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G.R. No.

90273-75 November 15, 1989


FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
David I. Unay, Jr. for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and
employment agency. T in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and
Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety
bond issued by petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was granted a license
to operate by the POEA.
Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez
filed with the POEA separate complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged
that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them.
Acting on the complaints, the POEA Administrator motu proprio impleaded petitioner Finman as party
respondent in its capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served upon Finman and
Pan Pacific. The return of the summons served on Pan Pacific at its official address registered in the
POEA records, showed that Pan Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of transfer or change of
address was furnished by Pan Pacific to the POEA as required under POEA rules. The POEA considered
that constructive service of the complaints had been effected upon Pan Pacific and proceeded
accordingly.
For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying liability and pleading, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that: (1) the POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being
vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts; (2) it (Finman) had not violated Articles 32 and
34 (a) of the Labor Code and complainants' claims had accrued during the suspension of the principal
obligor, Pan Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of action against Finman, since it was not privy to the
transactions between them and Pan Pacific and had not received any moneys from them; and (4) the
amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by them as deposits and not as placement fees.
A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at which time complainants presented their evidence.
Petitioner Finman, though notified of this hearing, did not appear.
On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an Order which, in its dispositive portion, said:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally complainants' claims as follows:
1. William Inocencio P6,000 .00
2. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .00
3. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00
Respondent agency is ordered to release Cardones' passport, the expenses or obtaining
the same of which (sic) shall be deducted from the amount of P2,000.00 as it appears
that it was respondent agency who applied for the processing thereof. The claim of Edwin
Hernandez is dismissed without prejudice.
For the established violations respondent agency is hereby imposed a penalty fine in the
amount of P60,000.00. Further, the ban earlier imposed upon it is herein reiterated.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of Labor insisting that: (1) the POEA had no authority
to implead petitioner as party respondent in the proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the POEA had
no authority to enforce directly the surety bond against petitioner. In an Order dated 3 August 1989, the
Secretary of Labor upheld the POEA Order appealed from and denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, raising much the same issues it had already ventilated before
the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is contended once again by petitioner Finman that the POEA had
no authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings commenced by private respondents: and that the
POEA was not authorized to require, in those same proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents'
claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of the surety bond issued by petitioner.
Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be dealt with together. They are, however, quite bereft of
merit and must be rejected.
Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and solidary nature of its obligations under its own surety
bond. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond is
joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's bond was posted by Pan Pacific in compliance with
the requirements of Article 31 of the Labor Code, which states that
Art. 31. Bonds. All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety
bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed
recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of employment
as appropriate.
The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or
direct payment from, or application of, the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury
covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied).
The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's obligations under the bond it issued are set out in broad
ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations:
Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. Upon approval of the application by
the Minister, the applicant shall pay an annual license fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post
a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P150,000.00 from a bonding company
acceptable to the Administration duly accredited by the Office of the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations
of the conditions for the grant and use of the license or authority and contracts of
employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Ministry and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the
condition that notice of garnishment to the principal is notice to the surety. 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching a copy of the bond it had issued to its Petition for
Certiorari, there can be no question that the conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific had posted
with the POEA include the italicized portions of Section 4, Rule 11, Book I quoted above. It is settled
doctrine that the conditions of a bond specified and required in the provisions of the statute or regulation
providing for the submission of the bond, are incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under that
statute or regulation, even though not there set out in printer's ink. 2
In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated
Article 32 of the Labor Code, as amended
Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee charging
employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has
obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such
fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid.

The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (Emphasis


supplied).
as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code:
Article 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee,
or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code 3 and the POEA Rules and
Regulations, 4 Pan Pacific had violated at least one of the conditions for the grant and continued use of
the recruitment license granted to it. There can, similarly, be no question that the POEA Administrator and
the Secretary of Labor are authorized to require Pan Pacific to refund the placement fees it had charged
private respondents without securing employment for them and to impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon
Pan Pacific. Article 36 of the Labor Code authorizes the Secretary of Labor "to restrict and regulate" the
recruitment and placement activities of agencies like Pan Pacific and "to issue orders and promulgate
rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of [Title I on "Recruitment
and Placement of Workers]," including of course, Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by workers," quoted
earlier. Upon the other hand, Section 13 of Rule VI, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations expressly
authorize the POEA Administrator or the Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to or in lieu of the
penalties of suspension or cancellation" of the violator recruitment agency's license.
If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the refunds claimed by them and to the POEA for the fine
of P60,000.00, and if petitioner Finman is solidarily liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms of the
bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to the private respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner
Finman asserts, however, that the POEA had no authority to implead it in the proceedings against Pan
Pacific.
We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly, petitioner Finman is a party-in-interest in, certainly a
proper party to, the proceedings private respondents had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal
obligor. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its new address and from
responding to the complaints, petitioner Finman may well I be regarded as an indispensable party to the
proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was an indepensable or merely a proper party to the
proceedings, we believe and so hold that the POEA could properly implead it as party respondent either
upon the request of the private respondents or, as it happened, motu propio. Such is the situation under
the Revised Rules of Court 5 and the application thereof, directly or by analogy, by the POEA can certainly
not be regarded as arbitrary, oppressive or capricious.
The fundamental argument of Finman is that its liability under its own bond must be determined and
enforced, not by the POEA or the Secretary of Labor, but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the
regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by petitioner's argument.
There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of a surety's liability under its bond
as to restrict that determination to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of
justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the second paragraph of Article 31 of the
Labor Code:
Art. 31. Bonds. ... ...
The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or
direct payment from, or application of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury
covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's
bond-to go to the Insurance Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to
collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution of claims against private recruitment and
placement agencies. The Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which some,

perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting
placement fees without securing employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks"
from those for whom employment is actually obtained, abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to
exploitative foreign principals, and so on. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA and its
predecessor agencies from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring
prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers' claims.
Clearly that public policy will be effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and
Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to make good on its solidary undertaking
in the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment or
employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety is given reasonable opportunity to
present any defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to set up. Petitioner surety whose liability
to private respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to
another or different procedure for determination or fixing of that liability than that which Pan Pacific is
entitled and subject to.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately
executory.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and
the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals decision2 dated
June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor Relations Commissions resolution
dated March 31, 2004,3 declaring respondents dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondents
three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the
NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorneys fees. 4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan.6
Joys application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a
placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged that in
her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked
to work as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport.13 She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation.14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission against
petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as

moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys
foreign principal.20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer].21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of ?70,000.00.22 As
evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of ?
20,360.00.23Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to
the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioners claims against it.26 It alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employers contractual obligations might be identified. 29 It further denied that it
assumed liability for petitioners illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys complaint. 31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there was
no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner. 33 The Labor
Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioners transfer of obligations to Pacific 34 and considered
the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondents complaint. 35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was
based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.39 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.40 There was no sufficient proof to show
that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees
for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. 44It
did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal
the Labor Arbiters decision not to rule on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in
the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorneys fees of
NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agencys motion for reconsideration 47 dated May 12, 2004 through a
resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition 49 for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commissions resolutions dated March
31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to
the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorneys fees. 51 The Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations
against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus:
Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we should point
out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the amount of NT$46,080.00,

which was based upon its finding that she was dismissed without due process, a finding that we uphold,
given petitioners lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in the proceedings below or before us.
Likewise we sustain NLRCs finding in regard to the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based
on the law; as well as the award of attorneys fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further proceedings,
for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioners third-party complaint against the
transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should
emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same
is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further
hearings on its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMEDin
accordance with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied in the last sentence. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition. 54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National
Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth
of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the alleged
existence of just causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that
respondent was inefficient in her work.55 Therefore, it claims that respondents dismissal was valid.56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoals accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time
respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoals
contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner.57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys petition is without merit. We find for respondent.
I
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joys dismissal.
The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. 58 They may
also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. 59 Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the
services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While the
law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not authorize the oppression or selfdestruction of the employer.62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is tempered with the employees right to security of
tenure.63 Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may
not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going
through the proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.
With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus.

Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since
Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country.
Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any
certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioners argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the
courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy. Here in the
Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article
XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
....
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine
for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness
would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts. 66 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines,
Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and that
they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners
contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is
within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or
overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the
Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in
this case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and
after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioners allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties 69 may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. 70 Failure to
show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer
has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the
standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employees performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow termination of the
employee only when there is just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his [or her] engagement.72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary employment.
That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed to all
employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary
employees fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires
that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his or her engagement so he
or she can adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards
upon which the employees qualifications will be evaluated will increase ones chances of being positively
assessed for regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employees work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on a
regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based
on that determination, and after complying with the due process requirements of notice and hearing, the
employer may exercise its management prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the

standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of
retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of character
or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on
allegations of the employers failure to communicate work standards that would govern ones employment
if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate. 73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employers work
requirements and was inefficient in her work.74No evidence was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were
violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her
work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties conflict as to the position held by
respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondents dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not
only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employers did not comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.75 The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. 76 One
of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her
dismissal.77 The other notice must [inform] the employee of the employers decision. 78 Aside from the
notice requirement, the employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard. 79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working on
June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed
of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion
of the employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of amounts
withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under

this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims
or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,
the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her]
personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas. The exception is when termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the
worker,80 which as we have established, is not the case. It reads:
SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. The repatriation of
the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency
which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or
charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport
of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the
principal and/or local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the
repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorneys fees
when the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commissions decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the three-month equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondents salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled that the
clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less 83 is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. 84

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. 85
We are aware that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this
mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global
services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de [sic] filed by
the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or
damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,
the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages
under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the appropriate
authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically
disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement
award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case provided under this section shall
subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed
period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any

such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence
of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondents termination from work in
1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their
proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause
already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals. At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment
in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner. Hence, there is a
necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to [p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.87 When cases become moot and academic, we do
not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are capable
of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working
abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical
clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise
its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as
to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases.
The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano.
Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships
that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added
expenses for further litigation that will reduce their hard-earned wages as well as add to the indignity of
having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been
followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties.
Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional. 90 The legislators intended a balance
between the employers and the employees rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment
agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as constitutional inSerrano.92

The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional. 93 However,
since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause as reinstated in Republic Act
No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.94
On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on
workers right to contract.95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. 96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 97 It is a guarantee
against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality.98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power to make distinctions and classifications. 99 In exercising
such power, it has a wide discretion.100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only
if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law
applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing
between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class. 103 A law that does not
violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable classification. 104
A reasonable classification (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class.105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixedperiod overseas workers and fixed-period local workers. 106 It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment
contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with
less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. 108
The Congress classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection. 110 Thus, this court in Serrano, [i]mbued with
the same sense of obligation to afford protection to labor, . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs. 111
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed in the same
manner.112 Their money claims were computed based on the unexpired portions of their contracts. 113The
adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally
dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of
their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with

fixed-term employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less
than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year
were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their
contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also found that the subject clause creates a sublayer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining
in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their
salaries for three months only.118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or substantial
distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money claims resulting
from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the
period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their
contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers right to security of tenure
is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than
nor less than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state
policy to protect the rights of workers without qualification as to the place of employment. 119 In both cases,
the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which they could have earned had they not been
illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and
disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment contract
of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and between
overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year left
in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that [overseas workers] are contractual employees
who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers 121 because it already justifies
differentiated treatment in terms of the computation of money claims. 122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims. 123 If anything, these issues justify an
equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classifications are not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to establish a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas
Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes.124 Further, we find specious the argument that reducing the
liability of placement agencies redounds to the benefit of the [overseas] workers. 125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of
protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivized by the reinstated
clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate our
overseas workers rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is decreased at the
expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period disregard other
opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in the
same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to

protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden
twist affecting the principal/employers liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs recovery in wrongful
dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section
10 read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies oversteps what it aims to do by
effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in
short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under
Section 10 cannot be an appropriate incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to
describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to
encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply
limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legallyimposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the laws intent to encourage
greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a
scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs the benefits accruing
to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken from the pockets of the OFWs to
whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the security
of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not
only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this
same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser
cost of dismissing a Filipino will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into account in
termination of employment decisions. . . .126
Further, [t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of
one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious. 127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it
deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose. 128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance
with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondents
salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which
an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional
provision of law.129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the

interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies in this case.
The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions
governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2
of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six
percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are
hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing legal
interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court
is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annumfrom such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall
not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. 131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the

judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013. 132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates, 133 these interest rates do not apply
when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. [A] Central Bank Circular cannot
repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers
are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Since
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No.
799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees
from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate
applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. The contracting parties need not repeat them.
They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter. 135 There is, therefore, an
implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency and the overseas worker that in case the
overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount shall
be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for
reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract under
Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide
for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation in
the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the
finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that
facilitated respondents overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer
and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the
performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if
they were awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the states policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers
plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended by practical
and legal complications. The distance of the foreign employer alone makes it difficult for an overseas
worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible conflict of
laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas workers
attempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an
indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of an action. 137

The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these complications.
The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation.138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only one of the joint and several
debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas employment, either the local agency
or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign employers labor law violations.
This way, the overseas workers are assured that someone the foreign employers local agent may
be made to answer for violations that the foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in
law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer
may be enforced to the full extent139 against the local agent, the overseas worker is assured of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. 140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer
from the overseas worker to the local employment agency. However, it must be emphasized that the local
agency that is held to answer for the overseas workers money claims is not left without remedy. The law
does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has
made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making local agencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is that
an additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by
nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout against foreign employers that tend to
violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local agencies must already have
mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas
employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed a transfer
of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the respondent overseas
worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the resources to
determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
V
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the farthest and
most difficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where
they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract,
maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of
debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers,
who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country. While these workers may indeed have
relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to
burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason
why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for
the redress of their grievances.142
But it seems that we have not said enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times over; each of
their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see
their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all

grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and
many other gadgets and online applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and economic
crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of our
people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of material creations of this world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by limiting
the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by the foreign
employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas workers with what
they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as well.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse
respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorneys fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.
The clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990
EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA
VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al., respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San Vicente for petitioner.
NARVASA, J.:
In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of J &
B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond
was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein
petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves
. . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of
Labor in the penal sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY . . .
(Pl50,000.00) for the payment of which will and truly to be made, . . . (they bound
themselves, their) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and
severally . .
The bond stipulated that:
a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and observance of the . . . principal (J & B
Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties and obligations in accordance with all the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and with the terms
and conditions stipulated in the License;
b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY; 1

c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; and


d) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be automatically
cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not discovered
and presented to it in writing within said period of . . . from expiration and the obligee hereby expressly
waives the rights to file any court action against the Surety after termination of said period of . . . . above
cited. 2
As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the facts are as follows: 3
From June 1983 to December 1985 . . . thirty three (33) . . . (persons) applied for
overseas employment with . . . (J & B). In consideration of promised deployment,
complainants paid respondent various amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts
issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby Bundalian, Executive Vice-President of . . . (J & B).
Because of non-deployment . . . (the applicants) filed separate complaints with the
Licensing and Regulation Office of POEA against . . . (J & B) for violation of Articles 32
and 34 (a) of the Labor Code between the months of April to October 1985.
Despite summons/notices of hearing,, . . . (J & B) failed to file Answer nor appear in the
hearings conducted.
In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the
claims were not expressly covered by the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order
forfeiture of the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the period of
effectivity of the bond.
On September 8, 1986, the POEA Administrator issued the Order in favor of
complainants ruling thus:
After careful evaluation, we find that the receipts and testimonies of
complainants, in the absence of controverting evidence substantially
establish that respondent charged and collected fees from them in
amounts exceeding what is prescribed by this Administration.
Complainants' non-deployment strongly indicates that there was no
employment obtained for them. Hence, violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a)
of the Labor Code, as amended, is established against respondent. The
claims of complainants having arose (arisen) out of acts of the principal
covered under the surety (bond), the respondent surety is equally liable
therefor.
Except for complainants Ramos, Samson, de Leon and Rizada, whose claims were
transacted prior to the effectivity of the bond, . . . EASCO was declared jointly and
severally liable with . . . (J & B) to twenty-nine (29) complainants.
(The dispositive portion of the POEA Administrator's Order also contained the following
statement and direction, viz.:
Respondent was suspended on May 23, 1985, June 26, 1985 and
January 17, 1986 all for illegal exaction. Considering its track record of
illegal exaction activities and considering further the gross violation of
recruitment rules and regulations established against it in the instant
cases, and the expiration of its license on February 15, 1985, it is hereby
forever banned from participation in the overseas employment program.
It is ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in recruitment
activities otherwise it shall be prosecuted for illegal recruitment.')
(J & B filed a motion for reconsideration). On December 19, 1986, the then deputy
Minister of Labor and Employment denied the . . . Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit and affirmed the findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator finding no
reversible error therein.

