CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COURSE OUTLINE 2016 PART 1V

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (RULES 113 and 126)

Requisites for issuance of search warrant and warrant of arrest
Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence

Sec. 3, par. 2, Art. III, Constitution
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Rights of a person arrested; custodial investigation

RA 7438 (1992)
Republic Act No. 7438

April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human
being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted
by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a
language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation.
If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained
does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall
be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

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(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by
or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on
Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc
or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew
or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by
the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the
prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable
with light felonies;lawphi1alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with
less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable
with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial
investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the
province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or
City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person
can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall
suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8)
years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall
also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon
orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate
family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or
from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6)
years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1

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The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility
over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to
secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other
laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Penalties for procuring search warrant without just cause and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained; searching domicile without witnesses; and unlawful arrest
Arts. 129, 130, and 269, Revised Penal Code
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or
use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is
proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the
latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in
the same locality.
Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law, or without reasonable
ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper
authorities.chanrobles virtual law library

Arrest of accused in cases under summary procedure - Sec. 16,

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to
appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance by
a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

ARREST (Rule 113)

Definition of arrest - Sec. 1
Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense

Judge not necessarily required to make a personal examination before

issuing warrant of arrest
Ocampo vs. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, citing People v. Grey, G.R.
No. 180109, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 523, 536.
- Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the
judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof;
FACTS:
1. On August 2006, mass graves were found at Leyte by the Philippine Army, supposedly done by
elements of the NPA under Operation Venereal Disease to purge the latters ranks of suspected
military informers. The site was then investigated to determine the identities of the skeletal
remains found at the site.
2.

Relatives later came forward, alleging that the victims-relatives were either abducted by or
were last seen with the NPA and were never seen again. The relatives also claim that the
execution was ordered by the CPP/NPA/NDF and that the skeletal remains found at the mass
grave belong to their deceased relatives.

3.

Information filed for 15 counts of multiple murder vs petitioners, at RTC Hilongos, Leyte. Judge
found probable cause.

4.

Ocampo went to the SC under special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
claiming that a case for rebellion was filed against them @ RTC Makati, and that under the
political offense doctrine, common crimes such as murder are already absorbed under the
crime of rebellion.

5.

Ocampos case was later consolidated with the petitions of Baylosis, Echasis, and Ladlad.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cases vs. petitioners should be dismissed on the ground of denial of due
process and on the basis of the political offense doctrine.
HELD: NO, the cases vs. petitioners should not be dismissed since there was due process and that the
political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the case.
1.

2.

There was DUE PROCESS during the preliminary investigation.

Purpose of preliminary investigation.

o Not just a casual affair.
o Protect civilians from embarrassment, expense, anxiety of public trial.

Nature of preliminary investigation.

o Statutory right
o Substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice, particularly the right to be heard.

Prosecutor may resolve the complaint based on evidence before him if a respondent could
not be subpoenaed.
o Sec. 3(d), Rule 112, Rules of Court
o As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an
opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid.
o The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to
delay the prosecution of offenses.
o Efforts to serve subpoenas at last known addresses enough compliance to due
process.

All 3 petitioners were assured of due process in the preliminary investigation.

o In particular, Ladlads failure to file their counter-affidavit was of his own doing.
Ladlads counsel filed a formal entry of appearance (in spite of Ladlad not receiving
any subpoena). Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to
secure copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused
to participate.

There was DUE PROCESS in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce."

Determination of Probable Cause does not require a hearing

o Probable cause refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested."
o However, it is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report
and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. No hearing
necessary
o In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is
not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant
of arrest.

Determination of Probable Cause addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
o The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
o He sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he
reviews the information and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis
thereof, forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which
he is being charged.
o Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Information, the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.

Trial judge complied with the constitutional requirement.

o His March 2007 order clearly states that:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by
the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents:
x x x, this court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged.

Borlongan vs. Pena (G. R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010)

Probable cause - existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the
person sought to be arrested; determined to address the necessity of placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice (Hao vs. People)
Facts:
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery of agent's
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney's fees against Urban Bank and herein petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Atty. Pea based his claim on
the Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former prevented any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank's property located along Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City. Petitioners on the other hand, presented documents as evidence. Atty. Pea filed a
complaint for said documents were falsified and that the signatories were neither stockholders nor
officers and employees of ISCI. Four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents
were filed upon the findings of the City Prosecutor of probable cause. Petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation for the trial court judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing warrant of arrest since
no counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted. MTCC denied the motion while CA
denied the same. While Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was mentioned in the affidavit-complaint as one of
the board members but in the accusatory portion, he was not included.
ISSUE:
Did the judge err in accusing and issuing a warrant of arrest against Mr. Ben Lim, Jr?
HELD:
YES.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was
not even a member of the board of directors.
We said in Soliven v. Makasiar that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct
the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be
to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead
of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely
is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of
probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification
as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision.
Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if
any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification. Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just
rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest
issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain
it. He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions
when the circumstances warrant.[35]An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of
a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.
Petition is hereby GRANTED

How made Sec. 2

Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be
subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.

Duty of arresting officer Sec. 3

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest
the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.

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Method of arrest of officer by virtue of a warrant Sec. 7
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that
a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable

Execution of warrant Sec. 4

Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered
for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten
(10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall
make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he
shall state the reasons therefor.

Time of making arrest Sec. 6

Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

When arrest may be made day and time

Colorado vs. Agapito (A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ],
July 3, 2007)
- an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was
issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of
arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
FACTS

Miguel E. Colorado accuses that Judge Ricardo Agapito has committed Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled
People v. Miguel Colorado, with Grave Slander and Grave Threats against the couple Urbano.

Colorado alleges that the cases were directly filed with the the court without first passing the
Office of the Barangay Chairman although he and private complainants are permanent
residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija claiming that the respondent Judge
Agapito ignored the deficiency, the judge approved two warrants for the arrest of Colorado for
the crimes aforementioned.

Complainant is charged with grave slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4
months under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code

Colorado was arrested on a Friday and was jailed for 2 days and nights. He posted bail and
filed a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the case, but the same was not acted upon.

Colorado faults respondent for causing him to languish in jail for two days and two nights.

Colorado received an envelope from the court with nothing inside and found out later that the
same was supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, he was ordered arrested in view of his nonappearance in court.

On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary.

With the 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to file his comment on
the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17, 2001 was sent and another on July 30, 2002 but
no comment was filed.

Respondent failed to respond to the Courts requirement for him to manifest why he did not
respond to the court for his comment thus fined P1,000.00 and deemed respondent to have
waived the filing of a comment on the complaint.

October 12, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty as
charged and recommended that he be fined in the amount of (P20,000.00) to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on him in the Resolution
of August 24, 2005 and submitted his Comment on the complaint, denying the allegations
made against him.

Respondent Judge claims that he acted in good faith and within the scope of his duties. He
further states that the crimes committed by the accused are not within the Katarungan

Pambarangay Law because the imposable penalty exceeds 1 year, and that There is no law or
circular issued by this Court that a court cannot issue a warrant of arrest on Friday.
Concerning the empty envelope he received the respondent answers that Colorado should
have said something to the court so the proper remedy would have been applied to the matter.

ISSUE
W/N the arrest on Friday was proper?
HELD
YES. The arrest on a Friday was a proper one for as the respondent Judge has stated there was no law
prohibiting an arrest to be made on a Friday.
Also Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest may be
made on any day and at any time of the day or night.
Colorado was not without recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of
Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10] dated December 5, 1996, providing for a skeletal force on a
Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.
And on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-working holidays, any judge may act on bailable
offenses. Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of authority for
issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being prohibited by law.
The judge was only found liable for his inaction concerning the motion for inhibition, the same is
tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondents explanation that despite the fact that the motion was
set for hearing several times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear thereat, is untenable.
Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on the motion for inhibition without requiring the
attendance of complainant.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of gross neglect and is
FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondents retirement benefits is considered as payment of the
fine.

Arrest without warrant, when lawful Sec. 5

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Method of arrest without warrant

Arrest by an officer Sec. 8
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. When making an arrest without a warrant,
the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the
latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission,
has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the
giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

Arrest by a private person Sec. 9

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private person shall
inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter
is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has
escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him,
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest.

