EVIDENCE 2016-2017 BATCH 1 FULL TEXT CASES

1- Ong Chia v. Republic, G.R. No. 127240, 27 March 2000

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.]
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Algarra Mutia & Trinidad Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. He stayed in the Philippines since 1932 wherein he
found an employment, started his own business and married a Filipina with whom he had four children. At
the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as Filipino citizen in accordance with the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. During the hearing, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and
presented three other witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The prosecution having been convinced by
the evidence presented by the petitioner, did not present any evidence to refute the testimony of the
witnesses for the petitioner. Hence, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed. The
State's appellant's brief with corresponding annexes alleged that the petitioner (1) failed to state all the
name by which he is or had been known as evidenced by an attached copy of the 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by the petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence as evidenced by his Immigration Certificate of Residence; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner as he lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage
from 1953 to 1977 as evidenced by his marriage contract; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation
as reflected by the 1973 to 1977 income tax returns; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. Hence, this petition.
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rule may
be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such case is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not
the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.
Moreover, it is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7, clearly provides that
the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.
This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS; EXCEPT BY ANALOGY AND SUPPLETORILY, FORMAL
OFFER OF EVIDENCE IS NOT APPLICABLE; NOT COVERED BY RULE ON RES JUDICATA. The rule on formal
offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present
case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are
not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the
State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE; PURPOSE. The reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility.
3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTION; PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO AUTHENTICITY OF
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO APPELLATE COURT BY THE STATE. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the
State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals, thus: The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy
is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That
"SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as
"SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
4. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; RULE. The Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in
SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath.
They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that
may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not
err in relying upon them.
5. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION LAW; RIGIDLY ENFORCED AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT; APPLICANT MUST SET FORTH IN THE PETITION HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE; NOT COMPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. We shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to
include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in
his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7. This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved
by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on
the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled,
however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone,
the instant petition ought to be denied. THIcCA
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine
citizenship. prLL
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as theRevised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law,
stated

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter
of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against
him, he remarked: prcd
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising,
in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish
to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that
petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known
lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which petitioner stated that in
addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As
petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail. 6 The State also annexed income tax returns 7 allegedly filed by petitioner from
1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that
petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been
married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with
his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that
petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8 and a Joint-Affidavit 9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These
documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license
had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel
had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the
trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held: cdrep
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the
same militates against a decision in his favor . . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow
those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the

authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for
citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to
give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections
against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving
the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been
the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the
benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from
being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law," and
therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization. . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . ."
It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their
old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be
added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and
allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY
SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LibLex
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal
of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
"scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall considerno evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (italics added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for
the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. 14Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for
a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the
State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case-No. 031767) which
was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the
case number of the alleged petition for naturalization . . . is 031767 while the
case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document
is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the
instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was
annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special
Committee On Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State. prLL
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the
issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in petition, but argues that since
the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because
the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community
where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should
be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As
noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application
of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. LLpr
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Ong Chia v. Republic, G.R. No. 127240, [March 27, 2000], 385 PHIL 487-499)

2-Bantolino, et al v. Coca-cola Bottlers, G.R. No. 153660, 10 June 2003

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003.]
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN
QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO
GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,
INC., respondent.
UST Legal Aid Clinic for petitioners.
Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ordered respondent
to reinstate complainants to their former positions and to pay their full back wages. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the finding of the NLRC, but agreed with the
respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants should not have been given probative value for
failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the CA
dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. Hence, this petition.
In granting the present petition, the Supreme Court ruled that administrative bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the
Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that
an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot
find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence
different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter
is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are
not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting
documents and their affidavits.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVITS; GIVEN EVIDENTIARY VALUE DESPITE FAILURE OF AFFIANTS TO
UNDERGO CROSS-EXAMINATION IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES LIKE THE NLRC. The
oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of
affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that "the
argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not
persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only." In Rase v.
NLRC, this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the
affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise
would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the
Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; RULES OF EVIDENCE PREVAILING IN COURTS OF LAW DO NOT CONTROL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC. Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly
states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We
find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the
Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that
an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot
find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence

different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter
is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are
not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting
documents and their affidavits.
3. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; WAIVERS AND QUITCLAIMS, WHEN VALID; CASE AT BAR.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to
follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC which outlines the parameters for valid compromise
agreements, waivers and quitclaims "Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.
If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is
shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking." In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face
the Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim are devoid of any palpable inequity as the
terms of settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we glean from the records any attempt by the
parties to renege on their contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown their due execution.
Consequently, the same must be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant
case should be dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero. ISCDEA
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated 21 December 2001 which affirmed with modification the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission promulgated 30 March 2001. 2
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers,
Lipercon Services, Inc., People's Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint
against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure
and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and
the declaration of their regular employment status. aSATHE
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit
their respective affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter,
Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10)
remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle
segregators, and others, they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further
maintained that when respondent company replaced them and prevented them from entering the
company premises, they were deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and cause of action, there being no employer-employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola
Bottlers, Inc., and that respondents Lipercon Services, People's Specialist Services and Interim Services
being bona fide independent contractors, were the real employers of the complainants. 3 As regards the
corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be faulted and be held liable for damages as
they only acted in their official capacities while performing their respective duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate
complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees,
and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must
be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of
P1,810,244.00. 4
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of
respondent company's witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing
the complainants personally, the testimonies of the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently
supplied every detail of their employment, specifically identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their
places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and dismissal.

On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employeremployee relationship between the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the
latter's decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied for lack of merit respondent's motion for
consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of
the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless
agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino,
Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas,
should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo
cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient
evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto
were declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination. 5 Thus
. . . (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between the
opposing claims of the parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on position
papers and their accompanying documentary evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative
to establish the parties' claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it was necessary to
give them ample opportunity to rebut each other's statements through cross-examination.
In fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to rigid crossexamination by petitioner's counsel. However, the testimonies of private respondents
Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to cross-examination, as should have
been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or by the labor arbiter as to why
this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by counsel, the latter should have
taken steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their counsel
to that effect. 6
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the
favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondent's claim
of failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based
merely on the parties' position papers and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent
pleadings that may be filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be
strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because
the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a
decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since the other alleged affiants were not presented
in court to affirm their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of
Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent points out that he should not have been impleaded
in the instant petition since he already voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and
Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition should be
dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners 7 to sign the petition as well as the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, in clear violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman. 8
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits
despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in
jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC 9squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the
propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we
held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for crossexamination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers
only."

In Rase v. NLRC, 10 this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary
for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings
mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC 11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor
Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and
effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, 12 that an affidavit not testified to in a trial,
is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to
determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the
cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to
follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC 13 which outlines the parameters for valid
compromise agreements, waivers and quitclaims
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there
is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking.
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face theCompromise
Agreement 14 and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim 15 are devoid of any palpable inequity as the terms of
settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we glean from the records any attempt by the parties to
renege on their contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown their due execution. Consequently, the
same must be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant case should be
dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.
We cannot likewise accommodate respondent's contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the
petition as well as the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule
7, of the Rules of Court will cause the dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the
strict observance of the Rules, it however provides an escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh
consequences of non-observance. Thus
. . . . We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance of the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard
of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction
(Italics supplied).
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day
extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to file their petition for review in view of the
absence of a counsel to represent them. 16 The records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that
Atty. Arnold Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry of appearance as counsel for
herein petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were not yet
represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be faulted for the procedural
lapse since they could not be expected to be conversant with the nuances of the law, much less

knowledgeable with the esoteric technicalities of procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity
in the filing of the present petition may be overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 29 May 1998 ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino,
Nilo Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia
and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as regular employees, and to pay them their full back
wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon proof of
his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein petition is DENIED insofar as it concerns
Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim with respondent company. ECTIcS
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, [June 10, 2003], 451 PHIL 839-848)

3-Cirtek Employees v. Cirtek Electronics, 6 June 2011 (RESOLUTION)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190515. June 6, 2011.]
CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, petitioner, vs.
CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.: p
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Court's Decision dated November 15, 2010.
Respondent-movant avers that petitioner, in filing the petition forcertiorari under Rule 65,
availed of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should have dismissed the petition outright. It goes on
to aver that the Court erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August 24, 2005 Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which is not the office of a petition for certiorari.
Respondent-movant further avers that the MOA 1 signed by the remaining officers of petitioner
Union and allegedly ratified by its members should have been given credence by the Court.
Furthermore, respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling
beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that, as early as February 5, 2010,
petitioner Union had already filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a resolution of
disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latter's lack of personality to represent
the workers in the present case.
The motion is bereft of merit. aIEDAC
Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. Due, however, to
the nature of the case, one involving workers' wages and benefits, and the fact that whether the
petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the
reglementary period under Rule 45) from petitioner's receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals'
Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it due course. As Almelor
v. RTC of Las Pias, et al. 2 restates:

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong
or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This is to prevent the party from benefiting
from one's neglect and mistakes.However, like most rules, it carries certain
exceptions. After all, theultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in ruling on a question of fact, it bears recalling
that a QUESTION OF FACT arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged fact, 3 while a QUESTION OF LAW exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts.
The present case presents the primordial issue of whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered
to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.
Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination and application of existing law, the provisions of
the Labor Code,and prevailing jurisprudence. Intertwined with the issue, however, is the question of
validity of the MOA and its ratification which, as movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and
one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however, is
not without exceptions, viz.: SaCIDT
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh
the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under
any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court on whether
the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the former giving scant consideration thereon, and the
latter affording it more weight.
As found by the Secretary of Labor, the MOA came about as a result of the constitution, at
respondent's behest, of the Labor-Management Council (LMC) which, he reminded the parties, should
not be used as an avenue for bargaining but for the purpose of affording workers to participate in
policy and decision-making. Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA were not the proper subject
of the LMC deliberation or procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore, deserving little
weight. TEHIaD
The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary did not have the authority to give an
arbitral award higher than what was stated in the MOA. The conflicting views drew the Court to reevaluate the facts as borne by the records, an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be
dealt with in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
As discussed in the Decision under reconsideration, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Manuel
G. Imson acted well within his jurisdiction in ruling that the wage increases to be given are P10 per day
effective January 1, 2004 and P15 per day effective January 1, 2005, pursuant to his power to assume
jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) 4 of the Labor Code.
While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into
by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary
of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an approximation of a
collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the
parties. Hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation between the parties. 5
In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other factors and
documents including, as in this case, the financial documents 6 submitted by respondent as well as its
previous bargaining history and financial outlook and improvements as stated in its own website. 7
The appellate court's ruling that giving credence to the "Pahayag" and the minutes of the
meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous.
The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor
cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc.8 teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor casespending before
the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very
rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from
accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in
the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it was validly
entered into by the parties, the Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations
thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued with
public interest. It must thus be given a liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and
technical construction, with due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose
for which it is intended. 9

As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the
pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the same does
not affect the Court's upholding of the authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards
higher than what was supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the
"unavoidable issue of disaffiliation" bears nosignificant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of
the Court's Decision.
En passant, whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue. Besides, the alleged
disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and
submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5, 2010 two months after the present petition
was filed on December 22, 2009, hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal Center's standing to file
the petition nor this Court's jurisdiction to resolve the same.
At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a
different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor
organization, not the employer.
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union
members, including grievances arising from any violation of the rights and
conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of
the union's constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or
disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03,
Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union
disputes, viz.: IHTaCE
RULE XI
INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES
SECTION 1. Coverage. Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
(a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by
another labor organization;
(b) conduct of election of union and workers' association officers/nullification of
election of union and workers' association officers;
(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers' association funds;
(d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements;
(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation;
(f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;
(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers' association
officers and members;
(h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition;
(i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration;

(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers'

association constitution and by-laws;
(k) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations and
collective bargaining agreements;
(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers' association
membership;
(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements;
(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union
membership and collective bargaining
(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;
(2) between and among members of a union or workers' association.
SECTION 2. Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict
between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that is not a
labor organization or workers' association. This includes: (1) cancellation of registration of
unions and workers' associations; and (2) a petition for interpleader. 10 (emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may disaffiliate at any time from
its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is prohibited under its
constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality
altogether.Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila Bay Spinning
Mills at J.P. Coats 11 enlightens: HCTAEc
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and
maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employeemembers. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it
is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the
will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its
own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where
the former acts in representation of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW "went against the will and wishes of its principal" (the
member-employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for
respondent to determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own pursuant to their principalagent relationship.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision of November 15, 2010 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
||| (Cirtek Employees Labor Union-FFW v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515 (Resolution),

[June 6, 2011], 665 PHIL 784-795)

4-Atienza v. Board of Medicine, 9 February 2011

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 177407. February 9, 2011.]
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA
SIOSON, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision 1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in-CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA
dismissed the petition forcertiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn,
assailed the Orders 2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No.
1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she
was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic
laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained,
however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent
kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed
a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the
doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela
Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed
by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent's
fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her
formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary
evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She
described her exhibits, as follows: ADaEIH
"EXHIBIT 'A' the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December
12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex '2' as it was actually originally the Annex
to . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III's counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said
office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results
of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as

or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex '2' to the
Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4,
2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT 'B' the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30,
1997, which is also marked as Annex '3' as it was actually likewise originally an
Annex to . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III's counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by the
herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the
document marked as Annex '3' which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is
appended as such Annex '3' to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by .
. . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this
complaint.
"EXHIBIT 'C' the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16,
1996, which is also marked as Annex '4,' on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT 'D' the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20,
1999, which is also marked as Annex '16,' on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit
appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination
which is the document appended as Annexes '4' and '1' respectively to the counteraffidavits filed by . . . Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the
complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as
Annex '4' is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document
marked as Annex '1' is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date
and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit 'D.'
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent's [Editha Sioson's] formal
offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters
which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for
which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was
admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the
Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la
Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby
ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of
this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the
evidence of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same
reasons stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8,
2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can
determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. . . . . 3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOM's Orders which admitted Editha Sioson's (Editha's) Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. HaECDI
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED
26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE
ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A
PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE'S LIVELIHOOD. 4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail
the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or
finally disposes of the case. 5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA's finding that the BOM
did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of
Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and
(4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible
evidence.
We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM. 6Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out
later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them. 8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals 9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. CIaHDc
Second, petitioner's insistence that the admission of Editha's exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20,
Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these
Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the
admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall
not vitiate the proceedings. 10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two
kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is
presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha's medical case.
The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits
were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III's counter affidavit filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by
Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the
predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha's exhibits, that her "kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory judicial notice. 11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth
respecting a matter of fact. 12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and
need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary. 13Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, 14 include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take
judicial notice that Editha's kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human
beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and CAIaDT
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha's kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha's kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established
not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha's
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha's
kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray
of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed. 15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, . . . to the new
building." 16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha's
formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Del Castillo, * Villarama, Jr. ** and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Atienza v. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 536-546)

5- Gomez v. Gomez, G.R. No. 156284, 6 February 2007

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156284. February 6, 2007.]
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez, petitioner, vs. MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B.
GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL,respondents.
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez, petitioner, vs. ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during the pendency of
the cases below and substituted by his surviving wife, LUZ BAYSON GOMEZ, and
children namely: ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B.
GOMEZ, MA. TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ)
and ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR.,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
This age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious circles, and has stimulated
the imagination of generations of children and adults. Many profess that they are certain of the answer,
and yet their answers are divergent.
The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser proportions of philosophical
mystery. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee
were jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies
of the Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and circumstantial
evidence ensued. Petitioner's expert claims she is certain of the answer: the signature came first.
Respondents' expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to determine which came first
accurately. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents, petitioner is
furious how these courts could adopt an opinion that was "neither here nor there."
However, as it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is the person certain of which came first necessarily the
one who is more credible?
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution 2dated 4 September 2002 and
27 November 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the Joint
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No.
36090.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 36089,
entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and
the Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants"; and (2) Civil Case No.
36090, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr.,
Defendants", both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers,
respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the
children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.

In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who
died on November 6, 1979, was the owner of the following real properties:
"(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, . . .;
"(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, . . .,"
"(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name, . . .;"
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or
caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo
donated the above described properties to defendants Rita and Jesus; that the said
defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the
notarial acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on
the basis of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of
title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the names of defendants
Rita and Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of DonationIntervivos be
declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818,
and 268396 be reinstated or be replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of
Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation plus costs.
On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of Pasig
and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common answer, denying the material allegations in the
complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of donation was submitted to the Notarial
Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid
and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being
valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as early
as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to cause the
cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the issuance of new
certificates of titles in their respective names; that they have the right to use, enjoy,
possess, dispose and own these properties; that nolaw was violated by the nominal
defendants when the old certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates were
issued in the name of the private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action
against the nominal defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of
P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the
estate of Consuelo Gomez.
In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also
the sole and absolute owner of the following personal properties:
(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of
P75,000.00 and covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First
Philippine Holdings Corporation with a total par value of P118,530.00 covered by Stock
Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370
shares);
(c) Jewelries and collector's items, contained in Consuelo Gomez's Safe Deposit Box No. 44
at the PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of
the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706,
Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No.
0140373 valued at P200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;

(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No.
RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at
P50,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued interests on money
market placement with the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116
dated March 9, 1978.
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be
prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo donated the
above described properties to defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said
defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the
notarial acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on
the basis of the said document defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978, effected or
tried to effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles; that defendant
Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA Finance and
received checks in the sums of P187,027.74 and P4,405.56; that with the exception of the
jewelries, which are with the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue
to benefit from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the dividends earned by the
shares of stocks.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be
declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be
ordered to deliver the stock certificates, jewelries, collector's items, and vehicles in his
possession plus all the cash dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable
compensation for the use of the two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be
ordered to pay the amount of P191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance, with interest
from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the plaintiff; and, damages, by
way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying the
material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation
was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979;
that the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity;
that the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to
defendants, as early as April 20, 1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute
right to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of
P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the
estate of Consuelo Gomez.
On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, in both cases, which the trial
court in Civil Case No. 36090 granted in its Order dated June 6, 1980. Whereupon, the
records of Civil Case No. 36090 were transmitted to the RTC, Branch 23.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda thirty (30) days from their receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes.
In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the trial court dismissed the complaints. 3
The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:
1. That the instant complaints be dismissed;
2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223, 2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold Insurance
Company, Incorporated be cancelled;
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily,
should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney's fees of P200,000.00

And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's
fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid. 4
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTC's Joint Decision
in the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. 5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed Resolution dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, bringing forth before us the following issues for
our consideration:
1) Whether or not the instant petition presents several exceptions to the general rule that
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law and that factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Honorable Court;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals' Decision is based on a misapprehension of facts
and on inferences that are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo
Gomez herself paid the donor's tax of the properties subject of the donation on 09 October
1979 when the evidence on record point to the contrary;
4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony
of former judge Jose Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of
Donation;
5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the irregularities
apparent on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of a non-lawyer
who prepared them;
6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in totally disregarding the very
unusual circumstances relative to the alleged totally execution and notarization of the
assailed Deeds of Donation;
7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in
inferring that respondents were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for
the belated transfer of the pertinent properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation;
8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly mistaken in not
giving due weight to the expert opinion of the NBI representative, which the lower court
itself sought; and IAETDc
9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not finding that the totality of
circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner produced a single network of
circumstances establishing the simulation and falsification of the assailed Deeds of
Donation. 6
As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. 7 Petitioner, however, seeks refuge in the following
established exceptions 8 to this rule:
1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. 9
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. 10
3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.11
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; 12and
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence of record. 13
Weight and Credibility of the
Expert Witnesses
The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner was able to prove that
the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by Consuelo Gomez
(Consuelo).

The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres,
Document Examiner 14 of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondents, on the other hand,
presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination 15 of the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating
that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary
Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the
respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of petitioner, it is imperative to
examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing her testimony, and the contradictory findings of
Francisco Cruz.
Zenaida Torres's testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the two Deeds of
Donation, denominated as Documents No. 401 andNo. 402, and her findings were that the signatures
therein were indeed those of Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were
not typed or prepared in one continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some variances
horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any variance. IDSETA
Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten words "Consuelo C.
Gomez" were typed after the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez." This is based on her analysis of
the letter "o" in the handwritten signature, which touches the letter "n" in the typewritten name "Consuelo
C. Gomez." She could not, however, make any similar findings with respect to Document No. 402, because
the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" and the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" "do not
even touch" in the latter document.
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in one
sitting:
To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo
in the Donations 401 and 402 are genuine.
(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged that the
signatures of Consuelo were forged. In fact, as per the allegations, in Augusto's complaint,
the signatures were forged, after the death of Consuelo).
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein
Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402
were typed on top.)
Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres admitted that she had not
taken any specialized studies on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or
two seminars on "Questioned Documents." She admitted that she had not passed the
Board Exams, as a Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or
similar work on the subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the
typewriter used to type the Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before
she made the report; that there were no variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the
typewritten documents were concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the
horizontal alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to
incorporate a document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step
to be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which can be seen via the
naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment, as admitted by her,
was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal
alignment will have a variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance,
and there would be nothing sinister about this. She had to admit this, because she was
confronted with an authority on the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison
(vide Exhibit "17"). She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the
photographs of the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which photographs she later on
enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2)
Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when
the photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted;

more so when a typewriter pitch measure is not used, when photographing the
documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the
testimony of Torres was completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19, 1986). 16
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one
continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this conclusion.
To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter,
because as per Cruz, when his typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over
the documents, there were twelve (12) letters that went inside one inch, which is a
characteristic of an elite typewriter.
Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire
documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in
one continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and
sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be
different.
He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He
explained how he arrived at this conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced
by the Criminal Research Co., Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the
vertical alignment from the top down to the bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he had already placed
the typewriting measuring instrument over the document and he showed to the court the
enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that all the vertical alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement.
He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words "Know All Men By
These Presents" and the words "That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino,
and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina", there is a slight
disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.
He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because the
typist sometimes tries to push the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the
roller, and if you press that round [button], there will be a variance spacing namely one
space, two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a variable in
the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.
Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that there
was typing in one continuous sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again,
there are differences in the left hand margin. All of his findings appear in the blow up
photographs which were marked as Exhibits "31" to "34".
He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian
inserted the date "21st" and "1" (page number), "401" (document number), "I"
(book number), and "82" (series); and also his signature "Jose R. Sebastian" and his
"PTR Number" (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved
futile. 17
As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the
typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." In this second round of analysis of the respective testimonies of
Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRES'S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER
"O", WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N".
BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME

"CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE "CONSUELO C.

GOMEZ".
We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities Torres was confronted
and which authorities she had to admit), which read as follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often stated that is possible to
determine whether an ink line which intersects typescript was written before or
after the typing. The theory is simple; most typewriter inks are greasy and an ink
line tends to shrink in width as it passes over a greasy place on the paper. If,
indeed, an ink line is observed to suffer a distinct reduction in width every time it
intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that the ink line was written
after the typescript.
In practice, however, ink lines written across typescript are rarely seen to suffer any
appreciable shrinkage in width, since the amount of oily medium transferred from
the ribbon to the paper is rarely sufficient to have any effect. Indeed, if the ink
happens to be alkaline, surplus ink, instead of shrinking, may spread out into the
typescript to increase the width of the inkline at the intersection. In the case the
proof that the ink followed the typescript would be the presence of a swelling rather
than a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any definite opinion as to the
order of appearance on the paper for intersecting ink lines and typescript to be
justified on the [meager] amount of evidence which generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for carbon paper and waxer; which
have much in common with typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they make on
paper react with intersecting ink lines". (Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits "19";
"19-A"; "37"; "37-D"; underscoring ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as follows:
"Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive patterns, depending upon the
order of writing the lapse of time between the two writings, the density of the two
strokes and the kind of inks, writing instruments, and paper used. With a binocular
microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully controlled light and photography,
the true order of preparation may be revealed and demonstrated to a lay observer.
What appears to be the obvious solution may not always be the correct answer. For
example, the line of deepest color usually appears on top even if it was written first.
Careful study and testing is necessary before reaching a conclusion. Some of the
more common criteria for determining sequence are considered in the following
paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or the intersection of writing
and typewriting the majority of problems are covered. Substantial, repeated
intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a single
indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke crossing another which only very
infrequently can produce a clear indication of the order of writing". (Exhibits "V"
and "V-1" (underscoring ours). 18
The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, 19that it is impossible to
determine accurately which came first, because there were no intersections at all. 20 The trial court
added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the
typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which came first." 21 The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court. 22
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that the handwritten
signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the typewritten name of
Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was "neither here
not there." 23

Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to
Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of
Francisco Cruz on the ground that he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr. 24
Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand,
Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of
Ariston, Jr. cTDaEH
On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence 25 is, as a general rule, more credible
than negative evidence. 26 However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative
may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to remember what never existed. 27
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings
in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence.
Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by
ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot
say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to
expert witnesses,28 the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should be
carefully examined and considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of
the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a knowledge derived from personal observation. He
virtually reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of
the eminent names responsible for them. 29 In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as
bases of their observations. Francisco Cruz's statement that "no finding or conclusion could be arrived
at," 30 has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities
speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" barely touch and do
not intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402,
said typewritten words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at," was
found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed
before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be more in
consonance with the authorities cited by both experts.
As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely examined the original in the
possession of Ariston, Jr. with respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot
be attributed to respondents. After the examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the
Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents burned in the fire.
Petitioner never rebutted respondents' manifestation concerning this incident, nor accused respondents of
burning the Quezon City Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioner's attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz (including
the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one continuous sitting) rests primarily in the
contention that, while Zenaida Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruz's testimony was solicited by
respondents, one of whom had previously solicited such testimony for another case.
In United States v. Trono, 31 we held:
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although
not exclusive on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are
not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh
them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been
adduced during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals 32 and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 33 this Court
held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the

trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his
opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which
he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of
the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the
expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of
the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, while the expert witness' possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact
that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same
with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well as with the witness' deportment, actions, ability,
and character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all
these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness' credibility, as it is in a better position than
the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
Alleged patent irregularities on the
face of the assailed Deeds of
Donation
As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only direct evidence presented
by petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated over the signature of Consuelo.
Petitioner, however, also presents the following circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same,
claiming that there are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation:
1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size (8" 1/2" x "11")
paper, instead of the usual legal size (8" 1/2" x "14") paper, and typed single
spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides; 34
2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different municipalities were
purportedly donated to two donees in the same document; 35
3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and collector's items in a
bank deposit box, two registered cars, cash and money placement in another bank,
and a bodega were donated to three donees in the same document; 36
4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by Consuelo. If the Deeds were
executed by Consuelo, she would surely have known this fact as she was the
treasurer of V-TRI Realty Corporation; 37
5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo on both documents
appear almost in the same place; 38
6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial acknowledgement portion
and the TAN Numbers and Residence Certificates of the signatories, were typed
with only one typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have been typed with a
different machine are the date ("21st") below the acknowledgement and the filledin numbers of the "Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page No. ___'" portion, the name
"Jose R. Sebastian" above the words NOTARY PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date
and place of issue; 39
7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right hand side of the
name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it; 40
8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine used for typing the name of
notary public Jose Sebastian) is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands in Quezon City, on the 20th day of
April/1979" (which was typed with another machine; the one used in typing the
body of the deed and the body of the acknowledgment); 41

9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the purported donor and
donees have already been typed with the same machine that was used in typing
the body of the deed and the body of the acknowledgement; 42
10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr.
would not have thought of preparing at least five copies of each document as there
were four donees and one donor. 43
The Court of Appeals ruled:
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation above the supposedly
priorly affixed signature of CONSUELO on a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the
one-page document in a letter size paper, typed single space with barely any room left on
the top, bottom and left and right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has
been explained that the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared
by defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such documents
should be executed and in how many copies. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing
a deed of donation, or any deed of conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared
the documents that are the subject matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.44
Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper construction or manner of
writing the documents as would necessitate the expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they relate to matters as
basic as observing the proper margins at the top, left, right and bottom portions of the document, using
the appropriate paper size and number of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing and
proper placement of the words in the document."
All these alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged irregularities affects the
validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud or foul play. It is true that the condition and
physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in
light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. 45 However,
neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the exhibits, had revealed such a
questionable physical condition.
Legal documents contained in 8 1/2 x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even uncommon. The same is
true with regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact, petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum was
actually single-spaced.
That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of paper
does not militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate length with importance. The simplicity
and practicality of organizing the properties to be donated into real and personal properties, and using
one-page documents to convey each category, are clearly appealing to people who value brevity. The
same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner to make a single-spaced Supplemental Memorandum
whose only object was to summarize the arguments he has laid down in the original twice-as-long
Memorandum, 46 an endeavor that we, in fact, appreciate.
The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of Donation, including the
notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the legal
profession for many years, we are aware that it is common practice for the parties to a contract to type the
whole document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and
the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.
The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR number and the date
and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of
below it. We agree with respondents that it is irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to
use another page just to insert those minute but necessary details. Such use of single-paged documents,
taken together with the fact that the Deeds of Donation are of almost the same length, are also the
reasons why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo appear at around the same portions of
these Deeds. Indeed, we would have been suspicious had these documents been of varying lengths, but
the signatures still appear on the same portions in both.

