Ratio Juris. Vol. 12 No.

3 September 1999 (23951)

Prima Facie Ought. A Logical

and Methodological Enquiry
OTA WEINBERGER
Abstract. The pressing problem of prima facie validity must be treated on the basis of
a differentiation of types of normative rules. Rules stating principles or purposes are
always applied as views determining the decision by weighing (but not by subsumption) so that the problem of prima facie validity does not arise. Neither is there a
problem of such a restricted form of validity concerning power-conferring rules. The
author shows that prima facie validity of rules of behaviour must not be treated as a
different kind of validity and that the notion of prima facie validity can be explained
in a logically satisfactory way on the basis of traditional norm-logical considerations.

I. Defining the Problem

Norm logic deals primarily with norms of behaviour. The subject matter of
normative regulation is human behaviour or action in the broad sense,
embracing all kinds of behaviour of subjects who are able to act and to control their actions by voluntary decision. Therefore also non-acting, forbearing from an action, can be the content of an ought. The validity of normative
rules and of individual norms in norm logic is conceived of as validity
straightforward not restricted by additional circumstances like the notion of
prima facie. In norm logic there is no place for the distinction between
simple validity and validity only prima facie.
Some authorsin the first place W. D. Ross (1930)were driven by
methodological considerations of ethics and jurisprudence to introduce the
notion of prima facie ought and prima facie validity of value judgements.
Prima facie oughtin this senseis a valid ought, but only provisionally as
a phase of the consideration determining behaviour, and is overridable for
various reasons.
It will be the task of my paper to scrutinize the problem situation of prima
facie ought in moral or legal considerations.
Introducing prima facie ought leads some authors to work with two notions of validity: prima facie validity and validity all things considered.
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I would not like to accept the distinction between two kinds of validity. The
simple concept of validity is fundamental, and validity prima facie, overridable or repealable validity, is only a modification which is introduced for
specific methodological reasons.
I understand that we need a suitable name for the unrestricted notion of
validity when we introduce the notion of prima facie validity, but the term
validity all things considered is not appropriate for unrestricted validity:
It does not express the fact that simple validity is basic, and restricted validity
with the reservation prima facie is only a modification of the normal notion
of validity used in norm-logical considerations. All things considered does
not correctly express the opposite to prima facie: It is never possible to consider all things, i.e., all possible consequences of the ordered behaviour.
The opposite to prima facie validity is something like definitive validity (or
validity without restricting addition).
In practical reasoning as well as in empirical considerations about nature
and laws of nature the notion of exceptions plays a certainthough rather
unclearrole. If a rule describes only so-called normal cases, i.e., the great
majority of cases of a certain type, then it seems reasonable to expect that
there will be also some exceptions, borderline cases of the type. If we use
rules of thumb for the determination or evaluation of our actions we may
reckon with exceptional cases where the rule does not apply. But from a
strictly analytical and scientific view, recourse to the notion of exceptions is
not satisfactory. There remains always a residual field of unexplained and
undetermined casesnamely the exceptionsbecause there is no clear
definition of which cases are exceptions and why they are to be judged in a
different way from normal cases. Only if we define exactly the exceptional
cases and the normative or evaluative consequences for these cases do we
achieve a satisfactory explanation or a justified practical rule. But then we
would better not speak of exceptions, as we have a specified judgement
about thesenow well-definedcases.
Therefore we prefer in empirical sciences to specify and defineif possible
the borderline cases, and in the field of practice we try to analyze so-called
exceptions by defining specific circumstances justifying the modification of
ought consequences in such cases.
It may be that rules which provide only an approximate orientation for
normal casesnamely, rules with exceptionsare useful in some situations,
but the common saying that the exception confirms the rule is mere nonsense, both in the field of the study of nature and in the field of practice.
The problem of prima facie validity in practical philosophymainly in
ethics and jurisprudenceembraces three important questions:
(i) the explication of circumstances where prima facie validity takes place;
(ii) the confrontation of two kinds of justified decision-making, namely, by
presupposed general rules or by evaluating considerations in respect to the
actual case;
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(iii) how can one express prima facie ought in such a way that overriding
or repealing of the ought conclusion from normative rules becomes consistent with the rules of norm-logical deduction.
These questions and connected problems are in need of a more detailed
analysis based on some preliminary considerations.
The role of norms and value judgements can be explained only in an
action-theoretical perspective, namely if we take into account the role of
normative rules and evaluations as tools for determining action. Therefore
my first step will be a consideration of the determination of action by norms
and evaluations.
If a normative rule states that a condition p ought to be, then if p is the
case the obligation q follows. This is a logical consequence of the validity of
the rule and the fact p. A restricted validity of the rulenamely prima facie
validityto the effect that the conclusion may not follow in some cases is in
conflict with the principles of norm-logical inference. Therefore the logical
task of analyzing the problem of prima facie ought is to find such a structural
explication of prima facie rules that operating with overridable validity will
not violate general principles of norm-logical inference.
There are, of course, methodological reasons why it seems sometimes
useful and justified to speak of prima facie rules which are actually valid in
some sense, but overridable under certain conditions. Overcoming the conflict
at least the apparent conflictbetween logically inferred validity and overridable validity is the logical problem of prima facie ought.
II. The Programme of My Approach
I shall underpin my argumentation by some preliminary considerations,
namely the following:
(i) The notion of validity is used in norm logic and in practical philosophy,
but in different ways; therefore I shall explain the relation of the use of the
term validity in both fields.
(ii) What are the different objects which we may characterize as prima facie
valid? I shall distinguish (a) individual and general theses as objects of prima
facie validity; (b) norm sentences and value sentencesincluding preference
sentences; and mainly (c) different types of general norm sentences.
The clarifying analysis of the problems we are investigating here will have
two starting points, namely the action-theoretical approach in practical
philosophy, and the recognition of a certain revolution in the theory of legal
sentences (cf. Weinberger 1998b).
(iii) In my opinion all fields of practical philosophy should be analyzed in
an action-theoretical perspective, and this theoretical view of action must be
conceived of as based on specific information processes; therefore we should
clarify the different methods in which choices and action can be determined
by practical information or/and acts of value decision.
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On the basis of this preliminary orientation I shall discuss the problems