In cases falling under in flagrante and hot pursuit exceptions, where to

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deliver person arrested Sec. 5, last par.
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Three instances when warrantless arrest may be effected

Ambre vs. People (G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012)
- Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
FACTS: On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit
conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdullah
Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound
in Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar
Tagoranao; that Sultan run away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2
Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to
his house; that inside the house, he police operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot
session; that Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up
alumni foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre,
Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
ISSUE:WON the arrest of and search done against petitioner is valid.
HELD: Yes. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing
or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the
act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively
identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Hence, the
arrest of and search done against the petitioner is valid.

Fourth instance when person previously lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued Sec. 13
Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any
person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within
the Philippines.

In flagrante delicto Par. (a) Sec. 5

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Valid arrest
People vs. Eduardo Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 205414 April 4, 2016)
- There is overwhelming evidence that appellant was actually committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers who arrested him without a warrant. Straightforward and

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unwavering testimonies were presented by the prosecution narrating, in detail, how the
police officers personally witnessed the sale by appellant of the dangerous drug, being
actual participants of the buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime.
G.R. No. 205414
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO DELA CRUZ y GUMABAT@"EDDIE", Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated March 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 04587 affirming the Decision2 dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in
Criminal Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an information filed on November 5, 2009, appellant Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat was charged with illegal sale
of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 23, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized
by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell or offer for sale to poseur-buyer, one (1) Blister pack with label "Valium" containing Ten (10) round
blue tablets weighing ONE POINT SEVEN TWO ZERO (1.720) grams which after a qualitative examination, gave
positive result to the test of diazepam, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.3
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. 4
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the prosecution, namely, PO1 Jaycee John Galotera, who
acted as the poseurbuyer; PO1 Roderick Magpale, who was the investigator-on-duty at the Special Operation and
Task Unit; and PO3 Ryan Sulayao, who acted as the perimeter back-up, are as follows:
At around 7:30 p.m. on October 22, 2009, a confidential informant arrived at the Jose Abad Santos Police Station,
Manila Police District and informed PO1 Ronnie Tan, PO3 Ryan Sulayao and PO3 Eric Guzman about the illegal drug
activities being conducted by appellant along Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Said informant claimed to have gained
access to appellant. Consequently, the police officers immediately informed their station commander, P/Supt.
Remigio Sedanto, who tasked the unit to conduct a buy-bust operation, to be led by P/Inspector Jeffrey Dallo, with
PO1 Galotera acting as poseur-buyer, and the rest of the team to serve as back-up. P/Inspector Dallo gave PO1
Galotera three (3) pieces of One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust money, which PO1 Galotera
marked with his initials "JJG." The team also agreed that PO1 Galoteras removal of his ball cap constitutes the
signal indicating that the transaction has been consummated and that the appellant may be arrested. After a
thorough briefing and coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the team left the station
and proceeded to the target area at around 12:20 a.m. 5
PO1 Galotera and the confidential informant went straight to the destination aboard a motorcycle, while PO1 Tan,
PO3 Sulayao, and PO3 Guzman, aboard a separate motorcycle, positioned themselves about ten (10) meters away
from PO1 Galotera and the informant. PO1 Galotera and the informant then walked along an alley on Solis Street
towards Villanueva Street and saw two (2) men standing at a dark portion thereof. As they approached said men,
the confidential informant whispered to PO1 Galotera that the person on the right was appellant. Thereafter,
appellant asked the informant what he needed.6 In reply, the informant told appellant that he and his companion,
PO1 Galotera, needed "Valium," which contains Diazepam, a dangerous drug. Appellant then asked how much
Valium they need, to which PO1 Galotera answered, "Isang banig lang." PO1 Galotera then handed the marked
money in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) to appellant, who placed the same in his front left pocket.
Thereafter, appellant pulled out one blister pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right
pocket and handed the same to PO1 Galotera. Believing that what he received was Valium based on its appearance,
PO1 Galotera executed the pre-arranged signal. Upon seeing the signal, PO3 Guzman proceeded to assist PO1
Galotera, who immediately grabbed appellant. Appellants companion, who tried to escape, was also subdued by
PO3 Guzman. PO1 Galotera then apprised appellant of the nature of his arrest and read him his constitutional
rights. He also marked the seized tablets with the initials "EDG" corresponding to appellants name.
Afterwards, he turned over the appellant and the seized evidence to PO1 Roderick Magpale, an investigator of the
Anti-Illegal Special Operation Task Unit at the Police Station. PO1 Magpale then took pictures of appellant and the
seized evidence, prepared the Booking and Information Sheet, and forwarded the seized tablets to the forensic
laboratory for examination. Accordingly, Forensic Chemist Erickson L. Calabocal, conducted a chemistry
examination and in his Chemistry Report No. D-787-09, found that the ten (10) round, blue tablets seized from
appellant tested positive for Diazepam, a dangerous drug.7 During trial, however, Calabocals testimony was
dispensed with after the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09. 8
Against the foregoing charges, appellant testified on his own version of facts, and further presented the testimonies
of his mother, Leonora dela Cruz, and one Roberto Balatbat. 9
Appellant testified that he was a jeepney driver by profession and a resident at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. At
around 3:00 p.m. on October 23, 2009, he went to see his friend, Nicanor Guevarra, to convince him to place a bet
on the "karera." He found him at the tricycle terminal at Solis Street corner Callejon Villanueva, playing cara y
cruz and joined him. Suddenly, the policemen arrived. They tried to run but were eventually arrested. Appellant
requested that he be brought to the barangay hall, but the policemen brought him directly to the police station. He
thought that he was only being accused of illegal gambling for playing cara y cruz. It turned out, however, that he
was being charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs.10
After appellant, the defense presented appellants mother who denied that her son was into selling dangerous
drugs. According to her, at around 3:00 p.m. on October 23, 2009, appellant asked her permission to leave the
house to place a bet. However, she later learned from her granddaughter that her son had been arrested.
Next was Roberto Balatbat, a tricycle driver residing at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila, who testified that on that day, he
was at the tricycle terminal on Solis Street playing cara y cruz. When the four (4) police officers arrived, he quickly
ran away leaving behind appellant and Guevarra, who were arrested. He denied that any sale of dangerous drugs
transpired at the time and place of appellants arrest. 11