The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of Donation that truly give
us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small margins on the sides of the same, the lack of
copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by
Consuelo. However, these doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by respondents and
to overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong. 47 Good faith is always
presumed. 48 It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the same, 49 who, in this
case, is the petitioner.
The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of sloppiness, were not necessarily
resorted to because there was a need to intercalate a long document and, thus, prove petitioner's theory
that there were only two pieces of paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet
of paper for both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevity's sake. While the ensuing litigation could
now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevity's
sake, there still appears noindication that he did so maliciously. Indeed, law professors remind bar
examinees every year to leave margins on their booklets. Despite the importance examinees put into such
examinations, however, examinees seem to constantly forget these reminders.
The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and
Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that there were one original and two copies each of
Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these documents, it was the original of Document No. 402 and a
duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were actually presented by petitioner himself before the trial
court, through the representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon City, who testified pursuant to a
subpoena. The latter two documents were submitted to the NBI for examination by petitioner and by the
NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau of Records
Management. He, however, was able to find certified true copies of these documents with the Register of
Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission. 50
According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was separated from the brown
envelope, containing the other copies of the Deeds of Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with
respondents, as they were trying to fit the same into a certain red album. On the other hand, Maria Rita
testified that one copy each of the duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria
Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her sister in Palma de Mallorica, her
father, Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate originals of the Deeds of Donation in
question, to show to her sister in Palma de Mallorica. 51 Maria Rita explained in detail how her handbag
was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while waiting for the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de
Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate originals of the said Deeds of Donation, but
also other important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita presented the police report of the Spanish
police authorities 52 and her letter to the Valley National Bank of U.S.A., 53 regarding these losses.
Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his files. Jose Sebastian
explained that he did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each document. Since Jose Sebastian had
to transmit to the Notarial Registrar duplicate originals of the document, he had to photocopy the same to
keep as his own copies, and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever duplicate original copies he had.
Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate original of Document No. 402, what was
left with him was the original. 54
While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by respondents do
arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been carefully
examined by the trial court, which found them to be credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings
of the lower court. 55
All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While such approach would
succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to
overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. It must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a conviction of the lower

court based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on preponderance
of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the
court should find for the defendant. 56
Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said Deeds of
Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged irregularities on the face of the
Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court was never given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr.
would have given a rational, logical and acceptable explanation for the same.
Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the part
of respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront respondents with these observations. Respondents
would not have thought that the Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that they were
written on short bond paper, or that their margins are small. Respondents were thus deprived of a chance
to rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were forced to explain the same in
memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these observations started to crop up. It would
have been different if the date of the documents had been after Consuelo's death, or if there had been
obvious alterations on the documents. In the latter cases, it would have been the responsibility of
respondents' counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment of donor's tax before the
death of Consuelo
In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation, the Court of
Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO
herself who paid the donor's tax of the properties subject of the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount of P119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification
dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents were acknowledged before him on 21
April 1979. 57 Respondents had presented evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of
P119,283.63 for the Donor's Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency
of P2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid
the donor's tax of the properties subject of the donation on 9 October 1979, as the evidence allegedly
shows that the Donor's Tax was paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after Consuelo's death. 58Petitioner
thereby calls our attention to his Exhibit "O," a certificate dated 4 December 1979 issued by Mr. Nestor M.
Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR, confirming the payment of the donor's tax. The
certificate reads:
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
December 4, 1979
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati, Metro
Manila, paid donor's tax on even date in the amount of P121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge,
interest and compromise penalties as follows:
RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956 P119,283.63
RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957 2,125.82

Total P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD.) NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7 59
Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation Receipts for the
payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December
1979 bore consecutive numbers, despite being issued months apart. Petitioner also points to the fact that
the tax was stated in the certification to have been paid "on even date" meaning, on the date of the
certification, 4 December 1979.

Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donor's Tax, which, petitioner himself admits, was
signed by Consuelo. 60 Petitioner draws our attention to the words "RECEIVED BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR.,
NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC. 4." Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company Bank, Cubao Branch,
received the check on 4 December 1979 as a collection agent of the BIR.
Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment of the Donor's Tax
before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:
1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and prepared by Mariano A.
Requija, accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which included the Donor's Tax Return for the properties
covered by the two Deeds of Donation. The letter was stamped received by the BIR Commissioner on 8
October 1979; 61
2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed by Mariano A. Requija containing the breakdown of
the donations received by the BIR on 8 October 1979; 62
3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24 September 1979 and which was also received by the BIR on
8 October 1979, enumerating all the donated properties included in the Deeds of Donation. 63
4) The Donor's Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds of Donation filed, received,
and receipted by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 64
5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by Consuelo in favor of the BIR
Commissioner in the amount of P119,283.63. 65
6) An "Authority to Issue Tax Receipt" issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21 October 1979 for a total
amount of P119,283.63. 66
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum 67petitioner is trying to establish
here is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the
signatures of Consuelo. Thefactum probans 68 this time around is the alleged payment of the Donor's Tax
after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to
prove in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donor's Tax after the
death of Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank
pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.
Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB Check No. A14473211 to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her
lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the same to the BIR. 69 On the query,
however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death of Consuelo, petitioner and
respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures
based on the evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the
consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant with the words "on even date" in his certification.
Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or
antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties stand.
This is in contrast to respondents' direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax during the lifetime
of Consuelo. With respect to respondents' evidence, all that petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another
speculation totally unsupported by evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose
Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the service
in Garciano v. Sebastian. 70 Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service
casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative
proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed others to distort the
truth.
Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979 Certification
by Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable circumstances surrounding such certification.
Said certification, marked as petitioner's Exhibit "P," reads:
November 22, 1979
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO

Executive Judge
CFI Quezon City
Sir:
In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial
report pertaining to another document submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2, 1979 I
have the honor to certify that documents Nos. 401 and 402 referring to Donations Inter
Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C. Gomez in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson
et. al. were signed in my presence by all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on
April 21, 1979 in my office. I hereby further certify that said two documents among other
documents were reported by me in accordance with law on July 2, 1979, for all legal
intents and purposes.
In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies of the said
two documents officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN
Notary Public 71
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same
appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention of the
subject Deeds of Donation intervivos, "despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the
matter referred to by Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter."72
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for
petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from
impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not
allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may
be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and
cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of
credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the
witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in
his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him." 73
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness.
Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or
private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party. 74
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness,
the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the same Rule, only
allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior
inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastian's subsequent
dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case. ETHIDa
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez, 76 which, in turn cited Cordial v. People, 77 that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as,
having organs of sense, they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their
perceptions to others."
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness;
the testimony of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the
same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined for its relevance
and credibility. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never
been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but wasinstead administratively sanctioned eleven
years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the
Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian's
testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question
were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of
Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
Alleged unusual circumstances
relative to the execution and
notarization of the subject Deeds of
Donation
The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged intercalation of the
subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual
circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the said deeds. According to petitioner:
1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly
improbable and implausible, considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day
for the United States on a pleasure trip; 78
2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that
the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding
procedures require Consuelo to be at the airport at least two hours before flight
time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner points out that respondents' alleged time frame
(from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is not enough to accomplish the following acts:
respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and arriving at the notary
public Jose Sebastian's house at Pag-asa, Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.;
some "small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose Sebastian examining the documents;
Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss the documents;
Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking the
latter whether they accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial
entries; the parties signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately with
Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his services; Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving
Consuelo and other respondents back to Marikina, and dropping the other
respondents at their respective residences; picking up Consuelo's luggage; and
Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila International Airport; 79
3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior
arrangement with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on
his being in his office; 80
4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact
planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she did; 81
5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when Consuelo and
respondents reside in Marikina. It is also illogical that Consuelo would have chosen
a notary public whom she met only on the same day she executed the Deeds,
especially when Consuelo had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she availed
of only two weeks before her death; 82
6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her
to carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave for the United States in
that same morning; 83
7. Maria Rita's residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she is a resident of
Marikina. Also, Maria Rita obtained said residence certificate on 20 April 1979, and
yet Maria Rita testified that she was surprised to know of the donation only on 21
April 1979. 84 Also suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr.
obtained a residence certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew of
the schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, and Consuelo had two residence

certificates, as she used different ones in the Deeds of Donation and the document
notarized two weeks before her death; 85
8. If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will; 86
9. All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves
either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a relative of a donee; 87 and
10. Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer
of the properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to
Maria Rita's testimony that the real properties were transferred after the death of
Consuelo. While respondents assert that the personal properties were transferred to
them prior to Consuelo's death, evidence shows otherwise. 88
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to
her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days that taking the
plane is the "safest way to travel," this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes
crash, now believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air travelers.
Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the
satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the documents signed and
notarized before she left for abroad.
The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice removed, and thus cannot be
given any weight. Petitioner claims that he was told by his twelve-year old son that Consuelo was leaving
at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April 1979, such son having learned about this from the maid of Consuelo when the
son called Consuelo's house that day. 89 This is in contrast to Maria Rita's positive testimony that the flight
time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same day. 90 Maria Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.
As regards petitioner's claim that respondents' alleged time frame in the morning of 21 April 1979 was
insufficient, this Court is not convinced. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any
proof that it had been impossible to perform those alleged acts within three hours. 91 As argued by
respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud without difficulty within five to ten minutes
each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on Saturday mornings,
and was much less of a problem in 1979.
Respondents and Consuelo's decision not to make a prior arrangement with notary public Jose Sebastian
does not surprise us either. Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of Marikina were inefficient
in the year 1979, they decided to take a calculated gamble. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that Jose
Sebastian would be at his house on a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.
With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City, we find the explanation relative thereto
satisfying. We quote:
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the notary public whom
his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did not want to go to said notary public since our
cousins whom she didn't like had access to him and she wanted to keep the execution of
the deeds confidential. Thus:
Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the
preparation and notarization of legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now
Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular Notary Public, but way
before that date. But after that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not
anymore that regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before that?
A: I don't specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document like this,
we would not really go to Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature,no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.

Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the
latter's performance of his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two
documents in question dated April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of
your auntie and you added that as a consequence, your auntie did not avail of the
notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it comes to confidential matters, is that
correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles
especially if the documents are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what these confidential matters
are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category "confidential".
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with
your auntie such that she made known to you this falls under confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly
notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these
documents should be notarized by other notary public other than Angeles, because
it is confidential?
A: It came from her.
Q: Yes, did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
That's what he said. "It came from her".
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that these two documents are
of confidential matters?
A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized, she said more or less, "ayaw ko kay
Atty. Angeles".
Q: She said that?
A: That's correct.
Q: And you were curious to know why she told you that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles. . . . well, my cousins whom
she didn't like have access to Atty. Angeles. 92
The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect the
validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents' factual assertions:
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able to sufficiently and
substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e.,
after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real
properties are concerned, the following:
"Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to
the States in the company of your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land
together with the improvements consisting of a house were transferred to you, you
did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States to effect the transfer of these
properties?
"A: No, I did not.
"Q: Why?

"A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I am not that aggressive. Tita Elo
told me "akin na iyon" but I did not transfer it in my name. "Siempre nakakahiya."
"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your
name?
"A: Yes, that was my reason.
"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a
donation inter vivos, meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
"A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I have also my sentiment. Tita
Elo was very close to us but I did not want to tell her: "Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan
SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko." It is not my character to be very
aggressive."
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
"Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of
certain contracts, by tradition.
"They may also be acquired by means of prescription."
Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not the mode by which
they acquired ownership of the properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated
to them. The circumstance that aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the
names of the donees only after the death of the donor, although the deeds of donation
were dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself indicate that the said documents were
antedated. 93
Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility one which experience tells us is not a rare
occurrence at all that donations are often resorted to in place of testamentary dispositions, often for the
purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties usually remain in the donor's possession during his or her
lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of
utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.
Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that Consuelo
should have also made a will, and the claim that all the instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are
purely speculative.
In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict
requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some
jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of
establishing a proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be
that the circumstances established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also
inconsistent with any other rational theory. 94
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such approach
would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much
more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioner's evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which
shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weaknesses of the defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be

stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on

his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of
action." 95 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner's liability for damages
The last part of the trial court's decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves the
award of damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late
Consuelo "jointly and solidarily liable" for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The trial court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to support his charges,
that he repeatedly subpoenaed the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting
evidence contradictory to his legal position and which actually happened, when plaintiff
subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his
witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality
of the estate of Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to
appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other than the
donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter
Vivos. 96
Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary. Respondents never
assailed the authenticity of petitioner's evidence, and merely presented their own evidence to support
their assertions. As previously stated, petitioner's evidence had successfully given us doubts as to the
authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge petitioner's
burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioner's institution of the present case was carried
out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts
of petitioner's counsel to represent its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against
its clients.
While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets of paper signed
by Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the opposite is true as regards the damages suffered
by the respondents. Having failed to discharge this burden to prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in
instituting the case, petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be held liable for moral
damages.
This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in addition to
any of the four kinds of damages mentioned. 97
The attorney's fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence of a clearly
unfounded civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff. CaAIES
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil CasesNo. 36089 and No. 36090, which was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the following portion be DELETED:
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily
should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney's fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's
fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, [February 6, 2007], 543 PHIL 436-483)

6- People v. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 (2000)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODEGELIO
TURCO, JR., a.k.a"TOTONG", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gregorio dela Pea III for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant appealed from his conviction of the crime of rape of his 13-year-old cousin, claiming: complainant was unable to
clearly identify him since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face
with a towel; complainant was forced by her father to implicate the appellant; and no actual proof was presented that the
rape of complainant actually happened because although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer
who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same. TSIDaH
The Supreme Court upheld appellant's conviction on appeal, ruling: declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full credence; minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person
recounts details of so humiliating and painful to recall as rape; if the charge were not true, it is difficult to understand why
the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor; the supposed closeness between appellant and the victim, is
explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship; absence of medical findings by a medico-legal
officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient
to convict.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; DECLARATIONS OF YOUNG AND IMMATURE RAPE
VICTIMS DESERVE FULL CREDENCE; CASE AT BAR. At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations
on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294
SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but
also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified
were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINOR LAPSES IN RAPE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY DO NOT DETRACT FROM HER POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE MALEFACTOR; CASE AT BAR. Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected
when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza,
285 SCRA 478 [1998]). Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not
something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes
deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or
subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These lapses do not detract from
the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA
296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated
portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM DESERVES CREDENCE WHERE THERE IS NO MOTIVE TO FALSELY
TESTIFY AGAINST ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. The Court finds that the victim hadno motive to falsely testify against
accused-appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286
SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF A RELATIVE OF THE VICTIM REINFORCED CONCLUSION THAT RAPE REALLY
HAPPENED. We reiterate the trial court's observation thereon the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree
cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree
relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the
obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim
initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would
charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to file said case against accusedappellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY IN REPORTING RAPE INCIDENT IS NOT UNCOMMON; CASE AT BAR. As regards the initial
delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to
make public the assault on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her
father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to her father

because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant. Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and
only strengthens her credibility. DTcACa
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF INDEPENDENT PROOF IN SUPPORT OF "SWEETHEART THEORY"; CASE AT BAR.
In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and
self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the
victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were
sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a
confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief,
seemingly abandoning this line. We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was
between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship.
7. ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; MEDICAL EXAMINATION IS NOT INDISPENSABLE IN THE
PROSECUTION OF RAPE; CASE AT BAR. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba,G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999;People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55
[1996];People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the
occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction
is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; CIVIL LIABILITY; AWARD OF P50,000.00 CIVIL INDEMNITY IN ADDITION TO P50,000.00
MORAL DAMAGES IS PROPER; CASE AT BAR. As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by
the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete
based on established jurisprudence and must be modified. In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the
award of P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the
Death Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from
the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis thereof (People vs. Prades,
293 SCRA 411 [1998]). aHTEIA
DECISION
MELO, J p:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 2349272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the
following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang Barangay, Municipality of Isabela,
Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly
make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and
removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of
force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the
undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of
her, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial ensued.
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its witnesses Alejandra Tabada,
mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brotherin-law of the victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk
who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after
the incident is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower
Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart
(p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father,
Alejandro and her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve
(12) years and six (6) months old at the time of incident, having been born on
December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).

The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven
o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was
accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor,
Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her
grandmother who was already sleeping in the room. About to enter the said
room, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when
she asked who was it, the party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are
referring to whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id.; Italics supplied)
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4)
years and appellant is her second cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that
was about to befall her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with
the use of towel, covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the
victim's mouth, even placed his right hand on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Escelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig
pen which was about twelve (12) meters away from the victim's house, appellant
lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off
her shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19, id.). Escelea tried to resist by moving her
body but to noavail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly
inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The victim felt terrible pain (p.
20, id.). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and held
the victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if she
reports the incident to anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will
kill you.
(p. 21, id; Italics supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on
the other hand, upon reaching home, discovered that her shortpants and panty
were filled with blood (p. 23, id.). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to
herself the harrowing experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to
muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, about the
said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's father, about the
rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked
Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27,id.). TcAECH
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial
Hospital. She was examined by Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of
the medical certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's
complaint against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and
accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts
was also advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase
was trying to project that the complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA
285, the Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart story"

was a mere concoction of appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal

liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an affirmative defense, the allegation
of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the same
was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused
and/or his witnesses must present any token of the alleged relationship like love
notes, mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare allegation of the defense,
not to mention its utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how
such a relationship could exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young
child barely a little over the age of twelve (12) years old. Indeed, a love
relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs. Sergio
Betonio,G.R. No. 119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court
Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor
Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October 17, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court
Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a paramount importance, and if her
testimony proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree
cousin or they are sixth civil degree relatives. The mother of the accused is a
first degree cousin of the father of the complainant. In the culture of the Filipino
family on extended family, the relationship between the complainant and the
accused being only second degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an older
relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative (the
complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files a
case of rape against her cousin, unless it is true. There is no showing that there
was compelling motive why the case be filed against the accused, except that
the rape really happened.
xxx xxx xxx
It is noted that there was nounderlying reason why the complainant and/or her
father would bring an action against the accused, except that the accused had
raped Escelea Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it
were not true that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself
to an embarrassment and traumatic experience connected with the litigation of
this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino culture especially on virginity. We
likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced
together . . . not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant
belonged, poor and helpless and everything is entrusted to God. The
complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost
illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family
cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a
neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show . . . and expose herself
to the danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the
court is a shout for help . . . let us try to hear it.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds
the accused "GUILTY" of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty

Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages without subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
I
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PROSECUTION, BASED ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL
TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO
PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE
EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that other than
the written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal
Trial Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there
was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that
immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony
clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator; that complainant
implicated accused-appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that noactual proof was presented
that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590
[1998];People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291
SCRA 188 [1998]).
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's
testimony.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having
attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to
go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show . . . and exposes herself to the danger of the
dark night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made
by the Court.
Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did
you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?

A It is just by saying: "Lea".SaHTCE

Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A I answered: "Who is that?"
Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are
referring to whom?
A Rodegelio, sir.
Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the
accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what
did you do?
A I opened the door, sir.
Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?
A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
Q Aside from placing his right hand . . . when he placed his right hand on your
neck, where was he? Was he infront or behind?
A He was at my back, sir.
Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do
next with that position?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?
A He told me to walk, sir.
Q Where did he bring you?
A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have a copra kiln?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III:
The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought,
leading, Your Honor.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a
place which you do not know?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What place?
A Pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the owner of that pig pen?
A Our pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Who owned that pig pen?
A My father, Your Honor.
Q How far is that pig pen to your house?
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)

Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were
brought to the pig pen or the place where you were sexually abused,
were you place inside or outside?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III:
Leading, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
I will withdraw.
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that
you were brought by the accused?
A Inside the grasses, sir.
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the
accused do to you?
A He put me down, sir.
Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?
A He mounted on me, sir.
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next?
A He molested me, sir.
Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A My shortpants and panty, sir.
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and
panty, did he totally remove it from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
A He abused me, sir.
Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse you?
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did
you do?
A I tried to move my body, sir.
Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of
you, what did the accused do?
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
Q And was he able to insert his private part?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
A I felt pain, sir.
Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was
already inside your private part?
A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please
tell us whether you have already experienced or you have already your
menstruation at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court . . . after the accused had sexually
abused you and you said you felt pains after he consummated the
sexual act, after that what did he do next after consummating the act?
A After consummating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he
kissed me and hold my nipple, sir.
Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you,
kissed you and hold your breast, did he tell you anything?
A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."
Q In what dialect?

A In Chavacano, sir.
Q After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and
threatened you in Chavacano dialect, what happened next after that?
A No more, sir. aSTHDc
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense counsel asked her about the
events that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date
when she also watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-appellant
came and called her "Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "so Totong". When she asked what he wanted,
he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said that she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around.
He insisted but to no avail, and hence he just went home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct examination, she
clarified that when accused-appellant came to borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. Lastly, she said that the incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 o'clock in the
evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents.
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion concerning the events that
transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are
young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In
addition, we take cognizance of the trial court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society to which the victim
belongs almost illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go to a
neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken . . .
can no longer be pieced together not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor
and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having intermingled two incidents.
Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion
when he asked the victim what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness'
testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as
rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]). Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in
detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but,
rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life,
which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These
lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor
(People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its
entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had nomotive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her testimony deserves the
credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. At this juncture, we reiterate
the trial court's observation thereon the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father,
that makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture,
particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an older relative
to protect and take care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her
cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the
malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape
really happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance
of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the
victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the

incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24).
Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented by the defense that must be
passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-appellant and the victim? The
theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this
regard, we agree with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to
exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory
of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his
alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the
theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has
not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was between accused-appellant and the
victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of
the incident, when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew right away
that her caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim Escelea Tabada and touched on
the apparent friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the
complainant Escelea Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were
arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III: (Continuing)
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada
were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the
Tabadas in San Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of
Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not
telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
(ibid., p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that noactual proof was presented that the rape actually happened since the medico-legal
officer who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same. cCDAHE

In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the
certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official
records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert
witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in
court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of
evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is
competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given
to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be
admissible, it may be entitled to little orno weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception
(Regalado,Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied
solely on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foulsmelling discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was
made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in
the prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55
[1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the
occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction
is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as
indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence and must
be modified. InPeople vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as
indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs noproof
other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved. This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral
damages which also needs nopleading or proof as basis thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rodegelio
Turco, Jr. a.k.a "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages. DEcTIS
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, andGonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Turco, Jr., G.R. No. 137757, [August 14, 2000], 392 PHIL 498-517)

7- State of Missouri v. William Arthur Bull, 339 S.W. 2d 783 Mo. 1960, 14
November 1960

339 S.W.2d 783 (1960)

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Arthur BALL, Appellant.
No. 47575.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
November 14, 1960.

Dewey S. Godfrey, St. Louis, for appellant.

*784 John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Richard R. Nacy, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree; the jury also found prior felony convictions and,
therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. V.A.M.S. 560.120, 560.135, 556.280.
The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men,
one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man spent
ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and
rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in
the store. Later in the day, about 5:50, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing
the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two
men who had been in the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat,
brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as
Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the
shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the
rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag
and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called
the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the
register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the
trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.
In his motion for a new trial one of the claims is that there was no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show that
Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his person," one of the essential elements of robbery in the first
degree. V.A.M.S. 560.120. Krekeler did not affirmatively testify that he was in fear but he could well apprehend injury if
he did not comply with their requests and in the circumstances the jury could reasonably find "the fear" contemplated in
the statute. 77 C.J.S. Robbery 16, p. 459; State v. Thompson, Mo., 299 S.W.2d 468, 474. The element of fear being a
reasonable inference from the evidence, the facts and circumstances support and warrant the finding of robbery in the first
degree. State v. Eckenfels, Mo.,316 S.W.2d 532.
Another of the appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial (V.A.M.S. 547.030; Supreme Court
Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R.) has to do with his arrest and the testimony of the two arresting officers. On November 4, 1958,
about three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers
stopped him, told him that they were officers and that he was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball
officer Ballard "holstered" his gun and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the
officers ran after him, Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air
but Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a
bullet in his back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too remote from the date of the
robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course prejuducial *785 that he is entitled to a new trial.
But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant
circumstance (State v. Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d 147, 153), the remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of
the evidence rather than to its admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p. 274.
When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took from his person and impounded a brown felt hat, "a
brownish" windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoesthese were exhibits one and two, Ball admitted that they
belonged to him although his evidence tended to show that he had purchased the jacket after October 15. In identifying
Ball, in addition to the scar on his face, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble, particularly
the "tall brown hat." These items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them.
State v. Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d 787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new trial that a police
officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person. It is said that the
introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues

involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any
other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day
of October, 1958; that said evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly."
The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were these: After the clothes were identified and introduced as
exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney inquired of officer Powell, "Did you also seize his personal effects?"
Defense counsel immediately objected to any testimony relating to personal effects found on the defendant "at the time."
The court overruled the objection and state's counsel inquired, "Well Officer, what personal effects were seized?" Defense
counsel, evidently knowing and anticipating, objected "to any testimony relevant (sic) to any personal effects seized upon
this Defendant at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is immaterial and irrelevant and tends to neither prove
nor disprove any facts involved and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial be declared." The court overruled the
objection and the officer said, "Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred and fifty eight dollars and two cents in
cash, with the denominations of the bill(s), two one hundred dollar bills, a twentytwo twenties, a ten, a five, three ones and
two pennies. He had a ladies ring and a man's wristwatch. He had a crusifixion along with a small pen knife and a black
leather wallet. Maybe one or two other personal articles." All of these items were then marked as exhibits, from three to
nine, offered in evidence and described by the officer, exhibit three being the bills and pennies comprising the $258.02.
According to the officer Mr. Krekeler was unable to identify any of these articles or the money as having come from the
jewelry store robbery and there is no objection in the motion to any of the items other than the money and some of them
were obviously not prejudicial, for example the keys, a small penknife and wallet.
Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356, the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in
proof of the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was
found on the defendant the same day of the burglary and while the fact was a circumstance admissible in evidence it was
held to not constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of burglary. In
State v. Gerberding, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to the proof but $4,000 was taken in a
robbery and *786 the appellant had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the day of the robbery. The
proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money
on his person prior to the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. As to this the facts
were that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no
visible means of support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of course,
there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment
house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to
identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not
admissible in evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the
value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in
the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had
suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 (annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The mere
possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken,
because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is
the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154, p. 601. In
the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his arrest
came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before
the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact relevant
and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on
trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v. Bray, Mo. App., 278 S.W.2d 49; People v.
Orloff, 65 Cal. App. 2d 614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation 123 A.L.R. loc. cit. 132-134 and compare the facts and
circumstances in State v. Garrett, supra. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the
right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court en banc.
WESTHUES, EAGER, STORCKMAN and HOLLINGSWORTH, JJ., concur.

HYDE, C. J., and LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., dissent.