On appeal by EASCO J & B having as aforestated taken no part in the proceeding despite due service
of summons the judgment was modified by the Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987,
disposing as follows: 4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister of
Labor dated December 19, 1986 affirming the Order of the POEA Administrator dated
September 8, 1986 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent J & B Manpower Specialist is
directed to refund all thirty-three (33) complainants as listed in the Order of September 8,
1986 in the amounts listed thereto with the modification that complainants Lucena
Cabasal and Felix Rivero are both entitled only to P15,980 and not P15,980
each. Respondent Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation is hereby found jointly and
severally liable with respondent J & B Manpower Specialist to refund nineteen (19)
complainants in the modified amounts . . . (particularly specified).
The other findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986
affirmed in the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister . . . are also hereby AFFIRMED.
This Order is FINAL. No further Motion for Reconsideration hereof shall be entertained.
It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to
19 named complainants (in contrast to verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which both ordered
payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was correspondingly reduced from P308,751.75 and US $
400.00 5 to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75. 6
The special civil action of certiorari at bar was thereafter instituted by EASCO 7 praying for the nullification
of the POEA Administrator's Order of September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy Minister of Labor
of' December 19, 1986, and the Order of the Secretary of Labor of July 1, 1987, It theorizes that:
1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees;
2) neither did the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction of the claims;
3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both the POEA and Secretary of Labor also committed
legal errors and acted with grave abuse of discretion when they ruled that petitioner is
liable on the claims.
EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question
because the same "did not arise from employer-employee relations." Invoked in support of the argument
is Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in part 8 that the POEA has
. . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment including seamen . . .
The complaints are however for violation of Articles 32 and 34 a) of the Labor Code. Article 32
and paragraph (a) of Article 34 read as follows:
Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.Any person applying with a private fee-charging
employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has
obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such
fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid.
The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees.
Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or
holder of authority:
a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance; . . .
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the
above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of
the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict
and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and

regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to
this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA 9 "on its own initiative or
upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . .
(authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or
authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any
fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and
regulations. 10
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension
of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister
the cancellation thereof." 11
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the
respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been
fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in
excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending
recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it
would leave the victims without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise
to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors.
Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that the recruiter and its victims are in pari delicto the
former for having required payment, and the latter for having voluntarily paid, "prohibited recruitment fees"
and therefore, said victims are barred from obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous, character of
the argument is evident upon the most cursory reading thereof; it merits no consideration whatever.
The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its argument that it should not be held liable for claims
which accrued prior to or after the effectivity of its bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had
conceded the validity of part of said argument, at least. The Secretary ruled that EASCO's "contention
that it should not be held liable for claims/payments made to respondent agency before the effectivity of
the surety bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken." According to the Secretary: 12
. . . A close examination of the records reveal(s) that respondent EASCO is not jointly and
severally liable with respondent agency to refund complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix
Rivero, Romulo del Rosario, Rogelio Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis, Francisco Sorato, Sonny
Quiazon, Josefina Dictado, Mario del Guzman and Rogelio Mercado (10 in all). These
complainants paid respondent agency in 1984, or before the effectivity of the bond on
January 2, 1985 as evidence by the reciept and their testimonies.
The related argument, that it is also not liable for claims filed after the expiry (on January 2, 1986) of the
period stipulated in the surety bond for the filing of claims against the bond, must however be rejected, as
the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave abuse of discretion in the Secretary's statement of his
reasons for doing so, to wit:
. . . While it may be true that respondent EASCO received notice of their claims after the
ten (10) day expiration period from cancellation or after January 12, 1986 as provided in
the surety bond, records show that . . . EASCO's principal, respondent agency, was
notified/ summoned prior to the expiration period or before January 12, 1986.
Respondent agency received summons on July 24, 1985 with respect to claims of
complainants Penarroyo, dela Cruz and Canti. It also received summons on November
26, 1985 with respect to Giovanni Garbillons' claim. Respondent agency was likewise
considered constructively notified of the claims of complainants Calayag, Danuco
Domingo and Campena on October 6, 1985. In this connection, it may be stressed that
the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has
been held that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent EASCO is to be

interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly in
favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v. American Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d. 626, 74 Am.
Jur. 2d).
So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly served with summons as regards a few of the
complaints must be rejected, the issue being factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error
invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion that summons had indeed been duly served.
Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its liability should be limited to the maximum amount set in
its surety bond, i.e., P150,000.00, is palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on it,
P140,817.75, supra, does not in fact exceed that limit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared to be
immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991
CLARITA V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDUL KARIM AL
YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Manuel T. Collado for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:p
Clarita V. Cruz** went abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her
future. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in
consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this
country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18,1988, after
completing her two-year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and
an angry grievance.
On March 23,1988, she filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its
foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her vacation
leave. She also claimed that she was charged a placement fee of P7,000.00 instead of the legal
maximum of only P5,000.00. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and required
her to work 18 hours a day. She was beaten up and suffered facial deformity, head trauma and decreased
sensation in the right portion of her body. On top of all this, she was paid only $120 per month and her
total salaries were given to her only three hours before her flight back to Manila. This was after the plane
she was supposed to take had left and she had to stay in the airport for 24 hours before her employer
finally heard her pleas and delivered her passport and ticket to her.
In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised the principal defense of settlement as
evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant on June 21, 1988. In this
document, she declared inter alia that
xxx xxx xxx
2. Thereafter going thoroughly over the facts of the case by reconciling our records, we
came to discover that it was only a plain case of misunderstanding on our part, and that
we have already settled our differences;
3. That I am no longer interested in further continuance of the above case against EMS
Manpower & Placement Services either criminal, civil or administrative or whatever
nature as I hereby desist now and hereafter;

4. That I am executing this affidavit of desistance to attest to the truth of the foregoing
facts and circumstances and for the purpose of asking the dismissal of my said complaint
against EMS Manpower & Placement Services.
On the basis of this affidavit, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed her
complaint in a decision dated May 16, 1989. This was affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in its resolution dated December 28, 1990, reconsideration of which was denied on
February 21, 1991.
The petition now before us faults the POEA and the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for having
upheld the Affidavit of Desistance. Cruz rejects the settlement as having been obtained from her under
duress and false pretenses and insists on her original claim for the balance of her salaries and vacationleave pay at the agreed rate of P250.00 per month.
Her contention is that she was inveigled into signing the Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of
counsel. The "Attorney" Alvarado who assisted her was not really a lawyer but only a helper in the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Atty. Biolena, on the other hand, merely acknowledged the
document. Moreover, when she signed the affidavit, she was under the impression when she was
agreeing to settle only her claim for one month unpaid vacation leave, as the wording of the receipt she
issued on the same date showed, to wit:
June
21,
1988
Receipt
This is to certify that I received the amount of P2,400.00 from EMS Manpower &
Placement Services in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation leave.
(Sgd.) CLARITA V.
CRUZ
IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) O.G. ALVARADO
OWWA Legal Dept.
For its part, the private respondent argues that the petitioner is bound by her Affidavit of Desistance,
which she freely and knowingly executed. After all, she was not an ignorant and illiterate person but a
high school graduate who understood what she was signing. The due execution of the instrument must
also be sustained on the basis of the presumptions of regularity of official functions and of good faith.
Significantly, neither the private respondent nor the Solicitor General refuted the petitioner's submission
that the person who allegedly assisted her in the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance and explained to
her its content and meaning was not a lawyer but a mere employee in the OWWA. His status was merely
assumed but not established by the respondents although it was directly questioned. The comments of
the public and private respondents did not meet this challenge squarely.
It is no less noteworthy that the receipt the petitioner issued on the same day was only for "P2,400.00 . . .
in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation." This clearly shows that she was not waiving the rest of her
demands in exchange for that measly amount (which did not even really represent the commutable value
of the 1 month vacation leave at the rate of $250.00). In fact, the total claim of the petitioner is for
P88,840.00, itemized as follows:
a) P84,240.00, representing the salary differentials of $130 for 24 months (US $3,120.00
x P27.00).
b) P2,600.00, representing the balance of her vacation leave pay.
c) P2,000.00, representing her excess placement fee.
In Principe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Service, Inc., 1 this Court held:

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's
right over the death benefits of her husband, the fact that the consideration given in
exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the
quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy. The State must be firm in
affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low
and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate claim. Equity
dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this instance. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The following guidelines were likewise set in Periquet v. NLRC: 2
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in
to annul the questionable transaction. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the
Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the
disputable presumptions invoked by the private respondent, such assistance has not been established
against the petitioner's allegation that the "Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was not
even a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the
question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity between the amount of the
settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to
waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she did,
the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public policy.
It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the private respondent in the proceedings below that
it has no privity of contract with the petitioner, we have held in a long line of cases that the local recruiter
is solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all damages sustained by the overseas worker in
connection with his contract of employment. Such liability is provided for in Section 1, Rule II, Book II, of
the POEA Rules and Regulations, which we have consistently sustained.
This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the
lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially
necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better
life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.
The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because she usually works only by herself in a
private household unlike other workers employed in an open business concern who are able to share and
discuss their problems and bear or solve them together. The domestic helper is denied that comfort. She
has no companions in her misery. She usually broods alone. There is no one to turn to for help. That is
why we must carefully listen to her when she is finally able to complain against those who would rob her
of her just rewards and even of her dignity as a human being.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated December 28, 1990, and February 21, 1991, are SET
ASIDE, and the Affidavit of Desistance is DECLARED null and void. POEA Case No. 88-03-255 is
REMANDED to the POEA for further proceedings and expeditious resolution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON,
JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO,
GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO, NITA
BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA

BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL,


ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA,
NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA
NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging
employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong.
Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda
Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from
P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved
unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32
and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that
Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not
authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed
by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to
unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that
petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments
on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a
representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was leaving
behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants.
Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the
receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following
claims:
1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00
6. Elma Flores 2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00

17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00


18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00
19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00
20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00
21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00
23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby dismissed
in view of their desistance.
The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
5. Virginia Castroverde
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five
(5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of
sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of penalties, any
suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of
cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to
participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered
CANCELLED, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among
other things, that to deny it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would
jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and
livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally, it manifested
its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion
be denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of
petitioner's license pending resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January

30, 1992, however, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the
April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases,
including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the 1987
POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of
1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797 3 (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247), 4 the POEA
was established and mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development
Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas employment function of the Bureau
of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these
agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is
vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
provides:
Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority The Minister of Labor
shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees
for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of
Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board,
or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and
Letters of Instructions.
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor, 5 we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for
violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has
the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority,
conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rulemaking power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, 6 "on its own initiative
or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved
person, . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or
cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated
offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or
services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws,
rules and regulations. 7
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case of the
suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or
recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." 8 (Emphasis supplied)
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, 9 viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which
has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement
by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the
Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties
with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing
them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's explanation, to wit:
On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued
pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and
particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified
and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties
contains only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations
governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable
by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.
Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the
authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987
POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties. 10
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure
under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a
sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for
brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko
sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.
Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay

hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang


company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE
MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR.
POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL
NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New
Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under
existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs.
Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan
and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates
"due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution
which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others
(including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family,
and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties
belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the
color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan)
are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we
shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our
client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant
petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig
Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are
alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in
view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the
Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors
may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of
the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does
the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less
issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power
on the mayor has been abrogated, renderedfunctus officio by the 1987 Constitution which
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been

manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on
the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by
judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase,
"such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart
provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to
exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his
case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and
his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our
mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree
No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of
giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor
arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or
will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers
for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor
Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight
moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37
of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien)
ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of
deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in
matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes,
228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the
Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds
that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public
interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco
Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New
Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the
"WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"


and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the
Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation
of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the
crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of
our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of
non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order
of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized
as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 116382. January 29, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.


VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.

MA.

LOURDES

DE

GUIANG

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Accused-appellant Lourdes Bautista de Guiang was indicted before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Manila in three separate informations, one for Illegal Recruitment proscribed under Article 38 and
Article 39, in relation to Article 13(b) and (c), of the Labor Code, as amended, and the other two for estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The averments made by the City State Prosecutor in each
of the three respective Informations read:
In Criminal Case No. 92-104614 "That in or about and sometime during the period comprised between October 1991 and February 9,
1992, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and wilfully and
unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement in Japan to the following persons,
namely: Reynaldo R. Jugo, Jose R. Jugo and Rosita R. Jugo, without first having secured the required
license or authority from the Department of Labor." [1]
In Criminal Case No. 92-104615 "That in or about and sometime the period comprised between December 2, 1991 and February 9, 1992,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Jose R. Jugo in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Jose R. Jugo to the effect that she
had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as factory worker in Japan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and
by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Jose R. Jugo to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P70,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P70,000.00 which amount once in
her possession, with intent to defraud, she wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jose R. Jugo in
the aforesaid amount of P70,000.00."[2]
In Criminal Case No. 92-104616 "That in or about and sometime the period comprised between October 1991 and December 1991,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Reynaldo R. Jugo in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Reynaldo R. Jugo to the effect that
she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as factory worker in Japan and could facilitate
the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Reynaldo R. Jugo to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P20,500.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P20,500.00 which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, she wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Reynaldo R. Jugo in the aforesaid amount of P20,500.00."[3]
The court held a joint hearing of the cases following the plea by the accused of "not guilty" to all the
charges.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Appellee's Brief, made an extensive narration of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Thus "On the last week of October 1991, private complainant Reynaldo R. Jugo, a farmer, was visited by his
`kumpadre,' Alberto Maclang, a member of the Western Police District (WPD), at his house in Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija. Maclang was accompanied by appellant whom the former introduced to Reynaldo as a
recruiter for jobs abroad. Appellant talked with Reynaldo, convincing him that she could do something

about Reynaldo's previous application for a job abroad. She represented that she could work on his travel
papers within a period of two (2) months and he would be able to work in Japan as a factory
worker. Further, appellant told Reynaldo that he only had to produce the initial sum of P5,000.00 for the
immediate processing of his papers. Reynaldo thus signed the application form appellant presented to
him (TSN, September 8, 1992, pp. 2-4; TSN, August 18, 1992, pp. 3-5; TSN, February 8, 1994, p. 12).
"A week later, appellant and Maclang again went to see Reynaldo at his house in Nueva Ecija. They told
him that they would be the ones to first advance the amount of P5,000.00 to cover the expenses for the
initial processing of his papers, to which private complainant agreed (TSN, September 8, 1992, p. 4; TSN,
August 18, 1992, p. 5).
"Two (2) weeks after, Reynaldo who was still in Nueva Ecija, learned that appellant was trying to get in
touch with him relative to his application for a job abroad. So, he left Nueva Ecija and proceeded to the
house of Maclang at Naval Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. Maclang confirmed that appellant was indeed
looking for Reynaldo. He thus called up appellant and it was arranged that the three (3) of them would
meet at the headquarters of the Western Police District (WPD) at U.N. Avenue, Manila, sometime on
November 1991 (TSN, August 18, 1992, pp. 5-7).
"During the meeting at the WPD headquarters at U.N. Avenue, appellant asked Reynaldo to give her the
amount of P5,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Since Reynaldo had with him only P2,500.00, he
was able to give that amount only, for which appellant did not issue any receipt. Thereafter, the three (3)
of them proceeded to Ermita to take some snacks. In the course of taking their snacks, appellant was
trying to convince Reynaldo to look for persons interested to go abroad for employment and to refer them
to her. After they parted ways, Reynaldo returned to Nueva Ecija (TSN, September 8, 1992, p. 4; August
18, 1992, pp. 6-7).
"Subsequently, sometime on January 1992, Reynaldo was informed by appellant that his passport will
soon be released. She told Reynaldo to prepare the amount of P18,000.00 for his plane fare to
Japan. Reynaldo thus prepared that amount which he borrowed from his sister, Rosita Jugo. When
Reynaldo and appellant met at the house of Reynaldo's mother at Malabon, Metro Manila, he asked
appellant to issue him a receipt for the amount he was about to pay her. Appellant however refused and
replied that `it seems you do not trust me.' Feeling assured and trusting appellant, Reynaldo was
persuaded to hand to appellant the amount of P18,000.00 (TSN, August 18, 1992, pp. 7-8; February 22,
1994, pp. 11-12).
"Two (2) weeks after, appellant went to see Reynaldo at his house in Nueva Ecija. She presented him
with a passport issued in his name. However, verification with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
and the Japanese Embassy revealed that the passport given to him by appellant was a fake. When the
passport was likewise referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), it was also determined to be
a fake. Reynaldo was thus advised to file a complaint against appellant (TSN, September 8, 1992; p. 5;
TSN, August 18, 1992, pp. 8-10).
"Earlier, Reynaldo had introduced his brother, Jose Jugo, and their sister, Rosita Jugo, to
appellant. Almost simultaneously with appellant's transactions with Reynaldo, appellant also transacted
with Reynaldo's brother and sister. Jose and Rosita met appellant for the first time on December 2, 1991,
along with Alberto Maclang, the `kumpadre' of their brother, Reynaldo, and the alleged `second' husband
of appellant. They met at appellant's office at Tayabas, Tondo, Manila. Jose and Rosita were made to fill
up application forms after they were informed that they would be deployed as factory workers to Japan for
the consideration of P70,000.00 (TSN, September 8, 1992, pp. 6-8; TSN, August 18, 1992, p. 11; TSN,
September 22, 1992, pp. 2, 5).
"The following day or on December 3, 1991, Jose Jugo personally paid to appellant the first installment in
the amount of P2,000.00 at Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila. It was followed by subsequent installments
paid to appellant at her office at Tayabas, Tondo, Manila, in the following amounts:
2nd Installment - P 20,000.00
3rd Installment - P 10,000.00
4th Installment - P 18,000.00
5th Installment - P 2,000.00
6th Installment - P 18,000.00

Jose Jugo gave the last installment to complete the total amount of P70,000.00 on January 9,
1992. Appellant, however, did not issue any receipt for any of the above-stated amounts she received
from Jose Jugo. When the latter asked for receipts of payment, appellant countered that he seems to
have no trust in her (TSN, September 8, 1992, pp. 8-10; TSN, September 22, 1992, pp. 4, 6).
"After receipt of Jose Jugo's last installment on January 9, 1992, appellant handed to him a passport with
numbers 203409 issued in his name, bearing what appellant represented to be a visa to enable him to
work in Japan. Then, for several times, he was allegedly scheduled to depart for Japan but none of those
scheduled departures ever pushed through. When Jose caused the alleged visa to be verified by the
Japanese Embassy, and later by the Bureau of Immigration, it was determined to be a fake and the
alleged visa number a tampered one. The alleged passport was likewise determined to be fake (TSN,
September 8, 1992, pp. 10-12; TSN, September 22, 1992, p. 8).
"For her part, Rosita Jugo attested that she likewise gave the amount of P2,500.00 to appellant upon the
latter's assurance of a job placement in Japan as a factory worker. She gave the amount to appellant at
the latter's office at Tondo, Manila for which no receipt was issued to her. Rosita was also not able to
leave for Japan. Worse, appellant did not heed Rosita's request that her money be returned although
appellant had earlier executed an undertaking to return all the money she received from Rosita and
private complainants Reynaldo and Jose (TSN, October 13, 1992, pp. 2-4).
Verification from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) revealed that appellant was
not a licensed recruiter and a certification to that effect was issued. The Jugos referred the matter to the
NBI which conducted an investigation. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the City State
Prosecutor, Manila, which filed the cases at bar (TSN, October 13, 1992, p. 3).
"While trial was ongoing and before the prosecution could rest its case on September 25, 1992, appellant
escaped from her jail guard while under confinement at the UST Hospital.Consequently, the prosecution
adduced evidence in appellant's absence and the case was submitted for resolution. Appellant managed
to stay out of jail for one (1) year during which period, she made arrangements with private complainants
to pay them the amount of P120,000.00 through Alberto Maclang. It was only sometime on September
1993 when appellant was again apprehended by agents of the NBI. At her instance, the trial court
reopened the case to accord appellant the opportunity to present her defense. Appellant presented as
evidence an alleged affidavit of desistance which contents and due execution were, however, repudiated
and disclaimed by private complainant Reynaldo Jugo, the alleged affiant thereof (TSN, February 8, 1994,
pp. 19-21)."[4]
The defense had its own version. Counsel Felixberto C. de la Cruz, joined by Atty. Ma. Soledad
Derquito-Mawis, recited what the defense considered to be the brief factual settings of the three cases.
"At the time of the commission of the acts complained of, appellant Ma. Lourdes Bautista de Guiang was
a licensed contractor of a low-cost housing project earning a monthly net income ofP50,000.00
to P70,000.00 (Exh. 3; pp. 17-19, tsn. Feb. 8, 1994). Prior thereto, she operated business under the name
LGB Enterprises and General Services, earning P10,000.00 toP15,000.00 a month (Exh. 2; p. 2, tsn. Feb.
22, 1994). She had never been engaged in the processing of travel documents in recruitment basis (p. 5,
tsn., Feb. 8, 1996).
"On the other hand, private complainants, namely: Reynaldo Jugo, Jose Jugo and Rosita are brothers
and sister (p. 6, tsn., Aug. 18, 1996).
"Sometime in 1991, appellant and one Alberto Maclang went to Nueva Ecija to get the harvested rice of
the latter. When they were about to return to Manila, Maclang decided to visit his friend and compadre
Reynaldo Jugo. During this visit, Maclang and Reynaldo Jugo talked about the latter's lost passport and
visa. Reynaldo Jugo asked Maclang how he could retrieve said travel documents which were never
returned to him when he applied in the Japanese Embassy. Maclang, in turn, asked appellant if she could
help. Appellant replied that she will try her best through the help of a certain Mr. Salazar, her friend in the
Japanese embassy. Since Reynaldo Hugo had no money at that time, he promised to leave his stainless
jeep if she could cause the re-issuance of his lost [passport] and visa, subject to redemption upon his
return from Japan (pp. 3-6, Feb. 8, 1994).
"Subsequently, Maclang, introduced appellant to Jose Jugo who was also interested in applying for a
tourist visa for Japan. Thereafter, Reynaldo Jugo, Jose Hugo and Rosita Jugo directly transacted
business with Mr. Salazar for the issuance of their tourist visas (p. 8, tsn., Feb. 8, 1994). In the course of