10
In its Decision dated August 2, 2010, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers as they were
given in a clear and convincing manner showing that the officers were at the place of the incident to accomplish
exactly what they had set out to do, which was to conduct a legitimate buy-bust operation on appellant. 12 It found
that unless the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant,
their testimonies deserve full faith and credit, particularly in light of the presumption that they have performed their
duties regularly. Indeed, the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses prevails over
appellants denial, which is inherently a weak defense.13 The trial court, therefore, disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused, Eduardo dela Cruz y Gumabat
@ Eddie, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch
Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law and rules.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that his warrantless arrest was unlawful for he was not, in fact, caught
selling dangerous drugs but was merely committing the offense of illegal gambling. Thus, the ten (10) tablets of
Valium allegedly seized from him is inadmissible as evidence. 15 Appellant also argued that there was no showing
that he was informed of the reason for his arrest, of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a
counsel of his choice.16 Appellant further faulted the prosecution for not only failing to present the buy-bust money
as evidence in court17 but also failing to show proof that the confiscated Valium was subjected to a qualitative
examination.18 He noted that the chemist who supposedly conducted the laboratory examination on the drug did
not know the source from which it came.19
On March 19, 2012, the CA sustained appellants conviction. At the outset, it noted that it was only in appellants
appeal that appellant raised for the first time the issue of the irregularity of his arrest. At no time before or during
his arraignment did he object to the same. As such, jurisprudence dictates that he should be estopped from
assailing said irregularity, for issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
without offending the basic rules of fair play. 20 Even assuming that the police officers failed to inform appellant of
his rights under custodial investigation, the appellate court held that such would not necessarily result in
appellants acquittal because his conviction was based not on any extrajudicial confession but on the testimony of
PO1 Galotera who clearly and convincingly narrated the material details of the buy-bust operation that led to
appellants arrest.21
On appellants main contention that the police officers should have obtained a judicial warrant to validly effect his
arrest, the appellate court held that the instant case falls within one of the settled exceptions: an arrest made after
an entrapment operation. This is because such warrantless arrest is considered valid under Section 5(a),22 Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The CA explained that buy-bust operations, such as the one conducted
herein, is a form of entrapment where means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their own, criminal plan. In upholding the validity of the operation, the "objective test" demands that
the details of the purported transaction be clearly shown, beginning from the initial contact between theposeurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 23 Here, the appellate court found that said
requirements were adequately met for as observed by the trial court, the testimonies presented by the prosecution
were given in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner.
As for the failure by the prosecution to offer as evidence the marked money, the CA cited jurisprudence holding that
the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the prosecutions evidence, as long as the sale of the
dangerous drug is adequately proved.24 Furthermore, the appellate court rejected appellants contention that there
was no proof that the Valium that was subjected to qualitative examination was the same Valium seized from him
during the buy-bust operation. According to the appellate court, the unbroken chain of custody of the ten (10)
Valium tablets was established by the prosecution through the testimonies of PO1 Galotera and PO1 Magpale. Thus,
in the absence of any bad faith or proof that the evidence has been tampered with, the integrity of the evidence is
presumed to have been preserved.25
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 26 on April 4, 2012. Thereafter, in compliance with the Resolution of the
Court, dated March 13, 2013, notifying the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desire, within thirty (30) days from notice, appellant filed his Supplemental Brief on June 14, 2013 raising the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
NONCOMPLIANCE BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. NO. 9165.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI.27
Appellant maintains that the instant case does not fall under the exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a
judicial warrant prior to making an arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
According to appellant, for in flagrante warrantless arrests to be lawful, the following elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. But here, appellant asserts that he was not exhibiting any strange actuation at the time of his arrest, merely
playing cara y cruz with a friend. Thus, absent any physical act on the part of the accused, positively indicating that
he had just committed a crime or was committing or attempting to commit one, no reasonable suspicion would be
sufficient enough to justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. 28
Next, appellant asseverates that the prosecution failed to establish, with moral certainty, that the item seized from
him was the very same item presented and proved in court because of its non-compliance with the requirements
under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 mandating the arresting team to conduct a physical inventory of the items seized
and photograph the same in the presence of: (1) the accused; (2) a representative from the media; (3) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (4) any elected public official who shall further be required
to sign the copies of the said inventory. According to appellant, no physical inventory nor photograph was ever
taken in this case.29
Furthermore, while appellant recognizes the jurisprudential teaching that non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No.
9165 is not fatal so long as: (1) there is justifiable ground therefor; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items were properly preserved by the apprehending team, he stressed that said conditions were not
established in this case. Not only did the prosecution fail to adequately explain its failure to comply with said
requirements, it likewise failed to show the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Appellant asserts that this is due to a gaping hole in the chain of custody of the seized items arising from the

11
prosecutions failure to show how the seized drugs were transported from the place of arrest to the police station, or
from the time they were delivered to the laboratory until their eventual presentation in court.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements under
Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.30
The Court finds that the prosecution sufficiently proved the preceding requisites warranting appellants conviction.
As appropriately found by the lower courts, the prosecution presented clear and convincing testimonies of the
police officers categorically recounting, in detail, how they conducted the buy-bust operation, beginning from the
receipt of the tip from the confidential informant, then to the marking of the buy-bust money with the initials of PO1
Galotera, and then to the meeting of the appellant as seller and PO1 Galotera as buyer, and next to the actual
exchange of the blister pack containing the Valium tablets with the marked money, and then finally to the
appellants eventual arrest and turn over to the police station where his arrest was duly recorded. Moreover, the
prosecution further presented before the trial court Chemistry Report No. D-787-09 on the seized tablets revealing
positive results for Diazepam, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165. It is clear, therefore, that the prosecutions
evidence adequately established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer and seller, the ten (10) tablets
of Valium as the object of the sale, the marked money as the consideration, as well as the exchange of the Valium
and the marked money signifying the consummation of the sale.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to appellants insistence on the illegality of his warrantless arrest due
to an alleged absence of any overt act on his part positively indicating that he was committing a crime. He asserts
that he was merely playing cara y cruz and denies any participation in the crime charged. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the circumstances by which a warrantless arrest are considered reasonable:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. 31
Contrary to appellants claims, there is overwhelming evidence that he was actually committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers who arrested him without a warrant. To repeat, straightforward and unwavering
testimonies were presented by the prosecution narrating, in detail, how the police officers personally witnessed the
sale by appellant of the dangerous drug, being actual participants of the buy-bust operation. Indeed, a buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. 32 Against the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offense charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and
convincing evidence, must simply fail.33
As for appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish that the items seized from him were the very
same items presented and proved in court due to its non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 mandating the arresting officers to take photographs and conduct a physical inventory of the items
seized, the Court is not convinced. Section 21, Paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and as admitted by appellant, the failure to conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items, as well as to take photographs of the same in the presence of the persons required above, will not
automatically render an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence, 34 pursuant to the following
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 35
In view of the preceding, the Court has, time and again, ruled that non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165
shall not necessarily render the arrest of an accused as illegal or the items seized as inadmissible if the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved in compliance with the chain of custody rule. 36 The
Court explained the rule on the chain of custody to be as follows:
The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items
for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such manner that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then

12
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 37
It is evident from the records of this case that the prosecution sufficiently complied with the chain of custody rule.
Contrary to the claims of appellant, the unbroken chain of custody of the tablets seized from him was categorically
established by the testimonies presented by the prosecutions witnesses. PO1 Galotera gave a clear and detailed
account of the events that transpired from the moment he handed the marked money to appellant, to the time
appellant pulled out the blister pack containing ten (10) pieces of round, blue tablets from his right pocket, all the
way up to his execution of the pre-arranged signal and subsequent arrest of appellant. He testified that he informed
appellant of his constitutional rights, apprised him of the nature of his arrest, and marked the seized tablets with
appellants initials. He also attested to the process by which he turned appellant and the seized items over to PO1
Magpale, who in turn, clearly narrated how he took photographs thereof, prepared the Booking and Information
Sheet, and eventually turned over appellant and the seized items to Forensic Chemist Calabocal.1wphi1
In an attempt to further assign breaks in the chain of custody, appellant claimed that the prosecution did not
present any testimony of the persons who took charge of the safekeeping and custody of the illicit drugs from the
time they were delivered to the laboratory. It bears stressing, however, that such point had already been addressed
by the appellate court in the following wise:
The testimony of Forensic Chemist PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal was dispensed with after the parties had
stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report No. D-787-09 (Exhibit "C").
xxxx
x x x Quoting from their testimonies, the Solicitor General aptly traced the unbroken chain of custody of the valium
tablets seized from appellant, thus:
xxxx
Worthy of note, as well is the fact that the parties stipulated during pre-trial that the forensic chemist
who conducted the qualitative examination of the seized item received a letter request dated October
23, 2009 from PO1 Magpale. Attached to said letter was the specimen with markings EDG. 38
In like manner, the trial court similarly noted appellants admission, during pre-trial, of the parties stipulation as to
the qualification of PS I. Erickson L. Calabocal as a Forensic Chemist, as well as the genuineness and due execution
of the documents he brought together with the specimen, part of which were his Final Chemistry Report and his
Findings and Conclusions resulting from the laboratory examination he conducted on the seized tablets, which
yielded positive results for dangerous drugs.39 Due to these stipulations, the testimony of Forensic Chemist
Calabocal was not presented at trial not because the prosecution failed to do so, but because the same was
dispensed with as expressly agreed to by the parties.
Unfazed, appellant further faults the police officers not only for failing to comply with the requirements of Section
21 of RA No. 9165 but also for failing to provide any explanation constituting justifiable ground therefor. It bears
stressing, however, that said objection was never raised in the trial court, and not even on appeal before the
appellate court. Appellant cannot belatedly raise its questions as to the evidence presented at trial, too late in the
day and, at the same time, expect the prosecution to have provided justifiable grounds for its non-compliance with
RA No. 9165. People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan40 explains:
It is well to note that the records of the case are bereft of evidence that appellant, during trial, interposed any
objection to the non-marking of the seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts of
the shabu after it was examined by P/Insp. Calabocal. While he questioned the chain of custody before the CA, the
alleged defects appellant is now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. The defects he raised
before the CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical inventory, non-taking of photographs of the seized items,
and the supposed failure of the police officers to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. But even then, it
was already too late in the day for appellant to have raised the same at that point since he should have done so
early on before the RTC. It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed aside an accuseds belated
contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible for failure of the arresting
officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165.20 This is considering that "[w]hatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because [appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. x x x"
Be that as it may, the Court has always reiterated that "what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused."41 Here, the Court opines that said requirement was sufficiently complied with. It is
evidently clear, therefore, that there exists no gap in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug seized from
appellant for all the links thereof beginning from the moment the item was obtained from appellant up to the time
the same was presented in court were sufficiently accounted for. Thus, it is because the apprehending team
properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items that the Court excuses their failure to
strictly comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 for on said failure, alone, appellant cannot automatically be
exonerated.
All things considered, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the courts below for the
prosecution adequately established, with moral certainty, all the elements of the crime charged herein. It is
hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are binding on
this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.42 Thus, there exists no reason to overturn the conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 19, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04587, affirming the Decision dated August 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 09-271907, finding appellant Eduardo Dela Cruz y Gumabat guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Peope vs. Usman (G.R. No. 201100, February 4, 2015)

-. Since accused-appellant was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his
immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the act and had to
be apprehended on the spot.