8- Lopez v. Heesen, 69 N.M. 206, 365 P. 2d 448 N.M. 1961, 22 August 1961
365 P.2d 448 (1961)
69 N.M. 206
Jesse G. LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Robert HEESEN and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 6760.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
August 22, 1961.
Rehearing Denied October 31, 1961.
*449 Smith, Kiker & Kitts, and Ramon Lopez, Albuquerque, for appellant.
Sutin & Jones, Albuquerque, David R. Hardy, Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.
CHAVEZ, Justice.
Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15,
1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a
shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to appellant, causing him great
bodily and mental pain and anguish, all to his damage in the total sum of $80,000, which included $25,000
punitive damages.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter appellant filed a
demand for jury trial. By stipulation of appellant and appellee, Heesen, appellee, Sears, Roebuck and
Company was joined as a party-defendant. Appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company, will hereinafter be
referred to as appellee "Sears." Thereafter two amended complaints followed before the third amended
complaint was filed, alleging that appellee, Sears, was engaged in the design and manufacture of hunting
firearms, including the Higgins Model 51, Cal. 30.06 rifle, and was also engaged in the selling of firearms in
Albuquerque.
It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, appellee, Sears, sold to appellee, Heesen, one of said Higgins
Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or manufactured by appellee, Sears, in
that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In
addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this dangerous condition known to appellee, Sears, was sold to
appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it would be used for hunting purposes and that appellee, Sears,
negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.
The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico,
appellee, Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result
of the joint and concurrent negligence of both appellees, appellant sustained a severe and disabling wound
and injury to his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the amount
of $55,000 against both appellees, jointly and severally.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. Appellee, Sears, also
answered denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's
injuries were caused by an unavoidable accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole
cause thereof; that the rifle involved was of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned
properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when used with reasonable care; that rifles of this type
had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters generally and by the government of the
United States and foreign countries; that the safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and obvious,
and had been seen and inspected by Heesen prior to the accident; that Heesen knew of the tendency of
the safety mechanism to come off safety to "fire" position while hunting in heavy brush and climbing up
and down mountain *450 terrain when pressure was applied to the safety mechanism; that appellee,
Sears, had no duty to warn appellee, Heesen, of the method of operation and use of the safety
mechanism; and that it could not have been foreseen that appellee, Heesen, would continue to hunt in

heavy brush and mountainous terrain knowing that the safety mechanism would come off safety without
taking proper precautions to handle the rifle in a reasonable manner.
The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both appellees and against appellant. Judgment was
entered for appellees and this appeal followed. Appellant abandoned any contention that the verdict in
favor of Heesen was erroneous and this appeal concerns only appellee, Sears.
The facts are substantially as follows. In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air
Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has
a bolt action known more particularly as a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familar. Heesen,
although experienced in hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a
rifle. The safety mechanism on the rifle is what is known as a "Class 1" safety, meaning that it interrupts
the firing pin directly. The safety lever is mounted on the left side of the gun to the rear of the bolt
assembly. It is a two-position safety with the action locked when the safety lever is in a raised position. To
release the safety, you push the safety lever to the left and down to a horizontal position and the gun is
then ready to fire.
Heesen first telephoned appellee's store about obtaining a Higgins rifle which they advertised. Later he
went to appellee's store and purchased the rifle. At the time of the purchase Heesen was given an
instruction pamphlet which he read. Said pamphlet explained the composition of the rifle and gave
operating instructions, including the method to be pursued to make the gun "safe," i.e., how the gun is put
in a safety position and how it may be released and have the gun ready to fire. It appears that Heesen first
talked to a salesman, John C. Villella, over the telephone and requested that the rifle be put aside for him.
However, another salesman, Roger Perkins made the actual transfer of the rifle to Heesen. Perkins'
whereabouts is unknown and nothing is known as to Perkins' conversation with Heesen. Villella did not give
Heesen any instructions as to the use of the safety mechanism. There was a telescopic sight advertised for
sale for use with this rifle but Heesen did not care for the sight and did not purchase it.
Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park
near the town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park that night and began hunting the next
morning on October 15, 1958. Heesen hunted without success and had seen no game up until the time his
gun discharged and appellant was wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M.
When Heesen commenced hunting that morning he placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the
gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during the hours before the shooting and on one or two
occasions he discovered the gun off safety position. This was when he had come down a long hill covered
with rocks and boulders and he assumed that he had hit it against a rock or something. Thereafter Heesen
checked the safety position on frequent occasions. Heesen carried the gun on his right shoulder with the
sling at port arms or ready position, with his left hand on the forearm of the gun and his right hand on the
stock, and by the forearm of the gun with his right hand at the "balance" of the rifle. In each of these
positions the safety lever was toward Heesen's body or right leg. Heesen changed the position in which he
carried the rifle during the course of his walking up and down mountain slopes. He also carried it in a
different position in going through brush and in climbing or stepping upon rocks. Although the gun moved
from "safe" to "fire" position at least twice during the hours before*451 the shooting, Heesen was not
aware of this occurrence. Shortly before the shooting, Heesen had been sitting on a knoll for about twenty
minutes checking the wind and watching for deer. While sitting on the knoll he checked or observed the
safety lever on the rifle several times and it was on safety position. At a time not more than ten minutes
before the shooting he left the knoll and started down a draw which ran in a southerly or southwesterly
direction. Heesen was not sure whether he checked the safety lever after he left the knoll and he was
carrying the gun on his shoulder by the sling as he proceeded down the draw toward the point where the
gun discharged.
At about this time, appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, was sitting next to a tree about fifty yards away from the
point where Heesen's gun subsequently discharged. Appellant in the company of two hunting companions,
Bennie Aragon and Ramon Barela, had gone from Albuquerque to Ute Park on the afternoon of October 14,
1958, and after spending the night in the area, commenced hunting on the morning of October 15th, the
first day of deer season. After hunting all morning and again in the early afternoon, the party stopped to
rest at the location where appellant was shot. It was then about 3:00 P.M. and appellant, dressed in bright
hunting clothes, was sitting about twenty feet away from his two companions and scanning the area for

game. After sitting there about four or five minutes, appellant observed an object to his right which was
moving but which he could not identify. This was shortly before the shooting.
As appellee, Heesen, proceeded down the draw after leaving the knoll, he heard a "rustle" and saw a deer
go between some trees to the left of his line of travel about 50 to 100 yards away. The deer, when
observed, was in a direction about 80 or 90 degrees to the left of where appellant was sitting and Heesen
did not observe appellant or his companions before the shooting. At about this time Heesen removed the
rifle from the sling on his shoulder and held it by his right hand at or near the balance position of the
weapon. He then came to a dead log in his path which was about eight or ten inches in diameter and was
lying horizontally a foot or less off the ground with several dead limbs sticking upward from it. One of these
limbs was a dead sapling sticking up about eighteen inches above the log and had a "fork" shaped like a
thumb and forefinger extended. Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better, and as he stepped
across the log his left foot caught on a little limb sticking out and caused him to stumble. His left foot went
down hard on the ground on one side of the log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the
gun down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking appellant. Heesen testified that he had his hand at
least six inches away from the trigger when the gun discharged. Immediately after the gun discharged he
observed that the gun was on "fire" position.
Appellant was sitting on ground higher than Heesen at the time the gun discharged and subsequent
investigation showed that the bullet had gone uphill, hit a dead tree and ricocheted several degrees to the
left, and had thereafter struck some seedlings before hitting appellant in the chest. The bullet traveled
approximately fifty yards altogether. Heesen went quickly to the spot where appellant was sitting,
observed the seriousness of his condition, and Heesen and Lopez' companions made immediate
arrangements to care for appellant. Heesen obtained medical aid.
There was testimony at the trial that when Heesen was going to the place of the accident with Dr. E.L.
Lindsley, he told Dr. Lindsley that the gun discharged as he was moving it from "fire" position to the "safe"
position.
Under point I, appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the
general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the
Higgins Model 51. A witness for appellee, Sears, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun
designing and testified *452 that the following companies had an excellent reputation in the small arms
field: Fabrique Nationale of Belgium, Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that it was
wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case.
Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and
defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, design, assembly or maintenance, in that the safety
mechanism thereof moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an
allegation of an ultimate issue of fact which the jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper
understanding of which by a jury composed of six men and six ladies, requires specialized knowledge or
experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn
on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist
them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of
experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony.
Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy
to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears',
objection, expressed the opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in
that the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also
testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the
opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen,
testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire"
position without his knowledge.
Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or
experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed
by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified
as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories
designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La

Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard
Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the
advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have
the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are
F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins
Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing
Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the
design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe
by all commercial sporting goods standards.
Appellant appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the modified leaf safety device,
and the fact that other companies manufacture guns with the same design, is relevant as tending to show
that the design is proper. Appellant also seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of
Belgium may be relevant to the issue.
Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who use a similar
safety device as the Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that
the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, and that the design of the
safety device of the Higgins *453 Model 51 was not negligent or defective. He also testified, without
objection, that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is excellent for hunting and fulfills the
requirements of a good designer. The witness, Thomas Raymond Robinson, Jr., testified that in his opinion
the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the field for a prudent hunter, and is suitable for hunting. Ira
L. Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has
a fair reputation, and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.
On an issue such as we have here we believe the applicable rule to be as stated in Wigmore on Evidence,
3d Ed., Vol. II, 461, p. 489, as follows:
"(1) The conduct of others evidences the tendency of the thing in question; and such conduct e.g. in
using chains on a hill, felt shoes in a powder-factory, railings around a machine, or in not using them is
receivable with other evidence showing the tendency of the thing as dangerous, defective, or the reverse.
But this is only evidence. The jury may find from other evidence that the thing was in fact dangerous,
defective, or the reverse, and the maintenance was or was not negligence, in spite of the above evidence.
* * *"
The conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider in determining whether the tendency of the
thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. McDonough, 8 Cir., 161 F.
657; Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II, 461, p. 495.
Under our Rule, 21-1-1(43) (a), which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which favors the reception
of the evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue
should be admitted, leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. Mourikas v.
Vardianos, 4 Cir., 169 F.2d 53; Lawrence v. Nutter, 4 Cir., 203 F.2d 540.
Circuit Judge Bratton, in a specially concurring opinion in United States v. Bowman, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 716,
720, in stating the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows:
"It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule
is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their
opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their
opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment
and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule,
which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the
truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not only to give
as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the
trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate
facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly appears that
the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the
minds of the jurors. * * *"
Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who
manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company,

Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which
have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and *454 that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting this testimony.
Under point II appellant also contends that the trial court committed error in permitting evidence to be
introduced as to the poundage pressure required to move the safety levers of various rifles from "safe" to
"fire" position. There is no merit in this contention. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, testified fully as to his
experience with guns and particularly with the Higgins Model 51 safety device, which he termed the
dangerous feature of the safety mechanism in that it was "so easy to knock off." Doyle's testimony was
introduced under appellant's contention that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was unsafe and thus the issue
arose as to the pressure required to move the safety lever from "safe" to "fire" position. Under the
circumstances it was proper for appellee, Sears, to show that the poundage pressure required to move the
safety lever on a Higgins Model 51 from "safe" to "fire" measured two-and-one-half pounds, and also to
show the poundage pressure required in rifles with identical safety devices. The evidence discloses that
the pound pressure required to move the safety lever on other similar devices was sometimes a little less
and sometimes more than the Higgins Model 51.
Under point III appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the witnesses, La Violette, Thomas
Robinson and Edwards Brown, to give opinion evidence that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model
51 rifle was negligently or defectively designed. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that
this was an opinion upon a subject which is within the province of the jury to determine and that the
question asked calls for an opinion as to a question of law and fact.
This contention, we think, must be rejected. The testimony of these witnesses, all experts in their field, was
upon the ultimate issue of fact of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous and
defective or unsafe, and was properly the subject of expert testimony. Opinion evidence on an ultimate
issue of fact does not attempt or have the power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this evidence could
not usurp the jury's function because the jury may still reject these opinions and accept some other view.
Opinion evidence offered by both parties in this case was not binding upon the jury and they were so
instructed. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. VII, 1920, p. 17; Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123
Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.
In Millers' National Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 10 Cir., 257 F.2d 93, 100, the court said:
"The insurance companies assert that McDonald was improperly permitted to invade and usurp the
province of the jury in that the sole issue was whether there was an explosion and McDonald was allowed
to testify that there was an explosion. The controlling rule as stated by the United States Supreme Court is
that where the matter under inquiry is properly the subject of expert testimony, it is no objection that the
opinion sought to be elicited is upon the issue to be decided. That rule has been followed in this circuit and
applied in two recent decisions."
See also Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122; United States Smelting Co.
v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407; Nelson v. Brames, 10 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 256; and Cropper v. Titanium Pigment
Co., 8 Cir., 47 F.2d 1038.
In 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, 775, p. 647, the rule is stated as follows:
"* * * In such cases, witnesses possessing requisite training, skill, or knowledge, denominated `experts,'
may testify, not only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting the facts, so far as necessary to
enlighten the jury and to enable it to come to a right verdict. * * * Issues of this kind are said to create a
necessity for the admission in evidence of the opinions or conclusions of witnesses who are *455 shown to
be specially skilled or experienced in the particular field in question."
Appellant's final objection to the opinion testimony is that the question asked of the witnesses calls for an
opinion as to a question of law and fact.
Many of the cases cited by appellant on this point are automobile accident cases which hold that an expert
or a non-expert witness cannot express an opinion that the defendant was negligent. The reasoning behind
these cases is that this is within the field of knowledge and understanding of the jury and is not a matter
requiring technical assistance of persons having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill,
experience, or knowledge.
The parties agree that the ultimate issue of liability is for the jury to determine and that a witness cannot
express an opinion on a matter of law, as distinguished from an ultimate fact. The ultimate issue in this

case was whether the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective
condition due to its negligent design, in that it moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to
"fire" position.
Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism
"dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a
safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in
great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the
Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and
was not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the
liability.
The word "negligence" is sometimes used in a broad sense and sometimes in a narrow sense. In the broad
sense it includes the elements of liability. In the narrow sense the element of liability is excluded.
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 78 Ind. App. 361, 130 N.E. 546, 553.
"* * * An allegation of negligence as applied to the conduct of a party is not a mere conclusion of law,
unless made so by the law, but the statement of an ultimate pleadable and provable fact. * * *"
Peavy v. Hardin, Tex.Civ.App. 1926, 288 S.W. 588, 589. See also Gower v. Lamb, Mo. App. 1955, 282 S.W.2d
867; Ege v. Born, 212 Iowa 1138, 236 N.W. 75; Cohen v. Swiller, 1959, 17 Misc. 2d 921, 186 N.Y.S.2d 844;
Louis v. Smith-McCormick Const. Co., 1917, 80 W. Va. 159, 92 S.E. 249; and Hooper v. General Motors
Corp.,123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.
Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337, follows the rule that an expert witness can
express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, but cannot testify as to the ultimate issue of liability.
There is much confusion among the decisions due to the language used by the courts in explaining why
opinion testimony should be excluded. Some courts say that the opinion would "usurp the functions of the
jury." Other courts say that the opinion should not be received because "that is the question which the jury
must decide." If we are to add to this, the additional confusion which exists in the decisions as to whether
negligence is a question of law or fact, or is a mixed question of law and fact, we would tend to create
more confusion and add to the fine distinctions and limitations.
Opinion evidence is admissible on the basis that it will aid the jury to understand the problem and lead
them to the truth on the ultimate facts, and opinions may be disregarded by the jury in whole or in part. It
is left to the jury to decide the issue. See Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797;
and Hooper v. General Motors Corp., supra.
From a careful consideration of the record, we have come to the conclusion that when we consider all of
the testimony *456 bearing upon the question of whether the rifle was dangerous and defective due to its
negligent design, that when appellee used the term "negligent or defective," he was using the word
"negligent" in a narrow sense and as to an ultimate and provable fact. This excluded the element of
liability. It was for the jury to fix the ultimate liability of either party. All of the facts went to the jury and it
is our view that under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the expert opinions expressed were
not improperly admitted.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. Bunton v.
Hull,51 N.M. 5, 177 P.2d 168; State v. Padilla, 1959, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312; and Wells Truckways v.
Cebrian, 1954, 122 Cal. App. 2d 666, 265 P.2d 557.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered.
COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.
MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating.

9- People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, 11 July 2002

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in
Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 2 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. cDAIT
S
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus: cEaSHC
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams,
without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended byRA 7659." 3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed
from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City
when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry.
Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. 4 The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited
to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by
two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag
and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN
Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took
custody of the accused and the seized items the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag 6 and eight (8) small plastic packs
of white crystalline substance. 7When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The accused and
the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters, 9 while the
packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory
examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila
where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring
a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan

port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage
or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of
Macapudi. 11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the
Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other
passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security
force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabinno. 106 came and told him that he was suspected
of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was
asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite
suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the
security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite
suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the
suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of
him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard,
then to the PAOCTF. 12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan yMacarambon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as
amended byR.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such
preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the
National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED." 13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v.
Marti 15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 16 Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent
to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, 18 "[i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." 19 The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only
after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function
of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase
and he had no knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the
dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged. 21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The first
two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, 23 this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the
possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with
the possession or control of such articles. 24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. 25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was
not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will
not be disturbed on appeal. 27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this
case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected. 28 Why

he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner
remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is
not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.31 To overcome this presumption, it is
necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican
"Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the
trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the
imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling
sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living,
breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused.
Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused." 32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the
accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court
that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting
accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant. IaHCAD
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Bongcarawan y Macarambon, G.R. No. 143944, [July 11, 2002], 433 PHIL 918-946)

10- People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; PRONOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AND STATE APPELLATE
COURTS, DOCTRINAL IN THIS JURISDICTION. Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which was in turn derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may
turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which
are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION

OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. In a number of cases, the
Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co.,
(Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No.
81510, March 14, 1990).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTIES MAY BE INVOKED ONLY AGAINST THE STATE, NOT
UPON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitutioncannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48
SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . . That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CASE AT BAR. The
contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If the search
is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE PRESENCE OF NBI AGENTS TO OBSERVE AND LOOK AT WHICH IS IN PLAIN SIGHT
IS NOT A SEARCH. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374
US 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
6. ID.; CONSTITUTION; DOES NOT GOVERN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS. The constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern
relationships between individuals.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EVIDENCE PROCURED BY INDIVIDUALS EFFECTED THROUGH
PRIVATE SEIZURE, ADMISSIBLE. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual
effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental
as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
8. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; SELF-SERVING DENIALS, DESERVE NO WEIGHT IN LAW. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; Peoplevs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR EVIDENCE TO BE BELIEVED. Evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
10. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; THINGS WHICH A PERSON POSSESSES ARE
PRESUMED OWNED BY HIM; CASE AT BAR. As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask

Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national
was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment. On the
contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him
(Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article II and Section 2 (e)(i), Article I of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing
therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p.
6)
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes nolonger insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2').
Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8). LLpr
"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp.
5-6, October 6, 1987).
"He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date,
i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes
informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
(tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in
the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took
out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to
have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that

dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by
the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics
Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS
WERE NOT OBSERVED. cdphil
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION." (Appellant's Brief,
p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Secs. 2
and 3, Art. III,Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence
(Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III).
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution.
As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and
State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 2d [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]),

declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant,
abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948])
wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter
(Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66
SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also
Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies. LLpr
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly
claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated
otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
"1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . .
". . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under
the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life . . ." (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116
US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies;
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served."
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge
and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals, (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence *** complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. LLphil
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of
the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate
that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as
a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
(TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly,
the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into
a warrantless search and seizure proscribed bythe Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited
by the constitution(US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10
L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into
custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by
the owner there is nounreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query
which he himself posed, as follows:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom?Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the
Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed. cdphil
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitutionhas been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the
evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October
1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that
an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or
that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of
the NBI, Thus:
"Fiscal Formoso:
"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the
accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?
"WITNESS:
"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused
availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave
uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment
of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under
custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of
error is therefore misplaced. cdphil
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not
the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN,
pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell

out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without
first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband
and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a
complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such
undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere sayso" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130;
see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA,
92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the
merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p.
40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to
the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. LexLib
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr . and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, [January 18, 1991], 271 PHIL 51-65)

11- People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112983. March 22, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL,
and RENE SALVAMANTE (at large),accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysayfails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between the former and the latter as
clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by
the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which he is charged. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession
made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO REMAIN SILENT, TO COUNSEL AND TO
BE INFORMED OF SUCH RIGHT; AVAILABLE EVEN AFTER THE FILING OF CRIMINAL ACTION; SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY ACQUIRED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The exercise of the rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are
available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily,
once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of
a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must
make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him
in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected
to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must
be faithfully complied with. In the case at bar, theSinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2
Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of the said Constitutional provision. As
disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said
section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang
Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOURCES OF SAID LAW. The direct and primary source of Section 12(1) of the present
Constitution is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution. It was an acceptance
of the landmark doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S.
436 [1966]). In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our
jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It may be
pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the
word custodial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view
thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, (138 SCRA 294, 319-320 [1985]) this Court aptly observed: The fact that
the framers of our Constitutiondid not choose to use the term ''custodial" by having it inserted between
the words ''under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase"any person" goes to
prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. Clearly then, the second
paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable to the
investigation for the commission of an offense of a person not in custody. Accordingly, as so formulated,
the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450 [1971]) that
the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment. Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this
Court laid down this rule in Morales vs. Enrile (121 SCRA 538, 554 [1983]): "7. At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him, . . ." Note that the first
sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest and
show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed
against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at
any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This paragraph
was incorporated into Section 12 (1). Article III of the present Constitution with the following additional
safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the
party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Then, too, the right to be heard would
be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present
Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall "enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel.''
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION IN CASE AT BAR; ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa are not governed
by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state
witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights

are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that
may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect. or restrictions on the
power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.'' They
are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of
authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the
Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to
Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, (183 SCRA 196 [1990]) this Court held that the declaration
of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and
any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify
as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not
repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to
oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for
Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his
admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness,
Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty.
His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial
admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established
beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this case: (1)
He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in
question was committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs.
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and
co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan,
Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991, (5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon,
on 4 March 1992, and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."
5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially
formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,i.e., the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. We do not hesitate to rule
that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.
6. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; WEAK DEFENSE ABSENT PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF CRIME AT THE
TIME OF COMMISSION. The defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly
rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time
and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Through the unrebutted testimony, it was positively
established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed
in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then
impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was
committed.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank,
and his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the

metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet.
Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and
trouble. That illusion was shattered when in the early morning of 27 August 1991, in the sanctity of
their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion
of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims, former
houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in
the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991
with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet. cdrep
Only Richard Malig was arrested. On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig,
the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector
Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence subsequently submitted established his
complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further
asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the
evidence disclosed nosufficient evidence against him. 3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he
filed an application for bail.4 He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a
State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in
this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information5 with only Salvamante and
Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th of August, 1991, at Tagadi. Upper Tadiangan, Municipality of
Tuba, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of the
owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of
spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and
intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry away the
following articles, to wit:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P204,250.00). Philippine Currency, belonging to the said Teresita and William Horace
Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery, both accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with
lead pipes on the different parts of their body, leading to the death of William Horace
Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required medical
attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise incapacitated her
from the performance of her customary labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded
against Maqueda only, after he entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial court found accused Hector Maqueda
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to "indemnify the victim, Teresita M.
Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker, P41,681.00 representing
actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs." LLjur
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie
Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje,
Prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio
Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno on rebuttal.
Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence
in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sur-rebuttal witness.

The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary
thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and
Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked as was her wont, the
main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the
Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the
door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she
opened the door of the toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew
Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers
whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her
chores. LLphil
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her
face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom
she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the
garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon
opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with his right hand
brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, she pointed to accused
Maqueda as the man she saw then. She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door
knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep. She went down the stairs and proceeded to the dining
room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly, the two
rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not
to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to
accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back of her right hand. She
fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to the garage and hid under the car.
After a few seconds, she went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she
called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they
saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone
from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr.
Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard
the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27, August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a
waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the
house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached
the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand
with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder.
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following
would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney
bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men
boarded it. Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter
used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he boarded it. In the
investigation conducted by the Tuba police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as
Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered enough courage to leave the room
where they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of
the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta
rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call
the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen
earlier. They just stayed near the road. LLphil

Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the
Baguio City Police Station, headed by police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto
Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only
because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station,
which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr.
Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location. They
went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"),
and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe (Exhibit "BB") at the back
of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions
of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security
guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK"). LibLex
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of
jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the
house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone
had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet.
Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the
premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the Barker house
to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the
Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the
Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, and then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal Health Officer of Tuba,
Benguet. He found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument,
determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P,"
"O," and "R"). LexLib
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center
where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L.
Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr.
Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily on the left side of the occipital area,
bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed.
She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were
caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left
unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic
shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the
hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the
persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When
informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for
them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered
consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she
had double vision. LexLib
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then
discharged from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the
robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit
"U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera,
radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The
aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these
missing items (Exhibit "X").
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that
she sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. She then sought

treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an
unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen
Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts of
accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay
captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991;
however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanio Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan
to find out whether Salvamante and "Putol' had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain
Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once
Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan. cdll
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that "Putol," who is
none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo
Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, proceeded to Guinyangan.
The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to
the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of
the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj.
Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and
according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker
house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit
"GG-6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above
entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor
Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the
company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an
affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained
permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda
narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut
vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the
vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City was to
rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the
kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead
pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead
pipe provided him by Salvamante. After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr.
Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor,
Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and
some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house,
walked toward the road where they saw two persons from whom they asked directions and when a
passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two persons that it was bound for Baguio
City, he and Salvamante boarded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and
walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. His testimony is summarized by
the trial court in this wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that on
August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot
1, Block 21, Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa. Metro Manila. He was
employed as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August
27, 1991. It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. As
caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his

employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all
sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that
day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the
new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was
his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New
Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused
Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood playmates,
having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day
when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused Salvamante
after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him
to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to
visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon. When the two
accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him (Salvamante) in
selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew
that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able
to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went to
visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante
again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work at the polvoron factory until
February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked
him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he
accompanied Roselyn home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for
work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the
CAFGU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to
the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he
was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in
the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he
would be freed and he could also become a state witness. He told them that he could
attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette
recorder. prLL
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet
where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda
Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda
worked, testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for
her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SPO3 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his
constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies
on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well
as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing
accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession
and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantial evidence, the following
requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken
chain of circumstances which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the

defendant to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People vs.
Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused
are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any
objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well
and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it
produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused
Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tayaban, the only
prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to
ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were
strangers to the place.
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they
come from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has
established that he and Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went
out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied
Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder. LLjur
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement "That he is willing
and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that
he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." This in effect, supports his
extrajudicial confession made to the police at Calauag, Quezon Province. Although
he claims that he did not bother to read the motion as he was just told that his
signature would mean his release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which
cannot be given credence. Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could
have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their
signatures were already fixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house
that fateful morning and his even more damaging admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa
as to what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already
bolster the increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long line of cases, alibi is at best a
weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020,
October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only
appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission (People vs. Pugal,G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA
247). This defense easily crumbles down as prosecution witness Mike Tayaban
placed accused Maqueda at the vicinity of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus his extrajudicial confession produce the
needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the
crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") of Maqueda taken by
SPO2 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we
acquit him because the trial court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments, which are anchored
on his alibi that at the time the crime was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, and the failure of the star witnesses for the prosecution to identify him. He alleges that
Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene

Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a description of
Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that
Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not
able to positively identify Maqueda. The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession
and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his
attention and arguments on these. LibLex
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession
the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between the former
and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as
follows:
SEC. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13Wharton
distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts,
to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is
but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence ofcorpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already
been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court,
theSinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was "no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16where this Court elucidated on the rights of a
person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial
court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court.
He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to
be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And
yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so. 17

The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he
failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him. LexLib
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove
the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the
tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People
vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution andhis rights after a criminal complaint or information
had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused
"no longer, [has] the right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then
there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view
would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the rights against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph
of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court
explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application
of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly
stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he
may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. 20

It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned
Section 20, the word custodial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was
excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by
having it inserted between the words "under'' and "investigation," as in fact the sentence
opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire
fabric of the Miranda doctrine. LexLib
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application
of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person not
in custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule
adopted inPeople vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment. Applying the
second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule inMorales vs. Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of
the reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply
means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and
that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the
right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section
20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the
commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present
Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and
independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel,
he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to
counsel. 25 Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitutionprovides that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall "enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs.
Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become
a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the

court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It was therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against
whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his
right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities
and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the
accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel. cdll
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested
by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he
is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of
theConstitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was
taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed
by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said
section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang
Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant toparagraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which
reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28or restrictions on the
power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not
unlimited." 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or
state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs.
People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he
gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he
explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to
be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if
we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstancial evidence. The following
circumstances were duly proved in this case:

(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after
the crime in question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie
Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place
sometime in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."
Section 4, rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court are present in this case. cdphil
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The
trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through
the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers.
It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the
time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda
started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his testimony
that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
decision of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet in Criminal Case No. 91-CR-1206 is
AFFIRMED in toto. LLphil
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983, [March 22, 1995], 312 PHIL 646-678)

12- Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.
SYLLABUS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE; A

PERSON BY CONTRACTING MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS
AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. Indeed the
documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The
case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that
they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross

misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
"impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order,
respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for
respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath.
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to nomore than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of
the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 63-69)

13- Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997.]
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.
Atty. D.P. Mercado & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
illegal suspension against the petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. Labor Arbiter Alex Lopez decided in
favor of private respondent, dismissing the ground of unfair labor practice, but, however, declared the
dismissal and suspension illegal, for failure by petitioners to prove their allegations against private
respondent and to show any investigation was conducted, and was therefore, dismissed without just cause
and due process. cdasia
On September 30, 1993, the NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed the labor
arbiter's findings, but with modification on the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the
awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed
this special civil action forcertiorari, with the allegations that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion and that due process was duly accorded to private respondent. In addition, petitioner further
alleged that the Commission gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that, except as to the third ground, the instant petition must fail. Concededly,
Catolico was denied due process. Even though he was given an opportunity to explain her side in
writing, no hearing was ever conducted for the proper investigation of her allegations against private
respondent. It clearly appears that her dismissal was based on hearsay information. Hearsay evidence
carries no probative value. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which
in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. In view thereof, the instant petition is dismissed and the
challenged decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed. The NLRC's reason for upholding the Labor
Arbiter's decision, i.e., that the evidence against respondent was inadmissible in evidence for having been
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, was set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL OF AN
EMPLOYEE BASED ON MERE SUSPICION, NOT VALID; CASE AT BAR. It is settled that the burden is on the

employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee. and its failure to discharge that burden
would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. It is
evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an
overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate
transaction . . . It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita
Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements
attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries noprobative value. . . . Catolico's dismissal then was
obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is
not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the
dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a
managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT AN EMPLOYEE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HER SIDE,
BUT NO HEARING WAS CONDUCTED, CONSTITUTES DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. Catolico
was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge
against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes
every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately
for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an
opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990
issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted
after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic]
in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than
the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
PARTIES; CASE AT BAR. Since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement
would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico.
Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service, In this
case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay to one-half month's salary for every year
of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation
pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION, BILL OF RIGHTS; DOES NOT PROTECT CITIZENS FROM.
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PERPETRATED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. As regards the
constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. AEIHCS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
"Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller." 1
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia
Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30 September 1993
decision 2 and 2 December 1993 Resolution 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRCNCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private
respondent 4 and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15
August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager
Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts
because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum 7 to
Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing

Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized
to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was
"due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through
misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico
then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.8
In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned
Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity
involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with
YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at
P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.'s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00 while P.O.No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or
total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC CheckNo. 222832 dated
December 15, 1988, Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it
was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting
Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up
price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check
voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through
China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having
received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms.
Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to
P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked
Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered
her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been
pocketed by Ms. Catolico. 10 aisadc
Forthwith, in her memorandum 11 dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation, 12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2
February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for
her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her
privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. 14
In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the
preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's
secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum 16 notifying Catolico
of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb.
10, 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of
dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession
which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made
Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with
previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of
P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was
confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company.
Accordingly, you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.

