1.

PERCY MALONESIO, GM OF AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), V.

ARTURO JIZMUNDO
(AUG. 24, 2016)
public use

ART. 32 NCC (7) The right to just compensation when private property is taken for

Facts:
This is a petition of Review of Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside Decision dated Nov. 30,
2010 and Resolution dated Oct. 7, 2011 of the CA.
On July 4, 2006, respondent filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with preliminary injuction against the petitioner in
the MTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
The property subject of the case is a parcel of land designated as Lot 4857-B of the Kalibo Cadastre situated in Brgy.
Pook Kalibo, Aklan and covered by TCT No. T-18445.
In the decision dated Sept. 11, 2006, MTC made the ff: findings of fact:
-

There is no question that the subject property is registered and declared for taxation purposes in the name
of the heirs of the late Bartola Marquez, one of whom is [Jizmundo] in his capacity as one of the
grandchildren of the said deceased.
It is shown that since 1995 up to the present, defendant [ATO] has been, and still occupying and utilizing
the land as airport parking area without any formal agreement or payment of rentals to [Jizmundo] or any
of his co-heirs.
Jizmundo and his co-owners appear to have tolerated [the ATOs] long occupation of the lot in question
because of its promise to them that they will be paid the reasonable value of their land. Disconsolately, said
promise was not made good by the [ATO].
Jizmundo for himself and in behalf of his co-owners, now seeks to eject the [ATO] from the land, alleging
that the [ATO] has become deforciant illegally withholding from Jizmundo the possession when it refused
to vacate the premises after his last demand which is received on June 5, 2006. He filed an instant case on
July 4, 2006, very well within one year from the date he made the last demand to vacate.

ATO filed its answer to the complaint, raising defenses such as failure to implead the Republic of the Philippines as
an indispensable party and the doctrine of estoppel by latches. Jizmundo filed thereafter a Motion to render
judgement which the MTC granted however his complaint was dismissed because of the failure to implead and it
was appealed by him in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. Moreover, Jizmundo averred that the ATO is NOT immune from
suit as it is performing proprietary functions.
In the decsion dated Apr. 17, 2007, RTC affirmed the judgement of MTC. The trial court brushed aside the argument
of Jizmundo on non-joinder of parties, ruling that the same was inapplicable under the Rule of Summary Procedure
given that there is a limited period of time for such proceedings. The RTC ruled that ATO is IMMUNE from suit as
it is an instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines.
Jizmundo sought the reversal of the above RTC ruling in a Petition for Review under rule 42 of the Rules of court
filed before the CA.
While the petition was pending before the appellate court, the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 was passed. With
that ATO was abolished and all its powers were transferred to the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP).
On Nov. 30, 2010, the CA granted the petition for review. The petition for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary
Injunction was reversed and set aside. The respondent is ordered to restore to the petitioner possession of the
property. Based in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA, the CA ruled that ATO was NOT immune from suit.
Thus, there was no reason to hold that the Republic of the Philippines was an indispensable party in the case at bar.

Malonesio filed this petition for review of certiorari arguing that the CA erred in (1) ordering ATO to surrender the
subject property that is presently used for the operation of the Kalibo, Aklan Domestic International Airport and (2)
reversing the dismissal of case on the fact that the Republic of the Philippines was not impleaded as an indispensable
party.
Jizmundo claims that Malonesio failed to present any evidence to prove that he is guilty of laches. Moreover he
added that he cannot be deprived of his property for the sake of public convenience. Finally, he pleads that the
continued occupation of the subject property by the ATO without the payment of rental or just compensation despite
the income derived is unjustly causing grave and irreparable damage to the lawful owners of the subject property.

Issue:
W/N ATO could be sued without tha States consent had been rendered moot by the passage of the Civil Aviation
Authority Act of 2008, which abolished ATO and transferred all its powers, duties, and rights to CAAP. Under Sec.
23 (a) of RA no. 9497, one of the corporate powers vested in the CAAP was the power to sue and be sued.