13
Facts:
That on or about 17 December 2003 in Manila, respondent was caught illegally selling shabu, a
dangerous drug, during a buy-bust operation conducted by the police.
During the operation, the respondent approached the Confidential Informant and asked him if he is
going to get, meaning if he is going to buy shabu. Instead of answering, the confidential informant
pointed to the undercover police officer who was beside him at that time. The undercover police
officer showed the marked money and the respondent took them. Respondent turned his back a little
and got something from his right pocket and passed to him a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
Upon receipt he grabbed the respondent and introduced himself as a police officer. He informed the
respondent of his constitutional rights and the law he violated (Sec. 5 of RA 9165). Respondent
resisted but other policemen rushed to assist. The police officer kept possession of the evidence from
place of arrest and upon arriving in the police station, he marked the same with the accuseds initials
MUG.
Respondent claimed that he was a victim of frame-up by the arresting officers. He claims that his
warrantless arrest was illegal. That he was not apprised of his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of R. A. No.
7438 and that there were serious lapses in the procedure mandated by R. A. No. 9165 in the handling
of the seized shabu, as well as non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, resulting in the
prosecutions failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same drugs seized from
accused-appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents arrest was lawful and valid.
Held:
Yes. Respondent was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer
in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. A buy-bust
operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors. Respondent was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot.
With the arrest being valid, we also hold that the subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs
from his person is equally valid. The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police
officer with the authority to validly search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove
the commission of the offense.
The Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for prosecution of offenses involving
the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is
the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.
As to the fact that PO1 Sta. Maria was able to mark the seized sachet only at the police station,
marking of the seized substance immediately upon arrival at the police station qualified as a
compliance with the marking requirement. Such can also be said here in light of the fact that the
reason why PO1 Sta. Maria was unable to immediately mark the seized sachet was due to the
respondents resistance to arrest and, as at that time, he did not know respondents name yet.
There is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it
gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining
those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. In the case at bar, the Court sees no
justification for overturning the findings of fact of the RTC and CA.

People vs. Araza (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)

-Araza was clearly apprehended in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a
crime (sniffing shabu) in the presence of PO1 Talacca; his warrantless arrest is valid
pursuant to Section 5(a) of the above-quoted Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
On August 15, 2003, an Information for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165) otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was filed against
Araza for having in his possession 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to
which he pleaded not guilty.
Version of Prosecution:
On August 28, 2002, PO1 Talacca along with the Barangay Chairman and several others, while
confiscating video karera machine inside the house of Alejandro Sacdo, saw nine persons,
including Araza, sniffing shabu or engaging in a pot session inside the house of Sacdo. He
arrested and frisked them and ecovered from the pocket of Araza a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he suspected to be

14

shabu. PO1 Talacca immediately seized said sachet and brought Araza and his companions to
the police station.
Version of the Defense:
Araza testified that he was sleeping inside a room in the house of Sacdo when PO1 Talacca
suddenly woke him up and frisked him. PO1 Talacca confiscated his wallet that contained coins
then took him to the police station and charged him with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of Araza beyond reasonable doubt. It
gave credence to the testimony of PO1 Talacca since he is presumed to have regularly performed
his duties and there was no evidence that he had any motive to falsely testify against Araza. The
RTC rejected Arazas alibi as a feeble defense that cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
PO1 Talacca.
Araza appealed to the CA, contending mainly that the shabu was confiscated from his pocket and
not in plain view, such is inadmissible in evidence since it was illegally seized, having been taken
from his pocket and not as an incident of an arrest in flagrante delicto.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating that Araza was estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest for his failure to move to quash the Information against him prior to
arraignment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the shabu confiscated was illegally seized and therefore, inadmissible as evidence
against araza.
HELD:
NO. The offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs has been established.
The prosecution satisfied the following elements during trial:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug."
The narration of the incident by a police officer, "buttressed by the presumption that they have
regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given
weight." His testimony, the physical evidence and the facts stipulated upon during trial were
consistent with each other.
The Constitution states that failure to secure a judicial warrant prior to the actual search and
consequent seizure would render it unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.24 This constitutional prohibition, however, admits
of the following exceptions:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
In this case, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the warrantless search of Araza was effected
as an incident to a lawful arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Wherefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

People vs. Adriano (G.R. No. 208169, October 8, 2014)

- A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in
flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized
but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have
been part of or used in the commission of the crime."
Facts:
Edward Adriano y Sales was found guilty of the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under
section 5, article II of R.A No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
During trial in the RTC, the prosecution presented PO1 Morales who testified that acting on a
report received from a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs, Police Chief

15
Inspector Porforio Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano. PO1
Morales was the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust money consisting of ten P100.00 bills with
the initials PC. The operation was successful in apprehending Adriano and confiscating the drugs he
was selling. The PNP Crime laboratory confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride in
the substance confiscated.
In Adrianos defense, he testified that on October 22, 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., he was at
home, putting his nephews to sleep when two armed men barged into the house and dragged him
outside and forcibly took him to the police station. It was only when they arrived at the police station
when he learned that he was arrested for illegal sale of shabu.
The RTC found Adriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
him to life imprisonment and a fine of P500,00.00.
Adriano appealed to the CA arguing that the shabu seized from his possession is inadmissible
because :
1.
2.

The warrantless arrest on his person is invalid;

The arresting officers violated section 21 of R.A. No. 9165

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Ruling that the prosecution established the elements of
the crime of illegal sale of shabu. Even if the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements
provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not render the seized items inadmissible
in evidence.
Adriano appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest on the
person of Adriano is illegal and in convicting Adriano despite the police officers noncompliance with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Held:
The SC affirmed the CA and dismissed the appeal.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two elements must be duly
established: 1. Proof that the transaction or sale took place; and 2. The presentation in court of corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The prosecution successfully established these two elements:
1. PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner;
2. The seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before the trial court as proof
of the identity of the object of the crime and of the corpus delicti.
The implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer some measure of flexibility through the proviso,
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said terms. Non-compliance does not
invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized from him as
inadmissible as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. Despite
the arresting officers failure to strictly observe the requirements of Section 21 on the custody and
disposition of the seized items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting
officers duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized items from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules on Criminal procedure, which provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant if
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Adriano was
caught in the act of committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal
shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view of the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a
valve and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction.

.
Invalid arrest
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
- no overt physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in
the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime..
Facts:
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information, 5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before
the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the existence and due execution of
the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory examination; 2]certification issued by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic

16
sachet containing small transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance. 6 Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
Prosecution and Defense presented their respective version of the events.
The RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual possession
of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in
possession of the said dangerous drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez
was carrying was found to contain shabu.
RTC convicted him, to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a fine of
Php300,000.00.
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC for
giving undue weight on the testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty of the said arresting officer. He insisted that the prosecution
evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
CA AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC stating that there was probable cause for the police officers to
believe that Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he was seen leaving the
residence of a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were
being perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic
from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search.
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in
its November 20, 2012 Resolution.
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid
due to the absence of probable cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends that the failure of the police
operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item
inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt.
The OSG prays for the affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG submits
that the warrantless search and seizure of the subject narcotic were justified under the plain view
doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
WON:
1.
2.

Held:
1.

WON the Search made by the Police to Sanchez was INVALID.

WON The OSG is correct to characterize the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as
seizure of evidence in plain view.

YES. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the
process cannot be reversed. A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of
the search. The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by
the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle
that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at
the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in
order for the police officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section
5, Rule 113 (in flagrante delicto arrest). The police officers in this case had no inkling
whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer.

2.