the Jugos' transaction with Mr. Salazar, appellant received a call from Mr. Salazar informing her that the
Jugos were going to pay P40,000.00 for the processing of their passports and visas. Appellant received
the said amount from the Jugos but turned over the same to Mr. Salazar without a receipt (pp. 8-16, tsn.,
Feb. 8, 1994).
"Reynaldo Jugo and Jose Jugo received their respective passports and tourist visa but were found to be
fake. Appellant was thus arrested and subsequently charged of illegal recruitment and estafa on two
counts.
"On March 16, 1992, appellant she signed a promissory note (Exh. B-Reynaldo Jugo, Folder of Exhibits)
which reads: `Promise to pay Rosita Jugo the amount of P93,000.00 as payment for money received by
me for having failed to [send] them abroad;' else, the NBI would publish the incident in the newspaper and
report the same in the television (pp. 22-23, tsn., Feb. 8, 1994).
"After the filing the cases in court, Reynaldo Jugo executed an affidavit of desistance (Exh. 1, p. 77, Rec.)
stating that he filed the illegal recruitment case against appellant was really due to misunderstanding with
a request the case be dismissed."[5]
The RTC, Hon. William Bayhon presiding, convicted the accused on all counts. The respective
dispositive portions of its decision on the three jointly tried cases read:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Lourdes Bautista de Guiang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Violation of Art. 38 (a), Presidential Decree No. 1412, amending certain provisions of Book L, Pres.
Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Art. 13 (b) and
(c) of said code as further amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2018 and is sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of Life Imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000.00 as provided for by law
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency with respect to the fine but in no case shall it exceed
1/3 of the principal penalty.
"Likewise the Court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in the other two
cases.
"In Criminal Case No. 92-104616 for Estafa involving P20,500.00, she is sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of One (1) year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Day[s] of Prision Correccional as
the minimum to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) days as maximum of Prision
Correccional in its maximum period and to pay Reynaldo Jugo the sum ofP20,500.00.
"In Criminal Case No. 92-104615 for Estafa in the amount of P70,000.00, she is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) years and Two (2) Months of Prision Correccional as the minimum to Six (6)
years, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision correccional as the maximum plus One (1)
year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party
Jose Jugo the sum of P70,000.00
"SO ORDERED."[6]
In her appeal to this Court, accused-appellant Lourdes Bautista de Guiang faults the trial court for
having relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witnesses, complainants Reynaldo Jugo, Jose Jugo
and Rosita Jugo, anchoring her argument on, firstly, the supposed nefarious motives of the complainants
and, secondly, on the affidavit of desistance executed by Reynaldo Jugo attributing the complaint against
appellant merely to a "misunderstanding."
The appeal lacks merit.
The allegation of improper motives on the part of the prosecution witnesses has not been
satisfactorily shown in evidence. Appellant merely hypothesizes, in effect, that the non-inclusion of a
certain Alberto Maclang, whom the trial court described as having had a significant role in the deception
played on the complainants, has only been to "force appellant to convince Maclang to refund the
money"[7] to the Jugos. Aside from being a conjecture, the proposition advanced is, to say the least, much
too strained and hard to follow. It does not seem to make any sense for the complainants to go through an
elaborate and circuitous scheme, such as by initiating and prosecuting these cases against appellant,
merely to pin ultimate liability on Maclang. The fact alone that Maclang is a "kumpadre" of one of the
complainants could scarcely be reason enough for complainants not to directly and promptly implicate

Maclang. Equating appellant's culpability to that of Maclang, in any event, will not necessarily either tie up
the guilt or dictate the innocence of appellant.
Neither does the affidavit of desistance by Reynaldo Jugo subvert the testimony given by the
witnesses. Not only did Reynaldo Jugo repudiate the affidavit [8] but that also affidavits of desistance are
best ignored when pitted against positive evidence given at the witness stand.
The matter of assessing credibility, most of all, is a function that lies with the trial court more than an
appellate court. Nor has the trial court been here inattentive to details; thus, it has observed:
"There is no reason to doubt the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution who are simple barrio
folks, one a farmer from Nueva Ecija and the other one a fisherman. From their appearances and manner
of testifying in Court, pervision of the truth is far and remote. The Court could see that they are not the
type of persons who would fabricate and concoct stories only to prosecute the accused. Reynaldo Jugo
will not come all the way from Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija to follow up his case and attend the trial on several
occasions had it not been for the assurance of accused to deploy them to Japan for a consideration. They
would not take the trouble of coming to Court on several occasions if they have no other motive, except to
seek for justice for themselves.
"On the other hand, accused have resorted to trickeries, even feigning illness for herself with the
connivance of some jail personnel if only to escape from the clutches of the law. And finally thru the evil
doings of Alberto Maclang, he coerced and threatened complainant Reynaldo Jugo into signing an
Affidavit of Desistance hoping that the Court would dismiss these cases against accused Lourdes
Bautista Guiang."[9]
Be that, such as it may, the Court itself has gone over the testimony of each of the complainants, and
the credence of their declarations is quite evident. Thus Testimony of Jose Jugo "FISCAL
"Q Mr. Jose Jugo, are you the same Jose Jugo who is one of the complainants in this case against the
accused for illegal recruitment and Estafa?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And if the accused is in this courtroom, can you please point to her?
"BRANCH CLERK
Witness points to a lady in yellow who identified herself as Lourdes Guiang.
"FISCAL
Q Please tell the court when was the first time you saw the accused.
"A The first time I saw her was on Dec. 2, 1991, personally.
"Q But previous to the time when you personally saw her, did you know about her?
"A Yes, sir
. "Q And what circumstances did you come to know about her?
"A Because my brother Reynaldo Jugo was the first one who applied to her and then my brother told
me that the name of his recruiter is Malou and because she calls by telephone to us whenever
she needs my brother Reynaldo.
"Q And you said the accused was calling through the telephone. How did you come to know that she
is the accused who was calling?
"A Because she says that she is the recruiter of my brother.

"Q Now, you stated that you saw the accused on Dec. 2, 1991, where?
"A In her office.
"COURT
Where is this office?
"A Tayabas, Tondo, Manila.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"COURT
Who was with you in going there?
"A Me and my sister, sir, and Alberto.
"Q Who is this sister of yours?
"A Rosita Jugo.
"Q Were you able to reach the office of the accused?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And what happened in the office of the accused?
"A We were asked to fill up an application.
"Q Who asked you?
"A She, the accused.
"Q Now, did you fill up the application?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When you fill up the application, was there any agreement or any discussion as to why you are
filling up the application?
"A For employment abroad in Japan, sir.
"Q And what were the condition, if any?
"A I was told I would be working in Japan as factory worker.
"Q Did you talk about expenses?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What was your agreement about that?
"A I was asked to pay the amount of P70,000.00 but not in a lump sum.
"Q And what purpose was this P70,000.00 about?
"A For the processing of papers like those that would be done in Japanese Embassy.
"Q Did you give this P70,000.00?
"A Yes, sir, I was able to give all of it.
"COURT
In one giving?
"A No, installment.

"FISCAL
"Q In how many installment did you give this P70,000.00?
"A In six (6) installments.
"COURT
On that day when you went there, Dec. 2, did you give any money?
"A No, sir.
"FISCAL
"Q When was the first time that you gave the first installment, if you know?
"A The first time I gave installment was on Dec. 3.
"Q The next day?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q How much did you give?
"A Only P2,000.00.
"Q Where did you give the money?
"A She went to our house.
"Q And where is this house located?
"A 219 Sioson St. Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila.
"Q Was there a receipt issued by the accused when you gave the P2,000.00?
"A No, sir.
"Q How about the second installment, where and when?
"A The second time was in Tayabas, Tondo already.
"Q How much?
"A I cannot remember the date, P20,000.00.
"Q How about the third installment?
"A Also in Tondo, I cannot remember the date, in the amount of P10,000.00.
"Q How about the fourth installment?
"A I cannot remember the date. Eighteen Thousand (P18,000.00) Pesos, also in Tondo.
"Q The fifth?
"A P2,000.00.
"Q Where was it given?
"A Also in Tondo.
"Q How about the sixth?
"A Eighteen Thousand (P18,000.00) Pesos.
"Q Where was it given?
"A Also in Tondo.

"Q All these amounts given to the accused personally by you?


"A Yes, sir.
"COURT
Was that amount for you alone and this include your sister's?
"A That is only for me, sir.
"FISCAL
"Q Why is it that the amount is big and you did not ask the accused to issue you a receipt?
"A I was asking but she countered I feel to have no trust on her.
"Q After you gave the amount, what happened?
"A She gave me a visa.
"Q What is that visa for?
"A That visa was for the purpose of going out from the Philippines so that I could work in Japan.
"Q About when was this?
"A She gave it on Jan. 9, 1992.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"FISCAL
"Q So when the accused gave you this, what did you do?
"A I waited for her schedule because I was scheduled many times.
"Q Were you finally scheduled?
"A Every week I was scheduled two times to fly out but I could never fly out and that is the same every
week.
"Q So what finally happened with that scheduled of yours?
"A What we did, sir, was to verify in the Japanese Embassy about this. We were told there is no such
number released.
"Q Are you referring to this number appearing in Exh. A-1-a?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And when you came to know that there is no such number as this, what did you do?
"A In order to be doubly sure, really sure, I made a verification in the Bureau of Immigration.
"Q What did you verify in the Bureau of Immigration?
"A If this Visa is genuine.
"Q And what did you find out?
"A We found out that the number, this number is tampered and I was advised not to proceed otherwise
I might land in jail.
"Q So when you came to know about this, what did you do?
"A I still have it examined by the NBI in order to be sure.
"Q And what did the NBI do?

"A Director Salvador Ramin said it was indeed fake.


"Q Which is fake, the passport or Visa?
"A The Visa.
"Q How about the passport, did you inquire about the Passport, Exh. A?
"A I did not verify but according to Dir. Salvador Ramin, it was also fake.
"Q So when Dir. Ramin of the NBI told you that this Document, passport and Visa are fake, what did
you do?
"A We complained to the NBI.
"Q In other words, you were not able to go abroad to Japan?
"A No, because I am here.
"Q How about the money which you gave to the accused?
"A It was not returned to us. We are asking to her . . ."[10]
Testimony of Reynaldo Jugo "FISCAL
"Q Mr. Jugo do you know a certain person by the name of Alberto Maclang?
"A Yes, sir, I know such person.
"Q And who is this Alberto Maclang?
"A He is my compadre.
"Q Now in the last week of October 1991 do you have any occasion to see or meet this Alberto
Maclang?
"A In the month of October he visited me in my house.
"Q Where is this house located?
"A Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
"Q Was he with somebody?
"A He was with a companion.
"Q And who was this?
"A Malou Guiang.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q If you see this Malou Guiang again will you be able to identify her?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Will you look around and see the persons inside the courtroom and tell the Court whether Malou
Guiang is inside the courtroom?
"A Yes, sir, there she is.
"INTERPRETER:
Witness stood up, extends her arm, and with the forefinger points to a woman wearing a yellow T-shirt
who answered by the name of Lourdes Guiang when asked what is her name.

"Q Do you know why this Alberto Maclang and Malou Guiang went to your house in Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija.
"A I know sir the reason. My compadre was in the company of the accused and they just visited me.
"Q Were there any conversation between you and these two persons?
"A Yes, sir, there was a conversation among the three of us.
"Q What was the subject of that conversation?
"A We talked about the application for employment abroad or for overseas job, my application.
"Q Why? Were you applying for a job abroad?
"A That was before I had my application with another person.
"Q So what has that application for abroad to do with your application with Maclang and Guiang.
"A Because Alberto Maclang introduced her (Malou Guiang) as a recruiter.
"Q So when she was introduced to you as recruiter what transpired?
"A Malou Guiang, the accused herein, convinced me that she will work or take care of the papers
relative to my application for my employment abroad.
"Q And where are you supposed to work?
"A In Japan.
"Q And what job.
"A As factory worker.
"Q And when she told you about this possibility of working in Japan as factory worker what did you tell
her?
"A She convinced me that in two months time she can arrange or fix my papers.
"Q And what was your reply to that?
"A I told her that I have no money yet for her to really convince me to seek employment abroad.
"Q Why, was there any amount asked by her?
"A Yes, sir, I will make a down payment of P5,000.00 and she would work on my papers relative to my
overseas employment.
"Q When you told her that you don't have any money what happened?
"A We parted ways that day.
"Q Was there any occasion that you have to meet Malou Guiang again?
"A After one week they [came] back again to my house in Nueva Ecija. Meaning Mr. Maclang and
Malou Guiang.
"Q And what transpired when you saw each other?
"A Malou Guiang told me that she will advance the money for the purpose of processing my papers.
"Q Did you agree?
"A Yes, I agreed.
"Q So what happened afterwards?

"A We parted ways again but after two weeks they called up by phone in the house of my mother in
Malabon, Metro Manila.
"Q Why do you know that Malou Guiang called your mother's house?
"A When Malou Guiang called up our house my brother went to Nueva Ecija to fetch me to come to
Malabon.
"Q When you were in Malabon what transpired?
"A I went first for a while to the house of my mother in Malabon and from there I proceeded to the
house of my compadre Alberto Maclang.
"COURT:
Did you ask your mother why they ask you to come to Malabon?
"A Actually my mother was staying in Nueva Ecija.
"Q To whom did you talk to in that house of yours in Malabon?
"A My sister Rosita, my brother Jose and Jerry.
"COURT:
DID you find out from them why they fetched you to go to Malabon?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What did they tell you?
"A Malou Guiang wanted to talk to me.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q So what did you do afterwards?
"A My compadre Alberto Maclang accompanied me and we went to the house of Malou Guiang. My
compadre called Malou Guiang first by phone to find out where we would be meeting, or where
would be the meeting place for us to see each other.
"Q And where is the meeting place?
"A We saw each other at United Nations Avenue at the compound of the police headquarters.
"Q Were you able to talk to Malou Guiang?
"A Yes, sir, I talked to her.
"Q And what was your conversation about?
"A Because of the need for me to give money to her.
"Q How much did she tell you?
"A Actually she was asking for P5,000.00 but I only have P2,500.00 with me at that time.
"Q Did you give the P2,500.00 to Malou Guiang?
"A I gave the amount to her.
"Q Now did they tell you for what is that P2,500.00 intended for?
"A For the processing of the paper, sir.
"Q Was there any receipt given to you by Malou Guiang when you gave her the P2,500.00?

"A She did not issue a receipt for the amount I gave her.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q What transpired with your application for abroad?
"A Last January 1992 she told me that my passport will already be released.
"Q What else, if any, did she tell you?
"A That I should produce already the sum of money with which to purchase the plane fare for Japan.
"Q And did she tell you how much?
"A P18,000.00, sir.
"Q And were you able to produce that amount?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And when that amount was produced by you what did you do with the amount?
"A I gave the amount of P18,000.00 to her.
"Q When you said `to her' to whom are you referring?
"A I gave the amount to Malou Guiang.
"Q Where did you give her that amount?
"A In the house of my parents at Malabon, Metro Manila.
"Q Was there any receipt issued by Malou Guiang when you paid her the P18,000.00?
"A She did not issue any receipt for the amount I gave her.
"Q The amount is big enough why did you not ask any receipt from her?
"A I was asking or demanding for a receipt but she said that as if I did not trust her.
"Q After that what happened else?
"A I gave to Malou Guiang the amount of P18,000.00.
"Q And were you able to get the passport and the plane ticket which Malou Guiang told you will be
released and bought the ticket?
"A Up to now she has not given me the passport and the promised plane ticket.
"Q When she failed to deliver the passport and the plane ticket what did you do?
"A I just waited for some more time. I was just thinking that the passport [has] not been fully prepared
and the passport is not finished yet so I waited for a little more time.
"Q After that little more time what happened?
"A After two weeks, after the lapse of two weeks she came to my house in Nueva Ecija with the
passport.
"Q And what happened? Did she deliver to you the passport?
"A Yes, sir, she gave me the passport.
"Q And what did you do with the passport?
"A I read the contents of the passport. I examined it.
"Q What did you find out?

"A I saw or read my name, the date and when I am supposed to use the passport.
"Q Were you able to use the passport?
"A I was not able to use the same, sir.
"Q Why?
"A We showed it to other person to have it verified to find out whether the passport was genuine or a
fake one.
"Q What was the result?
"A This who saw the passport said that it was fake.
"Q When they told you that the passport was a fake one what did you do, if any?
"A I sought the help of a friend of mine who was connected with the NBI at United Nations Avenue.
"Q And what did the NBI friend of yours do, if any?
"A He confirmed that the passport is fake.
"Q So after that what happened?
"A My NBI friend told me to file a complaint and there should be three of us.
"Q So did you make a complaint?
"A Yes, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"COURT:
Were you able to bring other complainant to the NBI in as much as the NBI said that there should be 3
complainants?
"A Yes, Your Honor, I was able to bring others.
"Q Who are they?
"A My brother and a sister of mine.
"COURT:
Now will you please tell the Court how this brother and sister of yours happened to be supposedly a
victim of Malou Guiang?
"A Because my brother came to know this Malou Guiang my brother and my sister came to know
Malou Guiang thru me. I introduced them to Malou Guiang.
"COURT:
And so what if they met her?
"A Malou Guiang was able to convince my brother and my sister to apply also for a job abroad.
"COURT:
When was that, before your transaction or after?
"A It was at the midway of the transaction with her.
"COURT:
Do you know if your brother and sister gave money also to the accused Malou Guiang?

"A I know that they gave money to her.


