Theories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989

Author(s): Ronald A. Francisco

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 663-680
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Theories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989*

Ronald A. Francisco, Department of Political Science,
University of Kansas

This study investigates the revolutions in the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia in the context of comparative theories of protest and revolution. After a
review of recent methodological advances and the two revolutions, the Gurr-Lichbach
mobilization of discontent model is adapted to the two cases and tested with longitudinal

data. Rational action theories are integrated into a final model that can be used to analyze
protest in authoritarian systems. The model performs better for the two revolutions than

any predecessor. In ex post and ex ante forecasting tests, the model generated large prediction error; however, it forecasted historically unprecedented levels of sustained protest.

The ossified regimes of Eastern Europe toppled like so many dominoes in the autumn of 1989. These revolutions unified Germany, de-

stroyed the Soviet block, and thus rendered moot the Cold War. Taken
as a whole, this was arguably the most significant political event since
1945.

Yet no one foresaw it. In Germany, academics have come under fire

for their inability to predict events of such scale or even to recognize the

revolution once it was under way. East European area studies specialists

in the United States fared no better.' The focus of this research, however
is on the problem of theory and forecasting of protest and revolution: the
revolutions of 1989 can move us closer to answering the fundamental
question posed in 1975 by Charles Tilly (1975, 183): "For [any] year and

[any] country, how could we go about estimating the probability of two

conditions: (a) that a revolution would occur; (b) that more than some

minimum proportion of the country's population would take direct part

in collective violence?"

*Thanks to Paul Johnson, Philip Schrodt, Deborah Gerner, and Paul D'Anieri for
helpful comments and to Carey Ewing and Trisha Beach for data analysis. This research
was supported in part by the University of Kansas general research fund.
'There was widespread recognition of serious problems (e.g., Brzezinski 1989;
Johnson 1987), but no one predicted the sequential collapse of successive regimes in revolu-

tions largely devoid of violence. Most accounts judged revolution least likely in the German
Democratic Republic.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 1993, Pp. 663-680

C 1993 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713

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664 Ronald A. Francisco

Theory and Forecasting of Protest and Revolution

Contemporary protest research is dominated by competition be-

tween the traditional deprivation-protest linkage and the more recent rational action approach. Newer research supports the rational action idea
that protest is an outgrowth of opportunity and expected utility, not a
product of inequality or deprivation per se (Opp 1989; Muller and Weede

1990; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991). Forecasting has not been a major
focus of either program. In fact, the rational action approach is only now
moving from formal theory to empirical tests.
A substantial segment of the comparative politics community rejects
the possibility of predicting protest and revolution. Eckstein (1990, 55)

claims that "forecasting the fall of a ruler or government falls in the

same category as forecasting earthquakes: the events are 'catastro-

phes'-in the technical sense of discontinuous, sporadic events-which

can be explained after the fact, but not forecast with reasonable accuracy. "

There is a difference, though, between the prediction of specific

events and the use of forecasting to accelerate the advancement of knowl-

edge. Like Eckstein, Kuran (1991) denies the predictability of protest,

but he presents this view as a falsifiable theory; he seeks progress toward
a general theory of protest and revolution. Forecasting on the basis of
theory is for Lakatos (1970) a requirement for the growth of science.2
Such forecasting is uncommon in comparative politics. The most familiar
use of systematic prediction occurs in election studies. For example,

Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) use forecasting to assess the validity of elec-

toral models. Yet elections are "stable" events: they occur regularly,
within defined rules and stable party systems. Protests and revolutions

are "unstable"- irregular and, some argue, always unique (Dunn 1989).
Research on military coups is perhaps the most sophisticated attempt

to predict unstable events in comparative politics. Plagued by many of

the same data and theory problems that confound the study of protest,
coup researchers rely on forecasting to test competing models. In both

cases, the first step to forecasting is the postdiction of historical data

using models derived from theory (e.g., Johnson, Slater, and McGowan
1984; Jackman et al. 1986).