On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. 17
In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found noproof of unfair labor practice
against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what
[they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the
dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal
but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he
awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of service; back
wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days
work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15

TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate
her services.
In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground
that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found
that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant,
which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. 20 It
concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of
the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is
bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed
decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation
of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action
for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its finding of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving
"commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential
position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company
rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given
ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in thePeople v. Marti, 21 the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's
decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent
with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private
respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was
given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check controversy, and concluded that the
opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements of just cause and due

process." The OSG was also convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that
Catolico's admission of the existence of the check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was Christmas gift
from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners' argument
that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case, 22 adding that petitioner
WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that
the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends
that petitioners miserably failed to proved their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its
findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this petition. cda
In her Comment, Catolico assets that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The
check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not
prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check
that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of
the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the
NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never
received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from
YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she
received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an
overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She thus
concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because,
being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive properties." She was
doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground,
the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be
apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from
the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and
that of her counsel. Nohearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The
Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not,
however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the
Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid
cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified. 25 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged
anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there
was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's
inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 26
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in
violation of the [company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to
supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle
of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through
Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the
difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me

and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never
testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to
her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. 27
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co,
through the former's memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru
MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from
YSP offered by petitioners. cdrep
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 29stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per
box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 30 priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The
difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended
by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice PresidentGeneral Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the
purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have
disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners hadno one to blame for their predicament but
themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners.
Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof
that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the
purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There
was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table
deal" with YSP.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which inno case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; 31 and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion. 32 Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees
the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. 33
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to
revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the
best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. 35 In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico
did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the
Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in
NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's
decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and
seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
||| (Waterous Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113271, [October 16, 1997],
345 PHIL 983-997)

14- Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, 13 January 2004

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004.]
VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to
show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the
circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22,
2001 Decision 2 and the February 15, 2002 Resolution 3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No.
15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED." 4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68
of PD 705, as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads as follows:
'That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud,
Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1)
cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd.
ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of
the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from
proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the
aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and
Rosalio Bon entered a plea of 'Not Guilty' to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the
case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant]
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and]
Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon. SEACTH
"The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:
'Prosecution's evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander
Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]
which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under
Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon.
Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed
into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel
Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought
the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of
the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita

[Dangalan-Mendoza's] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990,

together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad
Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza].
During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4)
Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the
stumps . . .. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of
the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he
sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.;
Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita [DangalanMendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and
found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the
lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of
P25,376.00 . . ..'
"In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation.
Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as follows:
'All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied
the charge[.] [He said] that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to
Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was
to eject his father as tenant of the land. IcHTCS
'Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [DangalanMendoza] [and was] instituted [as such] by Teresita's father. He developed the
land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]
wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian
case. Since Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowner's share
of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] . . .. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the
land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees
[to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being
confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint.
'Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar
Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the
former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he happened to box Oscar
Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.'
"On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio
Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was
acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre,
Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA]." 5
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses' credibility and the
sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial court's assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and
Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza's land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the
sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133 6 of the Rules of Court were amply
satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi,
petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son
Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February
13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from
the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was
presented to show the latter's participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that
the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 7 of the Rules of Court would be violated by

binding Jeniebre to petitioner's admission, which did not constitute any of the exceptions 8 to this
provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 ofthe Revised Forestry
Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition. 9
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open
court, is admissible in evidence against him.
"II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not
police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author
because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is believable for the reason that it
is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not
(U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
"III
Whether or not . . . the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses . . . that . . . petitioner
Bon admitted his guilt to them should be given high credence by the courts of justice
considering that . . . many people who are being quoted in media today . . . have been
found to be . . . lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness?
"IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the
prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] . . . the same [is constitutionally] admissible in
evidence against him?" 10
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported
extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the
cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses.acCITS
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 1 thereof, "only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth" may be raised. A
reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised questions of fact the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take
cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper
administration of justice. 11
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascano's and Dangalan's separate testimonies 12 regarding his
alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also
argues that his supposed admission should not have been admitted, because it had been taken without
the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:
"Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules."
Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the
witness stand. 13Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court
is considered hearsay. 14

In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner
admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for
three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made
the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own
perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by
petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On. this basis, a statement attributed
to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. 15Gotesco
Investment Corporation v. Chatto 16 ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of Dangalan's testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been
held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do
so; thus, it may be admitted. 17 The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?
A We were not able to see.
Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty
of cutting those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said
that he took [the] liberty of cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees. TAcCDI
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.
Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi." 18
Moreover, a party's verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard
it 19 fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, "[t]he act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is
based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. 20 The
testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial
investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. 21 We have ruled previously that constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner. 22
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which with the assistance of the barangay tanods 23
was conducted by the owner's brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial
investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III 24 of the 1987 Constitution, or
the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner. 25
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material
only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. 26 In the present

case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of
circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as
they testified. 27 Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, 28 as in this
case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA's findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. 29 We have no reason to depart from this rule.
Hence, we affirm the lower courts' assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended, 30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings
on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents. 31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. 32 It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the
alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only
matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 33 Conviction may be
based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements
concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. SAHITC
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its
assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and
circumstances:
". . . Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the
land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber.
He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses
present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-inlaw, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the
one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is
admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial
investigation." 36

The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved
petitioner's culpability:
". . . (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian
Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n
February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] . . . Rosalio Bon[,] went to private
complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter . . . pay the value of the questioned trees which
they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private
complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees." 37
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of
lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary
evidence: photographs of tree stumps, 38 the investigation report of an officer of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the
trees, 39 and the CENRO's computation of the value 40 of the timber generated from the felled trees. This
fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that
petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties
imposed by the appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the penalty to
imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,41 provides that any
violation thereof "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 42 and 310 43 of
Revised Penal Code." This amendment which eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" has already been
interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses
that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these articles. 44
Both the trial court 45 and the CA 46 found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309
and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods; 47 or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, 48 however, reduces the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years
and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court
and the CA are within the allowable range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty it imposed was more in
accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial court's
indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum;
to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant. aSTHDc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, [January 13, 2004], 464 PHIL 125-145)

15- People v. Ulysses Garcia, G.R. No. 1451761, 30 March 2004

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at
large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS,
MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO
LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y
CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI,appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The
lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-judicial
confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y
Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their co-accused Santiago Peralta
y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados,
Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio
Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the
Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the
sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of this
action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid." 2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused were charged as follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured
currency notes due for shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the
Central Bank of the Philippines as represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses
Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said
offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency
Reviewers, Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and as
such they had free access to the property stolen." 4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992. Appellants,
however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9
and 10, 1992, upon their filing of a cash bond to secure their appearance whenever required by the trial
court. 5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not
guilty. 6 On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta were at large, because
they had failed to appear in court despite notice. 7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed
Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of
the Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and

Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de
Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC,
punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00.
Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting
of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The punctured bills
were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the
investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was
determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for
shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for
circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the
above-named accused.
"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in
front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus
on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave
three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He
also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the
participation of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia's sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for
questioning at the police station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft
together with Garcia." 8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from
1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified
himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger
bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias City. He was arrested without any
warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accused-appellant Garcia
dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride . . . a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and
he was made to bend with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him
and he heard some of the occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he would
not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he told them
that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and . . . up and down . . . the
stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told
them that he does not know his co-accused. . . . Whenever he would deny knowing his coaccused, somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accusedappellant Garcia's nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that
had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he
could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he
decided to cooperate with the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him
to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, 'may
nakikinig.' Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s]. . . . As he was being brought
down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accused-appellant
Garcia's personal belongings consisted of [his] driver's license, important papers and coin
purse.

"He was forced to ride . . . the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were
removed when he was at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western
Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter's name, age and
address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the
Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get
accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia's wallet
and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from accusedappellant's wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers
appearing in accused-appellant Garcia's alleged three sworn statements dated November
4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and . . . November 6, 1992. cASIED
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the
cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was brought to
the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. He did not
identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his coaccused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took . . . pictures while he was doing the
said act.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney's
Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4
Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him that Atty.
Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have
Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and
accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not
present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed . . . the alleged three (3) sworn statements.
"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court
that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accusedappellant Garcia, and that he signed . . . the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness
thereto.
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4
Coronel's warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
"SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon,
Loyola, [Flores] on the basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was
effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico.
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty
Inquest Prosecutor assigned at the WPDC Headquarters." 9(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned to the
Security and Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores and Loyola were laborers
assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their main task was to haul perforated currency notes from
the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building for shredding.
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency notes
placed in a coin sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to someone waiting
outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that the coordinated acts of all the accused
unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging
to the BSP.
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was "an eleventh
hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial court found his allegations of torture
and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of
perforated P100 bills from Garcia's wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt
of the accused.
Hence, this appeal. 10

Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of
Accused-appellant Garcia and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft." 11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of
Accused Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits 'I', 'J' and 'K') and the alleged three pieces of P100
perforated notes (Exhibits 'N' to 'N-2') over the objections of the accused-appellants.
"2
The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon,
Loyola and Flores;
"3
The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the
demurrer to evidence;
"4
The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accusedappellants, consisting of exhibits '1', '2' to '2-B', '3' and '4' and the testimony of their
witness, State Auditor Esmeralda Elli;
"5
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft." 12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants, including the
admissibility of Garcia's confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes; and (2) the propriety
of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by Garcia and
the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however,
contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of
counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides thus:
"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public Attorney's
Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was not assisted by
Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word "SAKSI."
Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter
was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. 14

The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia
had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the
assistance of counsel. The lower court's action is manifest error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other
undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that
any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case,
counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands
its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first
question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a preprepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. 15 The
accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. 16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without
the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. 17 The Constitution states that
"[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in
evidence. . . ." Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled
confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was
tortured becomes moot. CADSHI
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") allegedly
confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence, inadmissible in
evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their
arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of the three
punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after
being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not
committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a
manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was
present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his
plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to
the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of
evidence allegedly found during the search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature. Without a judicial
warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a
lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs
search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search. 19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. 20 Any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule. 21 In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of
a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in
evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general's argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived
the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of
guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the aforementioned three appellants.
The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby.
Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of
it. 22

Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement. It
failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors of the
crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar access to
the shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault. 23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita
because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of
the unexplained increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did
not submit sufficient evidence to support his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be
utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence filed by
Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the prosecution and admitted
in evidence by the RTC established the alleged qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the
pieces of evidence showed appellants' participation in the commission of the crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge's determination of the sufficiency or the
insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against the
accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's
denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent until after
Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former
were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt
of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any other lawful cause. The director of
the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to submit his report on the release of the appellant or the
reason for his continued detention within five (5) days from notice of this Decision. Nocosts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Garcia y Tupas, G.R. No. 145176, [March 30, 2004])

16- People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, 20 January 2004

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD
ROBLE and GERLYN WATES, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, they
lodged the present appeal.
The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE
II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, without being authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried marijuana leaves which are prohibited
drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were manning a
checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the
COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. 2 One of the police
officers blew his whistle 3 and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong
(SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped
away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble
(Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member of
the army. 4 When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however,
offer any. At this point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right
shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting
suspiciously. 5 SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario
answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble
who, however, returned it to Vinecario. 6
Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following
which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed
something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit
reiterating that it was only a mat.
SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, 7 resulting to the
tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this," 8 but the latter ignored Vinecario and
instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that marijuana was found in Vinecario's
possession.
On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along with two bundles
of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and
were turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to
said battalion office, however, the incident was blottered 9 by PO3 Edward Morado at the Buhangin Police
Station. 10
On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual Padasay brought the
confiscated suspected marijuana to the camp's crime laboratory for examination 11 which determined it to
weigh 1,700 grams 12 and to be indeed positive therefor. 13
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine army
stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan, 14 approached motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab
and requested him to bring him to his elder brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he
paid. 15 The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate with Wates
as driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang.16
On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother Teofanis to shoulder
the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis' residence,
appellants left for Davao City. aIDHET
Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecario's former co-employee at Emerson Plywood where
he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle. 17Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook
hands with Datolarta 18who asked where they were headed for and requested that he ride with them.

Vinecario turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then asked
if he (Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum.
Without examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolarta's bag and left with his coappellants. 19
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a checkpoint, 20 sped
past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting
Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to
go back to the checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to alight from the
motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was, and Vinecario identified himself as a member
of the Philippine National Police. 21 The officer asked for identification and when Vinecario could not
produce any, the former got the backpack slung on Vinecario's shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario acquiesced, two
officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the
backpack to confirm if there was indeed marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and
brought him, together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp
Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following
which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. 22
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the
guilt of all three accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC
Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to
Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are
jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep
Act 8177 in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao City,
is ordered to elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court
Manila, for the automatic review of this Decision, after its promulgation.
SO ORDERED. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and disposed as
follows, quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition
of the penalty against all accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through
his counsel de oficio, will apply to all accused since there exists conspiracy of all in the
commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered, only
insofar as the imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection
under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead sentence
(sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to
Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5
thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as decided by the Supreme
Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R.No. 123872 dated January
30, 1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense
charged, is (sic) sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all
accused through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the offense charged, is denied, for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 dated September 14, 1995 of the abovementioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the offense charged against

appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in that it was committed by an organized or

syndicated crime group, thus warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal 26 on September 15, 1999. Vinecario
followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal. 27
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecution's Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE CONSPIRED
WITH VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM PARANG,
MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH DOCUMENTARY AND
TESTIMONIAL.
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE
CARVAJAL THAT BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND
APPREHENSIVE AT THE THE (sic) OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY PACK
CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR
VINECARIO TO BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH
FREE FOOD AND GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00 WHICH
VINECARIO PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO
SUN WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO. 28
Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with unity of purpose and
in the execution of any unlawful objective with Vinecario. 29 They assert that they had no prior knowledge
of Vinecario's plan to meet with a man who would give the backpack containing marijuana; that
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal's declaration that they (appellants Wates and
Roble) were not nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim
that they did not conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was merely
based on the testimony of PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was ordered opened
for inspection; that there was a "great variance" in the testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in
the direct examination and their testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995,
thus casting serious doubts on the trial court's findings of guilt.
On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 30stating that he is
"practically satisfied with the decision of the trial court"; that "he would not waste anymore the effort of
the honorable Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing his case"; and that as he was "driven by the
sincerest desire in renewing his life," he "irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal." On even
date, Roble and Wates likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,31 stating that they admit the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the
trial court; and that they are already serving the penalty for their offense and "realize the overt admittance
of guilt as the only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal."
By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and directed Vinecario to
file his brief within forty-five days from notice of the resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF
MARIJUANA AS (sic) VALID. ASHECD
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE
APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.32
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police officers was
incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been deemed to have consented to the search as any
such consent was given under intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable
cause to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence, it
being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform him of his rights
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his choice, thereby violating Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution.33
The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be conducted without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation
of the right of the people under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions,
however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk
situations. 34
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 35 For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. 36
. . . [C]heckpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where
the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of
the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government.
xxx xxx xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present
government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right to
defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government
intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the
equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best
achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists'
right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two. . . .

These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by
the U.S. Supreme Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the
potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these
highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement
activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is
visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed
checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by official responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement
resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field
officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for
abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or
operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review." 37
Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a gun ban during an
election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of theOmnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881). 38 The national and local elections in 1995 having been held on May 8, the present incident, which
occurred on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense. 39
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated
from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee. 40 (Emphasis supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the checkpoint is
gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three
persons approached?
A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?
A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened?
A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away?
Q: What did they answer?
A: One of them said that he is a member of the army.
Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to
him?
A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow t-shirt
who stood up and when asked about his name answered that he is Victor
Venecario). acADIT

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to show
that he is really a member of the army?
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.
Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?
A: Venecario.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us
why did you (sic) ask him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were
afraid and different reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A: Yes.
Q: That is what you have observed from their faces?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack?
A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.
Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom did
he pass it on?
A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble.
Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him?
A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person to
another?
A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.
Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to that
checkpoint?
A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be
bombed.
Q: Prior to that was there any incident?
xxx xxx xxx
A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.
Q: If you recall when was that?
A: April 4 of the same year.
Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what
happened next?
A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.
Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?
A: They opened the backpack. 41
SPO1 Goc-ong's testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:
Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual
incident while you were conducting that checkpoint?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident all about?
A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing
and flagged them to stop and there were three (3) persons and one was manning
and they briefly stopped but speeded away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?
A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an
army man, what did you do?
A: I asked for an ID.

Q: Who among you asked for an ID?

A: Sgt. Goc-ong.
Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?
A: I was behind him because I backed him up.
Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?
A: He answered that he has no ID.
Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was
an army man?
A: Our other companion moved closer as security.
Q: Why?
A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform.
Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?
A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After that what happened?
A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag.
Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents of
the bag?
A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes.
Q: Before that what did Venecario do?
A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder.
Q: What did he do with the backpack?
A: When asked he passed it to his other companions.
Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?
A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other
companion.
Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do?
A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold of
that backpack what happened?
A: He opened the backpack.
Q: Who told him to open the backpack?
A: Sgt. Goc-ong. 42
In light then of appellants' speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged
down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that
the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense. AEHTIC
As to Vinecario's allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation
conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. 43 In the case at bar, the trial
court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those
of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:
Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took
place?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What was that?
A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.

Q: Where?
A: Parang Highway.
Q: Coming here to Davao?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?
A: There was a person who blocked us.
Q: A former companion of yours?
A: Yes.
Q: A former soldier?
A: No, Sir.
Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?
A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.
Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?
A: Yes:
Q: You are familiar with him?
A: I know him very well.
Q: He was your close friend?
A: Yes.
Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?
A: Abdul Karim Datolarta.
Q: He was alone when he stopped you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you?
A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook
hands with him.
Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop?
A: My friend.
Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?
A: Not yet.
Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting?
A: He asked me where I was heading.
Q: What was your answer?
A: I told him that I am going back to Davao.
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: He told me if he can also ride with us.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I told him we were already three.
Q: What happened next?
A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of that
cousin of his in Tagum.
Q: He mentioned the name?
A: Yes, Merly.
Q: What is the family name?
A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.
Q: Where in Tagum?
A: Roxas, Tagum.
Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum?
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents?
Q: What did he answer you?
A: He answered clothes.
Q: What did you do?
A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.
Q: You did not become suspicious?

A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that
time. 44
Vinecario's account that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants were cruising
along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul
Karim Datolarta, flagged down45 the motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to
bring a backpack to Datolarta's cousin without checking its contents is incredible, contrary to human
experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus
further eliciting serious doubts on Vinecario's tale.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. 46
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1
Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus
then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same fails.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. 47 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 48 To exempt himself from criminal liability,
the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to
commit the crime. 49
In People v. Concepcion, 50 this Court held:
. . . Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect
to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts
of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully transporting the
subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon
seeing the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police officers. When asked as to the
contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that
they knew its contents. These circumstances manifest appellants' concerted efforts and cooperation
towards the attainment of their criminal objective. ITScHa
Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, they
contending that these witnesses contradicted their testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently testified
on rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or apprehensive at all when they were being inspected by the
policemen.
It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal
referred to by Roble and Wates on their deportment pertain to different stages of the checkpoint inspection
as a scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as follows:
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us
why did you (sic) ask him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were
afraid and different reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A: Yes.
Q: That is what you observed in their faces?
A: Yes, sir. 51
PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ong's observations on appellants' deportment upon
returning to the checkpoint:

Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped you
said you noticed one of them was nervous, did I get you right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Only one was nervous?
A: All of them.
Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were trembling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 o'clock in
the evening?
A: There was light.
Q: The place was well-lighted?
A: Yes, sir. 52
On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or apprehensive when he flagged them
down as they crossed the checkpoint. 53
PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervousas Vinecario's backpack
was being opened. 54
As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following arguments of the
Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval, should dispose of the same:
It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles
passed through the checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have
sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Goc-ong did not give any testimony that other
vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the appellants arrived. On the contrary, he
testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at the checkpoint when the
latter arrived on their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p. 7).
It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just
because SPO1 Goc-ong made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the checkpoint.
As described earlier in his Brief, this witness explained that the checkpoint was visible
because it had a sign board at the middle of the road that read, "COMELEC GUN BAN"
(TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for appellants not to have noticed the
checkpoint. 55
In fine, appellants' defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or transporting marijuana.
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or
transporting illegal drugs. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to
mean: "to carry or convey from one place to another." When accused-appellant used his
vehicle to convey the package containing marijuana to an unknown destination, his act
was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the crime
of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of
transporting a prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes
the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual committing the act,
regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught transporting marijuana, the
crime being mala prohibita, accused-appellant's intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof
need not be shown. 56 (Underscoring supplied)
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall transport any prohibited drug. Section 20,
Article IV of the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if the dangerous
drug is, with respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed
1,700 grams. Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code 57 is necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetuawas properly imposed by the trial court.

A fine of P500,000.00 should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in accordance
with the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 3523395 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and solidarily pay a fine of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 192-220)

17- People v. Eric Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, 20 January 2004

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
For automatic review is the judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated
March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In an Information dated March 23, 1998, appellant was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B.
Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a piece of wood and a saw, with intent to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and hit with a piece of wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw
one Victor F. Keyser, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
When arraigned on April 3, 1998, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the
charge. 3
On April 23, 1998, however, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a rearraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on April 28, 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by
counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 The case then proceeded to trial.
The facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows.
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp.
(Keyser Plastics for brevity), with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo
City. 5 Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of
faucets. 6 Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall,
the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was
of lawanit boards. 7 The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person
on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. 8
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was
on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics.
Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour

later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in
the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser
Plastics. 9 Campos paid scant attention to Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud
noises ("kalabugan") coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the
noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the
sound. 10
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw
appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant
calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos' assistance to help him carry the
corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. 11 Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately
dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the
suspect escape, 12 while a reaction team was being dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal
Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With
them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. 13 They were immediately met by Campos, who
informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of
Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some
minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside,
SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako lalaban,
susuko ako, haharapin ko ito." ("Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the
consequences.") 14 Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then
asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening
the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victim's
head was found stuffed inside a cement bag. 15
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed
the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a
carpenter's saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over
to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter's saw. 16 Photographs
were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime.
When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his
co-employees. 17 He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. 18
The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos
conducted the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without
providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keyser's remains. The Antipolo police then turned over the
bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
testing.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, autopsied Keyser's remains. He found that
the cadaver had been cut into seven (7) pieces. 19 He found that the head had sustained thirteen (13)
contusions, abrasions, and other traumatic injuries, 20 all of which had been caused by "forcible contact
with hard blunt object," 21 such as a "lead pipe, baseball bat, or a piece of wood." 22 He found the cause
of death to be "traumatic head injury." 23 Dr. Baluyot declared that since the amputated body parts had
irregular edges on the soft tissues, it was most likely that a sharp-edged, toothed instrument, like a saw,
had been used to mutilate the corpse. 24 He further declared that it was possible that the victim was dead
when sawn into pieces, due to cyanosis or the presence of stagnant blood in the body, 25 but on crossexamination, he admitted that he could not discount the possibility that the victim might still have been
alive when mutilated. 26

Dr. Olga Bausa, medico-legal pathologist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she subjected the
bloodstained piece of coco lumber as well as the saw recovered from the crime scene to a biochemical
examination to determine if the bloodstains were of human origin. Both tested positive for the presence of
human blood. 27 However, she could not determine if the blood was of the same type as that of the victim
owing to the insufficient amount of bloodstains on the items tested. 28
Keyser's death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed
on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto "Gus" Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara
David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to
David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. 29 He disclosed to David the details
of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed
in sacks and cartons. 30 When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not
paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him "like an animal." 31 Both Abelgas and David
said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their
respective interviews with him. 32
At the trial, appellant Guillermo's defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of police
"frame-up." He testified that he had been an employee of Keyser for more than a year prior to the latter's
death. On the date of the incident, he was all alone at the Keyser Plastics factory compound as a "stay-in"
employee. Other employees have left allegedly due to Keyser's maltreatment of them. 33
In the morning of March 22, 1998, appellant said Keyser instructed him to report for overtime work in the
afternoon. He proceeded to the factory premises at one o'clock in the afternoon, but since his employer
was not around, he said, he just sat and waited till he fell asleep. 34 He was awakened sometime later
when he heard people calling him from outside. He then looked out and saw persons with firearms, who
told him that they wanted to enter the factory. Once inside, they immediately handcuffed him and looked
around the premises. When they returned, they were carrying boxes and sacks. He said he was then
brought to the police station where he was advised to admit having killed his employer since there
was no other person to be blamed. 35 When he was made to face the media reporters, he said the police
instructed him what to say. 36 He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told the reporters. The
appellant denied having any grudge or ill feelings against his employer or his family.
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he was the shirtless person in the photographs taken at the
crime scene, while the persons with him in the photographs were policemen wearing uniforms. 37 He
likewise admitted that the cartons and sacks found by the police inside the factory premises contained the
mutilated remains of his employer. 38 He claimed, however, that he was surprised by the contents of said
cartons and sacks. 39 Appellant admitted that a bloodstained piece of wood and a saw were also
recovered by the police, but he insisted that the police made him hold the saw when they took
photographs. 40
The trial court disbelieved appellant's version of the incident, but found the prosecution's evidence against
him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the appellant, thus:
The guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder
as charged in [the] information. WHEREFORE, the accused is meted the maximum penalty
and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the mother of the victim, Victor Keyser, the
following amounts:
1. Death Indemnity P50,000.00
2. Funeral Expenses P50,000.00
3. Compensatory Damages P500,000.00
4. Moral Damages P500,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages P300,000.00
6. Attorney's Fees P100,000.00
plus P3,000.00 per Court appearance.
SO ORDERED. 41
Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE FOLLOWING DAMAGES: DEATH
INDEMNITY P50,000.00; FUNERAL EXPENSES P50,000.00; COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
P500,000.00; MORAL DAMAGES P500,000.00; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES P300,000.00; AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P 100,000.00 PLUS P3,000 PER COURT APPEARANCE. 42
Briefly stated, the issues for resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove
the appellant's guilt beyond .reasonable doubt; (2) the propriety of the death penalty imposed on
appellant; and (3) the correctness of the award of damages.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there
is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the
same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made to read said rights in printed form
posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the
custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he had waived
his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his alleged
confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence clearly shows that the
appellant admitted committing the crime in several instances, not just during the custodial investigation.
First, he admitted having killed his employer to the security guard, Campos, and even sought Campos' help
in disposing of Keyser's body. This admission may be treated as part of the res gestae and does not
partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said
statement is admissible as evidence against the appellant. Second, the appellant's statements before
members of the media are likewise admissible in evidence, according to the OSG, as these statements
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer. The
OSG stresses that appellant was interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he made
free and voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. He even supplied the details
on how he committed the crime. Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed to the
killing even before the police could enter the premises and even before any question could be posed to
him. Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the factory, the appellant pointed to the place
where Keyser's corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in time, appellant was not yet
under custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the police at the crime scene were spontaneous
and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and hence must be treated as part of the res gestae and
thus, says the OSG, admissible in evidence.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the police by a suspect in a crime falls within the
ambit of constitutional protection. Hence, if not made under "custodial investigation" or "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected by the Bill of Rights.
However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito
Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down
by the Constitution.Under Article III of the Constitution, 43 a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the
confession must be in writing. 44 In the instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination
clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said constitutional guarantees. This can readily be
gleaned from the transcript of Reyes' testimony, which we excerpt:
Q: What did you do next upon arriving at the police station?