"COURT:
Did your brother and sister inform you when they gave the money?
"A We did not talk about that as to the date when the money was given by them to Malou Guiang.
"COURT:
Now in as much as first you gave P2,500.00 and later on you came to know that the passport was fake
did you not caution them not to proceed with the transaction with Malou Guiang in as much as
you have given her P2,500.00 and that the passport was fake?
"A We have not discovered yet that the passport was fake when my brother and my sister applied to
her or have transaction with her.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Q Up to this day was there any amount that was reimbursed to you by the accused or was the money
returned to you?
"A None, sir. No amount was returned by her.
"Q Was she able to send you abroad?
"A I was not able to go abroad."[11]
Testimony of Rosita Jugo "Q Rosita Jugo, you're one of the complainants in this case against Madam Malou Bautista Guiang,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 92-104614 to 16, for Estafa and Illegal Recruitment, do you know
the accused in this case?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You stated you are charging her of Estafa, how much did she obtain from you?
"A P2,500.00.
"Q And where did she obtain the amount of money?
"A Tayabas, Tondo, Manila at her office.
"Q And do you know for what purpose is this P2,500.00 which she obtained from you?
"A She said it is for the passport.
"Q Why, what was the passport for?
"A She said for my use for the trip in Japan.
"Q What is your purpose in going to Japan?
"A To be employed in Japan as factory worker.
"Q And who recruited you for this purpose?
"A Malou Guiang, sir.
"Q The accused in this case?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And do you know whether this Malou Guiang was authorized as recruiter by the POEA?
"A I don't know, sir.

"Q But were you able to find out whether she is an authorized recruiter for overseas employment?
"A Later on I came to know about that.
"Q How did you come to know that she is not an authorized recruiter?
"A My brothers went to the POEA.
"Q And what did they find out at the POEA?
"A They were informed that the accused herein is not authorized.
"Q Was there any certification issued by the POEA to this effect, if you know?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Showing to you this certification from the POEA issued on 18, October 199_, stating that Malou
Guiang Bautista in her personal capacity is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit worker for
overseas employment. What is the relation of this document you are referring to, certification you
are referring to?
"A Yes, sir, this is the one.
"FISCAL
May I request that the said certification be marked as Exh. A Rosita Jugo.
"COURT
Mark it.
"FISCAL
"Q Now, was the accused able to employ you for overseas employment?
"A No, sir.
"Q And was she able to return the money which she obtained from you?
"A No, sir.
"Q Now, when did you ask for the return of the money which she got from you?
"A She promised that she will return to me.
"Q Is there any evidence to show that she is going to pay back the money?
"A She signed a document to the effect that she will return all the money that she got from us.
"Q You are referring to this undertaking which was previously marked as Exh. B?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When you talked about your employment, where did you talk about this matter?
"A At first when she used to talk to us over the phone and after in her office.
"Q Where is this office?
"A At Tayabas, Tondo, Manila."[12]
The prosecution has adequately established that appellant did offer to the complainants, namely,
Reynaldo Jugo, Jose Jugo and Rosita Jugo, overseas employment for a fee without first being duly
licensed to so engage in such activity, an act embraced within the term "recruitment and placement"
prohibited by Article 38, in relation to Article 13 and Article 39, of the Labor Code. The crime, if
perpetrated against at least three persons, whether individually or as a group, is deemed committed "in

large scale" that carries, pursuant to Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos.
Appellant, through misrepresentations and deceit, has likewise succeeded in defrauding complainant
Jose Jugo in the sum of P70,000 and complainant Reynaldo Jugo in the amount ofP20,500. These acts
have independently transgressed Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Estafa, pursuant to that law, is
committed by a person who defrauds another by abuse of confidence or deceit to the latter's damage. If
the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000, the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period is imposed; if the fraud
exceeds P22,000, the above prescribed penalty is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional P10,000, provided, however, that the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years.
The Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General that the trial court erred neither in its
findings nor in its judgment appealed from.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127162 June 5, 1998
JOSE ABACA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Jose Abaca was tried before the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, for the
crime of illegal recruitment under Article 38 and 39 of President Decree No. 442, based on an Information
which reads:
That in the month of November 1988, and for a period prior and/or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused thru false manifestation
and fraudulent representation made to ROSELIA JIZ JANEO, ZENAIDA J. SUBANG,
RENITA J. JANEO and MELROSE S. PALOMO to the effect that he has the authority to
recruit workers for employment in Taipei, Taiwan and can facilitate the processing of their
necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary amount of money to
cover the costs of such recruitment and by means of other similar deceit when in truth
and in fact he is not authorized nor licensed to recruit, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, and feloniously collect from the aforestated applicants the aggregate amount
of FOURTEEN TGHOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, the said
accused assuring and representing that the same would be used in depraying the
necessary expenses of the complainants' application for employment abroad and having
been convinced by said misrepresentation the complainants gave the said amount to the
herein accused, but the latter far from complying with his obligations, misapproprated and
converted to his own personal use and benefit the aforecited amount, to the damage and
prejudice of the said ROSELIA JIZ JANEO, ZENAIDA J. SUBANG, RENITA J. JANEO
and MELROSE S. PALOMO.
Contrary to Articles 38 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. 1
Arraigned on February 6, 1990, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafer, trial ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court, reads as follows:
The gist of the testimonies of the four complainants revolves on how the accused
(petitioner herein) recruited them to work abroad and made them believe that the
accused could work out their papers in consideration of a certain sum of money.

Specifically, the four complainants similarly testified that the accused was introduced to
them by his brothers, Perferio and Guiding Abaca, whom they already knew for a long
time. Sometime in the month of November 1988, the accused, accompanied by his
brothers, misrepresented himself to be a licensed recruiter and convinced the four
complainants that for a consideration they could work abroad at Taipei either as a
domestic helper or factory worker with a salary ranging from $300 to $500 a month. The
accused asked the sum of P14,000.00 each, but the complainants requested if they could
pay P6,000.00 first and before departure they will complete the amount as demanded.
Thus, the complainants paid partial amount at the office of the accused at Five Ace
Philippines located in Manila and all of them gave their own down payment. Each
complainant paid the accused P1,500.00 allegedly to be used for the processing of the
passport and the following amounts for processing . . .
All the complainants were able to receive the passport from the accused.
From the foregoing, the complainants were able to pay the accused the aggregate
amount of P14,000.00, excluding the amount of P1,500.00 each for the passport.
It was agreed between the complainant and the accused that the balance of thier
obligation would be given on or before they leave for abroad. But since their payment, the
accused promised them to leave, first on or before December, 1988 and then anytime in
January of 1989, and then later. When the complainants sensed that they would not
leave anymore, they informed the brothers of the accuse whom they are familiar with,
complaining about the failure of the accused to send them abroad when they have
already paid the advance payment. The two brothers could not do otherwise but
appeased them and promised to contract their brother, the accused herein. Finally, the
complainants were able to confront the accused and demanded the return of their money,
but the accused merely promised to do so, until such time that they already filed their
complaint with the NBI.
On the other hand, petitioner's version of the case is likewise capsulized by the trial court in this wise, viz:
In trying to absolve himself from criminal liability, the accused shifted the blame to a
certain Mr. Reynaldo Tan to whom he alleges to have remitted the sums of money he
received from the complainants. To corroborate his version of the incident, the accused
presented one Alberto Tolentino, an employee of the Department of Public Works and
Highways who also was recruited by Mr. Abaca and who was also referred to Mr.
Reynaldo Tan.
xxx xxx xxx
When asked if he recruited complainants as they testified in Court, the accused denied
the truth of such statement. The accused stated that he did not recruit them and the truth
was he happened to be at the establishment of complainants in Calapan and they were
able to talk with the Janeo sisters who told them of their problems wherein they were
notified to vacate the establishment, and thus asked the accused to assist them in going
abroad. The accused told them that they were recruiting workers in the Middle East but
he is discouraging female to work there because of the horrible experiences others have
undergone. The accused also told them that he was referring them to somebody whom
he knows are sending people to Taipei in the person of Mr. Reynaldo Tan. The
complainants agreed, after which the accused left for Manila where he was working.
Then, one morning, the two girls in the name of Melrose Paloma and Zenaida Subang
called the accused by phone and told him that they are interested in joining the Janeo
sister to go to Taipei and they said that they came across the calling card of the accused
marked as Exhibit "G". He admitted that the Five Ace Philippines is only engaged in
trading and not as recruitment agency. He informed the Court that he was connected with
the recruitment agency called WORK Incorporated-a licensed company.

After trial, judgment was rendered finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of P.D. 442, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of four (4) years straight and to indemnify the complainants the aggregate amount of
P14,000.00 by way of civil liability, with the legal rate of interest from 1988 up to the time
of payment.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It
found petitioner guilty of illegal recruitment on a large-scale and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a
fine of P100,000.00. 2
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on November 7, 1996. 3
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the respondent court committed grave and reversible errors of
law and/or acted with grave abuse of direction
1. In not considering the certification (Exh. 1) issued by the POEA
stating, among others, that WORK, Inc. was a duly licensed private
recruitment agency prior to August 20, 1989, and that petitioner was then
a manager and PDOS (Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar) Trainor in
said recruitment agency, and that, therefore, by virtue of his position as
manager and PDOS trainor of WORK, Inc., he had the authority to
undertake recruitment activities.
2. In not finding that petitioner, being a holder of authority, may not be
validly charged of illegal recruitment as defined by law in force at the time
of the alleged commission of the offense charged, much less, convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
3. In declaring petitioner guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and
sentencing him to a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00
4. In finding that herein petitioner undertook recruitment activities, there
being a grave misapprehension of the facts.
The petition must be dismissed.
The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code. 4
Under the first element, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which
has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary
of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or canceled by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) or the Secretary. 5 Agents or representatives appointed by
a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized by POEA are
within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority. 6
The record shows that petitioner is not a licensed recruiter as evidenced by the Certification 7 issued by
Mr. Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Branch, POEA. Testifying on the aforesaid certification,
Mr. Mateo said:
Q Now, how about a person by the name of Jose Abaca alias "Joe" or
Jose "Joe" Abaca listed in that particular list among those authorized by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to recruit workers for
employment abroad?

A He is not included among those authorized to recruit in their personal


capacity like single proprietorship, sir. 8
Petitioner's theory that he has the authority to recruit by reason of his position as manager and PreDeparture Orientation Seminar Trainor (PDOS) of the WORKERS FOR OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT
KEY CENTER, INC. (WORK, Inc.), a licensed private recruitment agency is devoid of merit. The
Certification 9 issued by Mr. Mateo, which was relied upon by petitioner is nothing but an affirmation that
he is an officer of WORK, Inc. It does not, in any way, prove that petitioner has a license or authority to
undertake recruitment activities. Moreover, his employment with a licensed placement agency does
not ipso facto authorize him to recruit workers. This was clarified by Mr. Mateo when he testified that:
Q Now, will you please tell this Court if the employees of WORK,
Incorporated in particular or any agency or that matter which are license
to recruit workers for overseas employment authorized or licensed to
recruit workers for employment abroad?
xxx xxx xxx
A That will depend on the designation of the person concerned, sir.
FISCAL SENOREN:
Q What do you mean by it depends upon the designation of a person?
A Well, if the designation states for example that he is only authorized to
market for overseas principal, that is the only function that he could do so
in representing the company. For example, if he is trainor, it so states
that he is authorized to serve as trainor in the conduct of pre-departure
orientation seminar, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When a person is trainor or only a personnel manager, do you mean to
say that he cannot recruit for his agency?
A As far as the POEA is concerned, we only recognize the appointment
submitted to our office in his capacity as that, Your Honor. 10
Even assuming that WORK, Inc. had authorized petitioner, by reason of his position in the company, to
recruit workers, still, such authority was not previously approved by the POEA. 11
Again, Mr. Mateo explain that a licensee or holder of authority may authorize their employees to recruit for
the agency. However, said authority must be submitted to and approved by the POEA. 12 The provision of
Article 29 of the Labor Code is very clear on this:
Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority. No license or authority shall be used
directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued of at
any place other than stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority
be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of
business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including
the establishment of additional officers anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of
the Department of Labor. (Emphasis Ours)
Moreover, there is nothing from the record which would show even by implication that petitioner was
acting for and in behalf of WORK, Inc. when he was dealing with the complainants. Petitioner gave his
calling card 13 and met with private complainants at his office at Five Ace, Phil., Malate, City of Manila.
Thus, complainant Roselia Janeo testified:
Q Where did you give the amount of P1,500.00 for your passport?
A I give (sic) the amount of P1,500.00 to Jose Abaca in Manila because
he instructed us to follow him in Manila.
Q Where in Manila did you give that P1,500.00?

A At Five Ace Philippines and this Five Ace Philippines is the agency
which according to Jose Abaca he is handling 14
Complainant Reneta Janeo also testified:
Q Miss witness, where did you give the amount of P6,000.00 to Mr. Jose
Abaca?
A At Five Ace Philippines, sir.
Q What is this Five Ace Philippines?
A It is an office, sir.
Q And where is this Five Ace Philippines located?
A At Guerrero corner J. Nakpil St., Malate, sir. 15
Petitioner's testimony that he referred the private complainants to a certain Reynaldo Tan because
WORK, Inc. is deploying workers to the Middle East and other countries with bilateral agreement with the
Philippines undisputably show that he was not representing WORK, Inc. when he dealt with private
complainants. Petitioner recounted:
Q If that is so, Mr. Witness, why do you have to refer the complainants to
other company represented by Mr. Reynaldo Tan, if according to you, the
WORK Incorporated was duly licensed to engage in recruitment
business?
A Well, as I have said that I did not want them to be deployed to the
Middle East wherein we have authority to deploy to the Middle East.
Now, the fact that we do not have a bilateral agreement with Taipei but
the Taipei government is accepting employees from the Philippines on a
tourist visa and a tourist passport and visitors visa and as matter of fact,
we have no less than two hundred thousand Filipino workers in Taipei
right now under a visitor's visa on a tourist passport.
Q So your company is not engaged in sending workers for Taipei, Taiwan
I am referring to WORK Incorporated?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because, according to you, our government has no diplomatic relation.
A Bilated agreement, sir.
Q Bilated agreement with said country?
A Because the papers to be processed by the POEA, that cannot be
processed because our government has no bilateral agreement with the
said country.
Q And you want to impress upon this Court that all workers going to
Taipei, Taiwan work there unofficially without the sanction of our
government but on shall we say, unofficial capacity, am I right?
A Yes, unofficially in our country because they are working there on a
tourist visa. And that is not the problem of our country. This is the
problem of the once accepting these people. Even a tourist visa, a tourist
passport.
Q So that is the reason, according to you, why you do not utilize your
company, the WORK Incorporated in connection with this particular
application of the complainants in going to Taipei, Taiwan?
A Yes, sir. 16 (Emphasis Ours)
It is clear therefore that petitioner never acted for and in behalf of WORK, Inc. when he recruited the
private complainants.

Going now to the second element of the crime charged, that is, the offender undertakes either any acivity
within the meaning of recruitment and placement, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment
and placement," as follows:
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. (Emphasis Supplied)
Petitioner's act of (1) representing to the private complainants that he can help them work in Taipei with a
monthly salary of $300 to $500; (2) requiring them to submit their ID pictures, birth certificates and biodata for their employment abroad; (3) demanding from them P12,000.00 as processing fee; and (4)
receiving from them certain amounts for the processing of their passports and other papers, are all
recruitment activities within the contemplation of the law.
The finding of the trial court in this regard is worth noting:
It has already been shown by the prosecution that accused was not licensed or
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for abroad. And yet, despite such fact,
accused, thru false manifestation and fraudulent representation, made the complainants
believe that he could help them work abroad as household helper or factory worker at
Taipei at a salary ranging from $300 to $500, alleging that he has a friend who could help
them work abroad. Relying on this representation, complainants were constrained to pay
the aggregate amount of P14,000.00 as demanded by the accused besides the
P1,500.00 each for passport, and the accused issued a private receipt (not official or
printed receipt) evidencing such payment. With these receipts marked as Exhibits "A" to
"E", "H" and "I" and the issuance of the passport, ID pictures, birth certificate, bio-data
and other personal papers, the complainants were led to believe that accused could
really help them work abroad. Thus, after payment, accused assured complainants that
they might be able to leave in December of 1988. Come December 1988 and yet
complainants were not able to leave and was again promised by accused that they could
leave the following month of January, 1989. Again, complainants failed to leave, thus,
they demanded from the accused to return the money, otherwise, they would file a case
against the accused in court. 17
Petitioner further asserted that he did not recruit private complainants but only tried to help them by
referring them to one Reynaldo Tan who was allegedly licensed to recruit workers to Taiwan. This posture,
unfortunately will not exculpate him. Petitioner's act of referring private complainants to Tan is, under the
law, also considered a recruitment activity.
Finally, petitioner faults respondent court in finding him guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale which
has a higher penalty. He argues that he cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale because
the information charged him only with simple illegal recruitment. Having been sentenced by the
respondent court to a graver offense, petitioner claims that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We do not agree.
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the technical name given by the fiscal
appearing in the title of the information but by the actual recital of facts appearing in the complaint or
information. 18
Thus, where the allegations in the information clearly sets forth the essential elements of the crime
charged, the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusations
is not violated. 19
The information against petitioner has clearly recited all the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment at
large scale, namely:

1. the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage in recruitment and


placement activity,
2. the offender undertakes recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13
(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34, and
3. illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group. 20
All these elements were duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner, as discussed earlier, is not
licensed or authorized to recruit overseas workers; he undertook recruitment activities defined
under Article 34 under the Labor Code and he recruited the four (4) complainant-workers, thus
making the crime illegal recruitment in large scale. The imposable penalty is life imprisonment
and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) pursuant to Article 38 (b) 21 and Article
39 (a) 22 of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 115719-26 October 5, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IRENE YABUT @ IRENE CORTEZ @ FLORENCE MADRID 1 (At-large), FERNANDO CORTEZ y
VEGA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated February 16, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159,
convicting appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, imposing
upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify
private complainants in the following amounts
a. Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;
b. Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;
c. Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;
d. German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;
e. Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;
f. Alejandro P. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;
g. Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and,
h. Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate of interest
reckoned from the filing of the Information until fully paid.
Appellant is a former policeman while the co-accused, Irene Yabut, is his common-law wife. Both were
charged with estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale, but only appellant stood trial as Yabut has
eluded arrest and remains at-large.
The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be duly supported by the
records, are as follows: 2
On August 13, 1992, prosecution witness and private complainant Mr. Henry Ilar met for
the first time the herein appellant, who was at that time a policeman, and his live-in
partner and co-accused Irene Yabut, at Rm. 103 P.M. Apartelle, N. Domingo Street, San
Juan, Metro Manila (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7). Ilar handed over to the appellant and
co-accused Irene Yabut the initial down payment of P10,000.00 for the processing of
papers and visa for Japan where he was to work as a roomboy in a hotel (Ibid., p. 3-4,
Exh. "A" Pros.). Appellant assured Ilar not to worry since he would be able to leave for
Japan otherwise his money would be refunded (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Additional
amounts were given by Ilar to co-accused Irene Yabut thru her employee Butch Barrios,
namely: P6,000.00, and P4,000.00 for the purpose of processing his papers (TSN, June