and methodological reasons why we sometimes introduce the restriction of
validity to prima facie validity:
(iv) Validity and Defeasibility of Practical Theses.
In the final section I shall try to find a logically appropriate form for expressing prima facie ought and prima facie value statements without sacrificing
logical consistency in practical reasoning under the heading:
(v) The Logical Form of the Prima facie Restriction.

III. Some Preliminaries

(i) Validity in Logic and in Practical Philosophy
In norm logic the notion of validity plays the role of a mark analogously as
truth is a mark of descriptive sentences when they are communicated as
information or used as arguments in proofs. In norm logic validity is the
hereditary feature in deduction as truth is in the logic of descriptive language. In both realms the attribution of this mark is a sign for taking the
respective sentence as a premise or as a sentence deduced from accepted
suppositions. When we are using the notion of truth of a proposition or that
of validity of a norm sentence in logic we abstract from the process of justifying the knowledge of truth and of the acceptance of validity of the norm
sentences under consideration. Yet in other considerations the method of
justifying the recognition of truth or of the acceptance of the validity of norm
sentences is very important.
The discussion of validity and restricted (in the sense of prima facie)
validity concerns problems of acceptance and justification or the actual
application of norms in practical reasoning, but not the theory of logical
operations.
The problem of prima facie validity has no impact on the theory of normlogical deduction, but the appropriate formulation of prima facie ought avoiding logical inconsistencies is in some ways a problem of logical methodology
in practical philosophy.
(ii) Which Objects Can Be Characterized as Prima Facie Valid?
The notion of prima facie applied to practical sentences does not deny the
validity of the practical sentencethe practical sentence remains accepted in
principlebut it is in some way overriden or overridable by special reasons
in some cases.
The prima facie restriction is applied with respect to two kinds of practical
sentences: with respect to value sentences or with respect to norm sentences.
The valuation of an object is either a global act or the result of a class of
value attributions according to different criteria whichin a second stepare
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combined into a total valuation. The partial valuation under a certain criterion is prima facie in the sense that the valuation is valid only as partial
valuation, but not alone determining practical decision which in fact is
determined by the value result of the complex valuation which may be
in conflict with some partial valuations. It seems therefore that the logic of
evaluation is bound to a mechanism of comparison and also of overriding
partial value considerations by the total valuation resulting out of a class of
partial valuations according to different partial criteria. The total valuation
is dependent on the relative weight of the partial valuations.
Norms of behaviour are generally conceived of as the definitive rules of
how to act. Stating norms in processes of norm creation expresses the result
of a norm-determining decision process. Speaking of prima facie validity means
re-opening the argumentation about the normative decision. If the normative regulation is restricted as only prima facie valid, i.e., overridable by
specific considerations, the justifying argumentation for creating the norm is
re-opened: The norm which is considered valid only prima facie is used as an
argument in deliberation side by side with other practical arguments.
The object of prima facie validity may be an individual sentence or a general one (a rule). The problems of overriding argumentation are similar in
both cases.
(iii) The Determination of Choice and Action
Action is information-determined behaviour, and it is justified not only by
the knowledge of facts, empirical laws and advice about how to realize purposes (know-how), but always also by practical information, namely,
by accepted aims, preferences or/and normative rules. On the basis of this
conception of action (cf. Weinberger 1998a) we arrive at the view that there
are in principle two kinds of practical determinants of individual and social
action: (a) teleological and preferential determination, and (b) determination
by normative rules.
There is, indeed, a complicated interplay of different kinds of practical
determinants which are effective in modern society. This complexity results
not only from the duality of teleogical (or utility) determination on the one
side, and normative determination on the other side, but in addition from
the fact that in modern society people are subjected to a plurality of systems
of normative regulation: law, rules of social morality, religious norms, social
habits, andlast, but not leastrules of specific professions or of actual
binding situations.
The decision concerning a choice or an action is either a result of deliberation
aiming at an optimization under the presupposed purposes and preferences
in the actual situation of deciding or the decision how to act is determined
by an accepted rule of behaviour. E.g.: I decide to go to bed at 11 p.m.,
because I feel tired and prefer this decision to the possibility of continuing
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reading, or I go to bed at this time because I have stated (or accepted) a rule
for myself to go to bed at this fixed time.
(iv) Types of Normative Rules
Precise analyses and important insights of logical and methodological
character led to a transformation in analytical legal philosophy: The aim of
finding a general form for expressing all possible contents of law (of legal
regulations) has been abandoned. In the second stage of analytical jurisprudence essential formal differences in the structure of legal rules have
been acknowledged together with distinct approaches to their application.
In the first stage of analytical jurisprudenceand in the norm-logical
analysis on which it was basedonly human behaviour or action (including
of course also omissions) were conceived of as the content of normative
regulation. The application of these rules of behaviour was determined by
the rule of subsumption: If the conditions for subsumption are fulfilled the
normative consequence for the given case is determined and the respective
decision is justified.
But there are legal rulesexplicitly formulated or only implicitly accepted
which play an important role in justifying decisions (especially in
so-called hard cases) which have a structure and meaning rather distinct
from rules of behaviour. This has been shown mainly by J. Esser (1964) and
R. Dworkin (1978). Hard cases which are not decidable by mere application of rules of behaviour in a subsumptive argumentation, but require as
additional arguments principles (and perhaps also political considerations)
are decided in a process of a more complicated structure.
If the legal decision can be gained by application of rules by mere subsumption the decision is so to speak pre-fabricated at least in its basic lines.
Here the discretion of the judge concerns only some evaluation which is
sometimes necessary for realizing the subsumption, and the specification of
the decision within the given frame which is logically determined. In hard
cases there is not such a clear frame pre-established by rules of behaviour,
but decision-making is dependent on more abstract and often teleologically
defined principles which do not define a clear and univocal frame for the
decision. In hard cases the discretion of the judge on the basis of principles
is a result of weighing the case in the light of different principles. Here the
decision is not defined by norm-logical inference, but is a result of applying
principles and weighing their relevance for the given case.
Behaviour rules must not be in such a logical conflict that they would
justify incompatible decisions; but different principles which are in some
way relevant for a given case may tend to lead the decision into different
directions. Deciding on the basis of principles means realizing a genuine
preference decision in the field of different possibilities. Moreover, in such
hard cases the finding of the suitable principle is not a formally determined
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operation (as in the case of subsumption), and sometimes a new principle

