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POVERY ACTION NETWORK ETHIOPIA (PANE)

Research Report on:

THE IMPACT OF FOOD AID IN ETHIOPIA

Poverty Action Network of Civil Society in Ethiopia (PANE)

August 2006
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

FOREWORD

1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1.

The study

1.2.

Food aid and socio-economic development in Ethiopia

1.3.

Objectives of the study

1.4.

Methodology

1.5.

Scope and limitations of the study

2.

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REVIEW OF FOOD AID PRACTICES AND DONOR POLICIES IN ETHIOPIA

13

2.1.

The history of food aid

13

2.2.

Types of food aid

14

2.3.

Food aid monetisation practices and donor policies

15

2.4.

Food aid targeting

17

2.5.

Implementation by donors and government food aid assistance

19

2.5.1. Issues of implementation


2.5.2. The process of implementing humanitarian assistance
2.5.3. Institutional arrangements for food aid management and delivery

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20
22

3. REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT FOOD AID DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND


STRATEGIES
3.1.

Food aid policies, food security and agricultural development strategies

23
24

3.2.
The relationship between policies, strategies and programmes: food aid, food security and
agricultural and rural development
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4. REVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF FOOD AID: EXPERIENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND
INTERNATIONALLY
4.1 Impact of food aid on domestic production

31

4.2 Impact of food aid on imports

32

4.3 The disincentive literature

32

4.4 Economic impact

33

31

4.5 The effect of food aid on livelihoods, labour allocation and food purchasing

36

4.6 Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable groups

37

4.7

Food aid and dependency

39

5.1

Food production, food security and food aid in the study woredas

40

5.2

Food aid practices and targeting mechanisms

45

5.2.1.
5.2.2.

5.3

Food aid needs assessments, appeal processes and distribution


Beneficiary targeting mechanisms

The impact of food aid

5.3.1.
5.3.2.
5.3.3.
5.3.4.
5.3.5.
5.3.6.
5.3.7.

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47

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The contribution of food aid to livelihood and asset creation


The impact of food aid on biodiversity and the environment
The impact of food aid on local production and product markets
The impact of food aid on the dietary habits of the beneficiaries
Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable community groups
The impact of food aid on community disaster coping mechanisms and informal social protections
Food aid and dependency

5.3.8 Measures suggested by communities to overcome food shortage and insecurity

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6. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES, FOOD AID


ACTIVITIES AND THEIR EFFECTS IN STUDY WOREDAS
59
6.1

Food production, food security and food aid in the study locations

59

6.2

Food aid practices and targeting mechanisms

62

6.2.1.
6.2.2.

Perceptions of causes of food insecurity and history of food aid


Assessment of food aid beneficiary targeting mechanisms

62
67

6.3

Allocation of food aid and perception of its effects

69

6.4

Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable community groups

71

7.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1
7.1.1.
7.1.2.
7.1.3.

7.2

Summary and conclusion

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73

Review of literature on the impact of food aid


Qualitative assessment of key informants and focus group discussions
Quantitative assessment based on household surveys

Recommendations on the way forward

REFERENCES
ANNEXES

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1

Acronyms
AEZ

Agro Ecological Zones

ADLI

Agricultural Development Led Industrialization

BOARD

Bureau of Agricultural and Rural Development

BOP

Balance of Payment

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

DA

Development on Agriculture

DPPC

Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission

DFSR

Emergency Food Security Reserve

EGS

Employment Generation Schemes

EMOP

Emergency Operation for Short Term

ESFR

Ethiopian Strategic Food Reserve

EU

European Union

FAO

Food and Agricultural Organization

FFW

Food for work

FD

Free Distribution

FSCB

Food Security Coordination Bureau

IFPRI

International Food Policy Research

IV

Instrumental Variable

MOARD

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

NPDPM

The National Policy on Disaster Prevention management

PASDEP

Participatory & Accelerated Sustainable Development to End


Poverty

PIM

Program Implementation Manuals

PRRO(s)

Potential Relief and Recovery Operation(s)

PRSDP

Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development Program

PSNP

Productive Safety Net Program

UNICEF

United Nations Childrens Fund

WFP

World Food Program

Acknowledgments
The Poverty Action Network of civil society organisations in Ethiopia (PANE) would like to thank
all the organisations and individuals who have contributed towards the fruition of this study. Firstly,
we would like to acknowledge Comic Relief (ACORD), Dan Church Aid, and Trocaire- CAFOD
for funding the project. Without their generous financial support, generating the important
information contained in this study would have been impossible.

Secondly, we are grateful to the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) for sub-contracting this
study. Their efforts in designing survey instruments, collecting and processing data and reporting
are much appreciated. Special thanks go to Dr Berhanu Adnew, senior researcher with EEA, for
implementing the study, analysing the data, writing the report, and presenting it at national and
regional consultations. The office of the director, Dr Assefa Admasie, provided the overall
institutional support for realising the study. The assistance of data entry clerks and the editor is also
sincerely acknowledged.

PANEs Policy Research and Dialogue Core Group reviewed the research proposal, delegated their
branch managers to facilitate the sampling processes at field level, and monitored the research
process. We very much appreciate this effort. Girma Aboma, Research and Dialogue Officer,
coordinated the whole study and his efforts are much appreciated. Tewodros Abate,
Communications and Information Officer, is also gratefully acknowledged for his contributions in
presenting the findings at woreda and regional levels, preparing press releases, and presenting
summary of the consultation at national level. Our acknowledgement also goes to all other
secretariat staff as they have considerable input in realizing the study in one or the other ways
including Ato Eshetu Bekele, the Executive Director, in giving directions for the proper
implementation of the study; Zemedkun Abebe, administration & finance officer, in giving
administrative & financial supports; Etaferaw Semere, office manager & admin assistant, in making
telephone calls & arranging federal consultation; and the drivers in driving and arranging venue
during the woreda, regional and federal consultations.

The cooperation of various federal government offices, civil society organisations (CSOs) and food
aid agencies deserves appreciation. Various line ministries and administrative organs at zonal and
woreda levels in the majority of the study woredas facilitated this survey and provided the
necessary data. Our special thanks go to the bureaux of agriculture and rural development, disaster
prevention and preparedness, food security and woreda administration councils for their support and
willingness to facilitate the survey work. The rural households, kebele leaders, community leaders,
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elders and key informants provided us with the benefits of their wisdom and endurance by telling us
their stories about food aid practices and the challenges they faced in drought and famine situations.
We hope this study will contribute to informed policy dialogue and measures to improve their
livelihoods.

We are also grateful to the survey supervisors and enumerators who have shouldered the burden of
practical difficulties, such as the after effects of the election, and recording the diverse data sets. In
this respect, we appreciate the support of different organisations working in the study locations,
including World Vision, Save the Children UK, Care International and Agri-Service.

Foreword
This report illustrates the historical evolution of food aid, its targeting practices and the impact it
has in light of various variables. It also presents a review of food aid and other related policies in
Ethiopia. It is our belief that previous studies lacks policy discourse at various levels and, as a
result, both government and non-state actors do not have a common understanding about the pros
and cons of food aid targeting and its likely impact in the country. This study could also serve as a
basis for further studies and discussions on the subject.
This study has identified some major causes of food insecurity, problems related with targeting
practices, as well as the impact of food aid at both macro and micro levels. Poverty Action Network
Ethiopia had held dialogue forums at various levels (district, regional, national and international)
for the key actors involved in food aid to promote the development of an appropriate food aid and
food security policy, and thereby enhance the effectiveness of food aid in Ethiopia. Furthermore,
this study intends to support civil society groups to produce policy briefing papers on the critical
issue of food aid for use in advocacy work.
PANE hopes that the findings of this study will be important for key food aid actors, national and
international, to revise their strategies on food aid to further target intended beneficiaries and avoid
badly functioning programmes. We will ensure that the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Commission, the highest federal body for relief operations, is made aware of the policy implications
emerging from the study to work on the recommendations to improve the targeting and distribution
strategies.
Food aid issues involve long and complex processes rather than problems that can be solved by
simple interventions. PANE plans to continue to build networks among key stakeholders, so that the
strengths and weaknesses of processes and approaches can be shared and ongoing joint measures
implemented, using a bottom-up approach. We hope that by enhancing discourse, we can
contribute to more informed policy formulation and its proper implementation at the grassroots
level, in order to better the livelihoods of the target groups.
Finally, we want to express our sincere thanks to Comic Relief (ACORD), Dan Church Aid and
Trocaire- CAFOD for supporting this study by covering the project costs. Our appreciation also
goes to the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, the contractor of this study, for taking up
both the desk and survey research, and to the Research & Dialogue Core Group and other PANE
members for their input and cooperations.

Eshetu Bekele
Executive Director

Part I: Background and review1

1. Introduction
1

The opinions contained in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the EEA/EEPRI or PANE.

1.1. The study


This study has been undertaken for Poverty Action Network Ethiopia (PANE), who wanted to carry
out research on the historical trends and impacts of food aid in relation to domestic food production,
food habits, gender, age and other characteristics of food aid recipients. The study was conducted in
six regional states; Amhara (South Gonder, South Wollo and North Showa zones); Oromiya (West
and East Hararghe zones); Tigray (Central and Northern zones); Afar (Zone 1); Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) (North Omo Zone); and Somali (Shininle Zone). This study is
based on a review of available reports and documents; analysis of official secondary data; a survey
of food aid beneficiary communities and households in sample study woredas; and interviews with
organisations and agencies concerned with food aid management and distribution.

The purpose of the study is to provide input for policy dialogue forums at national and regional
levels. The study is also expected to help develop a position by civil society on the critical issue of
food aid, so as to advocate for appropriate food aid policy in Ethiopia.

1.2. Food aid and socio-economic development in Ethiopia

Owing to a persistent failure to produce sufficient food for a growing population and overcome
recurrent food shortages, Ethiopia has been heavily reliant on food aid for many decades. The single
strongest indicator of the precarious food security situation in Ethiopia is the rising trend of
dependence on foreign food aid. Due to insufficient food supply from domestic production, a
significant proportion of the Ethiopian population continue to face difficulties in meeting their basic
food requirements. According to a USAID report (1998, #1), the amount of food aid as a share of
Ethiopias foreign exchange earnings grew from about 2% in 1954 to over 40% by the mid-1990s
(Berhanu, 2004). Food aid is a response to acute food shortages, which mainly occur after drought,
as well as the chronic food shortages faced in many areas of the country. In just 20 years, between
1984 and 2003, 10 incidences of drought were registered in Ethiopia.

Drought and famine are the major drives of foreign food aid flow to Ethiopia. The national food
security profile, compiled by the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC), shows
that over a period of two and half decades the proportion of Ethiopians that have been affected by
drought and famine rose from 4% in the 1970s to over 20% during 2002/ 2003 (EEA/EEPRI, 2004).
Although this trend is clearly affected by recurrent adverse weather conditions, it is also a sign of
the deteriorating food production capacity and coping mechanisms in the country. Over the last
three to four decades, a large proportion of the population has been affected by drought and famine,
with variations from year to year. The share of the population affected by drought grew at a rate of
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2.6% per annum until 1991, and increased to 4.63% per annum then after. As a result, in 2002/ 2003
food aid requirements to mitigate the impact of drought and famine reached its highest ever level of
1.4 million metric tons (MT), compared to only 0.4 MT in 1990. Relief food requirement was at an
average volume of 850,000 MT per year for the period 1990 to 2004.

Figure 1.1. Food aid inflow to Ethiopia from 1970 to 2003


1,300,000
1,200,000
1,100,000
1,000,000

Creals, total

900,000
800,000
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000

Other foods

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70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
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90
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92
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94
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96
19
98
20
00
20
02

Volume (MT)

100,000

Year

Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

The FAO has documented the trend of food aid inflow to Ethiopia over the past three and half
decades. Their data shows a significant increase over time, with some annual fluctuations (Figure
1.1). The volume of food aid rose from 3,400 MT in 1970 to a peak of 1.2 million MT in 2002/ 03,
the most recent drought affected year.

Figure 1.2. The volume of food aid inflow as a percent of total domestic grain food
production (1974-2001)
25.00

20.00

15.00

10.00

Percent

5.00

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76
19
78
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80
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82
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84
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86
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88
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90
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92
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94
19
96
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98
20
00

0.00

Year

Source: Computed based on data from Central Statistics Authority (production) and FAO (food aid)

The share of volume of food aid as a percentage of domestic grain food production has also been
rising over time, with some fluctuations (Figure 1.2.). Food aid as a percent of total grain
production reached a peak of 20% in 1984 and 18.4% in the year 20002.

The trend of increasing volumes of food aid reveals that food aid has become a routine activity over
a period of many years, which must have significant socio-economic and behavioural impacts on
the recipient households and communities, and at national level. Forms and strategies of food aid
have changed over the years and become part of the daily activities of many government bodies,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors. In addition to saving lives directly, food aid
has become an important component of development resources and a significant source of publicworks-based employment at community level.

This study assessed the diverse impact of food aid in Ethiopia in order to assist with public policy
dialogue to improve domestic food production capacity and food aid policy.

1.3. Objectives of the study

An earlier study (Clay et al, 1998) reported that the annual volume of cereal food aid in Ethiopia has ranged between
3.5% and 26% of total domestic food grain production over the period 1985-1996.

This research aims at achieving two broad objectives and related specific objectives:
1.

To investigate the impact of food aid across age and gender groups, including:

To assess trends of food production in relief prone areas across farming systems (crop,
livestock, etc) and gender groups

To examine the extent to which food aid has contributed to livelihoods across farming
systems, gender and age groups, including dependency

To assess the extent to which community copying mechanisms and informal social
protections have been affected, and in what ways

To examine the changes in dietary habits of communities receiving regular amounts of


food aid across gender groups

To examine the extent to which food aid is manipulated for purposes other than
amelioration of food security

To measure the impact of food aid on biodiversity and the environment

To examine decision making processes and the impact of food aid with respect to the
rights of men, women and children in the production process; specifically:

Onset of food shortages, official assessment, declaration of disaster, and response


(actual food delivery) in terms of a timeline

Voice of the affected population, across gender groups, in expressing their demand
(type, amount, duration) and how the decision makers respond

Targeting practices, e.g. priority for the poorest, and the participation and
representation of the most affected in the selection process

Whether food aid is treated as a form of charity or as a response to peoples basic


human rights to access food within decision making bodies at woreda, regional and
federal levels

2. To analyse the national food aid policy, in particular:


To examine the relationship between official food aid policies and emerging food security
strategies and programmes on the one hand, and other agricultural strategies on the other
To forward appropriate recommendations for improving food aid and agricultural policies
in the future

1.4. Methodology
This study consists of two major components. One is an intensive review of literature in the area of
food aid and development. The second major component is survey of rural food aid beneficiaries,
and other stakeholders. For this purpose 10 woredas were selected from the six regional states
covered by the study (see table 1.1 and the map below).
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Table 1.1. Sample woredas selected for survey


Region

Woreda

Amhara

Simada
Lagambo
Lalomama Midir
Oromiya Gola Odana
Darolebu
Tigray
Tsede Amba
Tayeta Maichew
Afar
Asaita
Somali
Shininle
SNNPR Humbo
Total

Zone
South Gonder
South Wollo
North Shoa
East Hararghe
West Hararghe
North Tigray
Central Tigray
Zone 1
Shininle
North Omo

Number of surveyed
Households
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
1000

In consultation with PANE and its partner NGO organisations, ten food aid recipient woredas were
identified. From a list of woredas supplied, the researchers selected the sample woredas taking into
account balanced representation and diversity of agro-ecologies, farming systems, drought history
and food aid practices.

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The survey team, composed of 10 field supervisors and 70 enumerators, conducted the fieldwork in
December 2005. In consultation with woreda bureaux of disaster prevention and preparedness, and
agriculture and rural development, the survey team selected two kebeles (smallest administrative
unit) for the household survey. During the selection, care was taken to minimise bias by kebele
leaders. The team made sure that the two kebeles surveyed must differ in some aspects, such as crop
production/ livestock production; more aid/ less aid; long duration of aid/ recent recipients.

Households were randomly selected for interview. It was originally planned to conduct a wealth
ranking in the process of household selection. Accordingly, teams were instructed to diversify the
sample households across different wealth groups. However, it was also felt that this could lead to
serious problems under certain circumstances, where households or community members may feel
that revealing their wealth status could jeopardise their access to food aid. Nevertheless, depending
on the situation, the team leaders in some woredas carried out wealth ranking in some cases for the
purpose of household selection. The plan was to interview 1000 households, but final number
achieved was 961 households. In Gola Odana woreda of Eastern Hararghe Zone, the survey team
leader was imprisoned by the police and could not conduct the planned 100 interviews.

Different survey instruments were prepared and tested before the survey was conducted. Structured
interview questionnaires for households, and checklist for key informants and focus group
discussions were employed, and are included as annexes to this document. The available secondary
data on productive resources, agriculture, local development, food aid distribution, etc. were
collected by the survey team leaders as far as available, although not all woredas could provide the
required information.

The data was edited, processed and compiled before analysis for report writing. The database was
prepared in SPSS format.

1.5. Scope and limitations of the study

This study relies on a one shot survey of rural food aid beneficiaries and other stakeholders to get
the primary data and information. It was not possible to ensure access to secondary data of the type,
depth, and quality needed for food aid impact analysis. The coverage and depth of analysis is
determined by the availability of some of the critical secondary data and information. This study
cannot claim that the selected sample woredas are nationally representative as regards food aid
practices and impacts. However, it is believed that the study woredas and communities present a
good sample of the diverse circumstances and experiences across the country.
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One of the main limitations of this study relates to data availability, especially secondary data at all
levels. There is no way to adequately verify the quality of food aid related secondary data. It was
not possible to obtain disaggregated data by food aid type and beneficiaries; by gender, age, social
group, etc. Secondary data could not be obtained at all from some of the sample woredas Gola
Odana and Darolebu in Oromiya, Shininle in Somali, and Asaita in Afar. Despite appeals by field
workers for cooperation in providing whatever secondary data available, it was not successful in
these five woredas. Due to the lack of secondary data at woreda level, assessment of the amount of
food aid reaching beneficiaries could not be adequately carried out.

Given the behavioural factors and memory limitations of the sample respondents, a one-off survey
cannot be expected to fully reflect reality. This is particularly the case regarding responses about
household data, such as food production, income and expenses. As mentioned above, in the process
of sampling households for the survey, field supervisors were instructed to conduct wealth ranking
to help select households of diverse socio-economic status. However, due to the fear that
community members would consider this a threat to their access to food aid, wealth ranking was not
carried out fully in household sampling.

Some of the sample study woredas were not cooperative during the survey work. For instance, in
Gola Odana Woreda, East Hararghe Zone,Oromiya, the survey supervisor was imprisoned for ten
days, despite producing official communications with the woreda authorities, including a letter of
cooperation. After many efforts he was released but could not cover all the sample households and
managed to complete only 58 interviews. The woreda office did not have secondary data so it was
requested from the West Hararghe Zone Bureau of Agriculture. However, the zonal office did not
cooperate in supplying the required data.

Given that food aid has been distributed for many years in the sample study woredas, it is natural
that household responses to enquiries were very much influenced by their expectations created by
the long-term presence of aid agencies. It may be said that the study was ambitious in trying to
obtain information about some aspects of the impact of food aid, for example, the effect of food aid
on bio-diversity, which are not easy to discover given the level of data and perception of
community members.

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2. Review of food aid practices and donor policies in Ethiopia


2.1. The history of food aid
Historically the primary motive of food aid has been humanitarian, i.e. to reduce famine and
suffering, but political motives have also been involved. After the Second World War food aid
became a regular feature of international development programmes. For instance, under the
Marshall Plan, the USA transferred huge amounts of resources, including food aid, in particular to
Europe in order to rebuild the continent. Food aid was also used to promote major US trading
partners, to open up new markets for American products and to reduce accumulated surplus food.
While the USA was the leading food aid donor in the 1960s, the European Union (EU) was the
largest food aid donor in the 1990s.

This study did not come across documentation that specified when food aid began in Ethiopia, but
food aid is largely associated with recent drought and famine periods. Among the natural disasters
that occur in Ethiopia, drought and famine are the most documented, and have become part of the
recent history of human misery in the country. As reviewed in some reports, the history of famine in
Ethiopia caused by drought goes back to the 11th century. Some even suggest that it occurred as
early as 253 B.C. In 1985 the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, quoting C. A. Wood, stated that
between 1900 and the present day about 18 periods of famine are recorded (EEA/EEPRI, 2004).
The later part of the Imperial regime experienced severe drought, predominantly in the northern and
north eastern parts of the country, especially Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo. Added to the cumulative
effects of land degradation and poor agricultural base, other factors such as conflict aggravated the
vulnerability of the population in these areas.

Food aid in Ethiopia became notable after the 1972/ 73 famine. Reports show that even before
official acknowledgment of drought and famine at that time, the international community was only
able to respond in a piecemeal fashion through missions, international organisations such as
UNICEF, and NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children that had permanent field staff in
Ethiopia (EEA/EEPRI, 2004). In May 1973 the Christian Relief Committee, now called Christian
Relief and Development Association (CRDA), was formed to coordinate famine relief projects and
food aid from foreign donors. After 1974, the military government, the Derg, tried to manage relief
activities by establishing the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). The establishment of
RRC gave foreign agencies a point of contact, although its functions were constrained by many
factors including lack of roads, food handling facilities, transportation, and high fuel costs3. Apart

Ibid

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from some nutritional surveillance programmes, there was no early warning system during that
period.
2.2. Types of food aid
There are three types of food aid delivery in Ethiopia: project food aid, emergency food aid and
programme food aid. All three types have historically taken two major forms: free distribution (FD),
which is generally categorised as emergency distribution, and food-for-work (FFW), which attracts
labour to work on creating assets in the process of channelling food to needy areas.
Project food aid: This type of food aid comprises food-for-work4 in which food aid is used as a
wage; supplementary feeding projects targeted at groups with inadequate levels of nutrition; projects
aimed at the establishment of food nutrition; projects aimed at the establishment of food reserves both
for emergency relief and market stabilisation; and other uses, primarily institutional and support of
training programmes.

In other words, this type of aid typically takes the form of development projects such as food-for
work projects or school feeding. Food-for-work programmes employ the otherwise jobless or
underemployed (when successfully targeted) in the enhancement of agriculture, e.g. building
irrigation systems, and infrastructure projects, such as road building. Through school feeding, students
with strong attendance records are provided with lunch or rations to motivate higher school
enrolment.

The largest food-for-work programme in Ethiopia, which is also the biggest food-for-work scheme in
Africa, is Project 2488 run by the UN World Food Programme (WFP)5. This was established in 1980
as a culmination of other WFP food for-work projects that had been running during the late 1970s.
The main objectives are the rehabilitation of forest, grazing and agricultural lands, which involves
land terracing, tree plantation and other improvements to farmers own land. Activities are designed to
increase future yields by reducing land degradation, and thereby improve food security. Similar
activities are still going on in many areas of the country.

Emergency food aid: As the name implies, emergency food is meant for people that have been
stricken by a natural event, such as drought, flood or earthquake, and people who have been displaced
4

Food-for-work (FFW) is meant mainly for carrying out public works programmes, where wages are paid in food rather
than cash. The provision of employment and income and the creation of assets are involved as well as supplying food
aid
5
In Ethiopia the food-for-work programmes assisted by the World Food Programme, United Nations Development
Programme/ Food and Agriculture Organisation and other organisations spent millions of dollars in soil conservation
works during the 1980s (Berhanu, 2001).

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by war. Among others, food, clothing, provision of fresh water, treatment of survivors and injured
persons, and protection against diseases like cholera and typhus are components of emergency
operations. It includes short-term emergency operations (EMOPs) and protracted relief and recovery
operations (PRROs). EMOPs distribute food in the very short term to alleviate famine and PRROs are
established when natural disasters necessitate longer-term responses.

Programme food aid: This kind of food aid primarily provides budget and/ or balance of payment
support. Food aid in this case is not intended to compete with commercial imports, but experience has
shown that commercial imports have actually been replaced.

2.3. Food aid monetisation practices and donor policies

Food aid monetisation refers to the sale, in part or in full, of food commodities delivered by donors
to the recipient country in order to generate cash required for running costs and for financing
development schemes. Traditionally food aid has been monetised in Ethiopia on a limited scale in
order to cover internal transport storage and handling costs. Hence, food aid monetisation was
initially conceived as a source of finance needed for operating costs associated with distribution in
kind. It also involved the purchase of inputs for food-aid projects and other development
programmes. USAID, the EU and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) sponsored
projects have monetised food aid components.