9, 1993, pp. 4-5; Exhs. "B" and "C" pros.). On September 26, 1993, Ilar handed over
additional P5,000.00 to the appellant the amount to be used allegedly for the expenses to
be incurred for Ilar's training (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5; Exh. "D" pros.). Finally, Ilar was
made to sign a one (1) year contract but he was not furnished a copy of the same (TSN,
June 9, 1993, p. 4). Ilar was scheduled to leave for Japan on October 8, 1993 but this
date was postponed allegedly due to problems (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5). The second
scheduled date for departure was again cancelled allegedly due to the necessity of
applicants undergoing medical examination (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6). After undergoing
the medical examination, Ilar was again scheduled to depart on December 12, 1992
(Ibid). Prior to the scheduled departure, Ilar checked on Irene Yabut but she was no
longer in her apartelle (Ibid) although he found the appellant who re-assured Ilar that he
would be able to leave for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Sensing fraudulent practice
on the part of the appellant and his co-accused, Ilar verified from the POEA whether the
appellant and his co-accused were authorized or licensed to engage in recruitment and
placement activities. A certification was issued by the POEA stating that the appellant and
co-accused Irene Yabut were neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6; Exh. "E" pros). As expected, the last
scheduled departure of Ilar on December 12, 1993 (sic) (1992) did not push through.
In the case of private complainant Mr. Reynaldo P. Claudio, on July 28, 1992, he went to
Room 103 P.M. Apartelle, San Juan, Metro Manila, to apply for a job as hotel worker in
Japan. Appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut, introducing themselves as husband and
wife, told him that he could work in Japan provided he paid the fees (TSN, June 15, 1993,
pp. 8-9, 26). Convinced by their assurances, (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 19) Claudio gave
them an initial payment of P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993 pp. 9-10; Exhibits "A" and
"G" pros.). Claudio was required to undergo training (June 15, 1993, p. 10-11, Exhs. "B"
and "H" pros.). On August 18, 1992, Claudio paid P30,000.00 to co-accused Irene Yabut
(June 15, 1993, p. 11; Exhs. "C" and "I" pros). On August 21, 1992, Claudio paid another
P25,000.00 to the co-accused Irene Yabut (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 12, 22; Exhs. "J"
and "D" pros.). The amounts he paid all in all totalled P70,000.00 which would allegedly
be used for the processing of the visa, plane ticket expenses, medical tests and seminar
costs for Claudio and his two (2) brothers (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13). Claudio was
made to sign a recruitment contract but he was not furnished a copy of the same by the
appellant and his co-accused (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 13). Yabut tried to convince
Claudio not to appear at the preliminary investigation hearing scheduled the next day at
the Department of Justice by refunding to him the amount of the plane ticket already paid
for by Claudio. This proved futile as Claudio appeared at the hearing nonetheless (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 14-16). Claudio was scheduled to depart five (5) times but not one of
those scheduled departures for Japan materialized for purportedly the following reasons:
that there was no escort or that the contract had to be changed or that it was necessary
for him to undergo a medical examination (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 18-19). Persistent
follow-ups made by Claudio with the appellant and Yabut at their apartelle went for
naught as Claudio was repeatedly told to wait as they were allegedly doing something
about the delay (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 20).
In the case of Mr. Arnel Diana, on July 20, 1992, he along with his brother-in-law, met the
appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut at their room in P.M. Apartelle, No. 26 N.
Domingo Street, San Juan Metro Manila (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 30). Diana and his
companion were assured by the appellant that they could leave for abroad (Ibid). The
appellant and his co-accused asked Diana to pay the fee of P50,000.00 for the travel
documents and POEA papers (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31). Diana was made to sign an
employment contract (Ibid; Exhs. "A" to "A-4" and "P" to "P-4") which convinced him to
part with his money (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 40-42). The amount was paid on

installments. Diana made the first payment on July 20, 1992 for P15,000.00 (TSN, June
15, 1993, pp. 33; Exhs. "B" and "Q" pros), handed over to the appellant and Irene Yabut
(TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 40-41). The second installment on July 24, 1992 for P25,000.00
(Ibid, Exhs. "C" and "R" pros) and the third installment was given on July 27, 1992 for
P10,000.00 (TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; Exhs. "D" and "S" pros). Diana was first
scheduled to leave on August 8, 1992 but his departure did not push through (TSN, June
15, 1993, p. 35). Disappointed, Diana asked the appellant and his co-accused Irene
Yabut for an explanation. Appellant cited lack of escort as the reason for his nondeparture (Ibid).
The second scheduled date of departure was also cancelled for alleged unavailability of
the Japanese who was to hire him (Ibid). Diana was scheduled five (5) times to depart
but each time the departure went for naught, while appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut
kept on assuring him that they were going to do something about it (TSN, June 15, 1993,
p. 36). Exasperated, Diana demanded for the return of his money from appellant (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 37-38). Despite the promises of the appellant, the money he paid was
never refunded. Thereafter, Diana found out from another complainant Henry Ilar, that the
appellant and his co-accused were not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 38).
In the case of private complainant Antonio S. Bernardo, he entered into an employment
contract with appellant's co-accused Irene Yabut (TSN, August 18, 1993, pp. 2-3).
Bernardo was told by the appellant that he did not affix his signature on the employment
contract because of his government employment i.e., a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), but appellant on several occasions promised Bernardo that he would be
able to leave for abroad (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 3).
Still another complainant, Fely Casanova testified that she first met appellant and his coaccused Irene Yabut who introduced themselves as Mr. and Mrs. Madrid on June 8, 1992
(TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 5). Casanova always saw the appellant at the P.M. Apartelle
on Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila whenever she made follow-ups on her
papers (Ibid). Casanova also saw the appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut at the
Town and Country on December 18, and 22, 1992 when the two were already in hiding.
They were talking to other applicants whom they promised to send abroad (TSN, August
19, 1993, p. 6). On those two occasions, appellant and his co-accused assured her about
a job placement abroad or the return of her money (Ibid).
Realizing that their overseas jobs would never materialize, complainants hauled appellant and his coaccused to the Department of Justice, which conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints.
Both were subsequently charged with (1) Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Criminal Case No. 98224,
and (2) eight (8) counts of Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 98997-99004. The Information for Illegal
Recruitment reads: 3
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice and Presidential AntiCrime Commission hereby accuses Irene Yabut and Fernando Cortez for (sic) Illegal
Recruitment as defined and penalized under Articles 38 and 39 of Presidential Decree
No. 422 as Amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, committed
as follows:
That during the period from June to September, 1992 or thereabouts, in San Juan, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
mutually confederating and conspiring with each other did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract; enlist and recruit for a fee, eight (8) persons for
employment abroad without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, for Makati, Metro Manila, March 31, 1993


Francisc
o F.
Benedic
to, Jr.
State
Prosecutor II
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charge. 4 Accused Irene Yabut already fled
and was not arraigned.
During joint trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses three (3) of the complainants, namely: (1)
Henry L. Ilar; (2) Reynaldo P. Claudio; and (3) Arnel M. Diana. The testimonies of the other five (5)
complainants were dispensed with upon the agreement of the prosecution and the defense that affidavits
would be offered as their testimonies. The corresponding receipts issued by accused Yabut for amounts
received from complainants were marked as evidence for the prosecution. 5
For the defense, appellant testified on his behalf. He admitted that accused Irene Yabut was his live-in
partner with whom he has a child, but he washed his hands of any participation in her business activities.
He further insisted that Yabut was not engaged in recruitment of workers for overseas employment but
only in the processing of visas. He also denied any knowledge of the special power of attorney executed
in his favor by Yabut for the refund of the PAL tickets of several recruits. Moreover, he claimed that he was
not present at any given time when large sum of money were received by Yabut and that he never gave
any assurances to complainants regarding their departure to Japan. 6
The prosecution then presented complainants Antonio S. Bernardo, Fely M. Casanova, and Henry L. Ilar
as rebuttal witnesses to refute appellants denials and protestations of innocence regarding accused
Yabut's recruitment activities.
On February 16, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 7 acquitting of eight (8) counts of estafa but
convicting him of illegal recruitment in large scale. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, accused Fernando Cortez is hereby Acquitted under Criminal Case Nos.
98997-99004 of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Upon the other hand, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused Fernando Cortez under Criminal No. 98224 of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment (in large scale) penalized under Art. 38(a) in relation to Art. 39(b) of P.D. 442,
this Court hereby imposes upon accused Fernando Cortez as follows:
1. To suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00);
2. To indemnify private complainants
a) Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;
b) Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;
c) Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;
d) German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;
e) Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;
f) Alejandro F. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;
g) Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and
h) Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate of interest reckoned from the
filing of the Information until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial court 8

. . . ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING THE


TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND AS A RESULT IT ALSO ERRED IN CONVICTING
FERNANDO CORTEZ OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT
ACQUITTED HIM OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA BASED ON THE SAME EVIDENCE.
Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the insufficiency of evidence, documentary and testimonial, to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If at all, appellant argues, the sole person guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale should be Yabut since she was the only one who signed the receipts for the
amounts received from the complainants. He contends that the mere fact that he is "romantically linked"
with Yabut does not mean he acted in conspiracy with her.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in praying for the affirmance in toto of the trial court decision, insists
that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, as shown by the following acts: 9
. . . (1) He received deposits of money to defray travelling expenses (TSN, June 9, 1993,
pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 9-12, 22, 40-41; July 15, 1993, p. 34); (2) He informed the
complainants that the money turned over would be used for the processing of papers and
visas for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13, 31); (3) He gave
assurance to the complainants that they would be able to leave for Japan otherwise their
money would be refunded (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 26, 30,
36; August 18, 1993, p. 3; August 19, 1993, p. 6); (4) He stayed at the apartelle office and
manned the office by entertaining job seekers even after his co-accused Irene Yabut had
gone into hiding (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 30; August 18,
1993, p. 5)
The crux of the issue is whether appellant could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite
his acquittal of the crime of estafa. If so, did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of illegal recruitment in large scale insofar as appellant is concerned?
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. 10 The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent
of the accused is crucial for conviction. 11Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. 12 Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code. It follows that one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and placement as
follows
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
The acts of appellant consisting of his promises, offers and assurances of employment to complainants
fall squarely within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined above. The fact that he did not
issue the receipts for amounts received from complainants has no bearing on his culpability for the
complainants have shown through their respective testimonies and affidavits that appellant was involved
in the prohibited recruitment.13 It is immaterial that appellant ingeniously stated to one of the complainants
that he (appellant) was a member of the PNP and a government employee, hence could not sign the
receipts. 14
Art. 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal all recruitment activities without the necessary license or
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor and
Employment) or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group. . . .
Thus, if the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, the Labor Code considers it
an offense involving economic sabotage and imposes a stiffer penalty therefor in accordance with Article
39 of the Labor Code.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: "(1) the accused undertakes any recruitment activity
defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
he does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and, (3) he commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. 15
Indisputably, all three (3) elements exist in the case at bar. First, the complaining witnesses have
satisfactorily established that appellant had actively promised them employment, gave assurance of their
placement overseas, and with his co-accused received certain sums as fees therefor. Second, the
Licensing Division of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a Certification dated
March 1, 1993 that JAWOH GENERAL MERCHANDISING 16 represented by Irene Yabut and Fernando
Cortez are neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. 17 In
fact, the defense even entered into a stipulation during trial that appellant is not authorized by the POEA
to recruit overseas workers. 18 Third, appellant and co-accused undertook recruitment of not less than
eight (8) workers complainants herein, who were recruited individually on different occasions. For
purposes of illegal recruitment, however, the law makes no distinction whether the workers were recruited
as a group or individually.
There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motive to testify falsely against appellant. And it
is generally observed that it is against human nature and experience for strangers to conspire and accuse
another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. 19 Moreover, we have no reason
to discount the trial court's appreciation of the complainants' truthfulness, honesty and candor. For such
appreciation deserves the highest respect, since the trial court is best-equipped to make the assessment
of the witnesses' credibility, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal. 20 Thus, after a
careful review of the records, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
As to the amounts to be refunded to complainants, we find the trial court's computations in accord with
the evidence, except with respect to complainant Fely M. Casanova. Upon recomputation, the amount to
be refunded for the failed promise of employment of her daughter and sister-in-law should be
P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00. 21
Lastly, it would not be amiss to stress that in these difficult times, many of our countrymen venture abroad
and work even in hazardous places to ensure for themselves and their families a life worthy of human
dignity. They labor overseas to provide proper education for their children and secure a decent future for
them. Illegal recruiters prey on hapless workers, charge exorbitant fees that siphon their meager savings,
then cruelly dash their dreams with false promises of lucrative jobs overseas. For this reason, illegal
recruiters have no place in society. Illegal recruitment activities must be stamped out by the full force of
the law.

WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Fernando Cortez y
Vega guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify complainants in the amounts
stated therein, EXCEPT that only P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00 should be paid to complainant
Fely M. Casanova, with interest at the legal rate from the time of filing the information until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120835-40. April 10, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TIONG MENG alias "TOMMY
TAN", accused-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and six (6) counts of estafa.
The information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:
"That on or about the period comprising June 1993 to August, 1993, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, using a
business name RAINBOW SIM FACTORY, a private employment recruiting agency, and misrepresenting
himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad with
the ability to facilitate the issuance and approval of the necessary papers in connection therewith, when in
fact he did not possess the authority or license from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
to do so, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit in a large scale and
promise employment in Taiwan to the following persons, to wit:
Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas - P15,000.00
Manuel Latina y Nicanor - P15,000.00
Neil Mascardo y Guiraldo - P15,000.00
Librado C. Pozas - P15,000.00
Edgardo Tolentino y Vasquez - P15,000.00
Gavino Asiman - P15,000.00
as in fact, the said persons gave and delivered the abovestated amount, respectively, to the herein
accused who know fully well that the aforesaid persons could not be sent to Taiwan, to the damage and
prejudice of said aforementioned private complainants." [1]
The informations for estafa aver substantially the same allegations as follows:
"In Criminal Case No. 277-93:
That on or about June 7, 1993, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of false representations that he can secure
an employment in Taiwan for Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas as a factory worker induced the latter to entrust to
him the amount of P15,000.00, in consideration of the promised employment, but the herein accused,
once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, with grave abuse of confidence and without
fulfilling his promise, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, misapply, misappropriate and
convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made upon
him for the return of the amount, accused herein failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas in the amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency."[2]
The other informations for estafa involve the following complainants and amounts.
1) Neil Mascardo - P15,000.00
2) Manuel Latina - P15,000.00
3) Ricardo Grepo - P20,000.00

4) Librado Pozas - P15,000.00


5) Gavino Asiman - P15,000.00
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the informations and all seven (7) cases were tried jointly.
On 12 May 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City rendered a decision * the
dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 278-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, as amended in relation to Article 39 thereof, and hereby sentences him to a
penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P100,000, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency;
2. In Criminal Case No. 277-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as the maximum; and to pay ERNESTO ORCULLO the sum of P15,000 as
actual damages andP15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 279-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as the maximum, and to pay NEIL MASCARDO the sum of P15,000 as
actual damages andP15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;
4. In Criminal Case No. 280-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay MANUEL LATINA the sum of P15,000 as actual
damages, and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;
5. In Criminal Case No. 343-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay RICARDO GREPO the sum of P20,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral and exemplary damages;
6. In Criminal Case No. 365-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as maximum and to pay LIBRADO POZAS the sum of P15,000 as actual
damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;
7. In Criminal Case No. 371-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum,
to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay GAVINO ASIMAN the sum of P15,000 as actual
damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
In addition to the foregoing penalties, the accused being an alien, shall be deported without further
proceedings after service of sentence.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the full time during which he underwent
preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with only four-fifths (4/5) thereof
(Article 29, RPC, as amended by RA No. 6127 and BP Blg. 85).
SO ORDERED."[3]

On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant assigns a single error allegedly committed by the trial
court, thus:
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN A LARGE SCALE UNDER CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 278-93 AND ESTAFA IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 277-93, 279-93, 280-93, 343-93, 365-93,
AND 371-93." [4]
The case for the prosecution averred the following facts:
Gavino Asiman testified that a certain Jose Percival Borja who was a friend of his relative informed
him that a job recruiter would be at Borja's house at Capt. Villareal St., Cavite City, in case anyone was
interested in an overseas job in Taiwan. Asiman further recalled that on 18 August 1993, he and his friend,
Librado Pozas went to Borja's house where they met the accused-appellant who told them he could get
them jobs as factory workers in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20,000.00. Accused-appellant required
them to submit their passport, bio-data and their high school diploma as well as to pay P15,000.00 each
for placement and processing fees. The former issued two (2) receipts which he signed in the presence of
Asiman and Pozas.[5] Accused-appellant assured them that they could leave for Taiwan twelve (12) days
later. Asiman stated that they filed the complaints for illegal recruitment when they learned that accusedappellant was arrested for illegal recruitment activities.
Librado Pozas corroborated the testimony of Asiman. He added that Borja had no participation in the
offense as his house was merely used as a meeting place by accused-appellant.
Neil Mascardo testified that he met accused-appellant through a friend and also through Jose
Borja. Mascardo narrated that on 7 July 1993, he went to Borja's house to meet accused-appellant who
assured him of getting him an employment in Taiwan at the Rainbow Ship Co., a marble and handicraft
factory with a monthly salary of P20,000.00. He further testified that he paid P15,000.00 to accusedappellant for placement and processing fees as shown by a receipt signed by accused-appellant.
[6]
Accused-appellant first told him he could leave on 15 July 1993. When he later inquired about his
departure date, accused-appellant told him he could leave by the end of July 1993. After July, accusedappellant told him he would leave on 15 August 1993 together with his uncle Manuel Latina. When he
failed to leave on the last mentioned date and accused-appellant told him he would leave on 28 August
1993, Mascardo told accused-appellant he wanted his money back. Accused-appellant told him that a
refund was not possible since he had already sent the money to his brother-in-law in Taiwan . Mascardo
decided to file a complaint for illegal recruitment on 28 August 1993. On 31 August 1993, he, Manuel
Latina and Ernesto Orcullo went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where
they found out that accused-appellant was not a licensed or authorized overseas recruiter.
Ricardo Grepo testified that on 11 August 1993, he went to Borja's house where he met with
accused-appellant who received from him P15,000.00 for placement and processing fees. Accusedappellant told him he could get a job as a factory worker in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20,000.00.
Accused-appellant gave him a signed typewritten receipt [7] and assured him he could leave for Taiwan on
28 August 1993. Accused-appellant later told him that his visa was not yet ready and he thereafter
learned from Jose Borja that accused-appellant had been arrested for illegal recruitment activities. Grepo
filed his complaint on 30 August 1993.
Lucita Mascardo-Orcullo testified that she is the wife of Ernesto Orcullo, one of the
complainants. She stated that on 7 June 1993, she went with her husband to Borja's house where they
gave Ernesto's passport and other papers to accused-appellant who assured them that Ernesto could get
a job as a factory worker in Taiwan. Lucita further averred that they paidP15,000.00 to accused-appellant
for placement and processing fees as shown by a receipt signed by accused-appellant. [8]
Dionisa Latina testified that she is the wife of complainant Manuel Latina. She stated that on 9 June
1993, she and her husband went to Borja's house to meet accused-appellant who told them that Manuel
could get a job at a toy factory in Taiwan. They paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant who issued a
receipt[9] and assured them Manuel could leave on 30 June 1993. After said date, accused-appellant kept
on promising them that Manuel would be able to leave for Taiwan. The promises were never fulfilled.