The revolutions of 1989 afford an opportunity to use this approach

to evaluate the theory of protest and revolution. This study assesses the

ability of several mainstream theories of protest to explain the revolutions

2Lakatos (1970, 132) cites "Popper's supreme heuristic rule: 'devise conjectures which
have more empirical content than their predecessors.'"

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THEORIES

OF

PROTEST

665

in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia, the two

most central cases of regime transition after reforms took hold in Poland

and Hungary. The revolutions in Eastern Europe, like most since 1970,
departed substantially from the "classic" form that has defined the lion's

share of scholarly attention. Therefore, the theoretical scope of this study

narrows to existing forecast models and findings from the rational action
research program.3

Several studies in the rational action program have argued that protest evolves differently in distinct contexts like Western democracies or
highly repressive authoritarian regimes (Muller and Weede 1990; Opp
1989, 256). A first step toward better theory, then, lies in understanding
each major type of political context. This research examines the revolu-

tions of 1989 through the theory of protest. It seeks to develop a model

for authoritarian regimes by investigating the collapse of two archetypal
repressive systems.
Forecasting Protest and Revolution

Theories of protest have been unable to predict significant challenges

to regimes. The most comprehensive attempt to develop this capability
was conducted by Gurr with Duvall (1973) and especially with Lichbach
(1979, 1982, 1986). Gurr and his colleagues sought "to determine whether

and how well empirical theories of conflict can make forecasts, past,
present or future, of some quantifiable properties of internal conflict"
(Gurr and Lichbach 1986, 5).
The problems that have plagued attempts to forecast protest and
revolution stem primarily from the intrinsic complexity of political conflict processes (see Kuran 1991). Nonetheless, methodological factors

have also played a role in the tenuous performance of existing theories

and models. Recent methodological work suggests three particularly rele-

vant guidelines for the cases in this analysis: (1) emphasize disaggregated,
longitudinal research; (2) specify dependent variables that are system-

specific and functionally equivalent across cases; (3) incorporate the international dimension into any theory of revolution. Below, I explicate
each of these perspectives.
Longitudinal, Disaggregated Samples
Protest and revolution unfold as processes over time and are strug-

gles between at least two contending groups. The strategy of each affects

the evolution of the conflict. Tsebelis and Sprague (1989, 550) argue that
cross-sectional analysis is inappropriate for the analysis of such conflict
3Moshiri (1991) surveys the evolution of a broad range of revolution research.

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666 Ronald A. Francisco

processes.4 Therefore, they developed a dynamic model and recom-

mended "always employing data over time." Snyder (1978, 528) similarly
advised "shifts toward 'disaggregated' treatment, both theoretically and
empirically. No theoretical explanation as currently formulated is univer-

sally valid." Snyder particularly stressed the measurement of core concepts at the appropriate level of analysis.
System-specific, Functionally Equivalent Indicators

Disaggregation can be conducted in small pooled samples, but this

study retreats to two cases of single-country analysis. Nonetheless, concern over comparative theory still guides the research. Przeworski (1987,
32) notes: "If one purpose of cross-national research is to replace proper
names of countries by explanatory variables, then a study of a single
country is cross-national as long as it takes a system-level variable to be

a cause of some intra-specific patterns of behavior." The key is to avoid

what Sartori (1991, 247) calls "single-country studies in vacuo." Increasing the variation among the countries investigated brings the benefit of

greater generality but requires the use of system-specific, functionally

equivalent indicators, particularly for the dependent variable. In this analysis, the revolutions of the GDR and Czechoslovakia evolved differently,
but in both cases the dependent variable (protest) reflects a desire to
replace a communist regime with a responsive alternative.

