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On March 15, 1943, Nava and his wife asked for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision and the trial
court, on March 24, 1943, ordered the clerk of court to issue
the corresponding writ of execution.
In their appeal, Agatona and her husband make the
following assignment of errors:
"I. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint
on the ground of res judicata.
"II. The lower court erred in not holding that the
present action is premised on a different cause of
action and that new facts like the withdrawal of the
redemption money after the decision had become
final, failure to register the decision and to cancel
TCTs in the name of Agatona Geronimo and cause
issuance of new ones in Nava's name and/or to
request issuance of writ of execution, etc., may be
presented and proven and are not barred by the
first case.
"III. The lower court likewise erred in not holding that
the judgment rendered in civil case No. 8071 as
confirmed by the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 21, 1942, is expired, and
cannot constitute a bar to present action for it is
itself barred by prescription and by laches after
almost 15 years for defendants' failure (1) to
execute the judgment, (2) to register the decision in
the office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
(3) to cancel the certificates of title in the name of
plaintiff Agatona Geronimo, (4) to cause the
issuance of new ones in the name of Jose Nava and
that the registration of titles since 1938 in Agatona
Geronimo's name created an indefeasible title on
her.
"IV. The lower court also erred in not holding that
defendant's withdrawal of the redemption money
deposited in the Cabanatuan Branch of the
Philippine National Bank for consignment is a
waiver of defendants' right to redeem the properties
involved and a loss of any right to said properties
defendants cannot have both the money and the
properties.
"V. The lower court also erred in not holding the
propriety of cancelling the annotations of lis
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and cause of action (30 Am. Jur. 914 I Moran p. 612, 1957
ed.)
In the present case, the parties are the same as those in
Civil Case No. 8071, except that after the death of Nava's
wife, Felisa Aquino, her children by Nava were substituted
as codefendants. The subject matter is the same in both
cases, namely, the four lots in litigation. However,
appellants Agatona and Inocencio dispute the identity of
the cause of action because in Civil Case No. 8071, what
was sought and decided therein was the right of Nava and
his wife to redeem the property in question, whereas, in the
present case, the complaint of plaintiffs
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No. 8071, not only allowed but even directed the tenant of
the house on the property to pay his rentals to Nava,
instead of to herself and when in 1945, she allowed Nava
to occupy the house when the tenant disoccupied it, and to
take possession of the whole property, her acts should be
construed as a recognition of the fact that the property,
though still in her name, was to be held in trust for Nava,
to be conveyed to him on payment of the repurchase price.
Such trust is an express one, not subject to prescription.
We may also hold that when the trial court in that Civil
Case No. 8071 declared in a decision that had become final
and executory, that Nava et al. had the right to redeem the
property, and ordered Agatona et al. to make the resale,
there was created what may be regarded as a constructive
trust, in the sense that although Agatona and her husband
had the naked title to the property by reason of the
certificates of title issued in their names, and which they
retained, nevertheless, they were to hold such property in
trust for Nava et al. to redeem, subject to the payment of
redemption price. Of course, it might be contended that in
the latter instance of a constructive trust, prescription may
apply where the trustee asserts a right adverse to that of
the cestui que trust, such as, asserting and exercising acts
of ownership over a property being held in trust. But even
under this theory, such a claim of prescription would not
prosper in the present case. As already stated, since 1944,
after the decision in Civil Case No. 8071 became final and
executory, Agatona evidently acquiesced in the decision
against her, so much so that thereafter, as already stated,
she suggested that the tenant of the house pay his rentals
to Nava instead of to her, meaning that Nava had a right to
said rentals. Not only this, but since May, 1945, when the
tenant left the house, Nava took possession thereof as well
as the land on which it was built, and has been occupying
the same up to the present time, exercising acts of
ownership over the same, and Agatona
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