Angelina de Luna, a Senior Labor Employment Officer of the POEA, testified that their office received
a subpoena from the trial court requiring the issuance of a certification stating whether or not Tan Tiong
Meng alias Tommy Tan was authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. De
Luna presented a certification signed by Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, Chief, Licensing Branch of the POEA
dated 7 July 1994 stating that accused-appellant is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit
workers for overseas employment.[10]
Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was the only witness for the defense. He
testified that he is a Singaporean national married to Estelita Oribiana, a Filipino-Chinese. He added that
he works as a sales representative for Oribiana Laboratory Supplies, a company owned by his brother-inlaw which sells laboratory equipment to various schools in Cavite.
Tan alleged that Jose Percival Borja was introduced to him by a certain Malou Lorenzo at the office
of their laboratory supplies in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Lorenzo allegedly told him that Borja needed his help in
processing job applications for abroad. When he talked to Borja, the latter told him that he could help in
convincing applicants that they could work in Taiwan. Borja offered him a P1,000.00 commission from the
amount paid by each applicant.
Tan admitted having received money from all the complainants but he said that all the money was
turned over to Borja after deducting his commission. Tan likewise admitted that he and his wife are
respondents in about seventy (70) cases of estafa and illegal recruitment but that it was Lorenzo who was
the main recruiter.
The prosecution presented Jose Percival Borja as a rebuttal witness. Borja testified that Tan was
introduced to him by Malou Lorenzo. Accused-appellant told him that they were direct recruiters for jobs in
Taiwan and that he has relatives there. Tan's offer was attractive considering that he charged
only P15,000.00 while the prevailing rate for job placements wasP45,000.00-P60,000.00. Borja added
that he even told his friends and relatives to apply with accused-appellant. Tan had told him that he
sometimes comes to Cavite to deliver laboratory equipment. When Tan called him up to tell him he was in
the area, Borja told him to come to his house. It was at his house where Tan accepted money from
several job applicants most of whom he (Borja) did not know. When Borja realized that Tan had cheated
the applicants, he helped set up a trap and had Tan arrested by his neighbor Tony Guinto, a Cavite City
policeman. Borja later learned that Tan had victimized several people in Batangas and Metro Manila.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant would have the Court believe that he merely acted as a
collector of money for the principal recruiter Borja who made the representations that he (Tan) could give
the applicants jobs in Taiwan. He maintains that he merely received commissions from the transactions
and that the deceit was employed not by him but by Borja who introduced him as a job recruiter.
The Court is not impressed by such bizarre pretensions.
Several revealing circumstances belie the version for the defense, namely:
1. Neil Mascardo testified that accused-appellant told him he could no longer return his money
because he had already sent it to his brother-in-law Lee Shut Kua in Taiwan;
2. All the receipts issued to complainants were signed by accused-appellant;
3. Tan admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases for estafa and
illegal recruitment in Batangas; [11]
4. Tan executed a sworn statement dated 13 September 1993 before SPO2 Eduardo G. Nover,
Jr. in the presence of his lawyer Atty. Florendo C. Medina wherein he admitted
receiving P15,000.00 from Gavino Asiman;[12]
5. The complainants all pointed to Tan and not Borja as the one who had represented to them
that he could give them jobs in Taiwan.
There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motives against Tan other than to bring him
to the bar of justice. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were straight-forward, credible
and convincing. The constitutional presumption of innocence in Tan's favor has been overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt and we affirm his convictions.

The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thus:


"(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." [13]
It is clear that accused-appellant's acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and
representing to said applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and
placement under the above provision of the Labor Code.
The Labor Code prohibits any person or entity, not authorized by the POEA, from engaging in
recruitment and placement activities thus:
"(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code x x x x
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group." [14]
The POEA having certified that accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment, it is clear that the offense committed against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal
recruitment in large scale punishable under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Accused-appellant's guilt of six (6) separate crimes of estafa has likewise been proven.
The argument that the deceit was employed by Jose Percival Borja and not by accused-appellant is
specious, even ridiculous. All the complainants agreed that it was accused-appellant Tan who assured
them of jobs in Taiwan. The assurances were made intentionally to deceive the would-be job applicants to
part with their money.
In People v. Calonzo,[15] the Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa
provided the elements of the crime are present. In People v. Romero[16] the elements of the crime were
stated thus:
a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and
b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.
Both elements have been proven in this case.
One final point. The names of a certain Malou Lorenzo and Chit Paulino have been mentioned by
accused-appellant as being illegal recruiters whom he contends are either the main recruiters or their
agents. It also appears that accused-appellant's wife Estelita Oribiana who is a co-accused in the other
illegal recruitment complaints may be a part of a large syndicate operating in Batangas, Cavite and Metro
Manila. There is nothing on the record to show that attempts were made to investigate these three (3)
people.
The campaign and drive against illegal recruiters should be continuous and unrelenting. Government
should not be content with bringing to justice but a number of these diabolic denizens of society who
thrive on the dreams of our countrymen of having a better life. Only when the last of their tribe has been
convicted and punished can the government rightfully claim that it has fulfilled the constitutional mandate
to protect the rights and promote the welfare of workers. [17]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias
"Tommy Tan" guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 124671-75. September 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LINDA SAGAYDO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 59
convicting accused Linda Sagaydo of illegal recruitment in large scale and of four (4) cases of estafa, and
sentencing her as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered (1) In Criminal Case No. 10838-R, finding the accused LINDA SAGAYDO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Article 38(b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by P.D. 1920 and further
amended by P.D. 2018, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P100,000.00;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 10839-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine
(9) years of prision mayor as maximum;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum;
(4) In Criminal Case No. 10841-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine
(9) years of prision mayor as maximum; and
(5) In Criminal Case No. 10837-R, finding the accused GUILTY of the crime of Estafa and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine
(9) years of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant Rogelio Tibeb the amount P39,000.00;
Jessie Bolinao, the amount of P35,000.00; Gina Cleto, P15,000.00; and Naty Pita the amount of
P38,500.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On December 15, 1992, Baguio City Prosecutor II Estrellita P. Bernabe filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Baguio City, Branch 59, separate informations charging accused Linda Sagaydo with one (1) case
of illegal recruitment in large scale, and four (4) cases of estafa. [3]
Upon arraignment on August 18, 1993, accused pleaded not guilty to all the five (5) charges against
her.[4] Thus, trial ensued.
The complainants recounted their respective experience with accused Linda Sagaydo in this wise:
Gina Cleto, an AB Political Science graduate and community worker residing in No. 19-A Sumulong
St., Holy Ghost Proper, Baguio City testified[5] that she knew the accused for almost a year as the latter
also resided at Sumulong Street. Sometime in September, 1991, the accused went to Ginas house and
encouraged her to work as a factory worker in Korea. Gina said she had to think it over first since she
went back and forth to Tabuk and Baguio City. She and the accused met again in the house of the former
in December, 1991, where the accused reiterated her offer of employment to Gina. When Gina asked her
whether she was a licensed recruiter, and accused answered in the affirmative. Accused told Gina that
she could not have the latters travel papers and passport processed unless she gave an advance
payment of P15,000.00.

Gina then went to San Gabriel, La Union to get the P15,000.00 required by the accused. They met
again in the house of Gina in the last week of December, 1991, where she handed the P15,000.00 to the
accused who assured Gina that she was leaving for Korea on January 6, 1992, provided Gina paid her
the remaining balance of P30,000.00.
Gina then went to Lepanto to ask for money from her brother and sister. She returned to Baguio City
on January 2, 1992, with P28,000.00 on hand. Gina and the accused met on January 5, 1992, where the
latter informed her that her flight for Korea on January 6, 1992, was postponed . Accused then advised
Gina to just hold the P30,000.00 balance until her flight pushed through.
About three (3) months later, or in April, 1992, Gina met the accused in Sumulong Street. Gina
demanded from the accused the return of P15,000.00 advance payment she had given her, but the
accused just answered that she would process her papers.
The next time they met was in November, 1992, where Gina again asked the accused to return
the P15,000.00, to no avail. This prompted Gina to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) regional office in Baguio City to inquire whether the accused was a licensed recruiter. The POEA
issued a certification dated November 25, 1992[6] stating that the accused was not licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of the region.
Rogelio Tibeb, a farmer and resident of San Gabriel, La Union, testified [7] that he was informed by his
townmate Domaan Samanillo that the accused was engaged in recruitment. Sometime in December,
1991, Rogelio went to the residence of accused to inquire on the requirements for overseas
employment. Accused replied that he needed to submit his 2 x 2 pictures and a passport. The accused
then told him to secure P39,000.00 as placement fee. In the last week of December, 1991, Rogelio
handed the P39,000.00 to the accused who told him to go home and wait for the date of his
flight. Accused did not issue a receipt.
Rogelio waited for months but his flight never pushed through. He then went to the Baguio POEA
office with his co-complainants Jessie Bolinao and Naty Pita where they found out that the accused was
not a licensed recruiter, per certification dated November 25, 1992.[8]
Naty Pita, also a resident of San Gabriel, La Union testified [9] that sometime in November, 1991, she
visited her sister-in-law who happened to be a neighbor-boarder of the accused at 19-A Sumulong Street,
Baguio City. Upon being informed that the accused was a recruiter, Naty and her sister-in-law went to the
room of accused where the latter recruited her as factory worker in Korea. The accused asked Naty to
prepare P38,500.00 for the fare and travel documents plus P1,500.00 for the passport. Naty went home
to look for money.
On December 26, 1991, Naty handed P38,500.00 to the accused who told her that she would be
leaving for Korea on January 6, 1992. After that, Naty went home.
On January 4, 1992, Naty went to the boarding house of accused in anticipation of her January 6,
1992, flight. Accused told her that she could not leave because she had no visa. So Naty asked the
accused to return her money. The accused instead offered her a placement in Taiwan to which Naty
agreed. Naty was told to wait for the call of accused.
Days passed and Naty had not received any call from the accused. Naty then went to the Baguio
POEA office where she, too, found out that the accused was not a licensed recruiter.
Jessie Bolinao, a farmer and resident of Lon-oy, San Gabriel, La Union recalled [10] that the accused
was his neighbor in Lubnagan, Kalinga-Apayao until 1982, and was even a distant relative of his father. In
the second week of December, 1991, Jessie went to the house of the accused and gave her P35,000.00
as placement fee for his employment to Korea as factory worker, on the assurance that he would be
leaving on December 28, 1991. Jessie, however, was not able to leave on that date because according to
the accused, his travel papers had not been processed.
Jessie returned to the house of accused more than ten (10) times thereafter to follow-up his papers,
until he found out that accused was no longer residing there. He thereafter inquired at the Baguio POEA
office whether the accused was a licensed recruiter, in answer to which the office issued a
certification[11]stating that accused was not a licensed recruiter.

The accused denied having recruited any of the private complainants. She claimed that they came to
her voluntarily after being informed that she was able to send her three (3) sons to Korea. While accused
admitted having received money from complainants Gina Cleto and Naty Pita, she said she used their
money to buy their plane tickets. Gina and Naty were not able to leave because the Korean government
imposed a visa requirement beginning January, 1992. When asked why she was not able to return the
money of Gina and Naty, accused said that she returned the plane tickets to the Tour Master travel
Agency for refund but said agency did not make reimbursements. With respect to complainants Jessie
Bolinao and Rogelio Tibeb, the accused denied having received any money from them. [12]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the complainants and rejected the denial of
accused. Thus, on October 25, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting her of the charges of
illegal recruitment and estafa, the decretal portion of which is quoted in the opening paragraph of this
opinion.
Hence, this appeal.[13]
In this appeal, accused-appellant claimed that she was erroneously convicted of illegal recruitment
and estafa because the trial court failed to consider that she only processed the travel documents of the
private complainants as tourists, and that no recruitment for employment abroad took place.
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Illegal recruitment has been defined to include the act of engaging in any of the activities mentioned
in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code without the required license or authority from the POEA. Under the
aforesaid provision, any of the following activities would constitute recruitment and
placement: canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not. Article 13 (b) further provides that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two (2) or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group. [14] This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the
recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or
as a group.[15]
All the aforementioned requisites were present in this case. The accused-appellant made
representations to each of the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory
workers, constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13
(b) of the Labor Code. From the testimonies of the private complainants that the trial court found to be
credible and untainted with improper motives, there is no denying that accused-appellant gave the
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such
that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[16] As against the positive
and categorical testimonies of the complainants, mere denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail.[17]
We thus defer to the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of the complainants as there is
no showing that any of them had ill motives against accused-appellant other than to bring her to justice for
the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa. Their testimonies were straightforward, credible and
convincing.[18]
As to the license requirement, the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority
to recruit for employment abroad, per certification issued by the POEA Regional Extension Unit in Baguio
City, [19] stating that ...the name LINDA SAGAYDO per existing and available records from this Office is not
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of
the Region." It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment unlawful or
criminal.[20]
Anent the last requirement, accused-appellant engaged in illegal recruitment against four (4)
persons, namely, complainants Gina Cleto, Jessie Bolinao, Rogelio Tibeb and Naty Pita.

A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art.
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy because illegal recruitment and
estafa are distinct offenses. Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which criminal intent is not
necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which criminal intent is necessary.[21]
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.The offended party must have relied
on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damages.[22]
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and
enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for
employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their
money back.[23]
The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to produce receipts as
proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not free the latter from liability. The absence of receipts
cannot defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment.[24] As long as the witnesses can positively
show through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in prohibited recruitment,
he may be convicted of the offense despite the absence of receipts. [25]
With respect to the penalty, accused-appellant having been found guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale in Criminal Case No. 10838-R, was aptly meted out the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (a) of the Labor Code.[26]
As to the estafa cases, the pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).- any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which maybe imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
xxx."
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that, in imposing a prison sentence under the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that, which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. [27] The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty is left to the sound discretion of the court, to fix from within the
range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.[28]
In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, where complainant Gina Cleto was defrauded of P15,000.00, there
being no modifying circumstances, the accused may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.[29]
In Criminal Case Nos. 10837-R, 10839-R and 10841-R where the respective amounts defrauded
from complainants Rogelio Tibeb, Jessie Bolinao and Naty Pita exceeded P22,000.00, the penalty
prescribed by law therefor is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, to be imposed in

its maximum period. The penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
and the maximum penalty therefor is six (6) years eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days to eight (8)
years, plus an additional one (1) year since the three (3) amounts had an excess over P22,000.00, of
only P17,000.00,P13,000.00 and P16,500.00.[30] Thus, accused-appellant may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, in each case.[31]
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellant LINDA SAGAYDO for illegal
recruitment and estafa, subject to the MODIFICATION that:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 10840-R, she is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and
(2) In Criminal Cases Nos. 10837-R, 10839-R and 10841-R, she is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, in each case.
Accused-appellant
is
further
ordered
to
indemnify
the
private
complainants the following amounts: Gina Cleto - P15,000.00; Rogelio Tibeb - P39,000.00; Jessie
Bolinao - P35,000.00; and Naty Pita - P38,500.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
With additional costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 119594. January 18, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENZON ONG y SATE alias "BENZ
ONG," accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1]of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Baguio City, finding accusedappellant Benzon Ong y Sate, alias Benz Ong, guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large scale
and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment, pay a fine of P100,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and pay the costs; and (2) seven counts of estafa for which he was
sentenced to suffer, on each count, an indeterminate prison term ranging from four years and two months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, in two cases, and to
nine years of prision mayor, as maximum, in five cases, and to indemnify the eight private complainants in
the aggregate amount of P277,500.00 with interest at the legal rate counted from July 25, 1994, until fully
paid.
In Criminal Case No. 13146-R, the information for illegal recruitment in large scale [2] alleged That sometime during and between the period from November, 1993 to January, 1994, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to
the following persons: Kyler
1. Noel Bacasnot y Baldivino;
2. Ruth A. Eliw;
3. Samuel Bagni;
4. Francisca Cayaya;
5. Teofilo S. Gallao, Jr.;
6. Sally Kamura;
7. Paul G. Esteban;
8. David Joaquin; and
9. Solidad M. Malinias

in Taiwan, without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper
governmental agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case Nos. 13147-R to 13154-R, eight informations for estafa were filed. Save for the dates of
commission of the crime, the names of the complainant and the amounts involved, the informations
uniformly alleged That sometime in [date],[3] in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud one [name][4] by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused
knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons
intending to secure work abroad convinced said [name] and pretended that he/she/they
could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of [amount],
[5]
when in truth and in fact they could not; the said [name], deceived and convinced by
the false pretenses employed by the accused, parted away the total sum of [amount], in
favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said [name] in the
aforementioned amount of [amount in words][6] [amount], Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
All indictments being based on the same facts, the cases were tried jointly. Accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty to each of the charges, whereupon trial commenced.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts: Kycalr
Complainant Noel B. Bacasnot is an optometrist by profession. In September 1993, he met accusedappellant at the insurance office of Zaldy Galos at Laperal Building in Session Road, Baguio City.
Accused-appellant represented to Bacasnot that he had contacts in Taiwan, Republic of China, who were
looking for workers. Factory workers would be paid P15,000.00 a month, while construction workers
would be paid P1,200.00 a day. According to him, his mother was in Taiwan and could help Bacasnot get
a job as an optometrist with a salary of as much as P50,000.00 to P80,000.00 a month. A week later,
accused-appellant told Bacasnot that, after talking to his mother, he thought it would be better if he
(Bacasnot) worked initially as a factory worker for six months. Bacasnot agreed. He was
chargedP30,000.00 for placement fee, of which P15,000.00 was to be paid at once and the balance
of P15,000.00 to be deducted from his salary once he got a job in Taiwan. As Bacasnot did not have
enough money, he was allowed to pay P10,000.00 as downpayment for his placement and processing fee
which accused-appellant received on January 31, 1994 (Exh. A)[7] at the Kimsam Eatery on Session
Road. Bacasnot was assured by accused-appellant that upon completion of his papers, he would leave
for Taiwan within three to four months thereafter.[8]
On the other hand, upon learning of job opportunities abroad, complainants Ruth A. Eliw, Sally
Kamura and Solidad Malinias also sought the assistance of accused-appellant. They were charged a
higher placement fee of P40,000.00 each, and payments were made to accused-appellant at the Gallaos
Optical Clinic, where Bacasnot treated patients, at 159 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City. Accusedappellant later accompanied complainants to Manila purportedly for interview and medical examination at
the Steadfast Recruitment Agency with which accused-appellant claimed to be connected. However,
instead of taking them to a recruitment agency, accused-appellant took them to an office in United
Nations Avenue where three men, allegedly Taiwanese nationals, interviewed them and later took them to
a clinic where they were examined.[9] Mesm
Eliw, Kamura and Malinias each paid accused-appellant the amount of P25,000.00 on January 21,
February 13 and March 30, 1994 (Exhs. D-1 and K), [10] respectively. On May 30, 1994, each of them paid
the balance of P15,000.00 (Exh. D).[11] In a handwritten agreement (Exh. D) prepared by Almi G. Bacasnot
(wife of Noel B. Bacasnot), accused-appellant acknowledged payment of P45,000.00, representing the
balance of P15,000.00 from each of complainants and promised them that they would leave for Taiwan in
three weeks. The agreement reads:
AGREEMENT
I, BENSON ONG, OF LEGAL AGE, RECEIVED THE AMOUNT OF FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P45,000.00) AS RECRUITMENT FULL PAYMENT

