Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez For Appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla For Appellee

G.R. No.
L-25010 October 27, 1926

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. PAULINO ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.
Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located
in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It
appears from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the
appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of First Instance
for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question
by virtue of her appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the
evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, denied the registration
of all of the northern portion of the land included in her petition represented
by Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action, upon the ground
that said portion was more valuable for timber purposes than for agricultural
purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.
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The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision
of the lower court. In the course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined the plans and all the
evidence presented in this case and are of the opinion that the trial court was
correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean the old road to
Bogabon. The fact that nearly all the northern property is forestry land is a
further indication that the applicant's possessory information title did not
include the land running up to the road to Bongabon, because all the papers
which the applicant has regarding this property call the land palayero." 1
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Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present
an amended plan in that case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land
in question which she was entitled to have registered. We have no evidence
before us showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied
with.
Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of

the land included in the former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when
the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the
registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del
Rosario in the former action. She presented her opposition in the present
action, claiming the very land which she claimed in the former action. The only
proof which she presented in support of her claim in the present action was
the proof which she had presented in the former action. No proof was adduced
in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree showed that she was entitled
to the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had been
conceded to her in the first action.
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Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C.
Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the
name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242
and 3243, which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her
name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court
upon the ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all
of the land included in her opposition in her name.
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof
presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in question
is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land. With reference to
said motion for rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is
presented in support thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with
reasonable diligence, have been presented. It cannot, therefore, be considered
now. It is not newly discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be
accepted it would not be sufficient to justify the granting of a new trial.
After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced
during the trial of this cause as well as that adduced during the trial of the first
cause, we are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether
particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during
the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of
Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of
private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land
in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.)
During the trial of the present cause the appellant made no effort to show that
the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her
favor, was more valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For all of the
foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-24066
December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling
the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground
that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the
sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in
question was a property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela
Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor
of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to
her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of
Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this
action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said
parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela
Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds
of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of
Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land
in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the
sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having
been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been
destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it
to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit
A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the
property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and
against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her
attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15,
1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for
twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation,
the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land
to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on
August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed
with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry
and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.
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It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.
While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela
Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in
possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken
into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when
he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to
possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is,
moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural
land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.
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If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already
become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only
the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to
recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-3793
February 19, 1908
CIRILO MAPA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta for appellant.
Basilio R. Mapa for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to
have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the
barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has
appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but
no exception was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review
the evidence.
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6
which follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress
of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war,
or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same,
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter.
The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the AttorneyGeneral is the question whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within
the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the court below upon
that point are as follows:
From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland,
and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession
of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used
during the said period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and
salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the
town of Molo being between the sea and the said land.
The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands"
as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not only in section 54
above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same
construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that
law.
The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called
agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature. If the contention of the
Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not agricultural
land, it is difficult to see how it could be disposed of or what the Government
could do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner thereof.
It could not allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No.
926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public lands" in the
Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not
sell it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10
only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the
Philippine Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to
"nonmineral public lands, as defined by section eighteen and twenty of the act of
Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in
passing that there is perhaps some typographical or other error in this reference
to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of these sections mentions
agricultural lands. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to a
native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates
only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two."
In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do
nothing with this land except to lay out a town site thereon in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about
agricultural land.
The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has
been given to that phrase by the act of Congress. An examination of that act will
show that the only sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could
be called a definition of the phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as
follows:
SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the
provisions of this act and except as herein provided, shall classify according
to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations
shall not go into effect of have the force of law until they have received the
approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall
be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing
session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said
session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of
law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall
not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and empowered on such terms as it may prescribe, by general
legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the
United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen
hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more
than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and
cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years,
during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber
said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers
of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the
estates of decedents.
It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the
phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the word "agricultural" does not
occur.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is
to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land" can be found in the act of
Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that
it means land which in its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a
definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired
from Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below
adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came
within the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph
6, Act No. 926 was applicable thereto.
1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of
the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly
declared that such a definition could be found therein. The President approved
this act and it might be said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly
approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of
Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be
given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the phrase is
not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can
be granted can not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the
Government has the right to sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II,
nor what lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor
the lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none
of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up to this time been
done by virtue thereof would be void.
2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has
defined agricultural lands as those lands which are, as the Attorney-General
says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural"
does not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify
according to its agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately
make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as saying that the
Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands
according to its agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it
shall classify all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification
shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and according to
its productiveness.
One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it
would be very difficult to apply it in practice. What lands are agricultural in
nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case says:
The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation
by the hand of man.
The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up
and any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber lands are expressly
excluded, but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was
not agricultural in nature. Such lands may be found within the limits of any city.
There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part thereof an
experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the
same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land
surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the
west, the Luneta on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is
of many hectares in extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could at
any time be devoted to the growing of crops.
The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is
emphasized when we consider that whether certain land was or was not
agricultural land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject to
homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the courts,
unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative
officers to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926
relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands
shall summarily determine whether the land described is prima facie under the
law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public
lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall
determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the
land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it
says nothing about his decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its
nature. Section 26 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the
Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural
than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records
whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or
salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native settlers makes no provision for
any determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the
character of the land applied for.
After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the
administrative officers on the theory that the lands were agricultural lands by their
nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by
the courts would be to produce an evil that should if possible be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the
phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful consideration of the
question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the
definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall
"Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition
that can be said to be given to acricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of
Jones vs. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same
section of the act of Congress were under discussion:
The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that would be entirely free from objection.
But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than
any other one that has been suggested.
There is nothing in this case of Jones vs. The Insular Government which at all
conflicts with the result here arrived at. The question as to whether the lands
there involved were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the
sections was neither discussed nor decided. In fact, it appears from the decision
that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest
definition of the phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been
cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was, not that the
lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of
illustration were not agricultural lands but that the law there in question and the
other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations within the meaning
of section 13.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., and Torres, J., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906