NO. The Court disagrees

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes

17
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 35Measured against the
foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does notfall
within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed,
Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and
third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match
box being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police
officers.
Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

People vs. Andaya (G.R. No. 183700 October 13, 2014)

- confidential informant was not a police officer. none of the members of the buy-bust
team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur
buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at
the moment of the supposed transaction.
FACTS:
An information was filed against Andaya for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. A team
composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and
asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. In the said operation, Andaya was caught with
more or less 0.09 grams crystalline substance which was later confirmed in a laboratory test as
Methampethamine
Hydrochloride
or
shabu,
a
dangerous
drug.
Accused-appellant denied the charge, contending that on that fateful night, police officers
arrived in his house and one poked his gun at him. He was then handcuffed and brought outside but he
refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The policemen searched the house, turned over the
beddings and uncovered their furniture. No gun nor shabu was found. He was brought to the police
station and detained for three days. His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony.
The RTC convicted Andaya.
Andaya appealed in the CA, arguing that the Prosecutions non-presentation of the confidential
informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the CA still affirmed the assailed decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N the search of Andayas house and his person and his arrest by the police officers violated
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
HELD:
YES.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous
drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. The
justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in
flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting
to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. The arresting
police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity in the
performance
of
official
duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the
State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt. Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be
the poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the
basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. However, the State did not present the
confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between
him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of
the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any. Without the poseur
buyer's
testimony,
the
State
did
not
credibly
incriminate
Andaya.

People vs. Cogaed, (G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

- At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.; Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested
that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

18
Facts: Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer" 2 that one Marvin
Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" 3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. 4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the
waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger jeepney from
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint. 7 The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. 8 SPO1
Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow
bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 Cogaed and Dayao told
SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" 16inside the station.
Issue:
Was the arrest valid?
Was the search and seizure of marijuana valid?
Held:
No.
"Stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search
should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant." 67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an
illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and
[who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police
officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing
a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled. 78 His flight added to the
suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm" 80 in his
possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not
possibly have procured a search warrant first." 82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a
man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a
person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.

19
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

Hot pursuit Par. (b), Sec. 5

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;

Pestilos vs. Generoso (G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Facts:

On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 AM, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the
petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the
incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched
SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who
mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police
Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners
stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on
the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest
took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order
denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise
denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC
for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its
decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the
Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer
clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding
was called for as a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which
it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the
RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April
17, 2008; hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
Held: YES.
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against
the petitioners should now proceed.

20
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their
determination on the evidence submitted by the parties. In other words, the arresting officer operates
on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather
within a limited time frame.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances"
is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.
This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the
facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained
after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated
and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts
or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
We hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable
arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1)
has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on
these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest,
would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso
was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest
From a review of the records of the CA, we conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the
facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the
warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the
alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills
Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February
20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City. The time of the entry of the complaint in
the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station,
would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the
crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of the crime
is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the
scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty. Generoso indeed suffered
blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, although they asserted that they
did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso. Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the
Medico-Legal Certificate that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the
alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date
of the incident.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one
(1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny

21
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of
what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime
until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within
their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the
persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers. This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. where
Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the
present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPO1 Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. This fact
alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that
a crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that
took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

Waiver of illegal arrest does not mean waiver of inadmissibility of evidence

Dela Cruz vs. People (G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
- petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and
raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his
right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest. However, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Antiquera vs. People (G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013)

- no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the
arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant; considering that his arrest was illegal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal; the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are
inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
- failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
FACTS:

22

PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol
on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house and
immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the
house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door and
saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him
was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised
burner.

The police entered the house, introduce themselves, arrested Antiquera and Cruz, and
confiscated all the drug paraphernalia used by the two and those found in the house.

Petitioners were brought to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in
Pasay City for further investigation and testing, and resulted to negative. While the
paraphernalia were on examined by forensic chemical officer to be positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu.

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of
the crime charged (violation of Section 12, RA 9165 Illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia in Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002) and sentenced them to a prison
term ranging from six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine
of P10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio
and PO1 Cabutihans credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz
in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers
were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in full the decision of the trial
court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. The accused is now before
this Court seeking acquittal.

ISSUE: WON accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they
saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
RULING: No. The attending circumstances in this from the facts do not make out a case of
arrest made in flagrante delicto.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure or Arrest in flagrante
delicto provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense." The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante
delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime
had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep
that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a
tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the
officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the abovementioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an
invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.

The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

Waiver of illegality of arrest

Roallos vs. People, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013

23
- the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he
fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to
arraignment; accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation
by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a
preliminary investigation
Facts:
Vivencio Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of
the Aguinaldo Vets and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAAs mother, worked as the
secretary and treasurer of Roallos. On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBBs office at
Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay
in her mothers office and wait for the latter to return. While waiting, AAA alleged that Roallos touched
her right breast and mashed it. AAA asked why he is touching her but instead of answering, Roallos
touched her left breast and he abdomen. AAA protested. Roallos then left the office.
Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, Roallos returned to
the office. He then asked AAA if she was hungry and then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy
food, but AAA refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos body pressing against her back. Thereafter,
Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. AAA was unable to escape,she just turned her face to avoid his kiss. But
he pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left cheek. AAA then tried to free herself from the grasp
of Roallos. Roallos then left the office. This time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait
for her mother to return.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA then
relayed what Roallos did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident. Roallos, however,
denied having done anything to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the office. However, BBB saw that
Roallos was following them. Fearing that Roallos would do something to harm them, BBB and AAA
immediately entered the office of the Department of National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo. They
were then advised by the employees therein to go to DNDs legal department office, where they were
advised to report the incident to the police authorities.
AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They then
referred the report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect the arrest of the
accused. Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police station for
investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he
merely stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he went out of
the office twice to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the
same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that he was not informed of his
rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
The RTC found Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act). His MR was
denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Roallos was denied due process since he was not afforded a preliminary investigation
and was arrested without any warrant of arrest.
Ruling:
No. Roallos claim that he was denied due process since he was not afforded a preliminary
investigation and that he was arrested without warrant of arrest is untenable.
In Miclat, Jr. v. People, the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him
on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the
trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An
accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or
to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.
In Villarin v. People, the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be
timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by
entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary
investigation. Thus:

24

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised

and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already
submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause
which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation.
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his
Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never
raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict, entered a plea of not guilty
during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the
scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was
only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore
been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the
supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is
likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
The SC denied the petition.

Effect of admission to bail on objections to an illegal arrest Sec. 26, Rule 114
Leviste vs. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he
vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment.
Facts:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on
January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case
was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order against petitioner
who was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner
posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention, and his
arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an
Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued an Order deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense, and another order denying reconsideration
of the first order. Leviste assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer
acting on the public prosecutor's recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court
resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the
prosecutor's recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable
cause. Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action
on the admission of the Amended Information.
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, which, first, admitted the Amended
Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and second, set the
arraignment on February 13, 2007. Leviste questioned these two orders via a supplemental petition
before the appellate court.
The CA dismissed Levistes petition hence this petition for review was filed before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Alameda erred in granting the reinvestigation and
admitting State Prosecutor Velascos amended information.
Whether or not by applying for bail, Leviste waived his right to object to an illegal arrest.
Ruling:

25
Whether or not the respondent Judge Alameda erred in granting the reinvestigation and
admitting State Prosecutor Velascos amended information.
No. Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in
the present case, the Court's holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in
or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state
its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused
would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment
may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to
entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for
quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible.
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without
leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at
that stage is a mere superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation - be it a complete disposition or an
intermediate modification of the charge - is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the
trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the
prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for
purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the
information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be
admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd
Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide
to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but
a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. The Court answers in the
affirmative.

RULE 126 (SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

Search and seizure defined Sec. 1
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation (G.R. No.
189669, February 16, 2015)
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court.

