Here I would like to discuss the case of

the rise of Japan, from 1960s

to 1990s.
This case is important, in the sense
that Japan has become a major economic
power.
Without challenging the military position
of the hegemonic
power, which is of course the United
States.
The first
question here is what were the causes that
led to Japan's economic rise?
Now you might want to think that Japan
wanted to
regain both economic and military power
after the Second World War.
And it was only because the United States
did not allow Japan to expand
into military spheres that Japan's
military capability was limited.
That is not the case.
As a matter of fact, the focus on economic
power became possible precisely because
Japan tried to use the military capability
of the United States for her defense.
One of the earliest examples of this
policy is shown in the documents of
[FOREIGN],
or the study group on post-war matters.
Which was one of the study groups
inside the ministry of foreign affairs.
The argument is a very simple one.
Japan destroyed herself by waging a major
war
against the international community,
including the United States.
The economy was weak in Japan, and
military expansion
further weakened Japan's economic
position.
What is important after losing the war is
economic recovery.
But that cannot be possible if Japan tries
to put so much natural resources in
military building.
Using the military alliance with the
United States, remember, this is 1946,
this was even before the alliance.
Using the military power with United
States was one solution to this question.
By relying on American military power,
Japan
could somehow achieve her defense on the
cheap.
And somehow use the resources that may
have
been used for military purposes to
economic recovery.

So one of the major causes that led to

Japan's economic rise was essentially a
focus on economic resources.
And to the, the effect of
relatively neglecting the expansion of
military capability.
So I'm not arguing that everybody
supported this policy.
But this became, essentially, the main
line policy followed by Prime Minister
Yoshida and afterwards.
So therefore it, it was not a coincidence
that Japan became a major economic
power, and still did not become a major
military power.
Now this was not the problem between Japan
and the United States.
So long as Japan was still a minor power,
both in economy and military.
A weak Japan was still relatively stronger
in terms of economy.
in the post-war years in the region,
for Japan was still an advanced industrial
country
in East Asia.
And Japan served the role of a very
reliable ally for
the United States, for example, in the war
in the Korean peninsula.
But as Japan's economy starts to develop,
and challenge the position of the United
States in the international market, then
it's a series of trade conflicts.
As shown in the diagram,
Japan's relative increase in GDP went hand
in hand with a more or less stagnating
expenditure on the military.
From the American viewpoint, this was seen
as free-riding.
The Japanese are using the Americans, the
American forces, so that the Japanese can
take, take the opportunity and expand her
economy and challenge American economy.
And then eventually even take over the
global hegemonic position in the economy.
So, this policy
of relying on American military capability
for defense and focusing on
economic development became more and more
unsustainable in the 1960's.
With the competitive Japanese economy, we
had a series of
trade conflicts that started with the
textile conflict in the 1960's.
And now all the way into the 1990's, when
we had a semiconductor conflict.
All of these were characterized by the
relative competitive advantage of
Japanese economy, as opposed to the
declining competitive advantage of

American economies.
And there was no way that the United
States could
change on that competitive position, but
United States could exert pressure
on the Japanese government.
So that the flooding of Japanese goods in
the American market could be restrained.
And also the United States was started to
expand to, to strengthen
pressure on the Japanese government for
more expenditure on defense purposes.
The argument was that the United States
would no longer allow free
riding, over American hegemony.
Now, to this extent, this was not
really against the interest of the
Japanese government.
For so long as the Japanese government can
rely on a strong relationship with the
United States.
And so long as Japan could, Japan stays in
that alliance framework,
managing trade conflicts in between the
United States and Japan was not a major
issue, to the stability of East Asia or
Japan's foreign policy.
It was, there was a cost, eventually, paid
by the Japanese government.
For example, in the textile, conflict
between U.S. and Japan,
the Japanese government, paid a large some
of money, for,
for destroying some of the textile
machines.
So it did a company government, government
scheme, and also and occasionally the
Japanese government helped by some new
generation of, airplanes,
battleships, from the United Ships, in a
way to somehow
make up for the trading balance between
the US and Japan.
But the more important question, is here,
is that Japan's management
of trade issues with the United States did
in no
way jeopardize the stability of East Asia.
The question
here, did Japan's economic rise lead to
geopolitical instability?
And the answer is a very straightforward
no.
In any case of trade conflict between US
and Japan, do
we see a major retreat of the United
States from Japan?
There was always talk that if Japan keeps
on free
riding on American hegemony, then the

Americans will pull out.

Would not allow the Japanese to rely on
security assurances.
But to do that, would actually decrease
Americas influence in East Asia.
And this works against American interests.
On the Japanese side, on the Japanese side
there was always this fear of abandonment,
that the United States would no longer
provide security to Japan.
And although there was much awareness
about that possibility, the relationship
between trade conflict and abandonment in
alliance issues, alliance
relationship was not a real concern on
both sides of the Pacific.
It was only, it was only when the end of
the Cold War changed
the geopolitical picture of the region
dramatically
that geopolitical instability starts to
show its face.
For Japan was no longer a necessary ally,
when Russia,
became a list of an enemy to the United
States.
There was anxiety
over the role of Russia in the post Cold
War world.
But Russia was no longer a communist power
and China was still not a major military
power.
So there was little reason for the United
States to be concerned about instability
in East Asia.
But then, from the Japanese viewpoint, the
rise of
China did pose a major geopolitical
challenge to Japan.
And because China was rising, and Japan
needed more support from the United
States.
So there was a certain geopolitical
instability
that emerged after the end of the Cold
War, but a point here is that it had
nothing to do with Japan's economic rise.
And the irony is that this geopolitical
instability somehow took place
at the same time when Japan's economic
position in the international market
started to erode.