System-specific indicators are an alternative to the use of complex

indices by Gurr, Hibbs, and others (see Rule 1988; Snyder 1978; Muller
and Weede 1990). The impetus for such aggregation came largely from
the demands of diverse cross-sectional samples. Focusing on several
countries-one at a time-opens a rich lode of contextual details about
the internal development of groups and dissidence.
The International Dimension

The revolutions in Eastern Europe challenge existing theories: they

were mostly peaceful; they transformed protest into rebellion; and they
were interdependent. The most important common element, though, was
international: the repeal of the Brezhnev doctrine. The revolutions in
Eastern Europe would have erupted earlier without the Soviet constraint.

The international dimension has been neglected by traditional re-

search on protest and revolution (Snyder 1978). As Tsebelis and Sprague

(1989, 552) contend, "it is as unrealistic to suppose that state coercion
is unconstrained (depends only on revolutionary activity) as it is to sup4Cross-national analyses rest on untenable assumptions: (1) revolutionary processes
are at equilibrium everywhere and (2) cross-country differences may be safely ignored.

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THEORIES

OF

PROTEST

667

pose that revolutionary activity depends solely on relative deprivation.

The classic form of resource support is foreign aid to repressive regimes."
The Revolutions

Contextual features of the GDR and Czechoslovak revolutions have

a bearing on the choice of variables and indicators for models of protest.

They are reported briefly, with particular emphasis on the role of strategy
by the contending forces.5
The GDR's pioneering revolution was planned by dissidents in

church-affiliated groups who were impressed by the ability of the Philippine people peacefully to overthrow a repressive regime. For years dissi-

dents in Leipzig maintained a local institution: the Monday evening

march. They were risk-averse, but they maintained a keen sense of the
mood and strength of the regime. The erosion of authority took place on
two fronts in the GDR. First, citizens fled by the thousands through
Hungary and from embassies in Czechoslovakia and Poland in August,
September, and October. Second, with Soviet inaction, the risk-averse
GDR population began to demonstrate in large numbers.
Demonstrations and the Power of Numbers

The regime found few substantive grounds on which to assail the

demonstrations. Regular Monday evening demonstrations in Leipzig had
defined a modus vivendi between the dissidents and the authorities. Protestors did not challenge socialism. They proceeded from moderate to
more radical demands, always within the boundaries that had been established in the USSR itself (e.g., free elections). This strategy is captured
in DeNardo's (1985, 79) logic of peaceful protest: "No peaceful strategy
wins a bigger concession than the most radical of the successful, minimalist strategies."

The reaction of the regime to the growing success of the dissidents'

peaceful strategy was to strike hard and punish the demonstrators. These

old tactics failed to stop the demonstrations. Instead, they grew larger,
and once the number of demonstrators reached 70,000, GDR security
authorities did not attempt to stop them.
The revolution in Czechoslovakia began to build momentum after
the Soviet military failed to intervene in the GDR. At the core of dissident
politics in Czechoslovakia was the redress of the suppression of the 1968
5For more complete accounts of the revolutions, see Ramet (1991, esp. 291-346). The

GDR revolution is covered more fully in Wallach and Francisco (1992, chap. 3). Eisenstadt
(1992) places the 1989 revolutions in historical context.

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668 Ronald A. Francisco

Prague Spring. The ultimate goal of Vaclav Havel and other dissidents

was to remove the Stalinist leaders who ousted Dubcek and to restore a
responsive government. The Czechoslovak regime was in the end even

more staunchly resistant to reform than the GDR. Its desperate attempt
at self-preservation led to higher levels of violence and repression. The
turning point came on 17 November when dissidents transformed a statesponsored rally into the largest antiregime demonstration since 1968. Riot

police killed one demonstrator and injured 17. Public revulsion to the
regime's actions took active form in growing demonstrations and political
strikes. After 20 November, the arrests stopped, but the regime held out

in the face of massive protests until 10 December.

What Level of Resistance Gains Concessions?
Table 1 lists the cumulative dissident mobilization that preceded sig-

nificant political concessions by the Czechoslovak and GDR regimes.

DeNardo's (1985) formal measure is the percentage of the population
mobilized. It is impossible to determine how many people attended multiple demonstrations. The best available indicator, then, is the cumulative
total dissident mobilization in demonstrations and strikes as a percentage

of the total population. In the GDR, this includes refugees.