ADDITIONAL TO SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) WHICH WAS


FIRST GIVEN TO ME FROM
1. SALLY KAMURA
2. RUTH ELIW
3. SOLIDAD MALINIAS
IN A CONDITION THAT I SHOULD LET THEM SIGN THE ABOVE NAMES THE
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR TAIWAN NOT MORE THAN THREE WEEKS
(JUNE 3 TO JUNE 24, 1994).
HEREBY, IF I COULD NOT LET THEM HAVE THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
FOR TAIWAN, I WILL RETURN THE MONEY WITHIN ONE MONTH THE AMOUNT OF
(P120,000.00) ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY AFTER THE
CONDITION ON THE DATE OF JULY 24, 94.
SIGNED ON THE MONTH OF MAY IN THE 30th DAY OF THE YEAR 1994.
APPLICANTS NAME AND SIGNATURE Calrky
SOLIDAD M. MALINIAS (Sgd.)
RUTH ELIW (Sgd.).RECEIVED AND AGREED BY:
SALLY KAMURA (Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
BENSON ONG
RECEIVER
WITNESSES:
(Sgd.)
ALMI G. BACASNOT
(Sgd.)
NOEL B. BACASNOT
Accused-appellant never fulfilled his promise. When complainants sought to inquire about their
application, they discovered that accused-appellant no longer held office at the place in the upper story of
Marios Restaurant on Session Road. Apparently, accused-appellant was already into hiding.
A week before June 27, 1994, Eliw chanced upon accused-appellant and she was told that Kamura and
Malinias had passed the interview and medical examination in Manila. Accused-appellant then asked Eliw
to pay an additional amount of P5,000.00 for processing. Instead of paying, Eliw denounced accusedappellants recruitment activities to the local office of the National Bureau of Investigation. On June 25,
1994, the NBI confirmed from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Regional Extension
Unit (POEA-REU) in the Cordillera Autonomous Region that accused-appellant had not been licensed to
recruit for overseas employment. On June 27, 1994, a team composed of an NBI agent and three special
investigators conducted an entrapment operation. Eliw handed the P1,500.00 marked money to accusedappellant, promising to pay the balance of P3,500.00 later. At that instance, the NBI group nabbed
accused-appellant and placed him under arrest. He was subjected to paraffin test and found positive for
the presence of fluorescent powder.[12] Slx
Complainants Samuel Bagni, Teofilo Gallao, Jr., Paul Esteban and David Joaquin were likewise
swindled. Accused-appellant collected P25,000.00 from Bagni on January 17, 1994 (Exh. M)
[13]
andP15,000.00 on May 9, 1994 (Exh. M-1).[14] From Gallao he collected P25,000.00 on January 31,
1994 (Exh. I)[15] and P15,000.00 on May 9, 1994 (Exh. I-1).[16] He collected various amounts from the
others, as follows: from Esteban, P7,500.00 on November 30, 1993 (Exh. E)[17] and P30,000.00 on March
7, 1994 (Exh. F);[18] from Joaquin, P7,500.00 on November 30, 1993 (Exh. E),[19] P7,500.00 on December
28, 1993 (Exh. E-1),[20] and P15,000.00 on March 6, 1994 (Exh. E-2).[21] Joaquin was with Esteban when
he was introduced to accused-appellant through Alice Sabala on November 15, 1993, at the Laperal
Building on Session Road, Baguio City where they made their first and second payments. Joaquins third
payment was made at the Bombay Bazaar on Magsaysay Avenue and he, together with Esteban, was
supposed to leave in March 1994. On the other hand, Gallao was a technician at the Gallaos Optical
Clinic. He came to know accused-appellant through Bacasnot who is the husband of Gallaos cousin, Almi
Gallao Bacasnot. Bagni, meanwhile, met accused-appellant through Bacasnot, Bagnis brother-in-law.
Gallao and Bagni were scheduled to leave by June 15, 1994. As with Eliw, Kamura and Malinias, both

Gallao and Bagni gave the downpayment of their fees to accused-appellant at Gallaos Optical Clinic. The
balance of their fees was paid at the house of accused-appellant at 83 Happy Homes, Baguio City.Slxmis
Accused-appellant failed to comply with his commitment to send complainants Bacasnot, Eliw, Kamura,
Malinias, Bagni, Gallao, Esteban and Joaquin to Taiwan as he could no longer be located after collecting
placement fees from them.[22]
Earlier, at the instance of complainant Bacasnot, Atty. Justinian O. Licnachan, POEA-REU Legal Officer of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region, issued a certification dated June 24, 1994 (Exh. C) [23] which read:
This is to certify that BENZ ONG a.k.a. "BENZON ONG SATE & JOHNSON ONG SATE",
per existing and available records from this office, is not licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of the region. He is
neither in possession of the required Provincial Recruitment Authority.
Complainant Francisca Cayaya failed to testify despite due notice to her. Her complaint for estafa was,
therefore, dismissed.[24] On the other hand, the complaint for estafa of complainant Bacasnot, which
should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court in view of the amount (P10,000.00) involved, was
nonetheless allowed because it arose out of the same facts as the case for illegal recruitment. Sdaadsc
For his defense, accused-appellant Benzon Ong y Sate admitted having met complainant Bacasnot
through Zaldy Galos. He got to know the other complainants through Bacasnot and one Patring Esteban
(sister of complainant Paul Esteban), his partner in the video rental business. He introduced himself to
Bacasnot as one from Taiwan and told Bacasnot that his mother and brother were based in Taiwan.
Accused-appellant testified that when complainants sought his help, he advised them to go to the POEA
but complainants claimed that they do not know anyone at said office. He then offered to scout for a
recruitment agency in Manila. Accused-appellant accompanied complainants to Steadfast Recruitment
Agency in Manila and introduced them to a certain Marilyn Pagsibigan, Marketing Manager of the agency.
He came to know about the agency through a friend in Manila, one Ernesto Sy. He denied collecting
placement fees from the complainants and claimed that his signatures on the receipts had been forged.
He also claimed that on June 27, 1994, he was at the Gallaos Optical Clinic to collect the payment for the
betamax player which Bacasnot had previously ordered and which accused-appellant had delivered a
week earlier. Bacasnot told accused-appellant that Eliw wanted to buy the betamax player
for P10,000.00. As Eliw had only P1,500.00, accused-appellant at first refused to accept the payment.
When Eliw assured him she would pay the balance, accused-appellant finally agreed to receive the
payment. As accused-appellant received the money, he was nabbed by NBI agents who identified
themselves and asked accused-appellant to go with them to the NBI office. He was later charged with
illegal recruitment.[25]
On November 23, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale and of seven counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:[26]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused BENZON ONG y SATE alias
Benz Ong, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale as charged in Crim. Case No. 13146-R and hereby sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The Court also finds and declares the same accused BENZON ONG y SATE, alias Benz
Ong, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa on seven counts and hereby
sentences him:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 13147-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to pay
the costs;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 13148-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to pay
the costs;
(c) In Crim. Case No. 13150-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as

minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to pay


the costs;
(d) In Crim. Case No. 13151-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to pay
the costs; Scslx
(e) In Crim. Case No. 13152-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to
pay the costs;
(f) In Crim. Case No. 13153-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to
pay the costs; and
(g) In Crim. Case No. 13154-R, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision mayor, as maximum; and to pay
the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his preventive
imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
The said accused BENZON ONG y SATE, alias Benz Ong, shall furthermore indemnify
the below-named persons the amounts indicated opposite their names, to wit:
1.........Noel Bacasnot

- - - - - -........P10,000.00

2.........Ruth Eliw

- - - - - -........ 40,000.00

3.........Samuel Bagni

- - - - - -........ 40,000.00

4.........Teofilo Gallao, Jr.

- - - - - -........ 40,000.00

5.........Sally Kamura

- - - - - -........ 40,000.00

6.........Paul Esteban

- - - - - -........ 37,500.00

7.........David Joaquin

- - - - - -........ 30,000.00

8.........Solidad Malinias

- - - - - -........40,000.00

all amounts to bear interest at the legal rate from July 25, 1994, the date of the filing of
the indictments, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESSES. Slxsc
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant claims that when complainants filled out their respective bio-data, application
forms and other documents for employment in Taiwan, they knew that they were applying for employment

abroad through the Steadfast Recruitment Agency. He claims that he merely suggested to them the
opportunity to work overseas but that he never advertised himself as a recruiter.
The contention has no merit
Accused-appellant is charged with violation of Art. 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2018, which provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices
enumerated in Art. 34 of said Code, undertaken by persons who have no license or authority to engage in
recruitment for overseas employment is illegal and punishable under Art. 39. Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor
Code, "recruitment and placement" refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, is considered engaged in
recruitment and placement. On the other hand, "referral" is defined as the act of passing along or
forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment
to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. [27]
On the other hand, illegal recruitment is considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of
these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a
syndicate,i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another; or, (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined
under Art. 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect
to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and
(3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. As
defined, a "license" is that which is issued by the Department of Labor and Employment authorizing a
person or entity to operate a private employment agency, while an "authority" is that issued by the DOLE
entitling a person or association to so engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private
recruitment agency. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment
unlawful or criminal.[28] Missdaa
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[29] Accused-appellant represented himself to
complainants as one capable of deploying workers abroad and even quoted the alleged salary rates of
factory and construction workers in Taiwan. He advised Bacasnot to accept a job as a factory worker first
because it would be then easier for him to transfer jobs once he got to Taiwan. Accused-appellant said his
mother, who was based in Taiwan, could help Bacasnot. Bacasnot paid accused-appellant an initial
placement fee agreeing to pay the balance through salary deductions once he was employed. Accusedappellant also promised jobs to Eliw and the other complainants. He accompanied them to Manila so that
they could be interviewed and physically examined at the Steadfast Recruitment Agency with which
accused-appellant represented he was connected. These acts of accused-appellant created the distinct
impression on the eight complainants that he was a recruiter for overseas employment.[30] There is no
question that he was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Nor is
there any question that he dealt with complainants. What he claims is that he merely "suggested" to
complainants to apply at the Steadfast Recruitment Agency, which is a recruitment agency.
Even if accused-appellant did no more than "suggest" to complainants where they could apply for
overseas employment, his act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code.
Indeed, the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record shows that accused-appellant did more
than just make referrals. The evidence shows that he made misrepresentations to them concerning his
authority to recruit for overseas employment and collected various amounts from them for placement
fees. Clearly, accused-appellant committed acts constitutive of large scale illegal recruitment.
Second. Accused-appellant denies that the signatures in the receipts of payments are his. To be sure, the
presentation of the receipts acknowledging payments is not necessary for the successful prosecution of
accused-appellant. We have already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment
does not warrant the acquittal of the accused-appellant and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As
long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused-

appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
[31]
Rtcsppedo
The prosecution evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was engaged in illegal
recruitment committed in large scale. He was positively identified by complainants as the person who had
recruited them for employment in Taiwan. He succeeded in inveigling them into paying various amounts to
him for their placement fees. Their testimonies dovetail with each other in material points. There is no
showing that any of complainants had any ill-motives to testify against accused-appellant. Their
testimonies were straightforward, credible and convincing. [32] In contrast, accused-appellant failed to
present evidence to rebut the evidence of the prosecution. He failed to present the person allegedly
responsible for the recruitment of the complainants. As a result of his failure to do so, he risked the
adverse inference and legal presumption that he did not present such witnesses because their
testimonies would actually be adverse if produced.[33] For, indeed, accused-appellant could have adduced
evidence to prove that he was an employee of the Steadfast Recruitment Agency, a duly authorized
agency. He could have presented the manager of the agency to corroborate his claim that complainants
actually applied to the agency and not through him. Instead, he merely interposed denials in his defense.
As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants, accused-appellants mere denials
cannot prevail.[34] He was aptly meted out the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine
ofP100,000.00 under Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code.
Third. Accused-appellant contends that the elements of estafa have not been proven by the prosecution,
specifically, the requirement that complainants must have relied on the false pretenses of accusedappellant, because complainants knew that he was not a licensed recruiter.
The contention has no merit. The following elements of estafa are present in these cases, to wit: (1) the
accused has defrauded the offended party by means of abuse of confidence or by deceit; and (2) as a
result, damage or prejudice, which is capable of pecuniary estimation, is caused to the offended party or
third person. Accused-appellant misrepresented himself to complainants as one who can make
arrangements for job placements in Taiwan, and by reason of his misrepresentations, false assurances
and deceit, complainants were induced to part with their money, thus causing them damage and
prejudice.
Moreover, it is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted
of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of double jeopardy
because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas
estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.[35]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130170. January 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROWENA ESLABON DIONISIO, JOSEFINA


MALLARI y PENAFLOR (Acquitted) and DIANE DOBLE y MACATUMPAG
(Acquitted), accused,
ROWENA ESLABON DIONISIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 [1] in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-26376, finding accused-appellant Rowena Eslabon Dionisio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing her to suffer life

imprisonment, pay a fine of P100,000.00 and reimburse to private complainants the sums of money she
collected.
The factual antecedents of the case, as appearing on the records, are as follows:
Sometime in August 1991, a certain Cora Molar enticed private complainant Juanita Castillo to apply
for overseas employment at the office of Jovial Trading and Employment Services, located at the third
floor of the Villa Building in Cubao, Quezon City. Lured by the prospect of working abroad, Castillo went to
the said office where she met accused-appellant Rowena Dionisio and Josefina
Mallari, a.k.a. Manay. Dionisio and Mallari assured Castillo that they had the right connections and could
send her to Saudi Arabia. They demanded from Castillo P9,000.00 as service fee and to defray expenses
for passport, medical examination and NBI clearance.
When Castillo told them that she did not have the money at that time, Dionisio said that she could
make a partial payment of P5,000.00 and pay the balance later on. Dionisio sent Molar to Castillos house
to collect the downpayment on August 12, 1991. Castillo handed over P4,000.00 to Molar, following the
telephone instruction of Dionisio, as evidenced by a receipt [2] signed by Molar. According to Castillo, she
went back to the Cubao office on August 17, 1991, where the P4,000.00 was remitted to Dionisio by
Molar. Dionisio and Mallari then promised to secure her a visa so she could leave immediately for the oilrich kingdom.
On September 3, 1991, Dionisio demanded another P1,000.00 from Castillo, which she delivered on
the same day as shown by a receipt [3] signed by Dionisio. Again, Dionisio assured Castillo that she would
facilitate the processing of all necessary documents and that a job awaited Castillo abroad as governess
and domestic helper.
After repeatedly following up her application with no result, it soon became apparent to Castillo that
she was hoodwinked. To confirm her suspicion, she went to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) office where she was informed that Dionisio, Mallari and the firm known as Jovial
Trading were neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. [4] Castillo
secured a certification[5] to this effect from the POEA and forthwith, went to Camp Karingal where she
executed a sworn statement[6] against Dionisio and company.
At about the same time, private complainant Juan Carandang, together with Juanito Castillo, Noel
Villanueva and Lito Gorospe, were likewise recruited to work abroad by accused-appellant and her
cohorts. Carandang was introduced by a friend to Diana Doble, who accompanied him to the office of
Jovial Trading and introduced him to Dionisio and Mallari.
Dionisio asked for a processing fee of P3,000.00, which Carandang promptly gave on August 3,
1991. Carandang was further persuaded to part with the additional amount of P4,500.00 on two separate
occasions, covered by two receipts[7] signed by Dionisio dated September 23 and October 24, 1991.
Subsequently, Dionisio informed Carandang and his other companions that they were to leave for
the Middle East on October 31, 1991. A day before the scheduled departure date, however, they were told
that the same was postponed to November 6, 1991, on which date, they were again told that their plane
tickets have not yet been released. Soon enough, they all realized that they were fooled by Dionisio,
when they found out from the POEA that Dionisio, et al. were not licensed recruiters.[8] Carandang
likewise secured a certification[9] from the POEA and executed a sworn statement against Dionisios group.
On the other hand, private complainant Alberto Meeks was also purportedly duped by Dionisio and
company. As testified by Albertos wife, Angelita, the Meeks spouses went to the office of Jovial Trading on
September 9, 1991 and gave Dionisio P7,000.00 as placement fee for Albertos application for a job in
South Korea. Dionisio issued and signed a receipt [10] for the said amount in the presence of Mallari and
Doble. However, Alberto was not able to go to South Korea, as promised, and later found employment in
Saudi Arabia through the efforts of another recruitment agency.[11]
Thus, on November 11, 1991, Dionisio, Mallari, Doble and one Jane Doe alias Cora Molar, whose
real identity was not established, were charged before Branch 94 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for large scale illegal recruitment. The information against them reads:

That on or about the period comprised from August 1991 to October 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, without any authority of law, and for a fee, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment and/or job placement
abroad to JUAN CARANDANG Y PRECILLA, JUANITO GOROSPE Y SANTILLAN, JUANITA CASTILLO
Y ALVAREZ, NOEL VILLANUEVA Y HENSON, ALBERTO MEEKS Y ADAN, ANTONIO GANZON Y
GARDE, ROBERTO CRISTOBAL Y FABRES and REYNALDO CASTILLO Y PELAEZ, without first
obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3)
or more persons individually or as group as penalized under Article 38 and 39 as amended by P.D. 2018
of the Labor Code (P.D. 442).
Contrary to Law.[12]
Upon arraignment on January 6, 1992, Dionisio, Mallari and Doble pleaded not guilty to the
information.[13] Cora Molar had absconded and remained at large. Trial on the merits then ensued.
On October 2, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Rowena Eslabon-Dionisio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed on a large scale and sentences her to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), to indemnify the
following private complainants: Juanita Castillo-P4,000.00; Juan Carandang-P4,500.00 and Alberto
Meeks-P7,000.00; and to pay the costs.
The other two accused, Josefina Mallari and Diana Doble, are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The trial court rejected Dionisios defense that the real illegal recruiter was Cora Molar, who rented a
table in the office of Jovial Trading where Dionisio was the sole proprietor. It disregarded Dionisios claim
that she received the money from the private complainants in behalf of Molar and that Dionisio was
engaged only in the business of buying and selling slippers, cosmetics and other goods. The trial court
gave credence to private complainants testimonies that they were recruited by Dionisio, who did not
possess the authority or license to conduct recruitment activities, as certified by the POEA and the
testimony of prosecution witness Benjamin Vasquez, a POEA employee. [15]
Accused-appellant Dionisio is now before us on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE COMPLAINANTS AND DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF ACCUSED ROWENA ESLABON
DIONISIO.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING DIONISIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED AND OF ORDERING HER TO PAY FINE AND INDEMNIFICATION OF AMOUNTS TO
COMPLAINANTS.[16]
Accused-appellant maintains that no conclusive proof was adduced by the prosecution to show that
she engaged in recruitment activities. She did not openly or directly advertise herself as a recruiter, nor
did she personally ask the private complainants to apply in her office for overseas jobs. The name of her
firm, Jovial Trading, alone implies that she was a merchant engaged in the buying and selling of goods
and not a recruiter.
Accused-appellant admits that she received the various amounts of money from private
complainants, as evidenced by receipts signed by her. However, she claims that she received the said
money on behalf of Cora Molar and did not benefit from it in any way. She further claims that she merely
entertained Molars clients in her absence since Molar rented a table in her office.