must be invented by the judge.
Evidently the category of principles is a category of norms which is
distinct from that of rules of behaviour.1
Another basic distinction in the field of normative rules has been realized
by the recognition that power-conferring rules (or empowering rules) are
formally irreducible to rules of behaviour (cf. Weinberger 1989, 253, 261ff.).
This is remarkable as in the first stage of the development of the dynamic
theory of lawespecially with H. Kelsenthe specificity of power-conferring
norms has not been recognized. The validity of norms created on the basis of
empowering rules was justified by a higher norm (or better: by an empowering norm) of hypothetical structure, but nobody noticed that the structure of
the empowering norm is distinct from a conditional norm of behaviour. The
empowering norm can be described symbolically by the following scheme:
For all A(N) and all N: If As(N) then N (where As(N) reads the norm
creating act of the norm N of the empowered subject S).
In this form the connection of the content of the norm-creating act with the
implied normative consequent is essential, but this connection cannot be
realized by an ordinary normative conditional.
The justification of a norm established by a legislative act or of norms
of legal decisions on the basis of empowering norms is composed of two
elements: namely, (a) by the presupposed validity of the empowering norm,
and (b) by the recognition of the fact that the norm-generating act has been
duly realized. Therefore, indeed, legal dynamics realized by norm-creating
acts is an interplay of established power-conferring norms and actual social
facts, namely, the realization of norm-generating acts.
There are other normative rules of a specific structure which cannot be
applied by mere subsumption, namely task-imposing norms (teleological
norms) and comparative norms which indicate criteria and standards for
the relative evaluation of different cases (cf. Otte 1972, 301ff.; Wilburg 1950;
Weinberger 1998a).
Without going into details here we can easily see that validity restrictions
of the prima facie type are not relevant in the same way in respect to different
forms of normative rules.
Considerations about restricted validity and about defeasibility of practical
theses deal with pragmatical reasons for modifying the use of normative
regulation of behaviour and of justifying value or preference sentences.
1
Principles may be of different logical structure: they may be rather abstract, so that they cannot
be regarded as a description of behaviour, or they may be of teleological character. It is worth
mentioning that principles play different roles: They function as legislative maxims, i.e., as
arguments in de lege ferenda argumentation, or as arguments in determining decisions of legal
cases or as arguments in hermeneutic argumentations.

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There are different types of reasons for the restriction of validity and applicability of normative rules: This means that for different types of normative
rules the problem of prima facie validity and defeasibility has a different
character.
(v) Rules of Behaviour and Their Exceptions
If a rule of behaviour is posited only as a rule of thumb we must expect that
there will be some casesso to speak, borderline casesin which the normative consequences stated by the rule are not acceptable. This form of ruling
is not clear. In legal practice there should be given an additional competence
rule stating who is empowered to acknowledge exceptions and to realize the
restriction of the rule to normal cases and to exclude the application of
the rule in exceptional cases.
Even in relation to genuine rules of behaviour there can exist good reasons
for restricting their field of relevance in some clearly defined cases: (a) the
case under consideration may be one which was not present (or could not
have been) in the mind of the legislator when formulating the law, or (b)
at the time of legislation cases of this specific type may not yet have existed.
It may be reasonable to give the judge under such conditions the competence
to restrict the applicability of the rule to normal cases and to exclude justified exceptions.
If the given rule reads if p then q ought to be (p > Oq), the modification