F. STEWART JONES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT,Defendant-Appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General, for appellant.
Pillsbury and Sutro, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the
Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a
certain tract of land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the
reservation defined in Act No. 636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court
below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was
public land. At the trial he objected to any consideration of the case on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that
reservation. The objections were overruled and judgment entered in favor of
the petitioner, from which judgment the Government appealed to this
court.
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction
throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was approved August 31,
1904, and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of
jurisdiction over lands situated in the Province of Benguet. That act, however,
contained a proviso by which the court was given jurisdiction over applications
for registration of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act
No. 648. Act No. 648 provides in its first section that The Civil Governor is hereby authorized and empowered by executive order to
reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law.
Section 2 provides: "Whenever the Civil Governor, in writing, shall certify that
all public lands within limits by him described in the Philippine Islands are
reserved for civil public uses, either of the Insular Government, or of any
provincial or municipal government, and shall give notice thereof to the judge
of the Court of Land Registration, it shall be the duty of the judge of said
court" to proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 627. Act No.
627, which relates to military reservations, provides that when notice is given
to the Court of Land Registration of the fact that any land has been so
reserved, it shall be the duty of the court to issue notice that claims for all
private lands within the limits of the reservation must be presented for
registration under the Land Registration Act within six months from the date of
issuing such notice, and that all lands not so presented within said time would
be conclusively adjudged to be public lands, and all claims on the part of
private individuals for such lands, not so presented, would be forever
barred.
On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by
Governor Taft to the judge of the Court of Land Registration:
SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648,
entitled "An act authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve for civil public
purposes, and from sale or settlement, any part of the public domain not
appropriated by law for special public purposes, until otherwise directed by
law, and extending the provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and twentyseven so that public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government
for public uses, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular
Government for such uses, may be brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act;" that the Philippine Commission has reserved for civil public
uses of the Government of the Philippine Islands the lands described in Act No.
636, entitled "An act creating a Government reservation at Baguio, in the
Province of Benguet," enacted February 11, 1903.
It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under