In this arena too, the differences between the two revolutions are

stark. Most Czechoslovak protest events followed the GDR revolution.

The Prague regime, left to its own devices by the USSR, displayed greater
stubbornness than the GDR. The decision to open the borders in the
GDR was a concession equal to the resignation of the leadership. Faced
with continuing waves of refugees and massive demonstrations, the new
communist leadership of the GDR saw no alternative to the surrender of
its control of emigration. The fact that large demonstrations continued

after the opening of the wall persuaded the new party leaders to resign.
In Czechoslovakia, though, Gustav Husak held out until (cumulatively)
more than half of the country's population had actively rejected the
regime.
Macrotheories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989

With the methodological guidelines and context established above,

we turn to the formulation and testing of six related models of protest.

All are based upon the theory of protest that has performed best in one
set of empirical applications (Gurr and Lichbach 1979), augmented by
recent advances in rational action research. Models from these theories
are adapted for the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Refinements to these mod-

els arise from contextual features either in the Soviet bloc generally or
in one of the countries.

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THEORIES OF PROTEST 669

Table 1. Levels of Dissident Mobilization Preceding Regime Concessions

Czechoslovakia

GDR

Cumulative

Cumulative

Dissidentsa

Dissidentsa

Concession

Concession

Arrests stop 1.03 Arrests stop 12.62

Minor leaders resign 11.42 Honecker resigns 13.26
Amnesty and

resignations 17.88
Borders open 21.69

Husak resigns, party Party surrenders

surrenders power 61.08 power 29.04
aCumulative demonstrators, strikers (in Czechoslovakia), and refugees (in the GDR) as a
percentage of total population.

The Mobilization of Discontent Model

A leading empirical theory of protest is Gurr and Lichbach's (1979)

complex model of the mobilization of discontent. One test of the forecasting ability of protest theories was performed by Gurr and Lichbach (1986)
using two sets of cross-sectional data, a pre-1971 base set to "predict"
conflict in another data set for 1971-75. Although this test provided weak
support for the mobilization model, it performed better than any alternative.

The mobilization of discontent model merges the relative deprivation

and organization strength orientations of Gurr and Tilly, respectively

(Gurr and Lichbach 1979, 157): "The fundamental axiom of the theoretical system states that discontent, dispositions (toward conflict) and organizational strength are interactive: each contributes to the extent of challenges to the degree that others are present. Moreover, the organizational
strength of challenging groups cannot be assessed absolutely, but rather
must be judged relative to the strength of opponents." Formally, the
axiom is represented:

EPC = (PAi) (WDC) [(EoSd) -(OSI)1

z

where

EPC = the extent of open political conflict;

PAi = the intensity of individual potentials for action

(discontent);

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670 Ronald A. Francisco

DCi = the sum of individual dispo

OSd = the organizational strength of collectivities that mobilize
individuals disposed to conflict (dissident groups); and
OSa = the organizational strength of the strongest collectivity in

the society (ordinarily the regime).

This model has retained its relevance and performance because it
integrates the deprivation, mobilization, and rational action perspectives.
The term representing the relative difference in organizational strength is
an effective indicator of Tilly's (1978) mobilization concept. It also provides a test of the rational action position that protest increases when the
relative balance of force shifts to favor the dissidents.
Contextually Determined Adaptations
We now adapt the mobilization of discontent model for the GDR and

Czechoslovak revolutions. The dependent variable for both countries is

person-days of protest per 100,000 citizens per week in 1989. Two of the
independent terms in the Gurr-Lichbach model present special problems
in Eastern Europe. First, discontent was high throughout the region in
1989; therefore, discontent is treated as a constant. Second, coercion
kept antiregime activity low. Thus, the sum of individual dispositions to
take part in conflict is best measured indirectly as the level of coercion

applied by the regime (Muller and Weede 1990). In the GDR, this is the
percentage of demonstrators arrested per week. In Czechoslovakia,
where the police were more brutal, coercion is the percentages of arrests
and of injuries per week.6
The organizational strength component of the Gurr-Lichbach model

represents the size, cohesiveness, and coercive capability of each group.