The advocates of food aid monetisation have several arguments to support their views, including:

Monetisation promotes the market process in subsistence economies

It facilitates government efforts towards food reserves and food security measures

Monetisation can help create much needed revolving funds at the disposal of vulnerable groups

Institutionalisation of food aid monetisation supports the development of private sector trade

There is fiscal benefit for the government from profit taxes, resulting from the expansion of
trade

The funds can readily be used to respond to need in times of disaster

Monetisation enhances a shift from limited traditional food aid projects to projects with higher
developmental impact

On the other hand, there are arguments in favour of direct food distribution in kind, such as:

Direct distribution in kind has a self-targeting advantage for the most vulnerable groups;
children and women

Due care is needed to cushion local food production and markets from competition and price
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distortion

Food aid is generally perceived as a vehicle for resource transfer to poor countries, particularly to
those that frequently experience local food deficits. Different donor organisations and countries
adopt different modalities regarding the sale of project food aid and programme food aid. There is
concern about how best to utilise such resources for sustainable economic development in recipient
countries.

Donors have different food aid policy for recipient countries. According to Tapio-Bistrom (2001),
food aid policies and operations have changed greatly over the past fifty years. Food aid has become
more and more diversified in terms of donors, commodities and policy objectives. In the 1950s and much
of the 1960s, the United States was the dominant donor. With the establishment of the World Food
Programme (WFP), food aid became partly multilateral, especially from the 1970s onwards. With the
signing of the Food Aid Convention in 1967, the number of donors increased substantially, making
food aid much less dependent on one single donor.

Currently major food aid donors to Ethiopia include the EU, USAID, WFP and CIDA. CIDAs food
aid principles are that food should be primarily directed to meeting the food needs of target groups
and other financial costs should be separately solicited from the official development assistance
budget. Monetisation may be exercised, depending on circumstances, if it can be proved that it
would be an efficient means for income transfer, stabilise food prices and promote local market
development. CIDAs food aid budget is delivered to beneficiaries through the WFP and/ or NGO
channels, depending on the comparative advantage in a particular situation.

The EUs food aid assistance largely aims to address inter-related structural problems. The first
objective is to contribute towards filling the supply-demand gap through imports of food aid and the
promotion of domestic assistance to vulnerable groups with need for cash, through employment and
income generating activities such as cash-for-work and/ or food-for-work. Secondly, their approach
aims at stimulating domestic production through local purchase of food that is in excess of market
demand.

The WFP has been operating in Ethiopia for over three decades. The WFP prefers direct distribution
of food commodities to beneficiaries in both development projects and relief operations, to
monetisation. The reasons for their preference of direct distribution are the self-targeting merits of
distribution in kind for the poor, its minimal adverse effects on local food production and market
distortion, and the practical problems associated with the management, accountability and
16

programming of funds generated from monetisation. In principle, however, there is no regulation


that excludes monetisation of food aid commodities, and food aid is partly monetized by the WFP.
Depending on circumstances, the WFP also pursues other courses of action, including local
purchase, food security measures, and price stabilisation programmes. Of these alternative courses
of action, WFP particularly encourages regional trade and local purchases for three reasons: lower
unit costs leading to greater quantities of food, proximity to point of delivery and consideration of
dietary habits of recipients.

USAID delivers food aid to food deficit countries under three streams: Titles I, II and III. Title I is
government-to-government programme food delivery on concessional terms. Title II encompasses
all food grants earmarked for specific development programmes and Title III refers to programme
food aid in support of balance of payments deficits or government budget. The US policy
encourages monetisation, in order to generate financial inputs to development programmes and to
enhance income transfer efficiency of food aid through cash for work, promote local and national
market development and stabilise food prices. There are certain conditions that a monetisation
proposal must fulfil for approval. The proposal should include details of the proposed project,
objectives and intervention strategies and must clearly justify that it will not produce any significant
disincentive effect on domestic production, market operation, prices or private trade. In other
words, the market study should clearly justify that there is a gap between domestic supply of the
commodity and private traders or government parastatals.

In summary, food aid programmes take different forms, aimed at solving food shortage problems at
different levels, from acute to chronic shortages. In Ethiopia the forms of aid evolved from direct
food aid through food-for-work to the recent cash-for-work. The non-direct forms of aid emerged as
a result of the need to use aid resources for development beyond mitigating acute food shortages.
Forms of food such as monetised food can help to transfer resources to support development
programmes. Food aid donors have their own respective policies and rationales that affect the way
they deliver food aid assistance.

2.4. Food aid targeting

Food aid may be classified according to mode of distribution and mode of procurement. There are two
major types of food aid distribution: programme and targeted. A recipient government sells
programme food aid to its citizenry. Targeted food aid is distributed for free to those citizens judged
to be in need of food aid. Targeting refers to the effort made to get food aid into the hands of the
hungry people. In Jaspars and Youngs study (as cited in Jayne et al., 2000) food aid targeting is
17

defined as restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk,
in order to maximize the benefit of the intervention whilst minimising the cost. Most at risk can be
defined in various ways and may have numerous dimensions. In the assessment of identifying the
most at risk population, income is agreed by most analysts to be an imperfect measure of need.
However, it is arguably the best single indicator of need in the absence of more detailed
anthropometric information. Empirical assessments indicate that household income tends to be related
to nutritional status (height and weight) and at least partially related to nutritional intake, especially
among the poor, according to Strauss and Thomass study (as cited in Jayne et al., 2000) .

Targeted food aid is typically multilateral; it involves many donor countries and is distributed through
an international organisation such as the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP was formed with
the goal of counteracting any possible disincentive effects on local agriculture in recipient countries
by providing targeted food aid and implementing food aid for agricultural development projects. All
WFP food aid is targeted and may be further differentiated as being either emergency or project food
aid (Clay et al., 1998).

Efficient food aid targeting, as defined above, includes only those intended to benefit. However, food
aid interventions vary considerably and therefore there are differences in how, and how well, targeting
is carried out. Important differences can be found in the type of intervention (free food, employment
generating schemes, food-for-work), the means used to identify the target group (self-administrative
or community targeting), the type and amount of benefits associated with the intervention (kg of
wheat or sorghum, litres of cooking oil), and the timing of the intervention.

Types of food aid targeting: there are four broad categories of targeting mechanisms, three of which
are applicable to food-for-work projects (Clay et al., 1998):

1. Administrative targeting applies a specific set of criteria, which qualify members of a household
for participation. Typical criteria might be income-based, according to the size of land holding,
nutritional status and/ or gender-based. This approach has the potential to select the most vulnerable
households, but it is both time- and resource-consuming and also opens the possibility of leakages
through corruption.

2. Self-targeting projects offer a level of payment, which is low enough that only the most needy will
want to participate. This minimises the costs incurred in selecting beneficiaries, but may ultimately
undermine the project objectives of providing adequate welfare to the most vulnerable if wages are
too low to support a family. On the other hand, if the wages are too high, there are likely to be more
18

volunteers than the project can accommodate.

3. Community targeting allows individuals who feel they should qualify to put themselves forward to
participate, while the final selection decision rests with a committee made up of community members.
Community targeting assumes that community members already know their neighbours' situation and
have an inherent understanding of vulnerability. Using this knowledge avoids expensive and lengthy
administrative procedures, but difficulties may arise in determining who is an appropriate community
representative for the group that works in targeting process.

In food aid beneficiary targeting, the question is how effectively can the most needy people be
targeted and by which approach. The process of selecting the most effective targeting strategy or
approach is important, since most design and delivery issues have a direct relationship with the
effectiveness of the chosen targeting mechanism. Many issues, including religious, cultural and
political factors, may further complicate the targeting process.

2.5. Implementation by donors and government food aid assistance

2.5.1. Issues of implementation

Coordination body: In Ethiopia, humanitarian assistance programme activities are usually


implemented through the coordinated efforts of the government, United Nations humanitarian
organisations, NGOs and the Red Cross, with the necessary donor financial support. Coordination
with the Food Security Coordination Bureau is critical to ensure that the needs of the chronically
and acutely food insecure are met through different mechanisms so that no households fall through
the cracks.

Targeting: National Food Aid Targeting Guidelines were first issued in 2000, after their
development by the DPPC and international partners. These guidelines have been adapted for the
safety net system, as described in the Programme Implementation Manuel (PIM). Geographical
targeting is based on multi-agency assessment, which identifies the approximate number of people
and duration of assistance for each woreda. The allocation for the woreda is targeted at community
level to the most vulnerable households. Household targeting involves the direct participation of the
community, assisted by nutritional surveys in targeting of supplementary food. When it is deemed
necessary to distribute food to other areas due to changed circumstances, the DPPC, in consultation
with concerned donors, retargets food resources.

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Monitoring and evaluation: the DPPC and the relevant sectors and regions, to ensure timely,
coherent and coordinated action, usually monitor emergency responses jointly. This includes
overseeing humanitarian activities, tracking emergency contributions, managing early warning
information and organising annual assessments, among others. Monitoring of sector emergency
activities is the responsibility of respective line ministries. Food aid appeals are reviewed mid-year
and evaluated at year-end in order to adjust requirements.

The commodity tracking system of WFP/ DPPC is meant to monitor and report on food dispatches
from the port to warehouses and distribution sites. WFP/ DPPC compare food allocations against
requirements and allocations against dispatches by woreda, including NGO and bilateral
contribution. Relief agencies undertake periodic food utilisation studies, complementing regular
post-distribution monitoring by DPPC and relief agency sub-offices.

2.5.2. The process of implementing humanitarian assistance

Institutional contributions to appeals: The DPPCs primary mandate is to respond to the food and
other basic needs of people affected by acute, unpredictable disasters. Under emergency appeal
circumstances, it manages the food component only for people affected by disasters.
Implementation details in the appeal apply only to emergency food requirements. Resources for
emergency food operations are mobilised through bilateral donor contributions to the DPPC and
contributions channelled through WFP or NGOs. In each case, emergency food activities are
coordinated and implemented through the framework of multi-agency assessments led by the
DPPC.

Resource mobilisation: The DPPC coordinates efforts to provide accurate and timely information
to donors and the media. United Nations agencies and NGOs provide their support to ensure that
adequate resources are mobilised for the emergency.

Local purchases and cereal availability study: In recent years cereals, pulses and blended food
have been purchased locally for humanitarian operations in Ethiopia. The availability of cereals for
local purchase is assessed by a cereal availability study. Local purchases encourage farmers
production through timely access to market and better prices. Production capacity for some blended
foods is said to be increasing. Local purchases are normally subject to prices equivalent to import
prices and should also meet schedules for timely distribution or repayment obligations to the
emergency food security reserve (EFSR).

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Relief operation process: the steps involved in relief operation process can be described as
following:
1. The early warning - crop production and aid needs - assessment leads to area targeting and
determination of the number of beneficiaries by the woreda
2. The confirmed donor pledges dictate the final beneficiary numbers decided by the woreda
3. The final beneficiary numbers and area targeting are translated into a list of beneficiaries
4. The resource transportation and distribution process follows after the food is delivered to the
distribution sites
5. Distribution reporting finalises the relief operation

The process of translating area targeting into a list of specific beneficiaries involves various steps and
procedures (see Chart 1 in Annex). On the basis of the results of early warning information about
crop production and food supply, food deficit areas are identified and the final number of
beneficiaries is determined by the woreda in all the affected regions. The DPPC will launch an appeal
and on the basis of confirmed donor pledges, it will inform the regions of the final approved number
of beneficiaries. As per the administrative hierarchy, the approved beneficiary numbers will be
transmitted to the respective regions disaggregated by region, zone and woreda, and food is allocated
according to the confirmed pledges. Based on the approved number of beneficiaries for whom food
will be allocated, a list of specific beneficiaries is identified at kebele/ tabia level.

Food storage and transportation: The Ethiopian Food Security Reserve (EFSR) makes basic food
readily available for use in the initial stage of food shortages, until the food can be supplied through
regular food appeals. EFSRs mandate is to stockpile a food reserve and it has stores in various
places, including Kombolcha, Mekele, Nazret, Dire Dawa and Shashemene.

There is a clear operating system with proper formats for transmitting information to the EFSR head
office (see the chart and box in annex 1). EFSR documents show the origin of the food supplies for
audit and inspection purposes, but once supplies are received, their origin is forgotten and they
becomes EFSR supplies.

Distribution up to local level: The DPPC and regional authorities determine food allocation plans
by woreda, based on assessed requirements. When resources are inadequate, prioritisation may be
necessary on the basis of current early warning data of a given period. Relief agencies may borrow
cereals from the EFSR against guarantee of a repayment. An established coordination system is in
place for DPPC, WFP, NGOs and the EFSR for food receipts, dispatches, loan withdrawals and
repayments. Donors normally make provision for costs for transport, storage and handling to final
21

food distribution points. Commercial transporters are contracted for primary and secondary
transportation. Woreda committees, composed of community members and local officials, manage
food distribution to beneficiaries after kebeles have targeted the households. Emergency food is
provided to able-bodied beneficiaries through food-for-assets activities where possible. If affected
households are unable to participate in food-for-work, rations are provided for free.

Ports, overland transport, warehousing and inland transport: Djibouti is the major port used by
Ethiopia to import food. The DPPC and EFSR have warehouse space to receive and promptly
offload relief cargo and also lease additional commercial storage if required.

2.5.3. Institutional arrangements for food aid management and delivery

Emergency aid distribution mechanisms: Direct food allocations are made in two stages: from
federal authorities to woredas, and then from woreda authorities to local kebeles who distribute the
food to beneficiaries. The administrative mechanisms used at each level are distinct. In the first
stage, the woreda administration determines the number of households in need within each woreda.
These assessments are given for revision to the zonal and regional administrations, and ultimately
the federal DPPC. After the DPPC sets the final estimate of need in each woreda, the federal government,
specifying the amount of food and number of households in need after aggregating across all woredas,
launches an appeal for food aid. However, it has been always the case that the amount of food aid pledged
by donors falls short of the requirements expressed in the appeal. This leads to further downward revision
of allocations to woredas6.

The second stage begins after the federal DPPC has finalised allocations to each woreda. Woreda
committees then assign allocations to individual kebeles within the woreda. The kebele leaders prepare a
list of beneficiary households against the assigned allocation, and distribution is carried out by elders and
community representatives of the kebele. The DPPC should not have control over the selection of
beneficiaries at kebele level. The critical element of this two-stage process is that while the amount of
food to be allocated to each woreda is determined at federal level (using input from local levels), the
actual beneficiaries are designated at local community, or kebele, level.

The existing relief operation: This refers to the hierarchy, role, relationships and responsibilities
of the various actors in food aid movement and distribution. The relief operation hierarchy follows
the government administrative hierarchy. At federal level the DPPC is the highest body, playing a

In many of the woredas included in this study, there were complaints that confirmed food aid arrivals are lower than
the requests made following local level assessments of need.

22

key role in relief operations. The subsequent government bodies are regional state offices, disaster
prevention and preparedness bureaus (DPPBs), zonal administration offices, disaster prevention and
preparedness desks (DPPDs) and woreda councils. As per the DPPC guidelines, the Woreda
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (WDPPC) is the ideal committee to oversee relief
operations and carry on the mandate of DPPBs and DPPDs at woreda level.

In accordance with national policy, DPPC is the official government institution that coordinates the
planning and implementation of relief activities. Following the federal structure of the country, the
actual implementation of the food distribution is undertaken by the DPPBs through DPPDs, woreda
councils and local level committees at kebele (tabia in Tigray Region) level. As per the federal setup,
DPPBs are directly responsible to regional state administrations and as such there is no direct
accountability to the federal DPPC. The DPPC can only appeal to regional authorities to take action
in cases where tangible evidences of negligence are obtained. In more serious defaults, regional
authorities have to report to the Prime Ministers Office.

The role of the federal DPPC: The federal DPPC has the following roles and tasks:
1. Coordination of early warning systems and area targeting
2. Launching appeals and mobilising resources for emergency relief operations
3. Determination of the final resource allocation
4. Managing three central warehouses in Kombolcha, Nazret and Dire Dawa
5. Coordination of food aid transportation from the port, central warehouses and EFSR
warehouses to the distribution sites
6. Chairing the board of EFSR
7. Holding a meeting with the regional council representatives and DPPB heads
8. Development of methodologies for monitoring and evaluation systems, and preparation and
dissemination of reports to donors and the Prime Ministers Office

The early warning activities - crop and needs assessments - are coordinated by the DPPC, as well as
assisting in area targeting. The DPPC is mandated to launch emergency appeals and to sign
agreements with donors. The final approved beneficiary numbers for each region are communicated to
regions and donors by the DPPC.

3. Review of government food aid development policies and strategies


Food aid has been a significant component of the national food supply economy in Ethiopia, and
government food aid policies and strategies have been important. This is manifested in the large and
23

institutionalised food aid operations, foreign relations and partnership with aid donors. However,
despite the fact that securing a sustainable supply of food for its people has been a priority for the
Ethiopian government and donors for 20 years, food insecurity remains the countrys most deeprooted problem (Clive, 2003).

Food aid policies and strategies are meant to operationalise aid resource flows, and integrate the
utilisation of food aid into development programmes. This section discusses national agricultural policies
and strategies in relation to national food security and food aid.

3.1. Food aid policies, food security and agricultural development strategies

1) National Policy of Disaster Prevention and Management


The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) of 1993 emphasises the need
to give priority to disaster prevention programmes in all development endeavours. It states that
disaster relief should ensure adequate income transfer for disaster affected households, promote selfreliance among the beneficiaries, preserve assets to promote speedy recovery, be geared towards
eliminating the root causes of disaster vulnerability, and contribute to sustainable development. The
policy advocates community participation, priority to the most at-risk areas, coordination of efforts
and no free distribution of aid to the able-bodied among the affected population (TGE, 1993). Relief
and emergency actions since 1993 have been undertaken in the context of NPDPM.

The policy sets employment generation schemes (EGS) as the cornerstone of food aid policy, in
order to meet the needs of non-performing agricultural areas. The policy says that all food aid
should be distributed on the basis of 80 per cent EGS and 20 percent free distribution. In this
respect, the official food security policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid
without working on a community project in return. Those who cannot work will receive targeted free
food aid. EGS is intended to link relief with development and its programmes provide opportunities
for immediate food security against encroaching famine, and also for public works that develop
infrastructure and the environment. The contribution of relief resources in mitigating future disaster
has been part of food aid policy for a long time, but the schemes face challenges, including lack of
implementation capacity in skilled manpower, logistics, communications, road accessibility, etc.
Multiyear resource commitments from donors, effective institutional linkages and a common vision
among stakeholders are all crucial to their success.

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2) The Federal Food Security Strategy

The Federal Food Security Strategy (1996, updated 2002) rests on three pillars; increasing supply
and availability of food; improving access and entitlement to food; and strengthening emergency
response capabilities. Some of the detailed aspects of the strategy are highlighted below:

Agricultural production in mixed farming systems: This is aimed at enhancing supply and
availability of food through increasing domestic food production where moisture availability is
relatively adequate. It envisages that subsistence farming has to be transformed into small-scale
commercial agriculture and employs household based integrated and market oriented extension
packages in order to realise the goal. However, in chronically food insecure areas due to weather
instability, moisture stress, soil degradation and farmland scarcity, ensuring household food security
through domestic production would be a difficult task. Under such circumstances comprehensive
asset rehabilitation and building mechanisms should be put in place to enhance production-based
entitlement for chronically food insecure communities.

Pastoralist development: Pastoralist communities depend on livestock for their livelihood.


Increases in livestock and human population put pressure on rangelands, resulting in soil erosion
and deforestation. In addition, the encroachment of notorious weeds to rangelands is increasingly
devastating pasture resources. The vulnerability of pastoralist communities to disaster is ever
increasing, while traditional coping mechanisms are being eroded following recurrent droughts. The
National Pastoralist Development Strategy places emphasis on livestock development,
strengthening livestock marketing, agro-pastoralism and sedentarisation. The latter intervention is
controversial and not popular with many pastoralists and others.

Additional entitlement and targeted programmes: The food security strategy focuses on
enhancing food entitlements for the most vulnerable sections of the society. There are three
components devised to enhance entitlement: supplementary employment income support schemes,
targeted programmes for disadvantaged groups and nutrition intervention.

Emergency capability: Various interventions are put in place to increase the capacity of Ethiopian
Strategic Food Reserve (ESFR) in food and relief distribution, among others, to enhance emergency
response capability. These include strengthening the early warning system, surveillance and
monitoring.

The new food security strategy has also brought about changes in government structures, by placing
25

the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB), within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MoARD), at the centre of all food security matters. At the regional level, some
bureaux of food security and disaster prevention and preparedness have been merged and operate
under the umbrella of the Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD). The new
arrangement also refocuses the DPPCs mandate for emergency humanitarian assistance to save
lives, protect livelihoods and to provide logistical support concerning delivery of food within the
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).

3) The New Coalition for Food and Livelihood Security

The New Coalition for Food and Livelihood Security in Ethiopia, adopted in 2004, aims to improve
long-term food and livelihood security for chronically food insecure citizens through its various
food security programmes. By consolidating partnerships between all stakeholders involved in food
security - government, NGOs and donors - the coalition is the first of its kind, and has made a
valuable and significant contribution. It aims to help experience sharing among the different
organisations working in the country in food security.

The three major objectives of the coalition are to increase the production and availability of food,
improve access to food and improve peoples health. In particular, the programme aims to improve
food security for the 15 million people considered most food insecure; 5 million with chronic food
shortages and 10 million vulnerable to shocks such as drought and famine. The coalition also aims
to improve access to land through resettlement, by targeting 2.2 million chronically food insecure
people. The plan is to provide them with access to land within the programme period.

4) The Productive Safety Net Programme

In 2005 the Ethiopian Government launched the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The
government decided that there was an urgent need to address the basic food needs of food insecure
households via a productive safety net system financed through multi-year predictable resources
rather than a system dominated by emergency humanitarian aid (MoARD, 2004). PSNP intends to
shift the mode of financing from food aid to cash and is designed to operate within the framework
of the national Food Security Programme to address the problems of chronically food insecure
communities in 262 woredas of the country.

The objective of PSNP is to facilitate transfers of food or cash to chronically food insecure woredas
without depleting assets at household level and creating assets at community level. There are two
26

components; a labour intensive public works component and direct support for chronically food
insecure households without the ability to work and with no other means of support. The
programme is designed to address immediate human needs while simultaneously supporting rural
transformation; preventing long-term consequences of short-term consumption shortages;
encouraging households to engage in production and investment; and promoting market
development by increasing household purchasing power7.

5) Rural development policies and strategies

National rural development policies and strategies are intended to have an impact on food
availability and access, by ensuring rapid development and releasing people from dependence on
food aid. Rural and agricultural development is at the centre of Ethiopias poverty reduction
programme: the first phase, called Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development Programme
(PRSDP) and the second and latest phase, Participatory Sustainable Development to Eradicate
Poverty (PASDEP) (FDRE, 2002 (b)).

The Rural Development Policy states that rapid economic development will be ensured through a
strategy of agriculture-led and rural-centred development (FDRE, 2001). It also assumes that trade
and industry will grow faster in alliance with agriculture. Agriculture will induce accelerated trade
and industry development by supplying raw materials, creating opportunities for capital
accumulation and enhancing the domestic market. In order to improve the performance of the
agriculture sector, emphasis has been given to supporting smallholder farmers using agricultural
extension programmes as an instrument to increase the supply and adoption of modern inputs,
mainly seeds and chemicals fertilisers, and advisory services.

A recent strategy in agricultural and rural development is the idea of commercialising smallholder
farms through engagement in high value and export-oriented production systems. Potential
commodities and areas are identified in order to plan their production system accordingly.

The main elements of agricultural and rural-centred development that are envisaged to assist in
improved food security through improved production are briefly highlighted below.

Extensive utilisation of human labour: Ethiopia has a large labour force, which should be
extensively utilised to exploit available land and natural resources. This would involve human
capacity building, through increased access to education and training, as well as improved health
7

Ibid.

27

services. Access to some health services through a health extension programme is a recent
development.