the operation of the Land Registration Act and become registered land in the
meaning thereof, and that you proceed in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 648.
Very respectfully,
(Signed)WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."
The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the Governor,
issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice
Jones, the appellee, within the six months referred to in the notice, presented
his petition asking that the land be registered in his name.
The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were
not complied with in the respect that this letter of the Governor did not
amount to a certificate that the lands had been reserved. The Solicitor-General
says in his brief:
To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648 it was
necessary for the Civil Governor first to certify that these lands were reserved
for public uses, and second to give notice thereof to the Court of Land
Registration.
We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648 conferred
power upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not
make that power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby deprive itself of
the power to itself make reservations in the future, if it saw fit; neither did it
intend to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The contention
of the Government is true when applied to a case where the land has not been
reserved by the Commission. In such a case it would be the duty of the
Governor to first reserve it by an executive order, and then to give notice to
the Court of Land Registration, but where the land had already been reserved
by competent authority, it not only was not necessary for the Governor to
issue any executive order reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In
such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of
Land Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in
the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the case.
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in question
from Sioco Cario, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in
the office of the registrar of property on the 8th day of May of the same year.
Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cario was in possession of the land, he
commenced proceedings in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory
information in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This
possessory information he caused to be recorded in the office of the registrar
of property on the 12th day of March, 1901.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cario was born upon the premises in
question; that his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift
of the property to Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years before the
filing of the petition in this case - that is, before the 16th day of January,
1904. Sioco's grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time
the gift was made, and has been in possession thereof for many years prior to
said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco took possession of the property, and
continued in such possession until his sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such
sale Jones has been in possession of the land, and is now in such possession.
For more than twelve years prior to the presentation of the petition the land
had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is sufficient, in
our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is required by
the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows that what he did in the way of
presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the
land was done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a
measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the
running of the statute of limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall be applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of
these acts. These acts in effect provide that in determining whether the
applicant is the owner of the land or not, the general statute of limitations
shall be considered, and shall be applied against the Government. The
evidence showing, as we have said, such an adverse possession, the petitioner
proved his ownership of the land if the Commission had authority to make the
statute of limitations applicable to these proceedings.
The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby
disposes of public lands; that Congress is the only authority that can take such
action, and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the
Commission in applying the statute of limitations to proceedings under Acts
Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think that this contention can be sustained.
Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides as follows:
SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the
Philippine Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain,
signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land
or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States
for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are
hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in
this act.
This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these
lands, and of all public lands, and to pass the law in question, unless there is
some provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or
limits that power. The government says that such limitation is found in section
13 of the act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:
SEC. 13. That the Gonvernment of the Philippine Islands, subject to the
provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to
its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands
other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go
into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the
President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him
to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless
disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of
such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided,
That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
chanroble s virtual law
library
SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized
and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said
Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws
and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title
thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any
native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than
sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually
occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized
and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to
provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and
settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public
domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said
Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one
person, and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and
twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided,
That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at
once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of
not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not
alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall
not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the
distribution of the estates of decedents.
It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and
mineral lands are expressly excluded. If the Commission should pass laws
relating to mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it has done
(Act No. 624), their validity would not be determined by inquiring if they had
been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if they
were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In
other words, the fact that such laws were not submitted to Congress would not
necessarily make them void.
The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53

and 57 contain provisions. By section 57 this Government is authorized to
issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying into effect this and
preceding sections relating to mineral lands. Such regulations need not be
submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands,
was not submitted.
The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands
beloning to religious orders. Section 65 provides as to those lands as follows:
SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall
constitute a part and portion of the public property of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily
for a period not exceeding three years after their acquisition by said
Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the
limitations and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government shall have
the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings
within such reasonable time as may be determined by said Government.
Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a
submission to Congress of legislation concerning such land? If it does, then Act
No. 1120, which contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so
submitted.
Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with
such modifications and amendments as may be made by the Government of
said Islands, are hereby continued in force.
Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its
approval? If they must be, then Act No. 1148, relating thereto, is void,
because it was not so submitted.
It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and
coal lands, and lands bought from religious orders need not be submitted to
Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of
Congress relating to the same subjects, they are valid.
Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general