This measure is consistent with recent empirical tests by rational choice
theorists. They stress the importance of expected utility estimations on

the part of dissidents (e.g., Opp 1989; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991).
The balance of force in Eastern Europe had for decades overwhelmingly

favored the regime. Citizens in the GDR and Czechoslovakia were especially attuned to the weakened position of their rulers wrought by the
reform movement in the USSR.

6Protest and coercion were coded from the 1989 editions of FAZ, FBIS, and NYT;
additional sources for the GDR were Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen and
Mitter and Wolle (1990). Because coercion is used as a deterrent, reported levels from a
week of confrontation were coded as persisting until the next encounter between regime
and dissidents. These data reflect only the coercion that was applied against groups. Both
regimes employed more sinister tactics at the individual level (e.g., permanently removin
children from dissident parents). See Vaclav Havel's statement in Brzezinski (1989, 111).

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THEORIES OF PROTEST 671

The GDR's dissident organizational strength is set at a base of 2,500,

the size of the church-affiliated dissident organization membership. In

May, 400,000 defied the regime by voting against its slate, an action
organized by dissident groups, thus providing a good estimate of the
extent of antiregime organizational strength. During the rest of the year,
challenging organizations grew by another 100,000.

Active dissident organization membership in Czechoslovakia was

large at the outset of 1989-almost 210,000. These were principally arts
groups, not active demonstrators. The total Czechoslovak dissident
strength grew only marginally the rest of the year.7
The regime's organizational strength base is the sum of its regular

and secret police forces, its military force, all Soviet forces in either

country, and all Kampftruppen, party members who formed a reserve riot

force. The Warsaw Pact repealed the Brezhnev doctrine on 7 July; the
USSR affirmed its commitment to this decision in October, thus removing
Soviet troops from the regimes' resource base. As demonstrations grew
larger, many Kampftruppen refused to act against the dissidents. By De-

cember half of the GDR security police was dismissed.8

The Basic Revised Model
The basic adaptation of the Gurr-Lichbach model for Eastern Europe
takes the form:

MODEL 1: PROTEST = COERCION + [(IOSd) - (OSr)],

where

PROTEST = person-days of protest per 100,000 per week;

COERCION = the percentage of demonstrators arrested per week
and in Czechoslovakia also the percentage of
police-inflicted injuries;

?Sd = the organizational strength of dissident groups; and

OSr = the organizational strength of the regime, which
includes the contribution of the Soviet Union.

The GDR revolution did not gather momentum until over 100,000
citizens had fled illegally to the West through third countries. They chose,
in Hirschman's (1970) terms, to exit when the opportunity arose, leaving

7The Czechoslovak organizational strength variables were coded from FAZ, FBIS,
NYT, Kurian (1989), Ramet (1991), and Starr (1989).

8The organizational strength variables for the GDR were coded from FAZ, Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Holzweil3ig (1985), Kurian (1989), Mitter and
Wolle (1990), NYT, and Starr (1989).

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672 Ronald A. Francisco

voice and loyalty choosers to define the fate of the regime. The sudden

wave of refugees was critical. Erich Honecker's regime made the right
to emigrate the transcendent issue in the country; from 1961 the state

alone could decide. The flood of GDR refugees that followed the opening
of Hungary's border to the West became a crucial test for the regime.

Refugees are thus added as an independent variable. Because the effect

of such massive emigration was delayed by reporting problems and organizational strictures (e.g., almost all marches in Leipzig took place on
Mondays), the dependent variable, protest, is measured as a function of
the independent variables for the previous week:
MODEL 2 (GDR ONLY):

PROTEST(,,,) = COERCION + (IOSd - OSr) + REFUGEES,

where

PROTEST(t+ 1) = PROTEST lagged one week;

COERCION = percentage of demonstrators arrested;
REFUGEES = GDR citizens fleeing per week.

