibition until 1979, making it difficult for individuals to learn how to brew beer on a small scale. This forced early home
brewers and subsequent small craft brewers to learn the art of brewing by trial
and error and from each other. It is common for entrepreneurs to start a new
business close to home (Costa and Baptista, 2012). Because many home
brewers in California and Anchor were located in San Francisco, it offered
greater brewing experience, more learning opportunities, and geographic
charisma in this region of the country. Many early entrants clustered near Anchor
Brewing to learn the art of craft brewing from Maytag. As mentioned in Section I,
several of the pioneers in craft brewing were in geographic proximity to Maytag's
operation, visited his facility, and learned (and received encouragement) from
him.
In the long term, the location of production facilities is a strategic decision. After
home brewing was legalized and the success of microbreweries became well
known by the mid-1980s, why did entry occur in the Pacific, Northeast, and upper
Midwest before other parts of the country?
Only three papers have been devoted to entry into the US brewing industry.
Manuszak (2002) investigated firm entry into small Western cities in the late
262 Craft Beer in the United States
designed to serve microbrewers were established at the University of California at Davis and Oregon
State University. The first company to manufacture brewing equipment for small brewers was JV
Northwest in 1981. The extent to which firms built their own equipment and the cost of the materials used
is difficult to identify across states over time. We control for these factors with time period dummy
variables and government regulatory variables.
Strategic effects can also explain the location choices of craft beer producers.
On the one hand, locating near competing beer producers may lead to more
severe price competition. On the other hand, locating near other brewers can
generate positive spillovers. Marshall (1920) argued that such positive effects
can come in the form of gains from having access to a larger pool of inputs (eg,
specialized labor) and from knowledge spillovers. To account for the potential
effect of nearby craft firms and craft production, spatial lag variables are included
in the empirical models.24 The first relates to craft production for state i in a
given year t and is defined as:
spatial prod
it
14
k1 j141
prod
jt
/distance
ij
j i 1
where distance
ij
14
k1 j141
number of firms
jt
/distance
ij
j i 2
The spatial-prod variable may better capture the competition effects of other
brewersthat is, the amount of craft beer produced nearby. The spatial-firms
variable may better capture the knowledge spillovers and what we call the
exuber- ance effect of having peers nearby. The use of spatial variables is not
without contro- versy.25 As a result, models are estimated with and without the
spatial terms.
The data set consists of 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1980 to
2012 for a total of 1,683 observations.26 Data sources are listed in the online
supplemen- tary data appendix. Production and spatial-prod are measured in
10,000 31-gallon barrels. Independent variables include real per capita
disposable income (in thou- sands of 1982 dollars), population in millions,
median age, and total (federal plus state) excise taxes per barrel in real terms
(1982 dollars). Brewpub laws are represent- ed by a dummy variable (D
brewpub
312.599
Note: Production excludes contract brewing. The number of observations is 1,683, which includes the 50 states and
the District of Columbia, with the exception of the spatial-prod and spatial-firms variables, which have 1,617
observations (Hawaii and Alaska are not included because the distance is too great to form a reasonable weight
variable).
while higher taxes appear to reduce production, all else being equal. In addition
to these variables, Model 2 contains the spatial variables. The results are
consistent with Model 1, except that the income parameter loses significance.
The parameter estimates on the spatial variables are significant at 1% and
opposite in sign. The negative sign on spatial-prod may indicate that nearby
production reduces output, perhaps due to increased competition. The positive
sign on spatial-firms implies that brewers are more likely to congregate where
more firms that produce similar products are nearby. This is consistent with the
presence of knowl- edge spillovers.
Negative binomial regression estimates of the determinants of number of craft
brewers in a state for a given year are shown in Table 5.29 In both Models 3 and
4, all parameter estimates have the expected signs and are significant at 1% or
better.30 Estimates indicate that states with higher incomes, larger populations,
older citizens, lower taxes, and legalized brewpubs are likely to have more craft
brewers, all else being equal. The interesting sign pattern of the spatial variable
29The overdispersion parameter, alpha, is significantly different from zero in all the negative binomial regression models. Consequently, estimates are obtained by negative binomial regression, which allows for
overdispersion, rather than Poisson regression. 30A negative binomial coefficient estimate represents the
approximate percentage change in number of craft brewers from a unit change in the regressor.