26

Facts: Proceedings for applications for search warrants are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule
that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Pilipinas Shell and Petron received information that
Romas International
Gases Corp (RIGC) was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by
illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and
device of Petron. Pilipinas Shell and Petron then
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of RIGC for the
purpose of apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution
and/or sale of LPG products using the same containers
of Petron and Shell.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron Gasul
and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at RIGCs warehouselocated in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur. The
NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two
separate Applications for Search Warrants against RIGC and/or its occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued
an Order issuingthe search warrants. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the RIGCs
premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were
seized. RIGC filed a Motion to Quashthe search warrants. But the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to
Quash. However, RIGC's new counsel filed an Appearance
with Motion for Reconsideration (MR). It was only in said motion where RIGC raised for the first time,
the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the
alleged crime was committed in a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. The RTC-Naga granted the MR, thereby
quashing the search warrants. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE:
Was the issuance of the search warrants within the jurisdiction of RTCNaga
when the crime was committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction?
RULING:
Yes. In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance
of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the
search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject UST Law Review, Vol.
LIX, No. 1, May 2015
matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time of
filing of the motion to quash. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the
defect in the application is an issue of
jurisdiction.
Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is
not one involving jurisdiction because the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts. Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTCNaga to have even taken
into consideration an issue which RIGC failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to
issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.

Court where application for search warrant shall be filed Sec. 2

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where
the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation (G.R.
No. 189669, February 16, 2015)
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," the power to issue which
is inherent in all courts, and jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
competence. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity. Thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the

27
issue of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not
one involving jurisdiction because the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts. The RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.
Personal property to be seized Sec. 3
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Requisites for issuing search warrant Sec. 4

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

Retired SPO4 Laud vs. People (G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014)
- was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are
issued for more than one specific offense.
- a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not
violate the one-specific-offense rule
- where several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant
uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be
confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does
not violate the one-specific-offense rule (Citing Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, 329 Phil.
875 [1996])

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters
under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant
applications, they shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or
things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges of these RTCs and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the ViceExecutive Judges are authorized to act on such applications and shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The Court
observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this case. As the records
would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was
endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause
therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as
the rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
FACTS

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 25, 2011 and the
Resolution3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017
upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.4

On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent
Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (ManilaRTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by
the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.

In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the
RTC(MANILA) and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, He was part of the group that buried the victims.

Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the ManilaRTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search
Warrant No. 09-144077 which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime
Operatives on July 15, 2009.

The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.

28

Petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the following grounds :
o Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he
had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court;
o The Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to
be enforced in Davao City;
o The human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant;
o the police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of
human remains;
o The search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause;
o the rule against forum shopping was violated;
o There was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and
o the proper specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized.
MANILA-RTC GRANTED THE MOTION OF LAUD.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied for :
o The People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a search
warrant by the Manila RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where the
offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court; the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable
cause;
o The applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject
matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same as the one
contained in a previous application before the RTC of Davao.
The People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA GRANTED THE PEOPLES PETITION annulling and setting aside the Orders of the ManilaRTC for having been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The CA found that :
o The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied for the
application involved a heinous crime, such as Murder which results in an exception to
the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court (explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in A.M. No. 03-802-SC,26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF),27 with the endorsement of its head,
before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued by
the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts).
o Probable cause was established since, among others, witness Avasola deposed and
testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in December 2005
and was actually part of the group that buried the victims.
o The court deemed that the physical evidence of a protruding human bone in plain view
in one of the caves, and Avasolas first-hand eye witness account both concur and
point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime of Murder had been
committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud
Compound.
o Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to
get involved in a criminal case, considering the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance
of the witness sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the application of a
search warrant.
o The CA found no forum shopping the first filed in Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC.
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE/s
W/N the requisites for issuing a search warrant were complied with in this case?
W/N the warrant in question was a scattershot warrant?
W/N Forum shopping was committed in this case?
HELD
YES. First Lauds contention that Judge Peralta did not have authority is false for Judge Peralta acted
as a De Facto officer 1. The abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
1

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts
of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far

29
invalidity of Search Warrant. The court decides that the De Facto Doctrine is for the protection of the
public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office
without being lawful officers.
3 elements are needed for the doctrine to apply :

There must be a de jure office; there must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

All of the elements are present in the case for there is de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive
Judge.

The Judge had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and
was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality. And lastly Good
faith is presumed for the contrary was not established.
Therefore Judge Peralta is with authority and thus his actions are valid.
Secondly Manila RTC has Jurisdiction for the case involved a special criminal case, Murder. Section 12,
Chapter V of AM No. 03-8-02-SC provides the requirements for the exception towards the Compelling
Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

The case involves heinous crimes;

Search warrant applications may be filed by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police(PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally
endorsed by the heads of such agencies."; warrant applications shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in
the Rules of Court;

Whenever the Executive Judges are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in
the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall
issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the said courts.
The court finds that the requirements are complied with.
Thirdly concerning the probable cause needed the court finds that the facts and circumstances
established from the testimony of Avasola who was personally examined by the Judge sufficiently show
that more likely than not the crime of Murder was perpetrated and that the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. The quantum of evidence to
establish probable cause had been met here. To the Courts mind, the supposed delay in the search
warrants application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein.
Fourthly concerning (A) the requirement of particularly describing the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized the court deems the requirement to have been met here. The warrant
approved complies with the courts standard of a warrant that is constitutional the description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation
or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it
(B) concerning the petitioners contention that the human remains are not personal property the court
states that Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place, as is
stated in Article 416 (Civil Code) and considering further that they qualify under the phrase "subject of
the offense" given that they prove the crimes corpus delicti,56 it follows that they may be valid
subjects of a search warrant under Sec. 3 of Rule 126 (Rules of Court). the Court sees it, the
description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the offense committed, i.e.,
of Murder.
If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence, as is with the
account of Avasola.
NO. Concerning the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, intended
to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific
offense. The court finds that the rule on one specific offense was not violated for it only concerns
Murder.
NO. Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the various
points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the Manila-RTC and that before
the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each application were different. Likewise, the
application filed in Manila was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any

as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
The treatment of a de facto officers acts is premised on the reality that third persons cannot
always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have
a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such.38 Public
interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the
officer in question is concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the
de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer
principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the
official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers

30
crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different that in Manila sought
the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold
Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the two applications, the
rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Alvarez (G.R. No. 179408, March 5,
2014)
Requirements for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge
must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.
- Should any of these requisites be absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and
enforcement of the search warrant may file a motion to quash the search warrant with
the issuing court or with the court where the action is subsequently instituted
FACTS: To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDTs ACP Detection Division (ACPDD) regularly visits
foreign countries to conduct market research on various prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow
their users to make overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate.
The ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card a card principally marketed to Filipinos residing in
UK for calls to the Philippines to make test calls using two telephone lines: the dialing phone an
IDDcapable telephone line which makes the call and through which the access number and the PIN
number printed at the back of the card are entered; and the receiving phone a caller identification
(caller id) unitequipped telephone line which would receive the call and reflect the incoming callers
telephone number.
During a test call placed at the PLDTACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone
number (28243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was originating from a local telephone
in Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDTs Integrated Customer Management (billing) System,
the ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez,
with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. It further
learned that several lines are installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents),
among others, as subscribers.
The same test calls were conducted by ACPDD on November 5, 2003 at the premises of the NTC in
Quezon City (and in the presence of an NTC representative) using the same prepaid card (validation
test). The receiving phone at the NTC premises reflected the telephone numbers registered in the
name of Abigail as the calling number from the United Kingdom.
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using the prepaid cards Unity Card and IDT Supercalling
Card revealed the same results. The calleridequipped receiving phone reflected telephone numbers 13
that are in the names of Experto Enterprises and Experto Phils, as subscribers, with a common address
at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. It turned out
that the actual occupant of these premises is also Abigail. Subsequently, a validation test was also
conducted, yielding several telephone numbers registered in the name of Experto Phils./Experto
Enterprises as the calling numbers supposedly from the United Kingdom.
According to PLDT, had an ordinary and legitimate call been made, the screen of the callerid
equipped receiving phone would not reflect a local number or any number at all. In the cards they
tested, however, once the caller enters the access and pin numbers, the respondents would route the
call via the internet to a local telephone number (in this case, a PLDT telephone number) which would
connect the call to the receiving phone. Since calls through the internet never pass the toll center of
the PLDTs IGF, users of these prepaid cards can place a call to any point in the Philippines (provided
the local line is NDDcapable) without the call appearing as coming from abroad. 15
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDTs Quality Control
Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular
inspection at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered that PLDT telephone lines
were connected to several pieces of equipment.
Four search warrants were issued for violations of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW
A1 and SW A2) and of PD No. 401, as amended (SW B1 and SW B2) for the ISR activities being
conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City. The four search warrants enumerated the
objects to be searched and seized as follows:1. MERIDIAN SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL LINES
and/or CABLES AND ANTENNAS and/or similar equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves
or frequency, such as a Meridian Subscribers Unit, Broadband DSL and telephone lines; 2. PERSONAL
COMPUTERS or any similar equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the