Protest-specific Models
When attempting to forecast only the extent of protest, Gurr and

Lichbach depart from their general model. They add a term for the extent
of democracy in the regime and limit the organizational strength variable
to the dissidents. Since the GDR and Czechoslovak regimes were brought
down largely by relentless demonstrations involving hundreds of thou-

sands of protesters, this specialized Gurr-Lichbach model is tested. However, since the democracy score for both countries was constant and one

of the lowest in the world (Gurr 1989), it is omitted. Once again, the

context of the GDR revolution requires the addition of refugees.

MODEL 3: PROTEST = COERCION + OSd.
MODEL 4 (GDR ONLY):

PROTEST(,+,) = COERCION + 0Sd + REFUGEES.

A Model for Authoritarian Systems

Because protest in a repressive regime is a process that unfolds over

time, the regime holds a range of policy choices: coercion, co-optation,

or concession. Co-optation is difficult to measure, but concessions can be
represented in a model as a binary variable, since in any given time period
a regime does or does not accept at least one dissident demand. Rational
action research suggests that concessions should rival coercion as a factor
that affects the course of a protest campaign. Protesters do not always

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THEORIES OF PROTEST 673

share the same goals as activists. An insightful regime might try to grant
concessions sufficient to satisfy the broad mass of demonstrators, if not
the protest leaders. In such a situation, dissident organizations face a
variant of the "unraveling problem" (see Johnson 1990).

From the rational action perspective, then, I construct a final variant

of the Gurr-Lichbach mobilization model. First, add a term that represents the concessions made by the regime to the dissidents. The sign of
this term, like coercion, might vary from case to case, but it seems hard

to deny that it is a critical factor in the evolution of a protest-based

rebellion. Second, given the inherent difficulty in measuring the individual dispositions for conflict, why not simply drop the whole term for

authoritarian regimes?9 Even in tyrannies that seek to wall out the rest
of the world (e.g., Albania), there is evidence that the people learn
enough to resent strongly the repression they endure. In such cases (e.g.,

North Korea or Myanmar), we might not be able to assume dispositions

to conflict-but neither could we easily measure it. Other variables, par-

ticularly differences in organizational strengths, should provide a significant statistical explanation in the East European cases without the deprivation and disposition term.

The following model represents the integration of these factors. It

applies only to protest in authoritarian countries:

MODEL 5:

PROTEST(t+l) = COERCION + [(ROSd- OSr)] + ACCEDE,

where

PROTEST(,+ 1) = person-days of protest per 100,000 population

lagged one time interval;

COERCION = system-specific measure of regime coercion (e.g.,

arrests, injuries, censorship, or executions);

?Sd = the organizational strength of dissidents,

including any international enhancement;

OSr = the organizational strength of the regime,

including any international enhancement; and
ACCEDE = a dummy variable representing accession to

dissident demands.
Results

The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 2.

The fact that the data are time series raises the inherent possibilit

9See the discussion of the Gurr-Lichbach mobilization of discontent model abov

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674 Ronald A. Francisco

Table 2.A. Parameter Estimates for the GDR

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

COERCION 3.019 -.6114 -2.2449 -.8329 .5075

(.381) (- .087) (- .272) (- .124) (.073)

OSNET

.00231*

(2.921)

OSd

.00197

REFUGEES

.00001

(-.018)

-.00001
(1.122) (- .123)

.0821*

.08389*

(4.300)
ACCEDE

.000114
(.436)

(5.317)

.061610*
(3.263)

1,076.24*
(2.678)

Model OLS R2 Corrected R2 Root MSE

1

.1795

.6682

.4577

.7653

855.83

743.86

.0363

.6303

903.41

.4599

.7798

735.03

.5950

.7915

709.42

Note: GDR results are Yule-Walker estimates correcting for autocorrelation. OSNET is the
net difference in organizational strength. ACCEDE is a dummy variable reflecting regime
concessions. T-values are in parentheses below each parameter.
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.