brewer production
and numbers are higher in these later periods than in the 19801998 period.31
Significance levels are 1% for all, but D9908 in Model 2, where it is at 10%. The
signs for parameters on income, population, age, tax, and the brewpub dummy in
all models remain the same, although the income parameter becomes
insignificant in the production models. The spatial-prod parameters are negative
and significant at 1%, and the spatial-firms parameters are positive and
significant at 1%, in the models with the time period dummies.32
The t-ratios presented thus far were constructed using the heteroscedasticrobust variance estimator, also known as the sandwich, Huber/White, or simply
robust es- timator. If there is time-variant spatial dependence, however, the
robust estimator is inconsistent, and our hypothesis tests are invalid. Timeinvariant spatial dependence means that there may be spatial dependence at a
given point in time, but the depen- dence does not vary over time. Bertanha and
Moser (2014) propose a spatial vari- ance estimator and a test for time-invariant
spatial dependence for count data, such
31Although growth declined and then flattened in some of the later years, the level of production and
number of firms remained higher than in the 19801998 period. 32Models with state fixed effects have
the same significant signs as the original models, except for a sign reversal on the income parameter in
both production and number of firms' regressions. There appears to be substantial multicollinearity among
the state fixed effects, real income, and other regressors.
the significant signs are the same. Coefficient estimates are slightly smaller, with
the exception of the population parameter. All coefficient estimates are significant
at 1%. The number of firms' results in column 1 of Table 5 and column 1 of Table
7 reveal the same significant signs, slightly lower coefficient estimates on all
variables, and a 1% significance level for all parameter estimates.
In additional models, we use time-lagged values of the spatial variables. It is
pos- sible that, at a given point in time, craft brewing in a state affects neighbors
or that a third factor affects both state and a neighbor's craft brewing. Using the
time-lagged spatial variables allows the influence of neighbors to predetermine
firm decisions in a state. Estimates of these models are presented in column 2 of
Tables 6 and 7. The coefficient estimates on the time-lagged spatial variables
have the same signs as the coefficients on the spatial variables in the original
modelsnegative for spatial-prod parameter and positive for the spatial-firms
parameterand are signifi- cant at 1%. The parameters on all the other variables
also have the same significant signs as in the original models.
To summarize the regression results, estimates indicate that income,
population, and median age encourage craft beer production and the number of
craft brewers in a state. Further, the legal environment appears to matter a great
deal: beer excise taxes have a negative effect, and legalized brewpubs have a
positive effect, on craft production and numbers. An interesting result is that the
spatial-prod vari- able, representing nearby production, appears to reduce
production and the number of craft breweries in the state. In contrast, the spatialfirms variable, representing the number of firms nearby, appears to raise
production and the number of craft brewers in a state. Because craft brewers are
of unequal size, perhaps production better reflects the level of competition while
knowledge spillovers depend on the number of neighboring brewers.
V. Conclusion
In 1976, Anheuser-Busch was operating several breweries with capacities of 4
million barrels or more apiece. That same year, Jack MacAuliffe opened New
Albion Brewing, the first new craft brewing facility. The capacity of the New Albion
facility was about 400 barrels.34 In 2013, the total industry production of craft
beer was about 13.2 million barrels, still less than the capacity of Coors' flagship
brewery in Golden Colorado (over 20 million barrels).
But craft beer now has all the ingredients of a modern industry. There is an
orga- nized market for inputs. The recent Craft Brewers Conference had dozens
of pro- grams for the over four thousand participants with how-to sessions
covering
34A barrel of beer = 31 gallons.
topics ranging from exporting beer to Thailand to methods for measuring product
bitterness.
One signal of the maturity of the craft beer segment is that it has its own trade
as- sociation: the Brewers Association. This association of brewers sponsors the
Great American Beer Festival, the World Beer Cup, the Craft Brewers
Conference & BrewExpo, and the American Homebrewers Association as well as
representing craft brewers before state and federal authorities.
Another signal of the maturity of the craft beer segment is that it warrants the
compilation of its own statistical database. The contribution of this paper is in
offer- ing a concise history of the craft beer segment and a foray into analyzing
these data so as to allow a better economic understanding of this prominent
development in the malt beverage industry.
Supplementary Material
For supplementary material accompanying this paper visit
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ jwe.2015.22.
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