Accused-appellants submissions fail to convince us.


We agree with the trial courts observation that private complainants did not harbor any ill motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant. Indeed, it is against human nature and experience for strangers
to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. [17] As
such, the testimony of private complainants that accused-appellant was the person who transacted with
them, promised them jobs and received money therefor, was correctly given credence and regarded as
trustworthy. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the
prosecution strongly tends to indicate that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [18]
Juanita Castillo described how she was recruited by accused-appellant in this wise:
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you arrived at their office, whom did you meet?
A. I met Rowena Eslabon Dionisio and Josefina Mallari.
Q. And were you able to talk with them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was the nature of the conversation?
A. Rowena Dionisio and Josefina Mallari convinced me that they have a right connection and
they are what you call it malakas and they can send us abroad, that they can process our
papers to send us abroad.
Q. When you said here that they were malakas and that they have connections with other
agencies, you were convinced by them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you do when you were convinced?
A. They asked for a P9,000.00 service fee and they told me, Rowena Dionisio and Josefina
Mallari, to process my papers including my passport, my medical examination and my NBI
clearance.
Q. And what did you do when you were told by them to give that P9,000.00?
A. I told them that I dont have enough money that total of P9,000.00, but they told me, Josefina
Mallari and Rowena Dionisio, you can give partial payment of P5,000.00 only and later on
the balance of P4,000.00.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Were you able to give partial payment to the herein accused?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. I gave the partial payment of P4,000.00 on August 12, 1991.
Q. Where did you give that P4,000.00?
xxxxxxxxx
WITNESS
In our house.
Q. To whom did you give that amount?
A. To Cora Molar.

Q. And who is that Cora Molar?


A. The representative. I gave the money, the P4,000.00, to Cora Molar through the instruction of
Rowena Dionisio.
COURT
I want to ... Thru the instruction. Why? Were you instructed by Rowena?
WITNESS
Yes, sir, thru the telephone.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. After you gave this P4,000.00, what did you do next?
A. I went to their office at 3rd Floor, Villa Building, Cubao, Quezon City.
Q. When was that?
A. August 17 of 1991.
Q. And what did you do when you went there to their office?
A. Cora Molar gave this money to Dionisio, to Rowena Dionisio.
Q. And after Cora Molar gave that money to Rowena Dionisio, what happened next?
A. They promised that they will do their best to get our visa right away or the soonest possible
time so that we can be sent abroad.
Q. When you said, they, whom are you referring to?
A. Josefina Mallari and Rowena Dionisio.
x x x x x x x x x.[19]
Similarly, Juan Carandang testified as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What transpired when you were accompanied by Doble to their office at Villa Building?
A. I was introduced to Rowena Eslabon and she promised me that I will be working in Saudi
Arabia.
Q. And after talking with Eslabon that you are applying for work abroad, what did you do next?
A. When she said that, she asked money from me to process the papers at the POEA.
Q. And were you able to give that money?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much did Eslabon ask from you?
A. P3,000.00.
Q. Was there a receipt for that purpose?
A. None, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. And after you paid her the sum of P3,000.00, what did she do next?
A. She told me to come back on a certain day in order to know if I will really have a visa.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you return as ordered by Rowena?
A. Yes. I came back and she told me I will prepare money in the amount of P2,500.00 because
the visa is already ready and the amount is for the ticket.
Q. And did you again give the sum of P2,500.00 as requested by Eslabon?
A. On that date, I cannot give but I told her I will come back.
Q. Did you return?
A. Yes. Last September 23, I came back and gave her the amount of P2,500.00.
Q. Where did you give that amount?
A. I gave it to Rowena and she issued me a receipt.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. After giving the amount, what transpired next?
A. Rowena told me to call her next week and she told me I will ask for the result of my
application.
Q. Did you call her as requested?
A. Yes. And she told me when I called her to bring again some money.
Q. And did you bring as requested by Eslabon the money?
A. Yes, I came back on October 24 and I brought the amount of P2,500.00.
Q. And did you give that amount?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there a receipt to that effect?
A. Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you were informed by Eslabon that on Oct. 31, you will be going to Saudi Arabia, did
you come back to the office of Eslabon on October 31?
A. On Oct. 30, I went to the office.
Q. Did you talk with somebody in the office of the lady?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the conversation all about?
A. When I came back on October 30 to confirm whether we will proceed or not, she told me that
it was postponed.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. After you were informed by Miss Eslabon that your schedule for Saudi Arabia was
postponed, what did you do?
A. I asked her why it was postponed and why we do not have ticket.
Q. What was her reply?

A. She said the tickets were still under process and because of her convincing words, I believed
her and asked her when we will return.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What transpired at the office?
A. She said we will be able to leave on Nov. 6.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. And on Nov. 6, were you able to leave?
A. No, sir because the tickets were not released yet.
x x x x x x x x x.[20]
The above testimonies were corroborated by Angelita Meeks, who declared that her husband was
promised employment by accused-appellant as a factory worker in South Korea. She was also personally
assured by accused-appellant that her husband, Alberto, would be able to leave. [21]
Private complainants were categorical and unequivocal in their statement that it was accusedappellant who separately recruited them during the same period of time for jobs abroad. Accusedappellant cannot feign innocence by claiming that it was actually Molar who promised them overseas
jobs, in light of her positive identification as private complainants recruiter.Hence, accused-appellants
mere denials cannot prevail over these positive and straightforward testimonies.[22] Besides, it is
inconceivable that private complainants could be mistaken in their belief that it was accused-appellant
who recruited them considering that it was she who personally talked with them on several occasions and
received the sums of money for which she issued receipts where it was stated that the amount given was
for processing and POEA.[23] Moreover, it was held in a number of cases that even the absence of
receipts is not fatal to the case of the prosecution, for as long as it is clearly established through the
witnesses respective testimonies, that the accused is the one involved in prohibited recruitment.[24]
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: x x x (Italics
ours). Consequently, even in the absence of money given as consideration for accused-appellants
services, she would still be considered as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was
sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to private complainants.
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are the following: 1) the accused
undertook a recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of
the Labor Code; 2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and 3) the accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group.[25]
All the aforementioned elements were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It was
established that accused-appellant promised employment to the eight (8) complainants and that she was
not authorized or licensed to engage in such activity as certified to by the POEA.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, finding
accused-appellant Rowena Eslabon-Dionisio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale and imposing on her the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and sentencing her
to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 and to REIMBURSE the amounts received from private
complainants, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2216
January 31, 1950
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO),


KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS
WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, respondents.
Quisumbing, Sycip and Quisumbing for petitioner.
Lazatin and Caballero for respondents.
Arsenio I. Martinez for the Court of Industrial Relations.
TUASON, J.:
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order
made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12) more laborers from time to time and
on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be
native." The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute between the petitioner
and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.
At the outset, the appellant takes exception to the finding of the court below that Dee C. Chuan & Sons,
Inc. is capitalized with foreign descent. This question has little or no bearing on the case and may well be
passed over except incidentally as a point of argument in relation to the material issues.
It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of
employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The restrictions of the
number of aliens that nay be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws." Although the brief does not name the persons who are
supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general
are in petitioner's mind. certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely,
discriminate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in
a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75 % of its
shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be correct.
But is petitioner entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a law or an order which does not adversely
affect it, in behalf of aliens who are prejudiced thereby? The answer is not in doubt. An alien may
question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is being, or is about to
be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.) The prospective employees whom the petitioner
may contemplate employing have not come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been
revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less
others who are unknown and undetermined. U.S. vs. Wong Ku Ark, 169 U.S. 649; Truax vs. Reich, 239
U.S. 39 60 Law ed., 131., and other American decisions cited do not support the petitioner for the very
simple reasons that in those cases it was the persons themselves whose rights and immunities under the
constitution were being violated that invoked the protection of the courts.
The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the appealed order restrains
it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. This complaint merits a more detailed examination.
That the employer's right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. "This privilege of hiring and
firing ad libitum is, of course, being subjected to restraints today." Statutes are cutting in on it. And so
does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The regulations of the hours of labor of employees and of the
employment of women and children are familiar examples of the limitation of the employer's right in this
regard. The petitioner's request for permission to employ additional; laborers is an implicit recognition of
the correctness of the proposition. The power of the legislature to make regulations is subject only to the
condition that they should be affected with public interest and reasonable under the circumstances. The
power may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts
or administrative agencies.
We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public
interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional objective
and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude,
bloodshed and revolution in our country." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)1"Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of
Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from
the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance
of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319,
324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. By the

same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed
should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling disputes or doing justice to the parties."
The order in question has that specific end in view. In parallel view the court observed: "Undoubtedly,
without the admonition of the Court, nothing could prevent petitioner from hiring purely alien laborers, and
there is no gainsaying the fact that further conflict or dispute would naturally ensue. To cope with this
contingency, and acting within the powers granted by the organic law, the court, believing in the necessity
and expediency of making patent its desire to avoid probable and possible further misunderstanding
between the parties, issued the order."
We are not prepared to declare that the order is not conducive to the aim pursued. The question is a
practical one depending on facts with which the court is best familiar. The fact already noted should not
be lost sight of that there is a pending strike and besides, that the employment of temporary laborers
was opposed by the striking employees and was the subject of a protracted hearing.
We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the sphere of
legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a political question. In the first
place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of
its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It
is not a permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only
in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and
menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court
likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate.
As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be employed should
be Filipinos is certain not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. The petitioner's right to employ labor or to
make contract with respect thereto is not unreasonably curtailed and its interest is not jeopardized. We
take it that the nationality of the additional laborers to be taken in is immaterial to the petitioner. In its
application for permission to employ twelve temporary laborers it expressly says that these could be
Filipinos or Chinese. On the face of this statement, assuming the same to be sincere, the petitioner
objection to the condition imposed by the court would appear to be academic and a trifle.
We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as pretend that the
hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems to be conceded that during the
pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the
Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the
court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission
should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or
established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step designed to relieve
petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner's part to
take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole judge of whether it should take the
order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire new laborers other than Chinese.
The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this appeal against the petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. 93666
April 22, 1991
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien
Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as
sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation ("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby the
latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.

On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to prearranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit.
GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional
Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December 1990, was
issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of
said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April 1990, issued a
decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no
showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the
services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration
but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma in an Order dated 8
June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked petitioner
Cone's alien employment permit; and
2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is null and
void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower respondent
Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed to show
any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent
Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking petitioner Cone's Alien
Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was cured when
petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before respondent Secretary of Labor.1
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal basis at all.
Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom to employ is, of
course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out by the
Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman Black as the
latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to the provisions of Article 40 of the
Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In any case, the term "non-resident alien" and its
obverse "resident alien," here must be given their technical connotation under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision would amount
to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before petitioners
entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly settled that provisions of applicable laws, especially
provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into contracts. 2 Private
parties cannot constitutionally contract away the otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the findings of
Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing petitioner Cone, is, again,
bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to make a
determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the Philippines who is competent, able
and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which an alien is desired." 3
In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of
availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and
authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the position
involved, cannot be seriously questioned.

Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, specifically
Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition not found in the Labor
Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides as follows:
Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may issue an employment
permit to the applicant based on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the
Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant are
desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the
national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government agencies if
the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the
imperative of economic development;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the
Department of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be
issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said
registered enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account the
question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national interest"
because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly to
concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest is tenuous and unreal) is not
persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he employment permit may be
issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a
person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates
that the authority granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the
second place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor
should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted by the
Labor Code,
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training,
allocation and utilization;
xxx
xxx
xxx
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with
the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work
permit system;
xxx
xxx
xxx

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to require
further consideration.
Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor has
reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek to
withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.
While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot and
academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by petitioners are such
that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions unanswered. 4
Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone, the basis
of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the record. If such
reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law different from those here set out, then
such employment permit, if one has been issued, would appear open to serious legal objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993
FARLE P. ALMODIEL, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS.,
INC., respondents.
Apolinario Lomabao, Jr. for petitioner.
Vicente A. Cruz, Jr., for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC Case No.
00-00645-89 which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision dated September 27, 1989 and
ordered instead the payment of separation pay and financial assistance of P100,000.00. Petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission and prays for the reinstatement of the
Labor Arbiter's decision which declared his termination on the ground of redundancy illegal.
Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired in October, 1987 as Cost
Accounting Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm, John
Clements Consultants, Inc. with a starting monthly salary of P18,000.00. Before said employment, he was
the accounts executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for several years. He left his lucrative job
therein in view of the promising career offered by Raytheon. He started as a probationary or temporary
employee. As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year
and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other
cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the written Cost Accounting System for the
whole company. After a few months, he was given a regularization increase of P1,600.00 a month. Not
long thereafter, his salary was increased to P21,600.00 a month.
On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance Reorganization,
affecting the whole finance group but the same was disapproved by the Controller. However, he was
assured by the Controller that should his position or department which was apparently a one-man
department with no staff becomes untenable or unable to deliver the needed service due to manpower
constraint, he would be given a three (3) year advance notice.
In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the Raytheon plants and
subsidiaries worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the Philippine operations. As a
consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager allegedly entailed only the submission of
periodic reports that would use computerized forms prescribed and designed by the international head
office of the Raytheon Company in California, USA.

On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence of IRD
Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy.
He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he was told
that the decision of management was final and that the same has been conveyed to the Department of
Labor and Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment.
On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy Cauton-Barcelona rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant's termination on
the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal and factual basis, thus
ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position with full
backwages without lost of seniority rights and other benefits. Respondents are further
ordered to pay complainant P200,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney's fees. 1
Raytheon appealed therefrom on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying its rights to dismiss petitioner on the ground of redundancy, in relying on baseless surmises
and self-serving assertions of the petitioner that its act was tainted with malice and bad faith and in
awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the total
sum of P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance. The dispositive portion of which is hereby
quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. In its stead, Order is hereby
issued directing respondent to pay complainant the total separation pay/financial
assistance of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 2
From this decision, petitioner filed the instant petition averring that:
The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to (lack of) or in
excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the
ground of redundancy in the face of clearly established finding that petitioner's
termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and irregularity. 3
Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article 283 of the Labor
Code which provides as follows:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing
the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department
of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In
case of termination due to installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker
affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered as one (1) whole year.
There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month before, of the termination of his
employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior, Mrs. Magdalena
B.D. Lopez sometime in the afternoon of January 27, 1989. He was issued a check for P54,863.00
representing separation pay but in view of his refusal to acknowledge the notice and the check, they were

sent to him thru registered mail on January 30, 1989. The Department of Labor and Employment was
served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code and the implementing rules.
The crux of the controversy lies on whether bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the abolition of
petitioner's position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy. Petitioner claims that the
functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of
Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by law. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that
corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were dispersed to other units in the Finance
Department. And granting that his department has to be declared redundant, he claims that he should
have been the Manager of the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general accounting, payroll
and encoding. As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work experience, and
a natural born Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial Engineer,
hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager
only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.
On the other hand, Raytheon insists that petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager had not been
absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country. It claims to have established below
that Ang Tan Chai did not displace petitioner or absorb his functions and duties as they were occupying
entirely different and distinct positions requiring different sets of expertise or qualifications and
discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that of petitioner's abolished position. Raytheon
debunks petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Estrada saying that the same witness testified under
oath that the functions of the Cost Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed with and the
position itself had been totally abolished.
Whether petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager have been dispensed with or merely
absorbed by another is however immaterial. Thus, notwithstanding the dearth of evidence on the said
question, a resolution of this case can be arrived at without delving into this matter. For even conceding
that the functions of petitioner's position were merely transferred, no malice or bad faith can be imputed
from said act. A survey of existing case law will disclose that in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 4 the
position of Sales Manager was abolished on the ground of redundancy as the duties previously
discharged by the Sales Manager simply added to the duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales
Manager used to report. In adjudging said termination as legal, this Court said that redundancy, for
purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an
employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an
exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such
characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of
the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.
In the case of International Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 this Court also considered the
position of Government Relations Officer to have become redundant in view of the appointment of the
International Heavy Equipment Corporation as the company's dealer with the government. It held therein
that the determination of the need for the phasing out of a department as a labor and cost saving device
because it was no longer economical to retain said services is a management prerogative and the courts
will not interfere with the exercise thereof as long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or
malicious action on the part of management is shown.
In the same vein, this Court ruled in Bondoc v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 6 that the bank's board of
directors possessed the power to remove a department manager whose position depended on the
retention of the trust and confidence of management and whether there was need for his services.
Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the abolition of his position, this Court
expounded that it is undeniable that the bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove him
and to determine whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his department.

Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the
operation of its business. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that a cost accounting system was installed
and used at Raytheon subsidiaries and plants worldwide; and that the functions of his position involve the
submission of periodic reports utilizing computerized forms designed and prescribed by the head office
with the installation of said accounting system. Petitioner attempts to controvert these realities by alleging
that some of the functions of his position were still indispensable and were actually dispersed to another
department. What these indispensable functions that were dispersed, he failed however, to specify and
point out. Besides, the fact that the functions of a position were simply added to the duties of another
does not affect the legitimacy of the employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal
exercise of its prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs.
Considering further that petitioner herein held a position which was definitely managerial in character,
Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider
discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial personnel compared to rank and file
employees. 7 The reason obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which
by nature require the employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the success or
failure of an enterprise.
Likewise destitute of merit is petitioner's imputation of unlawful discrimination when Raytheon caused
corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident
alien without a working permit. Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires employment permit refers to
non-resident aliens. The employment permit is required for entry into the country for employment
purposes and is issued after determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.
Since Ang Tan Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
Petitioner also assails Raytheon's choice of Ang Tan Chai to head the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department,
claiming that he is better qualified for the position. It should be noted, however, that Ang Tan Chai was
promoted to the position during the middle part of 1988 or before the abolition of petitioner's position in
early 1989. Besides the fact that Ang Tan Chai's promotion thereto is a settled matter, it has been
consistently held that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the
appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position. In
the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the
Court cannot substitute its discretion and judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management
prerogative. To do so would take away from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained
in National Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC: 8
It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's
judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the qualification and fitness
of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of
management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor
Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority.
The employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination
or those which may be provided by law. There is none in the instant case.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in reversing
and annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the termination of petitioner's
employment was anchored on a valid and authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
instant petition forcertiorari must fail.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

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