31
prescribed process of the information and supplying the result of this process; 3. NOKIA MODEM or any
similar equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate
with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line; 4. QUINTUM Equipment or any similar
equipment capable of receiving digital signals from the internet and converting those signals to voice;
5. QUINTUM, 3COM AND CISCO Routers or any similar equipment capable of switching packets of data
to their assigned destination or addresses; 6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment capable of
switching data; 7.COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar equipment or device used for
copying and/or printing data and/or information; 8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
On the same date, the PNP searched the premises indicated in the warrants. On December 10, 2003, a
return was made with a complete inventory of the items seized. On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the
PNP filed with the Department of Justice a joint complaintaffidavit for theft and for violation of PD No.
401 against the respondents.
The respondents filed with the RTC a motion to quash the search warrants essentially on the following
grounds: first, the RTC had no authority to issue search warrants which were enforced in Paraaque
City; second, the enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked particularity; and third,
there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash.
The CA rendered the assailed decision and resolution, granting the respondents' petition for certiorari.
The CA quashed SW Al and SW A2 (for theft) on the ground that they were issued for non
existent crimes. Relying on this Courts decision in Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, the CA ruled that the
respondents could not have possibly committed the crime of theft because PLDTs business of
providing telecommunication services and these services themselves are not personal properties
contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC. With respect to SW Bl and SW B2 (for violation of PD
No. 401), the CA upheld paragraphs one to six of the enumeration of items subject of the search. The
CA nullified the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of particularity and ordered the return of the
items seized under these provisions.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid.
HELD: The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections
4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. These sections lay down the following
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Should any of these
requisites be absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement of the search warrant may
file a motion to quash the search warrant with the issuing court or with the court where the action is
subsequently instituted.
Reviewing the RTCs denial of the motion to quash SWAl and SW A2
In the present case, the issue is whether the commission of an ISR activity, in the manner that
PLDTs evidence shows, sufficiently establishes probable cause for the issuance of search warrants
for the crime of theft. Unlike in Savage, the Court in Laurel was not confronted with the issue of
decriminalization (which is a legislative prerogative) but whether the commission of an ISR activity
meets the elements of the offense of theft for purposes of quashing an information. Since the Court, in
Laurel, ultimately ruled then an ISR activity justifies the elements of theft that must necessarily be
alleged in the information a fortiori, the RTCs determination should be sustained on certiorari.
The requirement of particularity in SWB1 and SWB2
According to PLDT, it corroborates the fact that the respondents have made a
business out of their illegal connections to its telephone lines.We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the
printers and scanners are or may be connected to the other illegal connections to the PLDT telephone
lines does not make them the subject of the offense or fruits of the offense, much less could they
become a means of committing an offense.
It is clear from PLDTs submission that it confuses the crime for which SW Bl and SW B2
were issued with the crime for which SW Al and SWA2 were issued: SW Bl and SW B2 were issued
for violation of PD No. 401, to be enforced in two different places as identified in the warrants. The
crime for which these search warrants were issued does not pertain to the crime of theft where
matters of personal property and the taking thereof with intent to gain become significant but to PD
No. 401.
These items could not be the subject of a violation of PD No. 401 since PLDT itself does not claim that
these items themselves comprise the unauthorized installations. For emphasis, what PD No. 401
punishes is the unauthorized installation of telephone connection without the previous consent of
PLDT. In the present case, PLDT has not shown that connecting printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to
a computer, even if connected to a PLDT telephone line, would or should require its prior authorization.

32

Neither could these items be a means of committing a violation of PD No. 401 since these copying,
printing and storage devices in no way aided the respondents in making the unauthorized connections.
While these items may be accessory to the computers and other equipment linked to telephone lines,
PD No. 401 does not cover this kind of items within the scope of the prohibition. To allow the seizure of
items under the PLDTs interpretation would, as the CA correctly observed, allow the seizure under the
warrant of properties for personal use of the respondents.
If PLDT seeks the seizure of these items to prove that these installations contain the respondents'
financial gain and the corresponding business loss to PLDT, then that purpose is served by SW Al and
SW A2 since this is what PLDT essentially complained of in charging the respondents with theft.
However, the same reasoning does not justify its seizure under a warrant for violation of PD No. 401
since these items are not directly connected to the PLDT telephone lines and PLDT has not even
claimed that the installation of these items requires prior authorization from it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 89213 are hereby MODIFIED in that SW Al and
SW A2 are hereby declared valid and constitutional.

Examination of complainant by the judge Sec. 5

Century Chinese Medicine Co. vs. People (G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013)
- A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable
cause, meaning the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched.
Petitioners contend that the products seized from their respective stores cannot be the subject of the
search warrants and seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of any crime, infringed product not
intended to be used in any crime; that they are legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the
same, since those genuine top gel products bore the original trademark/tradename of TOP GEL MCA,
owned and distributed by Yu. Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's order to release the seized
TOP GEL products, not one had been returned; that one or two samples from each petitioner's'
drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need to present them in a criminal prosecution, and
that confiscation of thousands of these products was an overkill. Petitioners also argue that the issue
that the RTC erred in applying the rules of search and seizure in anticipation of a civil action was never
raised in the RTC.
RESPONDENTS CLAIMS
Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and the style Worldwide Pharmacy, is the
sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya
whitening soap for a period of ten years from 2003. Respondent claims that the petitioners in this case
were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their products.
There was an investigation, which led to seizures of the petitioner's products because the NBI ruled
that it was counterfeit.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search warrants
RULING:
The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155
and 168, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes
trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition.
The SC agrees with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of
the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable
in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal
actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. - It was established that respondent
had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct an investigation and search warrant implementation for
the possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap.
Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing
stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are
likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies. - The affidavits of
NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling, clearly showed that they are seeking protection
for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF" registered to respondent by the IPO on 2003.

33
While petitioners claim that the product they are distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOP
GEL MCA and MCA DEVISE, it was different from the trademark TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF
subject of the application.

Distinguish from warrant of arrest where personal examination is not required

Particular description of place or person
Retired SPO4 Laud vs. People (G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014)
- description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points
out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to
it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
Del Castillo v. People (G.R. No.185128, January 30, 2012, 664 SCRA 430)
- the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that
points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness;
Facts: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival,
somebody shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep
they were riding and go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing
incriminating in Del Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from
the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded
not guilty.
The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA: There was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. OSG argued that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should
still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a
private individual.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Thus, rendering the evidence inadmissible.
HELD: There was a violation. Evidence must be inadmissible.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a
nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo.
The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the
search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation
of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure.
The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in
the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The
contention is devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the
search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that
the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the search
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who, by direct
provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay
tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: For

34
purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in
their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

Issuance and form of search warrant Sec. 6

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

Right to break door or window to effect search Sec. 7

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein

Search to be made in the presence of witnesses Sec. 8

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality

Receipt for the property seized Sec. 11

Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must
give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place
in which he found the seized property.

Time of making search Sec. 9

Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless
the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night.

Distinguish from warrant of arrest Rule 113, Sec. 6

Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or
night.

Validity of search warrant Sec. 10

Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its
date. Thereafter it shall be void

Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; duty of judge; return and

35
other proceedings Sec. 12
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together
with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued
and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge
shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that
the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of
the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Search incident to lawful arrest Sec. 13

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.