Agro-ecology based development approach: Diverse agro-ecological zones (AEZs) have different
problems, resource bases and development opportunities. Development packages suitable for
different AEZs are being prepared and implemented as a basis for agricultural diversification and
specialisation depending on the potential resources.

Integrated approach to development: In order to bring about meaningful rural development and
economic growth, integration is needed between different activities within the agricultural sector, as
well as between agriculture and other sectors such as health, education, water and sanitation,
infrastructure, trade, industry, rural financial institutions, etc.

Targeted interventions for drought prone and food insecure areas: Food insecure and drought
prone areas with erratic weather conditions, such as low rainfall, longstanding soil degradation
problems and/ or serious farmland scarcity are the targets of interventions that combine agricultural
and non-agricultural activities thought to improve access to food.

Enhancing benefits of the working people: Developing efficient marketing systems is necessary
in order to increase the benefits of the rural and agriculture-centred development strategy for urban
dwellers and improve rural-urban trade and linkages.

6) Resettlement
Voluntary resettlement programmes are part of the New Coalition for Food Security, developed in
2004. The main objective of resettlement programmes is to enable up to 440,000 chronically food
insecure households, or 2.2 million people, to attain food security through improved access to land
in other parts of Ethiopia where land is available. The plan is to resettle these households over three
years. Lessons from past experiences of resettlement in Ethiopia mean that the programme is
controversial. Results so far have not been encouraging, due to many problems with
implementation, lack of infrastructure and difficulties faced by people in unfamiliar natural
environments, such as disease.

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3.2. The relationship between policies, strategies and programmes: food aid, food security
and agricultural and rural development

Over the last few decades, securing a sustainable and sufficient food supply for the population has
been the priority development challenge for Ethiopia. Despite great hopes for the many plans and
interventions, food insecurity remains a deep-rooted problem and top of the development agenda.
Although food insecurity has been chronic for many years, interventions have been geared towards
short-term solutions. The fundamental causes of food insecurity have not been properly targeted or
addressed. The National Policy for Disaster Prevention, adopted in 1992, was designed to link relief
efforts with development by changing the mode of intervention and utilisation of food aid
resources. However, the results to date testify that it has not been adequately practiced. In many
food insecure areas of the country, food aid programmes have been implemented for years, but have
not been integrated with other essential polices or measures. For instance, few efforts have been
made to reduce population growth, despite the increasing pressure and depletion of agricultural
resources.

The recently adopted New Coalition for Food Security and Safety Net Programmes are ambitious in
terms of the resources needed to implement the programmes to address chronic food insecurity in a
short time framework of five years. The drawback of the programmes may be that they propose to
treat the large numbers of food insecure woredas (over half of all woredas in the country) in
isolation rather than integrating their efforts with development plans in relatively productive
woredas.

Ethiopias rampant poverty, food insecurity and development problems are structural. There must
be fundamental change that cannot be effected by food aid interventions alone. The problems are
the results of cumulative effects and processes that have led to a decline in peoples assets and
collapse of their livelihoods, increasing vulnerability and enhanced by poor infrastructure and
communication, lack of alternative productive opportunities, lack of focus in economic
management and weak implementation capacity.

Some of the major underlying causes of food insecurity and poverty in Ethiopia can be summarised
as follows:

1. There is no meaningful culture of long-term development or guiding principles.

29

2. Economic planning and strategies have traditionally been sector biased and failed to benefit
from the inter-sectoral linkages. In addition, despite good ideas and policies, implementation
capacities have been seriously weak.
3. Development interventions have suffered very much from changing political circumstances.
Changes in government led to the abandonment of previous policies and experiences that
could have been useful lessons.
4. In the challenge of food and agricultural production, development strategies have not
harnessed the water resources potential of the country in order to shift from rain-dependent
to irrigation based production systems. This would not only increase production and
productivity, but also largely help to overcome the challenges of weather uncertainty.
5. Ethiopia has been heavily reliant on foreign donations and loans for development. This
keeps the country in vicious circle of poverty. Sufficient attention has not been given to
mechanisms to mobilise and generate domestic resources, and partly explains why ideas,
programmes and projects have not succeeded, as the resources needed for implementation
are either not obtained or exhausted before completion.

Although grand ideas and strategies towards enhanced rural and agricultural development have been
devised, experience has shown that there is a serious problem of coordination and implementation.
The increasing volume of food aid arriving in the country shows that food and agriculture sector
development plans have not been adequately achieved. Food security interventions, in the form of
annual food aid appeals and pledges, are not satisfactory responses to the chronic problem of food
shortages. Lasting solutions for food insecurity and poverty in Ethiopia will come only from radical
and consistent efforts made over a sustained period of time frame to properly utilise available
resources, including water resources and by all sectors paying adequate attention to coordinating
their work.

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4. Review of the impacts of food aid: experience in Ethiopia and


internationally
The major arguments in the debate over food aid include those made by Schultz in the 1960s and
Barrett in recent years. Schultz maintained that programme food aid discourages domestic production
in recipient countries, whereas Barrett claimed that, rather than affecting production, programme food
aid displaces imports to recipient countries. The question of the impact of food aid remains
empirically unresolved, despite more than a half century of food aid distribution and extensive
literature and theories. Various contributions to the literature address the impact of programme food aid
and targeted food aid on domestic production and on imports.

4.1 Impact of food aid on domestic production

Targeted food aid: Disincentive effects may result from targeted food aid for various reasons. The
poor may receive more food aid than they need and sell the excess on to the local market.
Alternatively, targeted food aid, although intended only for the poor, may be distributed to the nonpoor who otherwise would have purchased or grown food. These 'un-needy' recipients who accept
free food will decrease their purchase of food from local markets, resulting in a decrease in food
demand and loss of sales for local producers. The disincentive to the staple food producer is very
real and may cause local farmers to move to other activities than food production as the market
shrinks. The end result is decreased local production and, unless the country experiences economic
growth, which allows it to import food, it will become dependent on food aid. The degree to which
targeting is not successful in preventing market disturbances determines the extent of disincentives.

Programme food aid: According to Lowder (2004), Schultz started to analyse the impacts of food
aid in the early 1960s. In 1960, he wrote that programme food aid creates a price disincentive effect
for food producers and discourages agricultural production in the recipient country and thereby
decreases domestic production. He described how a country receiving free food under US Public
Law 480 continued to import the same amount of food as it did prior to receiving food aid, and it
has no substitutes in production or consumption of the relevant food item. In this type of market,
receipt of programme food aid decreases the price of the food item and results in a price
disincentive to local farmers. Although he warned that this idea was mere speculation, not
supported by any empirical evidence, his paper shaped thought on food aid for many decades.

31

4.2 Impact of food aid on imports

Programme food aid: Most studies examine the relation between food aid and food imports, and
support the hypothesis that food aid is not additional but instead displace imports (Fitzpatrick and
Storey, 1989; Saran, 1991; Barrett et al., 1999). Barrett et al. found that food aid displaces food
imports but has little effect on food production. Evidence from their study shows a negative
correlation between US programme food aid and contemporaneous imports by recipient countries.
The study also indicates that programme food aid from the US displaces imports by recipient countries
in the short term, leading to short-term dependence on programme food aid. Programme food aid
was found to increase imports to recipient countries in the long run.

Targeted food aid: There are a few studies that examine the impact of targeted food aid on
imports. Targeted food aid is often monetised or sold on the market in a recipient country; this
practice is likely to make targeted food aid similar to programme food aid in its impact on imports.
In a study of monetised targeted food aid, Herman et al (1992) find evidence that the effect of the
food aid depends on how the recipient government uses revenues generated from monetisation;
government food subsidies lead to increased imports whereas stimulus of food supply leads to a decrease
in imports.

4.3 The disincentive literature

The literature on food aid focused heavily on the disincentive effects of food aid for around twenty years
following the Cochrane/ Schultz debates over PL480 (Barrett, 1999). In Isenman and Singers study (as
cited in Sarah, 2004) summarised the disincentive argument as follows: an increase in food supplies
provided by food aid shifts the supply curve as recipients monetise some of the food aid they receive,
which then depresses prices received by farmers. By contrast, others claim that the income effects of
food aid mitigate price disincentives because increases in income generated by food aid raise the demand
for food and at least partially diminish the negative impacts on prices caused by the monetisation of food
aid. The literature shows that most empirical studies on this issue have failed to find significant
disincentive effects of food aid on local price levels.

The feature that most clearly distinguishes food aid from other income transfer programmes is that
recipients are generally food producers as well as consumers. Most of the concern about food aids
effects on prices would not exist if recipients were not food producers. When food aid is provided directly
32

to households, the only way that food aid can affect prices is through altering household behaviour: either
recipient households sell more food crops in the market including the crops received as food aid, or they
buy more or less food crops from markets.

According to Tapia-Bistrom (2001) in an article about food aid disincentive in the case of Tanzania,
it is possible to speculate that the subsistence type of production, with high risk for household food
insecurity, might lead to a situation in which the farmers do not react to price incentives. In that
case, there would be no disincentive effect due to food aid, since farmers would make their
production decisions based on the presence of high risk and subsistence needs. Their grain
production for markets is additional income realised in good years, not the sole aim of the
production or they sell some grain to cover necessary money needs irrespective of the price. In this
case they would, if necessary, restrict their household consumption even below the nutritional
needs. However, this does not imply that farmers are not sensitive to price relations between various
crops.

4.4 Economic impact

Marjia and Tapia noted that, from an economic viewpoint, programme food aid functions in deficit years
to fill the gap between demand at existing prices and income levels, on one hand, and the normal available
supply of food through domestic production, on the other hand. The economic impact of food aid is based
on the fact that introduction of more grain into the market decreases the price of grain. If food aid is sold in
the open market at a market-clearing price, the price of cereals will fall. This means lower prices for local
producers and cheaper food for local consumers. Decreasing prices mean that producers profits will
diminish which will lead to decreased production.

Some literature argues that the other possible economic impact of food aid depends on the marketing
policy and production structure of the recipient country. The economic impact of food aid can be
affected by government actions. Governments have tended to regard food markets as having such
strategic importance as to call for different kinds of control mechanisms. Governments have several
policy tools at their disposal for influencing the effects of food aid, including segmenting of markets;
stabilisation of prices; using counterpart funds to establish a floor price or to subsidise input prices;
and using food aid as balance of payments support. Each of these may decrease the disincentive
effect.

According to an impact evaluation of food aid conducted by USAID in 1998, five elements have been
33

identified as its economic impact: providing additional real resources; providing additional development
money; introducing commodities to the economy in different ways; providing a basis for dialogue with
the government on policy reform; and expanding productive infrastructure in rural areas.

The impact of food aid at regional level in Africa has been documented. An example of a positive
contribution of food aid resources is from the Konso area of southwest Ethiopia. Farm Africa has
been working in Konso for a decade, and in 1998 started a capacity building project. The purpose of
the project is explicitly to build local capacity to cope with recurrent drought. As part of this process
a participatory resource use planning exercise was conducted in early 1999, where farmers, local
government officers and representatives of a local NGO, a partner of Farm Africa, mapped out their
local resources and mapped out a range of potential activities to activate in an emergency situation.
Over 9,000 tons of foods have been distributed in Konso to around 150,000 people, with 90% used
for food-for-work activities agreed and identified by the communities and only 10% used for relief
feeding of the most vulnerable. Food aid was used in this case as a valuable tool to provide gainful
employment and to strengthen local infrastructure and resource base, following an earlier period of
preparation based around acceptance of the inevitability of drought and planning for that
inevitability8.

There are also examples of the negative impact of food aid. For example, as reported by Gainey
(2000), in the early 1980s northern Kenya saw a major crisis for Turkana pastoralist communities.
Massive and widespread mortality of livestock had plunged whole populations into destitution.
Food aid was provided by the European Union, the Netherlands government, Catholic Relief
Services and the WFP, initially as immediate relief and later through food-for-work. Under this
system manual labour is remunerated with set quantities of food on a piecework basis. While it is
clear that this did actually save many lives it also created a 'stockless' underclass of former herders
who would formerly either have been restocked from within their clan or family or would have been
left to die. These people become permanently destitute and dependent on handouts. Many Turkana
people participated in the food-for-work programme, but although well intentioned, this programme
was poorly targeted both in terms of the actual work done and the people involved in it. Many of the
workers were by no means from the truly destitute population, but opportunists using the
opportunity to gain an additional income.

Impact of food aid on prices: One of the manifestations of the impact of food aid is its influence
on agricultural product prices. There is a well known correlation that emerges during times of

Ibid

34

drought between grain and livestock prices. As drought approaches and food becomes scarce, grain
prices start to rise rapidly. At the same time people start to sell their livestock to raise cash to buy
grain. As a result livestock prices crash. Evidence from the Konso area of Ethiopia9 shows that an
injection of food aid can stabilise this situation. In Konso, as drought occurred in 1999, these
patterns were clearly emerging. Deliveries of food aid at an early stage rapidly depressed the price
of grain on the open market nearly back to pre-drought levels, so that more people could continue to
purchase grain. In addition farming families who had been restocked with higher yielding dairy
goats through a Farm-Africa programme had more and healthier livestock capital in reserve to sell
and purchase grain. These families were able to maintain a higher standard of living for longer
through the drought than those without that support.

Effect on creating demand for and dependency on exotic foods: The delivery of food aid has
often involved foods exotic to that country, e.g. wheat or rice, which results in people developing a
taste for those foreign foods, creating a future demand and depressing production of local grain. In
Ethiopia, the government has developed a strategic grain reserve supplied from local stocks for use
in emergencies. One function of this is to avoid creation of a demand for imported foods10. Foreign
donors assist in re-supplying that reserve in times of crisis and it is hoped that this food will be with
foodstuffs appropriate to that country.

A report submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Agriculture and Hunger to the Agriculture
Committee of the US House of Representatives (Kushner et al., 1994) describes the impact of direct
feeding programmes on enhancing the long-term food security of recipient countries, including
significant improvements to infrastructure by food-for-work programmes and how well designed
projects can target people vulnerable to malnutrition. The report briefly summarises the impact of
food aid, stating that food distribution, or direct feeding projects, provide immediate access to food;
and selling, or monetising, commodities to generate local currency for other types of projects
addresses the primary cause of food insecurity that is, poverty. The impact of direct feeding
projects on advancement toward national- or community-level food security is not clear. Economic,
cultural and environmental factors may hamper a nations long-term food security. At the
community level, the long-term impact of direct feeding projects depends on project design and
implementation. Evaluations of some specific direct feeding projects have shown some positive
impacts on health, nutrition, and income generation at the community or individual level.

Ibid
Ibid

10

35

A study on the experience of food aid in rural Zambia (Scott & Mutwambi (2004) concludes that
food aid has its uses, as in a year of failed harvests imports will be costly and food aid can alleviate
hardship. However, after years of bad harvests, food aid is at risk of becoming an inappropriate
handout that pushes down prices in local markets, thereby deterring local food production and
trading. For many of the poor in Zambia, a more pressing need, except in years of national harvest
failure is for cash. Public works programmes for the able-bodied, and grants to those who are
unable to work on account of sickness, age or severe disability, are probably more suitable.

4.5 The effect of food aid on livelihoods, labour allocation and food purchasing

Many studies examine the relationship between food aid and the opportunity for livelihoods. The
Grain Marketing project (1998) conducted under the former Ethiopian Ministry of Economic
Development and Cooperation (MEDaC) examines the relationship between household food
availability and the receipt of food aid. The study found that there is no significant association
between household food availability, or need, and the receipt of food aid, either free or food-for-work,
during the sample study year. The report notes that this finding holds true even when controlling
for other key characteristics of the households such as age, gender, education of household head, offfarm income, land and livestock ownership, family labour availability, and fundamental agroecological characteristics of the sampled woreda, such as rainfall and elevation.

Another study by Takashi et al. (2000) has considered the potential effects of food aid on local food
markets. The study used household models to examine the effects of food aid, free distribution and foodfor-work, on crop marketing behaviour. The theoretical models suggest that the effects of food aid on
household marketing behaviour may depend on the type of food aid programme. The expectation is that
receiving free food has stronger income effects than participation in food-for-work, and the effects of
food-for-work will differ depending on the in-kind participation wage compared to households
opportunity costs of labour.

To empirically determine the effects of food aid on crop marketing, the researchers estimated gross sales
and purchases of wheat and other crops with instrumental variable models. The results indicate that
households reduce their purchases of wheat from the market when they participate in food-for-work.
The study confirmed that, on average, among households who purchased some wheat, 10 kilograms of
cereals from food-for-work decreased wheat purchases by 6.9 kilograms. The size of this effect increases
as the amount of wheat purchases increases. These effects were much smaller for free food aid
programmes. However, there are no significant effects of food aid, either free distribution or food-forwork, on sales of wheat or other cereals.
36

The conceptual and empirical results from the study paper suggest three implications for donor and
recipient country food aid policy. The first upholds the importance of targeting food aid to households
with a high propensity to consume additional food, typically the poor, from an injection of income to
mitigate potential market effects of food aid. The study concludes that the fact that food-for-work has
significant market effects, even in a very poor country such as Ethiopia, casts doubt on assertions that
targeting is not important in areas of absolute poverty. Secondly, there is a need to recognise that different
types of food aid programmes may have different effects on crop marketing behaviour and potentially
on food crop prices. The results show that providing wheat through food-for-work programmes
decreases wheat purchases from the market, while wheat through direct distribution does not. In areas
where wheat production is a major source of income for rural households, it may be advisable to consider
alternative commodities for use in food-for-work programmes. Third, the empirical results of this paper
suggest that potential market effects of food aid can, and do, alter household purchasing behaviour, not
only sales behaviour. Examining the effects of food aid only on sales behaviour may lead
monitoring agents to erroneously conclude that food aid has no effect on crop prices or markets.

A study conducted by Save the Children UK (1999) assessed food aid impact on household
economies in North Wollo, South Wollo and East Hararghe, in Ethiopia by studying wealth groups
(very poor poor middle class better off) depending on the level of farm land, livestock and
family size. The effect of food aid was different in different classes; however, the effect on the poor
and very poor was similar, and likewise for middle class and better off households. For poor and
very poor households, food aid reduced labour migration outside the normal migration season;
prevented whole household migration; increased dietary energy intake above levels that would have
existed without food aid; provided essential energy contributions; prevented the sale of animals for
grain (during distribution months); allowed households to return to their villages to attempt to
cultivate during appropriate season; and reduced dependence on wild foods to levels approaching
normal, among other effects. For the middle class and better off households, food aid reduced the
burden of redistribution to poorer households; provided opportunities to rent out pack animals for
transport of food aid; prevented malnutrition or food deficits; prevented the sale of animals for grain
(during distribution months); increased dietary energy intake to internationally accepted minimum
requirements; and allowed households to purchase grain at lower grain prices after distribution.

4.6 Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable groups

Food aid and gender: A study from Ethiopia (Clay et al., 1998) on access to food aid by women
and other vulnerable groups has found different results than other studies about access by women. A
37

study conducted by the Grain Marketing project (1998) reports that the issue of the vulnerability of
women and children is over emphasised, although the Food Security Strategy (FDRE, 1996) and
beneficiary selection criteria used by several key NGOs involved in the distribution of food aid
underscore the special vulnerability of women and the elderly under conditions of food shortages. The
Grain Marketing project study further notes that a disproportionate number of female and aged
heads of households received food aid, irrespective of their food needs. It is also found that households
headed by women and those aged 60 years and above are not less food secure than those headed by
men or younger farmers. Thus, the practice of targeting women and the aged, to the extent that it is used
exclusively in place of truly need-based criteria, has contributed to increased targeting error. The
authors, however, note that this result does not imply that gender and age inequalities do not exist
within households, although they could not test such a proposition using their chosen data set.

Food aid and children: To assess whether food aid, both free distribution and food-for-work, has an
impact on child nutritional status, Quisumbing (2003) conducted a study in rural Ethiopia focusing
on children under five, and six to nine years old. The study runs regressions on weight-for-age Zscores and height-for-age Z-scores separately in both categories, as well as for low asset and high
asset households, to see the effects of free distribution and food- for-work food aid.

1) Effect on low asset households: regression results for low asset households show that both
food-for-work (FFW) and direct food aid have gender-differentiated impacts. FFW has a positive
direct impact on weight-for-height for children aged under five in low asset households, although
there is weak evidence that FFW improves boys weight-for-height more than girls. This effect
does not depend on the gender of the aid recipient. In contrast, among older children, if a woman
receives food aid, it results in an improvement of boys weight-for-height relative to that of girls.
The lagged difference of total aid receipts has a positive impact on weight for-height of older
children. The effects of the interaction of child sex and a female recipient in the combined aid
regression do not show a consistent pattern of gender preference. Since height-for-age is a
measure of long-term nutritional status, it is not as responsive to food aid interventions in the
short run as is weight-for-height. However the effect of the food-for-work is weak and has a weak
negative impact on height-for-age of younger children. Similar to the effects on weight-for-height,
total food aid receipts seem to improve boys height-for-age more than girls. Height-for-age of
older children is less responsive to food aid, partly because height growth slows down for older
children. The only significant food aid variable (the lagged difference in FFW receipts interacted
with the female child dummy) suggests that FFW receipts tend to improve boys long-run
nutritional status relative to girls.
38

2) Effect on high asset households: Among younger children, FFW receipts improve boys
weight-for-height relative to girls. In contrast, direct food aid has a positive direct effect on weightfor-height for both older and younger children, and tends to benefit girls. Total food aid receipts,
regardless of modality, improve weight-for height, and weakly favour girls. The effect of the
gender of the direct food aid recipient is not consistent, with the first difference showing a positive
effect, and the lagged difference a negative one. Consistent with the relative insensitivity of
height-for-age to short-run interventions, the aid variables have a negligible impact on height-forage.

The study shows that FFW has a positive direct impact on the weight-for-height of younger children in
low asset households, while direct food aid has a similar positive impact on children of both age groups
in high-asset households. The effect of FFW on low asset households probably reflects its self-targeting
features.

4.7 Food aid and dependency

A study conducted by Oxfam GB (2004) on the impact of food aid in the Tigray and Amhara
regions of Ethiopia, assessed the issue of food aid dependency. The study concluded that
dependency exists in most cases when relief food is supplied to the needy people freely. Households
suspending productive work on their farm plots in preference to waiting for food aid also manifest
dependency. The study further found that some households in the study area even deplete their
livestock resources in order to become poor and qualify for food aid. Households feel that they will
be disqualified if they produce food grains or their own livestock. The research identifies free relief
food aid as one of the root causes of poverty in the food insecure areas of Tigray and Amhara,
although food aid can contribute to development and employment generation if it is supplied based
on food-for-work schemes.

Hoddinott (2003) has reviewed studies carried out in Ethiopia on the dependency impact and disincentive
effect of food aid. He indicated that these studies draw on rural household level data collected by Addis
Ababa University in the mid-1990s on food aid flows and several dimensions of household and inter
household behaviour. The studies aimed to investigate whether access to food aid has disincentive effects
on income generation, or affects labour supply, agricultural investments, or mutual support. The study
found that households that had previously received food aid spent considerably less time supplying
labour to permanent and semi permanent crops. Less time was also spent on non-agricultural business activities. On average, households not receiving food aid worked five times as many days in
these activities than households that had received food aid. However, children in households
39

receiving food aid spent more time in wage work than children in households not receiving food
aid. The study also considered whether access to food aid displaced two measures of informal links
between households: transfers (in cash and in-kind) received from other households, and the number of
days the household contributes to traditional labour sharing. It did not find evidence that receipt of food
aid led to lower receipts of private transfers. However, evidence was found that past receipt of food aid
reduced participation in labour sharing groups.

A book entitled Enough with Famine in Ethiopia by Fasil (2005) elaborates the dependency syndrome of
food aid. According to the author, dependency on food aid is manifested not only at the national level but
also at household level. For example, he quotes a commonly heard remark in Wollo; It doesnt matter if
the rain comes or not, as long as it does in Canada. He also notes that it is difficult to overcome the
problem of dependency, which has taken root over a relatively long period of time. The author remarks
that many participants in food-for-work programmes are only interested in being compensated for their
work and show little interest in the development programmes.

Part II: Assessment of the practice of food aid and impacts in study
areas
5 Qualitative assessment of food aid and its impact: perspectives of
key informants and group discussions

This chapter presents the results of key informant interviews and focus group discussions with
members of the communities in selected kebeles and stakeholder government organisations in the
study woredas. Secondary data is also included, as far as it was available.