autocorrelation. The Czechoslovak data show no significant problem, but

the error term of the GDR data is autocorrelated. Thus, in the tables
below, the Czechoslovak results reflect ordinary least squares analysis,

but the GDR findings are corrected Yule-Walker estimates.1"

Time series generally provide better fit than cross-sectional data.
Thus, it is not surprising that the results in Table 2 exceed the value

found by Gurr and Lichbach (1986, 17): R2 = .67 for the GDR; .21 for
Czechoslovakia versus .18 in Gurr and Lichbach's cross-sectional sample. Introducing refugees into the GDR model (2) with a lagged dependent
'0The Yule-Walker, or two-step full transform correction method, is used in all reported
findings. The Yule-Walker method is a stepwise procedure that corrects for AR(l) and
higher order autoregressive error (see Harvey 1981). Models 1 and 3 indicated only firstorder autocorrelation. The autoregressive parameters of models 2 and 4 were significant at
the second order. Model 5 exhibited first- and third-order autocorrelation. The GDR data
also were analyzed with the maximum likelihood and unconditional least squares methods.
Both of these provided estimates consistent with or higher than the Yule-Walker values.

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THEORIES

OF

PROTEST

675

Table 2.B. Parameter Estimates for Czechoslovakia

Variable

Model

Model

Model

COERCION -478.23 -411.244 -248.5

(-.0949)

OSNET

(-.850)

.03837*
(3.258)

OSd

(-.48)

.02662

(1.928)

.2811464*
(3.772)

ACCEDE

5,504.029
(1.591)

Model OLS R2 Root MSE Prob > F

1

.2940

5,349

.0012

.3423

5,063

.0001

.3751

5,035

.0001

Note: OSNET is the net difference in organizational strength. ACCEDE is a dummy variable
reflecting regime concessions. T-values are in parentheses below each parameter.
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.

variable raises R2 to .76 and wrests from the mobilization variable the
role of the most significant factor in the equation.

Models 3 and 4 reflect the Gurr-Lichbach equation for the extent of

protest. Model 3 provides the lowest values for the GDR (RJ2 = .63), but
raises Czechoslovak results to almost their highest level: R2 = .34.
Model 5 adapts the extent of protest model to the GDR's different refugee-triggered revolution. It outperforms even model 2 (R2 = .78).
The adaptation of the mobilization model for authoritarian systems

(model 5) generates higher statistical confirmation than the other models.

It then becomes the model of choice for two attempts at forecasting.
Forecasts of Protest Levels
Table 3 shows the actual and predicted number of protesters (per

100,000 population) for the weeks of heaviest protest in 1989. Predictions

are based on the authoritarian mobilization model (5) for the full year.
Table 4 shows the same values, but its parameters are calculated on only

the first 42 weeks of data in the GDR and the first 45 in Czechoslovakia.
These points follow the rise in protest but predate the massive levels that
developed in later weeks. The forecast error is large in both tables but
understandably better for the GDR, where protest levels are better explained by model 5.

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676 Ronald A. Francisco

Table 3. Forecasting Results for the Authoritarian Mobilization Model

Case Actual Protest Predicted Protest Forecast Error

Czechoslovakia
43
44
45

0
0

744.11

3,738.52

656.18

46

5,353.43

10,390.05

47

41,995.50

744.11
3,738.52

6,456.77

11,784.24

4,697.25
-

3,933.28

30,211.26
7,917.58

48

3,866.66

11,784.24

49

3,796.24

11,784.24

7,988.00

50

3,796.24

11,784.24

7,988.00

GDR

43

4,460.37

44

7,926.83

45

3,579.27

1,793.24

3,626.25
2,342.13

46

2,250.00

47

2,115.85

2,667.13

-4,300.58
-

1,237.14

2,344.41
2,344.41

94.41

228.56

48

1,817.07

3,639.91

1,822.84

49

2,134.15

3,639.91

1,505.76

50

1,393.29

3,639.91

2,246.62

Attempting to forecast protest in the most intense weeks of the revolution deliberately sets a difficult task. Forecasts are most accurate when
observation t + 1 is close to the mean for the time series. Here we have

the obverse: unprecedented levels of sustained protest. Still, they are not

atypical of unstable political events that arise precipitously and maintain

intensity for a relatively short period. While the forecast error is large,

all four equations predict historically high levels of protest-higher than

any previous week in 1989.