A: When we arrived at the police station, I pointed to him and asked him to read what was
written on the wall which was his constitutional rights.
Q: Did he read the same?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: Did you ask the accused if he did understand what he read?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: So Mr. Witness, you did continue your investigation at the police station?
A: Yes, ma'm.
COURT:
What did the accused say when you asked him if he understood what was written on the
wall which was his constitutional rights?
A: He said he understood what was written on the wall and he has noregrets.
COURT:
Proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Who were present at the police station during your investigation?
A: There were many people around when I conducted the investigation at the police
station. My companions were there but I do not know the other persons who were
present.
Q: How was the investigation that you conducted at the police station?
A: I inquired again from Eric Guillermo why he did it, the reason why he did it.
Q: And was your investigation being recorded in the police station?
A: No, ma'm.
Q: Let me just clarify, I did not mean like a tape recorder. Was it written?
A: I only asked him but it was not written down or recorded.
Q: During the investigation, was there any lawyer or counsel that was called during the
investigation?
A: None, ma'm.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a counsel during the
investigation?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort to provide him with
counsel before you asked him questions?
A: No, ma'm.
Q: Why?
A: Because during that time, it was Sunday afternoon and there wasno counsel around and
because he already admitted that he perpetrated the crime and that was explained
to him, his constitutional rights which was on the wall. We did not provide anymore
a counsel.
Q: I would just like to ask the reason why you made the accused read the written rights
that was posted on the wall of your police station?
A: So that he would be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Q: So, you mean that you made him understand his rights?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: So, you mean to say before you asked him to read his rights, you presumed that he
does not understand what his constitutional rights are?
A: I think he knows his constitutional rights because he admitted the crime.
Q: And did the accused understand his rights?
A: I believe he understood because he answered, "wala akong dapat pagsisihan." ("I have
nothing to regret."). 45
Appellant's alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The
investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial

investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellant's right to be represented by
counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday.
Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare
of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of
counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if
it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 46
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed. 47Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be
informed," as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial
shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes
the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant's confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or
those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State's coercive power as
would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the
police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos,
on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had killed his employer and needed
assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos' testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor
General points out, appellant's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res
gestae. Under the Rules of Court, 48 a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act,
the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances. 49 All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been
through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to Campos was
made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity
to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding the
killing of Keyser. Appellant's spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the
State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in
evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be
interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the
details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7, who testified in
court, to wit:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: Could you tell us what you found out in the interview?
A: The first question I think I asked was, if he admits the crime and he gladly said yes he
did it, the details about the crime, how he saw the body and where he put it, and
the reason why he did it.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
To what crime did he admit?
A: He said he got mad with (sic) his boss, so he got a piece of wood,"dos por dos," he hit
his boss in the back and then after that, I think he got a saw and sawed the body to
eight pieces.

xxx xxx xxx

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
You said the interview was done inside the room of Col. Quintana, how many were you
inside the room at that time?
A: I really could not remember but I was with my cameraman, an assistant, Col. Quintana
and I think two more escorts. I could not remember the others.
Q: You mentioned a while ago that he gladly admitted what he did, can you explain gladly
admitted?
A: Usually when I interview suspects, either they deny or [are] in hysterics, but Eric seems
(sic) calm when I interviewed him.
I said, "ginawa mo ba ang krimen," and he said, "Oo." "Hindi ka ba nagdalawang
isip?" "Hindi." It was kind of eerie.
Q: You also mentioned that he gave details of the crime he committed, aside from what
you already mentioned like his boss being hit in the head and cut to eight pieces,
what did he tell you?
A: He told me where he put it, like he looked for sacks and cartons, and he told me where
he put the head but I could not remember.
But I remember him saying he put the head in the bag and he said he asked help from the
security guard, Campos. Basically, that's it. And he told me the reason why he did
it.
Q: Why did he do it?
A: Because he was not being paid for what he has done and Mr. Keyser treated him like an
animal, things like that.
He said that what he did was just right, just justice. 50
The TV news reporters' testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when
they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the police. There
was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place
on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence.
Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser's killing. As held
in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are
voluntary and admissible in evidence. 51
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant's alleged confession to
the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant's guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare
denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court
admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The
positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as
the testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer,
Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.
But was appellant's offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death penalty, or only homicide
for which a lesser penalty is appropriate?
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove either treachery or evident premeditation to qualify
the killing as murder. He points out that there was not a single eyewitness to show how the crime was
committed and hence, absent an eyewitness to show the manner in which the crime was committed, he
cannot be held liable for murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted by the appellant himself, he repeatedly struck the
victim, with a piece of coco lumber (dos por dos), at the back of his head, while the victim's back was
turned towards him. The suddenness of the attack, coupled with the manner in which it was executed
clearly indicates treachery. The OSG agrees with appellant, however, that evident premeditation was not
adequately established. Hence, we shall now deal only with the disputed circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without
risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party might make. 52 Two essential
requisites must concur for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution that

gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 53
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable
penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 54 In
the instant case, we find insufficient the prosecution's evidence to prove that the attack on the victim
came without warning and that he had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, or to escape. None of
the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was initiated or carried out, simply because there
was no eyewitness to the offense. In addition, appellant's narration in his taped interview with Channel 7 is
not too clear on this point, thus:
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na lamang kainit ito. Bigla niya
akong inano dito sa batok ko tapos itinuturo niya ang dito ko (pointing to his head)
itinuturoturo niya ang dito ko.
Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko iyong kahoy.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Sa mga oras na 'yon, nagdilim, napuno ng galit ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya ang
isang dos por dos sa kanyang tabi at agad dinampot habang nakatalikod ang
kanyang amo.
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Nang gawin ko sa sarili ko iyon kalmadong kalmado ako noong ginawa ko 'yon. Nasa sarili
ako noong ginawa ko iyon.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Hawak ang mahabang kahoy, hinampas ni Eric si Mr. Keyser, hinampas hanggang sa
mawalan ng malay. Tila hindi pa nakuntento sa kanyang nagawa, napagbalingan
naman ni Eric ang isang lagare sa kanyang tabi at isinagawa na ang karumal-dumal
na krimen. 55
From the foregoing, all that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the appellant, and the victim's
back was turned towards the appellant when the latter picked up the piece of wood. It does not, however,
show that there was any deliberate effort on the part of the appellant to adopt the particular means,
method, or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to
defend himself.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, the NBI pathologist who autopsied the victim's body, observed that it was
difficult to determine the position of the victim in relation to his assailant. 56 Nor was the expert testimony
of Dr. Baluyot definitive as to the relative position of the assailant and the victim, to wit:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I would like also to ask from your medical knowledge thru the blows that the deceased
received in his head which caused the head injury, would you be able to ascertain
also in what position was the attacker or where the attacker was?
A: Based on the location of the injuries at the head, it would be very difficult to determine
the relative position of the victim and assailant as well as the position of the victim
when he sustained said injury, because there are injuries located at the front, at the
left and right portions of the head although there were none located at the
back (stress supplied). Based on these injuries, I would say that the position would
probably be maybe in front, maybe to the left or the right in order for him to inflict
the injuries to the front, to the left and right sides of the head. 57
Noteworthy, Dr. Baluyot pointed out that based on the injuries sustained by the victim, there is an
indication that he tried to defend himself against the blows being inflicted upon him, thus:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: The wound that you found at the back of the hand, which is at the back of the right
hand, would you characterize this as [a] defense wound?

A: It is a defense wound. All injuries especially at the upper extremities they could be
tagged as defense wounds to fend off. . . attacks and these upper extremities are
usually used to protect the head and the body. 58
The gap in the prosecution's evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation. Treachery cannot be
appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act
unfolded and resulted in the victim's demise. 59 Any doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved
in favor of appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecution's evidence which shows that
the victim's corpse was sawn by appellant into seven (7) pieces. Under Art. 248 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code, "outraging or scoffing at the corpse" is a qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead body is
one manner of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. 60 In the instant case, the corpse of Victor
F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant who sawed off the head, limbs, and torso. The Information
categorically alleges this qualifying circumstance, when it stated that the appellant "thereafter, cut into
pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser." This being the case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is
guilty not just of homicide but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances in the instant case, the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetua should be imposed upon
appellant. 61
Both appellant and appellee claim that the trial court erred in awarding damages. They submit that the
trial court's award of P50,000.00 for funeral expenses has insufficient basis, for only receipts amounting to
P38,068.00 as proof of funeral expenses were presented in evidence. Thus, this award should be reduced
accordingly. Concerning the award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000, compensatory damages
also for P500,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000, appellant submits that these cited
sums are exorbitant, and not in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG agrees, hence modification
of said amounts is in order.
The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, as the
purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to
enrich them. 62Award of exemplary damages is justified in view of the gruesome mutilation of the victim's
corpse, but the amount thereof should also be reduced to only P25,000, following current case law.
The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The victim's
mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a month 63 as shown in
the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co. 64 However, said receipt shows that it was made out to
her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the
actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning
capacity partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory
evidence but also by unbiased proof. 65
Civil indemnity for the victim's death, however, was left out by the trial court, although now it is
automatically granted without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the crime. 66 Hence,
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be awarded
in favor of the victim's heirs.
Nothing on the record shows the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of the victim for attorney's fees and
lawyer's appearance fees. Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages and
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 67 one of which is when the
court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees should be recovered. 68 In this case, we find an
award of P25,000 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses reasonable and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7,
2001 in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA GUILTY of the murder of
Victor Francisco Keyser is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant's sentence is hereby REDUCED TO
RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P38,068.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,

P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 248-275)

18- People v. Lita Ayangao, G.R. No. 142356, 14 April 2004

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142356. April 14, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This is an appeal from the February 29, 2000 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City
in Criminal Case no. 99-1261 convicting the appellant of violating Section 4, Article 2 of RA 7659, as
amended, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. ACIESH
Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana in an
information 2 that read:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1999, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province
of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, without any authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit or transport fifteen (15) bricks
of dried marijuana leaves with the actual total weight of FOURTEEN KILOGRAMS AND
SEVENTY FIVE HUNDREDTHS (14.75) of kilogram, a prohibited drug. IEAa
cS
The appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute an offense. This was denied by the trial court. Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded not
guilty. 3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO3 Nestor Galvez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and Chief Forensic
Chemist Daisy Panganiban-Babor. The prosecution's version 4 of the facts, as aptly summarized by the trial
court, was:
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez,
members of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision,
Balibago, Angeles City, received information from one of their informants that a certain
woman from Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas,
Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers. Said information was also relayed by the
informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct
surveillance operation against their target female who was described by their informant as
about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to their
headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas,
Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to
Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas.
While they were in their car, the informer pointed to them a woman bearing the same
description given by the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently
loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the place where
the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the
sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the
woman to put out the contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed

with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick, which was
damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves. The
woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of
Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the suspected dried marijuana
leaves were brought to the police officer's headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles
City. The evidence confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Olivas where it was examined by Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor. The Initial
Laboratory Report issued indicated that the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected
dried marijuana leaves weighing 14.75 kilograms were found to be positive for marijuana.
The defense, through the testimonies of the appellant and Reynaldo Nunag,purok chairman of Sitio
Makabakle, presented a different version, again summarized by the trial court: 5
Accused Lita Ayangao denied the charge made against her and alleged that she has
nothing to do with the marijuana allegedly found in her possession. She went to Sapang
Biabas "Marimar," Camachile, Mabalacat, Pampanga from Tabuk, Kalinga Province on
August 13, 1999 only upon the request of a certain Magda Dumpao. Allegedly, Magda
bought a house in Mawaque, Mabalacat and learned that it was being sold again. Magda
then requested her (accused) to talk to Jaime Alarcon who acted as Magda's agent in
buying the house. It was Magda who instructed her on how to go to the house of Jaime
Alarcon. She arrived at the house of Alarcon at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning and was
welcomed inside by Gloria and Jocelyn Alarcon, Jaime's wife and daughter-in-law. As Jaime
was not around, she asked the Alarcon's permission if she can have a nap. Gloria and
Jocelyn allowed her to sleep on the sofa and while she was resting, at around 6:00 o'clock
in the morning, somebody knocked at the door. Gloria opened it and two men, who
identified themselves as CIS agents, told Gloria that they were looking for somebody who
came from Baguio City. One of the men went to where she was then lying and asked Gloria
who she was. Gloria answered that she came from Tabuk. The police officers asked her
(accused) to go with them as they wanted to talk to her. When she refused, the policemen
forced her out of the house and boarded her to their car. While she was inside the car, she
saw a sack and a carton box. The police brought her to their headquarters at Diamond
Subd., Angeles City. She was made to sit in a chair and in her view, the sack was opened
and its contents were placed in (sic) a table. She then heard from the policemen that the
contents of the sack were marijuana and accused her of owning it.
Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle, Marimar, Biabas, Mabalacat,
Pampanga, testified that, as tricycle driver whose terminal is near the house of Jaime
Alarcon, he did not see any unusual incident that happened in said vicinity in the morning
of August 13, 1999. He also did not see how the accused was arrested and did not see the
policemen's car.
The trial court found the prosecution's version to be credible, reasoning that appellant's defense of frameup was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The law enforcer's testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-og is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Article II of R.A. 6425 as
amended by R.A. 7659 by transporting fourteen kilograms and seventy five hundredths
(14.75) of a kilogram of marijuana, a prohibited drug, without authority. Said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Lita AyangaoBatong-og (sic) is further ordered to pay a fine of five hundred thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos.
SO ORDERED. 6
The following assignments of error are raised in this appeal: 7
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE EXISTING SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES AND
INCREDIBILITY THEREBY CREATING DOUBT REGARDING THEIR TRUTHFULNESS AND
CREDIBILITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING FAVORABLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI AS A
GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN SPITE OF THE WEAKNESS OF
THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS
VIOLATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its
burden of proving the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court was
supported by the evidence on record.
Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best
assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and
deportment on the stand. 8 Besides, in this case, the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor
ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses' testimonies nor detract
from their credibility. 9
Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda rights.
(This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the warrantless
search was invalid, not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest.) This contention is without merit
since this Court has repeatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless
search. 10 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 11 Here, in submitting herself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial, the
appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest. 12
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant to People vs. Barros,13 reiterated in People
vs. Aruta, 14 the waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure is notto be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as
appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, an act
prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also
valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize
from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense. 15
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person even
without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred
by probable cause in making the arrest. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 16The
determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of each case. In this case, the
arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their
informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a

warrantless search. 17 Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest,
they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant's
arrival was not known by the informant. Apprehending officer PO3 Sagum testified 18 as follows:
Q So what were the information given you by your informer?
A Ang kausap po nila iyong hepe namin[g] si Maj. Rhodel Sermonia tapos po sinabi lang po
sa amin ni Maj. Sermonia ang sinabi ng informant.
Q So you did not hear the report of the informant?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the information given by your superior?
A He told us that somebody will be delivering marijuana at Sapang Bayabas and the
informer knew the person.
Q Give us the complete report? IHEDAT
A Sinabi po ng hepe namin na sinabi ng informant na merong babaeng magdedeliver ng
marijuana sa Sapang Bayabas at babalik daw po siya kung kailan magdedeliver.
Q On the date in question August 13 at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning you were in
your office?
A We were already at Sapang Bayabas, sir.
Q Which is which now?
A Nasa Sapang Bayabas na po, sir.
Q Before going to Sapang Bayabas where did you come from?
A We were in the office, sir.
Q What time where you in the office?
A That is where we were sleeping.
Q You were sleeping there?
A Yes, sir, we are stay-in.
Q And then what happened?
A Our informant came, sir.
Q What time?
A 5:00 o'clock, sir.
Q What was the purpose of the informant?
A Sinabi po niya sa amin na darating na raw po iyong ano.
Q I thought that your superior already informed you that the suspect or the accused will be
arriving at 6:00 o'clock the first time?
A Sabi po sa amin noong magpunta iyong informer sa office namin August 13 darating
daw po iyong babae.
Q It was on August 13 when he said that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was he talking with then?
A Iyong Chief po namin tapos kinausap ko rin po siya.
Q What time was that?
A Before 5:00, sir.
Q So they were talking before 5:00 with your Chief?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was outside, sir.
Q So you were not listening to them?
A No, sir.
Q So you do not know what they have talked about?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what were the instruction given by your superior?
A He said we will proceed to Sapang Bayabas because there is a lady going there bringing
marijuana.
Q Did you ask the identity of the woman?
A Yes, sir.

Q What did he say?

A About 50 years of age, 5 feet and with straight long hair?
Q How about the name, was the name given to you?
A No, sir, he just said she came from Kalinga.
Q Aside from that, was the quantity of the drugs given to you that was to be brought?
A No, sir.
Q So you just learned that the woman will be arriving at Sapang Bayabas at 6:00 o'clock?
A I do not know the time she is arriving.
Q He did not tell you?
A He does not know, sir.
Q The informant did not tell you?
A Yes, sir, he just said she will be coming in Sapang Bayabas.
Q You did not ask for the time?
A He does not know, sir.
Q What about the particular place where the woman will deliver the drugs?
A Hindi niya po alam basta doon sa entrance daw po ng Sapang Bayabas doon na po kami
mag-istambay. (Emphasis and Italics supplied).
Although there was testimony by PO3 Galvez that the informant told them the exact date of arrival, the
trial court gave more weight to the testimony of PO3 Sagum that stated otherwise, as evidenced by his
finding that the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed them
that the appellant was arriving at 6:00 A.M. 19 The judgment call of the trial court on which of these two
conflicting testimonies to believe should prevail because it involved the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses. 20 Thus, without proof that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance having a
bearing on the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, this Court will not
overturn such finding as the judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor of the two
witnesses. 21
In those cases where this Court invalidated a warrantless search on the ground that the officers could have
applied for a search warrant, the concerned officers received the tip either days prior to the arrival or in
the afternoon of a working day. In People vs. Aminnudin, 22 this Court found that the officers received the
tip two days prior to the actual date of arrival of accused Aminnudin. In People vs.Encinadak, 23 the police
officers were tipped off at 4:00 P.M. on May 20, 1992 that accused Encinada would arrive at 7:00 A.M. the
next day. Thus, the officers had time to obtain search warrants inasmuch as Administrative Circulars 13
and 19 of the Supreme Court allowed the application for search warrants even after office hours. In People
vs. Aruta, 24 the police officers received the information on December 13, 1988 that accused Aruta would
arrive on a Victory Liner Bus at 6:30 P.M. on December 14, 1999, giving them a day to obtain a
warrant. DHAcET
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and
informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The
circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez, 25 this
Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the
officer made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other
pertinent details were known by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search
warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days. 26 Considering that the officers did not know
when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act the way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellant's alibi
could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is
inherently weak 27 and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b)
the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. 28 The appellant failed to meet these two
requirements. Jaime Alarcon's house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was

only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. 29 Thus, the trial court
was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
With the effectivity of RA 7659, Section 4 of RA 6425, provides the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more.
Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for applying the penalties in Article 63
of theRevised Penal Code are applicable, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Simon 30wherein the Court
recognized the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by RA 7659. Thus, as the
appellant was found to be transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana, the trial court was correct in
imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua since there was no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, and in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which is not applicable when indivisible
penalties are imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City, finding the appellant
guilty of transporting a prohibited drug and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of
P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Ayangao y Batong-Og, G.R. No. 142356, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 379-394)

19-People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128587. March 16, 2007.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y
CHEN, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this
petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated 13 March 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang'sDemurrer to
Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e) (2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential
DecreeNo. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of
Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as
SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately
29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without
the corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law. 2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded
with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a
public place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without first securing the
written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the
COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead
interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives.
Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. 5 Thereafter, joint trial of the
three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito
Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano,
for unlawful possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu.
In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were
prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about
to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor,
respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did
not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. 6 They also disclosed
that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their
employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives
decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the
same under surveillance. TCacI
E
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang,
who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers
approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that
he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the
BMW car. 7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him
an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time,
the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items:
(a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941
kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one

mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang
resisted the warrantless arrest and search. 8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25
days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. 9 On 19 December 1996, the
prosecution filed aManifestation 10 to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the
two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun
Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecution's evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed
its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification 12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January
1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition 13 alleging that the warrantless search
was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the
defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed
Resolution 14 granting Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused
is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun
Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms
and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are
ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn
over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the
two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local
Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the accused,
and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition 15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred
I
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER
JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE
CONTRABAND THEREIN.
II
. . . IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
III
. . . IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
. . . IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS
SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS
OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
. . . IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE
PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

In its Resolution 16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the public
and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed
his comment 17 on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, 18 which the Office of the Solicitor
General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, 20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court's resolution
granting Wang's demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search
and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules
of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being
allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be
exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals 21 ). Although Section 2,
Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the People to
appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the
accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case
wide open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal
necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused's demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously
made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due
process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by
law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed
into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as
to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initioits verdict. This
renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused,
particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has
been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of
Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated
and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and

suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and
considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and
impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render
impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an
accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was
entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once
more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial
of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People
vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent
as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.

Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case
of People v. Uy, 23 which involved the trial court's decision which granted the two separate demurrers to
evidence filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their
respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed
directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United
States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and
irreviewable. The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas,
Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are
illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been
acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring
supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held
in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is " filed after
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the
case ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People, 24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed the accused's acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court, the
CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from
establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which
supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in
a petition for certiorari, sustained the CA's power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence,
explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving

accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal
of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v.
Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State . . . .
Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to
the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused's right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done viathe special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus,
when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case is
an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of
law, which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the distinction
between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which
shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of
judgment appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction
and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an
original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action
for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the
said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner's timely
filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order,
or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition forcertiorari, in order to afford the tribunal
an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order. HAaScT

Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different
remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal
is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this petition is
outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal
without violating private respondent's right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action ofcertiorari, which definitely
this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will
show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantlessarrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a
valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made;
the process cannot be reversed. 26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and
seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be
lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto 27without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court
granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of
evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an
invalid warrantless search. The trial court's ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his
warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as
asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person
without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of
these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was
merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW
car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused
was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an
indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense.
The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was
bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if
placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers
had noinformation and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun,
nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were
not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo
handgun was underneath the driver's seat of the car. The police officers
had noinformation, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion
that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and
SPO3 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL'S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?

A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita,
Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the
accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we
have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere
also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open
the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and
likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the
place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory
examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15,
1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May
16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is
it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?

A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the
Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your
companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence
Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched
the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it
not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL'S TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr.
Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his
car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us
the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck
mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer. cCHITA
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another
previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel
de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested
they divulged the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?

A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu. Then they divulged to us the name of
the person from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order
another supply of shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the
shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa
Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car
together with his driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the
compartment of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do
with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who
inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp.
15-24, December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has
gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your
team arrested. One of whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from
them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover
that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that
were confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also
these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your
team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at
the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for
the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu
scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is
scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the
matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did
you and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction
that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was
carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun
is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to
me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do
something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from
searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and
the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did
not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of
liberty. . . .
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and
finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.

Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the
trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it has been
shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms
in the accused's possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances,
then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on
the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful." 28 In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search
preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring
search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private
respondent to open his BMW car's trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of
credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a criminal
case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition
for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal
order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the
factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal basis for
this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to
evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest
of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 29
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the
part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was
merely walking from theMaria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not
committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly
established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and
charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their
source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo's declaration that there will
be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours
thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting
officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will
match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin, 31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in
appellant's possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in disregard
of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer (and not
a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The People's contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual
basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on
the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. 32 The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33 Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of
the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang's claim that he resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the law are
not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. HScCEa
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, [March 16, 2007], 547 PHIL 296-331)

20- People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133023, 17 February 2000

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sansano-Suyat Law Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging accused-appellant of
having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and consent,
and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and
then bury her in the field. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. He interposed the
defense of denial and alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime
occurred. Trial ensued. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim actual
damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape
with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder in an
information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information
showed that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. In rape with homicide, in order to be
convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance
must be sufficiently alleged and proved. In the absence in the information of an allegation of any qualifying
circumstance, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of murder. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, led to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant and no other else, killed the victim and that he was guilty therefor. The Court
found accused-appellant guilty of homicide. As to the crime of rape, the Court found no convincing proof
that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of the victim were caused in the course of
coitus or by a male organ.
Accused-appellant's alibi and bare denial deserved no consideration. Even assuming that accusedappellant's claim was true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of the victim was found buried was a few
meters from his house, and can be reached in a short while. aHTcDA
The assailed decision of the trial court was modified by the Supreme Court.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE
OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM; CONVICTION OF ACCUSED OF AN OFFENSE HIGHER THAN THAT
CHARGED IS AN UNAUTHORIZED DENIAL OF SAID RIGHT. In the absence then in the information of an
allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot

be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under
which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which
he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature
of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense
than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial
of that right.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; NOT VIOLATED IF PICTURES OF ACCUSED WERE TAKEN
EVEN WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; PURELY MECHANICAL ACTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PROHIBITION. We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and
"K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while
[GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without
the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with
adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
3. ID.; ID.; ARREST; ANY OBJECTION, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY THEREIN MUST BE INTERPOSED PRIOR TO
ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED WAIVED. With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he
was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea. The records show noobjection was ever interposed prior
to arraignment and trial. GALLARDE's assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged
illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by
the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in
the trial thereafter. It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced
and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against him. Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused
is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial
free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
4. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; PLACE, TIME AND DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME NOT
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE. There is also no merit in GALLARDE's
argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the
commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal. The place, time and date of the commission of
the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is
the carnal knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide
was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime provided it appears that
the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATION OF PLACE AND COMMISSION OF CRIME IN THE INFORMATION, WHEN
SUFFICIENT. The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. The rule merely requires
that the information shows that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The
Court may even take judicial notice that said place is within its jurisdiction.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRECISE DATE OR TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME NEED NOT BE PROVED; PROXIMATE TIME
OF COMMISSION OF OFFENSE ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. As to the time of the commission of the
crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does not require the prosecution "to prove
any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and
prejudice the defendant." Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the
proximate time of the commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE
left the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was
further corroborated by the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis,
that EDITHA died more or less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997.
7. ID.; EVIDENCE; ABSENCE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY ABSOLVE ACCUSED FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY; WHEN CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF
ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. We agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although
circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of
EDITHA. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to
sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused
from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty.

8. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION OF ACCUSED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. The importance of circumstantial evidence is more
apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is
usually only the victim and the rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for
the complex crime of rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against
the perpetrator of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually
circumstantial. The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads
to no other conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor.
9. ID.; ID.; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION PERTAINS TO PROOF OF IDENTITY AND NOT PER SE TO BEING AN
EYEWITNESS TO COMMISSION OF CRIME; TYPES. We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he
was not positively identified as the assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of
the crime. It does not follow that although nobody saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can
be said to have positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types
of positive identification. A witness may identity a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator
of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct

evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces
of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the
accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only
ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody
can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can
be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would
go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
10. ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; TO PROSPER, REQUIREMENTS OF TIME AND PLACE MUST BE STRICTLY MET.
GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve noconsideration. He did not present witnesses who could
confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The defenses
of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving,
deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his
house did not preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place
where the body of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the
alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
11. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES WHO HAVE NO MOTIVE TO FALSIFY
THEIR TESTIMONIES SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDENCE. No evil motive has been established against the
witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against
him. It is settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their
testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. Testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or
reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be given credence.
12. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE WITH HOMICIDE; IN ORDER TO BE CONVICTED OF MURDER IN CASE EVIDENCE
FAILS TO SUPPORT CHARGE OF RAPE, THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED
AND PROVED. We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder
in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the
information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the
term "homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, it
is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with
homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the
qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental
that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.

13. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION OF RAPE NOT PROVED; CASE AT BAR. As to the crime of rape, there is much to
be desired with respect to the prosecution's evidence therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial
court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHA's private part and thereabout. It is well settled that
the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape. Our doubt
on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of
the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male
organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the
laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the penis of a human being. Needless to state,
these could have been caused by any object other than the penis of a person.
14. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; APPLICATION THEREOF. Homicide, which
we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed
in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly,
he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period
ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
15. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES AND CIVIL INDEMNITY AWARDED IN CASE AT BAR. As to the
civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be construed as
actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current case law,
should be awarded.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding
accused-appellant Radel Gallarde 1 (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to
pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages. 2
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide in an
information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: cdtai
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy.
Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor, 10 years of age, against her will and
consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor
resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said EDITHA TALAN. 3
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. 4 Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial
conference. cdasia

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente,
Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin.
The relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellee's
Brief as follows:
In the evening of May 26 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant
Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez,
Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they
partook beer (TSN dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. As
they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to
urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other.
Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the
road leading to his house (Id., pp. 4-6). dctai
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed
her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for appellant.
Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments
later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to
help look for her (Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and
nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes
and fields to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire (TSN dated
Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-10 and 24).
When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant. About 7 meters away from appellant's
house, one of the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Editha's left foot slipper (TSN dated
October 22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata, Radel is here!"
pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from appellant's house. The searchers found
appellant squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil.
When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant answered he was
relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-16). cda
Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her."
When told "according to Jimmy, you were with Editha." appellant responded "I let her go
and brought her back to the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where did
you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" appellant answered "I
was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and
countered that appellant's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking
(Id., pp. 16-20).
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy.
Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen
talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22). Cdpr

Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her
slipper, she saw Editha's right foot slipper (the other one was earlier found near the house
of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24).
Around 3 meters farther from Editha's right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was
old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day
(TSN dated Sept. 25, 1997, p. 25).
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole
among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted
rubber tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle, look at
this loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then
Editha's hand pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in terror (Id., pp. 5-6).
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here
already dead!" Mindful of appellant's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
appellant to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant, saying: "Here is
the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving
him to you" (TSN dated Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-5). cdrep
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One
of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when
she was recovered. (Id., pp. 9-10).
The cause of Editha's death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed
"suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth,
associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated Oct. 23,
1997, pp. 22-23)." 5

On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He interposed a denial and the alibi
that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. He declared that he is
18 years old, single, a former construction worker. He knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he considered as a
sister because she used to come to his house. They never had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither
raped nor killed Editha. 6

On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court, GALLARDE admitted
that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in her parent's house, particularly in the kitchen. He was
there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez. He drank and
had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the drinking place and eventually went home
because he was then a little drunk. He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence
he did not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his (Gallarde's) toilet on the night
of May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to the PNP
at Camp Narciso Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of Editha
Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the Talan residence he was wearing short
pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he
complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. He was informed that a
cadaver was recovered near his house. When he was asked questions while in police custody, he was not
represented by any lawyer. prcd

GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he considered Editha
Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know that
Editha's parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them. However, he did not
go to them to tell them he was innocent because they brandished a bolo in anger.
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She was still alive when
he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home. From the time he arrived, he never left
again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact. 7

On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the crime of murder only,
not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It
observed:
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangin's testimony thereon show that the late Editha Talan sustained slit
wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion
of her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina was blood,
coupled with dirt. Had there been observed the presence of even just a drop of seminal
fluid in or around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and
rupture resulted from phallic intrusion. Without such observation, however, "carnal
knowledge" as element of rape would be an open question.

The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code because GALLARDE's alleged
inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 27 October
1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the matter of moral damages
to the discretion of the court. The trial court was not inclined to award moral damages because the
"evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a muchneglected child."