5.1 Food production, food security and food aid in the study woredas

The study woredas, selected from six regional states, represent different farming systems. They are
from different geographic locations, agro-ecological and socio-economic settings. The cropping
pattern and composition of the livestock owned in different woredas shows the diversity of the
samples in terms of farming systems (see Annex tables 1 and 2). Some are from highland
agricultural systems, while others are from pastoralist and semi-pastoralist lowland and moisture
scarce areas.

40

Asaita has a population of 65,925, 55.5% male and 45.5% female. During the last five years there
has not been a permanent migration of people from Asaita and no people have been settled from
elsewhere in the woreda. No data was available on land use. The major crop produced in the
woreda is maize, but livestock is the major source of livelihoods. Interview results show that there
is a potentially irrigable land of 23,560 hectares, of which only 8,560 hectares, or 36%, is currently
irrigated. From discussions it was learnt that there has been no agricultural extension service in the
woreda, although some livestock extension packages are known to exist in the area11.

According to discussions with the Asaita Woreda Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureau,
pastoralists department, grain traders and kebele administrators, the major reason for food shortages
is lack of rain in those kebeles where the Awash River is too far away for access. The main
indicators for food shortages in a specific year are low rainfall, decrease in the volume of the Awash
River and death of livestock. According to woreda authorities, in 1994 EC the drought resulted in
the death of 64,700 heads of cattle. Due to the problem of silt deposits in the Awash river, the water
volume has declined causing low agricultural production. Food shortages are detected by monthly
monitoring reports and follow-up of the situation.

Data on the amount of food aid that arrived in the woredas is not adequately obtained except for the
recent two years. Although no disaggregated data is available by gender and socio-economic
groups, currently 18,000 people (about 39% of the rural population) receive food aid. There is no
data on the public works supported by FFW and EGS in the woreda.

In Darolebu Woreda, West Hararghe Zone, the people of Odaluku Kebele report that it is eight
years since they have faced food shortage problems. Before the last eight years, they used to refuse
food aid, even when it was sent to them by disaster prevention agencies, as they said they did not
have problems with drought and famine. The communities depend on production of coffee and khat
for their livelihood. They report that during shortages of rainfall, they do not get any yield from
these major cash crops.

During the last eight years, drought and famine has disastrously hit the communities, killing their
children. They reported that households who have relatives elsewhere were even forced to give their
children to others, in order to save them from famine. Despite drought and famine, they did not get
enough attention; in their words, no one was there to rescue us. People sold their livestock to buy
food. They received some food from DPPC/ DPPB in the years 2001 to 2003, but successively
11

A recent study on the national agricultural extension package by EEA/EEPRI (2006) reports that lowland pastoralist
areas were not given adequate extension services.

41

smaller amounts after 2001, with no food aid at all in 2004. They know that food aid is not a lasting
solution for the problem, but only to help them until rainfall improves.

In the other study kebele, Gaadis, in Darolebu Woreda, respondents reported that they got food aid
only in the year 2003, although there has been a drought for eight years. Communities in this kebele
depend on annual crops (no perennial cash crops) and livestock production. During the time when
this survey was conducted, a serious problem of food shortage was reported. As a result of the
recurrent drought people have migrated to Bale and Wellega zones.

In the study kebeles, Diley and Mermasa, of Shininle Woreda the population is 2,320, and 2,000
respectively. Their livelihood is dependent on livestock production and contraband trade, with some
cropping activities of maize and sorghum. From the discussions with kebele authorities, workers of
the DPPB, woreda agriculture experts and early warning experts, it was learnt that during the last
five years the livelihood situation of the communities in the kebeles has changed.

Food shortage in the kebeles is caused by two major reasons; shortage of rainfall and drought and
government measures to make contraband trade in the area illegal. Due to controls on contraband,
communities lack the means to cope with the recurrent drought. Shortage of rain has resulted in lack
of water and feed for livestock and the drought is reported to have been progressively intensifying.

In Simada Woreda of South Gonder Zone, the persistent food shortages are attributed to population
pressure, which leads to the fragmentation of farmland. Communities reported that younger
members of the community without land have been cutting trees and destroying vegetation in search
of land for agricultural activities, house construction, charcoal, firewood, etc. In addition,
continuous cultivation of the same plot of land year after year has led to a decline in soil fertility
and low crop production, leading to food shortages. In some years loss of crop production has been
caused by frost, crop pests or disease. The signs of food shortage here are reported to be migration
of the community, drop out of students from school, health problems, increase in the price of crops
and shortages of amenities like clothing.
In Tsede Amba Woreda, Tigray Region, most people have been receiving food aid since 1996, due
to war and post-conflict rehabilitation programmes. Moreover, 6,400 people are benefiting from the
safety net programme package, which has two groups of beneficiaries: those who get free food aid
and those involved in food-for-work programmes. However, people reported that the support is not
sufficient, since the provision is not based on family size: 15 kg and 1 litre of oil are given to both
42

large and small households monthly. There were also complaints about the food-for-work
programme, since participants receive only 3 kg of grain or 6 Birr for a days work.

Interviews with focus group discussants in Tsede Amba indicated that the reasons for persistent
food shortages are poor soil fertility; shortage of rain; scarcity of farmland; soil erosion due to wind;
unavailability of irrigation; and high population pressure. The main manifestations of food
shortages are the proliferation of migrant job seekers in the streets of towns. The job seekers also
sell household property, including ornaments like gold and silver. In addition while the price of
property and livestock decreases, the price of grains and cereals increases substantially. Moreover,
the death of people and livestock substantially increases during bad drought years.

Discussion with two key informants from Humbo Woreda, SNNP Region, the DPPB and Food
Security Desk, showed the major reasons for persistent food shortages in the woreda are erratic
rainfall; population pressure in the highland kebeles; decline of soil fertility due to erosion; high
dependency attitudes due to many years of food aid donations12 resulting in unwillingness to work;
recurrent loss of crops due to flooding in some kebeles; death of cattle due to disease; and the
effects of malaria on household labour force. Other factors include shortage of improved seed and
unfavourable market for farm products.

According to the key informants in Humbo, food shortages are usually manifested in the area when
the following situations prevail compared to a normal year. During years of food shortage, there are
shortages of agricultural products in the markets; deforestation due to firewood collection and
charcoal making and selling; receipt of credit increases; sharecropping or renting of land increases;
sale of assets, such as cattle and other household assets; migration of the local people to different
places; eating unusual fruits and wild leaves, such as dokma, bedena, korea, woshe, lecha and the
roots of newly planted enset. In addition, theft and robbery become more frequent, and sending
children to relatives and school dropout increase. The informants reported that some standard
indicators, such as anthropometry results, recommendations by different aid organisations, global
acute malnutrition assessment, marasimic and oedema observation of children and mothers, and
clinical indicators are used to assess the level of food availability and need in the woreda.

In Gola Odana, Oromiya Region, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were
conducted in two sample rural kebeles, Jaben and Tuula Mino. According to the perception of focus
group discussants, the reasons for persistent food shortages in the sample kebeles are recurrence of

12

Experts report that the World Vision Ethiopia has been in the area for nearly 20 years, since 1979 EC

43

rainfall shortages, as the woreda is located in the lowlands; loss of livestock due to disease; decline
in agricultural output due to weeds (straiga and pertinium, locally known as haramul azaab or
dhinbil/ kimbil); crops pests that attack sorghum, maize, groundnuts, khat; and a disease, known as
shufd, that damages peppers. Respondents report that there has been no solution for such problems.
Key informants added desertification as one of the reasons for persistent food shortages.

The community representatives also described how a year of food shortages differs from a normal
year. In a normal year, rainfall occurs between April and June or April and May. In a normal year
there is no sign of oedema, known as iita locally, on children, sales of firewood and charcoal
decrease and labour migration decreases.

In Gola Odana, focus group discussants observed that the trend of agriculture and food production
in the last five years is decreasing to very low levels. As a result many people have been resettled in
western Oromiya. Although water harvesting practices, such as digging ponds for drinking water,
both human and livestock, and some farming activities are carried out, they have not brought about
notable change. The key informants indicated that agriculture and food production have been very
low because the woreda has been repeatedly hit by drought. The distribution of rainfall has not been
at normal levels and insufficient for farmers to harvest their crops. Crops have been lost because of
insufficient rainfall at the critical flowering stage.

In Lalomama Midir Woreda, North Shoa Zone, Amhara Region, discussants agreed that persistent
food insecurity is caused by soil fertility decline, shortage of rainfall and inappropriate traditional
ploughing systems. Food production and trend of agriculture for the last five years have been
decreasing from year to year and people are suffering food shortages. Food shortages force
community members to engage in daily labour activities, sell cattle to buy grains, etc. For this
reason most of the farmers do not have oxen for ploughing.

In Lagambo Woreda, South Wollo Zone, Amhara Region, the major causes of persistent food
shortages and reasons for continuous relief aid over a period of years are the fluctuations of rainfall
both in amount and distribution, degradation of top soil, and loss of top soil fertility due to depletion
of the essential trace elements required by crops resulting in poor production. Due to the highland
mountainous topographic location, the soil is susceptible to erosion. Even fertiliser application is
said to be difficult due to erosion. The ever-increasing population have contributed to repeated
ploughing of farmlands with same types of crops year after year. Cultivation of sloppy areas and
vegetation loss due to deforestation are the major environmental problems.
44

5.2 Food aid practices and targeting mechanisms

5.2.1. Food aid needs assessments, appeal processes and distribution

In Asaita Woreda the existence of an early warning system is acknowledged. Discussants report that
the early warning system in Asaita has been effective as, based on the early warning reports, the
federal DDPC and donors make field visits to confirm the emergency situation and make the
necessary interventions. It involves a monthly assessment of various indicators: rainfall, pasture
resources, water resources, crops, livestock diseases, human health, market situation, and migration.
Reports are regularly sent to the concerned authorities.

In Shininle Woreda, the participants in the discussion during the survey reported that assessment of
shortage of food and the need for aid is made by observing the adequacy of belg rains, the
performance of crops during the growing period, and availability and adequacy of pasture for
livestock. The assessment is made by a group which includes the woreda DPPB experts, other
government agencies and NGOs, as well as experts from Somali region, who then compose a report
about food shortages. However, they reported that in the food shortage assessment and appeal
process the people in the kebele and woreda do not participate.

In Shininle, the regional government does the food aid allocation. At the woreda level, a committee
established at the Woreda Bureau of Agriculture decides how much affected kebeles should get,
depending on the seriousness of the food shortages based on the assessments made. The bureau
head announces the food allocation to the chairpersons of all kebeles. Food is transported to the
kebeles by transport agencies that bid for the contracts. After delivering the food, the transport
agencies report back to the woreda DPPB on the volume and type of food aid they have delivered,
including the signature and seal of the receiving kebele administration.

The aid food that reaches the needy kebeles is not sufficient, so the kebele chairpersons and
committee members decide the amount each household should receive. There were complaints
regarding the rations allocated to households. Discussants reported that all households have been
receiving their allocations, but complained about the inadequacy of the amount.

In the case of Humbo, participation of local community members in the assessment of food
shortages and food aid needs was reported. Community members participate through the kebele
administration and village leaders participate by preparing a list of the households who have lost
their crops due to natural disaster. They invite the woreda DPPD to observe the vulnerability and
45

conduct an assessment survey, with the assistance of communities who provide information about
the degree of vulnerability of the most vulnerable group and actively participate in interviews
during the assessments. Although an early warning system was reported to have been developed by
the woreda DPPD, experts complain that the system is not effective used to warn against disasters.

The assessment report is submitted to the woreda DPPD committee, chaired by the woreda
administrator, which evaluates the report and determines the number of needy households to receive
food aid. The assessment report and the number of people needing food aid are then submitted to
the committee of food aid organisations, e.g. WFP and USAID. Experts from these aid
organisations evaluate the assessment conducted by the woreda committee. According to their
experience, the assessment reports by the woreda DPPD are mostly not accepted by the aid
agencies, who usually reduce the number of beneficiaries, despite claims by the woreda committee
that the appeal is based on a scientific and professional assessment. According to the key informant
experts, the federal DPPC further cuts down the figures, even when they have been accepted by
donor organisations.

In Humbo, targeting and selection of food aid beneficiaries involve the work of a task force
composed of kebele food security representatives, women, youth, religious leaders, elderly people,
NGOs and kebele administrators. Village representatives or members of the kebele administration
observe the distribution of the food aid sent to vulnerable households.

In Gola Odana, the community focus group discussants understood the process of how an appeal for
food aid is made. After assessment of the environment, community representatives appeal to the
kebele administration, the kebele administration appeal to the woreda and the woreda to the zone.
For the key informants, the procedure follows the assessment of agricultural production made by
the woreda DPPD committee, and the appeal is made by woreda food security, DPPD and
administration.

In Lalomama Midir, according to key informants from the Bureau of Agriculture and Food
Security, their office detects the presence of food shortages in the area by evaluating specific annual
agricultural production, and informs the zonal and regional offices. The bureau identifies those who
need immediate aid on the basis of their income and number of family members. Some community
elders also participate in the food aid appeal processes. Experts reported that there is an early
warning system in place, where the cattle and grain market situation, livestock health condition, and
labour wages are assessed. The government also regularly follows up the health condition of the
46

community and water supply situation. The woreda DPPD and food security desk shares the
information with zonal and regional offices as part of the early warming mechanism.

In Lagambo Woreda, South Wollo Zone, there is systematic situation assessment of food shortages
before an appeal for aid is made. The assessment includes rainfall, livestock and human situation,
crop assessment and production loss. Government bodies from the zonal DPPC to kebele level
DPPD task forces participate in the assessment. Sometimes the request for an assessment may come
from the faming communities. Based on this assessment, an appeal is made by the woreda DPPD
and approved by the zonal DPPC. The quota given to kebeles is decided by the woreda DPPD,
which is a recently established department. Previously the woreda Bureau of Agriculture and the
Amhara Rehabilitation and Development Organisation were involved in this decision.

As reported in Tsede Amba woreda, the assessment of food shortages is made by the Woreda
Agricultural Development Desk, who establish a committee of individuals represented from the
different bureaux, including their own office, health, education, DPPD and administration. Crop
production experts measure the amount of rainfall, crops at flowering stage, prevalence of crop
diseases and pests, crop area coverage and yield prediction. The major indicators used for the
assessment are the amount of daily meals per person and the nutritional status of residents. There is
also an early warning system established at woreda level. The system assesses the amount of
rainfall, price of grain and livestock and the amount of grain, and reports to the region. The early
warning system was judged to be successful in preparing the government to tackle the problems
faced by people in times of shortage.
5.2.2. Beneficiary targeting mechanisms

In Asaita, discussants indicated that the Woreda Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureau
distribute food aid in collaboration with the Woreda Health Bureau. Participation of communities in
distribution is through kebele chairpersons, clan leaders and leaders. The food aid distribution
centres may not be at equal distance to all kebeles, but care is taken that the food is stored where
security is assured to minimise loss of food. Beneficiaries are selected by kebele chairpersons, who
chose those households or persons thought to be highly affected by the drought and unable to cope
or survive. The woreda Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureau plays a major role in setting
the criteria for beneficiary selection. The community delegates its kebele chairperson to contribute
and for the last two years World Vision has also participated.

47

Two major indicators for food aid are the situation of the maize crop harvest during the year and
status of livestock. The food aid resources are scarce and not sufficient for all the people in the
woreda, so food distribution is based on a quota system whereby all kebeles get equal, regardless of
the number of needy people. This has been adopted to avoid any conflict that may arise when
different clans get different volume of food aid. Normally it is the household head that receives the
aid food, but each family has an eligibility card, so the kebele chairperson will give food to any
family member who produces the card and is trusted to deliver the food to the family.

In the Darolebu study kebele, Odaluku, community members reported that food aid was not
sufficient to reach the needy people. Even the small amount that reached the kebele was not
properly distributed, as the targeting system is defective. There were cases where people who do not
own livestock, even a chicken, did not get food aid and cases where the elderly, sick, handicapped
and women whose husbands have left could not access food aid. Community members report that
many households have migrated to Bale and Wellega by themselves to escape from drought and
famine.

In Gaadis Kebele, in Darolebu, community members reported that although there have been drought
and food shortages in the area for eight years; they have received food aid only once. The other
times they have been bypassed by food aid agencies13. They strongly criticise the targeting and food
distribution mechanism used in their woreda.

In the study kebele in Shininle, respondents report that although Somali Region is known to be food
deficient; the food aid allocated to the region by the federal DPPC has never been adequate. They
also report that the federal authorities determine the ration per person of 15 kg. In terms of targeting
mechanisms, respondents explained that as the community always needs food aid, there are no
criteria for a household to be eligible for food aid. However, at Shininle Woreda level, according to
an expert from the Woreda Food Security Office there are some criteria to identify beneficiaries of
food aid. These are: households who do not engage in any trading activities to earn some income;
households who do not get sufficient remittance from relatives who live elsewhere; households who
do not get any income from daily labour activities; and those who do not get sufficient income from
their livestock, although they may have many livestock holdings. Earlier, food aid distribution at
kebele level was done in the presence of government and NGO agencies, but now it is done by the
kebele administrators and the communities themselves. There is one central food aid storage facility
in Shininle Woreda.
13

Highlanders also have a problem of food shortages, but they complain that food aid is given to lowlanders who have
camels and can sell their camels at high prices to buy food.

48

Discussants reported that in Shininle, the amount of food aid that arrives from the woreda is less
than the amount requested and, hence, people do not get sufficient quantities. It was only in 2001
that a 15 kg per person ration was received. Respondents said that in order to distribute food to all
who need it, the kebele administration decides on a lower per person ration.

In the Gola Odana study kebeles, targeting of food aid distribution is made by organising the
community committees, including disabled persons, elders, sheikhs, women and youth village
leaders, militia commanders and kebele DPPC members participate. The administrators and
community identify food insecure people. Orphans, children, sick people, elderly, those who do not
get any yield from their farms, those with only one cow, those without productive assets to sell and
large families are targeted. For the key informants, asset ownership, family size, poverty status, a
person or a household with chronic or acute food shortages or those who are very poor compared to
others are targeted. The targeting also includes women who live alone without a husband
(harmalla), blind people and other handicapped persons. It was also noted that children, pregnant
women and lactating mothers get access to food aid by direct support, or free distribution.

Discussions in Gola Odana showed that food distribution does not take place in good time and it
was common that people had to sit idly for three or four days waiting for the food aid. It is not done
as per the timetable for food aid distribution, i.e. within fifteen days of its arrival in the woreda, but
often kept in the store for up to three months. Other problems with food aid distribution are the
shortage of stores at distribution sites, inadequate capacity of the available stores, lack of transport
and lack of distribution workers. Distribution of food aid is done through Woreda Agricultural
Development Office. Some distribution sites are not accessible in the rainy season.

In Lalomama Midir, community members say that the government attempts to give food aid to
mitigate food shortages, but the distribution is not equal or fair. They allege the distributors are
corrupt. Woreda food security experts also share this opinion, saying most of the time, food aid
distributors give food to their relatives and friends. It was also reported that except for government
officers, the communities do not participate in food aid assessment programmes. The food aid is not
sufficient and is not distributed at the critical time when it was needed.

In Lagambo Woreda, government teams at kebele level evaluate vulnerable communities. It was
reported that all kebeles are almost equally vulnerable, but some variation in number of
beneficiaries. Therefore, priority is given on the basis of degree of vulnerability and size of
vulnerable population. If complaints and allegations are made, the kebele is responsible for the
49

solution. From the year 2000 onwards, relief aid has been given in the form of employment
generation schemes. Under this principle 80% of the beneficiaries are able-bodied while the rest are
unable and disadvantaged groups of the society. Priority has always been given to the most needy
people. Every resident of the kebeles has the right to be a beneficiary, provided they are needy.

From the point of view of the community members in study kebeles in Lagambo, there were
problems related to the targeting of food aid. Discrimination was practiced and people who have a
close relationship with kebele officials benefit most while disadvantaged groups may be
disregarded, especially the disabled. Underestimation of family size during registration is another
problem, as a maximum family size of five is fixed to get food aid.

In Tsede Amba Woreda the criteria used to decide the need for food aid is the severity of food
shortages in each kebele and the health status of residents based on the reports from kebele
administration, village leaders, health office, district administration and the woreda agricultural
development desk. The appeal for food aid is made on the basis of official food need assessment.
The stakeholders involved in the process of targeting needy beneficiaries are kebele officials,
representatives of communities, the rural development desk, village leaders, and the woreda health
and education offices. Although the targeting of beneficiaries is supposed to use criteria like level of
income; disability; members who are old and helpless, without supporting relatives; orphaned
children; people living with HIV/AIDS; and sick people; with special emphasis on female headed
households, in practice, there is no special treatment for these groups.

From group discussions in Tsede Amba, it was reported that food aid has not benefited all members
of the community equally. Some of the reasons enumerated were: kebele administrators give
priority to their own families, relatives and friends; the food aid was not provided on the basis of the
number of individuals in the household; food aid was distributed in a uniform manner, that is 15 kg
per household whether there are three or nine people in the family; the regional government has
declared a food-for-work policy so able bodied people have access to the food aid, while the weak,
disabled and orphans have little access to food; and, in the targeting of beneficiaries, those who are
in the most need are not properly identified. In this woreda, the food aid distribution was made by
the woreda development desk (80%) as well as the woreda education sector, the woreda health
bureau, kebele administration (20%), community representatives and village leaders.

The problem of targeting beneficiaries was also reported from the assessment made in Tayeta
Maichew Woreda. The family, relatives and friends of the kebele administrators and village leaders
benefit more, although in principle there is special support for elderly, sick people, orphans,
50

children, and pregnant women. In reality these groups of the community are not treated in a special
manner. The main problems related to food aid distribution cited in this woreda include: kebele
administrators and village leaders do not select the most needy people; there is no controlling
mechanism by the responsible government authority on the distribution of food aid; and the food
aid is not distributed on time.

The key informants in Humbo Woreda also revealed that there has been a serious targeting problem
of food aid distribution. Targeting is done by the Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. In
2005, the woreda DPPB reported that around 18,000 people were in need of food aid, but only
15,000 was finally approved. While the original target was for seven kebeles, food was distributed
to fifteen kebeles, including those not originally targeted by the woreda DPPB14.
5.3 The impact of food aid

5.3.1. The contribution of food aid to livelihood and asset creation

In Asaita, discussants indicated that food aid has played important role in mitigating food shortages.
It has helped to avoid migration of the people, beyond the usual seasonal migration of pastoralists in
search of feed and water for livestock, and assisted them to stay where they are. However, it does
not contribute to asset creation or minimising loss of assets, because the amount of food aid
received monthly is very small.

In a study kebele in Shininle, it was acknowledged by kebele dwellers that food aid has helped to
save lives and has also contributed positively to minimise the loss of livestock assets through
desperate sales to buy food.

Interviews in Humbo Woreda showed the effects of food aid in mitigating food shortages have been
insignificant. It was stressed that the vulnerable are not properly targeted; the amount given is
small; the food aid mostly arrives late, after many have died and others have migrated; and the
number of beneficiary households targeted is very small relative to the number of households
estimated by the woreda DPPD.

In terms of improving agricultural activities, discussants argue that there has been a slight
improvement in soil fertility through foodforwork programmes. However, they reported a
14

Discussion with the woreda authorities at a regional workshop in Awassa revealed that due to the shortage of food
that arrived they were forced to distribute the available amount for all the kebeles they believed to have food shortage
problems.

51

negative impact on marketing local agricultural products. They also mention that there is now a
weak attitude towards agricultural activities that that has led to the decreased productivity of
farmers as a result of food aid distribution. In Humbo, a negative consequence of food aid activity
on asset creation was reported. The community cannot accumulate wealth because of food aid, as
they would rather lose valuable assets in order to be included during the selection of beneficiaries,
resulting in lack of oxen for agricultural activities affecting production.

In Gola Odana the community focus group discussants reported many benefits of food aid. It
mitigates food shortage; it saves lives; it helps to sow seeds and prevents the sale of livestock.
However, food aid cannot be used in asset creation. Key informants interviewed in this woreda
perceive that if food aid continues in the woreda, people will sell all their assets.