Ruling:
CAAP does not enjoy immunity from suit. Therefore, Malonesios contention that Jizmundo and his co-heirs may no
longer question the ATOs ownership or possession of the subject property on the ground of laches or estoppel. Time
and again, the court have held that the owner of the registered land does not lose his rights over the property on the
ground of laches as long as the opposing claimants possession was merely tolerated by the owner. However,
Jizmundo no longer has the right to recover the subject property, through an action for ejectment, given that the
same is now devoted to public use. Instead, Jizmundo and his co-heirs, as lawful owners, have the right to be
compensated for the value thereof.

2.

J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. and Eduardo B. Olaguer V.

United Overseas Bank Philippines (formerly known as Westmont Bank), Emmanuel T. Mangosing and David
Goh Chai Eng,
(Sept. 14, 2016)
Art. 32 NCC (The right against deprivation of property without due process of the
law) not abiding with the rules of court (violation of 3-day notice rule/requirement) An integral part of
the procedural due process.

Facts:
This is a Petition for review assailing the Oct. 7, 2014 and July 20, 2015 Orders of the RTC-QC. The first order
dismissed the petition for contempt filed by J.O.S. Managing Builders Inc. on the ground of mootness. The second
order expunged petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Oct. 7, 2014 Order from the record of case due to
violation of 3-day notice rule on motions.
On Sept. 10, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale against UOBP and
Atty. Ricardo F. De Guzman in RTC-QC.
On May 17, 2000, RTC-QC Br. 98 issued a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents prohibiting them
from: (a) consolidating title to the subject properties; and (b) committing any acts prejudicial to petitioners.
Eventually, on June 12, 2008, it issued a decision annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction sale of
the properties. Respondents filed an appeal to the CA.
On May 5, 2008, while the annulment case was still pending, respondents sold the properties to Onshore Strategic
Assets Inc. Thus, petitioners filed a petition to declare respondents in Contempt of Court in RTC-QC.
Respondents filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state cause of action. They countered that sale of
property did not violate the 2000 writ because petitioners did not plead that the sale was prejudicial to them. Further,
the petition did not allege that respondents consolidated title to the properties. RTC Br. 220 denied the motion to
dismiss. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. They elevated the case to the CA via petition for
certiorari, but the CA also dismissed it.
Respondents the filed an answer Ad Cautelam contending that the 2000 writ merely prohibited UOBP from
consolidating title to the properties and did not enjoin it from selling or transferring them to any person or entity.
They asserted that the sale is not prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners because the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure recognizes and allows transfers pendent lite.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the order of dismissal. Respondents filed a Motion to
expunge the MR on the ground that petitioners violated the 3-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.
Respondents alleged that the hearing for petitioners MR was set on Nov. 7, 2014 but they received the noticed only
on Nov. 6, 2014 or 1 day before the scheduled hearing.

Issues:
1. Whether RTC Br. 87 erred in expunging petitioners MR from the record of the case;
2. Whether RTC Br. 87 erred in giving due course to respondents motion to dismiss filed after their answer ad
cautelam; and
3. Whether RTC Br. 87 erred in dismissing the contempt case on the ground of mootness.

Ruling:
Theres no merit in the claim of the respondents that petitioners made direct resort to the SC violates the hierarchy
of courts. Sec. 2 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be before the SC.

1.

2.

RTC Br. 87 erred when it granted respondents motion to expunge petitioners MR from the records. It was
based on Sec. 4, Rule 15 of the Rules which provides that every written motion to be heard shall at least be
received 3 days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on a shorter
notice.
RTC Br. 87 did NOT err in giving due course to respondents motion to dismiss. Respondents filed their 2 nd
motion to dismiss almost 1 year and 6 months after they submitted their Answer Ad Cautelam. Thus,
petitioners aver that respondents violated Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules, stating that motion to dismiss must
be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Petitioners are incorrect. In Obando v. Figueras, the SC held that the period to file the motion to dismiss
depends upon the circumstances of the case:

x x x Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court

requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging improper
venue cannot be entertained unless made within that period

In the same manner, respondents' motion to dismiss was based on an event that transpired after it filed its Answer Ad
Cautelam. Consequently, there was no violation of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules as they could not have possibly
raised it as an affirmative defense in their answer. While RTC Br. 87 did not err in giving due course to respondents
motion to dismiss, the propriety of granting it is an entirely different matter.
3.