leads to the effect of splitting the given rule into two rules:
(p & not-p1) > Oq
(p & p1) > Or
where r is different from q, and p1 is an extraordinary circumstance.
IV. Validity and Defeasibility of Practical Theses
The problems of validity and abolition of validity of normative theses have
to be treated on two levels: as problems of normative (especially legal)
dynamics, and as problems of the pragmatics of normative justification.
In the perspective of legal dynamics the production of new norms and of
changes in the normative system is a legal process determined by specific
normative rules.
From an action-theoretical standpoint we can conceive the relationship of
the norm for the individual case and general rules in the following way:
Behaviour rules determine the decision how to act and how to value given
cases in advance, because the individual norm follows logically from the general rule and the actual findings of the case. The case norm can be justified
in another way too, namely, by taking an immediate value position towards
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the case. The immediate evaluation of the caseif not justified by a preestablished general ruleis often orientated by presupposed principles
or/and value standards. Such a value decision is not logically determined
as is in principle the case with argumentations by subsumption on the basis
of general rulesbut it is the result of reasonable weighing and of voluntary
decisions.
Rule-sceptics believe that general norms cannot properly do justice to the
determination of the norm for the case, yet legalism, in opposition to this
view, holds that only previously established general rules are the very core
of the justification of the norm for the case, i.e., the legal decision. This controversy can be dissolved by the following consideration.
Practical evaluation and the justification of a case norm defining the
decision in a specified case is bound to a weighing comparison of similar
and different cases, not only a simple taking of a value position with regard
to the given case. The evaluation of individual cases is realized with an eye
on the class of comparable cases, this means, it is realized in a generalizing
view. Therefore basic scepticism concerning the use of general rules is not
justified; on the contrary, without rules and principles there is no rational
value analysis. Within the frame of determination by rules there are of course
elements of discretion about the conditions of subsumptionthe subsumption of the facts of the case may be dependent on evaluationand about the
specification of the normative consequences. The general rule often works
as a determining frame, but not as a strictly univocal determination. The
adaptation of the frame stated by the general rule to the special features
of the actual case is realized in two places: (1) through the analysis of the
subsumability of the case under the rule, and (2) by the specification of
the normative consequences.
The adaptation of the general rule by evaluative processes by which the
case norm is determined concerns the normal application of the rule and is
not a modification of the general rule, but a decision in accordance with its
purpose.
General rules of behaviour can imply consequences for cases which the
norm giver did not intend to meet with the rule, because he forgot about
these possible cases or because such realities did not yet exist at the moment
of the creation of the rule. How to deal with such exceptional cases? Should
we remain at the binding force of the rule as it has been formally established
or should we presuppose the implicit competence of the judge to restrict
its applicability to cases which are really intended? The restriction seems to
me justified. But I am aware of the fact that this restriction is formally contra
legem, if we do not accept an implicit legitimate power in the judge to make
such a justified modification of the validity (or applicability) of the law.
When we accept such a possible power in the judge, should we say that the
rule of behaviour is therefore only valid prima facie? I doubt whether such a
terminology would be useful.
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A special situation arises when a system of norms contains conflicting