In Lagambo Woreda both positive and negative impacts of food aid programmes were reported.
Since the woreda is drought affected, the relief aid has minimised a great deal of the possible risk of
death due to famine and increased the human capacity to participate in development activities.
Since the relief aid is both in kind and in cash (1996/ 97 EC), beneficiaries have had the opportunity
to maintain and increase their assets; for example, students have been enabled to attend school. In
terms of development, under the EGS programme many development activities were implemented,
including soil and water conservation activities on communal lands; pond construction; spring
development and cleaning; diverting flood to farmlands; constructing and rehabilitating dry weather
roads; and tree planting.

In Tsede Amba Woreda food aid is reported to have benefited by mitigating food shortages, and
alleviated the problems of hunger, malnutrition and deficiency diseases. The food has also
contributed to temporary employment creation, school and health post construction, maintenance of
roads and infrastructure development.

In Tayeta Maichew Woreda the amount of food aid distributed is very small, so it contributes to
asset depletion, as the food aid is utilised only for consumption. Community members do not want
to gain assets or they will not be eligible for food aid.

5.3.2. The impact of food aid on biodiversity and the environment

In Asaita there were no reports that food aid has contributed to rehabilitation of the environment,
soil and water conservation works or local development. Discussants say that the attitude of the
52

communities in Asaita towards public or other work is bad, and most people are unwilling to
participate in food-for-work or employment generating activities.

The presence of food aid has apparently helped to minimise deforestation through firewood sales in
Shininle Woreda. However, no impact was reported on local development or other environmental
rehabilitation, such as soil and water conservation.

In Humbo, according to key informant interviews, there has been measurable soil and water
conservation, reforestation and rehabilitation of roads since 2005 through Safety Net Programme
activities.

In Gola Odana, food aid is reported to have benefited soil and water conservation and reforestation,
as well as creating employment opportunities and helping people to remain in their villages. It has
also benefited local infrastructure development, such as road construction and school building.
Roads now connect the woreda town, Burqa, with each kebele.

The key informants and community in Gola Odana perceive food insecurity to have the following
impact on the environment and bio-diversity: chopping wood to sell and for charcoal; eating wild
plants such cactus (tiinii) and bakka argatte; and driving away wild animals.

As reported from Lagambo Woreda, there used to be a tendency to plough in mountainous areas, a
practice that degraded the land. Deforestation in order to increase farmland or to use as firewood is
common strategy to cope with food shortages. Another negative impact of food shortages on the
environment is the cutting of acacia from pastureland to increase the availability of cattle feed.

In Tsede Amba Woreda, the impact of food insecurity on the environment has been very high,
because the farmers cut trees for sale in order to buy food items. When there is severe shortage of
food, farmers were forced to eat wild plants, such as kunti, hohute and ango. Similarly, in Tayeta
Maichew group discussants believe that food insecurity has a serious impact on the expansion of
desert. In order to buy food, food insecure rural people are forced to clear forest cover and bushes.
As the result many indigenous tree species have disappeared from the natural environment.

In Tsede Amba Woreda it was reported that food aid has had a positive impact on agricultural
activities, through the conservation of water and soil in particular, as well as digging water wells;
soil conservation; construction of terraces; and improved soil fertility, and because farmers have the
energy to carry out their own agricultural activities. However, deforestation and sale of household
53

property has continued, because only around 200 people receive food aid, while the rest of the
kebele continue to suffer food shortages.

5.3.3. The impact of food aid on local production and product markets

In Asaita, discussants report that food aid has not contributed to improving agriculture or livestock
production activities. Food aid has not had any impact on local production of maize or market
prices, because the amount of food received is small. It might have helped to stabilise the market
during the periods when maize is not harvested locally. A portion of aid foods is taken to the market
to generate income, which is used to cover other household daily transactions.

There were differences of opinion about the share of food aid on the market. Grain traders estimate
that aid food reaches up to 30% of the market share during months of food shortage - July to
November - while experts at the Asaita Woreda Disaster Prevention and Food Security Bureau
argue that it is never more than 5% of the market share.

In Asaita the major local food crop is maize, while aid food is mainly wheat. Hence, it is difficult to
compare market prices with accuracy. Maize is cheaper after harvest - December to June - while
wheat is expensive in this period. The reverse is true during the months of July to November.
Respondents had no perception that food aid has had a negative effect on production.

In Shininle the major local products are maize and sorghum. Their market price is relatively lower
than wheat, which is donated as food aid product. During the months when locally produced grain is
available, grain from food aid takes around a quarter of the market share while it rises to up to 85%
during the months when local products are scare. Sometimes other food aid items include lentils,
supplementary foods and oil. The price of aid oil is less than commercial oil. It was specifically
indicated that the aid oil has affected the market for locally produced oil, leading to price instability
and lack of markets for the local product.

Key informants interviewed in Humbo Woreda reported that food aid products are sold on to the
local markets in significant amounts. It is roughly estimated that during the months after harvest,
food aid takes 15% of the grain market share, rising to 85% during months of food scarcity. The
price of grain from food aid is reported to be higher than that of the local grain food products. For
example, in the same market the price of imported food aid was about 230 Birr per quintal while for
local wheat was around 140 Birr per quintal.
54

Reports from Gola Odana indicated that the food aid that arrived in the woreda was not enough
even for the needy population, let alone to sell onto the market. Therefore, food aid does not have
any impact on price levels for crop or livestock products. However, some effects of food aid on
agricultural activities were reported. Those who receive food aid through employment generating
schemes are prevented from working on their own farmland at the appropriate times. The
community have complained to the woreda agriculture office that EGS timetables do not fit with
their own agricultural activities. The community members want to return to their own farms but if
someone is absent from EGS, they will not receive food aid.

In Lalomama Midir, community members indicated that when people receive food aid, the price of
livestock increases because people sell crops to buy cattle. Generally, food aid negatively affects
those who have better agricultural production, since it reduces the market prices for crops.
However, for non-agricultural societies food aid is useful because it makes product prices cheaper.
Grain traders experience both positive and negatives effects; the presence of food aid programmes
reduces the agricultural production price, which helps grain traders to purchase grain at low prices
and sell it in other areas. On the other hand, food aid reduces the market demand of receiving
communities, which means that grain traders are forced to store their grain for a long time.

In Lagambo Woreda, since food aid has been given in connection with development activities, no
pronounced negative impacts were mentioned. In addition, the gradual decline in relief food aid
supplies over time has decreased dependency. In terms of effects on the market, relief food makes
local crops cheaper as prices are driven down by cheap food aid. Generally the availability of relief
food has helped to stabilise the local markets for buyers.

Tsede Amba has experienced market stabilisation due to relief food for short periods of time.
Secondary data on prices shows that, on average, the price of food aid is lower than locally
produced products by 7%, rising to 20% for wheat.
5.3.4. The impact of food aid on the dietary habits of the beneficiaries

The literature argues that in situations where delivery of food aid involves foods normally exotic to
that area, a taste for foreign foods often develops creating future demand for those foods and
depressing the production of local grain.

In Asaita, food aid has reportedly replaced the consumption of maize bread (qixa) eaten with milk,
with wheat bread (qixa) eaten with chickpea sauce (shiro wat). In Shininle respondents indicated
55

that food aid has caused some change in the dietary habits of the community by introducing new
foods that were unknown before.

From focus group discussions in Tayeta Maichew Woreda, it was learnt that food aid has not
affected the eating habits of the community, but that people have become more aware of the need
for healthy nutrition. As a result people do not sell their food aid supplies, especially supplementary
food.

5.3.5. Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable community groups

In Asaita, discussants reported that special supplementary food is provided for children. However,
in some cases, people who do not own livestock or even chickens do not get food aid. In Oduluk
Kebele, Darolebu, it was reported that the elderly, sick and disabled people, and women whose
husbands have left do not have access to food aid. In the same kebele, community members
reported that women with relatively small households go to work on local towns, for instance,
baking injera or washing clothes, and earn 2 Birr a day to support their families.

In Shininle, children, youth, elders, pregnant women, sick people and lactating mothers have the
right to receive food aid. When any of the people in the above groups are unable to go to the
distribution centre themselves, others cooperate by taking food to their houses. In Humbo Woreda,
the elderly, sick people, pregnant women and children, among others, receive supplementary food
on top of other food items.
5.3.6. The impact of food aid on community disaster coping mechanisms and informal
social protections

Food aid has not changed the culture of sharing and traditional support mechanisms, including food
sharing, according to participants in Asaita. On the other hand, in Humbo, key informants reported
that food aid has severely affected traditional coping mechanisms to mitigate food shortages. For
instance, community members used to store food and seed; rear small ruminants or cattle; or
cultivate drought resistant food items, such as enset. Now such activities are said to have been
abandoned, because households who cultivate enset in their homesteads or have cattle are excluded
during food aid targeting.

Food aid in Tayeta Maichew Woreda has also affected food shortage coping mechanisms and
informal social protections, including migration to engage in trade or labour work in urban areas.
56

Currently community members do not cope with food shortages in the traditional ways, but instead
wait for aid from the government or NGOs.

5.3.7. Food aid and dependency

The volume of food aid that arrives in Asaita Woreda has been increasing over time, related to the
increase in the number of people affected by recurrent droughts. Food aid has a negative impact on
work attitudes. According to participants, people now have low motivation for work and are
dependent on food aid, although the amount is insufficient. The indications of this dependency
syndrome are the lack of efforts to improve agriculture or livestock husbandry and the failure to
effectively utilise the Awash River for food production.

In the study kebele in Shininle, respondents feel that no food aid dependency has been created in
their community. Whether there is rainfall or not, community members continue to cultivate crops.
But the tendency to depend on food aid has been increasing very recently due to lack of rain and
recurrent drought, as well as by government policy, from 2000, prohibiting the trade in imported
items from Djibouti.

In Gola Odana, key informants perceive that food aid results in dependency if it is given
continuously. Food aid has a negative effect on labour use, as the attitude of farmers towards work
and agricultural activities is less motivated if they are continuously receiving food aid. However,
community interview participants argued that in their community food aid has not created
dependency.

In Lalomama Midir study kebele, kebele administrators believe that food aid dependency has been
created in their area. They suggest that the government, in collaboration with NGOs, should
encourage people to work rather than looking for food aid.

Assessment in Lagambo shows that food aid has had the negative impact of developing a
dependency syndrome in some farmers. It has also led to the corruption of kebele administration
workers. Dependency is manifested by unwillingness to engage in income generating alternatives to
farming activities.

Reports from group discussions in Tsede Amba Woreda showed that food aid has decreased the
working culture of farmers. Food aid has created serious dependency attitudes that have resulted in
farmers working as daily labourers rather than on their own farms. Every farmer expects to receive
57

food aid. The criterion for receipt of aid is lack of property, so community members sell their
household property and became aid dependent. Currently the amount of food aid arriving has
decreased; since the regional government issued a rule restricting the free distribution of food
because of the grave dependency problems food aid has created.
Discussants in Tayeta Maichew Woreda also believe that food aid has a negative impact on the
attitude of the community toward work. People prefer to engage in food-for-work than daily labour
in town, which has high payment of 6 or 7 Birr per day. They sell their draft oxen and other assets
to be considered as in need of food assistance.
5.3.8 Measures suggested by communities to overcome food shortage and insecurity

In Asaita discussants indicated that food security in their area will be assured only when the weather
improves. In addition, the flow of Awash River in its previous course, through minimising silt
deposits, would improve food security. They recommended that the regional government should
help by regularly removing silt from the river, in order to avoid flood disasters; such a task, they
argue, is beyond the capacity of the local communities.

The communities of Darolebu Woreda suggest that they would overcome food shortage problems if
the government supports them with water harvesting by assigning irrigation experts and livestock
specialists who can train them. In Gaadis Kebele, Darolebu, community members suggested that
government authorities need to listen to their voices when they call for relief food. In their words;
ours is also a life that deserves to be rescued. However, since food aid will not resolve the root of
their problems, they suggest measures such as support for water harvesting, irrigation and livestock
production.

Community members interviewed in Shininle Woreda suggest the following measures are
implemented by government and non-government agencies to help improve food production and
overcome food shortages: introducing improved and drought resistant crop varieties and
demonstrating to community members on how to use them; utilising the potential of groundwater
for perennial and annual crop production; support for water harvesting activities for livestock use
and reducing travel in search of water; facilitating markets for livestock and livestock products;
support for improved livestock husbandry practices through training, so that the pastoralist and
semi-pastoralist communities can produce enough food for themselves and the market.

58

In Gola Odana study kebeles, community focus group discussants suggested that people would be
able to produce enough food if they had oxen for farming; worked harder on their farmlands; used
manure as a fertiliser; and used rainwater for irrigation. It was indicated that properly implemented
water harvesting could help bridge the gap between dry and rainy seasons for the benefit of human
and livestock consumption, and garden crop production through supplementary irrigation. The key
informants perceived that introducing short season/ early maturing crops and modern seeds;
increasing water-harvesting schemes; and soil conservation in the area could help improve food
security.

Focus group discussants in Tsede Amba Woreda proposed the following measures in order to
increase food production in the area: irrigation schemes; quality seeds appropriate to the land; use
of fertilisers, at reduced cost; increase in forest cover; introduction of modern farming techniques;
and training for farmers. In addition, participants in Tayetay Machew suggested the wider
introduction of fodder plants for livestock feed, and assignment of development assistants to help
farmers.

6. Quantitative assessment of socio-economic features, food aid


activities and their effects in study woredas
6.1 Food production, food security and food aid in the study locations

This section discusses the basic features of surveyed households in terms of demographics, farm
resources, agricultural production activities and food aid practices. In addition, some aspects of the
household economy like cash income earned, food security situations during the year before the
survey are briefly touched upon.

Partly because of the scarcity of sufficiently detailed farm management data in the study locations
and the inadequacy of one off survey for this purpose, a detailed analysis of agricultural
performance, returns to resources and the household economy could not be made.

59

Table 6.1: Household characteristics


Study regions and woredas

Indicators

Tsede
Amba

Tayetay
Maiche

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

SNNP

Daroleb
u

Somali

Gola
Odana

Afar

Laloma
ma

Tigray

Lagamb
o

Oromiya

Simada

Amhara

Number of studied cases (N)


Interviewed household heads: male (No)
:Female (No)
Average age of household heads (years) :
Average number of years lived in the area
(years)
Average household size (No)
Religion of household heads (%):
Orthodox Christian
Muslim
Catholic
Protestant
Others
Household members went elsewhere in last
2 years (%)

100
84
16
47
47

100
69
31
54
49

101
78
23
45
43

58
56
2
37
37

100
51
49
35
31

100
78
22
48
39

102
88
22
49
84

99
62
37
40
27

100
66
34
43
40

101
80
21
37
33

4.7

4.8

6.8

5.5

5.3

5.6

5.6

6.1

6.1

97
3

3
92
1

89

9
90

98

93

100

100

99

10

4
10

11

1
13

14

21

1
5

6
1

23

11
28
7
54
19

Source: survey data. ni = no information

To facilitate comparisons across the sample study woredas, the data is presented in tables. As
shown in Table 6.1, except in Gola Odana Woreda where the surveyed households are only 58 for
the reasons explained earlier, in all the other woredas the desired number of sample households
were interviewed. In the sample, the participation of female-headed households is significant
ranging from 2 in Gola Odana to 49 in Darolebu. The average age of heads ranges between 35 and
54 years and the sample was dominated by adults. On average the respondents lived in the
respective areas for over 30 years, so they are well aware of the localities, including changes in
agriculture and food security situations, and history of food aid practices.

The average household size is large, ranging between 4.7 in Simada and 6.8 in Gola Odana. In
terms of religion, Orthodox Christian largely dominates in the samples drawn from the woredas in
Amhara and Tigray. Muslims dominate in Lagambo, Gola Odana, Asaita and Shininle woredas. In
Humbo, the largest shares are Protestants, followed by Muslims. The data shows that during the last
two years, in one in ten households one or more household members moved out of the community.
In Tayeta Maichew and Humbo woredas the share is larger. Some of the surveyed households
reported that they do not have agricultural land of their own (Table 6.2). They are 7% of the sample
in Tayeta Maichew Woreda. Similarly, some households reported that in the last five years the area
of farmland they are cultivating has reduced. About 20% of the sample in Gola Odana reported
reduction in their farmland, while 30% of the sample in Tayeta Maichew reported an increase in
farm holdings.
60

A significant share of sample cases in three woredas have irrigated plots, in Tayeta Maichew, Tsede
Amba, and Asaita. In the case of Asaita, a kebele near the course of the Awash River was selected
for the study. Except in Asaita, which is constrained by moisture scarcity, and in Lalomama Midir,
a large share of households reported that they apply manure to their farm fields. Fertiliser
application to farm lands is also practiced, except in Asaita and to a limited extent in Gola Odana
and Lalomama Midir woredas. There is no practice of soil and water conservation in Asaita, but it is
practiced elsewhere. Low numbers of households have participated in agricultural extension
programmes during the last five years, except in Tsede Amba, Tayeta Maichew and Shininle. As far
as this sample represents the study woredas, this data shows that inadequate efforts were made to
improve food production through adoption of better agricultural technologies.

Some of the survey households reported that they do not own livestock. This ranges between a few
in Humbo to 15% in Tayeta Maichew. Excluding the two pastoral woredas Shininle and Asaita the average livestock holding of the sample woredas amounts to only 1.7 to 3.6 Total Livestock
Unit (TLU) per household. The loss of a large number of livestock in Shininle and Asaita is notable
in the last five years. Their average holding has reduced from 49 to 6.5 TLU and from 33 to 5 TLU
in Asaita and Shininle, respectively. This dramatic reduction is presumably due to the recent
drought of 2002/ 2003.
Table 6.2: Household resources, farming systems and farm management practices
Study regions and woredas
Amhara

Tsede
Amba

Tayeta
Maichew

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

SNNP

Darolebu

Somali

Gola
Odana

Afar

Lalomam
a Midir

Tigray

Lagambo

Number of studied cases (N)


Households who do not own farm land (%)
Farm land cultivated during the last 5 years
(%)
Same size (%)
Larger size than current (%)
Smaller size than current (%)
Households own irrigated farm land (%)
Apply manure to farm fields (%)
Practice soil conservation on farm lands (%)
Participated in agric extension in last 5
years (%)
Applied fertilizer to fields in last 5 years
(%)
Households who do not own livestock (%)
Currently owned (TLU)
Owned 5 years ago (TLU)
Owned 10 years ago (TLU)

Oromiya

Simada

Indicators

100
ni

100
6

101
ni

58
ni

100
4

100
7

102
ni

99
3

100
6

101
2

96
2

100

64
6
30
27
69
91
77

89
2

7
74
61
24

84
4
3
59
81
83
52

94
3

2
24
29
14

78
19
1.8
7
100
77
19

95
1

1
63
87
16

89
4
1
9
28
88
22

8815
13
1
1

1
73
96
96

90
3
5
6
79
55
21

33

10

62

10

50

74

85

96

64

11
2.0
1.4
0.5

9
3.0
2.6
2.3

12
3.6
2.4
1.7

ni
2.8
6.0
6.3

12
1.7
2.1
1.9

13
2.2
2.4
2.4

15
1.9
2.2
1.8

5
6.5
47.8
42.2

4
4.9
32.5
41.0

2
1.8
2.1
1.7

Source: survey data. ni = no information


15

Selected households have fields near Awash River.

61

Darolebu

Tsede
Amba

Tayeta
Maichew

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

92.91
599
837
Source: Survey data

Gola
Odana

Lalomama
Midir

Lagambo

Simada

Table 6.3: Household cash income earned during the year 2005 (Birr)

1166

1156

981

664

794

2161

679

Attempts were made to enquire about the cash earnings of the sample households from agricultural
and non-agricultural activities during the last year before survey. The balance of cash income and
expenditure for the majority of households was reported to be negative, due to either
underestimation of their cash earnings or exaggeration of their expenditure, or both. Cash income is
presented in Table 6.3. Households in Simada reported the lowest earning of 93 Birr per year, while
the highest was in Shininle, with over 2,160 Birr, followed by Gola Odana at 1,166 Birr. In
Shininle, although they complained that contraband trade is now banned by the government, the
relatively large cash income must be generated by some trade activities or sale of livestock as they
are close to the trade route to Dire Dawa.
6.2 Food aid practices and targeting mechanisms

6.2.1. Perceptions of causes of food insecurity and history of food aid

The assessment of the weather situation during the last five years from the perspective of the survey
households shows that many of them recall years of rain shortage (Table 6.4). In Simada, Gola
Odana, Darolebu, Asaita, Shininle and Humbo woredas the majority report all the last five years as
drought years. Except in Lagambo and Lalomama woredas, in other cases more than half the
respondents recall that at least three of the past five years were years of rain shortage. Despite some
variation of the memory among the survey cases, the data shows the prevalence of unfavourable
weather during the last five years has been a major cause of food insecurity.

In 35 cases in Lalomama Midir and 94 cases in Humbo, households were facing food shortages
before food aid arrived. On the other hand, in 64 of cases in Lalomama, 34 in Lagambo and 32 in
Shininle say that they were not facing food shortage problems before food aid arrived. The
existence of coping mechanisms and community support was acknowledged in the majority of cases
in Asaita and Shininle, while responses were mixed response in the other woredas. Particularly in
the cases of Lalomama and Darolebu woredas, the majority said that there is no community support
to each other in cases of food shortages.
62

In some of the study woredas food aid distribution is a recent phenomenon. In Darolebu and about
half the cases in Asaita, it was reported to have begun during the last five years. Other woredas said
that food aid distribution started ten to fifteen years ago. About one third of households in Humbo
recalled that it is more than fifteen years since aid started in their kebele.

Table 6.4 Drought and food aid history


Study regions and woredas
Oromiya
Tigray
Afar

Amhara

Somali

SNNP

Lagambo

Lalomam
a Midir

Gola
Odana

Darolebu

Tsede
Amba

Tayeta
Maichew

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

Number of studied cases (N)


Years of rain shortage and drought last 5
years (%):
1 year
2 years
3 years
All were drought years
4 years
None was a drought year
In the past, HH facing food shortage before
aid arrived
Yes (%)
No (%)
Do community members support each
other these days?
Yes (%)
No (%)
Food aid distributed in the kebele (% of
HHs)
< 5 years
5 9 years
10 -15 years
16 20 years
Over 20 years
Do not know
Started receiving food aid first time (%)
Within the last 10 years (%)
More than 10 years ago (%)
Do not know
Why receiving food aid?
Lack of food (%)
Since others in kebele receive (%)
Since selected to receive (%)
To add to own production (%)
Others (%)

Simada

Indicators

100

100

101

58

100

100

102

99

100

101

-4
48
41
7
--

14
35
24
3
21
3

12
81
-2
-3

--14
53
31
12

1
13
23
46
17

13
44
29
14

1
23
65
11

-31
15
33
20

--5
95

1
11
35
32
20
1

88
11

64
34

35
64

88
3.4

98
2

76
16

82
2

79
19

67
32

94
5

55
43

63
31

13
86

53
45

22
76

55
42

47
47

98
2

55
39

34
64

--

1
20
73
7
---

1
2
6
1
2
41

8.6
25
16
19
31

99
1

17
37
16
6
1
4

6
40
38
7

49
51

52
48

2
20
32
29
11

53
36
4

5
6
39

77
18
3.4

87
1

29
45
1

51
36
1

100

97

30
59
3

75
1

40
4

88

85

43

89

5
2
4

56
5
18
14

79
21
--81
14

82
1
2
2
2

1
2

1
10

90

74
2
4
1
1

Source: survey data (ni - no information)

More than one third of the cases in Lagambo and Tayeta Maichew and 45% and 60% of the cases in
Tsede Amba and Humbo, respectively, started receiving food aid for the first time more than ten
years ago. Other cases in these woredas and in other woredas recall that they started receiving aid
for the first time within the last ten years. The majority say that they receive food aid because of

63

lack of food. About 20% and 15% respectively in Tayeta Maichew say that they were selected to
receive aid and that the aid adds to their own food production.

