‘Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 21 52 The Sociopolitical Paradigm in Financial Accounting Research yee Ruth D. Hines Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia A way of seeing, is also a way of not seeing (Poggi, 1965) Hopwood has frequently called for the development of theories of accounting which “see accounting as being at least one of the ways in which a problematic rather than self-evident social reality. . . (is) constructed rather than merely being a means for its reflection and representation” (1985, p. 372, emphasis added). An accounting research programme is emerging, which focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between accounting and social reality [1]. However, the social analysis of accounting involves a number of difficulties. For example, Hopwood (1985) reports the deliberations of an interdisciplinary committee which was established to investigate the intertwining of accounting with the social. The committee was unable to issue a final report, because of fundamental disagreements among its members. It was recognised by the committee that, “even a tentative, preliminary view of accounting as social at this time would require a major investment in new conceptual thinking” (Hopwood, 1985, p. 367). ‘The growth of a new research paradigm is often inhibited by the fact that it must ‘emerge in the face of an existing paradigm and/or commonsense knowledge with which it is incompatible, or incommensurable. Competing paradigms are often conceptually incommensurable, because “their content classes... are incomparable in the sense that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between them" (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 223). The conceptual foundations of different research programmes can be so different that researchers working within them can face major, and sometimes insurmountable, barriers to communicating with those working within other paradigms. Kuhn (1970) illustrates how researchers committed to different paradigms “‘talk through each other’” (p. 109) (2), Researchers within the emenging sociopolitical paradigm in financial accounting, research “see” the subject of their research in a way that is precluded from being seen, by the taken-for-granted assumptions of positive accounting research and the commonsense reasoning of everyday life. Thus, this article has three objectives: ‘The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of James Guthrie, Trevor Hopper, Anthony Hopwood and the reviewers of this article; participants at a Macquarie University Research Seminar; participants atthe 1986 Conference of the British Accounting Association, Wales, ‘and the 1987 Accountability Interest Conference, Sytiney.first, to elucidate some of the conceptual underpinnings of sociopolitical accounting research; second, by providing such an account, hopefully to help in informing potential researchers, and positive researchers, about some fundamental diflerences between sociopolitical (also often called “alternative"” or ‘‘radical") accounting research and mainstream positive research; and finally, to add to the emerging sociopolitical literature which illuminates the interactive and mutually constitutive relationship between reality and accounting Sociopolitical Research Requires a Major Reconceptualisation One of our most fundamental commonsense assumptions is that our accounts of realty, rather than reflexively constituting realty, correspond to a reality which exists independently of our accounts of it. It is assumed in commonsense reasoning that realty exists concretely and independently of social actors and social practices. This assumption also underlies positive research, which assumes that "what is"” exists independently of theories and knowledge about it, and that theories and knowledge correspond to ‘‘what is". Similarly, within the accounting profession, it is assumed that economic reality exists independently of accounting practices, and that the major role of accounting is to communicate that reality. Tt has been recognised to varying degrees in many disciplines, that accounts of social reality do not necessarily correspond to a reality which’is external to, and independent of, such accounts. Rather, accounts of reality reflexively refer to, and depend on, other accounts of reality. Reality is created and sustained by the ceaseless reflexive use of accounts, by social actors in constant interaction with each other (Mehan and Wood, 1975, pp. 8-33) (3| People think and act on the basis of those accounts which they consider to be “true, While for an individual, society and truth seem to exist concretely and independently of one’s thoughts, discourse/knowledge and behaviour, nevertheless social reality is constituted by what people think, say and do. ‘Those accounts which are considered in a particular society or situation to be “true” are those accounts which have been privileged over other accounts and have some belief attaching to them. On the basis of these accounts, people act, and so translate such accounts into reality — they actualise or realise them. Handel (1982) and Mehan and Wood (1975) elaborate how accounts and assumptions about realty predispose one to interpreting events in harmony with those assumptions. When acted upon, the conditions that were already assumed to have existed are created, or perpetuated. Thus, in retrospect, those assumptions or accounts appear to have been “‘true"” jd|. Certain assumptions are seldom explicitly articulated, because they are so taken- for-granted, and considered to be commonsense, that everybody “knows” them. Such assumptions may be called incorrigible propositions or assumptions (Mehan, and Wood, 1975, p. 9). One such incorrigible proposition is the belief that reality exists independently of what people think, say and do. Positive research reflects this unexplicated incorrigible proposition: its objective is to study “what is", without acknowledging that positivist accounts of ‘‘what is’ play a part in reifying, legitimising and reproducing the status quo. Incorrigible propositions or assumptions, being taken-for-granted, pervade Financial Accounting Research 53,Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 2,1 54 language and thinking, and as such, they are seldom exposed to questioning or critique. Since the fundamental propositions which constitute reality are seldom identified, much less criticised, the reality which they play a part in constituting, acquires a concreteness, legitimacy and durability, which it would lack were people to be self-consciously aware that their accounts of reality, and the accounts of others, constitute reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1971; Berger and Kellner, 1964; Berger and Pullberg, 1966). Handel (1982, p. 56) explains how the incorrigible assumption, that reality exists independently ‘of thought, discourse/knowledge and action, is protected, perpetuated and validated: Consider the assumption that the world has real characteristics that are imposed on us independently of our knowledge of them, We assume ofthese characteristics that they partially compel our perception but also that error, distortion, and bias are possible in our understanding. Recognizing that error is possible permits us to reconsider particuiar bits of knowledge withou! considering the accuracy of our assumption that the world has real charatristics. The recognition of error suggests an explanation for differences of opinion, changes of mind, perceptions that do not support successful action, and so on... Thus, the ontological assumptions of the ‘commonsense atitude protect themselves from scruting. There is no implication here that they fre incorrect, simply thatthe combination of them reduces inquiry into their own nature and ‘ccuray. The assumptions make a certain kind of world availble to seruiny; the assumptions are not part of that world (emphasis added). Mehan and Wood (1975, pp. 8-14) discuss how the incorrigible belief of the African Azande, in the existence and omniscience of oracles, is put beyond question, contradiction or disconfirmation, by the reflexive use of accounts about oracles. The Azande have a coherent body of knowledge consisting of accounts concerning oracles, and all events which would otherwise contradict the reality of oracles are interpreted in such a way that they reaffirm the fundamental belief in the existence of oracles. “The accounts of oracles, rather than referring externally to oracles, reflexively refer to other accounts of oracles. These accounts create a world in which oracles exist: oracles are experienced as existing tangibly and independently of anything said or thought about them. This self-preservative reflexive process is common to oracular, scientific and commonsense reasoning (see Mehan and Wood, 1975, p. 12). ‘The incorrigible proposition underlying western thought and language, that reality exists independently of our knowledge, theories, language, assumptions and social practices, results in the belief that the reality of other cultures, such as the African Azande, depends on their accounts of reality, but that, for us, reality is ‘‘real"” — our accounts of reality genuinely refer, or correspond, to a concrete reality which is external to our accounts of it. In other words, the commonsense assumption of our culture is that our accounts (such as scientific accounts) are corresponding, or “‘true”, and others’ accounts (such as oracular accounts) are reflexive. This protects our commonsense assumptions and the process by which they give rise to social reality from becoming apparent and thus vulnerable to dissolution. (See Appendix for a summary of the reasons why scientific theories are not necessarily ““true’’ or corresponding). ‘The sociopolitical research programme in accounting thus confronts several very