rules. This means that in the system there are rules which under the same (or
logically equivalent) conditions order incompatible normative consequences.
Incompatible behaviour which is ordered by reasons of logic cannot be
fulfilled. It seems reasonable to treat the situation as if there were no normative regulation in the case under discussion.2
V. Overridability and Normative Consistency
The view that there is a valid rule of behaviour, but it is defeasible for
specific reasons so that it should not be applied in certain subsumable cases
leads to normative inconsistency: In some subsumable cases p ought to be
(following the rule), and in some other subsumable cases p is not obligatory
(because in these cases the rule is overriden by specific reasons).
This dilemma of analytical jurisprudence can be overcome only by an
authorization of the judge (perhaps stated only implicitly) to modify the rule
or not to apply it under certain conditions.
This case of corrective power in the judge, not to apply a law because of
overriding reasons, has to be carefully distinguished from the competence of
the judge not to apply the law which he does not approve of morally (Some
natural law theorists presuppose this competence of the judge at least in respect to deeply immoral law). Such a competence would be very problematical, because in normal political situations there is no good reason to trust
the morality of the judge more than that of the legislator.
In other casesif there are strong and evident reasons for the modification
of the ruleit seems reasonable instead to presuppose such a corrective
competence of the judge. But the justification of such a corrective application
of the legal rule should be clear and restricted to well defined circumstances.
Otherwise legal certainty would be in danger.
VI. Motives and Reasons for the Restriction of Applicability
Practical information serves either as a determinant of action or as an argument in the process of justifying the rule or of the individual norm for action.
Sentences used as arguments determining the decision to act are in principle
exposed to considerations which may lead to their being overriden. Purposes
may be overriden by other purposes which are taken to be more important
(i.e., stronger): values may be overruled by stronger values, etc. These features of practical information used as arguments for deciding how to act are
by their very nature defeasible or overridable. But I believe that this is not
the essential field of the problems of prima facie validity in the proper sense.

Or is there only an undecided choice between the stated conflicting alternatives?