Due to memory limitations, households were asked to recall the amount of food aid they received
only for the last five years. The data shows that there is a significant difference between the
woredas in terms of the volume of food given to households. There is no data that could help to
verify the difference in levels of vulnerability and food shortages among the study woredas. In
Asaita and Shininle, households received an average of 4.5 quintals and 3 quintals of cereals of food
aid per year during the last five years (Table 6.5). In Gola Odana it is around 2 quintals, while it is
about 1.4 quintals in Darolebu. In Simada and Humbo, about half a quintal has been received every
year, with lower amounts received in Darolebu, Tayeta Maichew and Tsede Amba. In Lalomama
Midir, free food aid has not been given in the last five years, but food-for work programmes have
been implemented, although the figures reported are insignificant16.
Table 6.5. Food aid received during the last five years, yearly average (2001 -2005)

Tayeta
Maichew

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

SNN
PR

Tsede
Amba

Somali

Darolebu

Afar

Gola
Odana

Tigray

Lalomama

Cereal (kg)
49.5
Pulses (kg)
0.4
Oil (kg)
0.3
Source: Survey data

Oromiya

Lagambo

Simada

Amhara

137.6
0.0
0.1

3.6
0.0
0.0

196.0
7.8
4.0

28.0
3.5
0.6

19.6
1.3
0.3

31.0
0.1
0.0

450.9
20.3
12.5

306.6
12.0
5.7

47.6
2.8
1.4

The level and trend of food aid distribution over the last five years has been different among the
selected study woredas. As shown in Figure 6.1, three patterns are depicted. In Simada, Gola
Odana, and Asaita, the amount of grain received by households has been increasing annually, in
particular Asaita has seen a large increase of aid reaching households in the kebeles studied. In
Shininle, Humbo, Tayeta Maichew (after 2003), Tsede Amba, and Lagambo (after 2003), food aid
has been declining from year to year. The rate of reduction has been significant in Shininle. In
Darolebu, households reported they received food aid only in 2003.

16

The field survey workers were supported by the woreda bureau of agriculture during sampling of the kebeles. They
were told that the two selected kebeles received food aid receivers, but community members reported that they have not
received aid during the last five years, although previously they had.

64

Figure 6.1 Grain food (cereals and pulses) received by beneficiaries in the last five years (kg)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Simada

Legambo Lalomama Golaodo

Darolebu Tseada A.

Tayetay
M.

Asaiyta

Shinele

Humbo
64

2001

29

117

11

141

27

19

199

412

2002

42

120

175

27

61

279

515

67

2003

53

385

184

137

22

35

580

407

61

2004

59

47

259

13

28

656

156

41

2005

67

15

262

15

11

642

91

20

Source: Survey data

Figure 6.2. Supplementary food received by beneficiaries during the last five years (kg)
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Simada Legambo

Lalomam
Tseada
Golaodo Darolebu
A.
a
7.6

0.0

1.0

Tayetay
M.

Asaiyta

Shinele

Humbo

0.2

1.0

31.9

2.7

2001

0.2

0.0

0.0

2002

0.5

1.1

0.0

12.5

1.0

1.0

0.1

0.6

6.4

2.7

2003

1.0

0.0

0.0

150.0

1.5

0.5

1.0

3.9

9.3

3.1

2004

0.7

0.0

0.0

12.5

0.0

0.5

1.8

6.4

3.4

1.7

2005

0.6

0.0

0.0

14.3

0.0

1.3

1.0

0.5

12.1

1.3

Source: Survey data

The average amount of supplementary food received has been very small. It was only in Gola
Odana that a significant amount of about 150 kg was reported in the year 2003. Compared to other
places beneficiaries in Shininle and Gola Odana have been receiving some supplementary food. In
other study woredas amounts are either very small or nothing was given at all.
When compared across the studied kebeles and woredas, beneficiaries have been receiving notably
significant amount of edible oil in the case of Asaita, Shininle followed by Gola Odana and Humbo.
65

Households in Asaita have been receiving an amount reaching up to 18 kg (litre) per year (raised
from 6 kg in 2001 to 18 kg in 2004). In other woredas it was reported that distribution of food oil
was insignificant.

The data shows that there is significant variation among the households of the amount of aid food
received. On the other hand, as this data is obtained from the beneficiary households (as far as they
recall it), there is no other secondary data that helps to verify the responses of the households
regarding the actual amount of food aid distributed.

Figure 6.3: Edible oil received by beneficiaries during the last five years (kg)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Simada Legambo
0.1

Lalomam
Tseada
Golaodo Darolebu
a
A.

2001

0.1

0.0

2002

0.1

0.1

0.0

2003

0.2

0.1

0.0

2004

0.4

0.0

0.0

2005

0.8

0.0

0.0

2.4

Tayetay
M.

Asaiyta

Shinele

Humbo

6.3

9.5

1.7

0.0

0.5

0.0

5.3

0.1

0.3

0.0

7.6

5.5

1.8

2.6

2.6

0.3

0.0

14.1

7.4

1.5

3.7

0.0

0.1

0.0

18.1

3.1

1.1

6.1

0.0

0.2

0.0

16.3

3.0

1.0

Source: Survey data

The studied households generate their household food supply from various sources in given year.
Considering data of the year 2005, own production of food contributes between one third in
Shininle and close to 80% in Darolebu Woreda. In Humbo the households get 50% of their food
supply from own production. The data shows that although these study woredas are known to have
been receiving food aid since quite many years, it is noted that households do produce significant
share of the food supply from their own farms, including those in pastoralist/ agro-pastoralist areas.

On the other hand the food aid supplied about 20% of the household food in Gola Odana, and
Asaita woredas. The average food supply (including sales and other allocations) during the year was
ranging between 7.5 quintals in Shininle and 23 quintals in Asaita. In Asaita household produced
about 14 quintals from their own farms. This is a special case where the sample households are
reported to have owned irrigated field near the Awash river bank. Nevertheless they are receiving
66

food aid. Food purchase from the market has also been important for the household supply. Its share
ranges from 6% in Lalomama Midir to 39% in Humbo. All of the sample survey households
consumed on average about 90% of the food they received from various sources. A limited number
of the surveyed households (8% of the sample) reported that they have sold some of the food they
received from aid and food-for-work last year.

Table 6.6: Household food supply and allocation in the year 2005

Tsede
Amba

Tayeta
Maichew

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

SNN
PR

Darolebu

Somali

Gola
Odana

Afar

Lalomama

Produced
Food aid
FFW
Loan
Bought
Total supply
Own produced (%)
Food aid (%)
Purchased (%)
Sales from produce
Sales from aid & FFW
Shared with relatives
Pay loan
Exchange
Total allocation- out of
household (excl. exchange)
Consumed
Allocated out of household
9%)
Consumed by household
(%)
Source: survey data

Tigray

Lagambo

Food supply and allocation


(kg)

Oromiya

Simada

Amhara

475
83
64
4
92
718
66
12
13
52
8
0
4
3
64

719
151
96
12
109
1087
66
14
10
107
2
8
5
1
122

1061
25
132
6
77
1301
82
2
6
127
10
1
3
1
141

556
166
26
17
173
938
59
18
18
87
8
20
14
2
129

670
65
20
6
99
860
78
8
12
33
2
2
0
0
37

756
12
137
2
247
1154
66
1
21
101
19
2
1
1
123

352
55
51
3
195
656
54
8
30
37
5
3
4
6
49

1423
442
8
1
410
2284
62
19
18
276
4
5
4
1
289

248
77
22
3
397
747
33
10
53
12
21
2
5
7
40

660
34
95
10
501
1300
51
3
39
61
12
3
5
0
81

657
8.9

966
11.2

1161
10.8

811
13.8

823
4.3

1032
10.7

613
7.5

1996
12.7

714
5.4

1219
6.2

92

89

89

86

96

89

93

87

96

94

6.2.2. Assessment of food aid beneficiary targeting mechanisms


The survey households were enquired about their knowledge of aid beneficiary targeting
mechanism, criteria and practices. Compared to households from other woredas, those cases in
Tayeta Maichew reported that they are less ware of how beneficiaries are selected. One third of
them also say that the criteria are changing from time to time. From 13% in Lalomama to 60% in
Shininle and Gola Odana, the households report that they do not have knowledge about how
beneficiaries are selected to take food aid (Table 6.7). Some households, in fact in some woredas
significant share, do not agree with the criteria of selection. For instance, from 12% of the
households in Darolebu to 54% in Tayeta Maichew do not agree with the selection criteria. It shows
that there is a significant level; of lack of transparency or communication to the community
67

members about how households are selected for eligibility to food aid. There is also a doubt
whether food aid is fairly distributed to the needy ones. From 9% of the sample cases in Shininle to
76% in Tayeta Maichew woredas, they feel that they do not believe aid is fairly distributed to the
needy people. Other households believe that it is done fairly while the others do not know about it.
Table 6.7 Food aid beneficiary targeting mechanisms and distribution
Study regions and woredas
Somali

SNNP

100

101

58

100

100

102

99

100

101

62
32
6

83
15
2

82
13
3

38
59
3.4

45
52
1

78
18
2

21
48
28

41
56
3

31
59
2

59
35
1

51
17
26
5

67
16
8
7

37
55
6

16
45
26
9

40
12
13
2

62
20
7
3

21
54
4
21

36
26
34
2

16
1
55
1

48
12
34
3

36
36
20
4

65
23
10
1

24
53
21

14
57
22
3.4

43
24
31
1

39
40
19

13
76
8
2

36
42
19
2

51
9
31
6

45
29
20
4

86
2
11

80
3
14

2
92
3

78
3.4
19

34
1
24
18

31
5
56
1

80
2
5

32
50
17

13
28
19

66
9
22

59
31

54
22

34
52

53
45

52
32

40
40

46
16

76
22

56
14

65
26

17
13
40
7

29
7
5
30

36
4
2
2

19
21
7
26

9
17
6
23

2
1
16
29

17
5
3
41

27
3
7
61

34
20
4

35
13
8
19

7
1.7

4
3

69
8
4
7

49
9

27
10
4
4

16
48
17
5.2

40
19
4
2

26
15
1
5

Humbo

Asaita

Gola
Odana

Shininle

100

Darolebu

Tayeta
Maichew

Afar

Tsede
Amba

Tigray

Lagambo

Oromiya

Simada
Number of studied cases (N)
Do you know how households are selected to
take food aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
Criteria changes (%)
Do you agree with the criteria?
Yes (%)
Do not agree (%)
Do not know the criteria (%)
Sometimes agree sometimes not (%)
Do you believe aid fairly distributed to the
needy?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Only sometimes (%)
Did some households stop taking aid in the
last 2 years?
Yes there are (%)
No, all continue taking (%)
I do not know (%)
No aid given to the Kebele
Do you know amount of aid ration?
Yes (%)
No (%)
Who decides the amount of food aid ration?
Kebele Authorities (%)
Woreda authorities (%)
Decided at the country level (%)
Decided by the aid organisations at local level
(%)
Other (%)
I do not know (%)
Is food aid received according to the ration?
Yes, I think (%)
No I do not think (%)
Only sometimes (%)
No idea about the ration itself (%)
Source: survey data (ni - no information)

Lalomam
a Midir

Amhara

Indicators

21
12
21
13

61
31

57

49
21
2
19

Although a higher number of households in different woredas believe that people receive aid food
according to the ration set, there are still significant numbers of households who do not think that
68

aid is given according to the ration. They are count from 8% in Simada to 48% in Gola Odana
Woreda.

Not all households have knowledge about the amount of ration of aid food. From 14% of the cases
in Shininle to 45% in Gola Odana they do not know the amount of the ration. On the other hand,
significant share (65% in Humbo and 76% in Asaita) reported that they know the amount of the
ration allocated fro individuals. According to the information of the survey households, the food
ration is fixed by different bodies ranging from kebele authorities at the lower level to aid
organisations at the national level and donor agencies. There are some households who do not know
who decides the amount of the ration.

6.3 Allocation of food aid and perception of its effects


Although limited number of households (not more than 8% of the sample) has reported that they
have sold some food they received from aid and food-for-work programmes, they have reasons why
they sold it. In order to purchase cheaper food was a reason for 59%, 18%, 17%, and 12% of the
cases in Tayeta Maichew, Simada, and Shininle and Gola Odana woredas, respectively (Table 5.5.).
The other main reason was to get cash for other purposes as reported by 19%, 16%, and 8% of the
cases in Shininle, Tayeta Maichew, Simada and Humbo, respectively.

Households have also reported that they shared some food they received from aid programmes. The
reasons are because the others do not get aid food, they get food from them other times, anticipating
to get food from them in the future and sharing food being part of their culture. The later reason is
told by 18% of the sample in Asaita.

Households were requested their opinion about whether receiving food aid is good or bad. Not all
food aid receiving households consider the practice as a good one. The large majority (54% in
Tsede Amba to 91% in Asaita) perceive it as being good. The rest see it as bad or sometimes bad
and sometimes good. One third of the cases in Humbo, Tsede Amba, and Tayeta Maichew consider
food aid as bad.

69

Table 6.8. Food aid allocation and perception of its effects

100

100

102

12

1.7
14

2
13

1
1
2
14

59
11
16

33
3.4
2

2
29
5
4

15

72
7
19

64
20
14
2

54
33
9
3
1

4
82
4
10

8
6
6
1
1

7
74
10
13
1
1

88
5
4
1
2

81
13
5

15
47
20
17

15
70
5
7

14
6
9
67

17
59
7
7

3.7

76
16
3
2

91
5
1

86
7
6

90
7
3.4

50
33
16

4
72
19

6
59
11
2
2

73
14
1

2
82
10
2

10
65
18
2

2
16
35
37

Humbo

58

SN
NP

Shininle

Tayeta
Maichew

101

Somali

Asaita

Tsede
Amba

100

18

Afar

Darolebu

100

Tigray

Gola
Odana

Number of studied cases (N)


Why sold the food aid received?
To buy cheaper food (%)
To buy more quality food (%)
To get cash for other purposes (%)
Other (%)
Why shared aid food with neighbours?
In exchange for labour (%)
Since they do not get aid food (5)
They give us food other times (%)
To get food from them in future (5)
Because sharing is our culture (5)
Other (%)
Is receiving aid food good or bad?
It is good
It is bad
Sometimes good and sometimes bad
Depends on the situation (%)
Cannot judge
Food aid made people give less attention
to farm work?
Yes, it is true (%)
No it is not true (%)
No idea (%
May be true with others, but not with me
(%)
Other (%)
Food aid benefits/support for the NRM
It positively benefits (%)
Do not know about such benefits 9%)
No such benefit (%)
Other (%)
Does food aid have effect on family food
eating habit?
Yet, it has (%)
No such effect (%)
Do not know about this effect (%)
Difficult to mark such effect (%)
Other (%)
Source: survey data (ni - no information)

Oromiya
Lalomam
a M.

Amhara
Lagambo

Indicators

Simada

Study regions and woredas

99

100

101

17
5
19
1

8
11
1
11
4
1

4
16
3
18
4

13

71
27
3

91
9

81
6
11
1

68
27
3
1

8
68
15
8

18
45
1
32

43
31
19
5.1

1
68
24
7

6.9
80
11
1

62
35
3

90
7
3

39
60

46
44
10

49
39
10

18
72
1
7

32
52
13
1

46
21
13
6

8
78
7
3

59
16
2
2

The survey households do not deny the fact that receiving food aid makes people to give less
attention to farm work. While a 6% of the households in Lalomama Midir to 82% in Darolebu
consider such an allegation as not being true, there are quite good number in all woredas which
acknowledge that it is true or it may be true with other farmers if not with themselves. From 7% in
Humbo to 43% in Asaita consider that it is true that food aid has such a negative effect.
70

The large share of sample households in all woredas believes that food aid positively supports the
management of the natural resources. While a smaller number say that it does not have such a
benefit, others are not aware of this kind of benefit.

Except Lalomama Midir (73%), in Shininle (46%), in Asaita (32%), in Tayeta Maichew (18%)
where such an effect is acknowledged by a significant number of households, the large majority
consider that there is no effect of food aid on the households food eating habit.
6.4 Food aid, gender and the rights of vulnerable community groups
Many of the surveyed household reported either that the food aid is given to a family head or the
heads receive food in the name of all household members. In case of the former situation, many of
them think so because it is the household heads are known by Kebele administration. But in some
woredas respondents feel that the amount of the ration given to household heads is not the same as
for the other household members. Such a difference is thought by 46% of the cases in Tayeta
Maichew, 15% in Humbo, 14% in Darolebu and 10% in Lagambo.

The survey households have different awareness about the rights of children to receive food aid. In
Lagambo, Tayeta Maichew, Tsede Amba, Humbo, Shininle, and Darolebu, the large number of
households believes that children have the right. In Lalomama Midir, Gola Odana, Asaita, Tsede
Amba, Darolebu, and Humbo, significant number of case and in some cases the large majority
believe that children have no right (table 6.9). The same pattern of knowledge and awareness is true
with the right of locating mothers. There is no uniform knowledge and believe that locating mothers
have the right to access food aid. Significant number of households about 77% (Lalomama
Midir), 52% (Gola Odana), 46% (Tsede Amba), 43% (Tayeta Maichew), and 38% in Simada think
that lactating mothers have no right to access food aid.

There is uniform understanding/awareness and practice as far as the vulnerable groups in the society
orphans, disabled, and elderly- are concerned regarding access to food aid. The large share of
households says that these sections of the society do not have the right to access food aid. While
some households perceive that the disabled, elderly and orphans get special support, still significant
number of interviewed cases in different study woredas report that these sections of the society do
not get special support to access food aid.

71

Table 6.9 Perception about the rights of sections of the society to access food aid

Indicators

Amhara

Simada

Lagambo

Lalomama

Gola
Odana

Darolebu

Tsede
Amba

Tayeta

Asaita

Shininle

Humbo

Study regions and woredas

Number of studied cases


Do children have the right to receive food aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Do lactating mothers have the right to receive
food aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Do pregnant women have the right to receive
food aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Do orphans have the right to receive food aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Do the disabled have the right to receive food
aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
Do elderly people have the right to receive food
aid?
Yes (%)
No (%)
I do not know (%)
How do the disabled, elderly, orphans, children
access aid food?
Get special support
No special support
I do not know about them
How do people who cannot participate in FFW
get food?
Get free food (%)
No special provision of free food 95)
Everybody needs to work (%)
I do not know about them (%)
Other (%)

100

100

101

58

100

100

102

99

100

101

49
49
2

99

6
77
17

5.2
86
9

61
35
4

59
37
4

93
7

5.1
91
4

94
5

58
35
6

Midir

Oromiya

Tigray

Afar

Somali

SNN
PR

61
38
1

99
1

6
77
17

40
52
9

82
12
6

48
46
6

55
43
2

79
17
5

95
4

80
14
5

65
35

98
1

5
78
17

24
48
26

79
15
5

53
41
6

54
45
1

77
18
5

95
4

78
16
5

84
16

99
1

12
72
16

19
57
24

79
15
6

90
9
1

75
23
3

74
21
5

92
7

90
4
5

92
8

99
1

12
72
16

16
69
16

73
21
6

97
2

76
22
1

72
23
5

95
4

94
1
4

96
4

99
1

16
66
16

17
71
10

65
29
6

100

87
11

70
25
5

94
4

93
1
3

98
1

89
2
8

2
6
91

79
12
3.4

22
31
45

55
22
19

44
36
20

9
50
38

5
1
2

78
11
10

97

90

86
5

68
24
1
7
2

26
56
10
8

54

75
12

1
8
2

19
30
1
48

16
43

1
10
2
86

31

12

3.4

Source: survey data (ni - no information)

72

7. Summary, conclusion and recommendations


7.1 Summary and conclusion
Over the last decades the priority development challenge for Ethiopia and its donors has been
securing a sustainable supply of food. However, despite great wishes, plans and interventions, food
insecurity remains a deep-rooted problem and on top of the development agenda. Although the food
insecurity problem has been chronic for many years, interventions have been geared towards shortterm solutions. The fundamental causes of food insecurity have not been properly targeted or
addressed. Although the National Policy of Disaster Prevention adopted in 1992 was designed to
link relief efforts with development, by changing the mode of interventions and utilisation of food
aid resources, it has not been adequately practiced. In many food insecure areas of the country
where food aid programmes have been implemented for a long time, food aid has not been
integrated with other essential polices and measures, such as reducing population growth rates to
reduce pressure on agricultural resources.

The recently adopted New Coalition for Food Security and Safety Net Programmes are ambitious in
terms of the resources needed for their implementation in a short time framework, and the capacity
required to implement them, particularly at local level.

7.1.1. Review of literature on the impact of food aid

The following is a summary of a review of some of the available literature on food aid and its
impact. The literature documents that food aid can have a disincentive effect on local production.
However, proper targeting and appropriate government marketing and pricing policies can have the
effect of preventing disincentives and disturbance to the local food market. Some studies
recommend that it may be advisable to consider alternative commodities than those produced in aid
receiving locations for use in food-for-work programmes.

The most recent studies conclude that food aid displaces food imports to recipient countries. A
study carried out in Ethiopia showed that food aid introduced in the early stages of a drought
rapidly depressed escalating grain prices and helped more people to continue to purchase grain. The
impact of direct feeding projects on national or community level food security could not be
73

confirmed. Another Ethiopian study concluded that the potential market effects of food aid can, and
do, alter household purchasing behaviour as well as sales behaviour.

Another study from Ethiopia found that women are not marginalised as regards access to food aid,
as is commonly assumed, and a further research piece confirmed that direct food aid has a positive
effect on the nutrition and growth of children. The author of a study about the dependency effects of
food aid concluded that dependency is most likely when relief food is supplied to needy people for
free. A report on the impact of food aid on household labour allocation in Ethiopia stated that when
households receive food aid they supply less labour to agricultural and non-agricultural activities, as
well as labour sharing with others, compared to those who do not receive aid.

7.1.2. Qualitative assessment of key informants and focus group discussions

Discussions with community members in different study woredas show that food delivered to
people affected by food shortages is generally inadequate17. In some study woredas, the key
informant experts working at the DPPD/ Food Security Desk say that the estimated number of
vulnerable people reported by the DPPD based on the food aid assessments were not usually
accepted by aid agencies or the federal DPPC, and the number of beneficiaries reduced, although
they claim that the appeal is based on scientific and professional assessments.

There is a high level of understanding by the studied communities about the causes and signs of
disasters such as drought and food shortages. These elements of local knowledge can help the
modern early warning systems in improving the accuracy of disaster prediction.

The practice of food aid targeting varies from woreda to woreda, as assessed during the survey.
Community members understand that some of the criteria used for beneficiary targeting can have a
negative impact, for example, asset depletion so that people will be eligible for food aid. In some
study areas, food aid targeting criteria was reported to have indirectly caused people to deliberately
dispose of their meagre assets. There is some evidence that food shortage coping mechanisms and
informal community social protections are seriously affected by food aid distribution. Some places
have introduced a new policy of food aid allocation: 80% work-based and 20% direct aid.

17

Data compiled by the DPPC for the period 1995-2003 shows that the annual average food aid requirement was
775,000 MT, while the average volume of food aid distributed during the same period was 594,000 MT, showing that
only 77% of requirements were met.

74

The level of community participation varies. In many places lack of transparency and corruption by
kebele leaders is common in the distribution of food aid. In limited cases, targeting gives special
consideration to vulnerable groups, such as female headed households, disabled people, children,
especially orphans, pregnant women and lactating mothers, only in limited cases, usually through
free distribution. In the majority of the study areas there is no special support for vulnerable groups.
The surveyed households displayed different levels of awareness about the right of children and/ or
lactating mothers to receive food aid, with the majority believing no special support should be
given.

Many communities positively assessed the short-term role of food aid in mitigating food shortages
and saving lives, creating employment opportunities, and helping people to remain in their villages.
However, as the amount of aid given is mostly small, it was not seen as having any impact on asset
creation or asset rehabilitation.

The impact of food aid on biodiversity did not emerge clearly, as community members could not
easily observe environmental changes. Overall people acknowledged that food aid reduces
environmental destruction in some ways; for example, by minimising the cutting of trees for
firewood. Some communities observed that food insecurity has a major impact on desertification. In
order to buy food supplies, food insecure rural people clear forest and bush cover which result in the
disappearance of many indigenous tree species from the natural environment.

In many of the study woredas there is an understanding that food aid products are cheaper than local
products at the market place and that this could result in driving down the prices of local products18.
The poor local production conditions reported in some study areas meant it was not possible for
communities or experts to observe the impact of food aid on local markets and prices.

In many places communities acknowledged the creation, or potential creation, of dependency


attitudes due to food aid. People noted that food aid has a negative effect the attitude of farmers
towards work and their own agricultural activities. The implication was that proper targeting and
awareness raising efforts should aim to reduce the attitude of dependency on food aid.