Accordingly, in its decision 8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
hereby convicts the accused RADEL GALLARDE YHERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. 9
His motion for reconsideration, 10 having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution 11 of 28 February
1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us. cdphil
We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998.
In his Appellant's Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court committed the
following errors:

1. In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide.
2. In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that [he] was
responsible for the death of Editha Talan.
3. In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 12

We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that
there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as
used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, 13 it is settled in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one
of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. 14 In rape with homicide, in order to
be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. 15 It is fundamental that
every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. 16
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance, GALLARDE cannot
be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information
under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right. 17

Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although circumstantial,
was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA. cdasia
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. 18 The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to
sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused
from any criminal liability. 19 Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty. 20

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;

(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. 21
The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with
homicide. The nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and the rapist who are
present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of rape with homicide
particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator of the crime. In these
cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually circumstantial. 22

The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other
conclusion than that GALLARDE, and no other else, killed EDITHA and that he is guilty therefor. We quote
with approval the lower court's enumeration of the circumstantial evidence in this case: cdrep
1. Gallarde, 18, and Editha, 10, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to frequent
his place.
2. Both were at the Talan residence on the night of May 6, 1997 while neighbors indulged
themselves in beer.
3. Among said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five (5)
meters east of the Talan kitchen.
4. After Cabinta whistled he saw Gallarde run home towards north after letting go of
Editha's hands. Neighbor Clemente also noticed that Gallarde disappeared, and that
Editha returned to the kitchen.
5. Cabinta followed Editha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp. She
told him that she was going to look for "Dalpac," and off she went in the same
direction Gallarde took.
6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. Subsequently he
was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.
7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Editha, her
lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind Gallarde's
residence.
8. Before Editha's body was discovered, a searcher found a girl's slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6
inches long, among thickets seven meters away from Gallarde's house.
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. "B-1"), of the same color and size as the
first one. Both slippers were Editha's, the searchers recalled.
10. A third rubber slipper (Exh. "C') was thereafter found in the field near Exh. "B-1." It was
an old slipper, 8-9 inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
11. Soil stuck to each one of the three slippers.
12. Gallarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta told
them that Editha was last seen with Gallarde.

13. When Gallarde was discovered squatting in the dark toilet behind his house and beside
the thickets, his shorts were up and on. His hands and knees were soiled.
14. At the toilet he was asked the innocent question of where Editha was and he answered
revealingly, thus: "I did not do anything to her" and "I let her go and brought her
back to the dike and let her go home."
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, Gallarde said he
was with Kiko and he slept at the latter's house, which answer Mario Bado promptly
refuted saying, "Vulva of your mother . . . Kiko was with me drinking." Bado and
Kiko were not at the place of the Talans that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez
sans protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Editha's cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away from
her nostrils. Both wounds were fresh and reddish.
From the lower portion of Editha's vagina blood oozed, accompanied by dirt.
Her hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.
The medico-legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Editha's
nose and mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her
face, and that in 30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the
vaginal injuries contributing to her death. 23

As to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution's evidence therefor,
but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of spermatozoa in EDITHA's private
part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not
negate the commission of rape. 24 Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is
at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were
caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. Our meticulous reading of the testimony of Dr. Tebangin
disclosed that he was never asked if the laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the penis of
a human being. Needless to state, these could have been caused by any object other than the penis of a
person. LLphil

We cannot sustain the contention of GALLARDE that he was not positively identified as the assailant since
there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not follow that although nobody
saw GALLARDE in the act of killing EDITHA, nobody can be said to have positively identified him. Positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the
very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identity
a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of
the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able
to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an

unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted
unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and
unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that
direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. 25 If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove
identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community
would be denied proper protection. cdasia

As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case and
enumerated by the trial court positively established the identity of GALLARDE, and no one else, as the
person who killed EDITHA.
We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and "K") taken of
GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while [GALLARDE] was
already under the mercy of the police." The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination 26 proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when
it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 27 The essence
of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against
himself through a testimonial act. 28 Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; 29 and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; 30 to
expel morphine from his mouth; 31 to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; 32 and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. 33

There is also no merit in GALLARDE's argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will justify his acquittal.
The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman and that on the occasion
of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to
the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of limitation, and
within the jurisdiction of the court. 34

The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if it can
be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof

occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court. 35 The rule merely requires that the
information shows that the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court
may even take judicial notice that said place is within its jurisdiction. 36
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the information does
not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or time," but may prove any date or time which is
not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant." 37

Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of the
commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when GALLARDE left the house of Talan
followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by
the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or
less, at 10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997. 38

Likewise, GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present witnesses who
could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family corroborated him on this matter. The
defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and selfserving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 39

Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude his physical
presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place where the body of EDITHA was found
buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short
while. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. 40
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might prompt
them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is no showing
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and
credit. 41 Testimonies of witnesses who have nomotive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies
should be given credence.42
With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any
objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea. 43 The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial. 44 GALLARDE's
assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea
he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter. 45 It is settled that
any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. 46 It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information
had been filed and the accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him. 47 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for

setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest
does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. 48
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal asmaximum. LexLib

As to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P70,000 as liquidated damages. This should be
construed as actual damages. However, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of P50,000, per current
case law, should be awarded.

WHEREFORE the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, in
Criminal Case No. T-1978 finding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty of the crime of murder is
hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period
of prision mayor asminimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the medium period
ofreclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the sum of P70,000
as liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan. LLphil

Costs against accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE in both instances.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, [February 17, 2000], 382 PHIL 718-741)

21- Villaflor v. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, 8 September 1920

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 16444. September 8, 1920.]
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner, vs. RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the city of
Manila, respondent.
Alfredo Calupitan and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Felix for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PHILIPPINE BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF ACCUSED PERSON; GENERAL
PRINCIPLES. The object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the
laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
constitutional provisions are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule
is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the
truth.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; With a losse extension of constitutional guaranties because of a
misconceived motion of the rights of accused persons, this court is not in accord.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SELF-INCRIMINATION; HISTORY OF THE GUARANTY. The maxim of the common
law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in early days is a revolt against the
thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitional methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present
temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The principle was taken into the American Constitutions,
and from the United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as States was brought to
the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English days.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY OF THE LAW. Even superior to the complete immunity of a person
to be let alone as the interest which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Between a
sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public
welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES. The constitutional guaranty, that noperson shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Torture force shall be avoided.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BODILY EXHIBITION. On a proper showing and under an order of the trial
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Upon petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the trial court
ordered the defendant, a woman charged with the crime of adultery, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine whether she was pregnant or not. Held:
That while this order of the trial court is phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be
understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and thus as not in violation of that portion of
the Philippine Bill of rights and that portion of the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure which find their
origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all State Constitutions, and in the
common law rules of evidence, relating to self-incrimination.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The rules announced are believed to be staredecisis in this jurisdiction.
(Holt vs. U. S. [1910], 218 U. S., 585; U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong
[1917], 36 Phil., 735.) Even if not so, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would rather desire its
decision to rest on the reason of the case than on blind adherence to tradition.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
The facts are not in dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this
case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of
the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, now
become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and
was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required
by the court.
The sole legal issue arising from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to
permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of
our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and
practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . (President's Instructions to the
Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United States
Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an
infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not
an infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the
fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical question
as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.

The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the conservative courts
emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of the constitutional provision and are pleased to extend the
privilege in order that its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make
evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey
[1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902], 117
Iowa, 650; Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view and almost
directly in point is People vs. McCoy relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found ([1873], 45
How. Pr., 216). A woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The coroner directed two physicians
to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine whether she had recently been delivered of
a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination
was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled out. The court said that
the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing, the
court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to testify that
she had been pregnant, and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to
allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel the prisoner now to
submit to an examination of her private parts and breasts, by physicians, and then have them testify
that from such examination they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not
possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus
obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that,
greatly impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially the one written by Mr. Justice McClain,
in State vs. Height, supra, the instant case was reported by the writer with the tentative
recommendation that the court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to
disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. But having disabused our minds of
a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to
penetrate through the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional guaranty
and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the
reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to us more
progressive in nature. Among these can be prominently mentioned decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of these Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr.
Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an
objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." (See also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice
Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S., 585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two
decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng
[1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory principle
announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands as authority.)
Although we have stated a proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest
tribunal in the United States, we cannot unconcernedly leave the subject without further consideration.
Even in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, to which we have alluded, there was inserted the careful
proviso that "we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself."
Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact location of the dividing line
between what is proper and what is improper in this very broad constitutional field. But here before us

is presented what would seem to be the most extreme case which could be imagined. While the United
States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person put on a
blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of
Nevada could go so far as to require the defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo
marks, and while the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands could permit substances taken from the
person of an accused to be offered in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an
order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the gaze of
strangers. We can only consistently consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a
result by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was
and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in
the Philippines, being in the agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision
to rest on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one of blind adherence to tradition
and precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the history of the constitutional
provision will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in
early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the
rack. A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person
by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As
forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of republican
government, the principle was taken into the American Constitutions, and from the United States was
brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old
English days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but with a
judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of
Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610, found in 4 Wigmore
on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], 3 Phil., 143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to
elementals and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of
having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice
of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to
embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused person
should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. For instance, under the
facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only result in inducing her
to tell a falsehood. But noevidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to account a guilty
person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own
body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. As
Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S., 250) said, "To compel any
one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by
the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest
which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the
modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions
which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not
exempt him from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal

considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal
trials have sometimes seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers
as players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose
extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression
is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences.
Once' again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under
an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is
that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and
proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely
necessary. Indeed, noobjection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an
examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The
writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I think, however, that the scope of our ruling in this matter should be expressly limited, in
positive and definite terms, so as to make it clear that the examination of the person of the accused
shall not be carried beyond a mere ocular inspection, wherein the use of instruments or of physical
force upon the person of the accused would be prohibited.
||| (Villaflor v. Summers, G.R. No. 16444, [September 8, 1920], 41 PHIL 62-71)

22- Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 20 September 1996

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996.]
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.
CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996.]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Manuel G. Abello for petitioners.
Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos for Raul S. Roco.
Mario E. Ongkiko for Presidential Commission on Good Government.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; BOUNDED BY RULES, ETHICAL CONDUCT AND DUTIES;
RATIONALE. In the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a
lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is
entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. Considerations favoring
confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns.
In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without
effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum
of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not
as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
2. ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE A LAWYER MAY NOT REFUSE TO DIVULGE THE IDENTITY OF HIS CLIENT;
RATIONALE. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general
rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process
considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing
or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION; WHEN THE CLIENT'S IDENTITY IS PRIVILEGED. The general rule is, however,
qualified by some important exception. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the
government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an

individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged. Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist
other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any
client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal
problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the
identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure and the entire transaction. Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of
a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CONSTRUED. The equal
protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes
and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms
so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. (Gumabon
v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated
alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed. . . . What is required under this
Constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: 'Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding the rest.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; COVERED BY THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of
professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so
occupies, as it should, an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles have
evolved that would help ensure its effective ministation. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyerclient relationship is one, and it has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the
lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence essential in
a justice system that works on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is
not without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate
analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and will make that rule endure.
DAVIDE, JR. J., dissenting opinion:
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; NATURE OF THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY. The rule
of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a
ground for disqualification of a witness (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the
appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the
witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise
judicially coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents
containing the same privileged matter.
2. ID.; LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; CONTRARY TO THE MAJORITY RULE, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PHILIPPINE RULE. Hypothetically admitting the
allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion
that the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they
cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all because of the sacred lawyerclient privilege. This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The majority seeks to expand
the scope of the Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of American
jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the identity of the client under the exceptional situations
narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of
privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which are primarily

proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply in
the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked in the court where it was already filed.
Secondly, and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely
advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here,
the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators in the offenses
charged. The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them.

3. ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE INVOKED AS A SHIELD FOR THE COMMISSION OF CRIME. I wish to repeat and
underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against
the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that
the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the
lawyer and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction,
lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id). And under the
Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind that his great trust is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his
profession and the best interest of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon
32, Id.). These canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires with the client in
the commission of a crime or a fraud.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; CAN NEVER BE USED AS A SHIELD TO COMMIT CRIME OR
FRAUD. The attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
Communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature
of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances
it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such shield
from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can safely
commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting
crimes." (125 American Law Reports Annotated 516519 citingPeople v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich 69, 23 NW
594)
2. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RIGHT OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT IDENTITY AS A GENERAL RULE;
EXCEPTIONS. As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure
of
client
identity.
The
general
rule,
however,
admits
of
well-etched exceptions which
the Sandiganbayanfailed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accuratelysummarized in In
re Grand Jury Investigation. The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the
identity of a client is not within the protective ambit of an attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions
appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 633 (8th
Cir. 1960). 'The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the circumstances of the
case are such that the name of the client is material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment
of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was employed.' 'A
significant exception to this principle of non-confidentiality holds that such information may be privileged
when the person invoking the privilege is able to show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the
information would implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first
case.' Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not privileged arises where
disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential
communication. To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the rule itself. The privilege may
be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed that identification
of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication. The privilege may be recognized
where so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed [not necessarily by the attorney
but by independent sources as well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to disclosure

of a confidential communication. Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F, 2D 1026 5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when disclosure
of the identity of the client would provide the "last link" of evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; PERSON CLAIMING THE PRIVILEGE OR ITS EXCEPTIONS HAS THE OBLIGATION TO PRESENT THE
UNDERLYING FACTS DEMONSTRATING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PRIVILEGE. The person claiming the
privilege or its exception has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of
the privilege. When these facts can be presented only by revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in
an in camera hearing. The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a wellrecognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while
simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera
ex-parte hearing. Without the proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual basis
to determine whether petitioners fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the
contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based the sanctity of fiduciary
duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the
law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In
this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33
(Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippinesversus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA
Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course
of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of
clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition
of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good government (hereinafter referred to as
respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint"
which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant. 3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his

undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and
Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the whollyowned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the
name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their co-defendants
are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,
defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A.
Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the
corporations listed under their respective names in Annex 'A' of the expanded
Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such,
they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.
4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976
of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business
purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint.
However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore
denies that the 'shares' appearing in his name in Annex 'A' of the expanded
Amended Complaint are his assets. 6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8,
1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as
parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. 8 The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners
from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor
of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. 9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated

March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c)
Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in
behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the
evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying
the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause
against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules
of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to
Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners
ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering
petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nomineestockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial
distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor
of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested
by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged
matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that
the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers to the equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same
grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants
him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client,
giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship. cdasia
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the
identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as
party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil
Case No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'" 14 and he has
undertaken to identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish"
as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with

petitioners the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of
the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Italics ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel
Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through
the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco"; that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third
Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in
the name of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers
that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed
deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment
and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our
claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth,
that most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say that?
One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they
have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses
now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are
some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they
called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of
their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail
these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG hasno valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom
reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to

the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principalagent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. 19 A
lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent. 20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as
a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21and exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe
life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable
tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford, 26 the U.S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than
that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully
discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles
of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing
it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedureenacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of
his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of theRules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,"

to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind
that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any
client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between
legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum
of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence
which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery.30 Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. 31

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the
issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an
election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election

laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client
had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under
the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was
privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the
client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang,"
a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners,
represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf
of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case,
held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged
where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that
disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe
enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law.
Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorneyclient privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore,
supra Sec.2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of
his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.Terminal Cab Corporation, 37 prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation. llcd
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action
both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as
John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to
him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to
the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired
him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice
or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to
any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to
afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged
from disclosure. . . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the
attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the
courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action
pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The
objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, 40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower court
to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's
request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he
represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress
in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of
such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditionsno case has ever gone to the length
of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his
retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, 42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayer's returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought
advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the
sum of $12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore,
Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that
Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did
not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted
privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay
sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on,
and with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning
the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation
and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule.
Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The
names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one
year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal
guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed to advise his
clients what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that
the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions
laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and
set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners'
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers.
Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very
activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words
of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime." 47

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney,
for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal
activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and
consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same
cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not
the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if
the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible
action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for
an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the
second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The
reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the
commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and
are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an
attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be
supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are
under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." 50 Where the
communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity
but there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge
except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject
matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is
consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained inIn re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson
v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what
may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and
litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed
by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows
that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the
latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has
a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,

competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon, 54the US
Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its
client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled
that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen
normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller 55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of
work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his
client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the
client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was
originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard
v. Salmon 56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilioof
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved
was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to
accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and
actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united this
abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our
lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme by eyes
dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a
mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion only to be won by straining
all the faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of
the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on
them in the exercise of their duties. LLphil
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and
others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished
all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents

by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also
because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require,
which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement
made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise
made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended
Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering." 60 Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist
other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently
from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the
PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the
clients in question. However, respondents failed to show and absolutely nothing exists in the records of
the case at bar that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking
more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking .
Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which
were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA
lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private
respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients
which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent
court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial
distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at
bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of
legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment. 62 Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges
granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: 'Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or

charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion
as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The
condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. 64 it is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only
touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called
to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against selfincrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of
coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a
proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction
acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. LibLex
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to execute petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Conception, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as partiesdefendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J ., see separate opinion.
Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.
Davide, Jr. and Puno, JJ ., dissents.
Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., join Justice Davide in his dissent.
Romero, J ., took no part. Related to PCGG Commissioner when Civil Case No. 0033 was filed.
Hermosisima, Jr., J ., took no part. Participated in Sandiganbayan deliberations thereon.
Mendoza, J ., is on leave.
Separate Opinions

VITUG, J ., separate opinion:

The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of
professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so
occupies, as it should, an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principle have
evolved that would help ensure its effective ministration. The protection of confidentiality of the lawyerclient relationship is one, and it has been since an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the
lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence essential in
a justice system that works on the basis of substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is
not without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate
analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and will make that rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already detailed in the ponencia, a situation
of the Republic attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be the strength of its own
evidence but on what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the
Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly
disguised threat of incrimination. cda
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for the GRANT of the petition.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
The impressive presentation of the case in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes difficult the espousal
of a dissenting view. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to express that view because I strongly feel that this
Court must confine itself to the key issue in this special civil action for certiorari, viz., whether or not the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants, the petitioners
herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Code No. 0033. That issue, unfortunately, has been
simply buried under the avalanche of authorities upholding the sanctity of lawyer-client relationship which
appears to me to be prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the pleadings and summarized in theponencia, I cannot find my
way clear to a conclusion that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not acting
favorably on the petitioners' prayer in their Comment to the PCGG's Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff,
or the PCGG in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the issue of "interest" (2,Rule 3,
Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a
misjoinder of parties (7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised. llcd
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude from the complaint original co-defendant Raul
Roco because he had allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that
he will reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short, there was an agreement or compromise settlement between the
PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a Third Amended Complaint without Roco as a
defendant. No obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated. If Roco's revelation violated the
confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable therefor to his
principals/clients and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. There is at
all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot further be proceeded upon or that any judgment therein
cannot be binding without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly, the admission of the Third
Amended Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be excluded but only made the request to that
effect as a rider to their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint, entitled to be
excluded from the Third Amended Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the answer is clearly in the negative.

The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason
and logic dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated,
they must first voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by Roco and must bind
themselves to perform certain obligations as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to the petitioners'
comment on the aforementioned Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that it is
willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave Roco provided they would do what Roco had done,
that is, disclose the identity of their principals/clients and submit documents substantiating their claimed
lawyer-client relationship with the said principals/clients, as well as copies of deeds of assignments the
petitioners executed in favor of their principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because they believed
that compliance thereof would breach the sanctity of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship.
It, indeed, appears, that Roco has complied with his obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the
Third Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of action
against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules
of agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to substantiate Roco's compliance. The ponencia itself
so stated, thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as partydefendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by
the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent in behalf of
private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of
evidence by the PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. (Id., 56).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which the Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the PCGG
was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The petitioners have not assailed such finding as arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not refute the petitioners' contention that he did not comply
with his obligation to disclose the identity of his principals is entirely irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco.
They cannot claim the same treatment, much less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for
nothing whatsoever. They haveno right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the
conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss
based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule of
confidentially under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground
for disqualification of a witness (24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate
time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when, having taken the witness
stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially
coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing
the same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or
otherwise reveal "any [confidential] communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment." What they are being asked to do, in line with
their claim that they had done the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their professional relation to their
clients, is to identify the latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if they so choose in order to be
dropped from the complaint, such identification being the condition under which the PCGG has expressed
willingness to exclude them from the action. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part.
The attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners' prayer for
their exclusion as party-defendants because they did not want to abide with any of the conditions set by
the PCGG. There would have been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the prayer because then it would
have capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed its will on the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal of
the case insofar as they are concerned because either they are invested with immunity under the principle
of confidentially in a lawyer-client relationship, or the claims against them in Civil Case No. 0033 are barred
by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit that the lawyer-client privilege provides the
petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No. 0033, a case for the recovery
of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they are, allegedly,
conspirators in the commission of the acts complained of for being nominees of certain parties.
Their inclusion as defendants is justified under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution which provides
that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel
and E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2 of 12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules
and Regulations of the PCGG. Furthermore, 2,Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the complaint or
information should be "against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved."
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to
agree with the majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or that they have to be excluded
as defendants, or that they cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their principals, all
because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule on the lawyer-client privilege by copious
citations of American jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the identity of the client under the
exceptional situations narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out in bold relief.
Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which
are preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we are not even told what
evidentiary rules apply in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is invoked in the court where
it was already filed and presently pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules above-quoted. Secondly,
and more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely advocating the
cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel
themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators in the offenses charged. The cases
cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I quote, with emphases supplied,
from 81 AMJUR 2d, Witnesses, 393 to 395, pages 356357:
393. Effect of unlawful purpose.

The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attorney-client privilege from attaching.
The attorney-client privilege does not generally exist where the representation is sought to
further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past, present, or future. Thus, a confidence
received by an attorney in order to advance a criminal or fraudulent purpose is beyond the
scope of the privilege.
Observation: The common-law rule that the privilege protecting confidential communications between
attorney and client is lost if the relation is abused by a client who seeks legal assistance to perpetrate a
crime or fraud has been codified.
394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of
a crime in concert with the attorney, even where the attorney is not aware of his client's
purpose. The reason for the rule isthat it is not within the professional character of a
lawyer to give advice on the commission of crime. Professional responsibility does not
countenance the use of the attorney-client privilege as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies,
either active or passive, which are calculated to hinder the administration of justice will
vitiate the privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this exception to the rule of privilege is
confined to such intended acts in violation of the law as are mala in se, as distinguished
from those which are merely mala prohibita.
395. Communication in contemplation of crime.
Communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. But, the
mere charge of illegality, not supported by evidence, will not defeat the privilege; there
must be at least prima facie evidence that the illegality has some foundation in fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the same effect, for the rule is prostitution of the honorable
relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice . In
accordance with this rule, where a forged will or other false instrument has come into
possession of an attorney through the instrumentality of the accused, with the hope and
expectation that the attorney would take some action in reference thereto, and the
attorney does act, in ignorance of the true character of the instrument, there
is noprivilege, inasmuch as full confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then
compelled to produce a forged writing against the client. The fact that the attorney is not
cognizant of the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it, attempts to dissuade his
client, is immaterial. The attorney's ignorance of his client's intentions deprives the
information of a professional character as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C.
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Evidence, vol. 2 Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp.
836837; italics mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED, 516519, summarizes the rationale of the rule excepting
communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with respect to contemplated criminal or
fraudulent act.
Various reasons have been announced as being the foundation for the holdings that
communications with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts are not
privileged.

The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in such cases there
is no professional employment, properly speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co. v.Smithhart (1919)
183 Ky 679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927) 221 Ky 301, 298 SW
943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW(2d) 599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57
Mich 69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App 338; Carney v. United
R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455,
21 A 1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM Dec 287; People ex
rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc 714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in
(1934) 242 App Div 611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell v.Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng
Reprint 558; Charlton v. Coombes(1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884)
LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR; Re Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35 Ch Div (Eng) 722.
In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 CCR, the court said: "In order that the rule
may apply, there must be both professional confidence and professional employment, but
if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of
these elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his
solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his
adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal
object. If the client does not avow his object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of
facts which is the foundation of the supposed confidence does not exist. The solicitor's
advice is obtained by a fraud."
So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679, 211 SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the
court said: "The reason of the principle which holds such communications not to be
privileged is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice upon
such subjects, and that it is no part of the profession of an attorney or counselor at law to
be advising persons as to how they may commit crimes or frauds, or how they may escape
the consequences of contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has already
been committed and finished, a client may advise with an attorney in regard to it, and
communicate with him freely, and the communications cannot be divulged as evidence
without the consent of the client, because it is a part of the business and duty of those
engaged in the practice of the profession of law, when employed and relied upon for that
purpose, to give advice to those who have made infractions of the laws; and, to enable the
attorney to properly advise and to properly represent the client in court or when
prosecutions are threatened, it is conducive to the administration of justice that the client
shall be free to communicate to his attorney all the facts within his knowledge, and that he
may be assured that a communication made by him shall not be used to his prejudice."

The protection which the law affords to communications between attorney and client has
reference to those which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment, and does not extend to communications made in contemplation of a crime,
or perpetration of a fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky 502, 105 SW (2d) 599.
The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23 NW 594, in holding not privileged
communications to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime, said:
"They then partake of the nature of a conspiracy, or attempted conspiracy, and it is not
only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require
that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who
takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime.The relation of attorney and client cannot
exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." prcd
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 Am Dec 287, the court was of the
opinion that there could be no such relation as that of attorney and client, either in the

commission of a crime, or in the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an individual, the

privileged relation of attorney and client existing only for lawful and honest purposes.
If the client consults the attorney at law with reference to the perpetration of a crime, and
they co-operate in effecting it, there is no privilege, inasmuch as it is no part of the
lawyer's duty to aid in crime he ceases to be counsel and becomes a criminal. Matthews
v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud forms part of the
professional business of an attorney or solicitor. Charlton v.Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66
Eng Reprint 751.
If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his object and intention as well as facts,
there is not professional confidence, and therefore noprivilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ)
supra. See to the same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW
308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the production of documents passing
between solicitor and client, when the transaction impeached is charged to be based upon
fraud, that is the matter to be investigated, and it is though better that the alleged
privilege should suffer than that honestly and fair dealing should appear to be violated
with impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng) p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v.Cox (1884)
LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 172 CCR), the chief justice said: "I believe the law is, and properly is,
that if a party consults an attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards turns out to be
the commission of a crime or a fraud, that a party so consulting the attorney
has no privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney from stating the truth. Indeed, if
any such privilege should be contended for, or existing, it would work most grievous
hardship on an attorney, who, after he had been consulted upon what subsequently
appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would have his lips closed, and might place
him in a very serious position of being suspected to be a party to the fraud, and without
his having an opportunity of exculpating himself. . . .There is no privilege in the case which
I have suggested of a party consulting another, a professional man, as to what may
afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the best mode of accomplishing it."
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39, although the question of privilege as to
communications between attorney and client was not involved, the question directly
involved being the competency of a clerk in a business establishment to testify as to
certain information which he acquired while working in the establishment, the court
strongly approved of a view as stated arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley
v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr (Eng) 1229, as follows: "I shall claim leave to consider
whether an attorney may be examined as to any matter which came to his knowledge as
an attorney. If he is employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the
public obliges him to disclose it; noprivate obligations can dispense with that universal one
which lies on every member of society to discover every design which may be formed,
contrary to the laws of society, to destroy the public welfare. For this reason, I apprehend
that if a secret which is contrary to the public good, such as a design to commit treason,
murder, or perjury, comes to the knowledge of an attorney, even in a cause where he is
concerned, the obligation to the public must dispense with the private obligation to the
client."
The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213, said: "It would be monstrous to
hold that if counsel was asked and obtained in reference to a contemplated crime that the
lips of the attorney would be sealed, when the facts might become important to the ends
of justice in the prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot be taken to exist.
Public policy would forbid it."