power all property acquired from Spain. When it required the Commision to
immediately classify the agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations
for their sale, we do not think that it intended to virtually repeal section 12.
Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the
Govenrment. If, notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in
any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the title of the Government to
public lands must be submitted to the President and Congress for approval,
the general power given by section 12 is taken away. An examination of some
of the laws of the Commission will show that a holding such as is contended
for by the Government in this case would apparently require a holding that
such other laws were also void. Act No. 496, which established the Court of
Land Registration, the court that tried this case, provides in section 38 that the
decrees of the court shall be conclusive on and against all persons, including
the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof. Neither the President
nor Congress ever gave their consent to this law. They never consented that
the title of the Government to public lands should be submitted to the
judgment of the courts of the Islands. That this law provides a means by which
the Government may be deprived of its property in such lands is apparent. In
this very case, if the Government had not appealed from the judgment, or if it
should withdraw its appeal, the lands would be lost to it--lands which the
Attorney-General claims are public lands. The land could not be more
effectually lost by the law shortening the statute of limitations than by this law
making the decrees of the Court of Land Registration binding on the
Government. In fact, the former law could not in any way prejudice the
Government if it were not for the latter law making the judgments of this court
binding upon it. Both of these laws in an indirect way affect the title to public
lands, but we do not think that for that reason they are included in the terms
"rules and regulations" used in section 13 of the act of Congress.
Act No. 1039 granted to the Province of Cavite and to the pueblo of Cavite
certain public lands. This act never was submitted either to the President or
Congress. Acts Nos. 660 and 732 authorized the leasing of parts of the San
Lazaro estate. The Government leased the sanitarium at Benguet, and
provided for its sale. None of these acts were ever submitted to the President
or Congress, which authorized such disposition. The Government owns many
isolated tracts of land, such as the Oriente Hotel, for example. It has reclaimed
from the sea a large tract of land in connection with the works of the port of
Manila. If the Government should desire to sell this reclaimed land or to lease
a part of it for the site of an hotel, or should desire to sell the Oriente Hotel
building, we do not think legislation to accomplish such purposes would
require the previous approval of the President and of Congress. The general
purpose of section 13 was to require the Government to classify agricultural
lands and to pass a homestead law - that is, a law which would state the rules
and regulations by virtue of which title to the public lands of which it can be
decided in every case whether an act of the Commission constitutes a rule or
regulation within the meaning of section 13. It is sufficient to say that the law
in question (Act No. 648), making a statute of limitations run against the
Government when the title to few scattered tracts of land throughout the
Archipelago is under consideration, is not such a rule or regulations as
required previous submission to the President and Congress. It will be
observed that be section 86 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, Congress
reserves the right to annul all legislation of the Commission.
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein
mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that although as to Act
No. 648 submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when
applied to one not a native of the Islands, because forbidden by this section;
and that this section limits the power of the Commission to declare possession
alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in
which the amount of land does not exceed 16 hectares.
Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It

includes mineral and timber lands. So far as it relates to proceedings
theretofore taken under Spanish laws its benefits are not limited to natives of
the Islands nor to tracts not more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only
claim is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August 13,
1898, is required, nor is proof of any possession whatever after that date
demanded. According to the strict letter of the section a native would be
entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in possession for the months
of July and August only of 1898. It is not stated whether or not one who
receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter, as
required by section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in
possession for the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to a patent in
preference to the actual settler spoken of in section 6. When legislating upon
the subject-matter of section 14, the Commission, in Act No. 926, did not
make such a limitation as has been suggested. Section 54, paragraph 6, of
that act is as follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public land, as defined by said act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provision of this chapter.
It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to
tracts not exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the power
of the Commission is so limited would require a holding that this section is void
as to foreigners and as to all tracts of land over 16 hectares in extent.
This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of

Act No. 648 and an extension of its provisions to all the lands of the
Islands.
To adopt the construction contended for would lead to an unjust result. By the
terms of the first part of section 14 the Commission has the power to perfect
the title to 100 hectares of land as to which a Spaniards may have done
nothing more than to file an application relating thereto, and of which he never
was in possession, while by the last party of the section the Commission would
be entirely without power to make any rules by which a native who by himself
and his ancestors had been in possession of 100 hectares. Such a
discrimination in favor of foreigners and against the natives could not have
been intended. It could not have been the purpose of Congress to give the
Commission ample power to legislate for the benefit of foreigners and to limit
its power to legislate for the benefit of natives.
The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a
construction that will be entirely free from objection. But we do not think that
authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16
hectares of land of which he was in possession during the month of August,
1898, was intended to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is
given to the Commission.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final judgment be entered in
accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the cause be remanded to the
lower court for proper procedure. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13756
January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.

VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MOIR, J.:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros,
the appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in this
appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small
portion of lot 1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants
had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused registration of the
parts of these lots to which opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The
claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to
this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots
1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of Hinigaran were possessed
by Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the
year 1880, and, after his death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were
planted and now exists and that these latter are not spontaneous plants
utilized by said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No.
1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed as owner by Bibiano
Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession
continued by his heirs who still enjoy the use of the land up to the present
time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot
1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and still exists, a fish
hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano
Jocson, as owners, for more than 27 years, not counting the prior
possession of their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and
1154 are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven by the sole and
absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of
spontaneous growth and in not planted; and , as the photographs only refer
to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding that
the whole lot was covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small
portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and the fish
hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with
rice and used as pasture land.
5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158,
covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land, and in not holding to
have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they
are drained at low tide; errors committed with manifest violation of law and
disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme Court
of the Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more than forty years, as
owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired
by prescription lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190,
section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to
private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and
appellants, in consideration of the possession they have had for more than
forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present
time, thus violating the legal provision whereby the holders of land who
have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment of the land
law, Act No. 926, by the United States Philippine Commission, are to be
deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have
applied for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all
the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the composition of titles;
and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question
should be adjudicated to the possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants,
the motion therefor being based on the ground that his findings of facts, if
there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main
question involved is whether manglares[mangroves] are agricultural lands or
timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere
occupation for ten years prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them
under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states
that lot 1104 was in possession of claimants and their ancestors for more than
thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to
be wholly "forestal." The are of the lots does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in
possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under a claim
of ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There
is not a word of proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up no
documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are
"mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing
on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond (vivero de
peces) which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is
pasture land, part palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied
registration are public forest and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all
"manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands
of the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of Congress
used the words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish
translation of that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation would be "terrenos madereros." Timber
land in English means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would
never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes,
shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."
The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at
two places there were trees growing on this land, but the forester who testified for
the Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which
are growing on the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there
are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general
character of the land from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber
lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in the
case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the
court said:
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented
substantially together, all being covered by one brief of the late AttorneyGeneral in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting
historical and graphic citations he described that part of the marginal
seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their
characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats,
alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered
plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate
there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists
naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the
useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal
lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the
sense in which the term is used in the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose
of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:
It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil.
Rep., 175).
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears
opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether
lands used as a fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland
some desistance from the sea, and asserted, thought not clearly proved, to
be overflowed at high tide, could be registered as private property on the
strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act
No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point decided was that such
land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was
agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that
Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three
classes it must be included in tone of the three, and being clearly neither
forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural
land.
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said
that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish
law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that
are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether
they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress
preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war
of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same,
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions
of this chapter.
xxx
xxx
xxx
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in
possession of agricultural public lands under the conditions mentioned in the
above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively
presumed to have a grant to such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of
title issued to them. (Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private
acquisition and ownership when it is fully proved that the possession has been
actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must
stand on its own merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few

loads of firewood from the lands occasionally. The possession must be more
complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and
their ancestors before that date, and they should have been declared the owners
and title should have been issued to them.
There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower
court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-13298
November 19, 1918
CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
Basilio Aromin for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of
parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the
plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable
tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in
the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to
obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on February
8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title
of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant
petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition
was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired
a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the
ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the
objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the
provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would
emphasize that for land to come under the protective gis of the Maura Law, it
must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and
that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the
land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not
agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to
80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following
the doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to
Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is
claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having

taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed.
(Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United
States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice
that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land
under color of title.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as
amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress
preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except
when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to
have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such
land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed.
The first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural
public land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated
only about one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1
of the Government, following:
The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land
described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire
tract of land?
lawphil.net
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is
that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213;
Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of
course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to
the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in
possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See
arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that
a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of
agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural
public land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of
July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find
in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is
variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral
land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes
nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the
land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on
numerous occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government
([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not
clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from
objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject
(Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does
exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It
was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means
"those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or
mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here,
again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the
purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in
public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director
of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With
reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in
the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural
growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word
"forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not
embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually
of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp.,
262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H.

Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be
found either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on
the other hand, to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It
may be necessary, for example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly
barren land which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it,
but which in the course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition
wide enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much that was not
wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to treegrowth, might (and indeed would be almost sure to) include a garden,
shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by
no means a mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts,
although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it
were and apparently unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are
as interdependent as any other beings and conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this
question of forest and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some
attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it
leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the certification as to what lands are for
agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau
has in its administration since the passage of this act construed this term to
mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to protect, for the
public good; waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable
for forestry in many instances in the past. The term 'timber' as used in
England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood
suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and
the application of new methods every plant producing wood has some
useful purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as
synonymous with forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to produce
wood, if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the financial
return that timber will or if the same land is needed for protection purposes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of
duly appointed boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide
what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural
purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as
allowable under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of
Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are considered as true forest
land. For instance, mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation under
ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would
destroy the big natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by
this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course,
examples exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been
terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even then the mountain
people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover
which they from experience have found protect their water supply. Certain
chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other tribes on the
opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other
tribes from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for
irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School,
remarked that if mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing with
the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look forward to
the time, remote it may be, yet equally discernible, when out kin having
wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it
has accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of
lands, in order to determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural
or forest purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different
phases of the conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously
prepared set of questions in which the different characters of the land under
inspection are discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and
timber mixed, dense forest.
If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares

under cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species
and estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage
of each species.
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable
for agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State
reasons in full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve
or communal forest? Description and ownership of improvements.
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the
claimant, his place of residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a
separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim.
When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been
applied for, the corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of
Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a
title is requested from the Court of Land Registration, and the inspection
shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of
Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all
data collected during the inspection and offering him the forest officer as a
witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the
limited time intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of
land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well
as the distance of the land in question greatly hinder the handling of this
work.
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by
means of his delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all
evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land, so that the
court may compare them with the alleged right by the claimant.
Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper
authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with
the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the
least as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the public or
private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character
should be established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on
the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the land, and by comparison
between this area, or different previously occupied areas, and those areas
which still preserve their primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there
should be conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The
prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the
fleeting moment must be restrained for the less spectacular but surer policy
which protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of
our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the
Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of
nature's powers by man for his own good." On the other hand, the presumption
should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very
apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the
large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of
the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that
the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of
public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen
and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the
Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is
not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it
may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion
of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere
formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to
the claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of
land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of
section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the
Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory
information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the
applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without
special finding as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19535
July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and

ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both
surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and
JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositorappellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR.,
private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositorsappellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City)
dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting
of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of
San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696
as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land
above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land
had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn
acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos
Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land
Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended,
on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous
and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years
immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the
parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same
Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez,
on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the
applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an
interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60)
years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession,
according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under the claim of
ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to
appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and
incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue
in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words,
the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and
that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision
of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its
opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been
declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss
by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is
declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be
the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only
the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free
patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands
nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by
applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case,
denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares
in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged
possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession
for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land
Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended
by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration
of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their
"imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least
thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous
case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first
alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor
had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the
land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory
title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the
proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial
confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and
hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the
claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have

performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the
necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that
they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for
its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
1wph1.t
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.

Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez For Appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla For Appellee

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G.R. No.

L-25010 October 27, 1926

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Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of

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G.R. No. L-24066

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-3793

February 19, 1908

CIRILO MAPA, petitioner-appellee,

G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906

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It is therefore requested that the land mentioned be forthwith brought under

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The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53

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Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

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Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general

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Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It

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This paragraph of section 54 of Act No. 926 is in substance a continuation of

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G.R. No. L-13756

January 30, 1919

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.

One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few

G.R. No. L-13298

November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares

G.R. No. L-19535

July 10, 1967

HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have

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