Community members suggested many diverse solutions in order to overcome food insecurity,
including short season crops, water harvesting, irrigation of crops and pasture for livestock, soil
conservation, environmental rehabilitation and technical advice on agriculture.
18

Some years ago local oil processing companies complained that they could not compete with food aid imported oil on
the market and many of them were forced to run at low processing capacity.

75

7.1.3. Quantitative assessment based on household surveys

Despite some variation in responses, the data shows that unfavourable weather over the last five
years has been a major cause of food insecurity in all the study areas. The survey data shows that
inadequate efforts have been made to improve food production through adoption of better
agricultural technologies, with limited practice of fertiliser application. In addition to the general
problem of poor farming techniques, in some households food insecurity is also related to lack of
assets, such as cultivable land and livestock.

There is a significant difference between woredas in terms of the amount of food given to
households. However, there is no available data to verify the differences between the level of
vulnerability and food shortage among the study woredas. Although the most of the studied
communities are known to have been receiving food for many years, it is clear that households do
produce a significant share of their food supply themselves, as well as purchase food from the
market. The share ranges from 6% in Lalomama Midir to 39% in Humbo Woreda. The entire
sample survey households consumed on average about 90% of the food they produced or received
from various sources, including food aid. Given that the amount of food aid received is generally
small, although with variation from place to place, this data shows that sale of aid food onto the
market by households is very limited.

The household survey data shows that there is a significant lack of transparency in communicating
to community members about how households are selected for receipt of food aid. Many doubt
whether aid food is fairly distributed, and not all households are informed about the amount of food
aid allocated per person or household.

Not all food aid receiving households consider the practice to be positive, as food aid can result in
households giving less attention to farm work. The perception of community is that food aid
targeting practices have not been comprehensive enough to accommodate the special needs of
vulnerable groups within aid recipient communities.

76

Except in some limited cases, the majority of respondents do not consider food aid to affect
household eating habits. However, lack of household level data on food aid and food consumption
means the influence on household consumption cannot be accurately assessed.

The survey households have different awareness about the rights of children and lactating mothers
to receive food aid. The large share of households says that these sections of the society do not have
the right to access food aid. While some households perceive that the disabled, elderly and orphans
get special support, still significant number of interviewed cases in different study woredas report
that these sections of the society do not get special support to access food aid.

In summary, Ethiopias rampant poverty, food insecurity and development problems are structural.
There must be fundamental change that cannot be effected by food aid interventions alone. The
problems are the results of cumulative effects and processes that have led to a decline in peoples
assets and collapse of their livelihoods and increased vulnerability.

Although grand ideas and strategies towards enhanced rural and agricultural development have been
devised, experience has shown that there is a serious problem of coordination and implementation.
The increasing volume of food aid arriving in the country shows that food and agriculture sector
development plans have not been adequately achieved. Food security interventions, in the form of
annual food aid appeals and pledges, are not satisfactory responses to the chronic problem of food
shortages. Lasting solutions for food insecurity and poverty in Ethiopia will come only from radical
and consistent efforts made over a sustained period of time frame to properly utilise available
resources, including water resources and by all sectors paying adequate attention to coordinating
their work.

7.2 Recommendations on the way forward


There is no alternative to improving the domestic food production capacity of Ethiopian agriculture
for a lasting solution to the problem of food insecurity and dependence on food aid. Based on the
evidence gathered in this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. This study confirms that food aid is a short-term solution to food insecurity. Food aid does
not contribute to asset creation or rehabilitation of beneficiary communities. The solution
for chronic food insecurity should be development interventions that focus on rehabilitation
and creation of productive assets for the vulnerable communities, as well as linking them
with markets.
77

2. Although most of the communities covered by this study have been receiving food aid for a
long time, they continue to produce their own food as well as buy food from markets. The
food security strategy of federal and regional governments must pay sufficient attention to
appropriate support mechanisms to rehabilitate and improve the productive capacity of food
aid recipient communities, so they do not wait for food handouts year after year.

3. Despite longstanding food aid programmes in the studied woredas, beneficiary communities
have limited awareness about practices such as targeting mechanism and the rights of the
vulnerable. Respondents complained about the transparency of distribution practices and
equity of access to aid. Attention should be given by food aid and government agencies to
promoting adequate community participation and awareness raising. This could help ensure
that limited aid resources are allocated to the most vulnerable. Targeting guidelines and
procedures should be developed in a participatory manner by involving all stakeholders.

4. As far as communities are concerned, the practice of food aid beneficiary targeting and
distribution does not seem to give special consideration to vulnerable groups, such as
lactating mothers, pregnant women, orphans, elderly or disabled people. Appropriate
government food aid policy needs to ensure the needs of the vulnerable are met by targeting
beneficiaries closely. Civil society organisations and NGOs should make sure this is on
their lobbying and awareness raising agenda.
5. Food aid receiving communities need to be monitored and evaluated so that the impact of
aid on production, markets, labour allocation, behaviour and attitudes towards work can be
assessed. The resulting insights will help to improve targeting mechanisms and manage aid
resources based on practical evidence and indicators supported by data.

6. A more flexible and mobile labour force would be able to move to agriculturally productive
areas and commercial farm in times of food shortages. This would serve the purpose of
overcoming labour shortages in peak months, and supporting the livelihoods of migrating
labourers and their families. Federal and regional food security and rural development
strategies should give due attention to this issue.

7.

In some study areas community members reported that the combination of drought and
banning illegal trade has resulted in their dependence on food aid. In regions and
communities that are highly vulnerable to drought and food insecurity, government
78

development policies and interventions should consider the impact of policy change on
livelihood practices and disaster coping mechanisms.
8. In the medium and long-term, local development strategies, including tourism,19 should be
implemented in collaboration with environmental rehabilitation for areas that are currently
vulnerable to recurrent drought and poor production. Developing and exploring natural
resources, such as minerals, salt, gas and precious stones, could provide employment
opportunities in such areas. Government and private sector partnership would be highly
important in this respect.

9. Government bodies, aid agencies and implementers should not consider only the physical
presence of assets such as livestock while targeting aid, but also the existing situation of
product markets, outputs and services from the assets. This is important because the study
confirmed that in many places the ownership of assets is misconceived in targeting,
eventually leading to deliberate loss of assets by households in order to become
beneficiaries of food aid.

10. In some study areas key informant experts reported the existence of disaster early warning
systems, but community members are not very aware of their existence. It would be useful
to integrate local knowledge about disaster prediction into modern early warning systems.
Communities would then be more aware about the way early warning systems function and
contribute their knowledge to enhancing disaster prevention.

11. The number of food aid beneficiaries is usually less than the estimated number of vulnerable
people in most areas. Experts complain that decisions made at high levels in the hierarchy
of the disaster prevention and preparedness system reduce the final figures. To help reduce
the gap, decision-making processes should benefit from administrative decentralisation to
woreda level, give sufficient decision-making power and build the capacity of the relevant
woreda level offices. These measures could assist with making correct assessments of the
magnitude of disasters affecting vulnerable people and in planning food aid needs.

12. Some NGOs and food aid agencies appear to lack of coordination between their food aid
and related programmes and local development activities. Adequate collaboration and
19

There are many examples of government agencies and NGOs helping rural communities in building their capacity to
develop concept, management, entrepreneurship and product development skills in rural-centered tourist attractions. A
good example is found in Namibia (Maxi, 2004), where tourism became a viable economic activity in communities that
live in difficult weather and poor agricultural conditions.

79

communication between NGOs, food aid agencies, donors, government organs and the
private sector is essential, not only in avoiding misunderstandings but also to effectively
utilise and integrate food aid resources for local development and minimise the potential
negative effects.

13. The issue of appropriate policies and strategies for water resource development and use is
crucial for sustainable food security in Ethiopia.

14. Comprehensive development plans and strategies are needed to link food insecure areas to
agriculturally productive areas through labour mobility, markets, trade of food commodities
and interventions that enhance purchasing power. The potential of food insecure areas must
be identified and explored and the creation of rural towns could be beneficial.

7.2.1

Suggested areas for further research

The following are potential areas for follow up research:

1. In the currently food aid receiving areas while some are still aid dependent other households
produce their own food. Why and how does that happen?

2. The need for objective assessment of impacts of food aid based on longterm and accepted
database. This can also involve a disaggregated assessment of the impact by different
categories of food aid.

3. The traditional disaster coping mechanisms need to be thoroughly studied: which ones are
helpful, how they are abandoned, and how they could be restored?

4. The long-term macro-level implications of food aid: how did/does the food aid affect the
national/ macro-economic variables?

80

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83

Annexes
Chart 1: Schematic presentation of relief operation and procedures

EARLY WARNING

AREA TARGETING
BENEFICIARY NUMBERS

BENEFICIARY LIST
RESOURCE TRANSPORTATION
DISTRIBUTION

REPORTING

Relief operation procedures


STEP 1: Warehouse administration (WA) receives receipt authorisation form (RAF) from
Ethiopian Food Security Reserve (EFSR) head office.
STEP 2: WA receives issue authorisation form (IAF) from EFSR head office.
STEP 3: WA assigns warehouse to receipt or issue.
STEP 4: Driver comes with waybill from carrier and unloads, and two copies of goods
receiving note (GRN) are given to the driver. In case of IAF driver comes WTR loading
freight order, collects the grain and signs on the issue voucher.
STEP 5: Documentation takes place; receiving ledger, issue ledger, bin-cards and stock
cards are filled.
STEP 6: Warehouse receipt data transmission form is filled.
STEP7- Daily stock balance sheets are filled by each warehouse and summarised by the
administrator in stock status reports.

Annex table 1: Characteristics of study woredas: population, agricultural resources, land use
and inputs

Population size
Male
Female
People resettled in the
last 2 years
Annual average rainfall
(mm)
Rainy days (no)
Land use
Land for crop
production
Grazing land
Forest and wood land
Common resources
Not useable land
Irrigation potential
Actual used
To be developed
Input use, annual
DAP fertilizer (quintal)
Urea fertilizer (quintal)
Livestock owned

Simada
263223
131600
131623
546
6
10001500

Lagambo
176903

Tsede
Amba
137354
65378
71976

Humbo

Tayeta
Maichew
110638
14511
7071

40

800-900

606
32

300
780 (619
lowland)
34

19608
12982
23124

1059
172
391

20612
46644
NA
2850

23,344
10307

13828
9938

Darolebu
190353
97080
93272
NA

Gola
Odana
114632
56052
58580
1810

4260

114714

135158
1700

12000
13000
16253

24290

99.74
100

200
788
200

24595
NA
1473

5000
6000
115353

Cattle
Equine
Sheep
Goats
Poultry
Bee hives
Camels

Lalomama
Midir
140527
68858
71669

202555
71857
62572
105121
9467

67212
532
600

700
11000

12000
10709

9188
9152

66419
20226
90707
14319
61783
---

60328
6494
19986
66471
38062
4548

4361
636
1772
2567
7674
220
22

7574
6867
25195
55517
841002
4405
560

199116

273786

127
3013
70036
12343
--7487

12398
15595
71064
14535
17518
91741

Source: Agriculture and food aid bureaux in respective woredas

Annex table 2: Crop production in study woredas in the previous 5 to 6 years, in quintals

Woreda/
year
Simada
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
av. 2000/05
% reduced
in 2005
Lalomama
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
av. 2000/05
% reduced
in 2002
Tsede
Amba
1999
2002
2003
2004
2005
av. 2000/05
% reduced
in 2002

Teff

Wheat

Barley

Beans

Types of crops grown


Chick
peas
Lentils Sorghum

Peas

88,045
107,997
67968
75546
84,889

24711
28544
19216
18912
22846

32916
38381
20080
27692
29767

6087
10911
5082
8208
7572

13784
14593
10134
12187
12675

12415
16049
13608
15064
14284

10000
14055
20896
12270
14305

12

21

-8

-5

17

17575
5456
5742
35799
825
13,079

7978
1476
2132
1850
1781
3,043

1002
265
537
465

140

106

114

43257
561511
812428
734014

111385
405847
649313

190080
407346
799415

2190965

1935623

868,435

775,542

55

91

Maize

Haricot
beans

Pep
per

Sweet
potato

567

5048
893139
1935897

32265
336954
814312

2271198

2947519

1059785

917,010

1,445,401

560,829

125

62

66

Source: Agriculture bureaux of respective woredas

Cotton

Annex table 2: Crop production (continued)


Woreda/
year

Humbo
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
av.
2000/05
%
reduced
2002
Wukro
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
av.
2000/05
%
reduced
2002
Darolebu
2004
2005
Gola
Odana
2002
2003
2004
Lagambo
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Types of crops grown

Teff
12843
8112
8495
13601
21207

Wheat

16

Barley
1013
642
408
259
380

12,852

16

540

58

Beans

Peas

Chick
peas

Lentils

Sorghum

Maize

754

147

3390

5,293

974

10

168

18

25493
32734
36742
30437
20376

28849
16493
18943
16388
30249

55723
30713
39843
41070
73951

42610

37478

29157

22185

48260

104

-7.1

-10.9

34.5

57.1

7408
8210

1400
1120

1722
1220

35968
42705

65507
55210

57622
63887
45742

3896
10138
1920

24372
23539
22346
46449
40723

716
822
814
2128
390

113
180

22567
40349
45638
58208
20626

224075

6195
1974
7469
2885
7944

Sweet
potato
11200
64656
24300
58290
80900

253
1255

-16

29136
21464
26045
25203

Pepper

3851
3096
6566
700
2738

40521
20932
32431
28070
91095

18460
21174
13758
13926
1104

Haricot
beans

5710
8981
7320
7396
8815

7632
15099

7091
2084
8451

1548
2390
1660
1430
924

6504
5360
5425
5560
8780

Cotton

753
3260
4980
3800

Ground
nut

Potato

26916

80678
11970
9224
840
1200

47869

7942

20782

-26

144

74

17863

851
7997
8367

360
2640
615
645
588

Source: Agriculture bureaux of respective woredas

Annex table 3: Annual average crop prices in study woredas, Birr per 100kg
Crop types

Woreda

Chick

Prices
Price
av.
before
harvest
Simada

Lalomama
Tsede
Amba

Humbo

Wukro

Darolebu
Gola
Odana

av. after
harvest
av. 199698
Change
1996-98
(%)
when
food
short %
inc. 96
when
food
short %
inc. 97
av. 19952000
av. 200105
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
av. 1996
-2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
av. 200104
2003
2004
2005

Teff
250

Wheat

200

200

Peas
185

290

230

210

210

180

190

Barley

Millet

Beans

peas

Lentil

Sorghum

Maize

200

160

220

220

180

170

185

145

190

145

167

188

143

317

140

33

57

13

-19

50

50

33

57

13

33

150

-15

36

32

-17

-20

182

-30

320

224

233

321
117
99
151
164
203

217
108
104
144
126
184

227
186
140
170
197
167

348
310
253
298
335

223
230
240
247
284

299
177
204
263

250
196
211
200

175

191

234
66
47
99
103
130

173
62
70
122
103
160

230
240
230
203
251

170
253
241
286

189
180
193
189
210

231
127
141
160

238
144
142
168

193
115
139
165

230

220

130

120

135
113
345
214

147
121
191
205

av.
before
harvest
av. after
harvest

127
130
198
207

Haricot
beans

Sweet
potato

Potato

Yam

Coffee

130
120
183
163
166

33
31
41
33
150

57
60
70
65
63

33
40
55
64

863
498
482
680
1171

Pepper

275
296
450
950

Source: Agriculture bureaux of respective woredas

Annex table 4: Food aid, food-for-work and EGS activities and beneficiaries in the study
woredas
Characteristics
Food aid received last 10 years
Food insecure population (%)
Grain (quintals)
Supplementary (quintals)
Oil (litres)
Grain
Supplementary
Aid recipients
maximum
minimum
FFW and EGS food
Grain (quintals)
Oil (litres)

Simada

Lalomama
(2001-04)

36.5
539250
9104

Lagambo
5 years
(1999-2003)

5581420*
528332*
178242*

281,956

10427383
(in 10 yrs)

351,100

Humbo

Wukro
Last 4
years

Darolebu
Last 3 years

Gola
Odana
Last 3
years

102646

45579

208,448
964
123628

108

147

112312
(last 4 yrs)

45255

117195
144710

95786

58547
148

171360

4354272.45

2831380

78130 (last
2 years)

112530

60823

77254

533997
8935
15054

158,000
15,000
44,131

116,261

Cash (Birr) last 5 yrs

FFW and EGS beneficences

140040
Male 71%
female
29%

Type of recipients
EU IFSP for all kebeles for 3
years (Birr)

11,000,000

EU EGS for all kebeles for 3


years (Birr)

2,930,081

Remark

Tsede
Amba

M: 58%
F: 40%

M: 52%
F: 47%

* = only
for 5 years

Source: Agriculture and food aid bureaux of respective woredas

Questionnaire for household surveys


HH No:

Name of the enumerator:


Name of the supervisor:
Date of administration:
Part I. Identification and socio-cultural information
1. Name of interviewee:
2. Sex:
3. Age:
4. Household Membership Status:
(1=head

2=wife/ husband

5. Location:

3=child

4=relative)

Region:
Woreda:
Kebele

(1=Tigray 2=Afar 3 = Amhara 4=Oromiya 5=Somali

6=SNNP)

6. How many years have you been living in this kebele?


7. Family size (this includes anyone permanently living in the house, but excludes guests)
8. What is your religion?
(1=Orthodox

2=Protestant 3=Catholic

4=Muslim

5=other - please tell us)

9. To which ethnic group does the interviewee belong?


(1=Amhara

2=Oromo

3=Tigray

4=Afar

5=Somali

6=Woliyta

7 =other)

Codes for Part II, Section I: household demographics and migration


Code (a): relationship to head

Code (b): occupation

Code (c): highest grade obtained

1 Head
2 Wife/ husband/ partner

1 Did not complete any schooling


2 Some church/ mosque School

3 Son/ daughter
4 Grandchild
5 Father/ mother

1 Farmer or family farm worker


2 Domestic work, including
housewife
3 Manual worker
4 Tailor
5 Weaver

Code (d): where currently


living
1 Village bordering this kebele
2 Other rural area, this woreda

3 1st Grade
4 2nd Grade
5 3rd Grade

3 Other rural area, this zone


4 Other rural area
5 Urban area, this woreda

6 Sister/ brother

6 Craft worker/ potter

6 4th Grade

6 Addis Ababa

th

7 Niece/ nephew

7 Blacksmith

7 5 Grade

7 Other urban area

8 Uncle/ aunt
9 Son/ daughter-in-law
10 Father/ mother-in-law

8 Food seller
9 Driver/ mechanic
10 Skilled factory worker

8 6th Grade
9 7th Grade
10 8th Grade

8 Other

11 Brother/ sister-in-law
12 Grandparent
13 Other relative of head or his/ her spouse
14 Servant (farm worker, herder, maid, etc.)
15 Other unrelated person

11 Soldier
12 Trader
13 Disabled
14 Student
15 Looking for work
16 Not in labour force
17 Herding

11 9th Grade
12 10th Grade
13 11th Grade
14 12th Grade
15 Incomplete higher education
16 Completed higher education
17. Adult literacy programme
participation
18. Other literacy programme
30 Other

20 Other

1. To be with parent
Code (e): 2. To be near school/ get better
education
why left?
3. Parents were too sick/ unable to
care for him/ her
4. Sent or adopted by relative/
friends for other reason

5. Marriage
6. Divorced out of
family

9. To take up job
10. To be near place of
work

7. Returned home

11. To run own farm or


enterprise
12. Contract ended

8. To look for work

13. Land shortage


14. To look after/
support other
relatives
15. Recruited into
army
16. Sick, went for
treatment

17. Migrated, intentions unknown


18. Other

PART II, SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS and MIGRATION


11.
Serial
10.
Sex:
no.
What is the relationship of [name]
(male=1
to the head?
female=2)
Code (a)

12.
Age:

13.
Major occupation

(If it is less than one, Primary


write 0)
Code (b)

15. Did any member leave the family in the last two years? (1= yes 2=no)
16.
Serial
17.
18.
19.
20.
no.
Relationship
Sex
Age
School grades Why left?
of. [NAME] to (1=male
completed
Code (e)
the head?
2=female)
Code (c)
Code (a)

14.
School grades completed
Code (c)

Secondary
Code (b)

If the answer is yes, go to questions 16 - 22


21.
22.
23.
To where?
Current
Did she/ he come back
occupation?
home in the meantime?
Code (e)
Code (b)
(1=yes 2=no)

Crop codes (b)


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

White Teff
Black/ mixed teff
Barley
Wheat
Maize
Sorghum
Zengada
Oats
Horse beans (bakela)
Linseed
Groundnuts
Sesame (selit)
Black pepper (kundo berbere)

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Sugarcane
Tobacco
Pineapple
Avocado
Onions (shinkurt)
Spinach (costa)
Garlic (nech shinkurt)
Yam
Fasolia
Fruit
Mango
Hamicho
Kocho

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

14
15
16
17
18
19

Lentils
Vegetables
Coffee
Chat
Enset
Bananas

40
41
42
43
44
45

66
67
68
69
70
71

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Grass
Gesho
Eucalyptus
Shiefera/ haleko
Dagussa
Sunflower
Potatoes

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Chickpeas (shimbra)
Cow peas (ater)
Orange
Godere
Adenguare
Sweet potatoes (sukwar
dinich)
Tomato

Code (F): quantity units


1 Kilograms
2 Quintals
3 Chinet
4 Dawla
5 Kunna
6 Medeb
7 Kurbet
8 Silicha
9 Akmada
10 Esir

11 Debignit
12 Packets
13 Bags
14 Bundles
15 Pieces
16 Bars
17 Boxes
18 Leaves
19 Litres
20 Qil

Guaya (Vetch)
Nug

72
73
74

Cabbage (gomen)
Rice
Sinar/ gerima

76
77
80

21 Gan
22 Ensira
23 Gurzigne
24 Tassa
25 Kubaya/ kelasa
26 Birchiko
27 Sini
28 Gembo
29 Bottles
30 Birr

Haricot beans (boloke)


Oats (aja)
Fenugreek (abish)
Beetroot (kai ser)
Carrot
Ginger (jinjibel)
Lettuce
Pumpkin (duba)
Other - specify

31 Big madaberia
32 Small madaberia
33 Dirib
34 Sahin/ lotery
35 Mankorkoria
36 Plastic bag/ festal
37 Zurba
38 Akara (for khat)
39 Small plastic bag (mika)
41 Kerchat/ kimba

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15

(a) Land units


Gasha
Hectare
Gemed
Timad
Kert
Massa
Kedema
Kufaro
Zhir
Tinto
Ermija
Dero
Gezem

16
17
18
19
20
21

Kend
Square zhir
Medeb
Square metre
Boy
Other - specify

42 Melekia
43 Guchiye
44 Bekole
45 Enkib
46 Shekim
47 Number
48 Gotera
49 Lemba
50 Shirimeri

51 Egir
52 Wesla
53 Mesferia
54 Kurfo
55 Kolela
56 Other - specify

10

Part III Section 1: Land and crop production


24. We would like to ask some questions about the land used by your household. Does your household own its own land (cropping and pasture land)?

Plot
no.

25.
Plot size
Area

Unit
(a)

26.
Crops grown in 1996/ 97 E.C.
Code (b)
(P=pasture land T=trees)
Crop
Crop
Crop Crop
no.1
no.2
no.3
no.4

27.
Used fertiliser in 1996/ 97 E.C ?

28.
Used improved seed 1996/ 97
E.C?

29
Production in 1996/ 97 E.C (Amount in one of the local
units; use same unit)

Yes = 1
No = 2

Yes = 1
No = 2

Crop
no.1

Amount

Unit
Code (f)

Amount

Unit
Code (f)

Crop
no.2

Crop
no.3

Crop
no.4

Local unit
Code (f)

01
02
03
04

05
06

11

30. During the last five years, have you been cultivating the same land?
(1=same land size
2=larger land size
3=smaller land size)
31. If changed, what is the main reason for this change? Code (g)
Code (g)
1. Land redistribution (shigishig) by kebele
2. Land inheritance or sharing within family
3. Sharecropping or renting of land
4. Other
Code: Farm management practices and soil and water conservation
Code (b) reasons for no conservation
No Code (a) type of soil
conservation measure
1
Stone bunds; indigenous
7. Strip cropping
1. No need/ no erosion problem
2
Soil bunds; indigenous
8. Alley cropping
2. Shortage of labour
3
Stone bunds; introduced
9. Soil bunds;
3. Have doubts about effectiveness of
planted with trees
methods of conservation
4
Soil bunds; introduced
10. Other
4. No skills to implement measures
5
Fanya juu
5. Lack of food to do the job
6
Contour ploughing
Section 3: Farm management practices and soil and water conservation
32. Are any of your farm plots irrigated?
Yes=1
No=2
33. Do you apply manure on your fields?
Yes=1
No=2
34. Do you practice soil conservation measure on any of your Yes=1
land?
No=2
35. If yes, which type? Code (a)
36. If no, why not?
Code (b)
37. Did you participate in government extension programmes Yes=1
in the last five years?
No=2
38. If yes, did you participate in the years:

39. Have you used fertiliser in any of the last five year?
40. If yes, have you used in the years:

Response

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Yes=1
No=2
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

41. Source of fertiliser (1=credit 2=purchased 3=aid)

12

Section 4: livestock ownership and production activities


42. Can you tell us about your livestock ownership: does the household own livestock? (1=yes

2=no)

Type of livestock

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

(a)

Currently

Not owned

Owned

Born or found

Died during the

Bought during the last 12

Sold during the last 12 months?