People vs. Araza (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)

- The Constitution states that failure to secure a judicial warrant prior to the
actual search and consequent seizure would render it unreasonable and any
evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.. The constitutional prohibition, however, admits of the following
exceptions; having been lawfully arrested, the warrantless search that followed was
undoubtedly incidental to a lawful arrest, which is an exception to the constitutional
prohibition on warrantless search and seizure. Conversely, the shabu seized from
Araza is admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged.
FACTS: On August 15, 2003, an Information for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165
(RA 9165) otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was filed against
Araza for having in his possession 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to which
he pleaded not guilty.
Version of Prosecution:
On August 28, 2002, PO1 Talacca along with the Barangay Chairman and several others, while
confiscating video karera machine inside the house of Alejandro Sacdo, saw nine persons, including
Araza, sniffing shabu or engaging in a pot session inside the house of Sacdo. He arrested and frisked
them and ecovered from the pocket of Araza a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance which he suspected to be shabu. PO1 Talacca immediately seized said
sachet and brought Araza and his companions to the police station.
Version of the Defense:
Araza testified that he was sleeping inside a room in the house of Sacdo when PO1 Talacca suddenly
woke him up and frisked him. PO1 Talacca confiscated his wallet that contained coins then took him to
the police station and charged him with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of Araza beyond reasonable doubt. It
gave credence to the testimony of PO1 Talacca since he is presumed to have regularly performed his
duties and there was no evidence that he had any motive to falsely testify against Araza. The RTC
rejected Arazas alibi as a feeble defense that cannot prevail over the positive testimony of PO1
Talacca.
Araza appealed to the CA, contending mainly that the shabu was confiscated from his pocket and not
in plain view, such is inadmissible in evidence since it was illegally seized, having been taken from his
pocket and not as an incident of an arrest in flagrante delicto.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating that Araza was estopped from assailing the legality of
his arrest for his failure to move to quash the Information against him prior to arraignment.
ISSUE:

36
Whether or not the shabu confiscated was illegally seized and therefore, inadmissible as evidence
against araza.
HELD: NO
The offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs has been established.
The prosecution satisfied the following elements during trial:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug."
The narration of the incident by a police officer, "buttressed by the presumption that they have
regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given
weight." His testimony, the physical evidence and the facts stipulated upon during trial were consistent
with each other.
The Constitution states that failure to secure a judicial warrant prior to the actual search and
consequent seizure would render it unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This constitutional prohibition, however, admits of the
following exceptions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in "plain view";
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.

In this case, there is sufficient evidence to prove that the warrantless search of Araza was effected as
an incident to a lawful arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Wherefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

People vs. Calantiao (G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)

- Purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might
be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach.
- It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks
to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under
the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
FACTS:
The accused was charged before the RTC of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 in a information filed
- That on or about the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, the accused, without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing
the same to be a dangerous drug.
In the afternoon of November 12, 2003, while PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez were on duty, Lojera
arrived at their office and asked police assistance regarding a shooting incident that while driving a
towing truck and traversing along EDSA Balintawak, he had a traffic dispute with a taxi which he
followed the taxi until it reached C-3 Road, Caloocan City; that the passengers of the taxi (calantiao),
alighted and fired their guns; that he was surprised thus he continued his driving until he reached a
police station nearby.
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately responded to the place where the taxi was found, and
while approaching the same, 2 armed men alighted and fired their guns towards them and ran away.

37
Thus, they chased them but they were subdued. A black bag containing 2 bricks of marijuana and a
magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos and .38 revolver was recovered from them.
Defense:
The case originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi almost collided with another car; Reyes
opened the window and made a FU sign against the persons on board of the another car; this
prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in traffic, PO1 Mariano, who boarded
the other car, alighted and kick the taxi where PO1 uttered PI mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba
ako kilala? and that he poked his gun to Reyes and Calantiao and gun fired. Then they were
handcuffed and brought to the police station. They were framed up of using drugs.
RTC guilty; illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search
after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly established by the
prosecution.
CA affirmed RTC; there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were
acting on a legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the
scene were the perpetrators of the offense; hat the search and subsequent seizure of the marijuana in
question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.
ISSUES:
WON the arrest and search was done lawfully.
HELD: YES
Search and Seizure of Marijuana valid
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from
being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity
of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of
his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiaos possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiaos possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiaos situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black
bag, which was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiaos lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of
custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary

38
value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory,
and (2) taking of photographs.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have
not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing
the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with
regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao
failed to discharge such burden.

Objection to issuance or service of warrant

Santos vs. Pryce Gases, Inc. (G. R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007
- Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
fACTS:
This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin orders of RTC Iloilo
City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG cylinders seized from petitioner.
Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial gases and LPG
products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees
suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from market circulation and refilled by their
competitors, one of whoom is Sun Gas and Santos as the manager.
Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to recoverLPG cylinders
allegedly in posession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) conducted
surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to
conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to
take photographs of LPG cylinders (PO@ Demandara).
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the allegation that Pryce
LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking, averred also that Sun Gas is
distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC issued the search warrant with the
authority to seize the following items:
1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and embossed Pryce
Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The authorities have seize a
number of Pryce LPG tanks.
Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of probable cause as
well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the application, violating article 3,
section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.
On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of Iloilo against
Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.
After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as found by it at the
time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite probable cause necessary to
sustain the validity of the search warrant.
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the seized items. It
also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied in an Order dated 9
August 2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, arguing
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant. The petition
essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause and
the failure of petitioner to prove that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged
petitioners personality to file the motion to quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set aside the two
orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to respondent.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July 2004.

39

ISSUES:
(1) WON petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search warrant;
(2) WHO has proper custody of the seized items; and
(3) WON respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail the quashal of
the search warrant.
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial courts quashal of the search
warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show his
authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no legal personality to question the
validity of the search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining and subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.
Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.
2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the standard of
probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
3.The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized
items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the
criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the
warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in
order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties.
The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for
(1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to
the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court.
The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant
pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner.
Petition denied.

Motion to quash search or to suppress evidence; where to file Sec. 14

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon
only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the
motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such
court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion
shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)

Probable cause for issuance of search warrant

HPS Software and Communication Corporation vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLOT) (G.R. No. 170217, December 10, 2012)
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched.
Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
- Facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the

40
offense are in the place sought to be searched; referring to factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.
Century Chinese Medicine Co. vs. People ( G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013)
- The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Tan vs. Tiong Gue (G.R. No. 174570, December 15, 2010)
- a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one
specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant's personal knowledge
and his or her witnesses; cannot utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if
both cases emanated from the same incident.
When warrantless search and seizure valid
a) Search incidental to lawful arrest
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
-

People vs. Nuevas (G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463)
- search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The arrest
must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the
search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.

Buy-bust operation
People vs. Collado (G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013)
- The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in
pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; the subsequent search
and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid.
People vs. Araneta (G.R. No. 191064, October 20, 2010)
- search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust
operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and
selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buybust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is
a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

Invalid Search
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)
- A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It
bears emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of
a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed; Here, the search
preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the
search.

b) Consented search ((waiver of right)

Requisites: People vs. Nuevas (G.R. NO. 170233, February 22, 2007
(1) the right exists
(2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and

41
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
c) Search of moving vehicle
People vs. Mariacos (G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010)
Justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
d) Check points; body checks in airport
Abenes vs. Court of Appeals (G. R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007)
- not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed; as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search.
In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
- firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it
tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
People vs. Vicenerao (G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004)
- Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by
the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
e) Plain view situation
Elements- Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)
(1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
People v. Mariacos (G.R. No. 188611, June 21, 2010, 621 SCRA 327)
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Applicable
Miclat, Jr. vs. People (G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 539)
- What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
People vs. Nuevas (G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463)
- An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant; if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized; if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

Not applicable

People vs. Calantiao (G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)

42
- Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in this case because the police
officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiaos possession;
they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful
arrest.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009)
-"plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to
find evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions.
f) Stop and frisk situation or Terry search
Invalid Search
Sanchez vs. People (G.R. No. 190623, November 17, 2014)
- no valid stop-and-frisk search; coming out from the house of a drug pusher
and
boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements, and by
themselves
alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer
of
any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or that he was

probably

committing a
crime in the presence of the officer.
People vs. Cogaed, (G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
- He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney.
There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver;
Two-Fold Interest:
the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection; and
safety and self-preservation
Esquillo vs. People (G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010)
- essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who
manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed
about him.
- The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's
possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative- was undertaken
after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after
PO1 Cruz introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to
flee after the police officer had identified himself.
g) Enforcement of custom laws
Tarriff and Customs Code authorizes customs officer to:
a. Enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse;
b. Inspect/search/examine any vessel/aircraft and any trunk/ package/box/
envelope or any person on board
c. Stop and examine any vehicle/boat/person suspected of holding/conveying
any dutiable/prohibited articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.
Salvador vs. People (G.R. No. 146706, August 15, 2005)

43
- law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo
or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said
items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs
law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person
suspected of holding or conveying the said articles.