Protest is a difficult dependent variable to forecast. Most empirical

studies of protest and revolution use other measures, especially political

deaths (e.g., Muller and Weede 1990). Two obstacles confront the prediction of protest. First, it is multidimensional. Gurr and Lichbach (1986,
21) point out that the presence of political strikes inhibits the performance

of forecasting models. This was not a problem in the GDR, but a good
deal of the protest in Czechoslovakia took the form of a long-term student

strike in universities and secondary schools and a one-day protest strike

involving 6 million citizens. Such spikes in protest activity challenge any

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THEORIES

OF

PROTEST

677

Table 4. Ex Ante Forecasting

Case Actual Protest Predicted Protest Forecast Error

Czechoslovakia
P = 134.2882 + 5.3845 COERCION + .001702* OSNET - 45.25 ACCEDE
(3.96)

(.706)

46

10,390.05

47

41,995.50

(6.644)

355.56

310.32

(-

.611)

10,034.48

-41,685.18

48

3,866.66

310.32

3,556.34

49

3,796.24

310.32

3,485.92

50

3,796.24

310.32

3,485.92

GDR
P(1+1) = 397.395 + 2.68 COERCION + .00065* OSNET
(2.96) (1.29) (2.83)

+ 64.1 ACCEDE + .0072 REFUGEES

(.28) (.564)

43

4,460.37

572.97

3,887.40

44

7,926.83

788.50

7,138.33

45

3,579.27

724.43

2,854.84

46

2,250.00

737.48

-1,512.52

47

2,115.85

737.48

-1,378.37

48

1,817.07

49

2,134.15

50

1,393.29

866.81

866.81

866.81

-950.26

-1,267.34

526.48

Note: OLS regressions based on 45 cases in Czechoslovakia and 42 in the GDR. (No
significant autocorrelation exists in this GDR analysis.) T-values are in parentheses.
*p < .05.

statistical model. Second, protest in authoritarian regimes is generally

discouraged by coercion. Thus, there is often, as in these cases, no regular pattern of previous demonstrations that can form the basis for a statistical model.

Nonetheless, the revolutions of 1989 and their recent counterparts

show the importance of protest. Large public demonstrations launched
every revolution. The results of this exercise in forecasting demonstrate
that, at least for these cases, it is possible to predict the trend toward
large-scale protests given particular changes in the application of coercion, the relative strength of dissidents, and the willingness of the regime
to compromise.

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678 Ronald A. Francisco

Discussion

The models in this analysis performed better for the GDR than for

Czechoslovakia. The sudden rise of protest and the tenacity of the Prague
regime probably account for some of this difficulty, but it may also be
necessary to expand the notion of an international dimension. One of the
best single predictors of Czechoslovak protest is the amount of East
German protest four weeks earlier. It is clear that these revolutions are
linked. A contagion model might explain this facet of the Czechoslovak
and subsequent East European revolutions.
The results of this study indicate that one can enhance the explanation of antiauthoritarian protest by merging rational action perspectives
with more traditional mobilization measures in an integrated model. Attempts to forecast high levels of protest were less successful. Forecast
error was large in all cases, but the models were able to provide a general
prediction of high, historically unprecedented levels of sustained protest.
Perhaps no linear model can fully explain processes that often take the
form of pulses on historical dates and reactions to unexpected events.
Further work on the process of domestic conflict should confront the
nonlinear, event-driven character of most revolutions.
Manuscript submitted 11 November 1991
Final manuscript received 15 July 1992
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