Number slaughtered

How many did

How many did

owned on

but cared

with

during the last 12

last 12 months

months?

in the last 12

you own five

you own ten

farm (no)

for (no)

someone

months

months?

years ago?

years ago?

Number

Total
purchase

Number

Total sales
value

value
1= oxen
2=cows
3= bulls
4=heifer
5=calves
6=sheep
7=goats
8=horses
9=donkeys
10=mules
11=camels
12=chickens

13

Section 5: livestock production and income


Could you tell us about your gross income from the sale of livestock products during the last 12 months?

Type of product

53.
Monthly
production

Amount

Unit
Code
(a)

55. Total revenue obtained from


sales in one month (Birr)
Last year In one of
In one of
(1997
drought
the normal
EC)
year in the
year in the
last 5 years last 5 years

54.
Did you sell any?

Yes=1
No=2

Amount
sold?

Unit
Code
(a)

Hides/ skins
Butter/ cheese
Milk
Dung cakes
Chickens
Eggs
Others - specify

Part III: Food aid activities and living conditions


56. During the last five years, how many were years of rain shortage and drought in your area?
(1=one year

2=two years

3=three years

4=all

5=none

6=four

years)

57. Was your family facing food shortages in the past before food aid was coming to this area?
(1=yes

2=no)

58. How did the family overcome food shortages in the years before food aid came?
(1=store from own production
relatives

2= sell livestock and buy from the market

4=borrow food from relatives or others

places to work and buy food

5=eating wild foods

7=get money from relatives who live in towns

3=get food from


6=migrate to other
8=other - specify)

59. How did the community here support each other in the past to overcome food shortages?
(1=give/ lend food to each other

2=the poor work on the farms of the rich

each other 4=there was no tradition of support

5=lend money to each other

3=lend livestock to
6=other specify)

60. Do community members support each other these days?


(1=yes

2=no)

61. For how many years has food aid been distributed in this kebele?

62. When did you or any of your family member first start receiving food aid? (year in E.C)

14

During the last ten years, which years did you or any family members receive food aid?
(1=yes, and indicate amount received

Year in
EC

2=no)

64. Amount of food aid received

63.
Did you
receive food

Cereals

Pulses

Oil

Supplementary

Amount Unit

Amount

aid?
(1=yes 2=no)

Amount

Unit

Unit

Amount

Unit

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Cereals = maize, wheat, sorghum, etc.
Pulses = beans, peas, haricot beans, etc.
Supplementary foods = biscuits, powder milk, etc.
Unit code (a): 1=kilogramme

2=quintal

3=madabaria/ luka (50 kg)

4=litre

(Change the other local units to kg, quintal or litre)

65. With reference to the above table; if the family did not receive in one of the years, why?
(1=the family was not selected

2=the family produced enough food that year

not sufficient that year and priority was given to others

3=aid food was

4=I do not know the reason why

5=other - specify)

66. Why have you or other family members been receiving food aid?
(1=lack of food

2=because others in the kebele receive food

4=to add to what I produce myself

3=we were selected to receive food

5=other - specify)

67. How many times did you receive food aid in the last one year (1997-1998)?
(1=once every week

2=once every two weeks

5=I do not recall how many times

3=once every month

4=two times

6=other specify)

68. Do you know how households are selected to receive food aid (the criteria)?

15

(1=yes

2=no

3=the criteria changes from year to year

4=other - specify)

69. Do you agree with the criteria used to select beneficiaries of food aid?
(1=yes

2=no

3=I do not know the criteria used

4=sometimes I agree,

sometimes not)

70. If no, why?


(1=because they do not make sufficient assessment of needs
3=the poor get less food
for those they like

2=they favour rich households

4=the people who need it do not get food

6=I do not have a good reason

5=they give more

7=I will not tell you the reason why

8=other - specify)

71. Do you believe that food aid is fairly distributed to those who need it in your area?
(1=yes

2=no

3=I do not know

4=only sometimes)

72. If no or only sometimes, what is your reason?


(1=the rich households get more
food is distributed than arrives
to household size

2=those who know kebele officials get more


4=the old people do not get enough

6=women headed households do not get adequate

3=less

5=it is not given according


7=other - specify)

73. Did all the households in your kebele receive food aid last year?
(1=yes

2=no

3=I do not know)

74. If no, who did not receive?


(1=those who are considered rich households
differentiation criteria

2=those who have livestock

4=those who harvested some crops

3=there

is

no

5=I do not know who they are

6=other specify)

75. Are there people/ households in your kebele who have received food aid in the past, but did not
receive any in the last year or two years?
(1= yes

2=no

3=I do not know)

76. If yes, who are those people/ households?


(1=those who are considered as rich households

2=those who managed to recover their livestock

3=those who worked in towns and got money to buy food


crops

5=I do not know who they are

4=those who harvested their own

6=other specify)

77. Who received food aid during the past years in your family?

16

(1=it is given to the head of the family


3=it is given to the wife

2=it is given in the name of all the members of the family

4=it is given for children

5=other - specify)

78. If the answer is the family head why not also other members of the family?
(1=the kebele only knows the head

2=other members do not have the right

members cannot defend their rights as well as the head


receive

3=other

4=the heads do not allow other members to

5=other specify)

79. If food aid is given for household members, is the same ration given for heads and other members?
(1= yes

2=no

3=I do not know)

80. If no, who gets more?


(1=household heads

2=children

3=women

4=other specify)

81. If the answer for Q.79 is no, why do other family members get less?
(1=only the household head can go to where food is distributed
express their needs

2=women and children cannot

3=kebele knows only the household heads

4=other - specify)

82. When you were facing food shortages in the past, what did you do to get food for your family?
(Choose the following mechanisms in time order)
Coping mechanisms

1=yes
2=no

Order: 1 =first action


2=second action, etc.

No action/ measure against food shortage


The family members reduce number of meals in a day
Borrow food from relatives
Sell goats and sheep and buy food
Sell calves to buy food
Sell cattle to buy food
Sell furniture/ durable items to buy food
Borrow money from relatives
Go to other places to work and buy food
Use the saved food from harvest for bad times
Use the saved money from good years
Engaged in some trading activities to buy food
Collect and sell firewood/ charcoal to buy food
Collect and eat wild food, leaves, fruits, etc.
Other - specify

17

83. In addition to the relief food aid, did you also benefit from food-for-work programmes or
employment generation scheme- based food assistance in the past years?

Year
in
EC

Participated in food-for-work
84.
85.
1=yes
Benefits in kind
2=no
Amount

Item
code
(a)

86.
Benefits
in cash
(Birr)

Unit
code
(b)

Participated in employment generation schemes


87.
88.
89.
1=yes
Benefits in kind
Benefits
2=no
in cash
(Birr)
Item,
Amoun Unit,
t
code a
code b

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Code (a)
(1= cereal grains (maize, wheat, sorghum, etc.)

2=pulses (beans, peas, haricot beans)

3=oil)

Code (b)
(1=kilogramme

2=quintal

3=adularia/ 50 kg sack

4=litre)

Note: change the other local units to kg, quintal or litre

90. When taking food aid, do you know how much the ration per person or household is?
(1= yes

2=no

3=I do not know)

91. Who decides the ration/ amount?


(1=kebele authorities
organisations

2=woreda authorities

3=it is fixed at the country level by the food aid

4=it is fixed by the food aid office here in the kebele or woreda 5=other - specify)

92. Do you think the food aid you receive is according to the ration/ amount decided per person of
household?
(1=yes

2=no

3=only sometimes

4=I have no idea about the ration)

Code (a) quantity units


1 Kilograms
2 Quintal
3 Chinet
4 Dawla
5 Kunna
6 Medeb
7 Kurbet

11 Debignit
12 Packets
13 Bags
14 Bundles
15 Pieces
16 Bars
17 Boxes

21 Gan
22 Ensira
23 Gurzigne
24 Tassa
25 Kubaya/ kelasa
26 Birchiko
27 Sini

31 Big madaberia
32.Small madaberia
33 Dirib
34 Sahin/ lotery
35 Mankorkoria
36 Plastic Bag/ festal
37 Zurba

42 Melekia
43 Guchiye
44 Bekole
45 Enkib
46 Shekim
47 Number
48 Gotera

8 Silicha
9 Akmada
10 Esir

18 Leaves
19 Litres
20 Qil

28 Gembo
29 Bottles
30 Birr

38 Akara (for khat)


39 Small bag
41 Kerchat/ kimba

49 Lemba
50 Shirimeri

51 Egir
52 Wesla
53 Mesferia
54 Kurfo
55 Kolela
56 Other specify

Cereals = maize, wheat, sorghum, teff, barley, millet, dagussa


Pulses = beans, peas, haricot beans, chickpea, lentils, guava, etc.
Oil crops = groundnut, nug, flax, sesame
Supplementary foods = biscuits and others

18

Would you please tell us the different sources of food for your family and how you used the food during the year 1997 EC?
100.
99.
98.
95.
96.
97.
Food items
93.
94.
Purchased
Sold from
Sold from
Received
Received
Received
Amount and
Own
from the
aid food
own
unit
production from food aid from-food- from
market
production and FFW
for work 20 relative/loan
(1996/ 97)
Cereals
Amount
Unit code (a)
Pulses
Amount
Unit code (a)
Oil crops
Amount
Unit code (a)
Supplemen Amount
tary foods
Unit code (a)
Oil
Amount
Unit code (a)
Powder
Amount
milk
Unit code (a)
Potato
Amount
Unit code (a)
Sweet
Amount
potato
Unit code (a)
Enset
Amount
Unit code (a)

20

101.
102.
Shared with a Paid back
relative
a loan

103.
Exchanged
with others

Including employment generation schemes (EGS)

19

104.

Referring to the table above, if you sold some of the food you received from aid, why did you

sell?
(1=to buy cheaper food

2=to buy more quality food

3=we do not like to eat aid food as it is not

tasty

4=to get more money, since aid food fetches higher prices

purposes

6=other - specify)

105.

What did you do with the money obtained from selling aid food?

(1=we bought food

2=saved the money

5=bought seed
items

106.

5=we need cash for other

3=bought livestock

4=bought fertiliser

6=bought non-food items, like clothes for the family

8=paid government tax

9=paid credit/ loan

7=bought non-food

10=other - specify)

Referring to the table above, if you exchanged some of the food you received from aid with

others why did you exchange?


(1=to get other food items

2=to get better quality food

3=to get more food items

4=other - specify)

107.

Referring to the table above, if you shared the aid food with neighbours or relatives why did you

share?
(1=they did not get aid food
from them in future

108.

2=they gave us food at other times


4=In exchange for labour work obtained

5=other - specify)

Why has food aid distribution continued in this kebele over the last many years?

(1=continuing drought

2=food production has not improved

capacity to produce enough food


have oxen to plough with

3=people do not have the

4=people do not have sufficient land

5=people do not

6=the land has become infertile and cannot produce enough food

7=I do not know why

109.

3=to be able to get food

8=food aid agencies continue to give us food

9=other - specify)

Why have you or members of your household continued to receive food aid during the past

years?
(1=continuing drought
enough food

2=food production is not improving

4=I do not have sufficient land 5=I have no oxen to plough with

aid agencies continued to give us food


could not produce enough food

110.

3=I have no capacity to produce

7=I get free food

6=the food

8=our land became infertile and

9=other - specify)

Is receiving aid food bad or good?

20

(1=good

2=bad 3=sometimes good and sometimes bad 4=depends on the situation

judge

6=other - specify)

111.

If your answer was bad or sometimes bad, why?

(1=it makes people lazy

5=I cannot

2=it draws attention away from making efforts to produce our own food

3=the aid food lowers the prices of local products

4=aid food creates dependency attitude 5=people

dont make efforts to change their situation

6=it is like begging

112.

7=other - specify)

If your answer was good or sometimes good, why?

(1=it saves lives

2=the food helps us to work

3=it helps to get better food

4=it fills the food

shortage gap from own production 5=food-for-work helps to conserve soil and water
money by selling the aid food

113.

7=it helps children to go to school

6=we get

8=other - specify)

How do you see the future or the coming few years in terms of food availability for your

family?
(1=I think my family will continue receiving food aid 2=It depends on the weather and food production
3=I think we will be able to produce or buy our own food

4=I do not know about the future

5=It depends on the support we get from the government to improve our food production 6=I do not
like to receive aid food in future

114.

7=other -specify)

What kind of efforts have you been making to produce enough food for your family?

(1=I do not make any efforts


rain

2=No hope here to produce enough food due to shortage of

3=I do not have oxen for ploughing

4=I do not have sufficient land 5=I am conserving

soil and water for better production 6=I have shortage of necessary inputs
produce sufficient food

115.

7=I am working hard to

8=other - specify)

Do you think that people in your kebele tend to give less attention to agricultural work

since they started receiving food aid?


(1=yes

2=no

3=I do not have any idea

with me

5=other - specify)

4=It may be true with the other farmers, but not

116.
What employment and income earning opportunities are available in your area? (You may
choose more than one)
1.

Only own farming (self-employment)

4.

Migration to work in other areas

2.

Own non-farm employment (trading,

5.

Non-farm labourer (e.g. work in cities)

6.

Other - specify

handicrafts)
3.

Farm labourer (work on other farms)

117.
What are the five major problems of agriculture, pastoral system and food production in your
kebele? Rank the major 5 problems in order

21

Do you see this


as a problem?
(1=yes
2=no)

Activity or source of cash


1.

Land/ soil became infertile

2.

Lack of inputs (seed, fertiliser, chemicals)

3.

Shortage of rain and drought

4.

Lack of market for products

5.

Shortage of land

6.

Low agricultural product prices

7.

Shortage of pasture land

8.

Shortage of water for human and livestock

9.

Lack of attention by the government extension experts

Rank the
problem by
number

and workers
10. Lack of roads
11. Population pressure
12. Crop pests and diseases
13. Livestock diseases
14. Other - specify

118.

From among the following members of the community, who has the right to receive food aid?
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

119.

Members of the community


Children
Lactating mothers
Pregnant women
Orphans
Disabled people
Elderly people

1=yes

2=no

3=I dont know

If food aid is given to household heads, how do disabled, elderly people, orphans, and children

get access to food aid?


(1=they get special support 2=there is no special support for them 3=I do not know about them
4=other - specify)

120.

When other people get food through food-for-work and employment generation activities, is

there any way for disabled people, elderly people, orphans, underage children, lactating mothers, and
pregnant women to get free food?
(1=yes, they get free food

2=no, there is no such special consideration for them

3=I do not know

about them 4=everybody needs to work in order to get food 5=other - specify)

22

121.

According to your observations, how does the problem of lack of food affect the environment

and natural resources?


(1=I do not know about this issue
charcoal to buy food

2=when there is no food, people cut trees and sell firewood and

3=lack of food leads to deforestation and destruction of water sources

4=during food shortage, collection of wild fruits and plants for human consumption destroys the natural
environment

5=there is no impact on the environment

6=due to food shortages people

cannot do the work of soil and water conservation, hence, soil erosion increases

122.

7=other - specify)

In addition to providing the food needed for human consumption, does food support benefit the

natural resources and environment?


(1=yes, it benefits positively

2=I do not know about such effects or benefits

contribution or benefit from food aid

123

3=there is no such

4=other -specify)

If the answer is yes, what are the benefits?

(1=food aid stops cutting trees


and water conservation

2=food aid helps to reduce cutting trees 3=food aid helps with soil

4=food aid supports agricultural activities

5=food aid avoids

destroying wild plants and fruits used for human consumption during food shortages 6=other - specify)

124

Does food aid affect your familys food eating habits?

(1=yes

125

2=no

3=I do not know

4=it is difficult to mark such effects

5=other - specify)

If there is an effect, what kind of effects did you observe after many years of receiving aid
food?

(1=family might start eating food items that were not eaten previously
food than traditional food

3=we stopped producing some of the traditional food crops

children get supplementary foods which we didnt know previously


buying other food crops from the market

4=our

5=due to food aid, we started

6=the foods we eat now are useful for our body 7=we are

now accustomed to buying food from the market

126.

2=my family eats more aid

8=other - specify)

During the last year (1997 EC), how much cash income did you earn per week from the

following activities and sources? (Ask him/her if he/she can recall the total income earned during the
year for respective sources or activities). If no cash earning, write 0

Source of cash or activity

1.
2.
3.
4.

Earning If recalled, total


per week earning per year
(Birr)
(Birr)

From sales of own produced crops


From sales coffee, chat, enset, trees
From sells of livestock products (milk, eggs, butter, cheese, )
From sales of food received from food-for-work activities

5. From sales of aid food

23

6. Profit from trading activities (sales price minus purchase cost)


7. From sales of firewood, charcoal, cow dung cake,
8. From non-farming activities (pottery, weaving, blacksmith,)
9. From off-farm jobs (daily labour, farm labour.)
10Women household activities (tella, araki, tej, kollo, bread selling)
1 Remittances from family members and relatives who live elsewhere
12
Other
127.

During last year (1997 E.C) how much did you spend per month on average on purchase of

food and non-food items? If no expense, write 0


No

Expenditure items
Food and stimulant items
1.
2.
3.
4.

Purchase of cereals, pulses, oil seed


Food preparation cost (e.g. milling flour)
Relish items (Salt, oil spices, berbere shiro)
Purchase of meat/fish

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Purchase of milk, cheese, egg,


Purchase of fruits and vegetables
Purchase of potatoes and other tubers
Purchase of coffee, tea, sugar
Purchase of cigarette, tobacco
Non-food items
Clothing
Footwear
Personal care (ointments, soap, hair care...),
Gas, candle, firewood, charcoal
Household utensils
Entertainment: religious, cultural, holidays
Medical expenditure
Transportation expenses

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Expenditure
per month
(Birr)

If
recalled,
total expense
per year (Birr)

18. Educational and school fees for children


19. Purchase of farm inputs: fertilizer, seed,
pesticide, veterinary drugs
20. Agricultural taxes (land tax, income tax)
21. Purchase of Farm tools and implements

128. What is your approximate average total expenditure for purchase of food and non-food items in
Birr?
We thank you very much for your cooperation!

24

A checklist for qualitative data collection


I. Primary data:
Source: woreda and community level interviews

FGD and interviews with:


o

elders, women, farmers, youth, grain traders in kebele, (include


also people who did not receive food aid, if there are any)

Key informants interview with:


o

Kebele administrators

Elders (male and female)

Woreda disaster prevention and preparedness desk/ committee

Woreda agriculture and rural development desk

Woreda food security bureau officers

Local and woreda grain traders

NGO workers

The issues:
Conduct the discussion/ interview based on the following key issues as a guide

1. What are the reasons for the persistent food shortage in this kebele/ woreda?
i.

How does a year of food shortages differ from the normal year (manifestation)?

ii.

How is the trend of agriculture and food production the last 5 years? (situation
analysis)

2. What criteria are used to detect and assess the presence of food shortages and the need for food aid?
i. How are food shortages assessed? Criteria and indicators?
ii. What criteria are used to decide the need for food aid?
iii. How is appeal for food aid made? Who makes it?
iv. How do the community members involve in food aid need assessment and appeal
process? Who is involved?
3. How is the targeting of food aid distribution made?
i. Who is involved in the targeting process? The role of community members?
ii. What criteria is used to identify those who need food aid?
iii. Who is entitled to get food aid?
iv. How do the elderly, sick people, orphans, children, pregnant women, lactating
mothers get access to aid food? Is there special support for these groups of the
community?
v. How is food aid distribution done? Organisations involved, facilities, accessibility
for the needy.?
4. Has the food aid been benefiting all community members equally?
i. If not equal, who benefits more? Why?

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ii. What are the problems of food aid distribution in this woreda/ community?
5. What are the benefits/ effects of food aid in terms of the following? (illustrate and give examples)
i.

Mitigating food shortages?

ii.

Improving agricultural activities?

iii.

Wealth or asset creation of community members?

iv.

Soil or water conservation, reforestation, or rehabilitation of the environment?

v.

Local infrastructure development?

vi.

Employment creation?

vii.

Food eating habits?

6. How did food aid distribution affect or undermine community food shortage coping mechanisms and
informal social protections that existed in the past?
7. How does food aid affect local agricultural production and product markets?
i.

Observed levels and changes of price for crop and livestock products in relation to
food aid commodity flow?

ii.

Roughly what % of product market is covered by the food aid commodity?


Months after harvest? In months when food is scarce?

iii.

How are the prices for similar local products with aid products and non aid local
and commercial import products relate?

8. What are the drawbacks/ negative effects of food aid? (illustrate and give examples):
i.

On agricultural production and markets?

ii.

On wealth or asset creation of the members of the community?

iii.

On family labour use and attitudes towards work?

9. Has food aid created dependency attitude in this community/ woreda?


(If yes, explain how it is manifested)
10. How does food insecurity impact on the environment and biodiversity?
(Deforestation, feeding on wild plants and fruit for survival means, etc)
11. Has the amount of food coming to this community/ woreda reduced or increased over time?
i.

If reduced, what are the reasons?

ii.

If increased, what are the reasons?

12. What should be done to make people in this kebele/ woreda able to produce enough food?
13. What type of early warning mechanism exists?
i.

Does it work? Did it help? How?

ii.

If it did not help, why not?

II. Secondary data to be collected


Possible sources are:
-

Woreda agriculture development desk

Woreda disaster prevention and preparedness desk

Woreda food security office

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1.

Woreda social affairs office

NGOs and feeding centres

Kebeles

Population:
a. Current total by age and gender group
b. Number of people who migrated in the last five years
c. Number of people who went for resettlement in the last five years

2. Agriculture, environment and production


a.

Land use and production


i. Land classification by quality indicators
ii. Irrigation potential (actual used, potential to be developed)

iii.

Agricultural land for crop production, livestock production, common resources, forest areas

iv. Major crops produced, agricultural extension activities, modern input distribution, yields during the
last five years
v.

Livestock owned by type: changes in the last 5 years, if any.

vi.

Agricultural product market prices: yearly/ monthly average, average of months after
harvest, months of food shortages. If possible price data for the last 2 5 years:
b. Major food crops
i. Locally produced
ii. Commercially imported to the woreda and traded
c. Livestock (by type)
d. Livestock products

3.

Food aid and related activities


a. Amount of food aid received/ arrived in woreda, or kebele during the last 5 to 10 years
i. Types of food (grain, oil, supplementary, others)
b. Amount of aid food distributed in the woreda, kebele during the last 5 to 10 years (grain, oil,
supplementary, others)
c. Food aid recipients, by gender, age groups, other social classifications (elderly, sick,
orphans, pregnant women, lactating mothers)
d. Amount of food received and distributed through food-for work and employment generation
schemes or other development works support
i. Number and type of beneficiaries by gender and other classification
ii. Amount of public works done through food-for-work and EGS activities:
1. Roads constructed/ maintained, soil and water conservation activities,
reforested area, springs developed, etc.
2. Value of local labour contributions for the works
3. Value of benefits received by the community members (both in cash and
kind)

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4. Data on public or NGO projects which have been implemented in the woreda or the sample kebele in
order to improve agriculture and food security:
a. Type of such projects, their areas of intervention, their resources (funds, human, other
inputs)
b. The current level of implementation
c. Number of beneficiaries, areas or households covered; results achieved so far

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