RTC Br. 87 erred when it dismissed the contempt case for being moot and academic. In their motion to
dismiss, respondents advance that the CA's reversal of RTC Br. 98's ruling is a supervening event that
renders the contempt case moot and academic. They argue that it would now be absurd to restrain UOBP
from exercising its rights under the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage when it was found to have proceeded
lawfully in the foreclosure proceedings. Respondents maintain that it would be illogical to hold them in
contempt for a lawful act.43

RTC Br. 87 agreed, citing the cases of Golez v. Leonidas and Buyco v. Baraquia, where we held that a writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, its purpose as a provisional remedy having
been served, despite the filing of an appeal.
The SC is not persuaded. A case is moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events so that a declaration would be of no practical value. Courts decline jurisdiction over it as there is no
substantial relief to which petitioner will be entitled and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Here, the consequent dissolution of the 2000 writ did not render the contempt case moot and academic.
Foremost, RTC Br. 87's reliance in Golez and Buyco is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the facts
and circumstances in the two cases differ from the present petition. In Golez and Buyco, the alleged acts in violation
of the writ of preliminary injunction were committed AFTER the writ was lifted upon the dismissal of the main
action, such that a case for contempt on the ground of violation of the writ would be unavailing. In the case before
us, the sale of the properties-which is the act alleged to be in violation of the 2000 writ-was conducted while the
2000 writ was still subsisting. In fact, the 2000 writ was issued on May17, 2000, while the sale was made on May 5,
2008. RTC Br. 98 annulled the sale in favor of petitioners on June 12, 2008.

The reversal by the CA of the ruling of RTC Br. 98 in the annulment case and the automatic dissolution of the 2000
writ will not protect respondents from an action ascribing a violation of the 2000 writ, which was committed while
it was still in full force and effect.
Notably, this is not to say that respondents are already guilty of indirect contempt. Whether respondents violated the
2000 writ is not for us to decide. Section 5, Rule 71 of the Rules provides that where the charge for indirect
contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Here, the petition for indirect contempt was
correctly filed with the RTC. The contempt case was however dismissed while it was only in the pre-trial stage and
clearly before the parties could present their evidence. Proceedings for indirect contempt of court require normal
adversarial procedures. It is not summary in character. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act
committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due
process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is
adjudged and sentence imposed. In this regard, the SC cannot grant petitioners prayer to declare respondents guilty
of contempt of court and order them to pay damages.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The October 7, 2014 and July 20, 2015 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87 in Civil Case No. Q-11-69413 are hereby REVERSED. The case is REMANDED
to the court a quo for continuance of the trial of the case.

3. SPOUSES Ernesto Ibias Sr. and Gonigonda Ibias, V.

Benita Perez Macabeo
(Aug. 17, 2016) Art. 33 NCC In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries

Facts:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision promulgated on May 30, 2012 as well as the Resolution
promulgated on Dec. 11, 2012 by the CA. The CA affirmed the decision dated Mar. 7, 2016 of RTC-Manila Br. 33 in
Civil Case No. 01-102236.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent Benita Perez Macabeo and against petitioners Spouses Ernesto Ibias, Sr. and
Gonigonda Ibias and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
245124 under the name of the Spouses Ibias and reinstate TCT No. 24605.
Benita filed a complaint for annulment of title against spouses Ibias on 12 November 2001. She averred that she is
one of the heirs of Albina Natividad E. Perez and Marcelo Ibias, both deceased and registered owners of parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 24605 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 13 August 1999, Ernesto executed an Affidavit of Loss alleging that the Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 24605
was missing among his files. In support of his petition for reconstitution, he testified that said owners duplicate of
title was lost while in his parents possession. Such petition was granted and the title was reconstituted, now TCT
No. 245124 under the names of Spouses Ibias.
For this reason, Benita filed a perjury case against defendant-appellant Ernesto docketed as Criminal Case No.
348152 pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. She averred that Ernesto made it appear the
title was lost or misplaced while in the possession of the registered owners when in truth and in fact, he knew fully
well that said title was in the possession of Benita. Proof of such knowledge was shown by his letter dated 23 July
1999 where he asked Benita for TCT No. 24605, which was in the latters possession. At the time, Ernesto executed
the Affidavit of Loss and filed his petition for reconstitution, he knew that the title was intact and in the possession
of Benita. The issuance of the reconstituted title in favor of the Spouses Ibias thus deprived Benita and her other
siblings of their right over the subject property.
Ernesto countered that he is the registered owner of the land. He claimed that he and
his late brother Rodolfo are the only heirs of Marcelo and Albina Ibias. The subject property was acquired and titled
sometime in 1950.
After the death of his parents, he diligently exerted efforts to locate TCT No. 24605 but these attempts proved futile.
He inquired from his half-sister, plaintiff-appellee Benita Macabeo, about the whereabouts of said title. Benita
claimed that she was in possession of the title but asked him P11,000 in exchange of the title. He paid for it but
when he asked her for its turnover the latter failed to deliver.
Believing in good faith that the title was indeed lost, he executed the Affidavit of Loss dated 13 August 1999.
Thereafter, he instituted a petition for issuance of new owners duplicate certificate of title. Benita did not oppose or
object to the petition. Eventually, the new TCT No.245124 was issued in favor of Spouses Ibias by the Register of
Deeds.
The RTC Ruled in favor of Benita. His assertions didnt coincide with the findings of the court. He claimed that the
owners duplicate was lost but knew that the title was in Benitas possession. Ernesto
himself wrote a letter dated 23 July 1999 to Benita to ask for the title. Prior
to this, Ernesto borrowed the title from Benita in 1996 for the connection of his water system to NAWASA.
Moreover, he falsely declared in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights that he and his

brother Rodolfo Ibias are the only surviving heirs of Albina Natividad. Ernesto and Rodolfo actually have four older
half-sisters with their mother Albina: Avelina, Abuendia, Seferiana, and Benita. To the RTC, it is clear that Ernesto
was able to procure the new title in his name through fraudulent means.
The RTC judgement is read as follows: the Register of Deeds of Manila is ordered to cause the cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 245124 under the name of Spouses Ibias and REINSTATE TCT No. 24605. The
Spouses Ibias are ordered to pay the costs of the suit. The counter-claim is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Spouses Ibias filed a notice of appeal on 19 July 2006. The RTC released an Order elevating the complete
records of the case on 26 July 2006.
The CA dismissed the Spouses Ibias appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Moreover, it found out that the
title was in Benitas possession only because Albina entrusted it to her. Ernesto knew that Benita had the owners
duplicate of TCT No. 24605 in her possession prior to the filing of the present case. The CA identified the strained
relations between the parties as the reason why Ernesto could not compel Benita to turn over the owners duplicate
of TCT No. 24605 to him. Ernesto falsely stated in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of
Rights that he and his brother Rodolfo are the only surviving heirs of Albina and Marcelo.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the order of the court a quo cancelling the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
245124 issued in the name of Spouses Ibias as well as the reinstatement of TCT No. 24605, as the assailed decision
contravenes the established facts of the case; the evidence presented by the parties; and existing law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
Ruling:
The finds the petition lacking merit. The RTC and CA were correct in cancelling TCT No. 245124 and reinstating
TCT No. 24605.
In the case of Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,
The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate
covered thereby.
Ernesto claimed loss of TCT No. 24605, and instituted reconstitution proceedings. Sec. 109 of the PD 1529 provides
for the procedure in case of loss of an owners duplicate certificate of title. It only applies if the owners duplicate
certificate is indeed lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time based on Sec. 7 of RA No. 6732, which amended Sec. 19 of
RA No. 26. Furthermore, Sec. 11 of RA No. 6732 further provides that a reconstituted title obtained by means of
fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having
knowledge thereof.