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The differentiation of the character of normative rules which I discussed

earlier leads to the recognition that only rules of behaviour are the proper
object of prima facie validity. With respect to power-conferring rules the
restriction to prima facie validity does not apply. Of course, in the life of an
institution a situation may arise in which there is a need for normative
regulation which is not given, and forms of action may be prescribed which
cannot be accomplished in the prescribed way. Legalism presupposes in such
situations that the situation is legally not solvable, but institutionalism
classical as well as neo-institutionalismholds that the institution is duty
bound and able to produce a solution that gives effect to the leading idea of
the institution even without an explicit empowering rule. (Yet there remains
an open question as to which organ will and should have the competence of
immediate action in order to preserve the institution. The action will not be
illegal though legally not pre-determined.)
The defeasibility of behaviour norms has different features in moral and
legal contexts. The moral ought leads to a restriction of possible means to permissible ones to fulfill our aims, i.e., ought produces taboos which eliminate
possible, but unallowed means.
The morally prescribed action may be defined by a final decision or it may
be more or less only a proposal which underlies a justification by continual
moral valuation. In this perspective the moral ought is only prima facie valid,
but overridable by stronger duties or values. Moral autonomy does continue
its value considerations, and moral ought therefore undergoes changes by
new and possibly overriding valuation. Here logical inconsistency does not
arise.
In opposition to the realm of moral considerations, legal norms are valid
as a result of a norm-determining argumentation and a normatively prescribed norm-creating process. Therefore legal norms of behaviour are valid
as such, without prima facie reservations.
But there are two perspectives in which defeasibility of legal behaviour
rules can be considered: (1) The formal rules of norm creation define the
empowered organ and the due process of norm creation. In the opinion of
natural law theorists there are additional moral criteria as a precondition of
the validity of norms produced in due processes. But it remains problematical how such minimal standards of morality for the validity of legal norms
can be philosophically justified (therefore this kind of restriction of legal
validity may be in fact empty, because there are no a priori valid moral standards for legal validity). (2) There are circumstances which make valid legal
norms inapplicable or which give reason to conceive them as valid only
prima facie.
It would be necessary to state explicitly reasons which can justify the
inapplicability or modification of behaviour rules in special cases:
(i) It can be provenor presupposed with good reasonthat the legislator
did not consider the type of case in which the applicability of the rule is denied.
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(ii) The type of case in which the applicability of the rule is denied is a
new kind of circumstance which therefore was unknown to the legislator.
(iii) The reason for which the rule was stated is no longer valid. Sometimes
it may be reasonable to deny the applicability of the rule because of cessante
ratione. But this argumentation may become problematical and lead to legal
uncertainty. The reason why a rule was created is not always clear and it
can be doubted whether the presupposed reason is in fact the sole reason.
Therefore jurists generally prefer the standpoint cessante ratione non cessit lex
ipsa.
(iv) If there is a conflict of rules so that no indubitable ought can be recognized, there is no other possibility than to re-open the normative deliberation
and to decide which of the conflicting norms should be considered as relevant.
(v) If a valid rule is not in conflict with another rule, but seems to violate
essential legislative principles, then only in exceptional cases can the nonapplication of the rule be reasonably justified, because the stated rule is
usually a clearer decision than the principle used as an argument against the
applicability of the rule.
VII. The Logical Form of Prima Facie Restrictions
Our analysis has shown that the logical problem of prima facie validity does
not concern all normative rules and all cases of valuation. The problem of
avoiding inconsistency if we justify the non-application of valid rules in
specific cases concerns rules of behaviour which are applied by subsumption.
The reasonable presuppositiongiven explicitly or only implicitlythat the
judge is authorized to restrict the application of law under strictly defined
conditions can be formally expressed by inserting an additional negative condition for subsumption unless there are exceptional excluding circumstances
into the conditional form of the rule. Then there does not arise any inconsistency with prima facie restrictions. And there is no need to introduce a notion
of weakened validity, namely validity only prima facie. The whole problem of
prima facie validity has reduced the difficulty to defining reasons for nonapplicability of valid norms in special cases in an appropriate way.
Karl-Franzens Universitt
Institute of Philosophy of Law
Universittsstrasse 27/II
A-8010 Graz
Austria

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References
Dworkin, R. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
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Esser, J. 1964. Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortentwicklung des Privatrechts.
2nd ed. Tbingen: Mohr.
Otte, G. 1972. Komparative Stze im Recht. In Rechtstheorie als Grundlagenwissenschaft.
Ed. H. Albert et al. Dsseldorf: Bertelsmann.
Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon.
Weinberger, O. 1989. Rechtslogik. 2nd ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
. 1998a. Alternative Action Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
. 1998b. Die Revolution in der Rechtssatztheorie. Archiv fr Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie 84: 26370.
Wilburg, W. 1950. Entwicklung eines beweglichen Systems in Brgerlichen Recht. Graz:
Karl-Franzens-Universitt.

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