And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36, observed thatthis rule was not
in contravention of sound public policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance of
a higher standard of professional ethics by preventing the relation of attorney and client
from operating as a cloak for fraud.
Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged if they were a request for
advice as to how to commit a fraud, it being in such a case not only the attorney's
privilege, but his duty, to disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells & Co. (1907) 3
Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: "We say this notwithstanding the comments of
opposing counsel as to the indelicacy of his position because of his being now on the
opposite side of the issue that arose as a consequence of the communication he testifies
about, and is interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee, as he
confesses."
The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications is to protect the
client, and not to make the attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the commission
of a crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60 App Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a transaction which is in itself
a crime. People v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE 457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, 410 and 411, pages 366368, states:
410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client's identity is necessary proof of the existence of the attorney-client
relationship and is not privileged information. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is
inapplicable even though the information was communicated confidentially to the attorney
in his professional capacity and, in some cases, in spite of the fact that the attorney may
have been sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is directed to an attorney as to the name or
identity of his client. This general rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil
actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action, the opposing party has a right
to know with whom he is contending or who the real party in interest is, if not the nominal
adversary.
411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a client is not usually considered privileged, except
where so much has been divulged with regard to legal services rendered or the advice
sought, that to reveal the client's name would be to disclose the whole relationship and
confidential communications. However, even where the subject matter of the attorneyclient relationship has already been revealed, the client's name has been deemed
privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a client might harm the client by being used against
him under circumstances where there are no countervailing factors, then the identity is
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
In criminal proceedings, a client's name may be privileged if information already obtained
by the tribunal, combined with the client's identity, might expose him to criminal
prosecution for acts subsequent to, and because of, which he had sought the advice of his
attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter
of public record and, thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege, where the attorney
has surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in his possession by way of the
attorney-client relationship, the state must prove the connection between the piece of
physical evidence and the defendant without in any way relying on the testimony of the
client's attorney who initially received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may not be
called to the stand and asked to disclose the identity of the client. However, an attorney

cannot refuse to reveal the identity of a person who asked him to deliver stolen property to
the police department, whether a bona fide attorney-client relationship exists between
them, inasmuch as the transaction was not a legal service or done in the attorney's
professional capacity.
Distinction: Where an attorney was informed by a male client that his female acquaintance
was possibly involved in [a] hit-and-run accident, the identity of the female did not come
within scope of attorney-client privilege although the identity of the male client was
protected. (italics supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is not within the lawyer-client privilege in this matter.
2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit. The identity of the attorney's client or the
name of the real party in interest will seldom be a matter communicated in confidence
because the procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a disclosure of these facts.
Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to secure action
without appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such a
wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents. He cannot
be obliged to struggle in the dark against unknown forces. He has by anticipation the right,
in later proceedings, if desired, to enforce the legal responsibility of those who may have
maliciously sued or prosecuted him or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as much right
to ask the attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to ask the witness (966 supra). "Who
maintains you during this trial?" upon the analogy of the principle already examined
(2298 supra), the privilege cannot be used to evade a client's responsibility for the use of
legal process. And if it is necessary for the purpose to make a plain exception to the rule of
confidence, then it must be made. (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609; emphases
supplied).

In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following statement:

1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that the rule making communications
between attorney and client privileged from disclosure ordinarily does not apply where the
inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's employment and the name of the person
employing him, since the privilege presupposes the relationship of client and attorney, and
therefore does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings below, the petitioners have not shown that they are so situated
with respect to their principals as to bring them within any of the exceptions established by American
jurisprudence. There will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the trial where the broader
perspectives of the case shall have been presented and can be better appreciated by the court. The
insistence for their exclusion from the case is understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution
desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be
invoked to prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer and the client are conspirators in
the commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not to counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon, 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer
must steadfastly bear in mind that his great trust is to be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his profession and the best interest of his client
when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These canons strip a lawyer of the
lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud.

I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition.

Narvasa, C .J . and Regalado, J ., concur.
PUNO, J ., dissenting:
This
is
an
important
petition
for
certiorari
to
annul
the
resolutions
of
the
respondent Sandiganbayan denying petitioners' motion to be excluded from the Complaint for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the
identity of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil
Case No. 33 before the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., for the recovery of alleged illgotten wealth. Sued as co-defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar lawyers Teodoro Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta
and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a co-defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected senator of
the Republic. All co-defendants were then partners of the law firm, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law Firm. The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the
petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert
with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the
nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption,
betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power as more fully described (in the
subsequent paragraphs of the complaint), all at the expense and to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
"Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D.
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and
Raul S. Roco of Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of the San Miguel
Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its whollyowned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the
name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of 7 June 1984."
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal services offered and made available by their firm to its
clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators or
stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to clients the corresponding documents of their equity holdings
(i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in blank or blank deeds of trust or assignment). They claimed that their
activities were "in furtherance of legitimate lawyering."
In the course of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to Admit Third Amendment
Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party defendant. Lawyer Roco was
excluded on the basis of his promise to reveal the identity of the principals for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in the case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to comment on the motion. In their Comment, petitioners
demanded that they be extended the same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They prayed for their

exclusion from the complaint.PCGG agreed but set the following conditions: (1) disclosure of the identity of
their client; (2) submission of documents substantiating their lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submission
of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed on lawyer Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions contending that theattorney-client privilege gives
them the right not to reveal the identity of their client. They also alleged that lawyer Roco was excluded
though he did not in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied
the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause
against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules
of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same, vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to
Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit."
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21,
1988 and September 3, 1992. cdrep
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
"I
"The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners
ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law agency.
"II
"The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering
petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosures does not constitute a substantial
distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection
clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor
of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
"III
"The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested
by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
"IV
"The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that
the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due considerations to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers to the equal protection of the law."
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the applicability of attorneyclient privilege. It ought to be noted that petitioners were included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33
as conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having ". . . conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition
of San Miguel Corporation shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly." To stress, petitioners are charged with having conspired in the commission of crimes. The issue
of attorney-client privilege arose when PCGGagreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on
condition they reveal the identity of their client. Petitioners refused to comply and assailed the condition
on the ground that to reveal the identity of their client will violate the attorney-client privilege.
It is thus necessary to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
rejected petitioners' thesis that to reveal the identity of their client would violate the attorney-client
privilege. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the common law. 1 For the first time in this jurisdiction, we are asked to rule whether the
attorney-client privilege includes the right not to disclose the identity of client. The issue poses
a trilemma for its resolution requires the delicate balancing of three opposing policy considerations. One
overriding policy consideration is the need for courts to discover the truth for truth alone is the true
touchstone of justice. 2 Equally compelling is the need to protect the adversary system of justice where
truth is best extracted by giving a client broadprivilege to confide facts to his counsel. 3 Similarly
deserving of sedulous concern is the need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against selfincrimination and the right to effective counsel in criminal litigations. To bridle at center the centrifugal
forces of these policy considerations, courts have followed the prudential principle that the attorney-client
privilege must not be expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search for truth. 4 Accordingly,
a narrow construction has been given to the privilege and it has been consistently held that "these
competing societal interests demand that application of the privilege not exceed that which is necessary to
effect the policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., 'the privilege must be upheld only in those
circumstances for which it was created.'" 5

Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define in clear strokes the substantive content of the
attorney-client privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the petition at bar. With due
respect, I like to start by stressing the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can never be
used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud. Communications to an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The
interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect
a person who takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot
exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." 6 In the well chosen words of retired Justice
Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. 7 I hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer
conspired with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the privilege. 8 As early as
1993, no less than the Mr. Justice Cardozo held in Clark v.United States 9 that: "there are early cases
apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any evidence, will set the
confidences free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without support . . . To drive the privilege away,
there must be 'something to give colour to the charge'; there must be prima facie evidence that it has
foundation in fact." In the petition at bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its original
stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the
attorney-client privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners from the Complaint provided they
reveal the identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that petitioners are entitled to invoke the
attorney-client privilege if they reveal their client's identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client privilege since the PCGG is no longer
proceeding against them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue of
whether the attorney-client privilege includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended
by the petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the right of nondisclosure of client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which
the Sandiganbayan failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately summarized
in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 10 viz:
"The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general rule that the identity of a
client is, with limited exceptions, not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351
F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540
(1966); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the general rule that the identity of a
client is not within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. All such exceptions
appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird the IRS received a letter from an attorney stating that
an enclosed check in the amount of $12,706 was being tendered for additional amounts
due from undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS summoned the attorney to ascertain the
identity of the delinquent taxpayers the attorney refused identification asserting the
attorney-client privilege. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, adjudged that the
"exception" to the general rule as pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149
P.566 (1915) controlled:
'The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the
circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material only for
the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the
very offenses on account of which the attorney was employed.'

Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the Baird taxpayer was adjudged within this
exception to the general rule. The Ninth circuit has continued to acknowledge this
exception.
'A significant exception to this principle of non-confidentiality holds that such
information may be privileged when the person invoking the privilege is able to
show that a strong possibility exists that disclosure of the information would
implicate the client in the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first
case.'
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.
1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695
F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This exception, which can perhaps be most succinctly
characterized as the "legal advice" exception, has also been recognized by other
circuits. See: In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.
Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S. Ct. 869-70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). Since the
legal advice exception is firmly grounded in the policy of protecting confidential
communications, this Court adopts and applies its principles herein. See:In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however, that the legal advice exception may be defeated through
a prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of present
or intended continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger
conspiracy. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Decus Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695
F.2d at 365 n. 1; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 101 S.
Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d 291 (1980): In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d
Cir. 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083. 101 S. Ct. 869, 66 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman,
445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53, S.
Ct. 465, 469, 77 L. Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc).

Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not privileged arises
where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected
confidential communication. In Baird,supra, the Ninth Circuit observed:
'If the identification of the client conveys information which ordinarily would be
conceded to be part of the usual privileged communication between attorney and
client, then the privilege should extend to such identification in the absence of
other factors.'
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit promulgated the following exception:
To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the rule itself. The privilege
may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has already been
disclosed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential
communication.
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United States v.Tratner, 511
F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner,
350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.
1944). See also: Chirac v.Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The
Seventh Circuit has added to the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat:

The privilege may be recognized where so much of the actual communication has
already been disclosed [not necessarily by the attorney, but by independent
sources as well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts to
disclosure of a confidential communication.
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976 (emphasis added). The Third
Circuit, applying this exception, has emphasized that it is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the link between the client and the possibility of potential
criminal prosecution, which serves to bring the clients' identity within the protective ambit
of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled February14, 1978
(Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal advice" exception, this
exception is also firmly rooted in principles of confidentiality.
Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision of In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when
disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last link" of evidence:
We have long recognized the general rule that matters involving the payment of
fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); see cases
collected id. at 670 n. 2. There we also recognized, however, a limited and narrow
exception to the general rule, one that obtains when the disclosure of the client's
identity by his attorney would have supplied the last link in an existing chain of
incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment.'"
I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize the
exceptions discussed above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall
within the exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is not a
magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection.
Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. 11 The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions
has the obligation to present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege. 12 When
these facts can be presented only by revealing the very information sought to be protected by the
privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in an in
camera hearing. 13The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a wellrecognized means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the general rule, while
simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move the court for an in camera
ex-parte hearing. 14Without the proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has no factual
basis to determine whether petitioners fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall within
any of the above mentioned exceptions for as aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the
exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that petitioners
need not further establish the factual basis of their claim that they fall within the exceptions to the general
rule, the majority held:
"The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench therefore
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client relationship). Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for
the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the word
of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a . . . crime."

I respectfully submit that the first and third exceptions relied upon by the majority are not selfexecutory but need factual basis for their successful invocation. The first exception as cited by the majority
is ". . . where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice." It seems to me evident that "the very activity
for which he sought the lawyer's advice" is a question of factwhich must first be established before there
can be any ruling that the exception can be invoked. The majority cites Ex Parte Enzor, 15 and US
v. Hodge and Zweig,16 but these cases leave no doubt that the "very activity" for which the client sought
the advice of counsel was properly proved. In both cases, the "very activity" of the clients reveal they
sought advice on their criminal activities. Thus, in Enzor, the majority opinion states that the "unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate
election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end." 17 In Hodge, the "very activity" of the clients
deals with illegal importation of drugs. In the case at bar, there is no inkling whatsoever about the "very
activity" for which the clients of petitioners sought their professional advice as lawyers. There is nothing in
the records that petitioners were consulted on the "criminal activities" of their client. The complaint did
allege that petitioners and their client conspired to commit crimes but allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as related by the majority is "where the government's lawyers
have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime." 18Again, the rhetorical questions that answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that
PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without presentation of evidence? and (2) how can we determine
that the name of the client is the only link without presentation of evidence as to the other links? The case
of Baird vs.Koerner 19 does not support the "no need for evidence" ruling of the majority. InBaird, as
related by the majority itself, "a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable
position in casecriminal charges were brought against them by the US Internal Revenue Services (IRS). It
appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. 20 Once more, it is clear that the Baird court was informed of the activity of the client for
which the lawyer was consulted and the activity involved probable violation of tax laws. Thus, the Court
held:
"The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule.
Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past . The
names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one
year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal
guild is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the
feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed to advise his
clients what, under the circumstances, should be done."
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly established by the parties. In the case at bar,
there is no evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made by petitioners' client. Again, the
records do not show that the subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw allegations in the
Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of the client
". . . would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to petitioners who are marquee names in the
legal profession and unjust to their undisclosed client.

Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners' right to claim the attorney-client privilege is
resolutory of the Complaint against them, and hence should be decided ahead and independently of

their claim to equal protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should
not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also respectfully submit that there
isno immediate necessity to resolve petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this stage of the
proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified dissent from the majority opinion.
||| (Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113, [September 20, 1996], 330 PHIL 678-755)

23- People v. Judge Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, 7 July 1989

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85215. July 7, 1989.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON,
Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City,
and FELIPE RAMOS,respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION; RIGHT CONSTRUED. The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME TO ASSERT RIGHT. The right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoenamust obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed
to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A SELF-EXECUTING RIGHT. The right against self-incrimination is not selfexecuting or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as
by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. The accused in a criminal case in court has other rights
in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others 1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his
own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BE EXEMPT FROM BEING A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF, CONSTRUED. The right
of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one
of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even bysubpoena or other process or order of the Court.
He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself.
In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify
by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is
put to him the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the
witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal
to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE AND AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN THE COURT. A
person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE
IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated
by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be
subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to
have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to
testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the persecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse
to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some time other than that for which he is
prosecuted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS STATEMENTS MADE
DURING AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A,
just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,
1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was
a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The
relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
note 3 reading as follows:
"2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos"
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R.
Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA
Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter,
his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the
effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the

money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise . . . to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known
in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO,"
and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was
willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt
with the parties at all; but it would seem thatno compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime
of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In
that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
". . . with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully . . .
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, . . . in the following manner, to wit:
said accused . . . having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of
passengers for one-way-trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the
express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return
those unsold, . . . once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation,
with intent to defraud, did then and there . . . misappropriate, misapply and convert the
value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, . . . failed
and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
party . . ."
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the
Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21,
1988, 6 which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten
admission . . . given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." 7Particularly as regards the
peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons
interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.' "
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony
of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A
and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the
statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager . . . since it does not appear that the accused was
reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the
same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared
inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8,
1986 . . . for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the
accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14,
1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan
Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, Peo. v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, Peo. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and Peo. v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the
explicit precept in thepresent Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at
the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets
issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact
that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not
operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."

These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines.
By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on
the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents
from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People . . . vs. Felipe
Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in
relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial
Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The
comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor
General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and
thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit
Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety
might have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by
lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was grave abuse of
discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to
resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11to which respondent
Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealth with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of
the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American
Constitution, 12and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for
the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of
these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-incrimination, "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are
now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself."
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed
at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before
the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving asubpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when

a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that
he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his
right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the
well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.
Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If
not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights.
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the
first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of each
right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of . . . (these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding
against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers
are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been
more precisely described by this Court. 28
. . . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation
arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army
camp or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by
one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He
finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he
considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their

work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such
an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this imbalance."
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a
police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself
up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this
Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against selfincrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the
time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there
is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he
is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in the
first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific
incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or
refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies
that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused,
or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the
Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself. 33 In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled
to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the
time it is put to him the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to
take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify,
then he "may be cross-examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters
stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith. 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce,
would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should
testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which
might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in
court, has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some time other than that for which he is prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them
as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred.
To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The
thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal
principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally
unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A,
just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,
1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was
a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger . . (of) the violation of the right of any
person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties,
complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their overeagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under
an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy, and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to
the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any
employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is
meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the

employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance
of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at
the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against
him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a
subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making
and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they
may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation
of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to
bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another
whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person
under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not
because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general,
incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against
the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent
Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby
ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and
thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26,
1988 having become functus oficio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, [July 7, 1989], 256 PHIL 671-690)

24- Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, 26 May 1969
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969.]
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torresand Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil & Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATION; APPLICABILITY
THEREOF IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. Where petitioner was the respondent in the malpractice
charge filed against him with the Board of Medical Examiners, the said Board cannot compel him to take
the witness stand as a witness for the complainants. The principle against self-incrimination is equally
applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT INCLUDES RIGHT TO SILENCE. The constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination is not limited to that of allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could
lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right
to silence.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. Why the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination protects as well
the right to silence should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other

rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes
is given due weight.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SAID RIGHT IS IDENTIFIED WITH RIGHT TO PRIVACY. It is of interest to note that while
earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which the right against self-incrimination is
predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current
judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has
been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the
Constitution. 2 Bermudez v. Castillo, 3 decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This
Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a
real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it
was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended
to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan, 5 where
it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be
required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where
petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein
petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being
a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the
same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be
called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional
right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture
or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as
witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the
respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount
of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the

affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in
the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them
on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to
incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self- incrimination cannot be availed of in
an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to
be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this
appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the
petitioner-appellee.
1.We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us
in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan,
it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner
under the Anti-Graft Act, 9 the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be
ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as
such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a
motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance
with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever
property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar;
petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus be distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American
Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude
.. that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it
extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by
imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it." We
reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of
the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2.The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenorsappellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American
decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that
were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption
of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we

reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless
he chooses to take the witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must
be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes
is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this
right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental,
current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according
to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16
In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised
against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently
with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without
his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ.,concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on official leave.
||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969], 138 PHIL 361-369)

25- Cabal v. Kapunan, G.R. No. L-19052, 29 December 1962

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19052. December 29, 1962.]
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T . Reyes for respondents City of Manila.
SYLLABUS
1. ANTI-GRAFT LAW; FORFEITURE OF UNEXPLAINED WEALTH; NATURE OF FORFEITURE AS PENALTY. The
purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been
held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
2. ID.; EXEMPTION OF DEFENDANTS FROM OBLIGATION TO BE WITNESS AGAINST THEMSELVES.
Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witness against themselves are applicable thereto.

3. ID.; FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF

PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; CASE OF BOYD vs. U.S.
and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that the
information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain
revenue law, "though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one ", and that
suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that
portion of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be
compelled in a criminal to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer
was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion
of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or
redressprivate and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public
offenses" and "a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal
laws, and, with this object in view,it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal
case . . . ."
4. ID.; ID.; CASE OF ALMEDA vs. PEREZ, DISTINGUISHED. In Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962)
the theory that, after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was
rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers,
however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights
of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Hon.
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding in Criminal
Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as the whole
proceedings in said criminal case.
On or about August 2, 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of
National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel F. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an
officer and gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958
and other equally reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a
committee of five (5) members, consisting of former Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, as Chairman,
former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B.
Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its
report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, on September 15,
1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant, Col. Maristela, ordered petitioner herein to take the
witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of
unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of
Col. Maristela and to the aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject
to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner
respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness or take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication
dated September 18, 1961, the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such
action as he may deem proper. On September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a "charge" reading as follows:
"The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt under section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code in relation to sections 1 and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
committed as follows:
That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation conducted at the U.P.
Little Theater, Padre Faura, Manila, by the Presidential Committee, which was
created by the President of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with law to
investigate the charges of alleged acquisition by respondent of unexplained wealth

and composed of Justice Marceliano Montemayor, as Chairman, and Justices

Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug and Generals Basilio Valdez and
Guillermo Francisco, as members, with the power, among others, to compel the
attendance of witnesses and take their testimony under oath, respondent who was
personally present at the time before the Committee in compliance with a
subpoena duly issued to him, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
contumaciously, without any justifiable cause or reason, refuse and fail and still
refuse and fail to obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the witness stand,
be sworn and testify as witness in said investigation, in utter disregard of the lawful
authority of the Committee and thereby obstructing and degrading the proceedings
before said body.'
"Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of
contempt of the Presidential Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of
court by imprisonment until such time as he shall obey the subject order of said
Committee."
This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned to Branch XVIII thereof,
presided over by respondent Judge. On October 2, 1961, the latter issued an order requiring petitioner to
show cause and/or answer the charge filed against him within ten (10) days. Soon thereafter, or on
October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to show
cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file said charge and
the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge has been filed without a preliminary investigation,
and, if civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of civil cases being limited to
representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense, for section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due process, in that it is vague and
uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor and that it fails to specify
whether said offense shall be treated as contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court; (3) that more
than one offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt
of an inferior court, as contempt of a superior court and as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court; (4) that the Committee had no power to order and require petitioner to take the witness
stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order
violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
By resolution dated October 14, 1961, respondent Judge denied said motion to quash. Thereupon, or on
October 20, 1961, petitioner began the present action for the purpose adverted to above, alleging that,
unless restrained by this Court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for contempt, and that such
action would not be appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the
Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon
by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations (Section 38-C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended
by Republic ActNo. 1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580, of the Revised
Administrative Code, contempt against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a
superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that, under the constitutional
guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to
answer incriminatory questions.
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 19591960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before
the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to beno question that Col. Maristela does not
seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter

of fact he nolonger holds such office. It seems, likewise, conceded that the purpose of the charge against
petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of
the nature of a penalty.
"In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in
consequence of a default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article.
A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention
of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a
method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and
to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the
title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599)
(Emphasis ours.)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a
definite sum of money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or
refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed
for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are
applicable thereto.
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek nojudgment of fine
or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such
proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res
illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of
a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature of criminal proceedings that
a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one count is
good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property
appears, are so far considered as quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books
and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612; Emphasis ours.)
"Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the later decisions are to the effect that
suits for forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are so far of a
quasi-criminal nature as to be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes
of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . . It has frequently been
held upon constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution that a witness or
party called as a witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to matters which
would subject his property to forfeiture. At early common law no person could be
compelled to testify against himself or to answer any question which would have had a
tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture, or to form a link in a chain of evidence for
that purpose as well as to incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection
against compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to a forfeiture,
such protection was claimed and availed of in some early American cases without placing
the basis of the protection upon constitutional grounds." (23 Am. Jur. 616; Emphasis ours.)
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of
proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil
cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable to them. In
some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and
within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of . . . that portion of the
Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against

the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture
and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368; Emphasis ours.)
"The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would
incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and
punishment, but also when his answer would tend to expose him to a . . . forfeiture . . . (58
Am. Jur., Sec. 43, p. 48; Emphasis ours.)
"As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a
person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasicriminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of
property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the
penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, . . ." (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49;
Emphasis ours.)
"The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the
witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal,
and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer
may tend to criminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to
answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because
the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.
"The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where
the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he
may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer one and all questions ."
(98 C.J.S., p. 252; Emphasis ours.)
"A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to
answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where
the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.
"In general, both at common law and under a constitutional provision against compulsory
self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness
which would subject him to a penalty orforfeiture, or testify in an action against him for a
penalty.
"The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture is recoverable, or is imposed in
vindication of the public justice of the state, as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or
penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its
enforcement is not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of
procedure applicable to an ordinary civil remedy." (98 C.J.S., pp. 275-6.)
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to
declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law,
"though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one ", and that suits for
penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that noperson shall be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held,
in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the
Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or
redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission of public
offenses" and "a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal
laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal
case . . .". This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151). Hence, the Lawyers
Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent cases, concludes that said
constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a
redress for a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter
others from offending in a like manner . . ."

We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which
the theory that, after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was
rejected by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers,
however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights
of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from
proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regalaand Makalintal, JJ ., concur.
Bengzon, C . J ., is on leave.
||| (Cabal v. Kapunan, G.R. No. L-19052, [December 29, 1962], 116 PHIL 1361-1370)

26- Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, 23 September 1929

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32025. September 23, 1929.]
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial
District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPULSORY APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT FISCAL'S
INVESTIGATIONS; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO WRITE FROM DICTATION. The fiscal under section 1687
of the Administrative Code, and the competent judge, at the request of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in
refusing to write down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose of verifying his handwriting
and determining whether he had written certain documents alleged to have been falsified, seeks
protection his constitutional privilege.
2. ID.; RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT; TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. The right was
promulgated, both in the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 and in paragraph 3, section 3 of
the Jones Law, which provides (in Spanish); "Ni se le obligara (defendant) a declarar en contra suya en
ningun proceso criminal," and recognized in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section
15 (No. 4) and section 56. The English text of the Jones Law reads as follows; "Nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," thus, the prohibition is not restricted to
not compelling him to testify, but extends to not compelling him to be a witness.
3. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE. "The rights intended to be protected by
the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is
strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in
favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there
is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral
testimony, but embraced as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the

divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., par. 20, page
434, and notes.)
4. ID.; ID.; CASES INAPPLICABLE. There have been cases where it was lawful to compel the
accuse to write in open court while he was under cross-examination (Bradford vs. People, 43 Pacific
Reporter, 1013), and to make him write his name with his consent during the trial of his case
(Sprousevs. Com., 81 Va., 374, 378); but in the first case, the defendant, in testifying as witness in his
own behalf waived his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as witness; and in the second,
he also waived said privilege because he acted voluntarily.
5. ID.; ID.; PREPARATION AND CREATION OF EVIDENCE BY TESTIMONIAL ACT. This
constitutional prohibition embraces the compulsory preparation and creation by a witness of selfincriminatory evidence by means of a testimonial act. "For though the disclosure thus sought" (the
production of documents and chattels) "be not oral in form, and thought the documents or chattels be
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of
the person in response to the process, stillno line can be drawn short of any process which treats him
as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or
authenticity or origin of the articles produced." (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 864, 865, latest edition.) IN
the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not
purely mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing means for the
petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against himself.
6. ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF CRIMES; PRIVILEGE, REASON FOR EXISTENCE OF. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is
not granted, the crime would go unpunished. The petitioner is a municipal treasurer, and it should not
be difficult for the fiscal to obtain a genuine specimen of his handwriting by some other means. But
even supposing that it is impossible to secure such specimen without resorting to the means herein
complained of by the petitioner, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by
the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
7. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN VILLAFLOR-SUMMERS CASE AND CASE AT BAR. The
difference between this case and that of Villaflor vs.Summers (41. Phil., 620, is that in the latter the
object was to have the petitioner's body examined by physicians, without being compelled to perform a
positive act, but only an omission, that is, not to prevent the examination, which could be, and was,
interpreted by this court as being no compulsion of the petitioner to furnish evidence by means of a
testimonial act; all of which is entirely different from the case at bar, where it is sought to make the
petitioner perform a positive testimonial act, silent, indeed, but effective, namely, to write and give a
sample of his handwriting for comparison.

DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J p:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his won handwriting from
the latter.

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaints filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and against which the
instance action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and
on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs.Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States vs. Tan Teng
(23 Phil., 145); United Statesvs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the respondents, and
in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional
provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the
order against which these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni
se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones
Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned
with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of
the United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a
common conception.
"In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wordings
in the constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore
immaterial that the witness is protected by one Constitution from 'testifying,' or by another
from 'furnishing evidence,' or by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from
'being a witness.' These various phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the
form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception?" (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p.
863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man
accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the
pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the
evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor
of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence,

there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by
other means than by word of mouth,the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Italics ours.)

The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's
dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination but compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so
held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in
offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374, 378), where the judge asked the
defendant to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned
here with a defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for
the supposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and under
cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And
let it further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant
was obtained before the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of
People vs. Molineux (61 Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of
Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there given prominence to the defendant's right
to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said
decision referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):
"The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to
accede to the latter's request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings
thus produced can be excluded from the case." (Italics ours.)

For this reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert 941 Mich., 709; 3 N. W.,
199), that the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as
follows:
"The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the indorsement.
"He was then cross-examined and questioned in regard to his having signed papers
not in the case, and was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures
made prior to the note in suit, and whether he would not write his name there in court. The

judge excluded all these inquiries, on objection, and it is our these rulings that complaint is
made. The object of the questions was to bring into the case extrinsic signatures, for the
purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think the judge was correct in ruling against it."
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:
"Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is
the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the
party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to
make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body . . ." but
he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We noted
that in the same paragraph 2265, where said author treats of "Bodily Exhibition," and
under proposition "1. A great variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled upon," he
cites many cases, among them that of People vs.Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we
have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the defendant voluntarily
gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so and has even
instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.

Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present
case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as to such
production of documents or chattels, which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the
same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that
the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or partywitness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form
of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to
furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the
protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." (And he cites the case of
People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119, 38 N. E., 1003.)

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one
who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.

And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act
of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this
reason the same eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of
documents and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:
"For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or
chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or
utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process

which treats him as a witness; because in virtue of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the
identity of authenticity or origin of the articles produced." (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Italics ours.)

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain
a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of herein, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.

With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it
should be remembered that in the case of People vs.Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the
defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not
refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could
certainly do.
"The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed,
may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it." (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and
cases noted.)
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), where the
defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against
him.

In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to
rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason
of the case there consisted in that it was a case of the examination of the body by physicians, which
could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein
to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any
position act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something, preventing the
examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the petitioner in the present case,
where it is sought to compel his to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of
his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Beside, in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers, it was
sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with
something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or
produce by means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.

Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United

States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was to compelled to perform
any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him

to testify or to be a witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act,
evidence for his own condemnation.

Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

||| (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL 570-579)

27- US v. Tan Teng, G.R No. 7081, 7 September 1912

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 7081. September 7, 1912.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Chas. A. McDonough for appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. RAPE; "ABUSOS DESHONESTOS." Held: Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos" and that the crime was committed in the
house of the offended party, and that therefore the maximum penalty of the law of six years of prision
correccionaland the costs should be imposed.
2. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; RIGHT OF ACCUSED. At the time of the arrest of the
defendant he was apparently suffering from some private disorder. A portion of the substance was
taken and scientifically examined, with the result that such substance showed that he was actually
suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The result of the scientific examination was
offered in evidence, during the trial of the cause. The defendant objected to the admissibility of such
evidence upon the ground that it was requiring him to give testimony against himself. The objection
was overruled upon the ground that "the accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer
any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his person was examined seems no more
to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a
thief." The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection. The examination
of the substance was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant
was suffering from said disease. Such evidence was clearly admissible. The prohibition against
compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against himself is a prohibition against physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence,
when it may be material. The prohibition contained in the Philippine Bill (sec. 5) chat a person shall not
be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J p:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:
"That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully and

criminally, and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse with a certain Oliva
Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age."
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant
guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal
Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison
correccional, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this
court:
"I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having
taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and
regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical
condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
"II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a
venereal disease produced by contact with a sick man.
"III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal
disease.
"IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence."
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl
seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of September, 1910, staying in the house of her sister,
located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were
gambling in or near the said house; that some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the
house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after having taken
a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some
face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts, he
threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position
for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered
that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this
discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of the 15th of
September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of
Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The
defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who
had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore every
sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman
took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the
Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the
examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on
the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court,
after carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that
she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full
faith and credit. With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur.
The defense in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal disease of gonorrhea might
be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described in the present case, and called
medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting that contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that
question said:
"We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease
might, in exceptional cases, arise from other than carnal contact. The medical experts, as
well as the books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this was an

exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the
exception."
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some
moments. The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified
agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described.
Believing as we do the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which
Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however,
that Oliva contracted said obnoxious disease from the defendant is not necessary to show that he is
guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the
purpose of compelling him to pay to the sister of Oliva a certain sum of money.
The defendant testified and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister
of Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to
believe that the sister, after having become convinced that Oliva had been outraged in the manner
described above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest women
do not consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of their near relatives, for the filthy
consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made
by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested,
was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit
such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge Lobingier, in discussing
that question in his sentence, said:
"The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions,
and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined; seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken
from the person of a thief."
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination
was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering
from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen
property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been
taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore,
by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as
proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case
indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is
not a new question, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this question, said:
"But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far
a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether
voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is
competent."

The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of
New Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71 N. J) Law Reports, 527). In that case the court said,
speaking through its chancellor:
"It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was
confined, to testify to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the accused,
although he also testified that he had the accused removed to a room in another part of
the jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made by the witness of the wounds
on the hands and testified to by him, was in no sense a compelling of the accused to be a
witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes had been forcible and the wounds
had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of their character and appearance
would not have been objectionable."
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of
the house where the crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand
would have produced the bloody print. The court said, in discussing that question:
"It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of
the accused and the bloody prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime
was committed, the hand of the accused having been placed thereon at the request of
persons who were with him in the house."
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the
jury and the testimony of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case decided by
the supreme court of New Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N. J., Law Reports, 271).
The defendant caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the jury, and witnesses
who had observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the commission of the crime were permitted
to compare them with what they had observed at that place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician
or a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead insanity as a
defense, where such medical testimony was against the contention of the defendant. The medical
expert must necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making such examination.
(People vs. Austin, 199 N. Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prevent the
courts from making an examination of the body of the defendant where serious personal injuries were
alleged to have been received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the
injured parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
"If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control
of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercised,
then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the
tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence
anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling
the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it
is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial
compulsion." (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the face of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under

discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by
witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr.
Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony by his body but
his body itself.
As was said by Judge Lobingier:
"The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions,
and the mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief."
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the
Government from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.
We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal
disease, as above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva
Pacomio. In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof. Such crimes
as the present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law
require corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret. In the
present case, taking into account the number and credibility of the witnesses, their interest and
attitude on the witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general circumstances surrounding
the witnesses, including the fact that both parties were found to be suffering from a common disease,
we are of the opinion that the defendant did, on or about the 15th of September, 1910, have such
relations as above described with the said Oliva Pacomio, which under the provisions of article 439 of
the Penal Code makes him guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos," and taking into consideration
the fact that the crime which the defendant committed was done in the house where Oliva Pacomio
was living, we are of the opinion that the maximum penalty of the law should be imposed. The
maximum penalty provided for by law is six years of prison correccional.
Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower court and sentencing the
defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
||| (U.S. v. Tan Teng, G.R. No. 7081, [September 7, 1912], 23 PHIL 145-154)

28- People v. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55, 19 April 2001

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months

of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. aSECAD
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, 4whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief
of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10,
Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseurbuyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. 6

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house. 7

After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house. 8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline

substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint 9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255
grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. 12

PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. 13The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of
dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. 14

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his
mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their
house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in
civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the
roof. 15

When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was
waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn
and he had no chance to read it. 16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber
firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accusedappellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was
detained. 18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the
policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables. 19

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic ActNo. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana
bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The
evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the
National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED. 20

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION
8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE
IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of

the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force
by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance. 22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless
all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160

For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the properties to
wit: TcIAHS
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable
cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.

Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence
was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was
presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be
seized by the trial court. 23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a
poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about
drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A Yes, sir.

Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without anumber located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q Are you familiar with that place?
A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.
Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q Were you able to buy at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the
stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I
saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12
grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally
requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical
Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the
attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

A Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of
One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A Yes, sir. 24

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday
v. Superior Court, 25 the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other
articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was
invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even
though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was
defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable
from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the
charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not
rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles . . . In so holding we do not mean
to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are
essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation
that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse
of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred
in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. 26 Accordingly, we hold that the
first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia,
is not.

Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. 27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar
case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
"Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly

recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias
'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and
other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the
offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies
the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of
the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso 29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying
what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana
leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court,
however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He
engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for
more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been
three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for
illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated"
drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30

Similarly, in another case, 31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation ofP.D. No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued
without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We held,
however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be
subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one
warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160

contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located
in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of
witness which described the premises as "a house without anumber located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be
searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of
Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar
resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's
place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by
Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant's house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was
inside his residence before they actually started their operation. 32

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. 33 For example, a search
warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both
the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the
description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass." 34 In this
case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can
be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence, Search
Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized
within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. 35 For this
doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. 36 The question is whether these
requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it
is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting
the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a

piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. 37

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to
accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. 38 The rationale
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit
violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.AHDcCT
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accusedappellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during
the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
This case is similar to People v. Musa 39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by
NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its
contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
"plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that
the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was
conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in
effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to
execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein.

Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and
had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit
or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented
by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be
doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the
fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer
a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. TaCDIc
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
||| (People v. Salanguit y Ko, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, [April 19, 2001], 408 PHIL 817-837)

29- People v. Damaso, G.R No. 93516, 12 August 1992

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 93516. August 12, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASILIO DAMASO @
Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY EVIDENCE; HAS NO PROBATIVE VALUE WHETHER OBJECTED TO OR
NOT; CASE AT BAR. The testimonies in case at bar are hearsay because the witnesses testified on
matters not on their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the
testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to
object thereto. It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as
evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence. In People v. Valero, We emphatically declared that: "The failure of the defense counsel to object
to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule
of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any
probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has noprobative value." (L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675)
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
PURPOSE. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article
III, Section 2). The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property,
and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637,
646). However, such right is not absolute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid,
namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view (Manipon, Jr. v.Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BEING A PERSONAL RIGHT, CANNOT BE WAIVED BY ANYONE EXCEPT THE PERSON WHOSE
RIGHTS ARE INVADED OR WHO IS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO IN HIS BEHALF. The constitutional
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf
(De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his
house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it.
We find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if
it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this
evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
(Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities
was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have
prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION THEREOF CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE URGENCY OF THE RAID. The fact that
they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his
house. In Alih v.Castro, We ruled that: "The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because
it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would
be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure.
There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the

Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the
menace of a military invasion." (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
6. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (P.D. NO. 1866); EXISTENCE OF FIREARM AND THAT
THE ACCUSED WHO POSSESSED OR OWNED THE FIREARM DOES NOT HAVE THE CORRESPONDING
LICENSE MUST BE PROVED. In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has
the burden to prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm
does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun
described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime
has actually been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious
claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the
prosecution's case.
7. ID.; ID.; NOT ABSORBED IN THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION; REASON THEREFOR. The argument raised by
the defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance
of or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is
facing a separate charge of subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily
dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., WE set
forth inno uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote: "If We are to espouse the theory of the
respondents that force and violence are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from
rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976])., the Court categorically
distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held: 'Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is
more commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic ActNo. 1700) punishes affiliation or
membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising
and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive
association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the
Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.' "The first
Whereas clause of R.A.. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government,
not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. This is a recognition
that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private
respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring
subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable." The Court upheld
the validity of the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the
dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit
to provide for two distinct offenses" (1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866)
and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). 'The practical
result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that
obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact
laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into. . ." (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1991).
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel,
Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista
@ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such
information was later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant
from the criminal charge. The amended information reads:
"That on or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio
DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally, have in his possession, custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing
SerialNo. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of,

or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in
the above-entitled case for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive
order No. 276. prLL
"Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866." (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on
the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for
accused-appellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds
of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he,
thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989,
p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias
Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866,
and considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
"The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles
and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and
submitted in court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine Constabulary Command at
Lingayen, Pangasinan.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT
TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS
LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF
THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OR OF INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF
SUBVERSION." (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
"On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with
the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to
verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan
City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba,
Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended
revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group
proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x
7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989). LLpr
"After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance
the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She
stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant. She guided the group to the

house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it had
already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new
address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and
requested him to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again required
Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco
outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the
area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go
inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain,
saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox copiers and a computer machine.
They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,
Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group
requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco
opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle,
bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,
Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and
brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons
found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that
appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 812, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989)." (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee,
p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our
society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters
of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the
law officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented
against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No.
1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there
is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person
as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the
said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
"Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
"Q: How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
"A: He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned the
name Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same
time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items." (TSN of
October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
"Q: I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit 'K-2,' tell
us if it has any connection to the house?
"A: The same house, sir.
"Q: Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan
Gueset, by the name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did
you find out the identity?
"A: I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman. Cdpr
"Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true identity of
Bernie Mendoza?
"A: The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
"Q: Can you name these officers?
"A: Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
"M/Sgt. Artemio Gomez

"Q: That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that house?
xxx xxx xxx
"A: During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is
the one occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
" . . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on
their own personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may
be hearsay, the same are admissible because of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But,
one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now
have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People
v. Valero, We emphatically declared that:
"The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence,
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure
to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value.
The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. Butadmissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.Hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value." (L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675,
italics supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the
appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness.
Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the
lessee of the house and the owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional rights
useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him
still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a
valid search and seizure proceedings. prLL
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in theConstitution Article III, Section 2.
The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and
to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (see Rivero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646).
However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes
valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle, and (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 267). None of these
exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims, that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's
house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, radio set and more subversive items, that technically speaking, there was no search as the
group was voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly
conducted without a search warrant with the consent of the person searched as in this case, appellant's
helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's house; and that since
the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695). In the case at bar,
the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We find no evidence that

would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it was true that she was
his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution
likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities'
intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and
seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil.
230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been
different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense
with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the house of the
appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih
v. Castro, We ruled that:
"The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they
should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion." (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the
identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information
(supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at
the trial bore a different serial number thus:
"FISCAL:
Q. Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house? Lt. Quijardo:
A. When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately saw
different kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive orientation
and the M-14 rifle. prcd"
Q. In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?
A. In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.
Q. If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes of
identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit 'D.'
COURT:
Mark it.
"FISCAL:
Q. Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that firearm
to the firearm which according to you found inside the room allegedly occupied by
one Bernie Mendoza?
A. This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house." (TSN,
October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, italics supplied)
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it
could spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the
existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the
corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the
amended information, the corpus delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually
been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of

appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's
case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense
that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident
to or in connection with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate
charge of subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this
case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We set forth
in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
"If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very
essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag
(G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976])., the Court categorically distinguished
subversion from rebellion, and held:
'Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly
called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of
the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the AntiSubversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a
subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must he a public
uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance
which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.' (Italics supplied)
"Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R.58284, 109 SCRA 289
[1981]), this Court said that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security,
while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government is the very element of the crime of rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700was
enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), other similar associations
and its successors because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and
grave danger to national security.
"The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute
force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of
other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive
materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable." llcd
"Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an
accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine
of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion could have found application
therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:
' . . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866.
HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of
the Court inHernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.'
"This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the
charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the
dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that the
legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of
firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866 and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of
arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). `The practical result of this may be harsh or it
may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that obtain in the
present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact

laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . " (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22,
1992)
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are
therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costsde oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs.
||| (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, [August 12, 1992])

30- People v. Sy, G.R. No. 136066-67, 4 February 2003

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003.]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BINAD
SY
CHUA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ola & Asso. Law Offices for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused was charged with Violation of theDangerous Drugs Law and with Illegal Possession of Ammunition.
After trial, he was acquitted of Illegal Possession of Firearms for insufficiency of evidence, but was
convicted of Illegal possession ofshabu.
On appeal, he questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made
upon him.
The Court acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that neither the in
flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles are applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and
consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on the accused. In acquitting the accused,
the Court noted the following circumstances: the appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure
of the alleged illegal items found in his possession; at the time of the arrest, accused did not exhibit
manifest unusual or suspicious conduct; the arrest of the accused was not a product of an "on the spot" tip
which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest; the prohibited substances were not in plain
view of the arresting officers, hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree; there was
also no clear showing that the items allegedly seized from accused were the same prohibited items
presented in court, since they were not marked at the place where they were seized.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; WARRANTLESS ARRESTS; IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTOARREST; ELEMENTS THEREOF; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the
accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the
law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest
must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We find the two aforementioned elements lacking
in the case at bar. The record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn
Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded
towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. However, notwithstanding
the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud

"hurriedly accosted" accused-appellant and later on "introduced themselves as police officers." Accusedappellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this case was
more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search,
in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had committed a
crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it
has been held that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT JUSTIFIED WHERE POLICE OFFICERS HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL
ACTIVITIES OF ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged
illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected
culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why
the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and
searching his person. Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before accusedappellant's arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining a
warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team's contention that their arrest of accused-appellant was a
product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STOP-AND-FRISK; THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MUST PRECEDE THE ARREST. In the same
vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There
was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first
arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant's business in the
vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to
dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine
reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant's arrest. Obviously, the acts of the police
operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly,
before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accusedappellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. At any rate, even if the
fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and
consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and-frisk" the
search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier
emphasized, the information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the
apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid
"stop-and-frisk."
5. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE; SEIZURE IN PLAIN VIEW; REQUISITES FOR
ADMISSIBILITY; PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES NOT IN PLAIN VIEW OF ARRESTING OFFICERS IN CASE AT BAR.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accusedappellant's possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found
in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The
police officers first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the
sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance
was shabu. There wasno clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline

substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in
plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree. IAETDc
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF ILL MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ARRESTING TEAM CANNOT VALIDATE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND CONSEQUENT WARRANTLESS SEARCH. All told, the absence of illmotive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the
arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of regularity
of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; IDENTITY OF CONFISCATED ITEMS RENDERED DOUBTFUL WHEN NOT MARKED AT THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE SEIZED; CASE AT BAR. We entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the
initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken.
In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items
since they were not marked at the place where they were seized.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations which read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507 1
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos
and one (1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
weighing more or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated drug, without
any authority whatsoever.
Criminal Case No. 96-513 2
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal.
ammunitions, without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or
carry the same.
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment. The two cases were then jointly tried.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their
testimonies can be synthesized as follows:
On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag
received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that
night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accusedappellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead, the
PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team of operatives composed of
Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag, SPO1 Fernando Go, and
some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag
and the civilian informer positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting
Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just
arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the
car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag

with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to
a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket.
When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the
twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office
of Col. Gutierrez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.3
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline
substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the
seized items contained shabu. 4Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these
items for further laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga. After due testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline
substances yielded positive results for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two
big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms ofshabu. 5
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and
his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies.
While at the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the
attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the
policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car
keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer's companions arrived at the scene in
two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while
the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Gutierrez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters,
Col. Gutierrez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being
taken. 6
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified that he
witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises of the Guess
Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel. 7
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decisions, 8 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the
accused is hereby acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams
ofshabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charge and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION

OFSHABU ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL
AND VALID MANNER;
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS
SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 10
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was
unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under
surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the
arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient
information about him and could have easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further argues that since his
arrest was null and void, the drugs that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they
were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.
Accused-appellant's argument is impressed with merit.
Although the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to
the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the
reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the case. 11
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty and
indemnity imposed by the trial court. 12 We are clothed with ample authority to review matters, even
those not raised on appeal, if we find that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of
the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. 13 This is in keeping with the
constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon accusedappellant, the court a quomade the following findings:
Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs
(shabu). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caughtin flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects . . . allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. . . .
While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing
a crime.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities.
The police officer had to act quickly and there was nomore time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop and frisk".14
A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It
confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a
"stop-and-frisk."

In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 15 we distinguished the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search

incidental to a lawful arrest, to wit:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stopand-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable Scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in
a large majority of these cases,e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for
a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with
the means of escaping or committing violence.
xxx xxx xxx
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-andfrisk" as a"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid
down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today thatwhere a police officer
observes unusual conductwhich leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds thatmere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.Finally, a
"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. 16(Emphasis ours)
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify
the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accusedappellant.
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis

should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest.Therefore it
is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. 17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. 18
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when
accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur
Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed
Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the
group of SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted" 19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced themselves as
police officers." 20 Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off ofshabu was done. Probable
cause in this case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delictoarrest
preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he
had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante
delicto arrests, it has been held that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 21 Hence, inPeople
v. Amminudin, 22 we ruled that "theaccused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v.Tangliben 23 to justify the police's actions is misplaced. In the
said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit
misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the
policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuanaleaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The
police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same
informant of accused-appellant's activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the
arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of accusedappellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of
SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this
chinese drug pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.
Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September
21, 1996?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the
activities of this chinese drug pusher reckoning in relation to
September 21, 1996?
A. That was about two years already.

Q. Notwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from
the civilian informant that this chinese drug pusher have been
engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles City, you did not think of
applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the
road near the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right?
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug
pusher that will deliver to him also.
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this
case he alighted with a Corolla car with platenumber 999, I think, he
just alighted when you saw him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the
entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed
already by the civilian informer.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you
used pounced on him in your affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic
bag, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the
accused that he is really a drug pusher.
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are
very sure that what was brought by him wasshabu?
A. Yes, sir. 24
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant.
Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two
years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have
obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever
information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellant's arrest was not a product
of an "on the-spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the
arresting team's contention that their arrest of accused-appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is
untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the
act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) 25 or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. 26 The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason,
in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that

the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. 27 It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. 28
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. 29 In said
case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and
who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk."
In People v. Solayao,30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering
the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his
companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the
case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure
of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any
initial inquiry into accused-appellant's business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody
of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual
and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and
the law. There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant's
arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their
confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers
had nopersonal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellant's
warrantless arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a valid
"stop-and frisk" the search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we
have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown
to the apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a
valid "stop-and-frisk".
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accusedappellant's possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found
in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The
police officers first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the
sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the crystalline substance
was shabu. There wasno clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline
substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in
plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.
In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the
presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 31 In People v. Nubla, 32 we
clearly stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be
used as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged by

evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second,

the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the
very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the
items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. 33 The
items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v.Casimiro, 34 we struck
down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the
place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item
as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but only
at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick ofmarijuana marked
by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory.
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly
disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the
rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as
such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence. 35
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59,
in Criminal CasesNos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of
Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy
Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released
from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, [February 4, 2003], 444 PHIL 757-777)

31- People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 648 (1988)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 72564. April 15, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; NOT ONLY DELIVERY BUT ALSO SALE, ADMINISTRATION,
DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORTATION ARE PENALIZED; CASE AT BAR. Section 4 of RA. No. 6425 shows
that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution
and transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the
lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.

2. ID.; ID.; INTENTION TO SELL, DISTRIBUTE AND DELIVER, MANIFEST IN POSSESSION OF 1.1. KILO OF
MARIJUANA. The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the
possessor is unknown. This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession
1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case ofPeople v. Toledo, (140 SCRA
259, 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the
intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LEGAL WHERE ACCUSED WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat.
Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509).
Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT UPHELD; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY APPLIED TO
POLICEMEN AND NO MOTIVE WAS SHOWN TO IMPLICATE APPELLANTS. We have carefully examined the
records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of
testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the
absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the
records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
5. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING, WHERE DEFENSE WAS TESTIFIED ONLY BY ACCUSED. The accused
testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo City all
that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all. In the case at bar, alibi does
not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA
582).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. It is a well-established rule that alibi
cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La Cruz, supra).
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the
accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
"That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of
Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same
from Baguio City to Olongapo City." (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence
as follows:
"To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following documentary and
testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected
marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic
container; "B" marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B"-1-a" another plastic
container; "C" Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C " Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D,
"D-1," D-2 and "D-3;" "E" and "E" photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and
Paulino Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977; "G" Sworn
Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from
accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo; "H"-1 date of receipt of the request; "L" Certificate
of Field Test dated duly 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2-a" additional wrapping paper; and the
testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obia, Cpl.
Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

"Theresa Ann Bugayong - 22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150
Sampaloc, Metro Manila, testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong
Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen of marijuana submitted for
examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried marijuana flowering
tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
"The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29, 1981 (Exhs. "C"
and "C-1"). She conducted three examinations: microscopic examination, the duguenoi
levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer chromatographic test.
The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a representative of the
CANU, Olongapo City. LexLib
"The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that
he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June,
1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was among other things to
follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. On July 21,
1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date,
he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner
in going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner,
he was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita
Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which
she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind his
seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the
accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt
(sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was something unusual, he had the urge to
search the woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was
able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom
of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could
recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTINARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was
marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the
accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right
after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obia intercepted her and showed her
his ID identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him,
"Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea
and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and
brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain
vegetables.
"At the police headquarters Investigation Section. the bag was searched in the presence of
Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the
plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo.
Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before the application of chemicals
because of his one year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was
taken from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused and the
marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obia and that of Investigator
Tiongco, accused and himself identified photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs.
"D," "D-1," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana
contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1-a") and identified it as the one
confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which
also shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to
be soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.

"To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City
to Olongapo City, witness identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated
from the accused and for identification purposes, the witness presented the
body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F1"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as a policeman,
he used his badge and a free ride.
"On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15, 1981 and
underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical
treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City or
July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the accused, and the first time he
saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he took. When the
accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed the bag right behind his
seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat Witness Obia became
suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga,
after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline.
Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He
confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to
go with her in order to settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that
from the time the accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so
nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken
his medicine that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right
hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom
of the bag. He identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
"Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was
inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator,
between 1:46 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat. Daniel Obia arrived
at the Police Station with a woman and identified her in the courtroom as Anita Claudio.
Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus
for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves were contained in a buri
bag with some vegetables such as camote tops, bananas and some other vegetable". The
marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored
black and white. Witness identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the
markings of Pat. Obia which are his initials, (Exh. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781
representing the date which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the
suspected marijuana. cdrep
"After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed
apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco identified
the sworn statement of Obia (Exh. 'G). He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who
was all the while inside the Investigation Room seated on a chair. After appraising her of
her constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was willing to give her written
statements to which the accused refused. Hence, nostatements were taken of her.
However, pictures were taken inside the investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series
which were already previously identified by Pat. Obia. Witness identified the persons
appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. Obia and the accused and also of himself.
Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and
Anita Claudio was detained.
"Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac,
Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police
Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the
CANU-General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU
and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As

requested by Lt. Galindo, he conducted a field test on this marijuana which he received
from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July 22, 1981 (Exh. "H").
"In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can only
be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello identified a plastic bag of marijuana
received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the Evidence
Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.
"The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married, residing
at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned
with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July,
1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty was to patrol the city proper
from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
"He narrated that on July 21, 1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along
Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the said
place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering somebody to alight
from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia, he approached him and asked him what
was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a certain woman possessing dried
marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat. Obia then brought the woman to
the police department who was bringing with her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the
woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in
his motorcycle the said tricycle to the police station. He went inside the Investigation
Section of the Police Station and he was there when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his
apprehension of the woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time
inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed
the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when
it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried.
Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and bananas. Witness
identified in open court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the accused. His
means of identification was the signature of Pat. Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise identified
a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
"While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl.
Tiongco's question that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however,
did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the
answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongco's question the place of delivery of the marijuana, he
left the police station. Witness likewise identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already marked as
Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands for Daniel Obia. After the
testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its case." (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
"CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
"CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425IF THE ALLEGED
BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
"APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG
BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF
APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act No.
6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch
in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore,
she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. ActNo. 6425. LibLex
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery
which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs.
Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty
of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the
possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with
the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the
accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana."
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
" . . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)"
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to
arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a
lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the
seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief At first, she does not deny having had with
her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In
a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were
mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings
and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to
the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the

prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime
(See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500). cdphil
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself
(People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La
Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Claudio y Bagtang, G.R. No. 72564, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 795-805)

32- Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997.]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,respondents.
Raval and Lokin, Robert A. Padilla and Philip Jurado and R.A.V. Saguisag and Gina C. Garcia for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; WARRANTLESS ARREST; GROUNDS. Warrantless
arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant ; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense., (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRESENCE OF ARRESTING OFFICER OR PRIVATE PERSON"; PRESENCE DOES NOT ONLY
REQUIRE THE PERSON TO SEE THE OFFENSE BUT ALSO WHEN HE "HEARS THE DISTURBANCE CREATED
AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE"; CASE AT BAR. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be
arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit
an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as
it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this
point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he
"hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." As testified to by Manarang,
he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order
to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner
herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the
police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of hot
pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The court acknowledges police authority to

make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. When caught inflagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed arm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. Besides, the policemen's
warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was nosupervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and
run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, its dangling plate number(PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that,
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run accident. Verily their, the arresting
police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
5. ID; ID.; ID.; OBJECTION, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY MUST BE MADE BEFORE PLEA. Any objection,
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's
belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and
by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying
for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
6. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF PROPERTY; WHEN VALID. The five (5) well-settled
instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as follows: 1. warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence. 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a). a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are; (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search. 3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PLAINVIEW" DOCTRINE; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discoveredthe revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which wasimmediately apparent to the policemen as they took a
casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus, it has been
held that: "(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the corpus delicti."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF FIREARM AND ASSORTED MAGAZINE, WAIVER OF RIGHT
AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner
indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
9. ID.; ID.; SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO AN ARREST. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were
products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure
without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first
instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the
passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the
item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the
search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not
excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In

connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of
the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM; REQUISITES. In crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm, two requisites must be established,viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and,
(2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license
permit to possess.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution.
Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more
formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances.
12. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF REPRESENTATIVE OR CERTIFICATION FROM PNP-FEO THAT A PERSON IS NOT A
LICENSEE OF ANY FIREARM, SUFFICIENT TO PROVE SECOND ELEMENT. In several occasions, the Court
has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we
reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license.
13. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ACCORDED RESPECT
AND FINALITY ON APPEAL. The fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess was
overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the
evidence that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated
firearms cannot be licensed to a civilian, as in the case of petitioner. The Court entertains no doubt in
affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to
depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded
by the Court with respect and finality.
14. CRIMINAL LAW, OFFENSES, COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY GOVERNING LAW AT THE TIME OF
COMMISSION OF OFFENSE. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing
law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And
until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
15. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; BILL OF RIGHTS; CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; PENALTY FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, NOT EMBRACED THEREIN. Equally lacking in merit is appellant's
allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple
possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporalmaximum to reclusion
perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make
the same cruel and excessive. "It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it
has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive,'
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.'" It is
well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of
the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.
16. ID.; ID.; LAWS ON ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, CONSTITUTIONAL. Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with
the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court.

Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not]
contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . ."
17. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT; NOT CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM OR MORALITY OF LAWS. Appellant's
grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province
of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of
the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
18. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; MINIMUM PENALTY. With respect to the penalty
imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with
the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the Court en bancprovided that the indeterminate penalty
imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J p:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 2 thru the following
Information: 3
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) 380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and
eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and
possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW." 4
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, 5 but granted his application for bail. 6 During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, 7 upon
advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporalas minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the
respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong
evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of
this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's
conviction, 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This
shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a
report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by respondent court in
its September 20, 1995 Resolution,18 copy of which was received by, petitioner on September 27, 1995.
The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorariwith application for
bail 19 followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental
petition" 21 and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the SolicitorGeneral22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution
promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a
consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However,
after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this
Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the
Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying
for petitioner's acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by
respondent court, is as follows: 26
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his
compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo,
Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15,
1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along Mac Arthur
Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get
into an accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid.) In the local vernacular, he
said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid.). True
enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running
very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid.) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p.
8, ibid.). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that
Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying
the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid).
Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster
Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of
Angeles City (p. 10, ibid.). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of
the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid.). By the time Manarang
completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the
general direction to the north (p. 11,ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11, ibid.). During the chase he was able to make out
the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the
Viper through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid.) reporting that a vehicle heading north with
plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993).
The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call flashed

the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p.
20,ibid.). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol
Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993).
SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately boarded a mobile patrol
vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan
bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid.). It took them
about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge
(p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan
was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol
along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado
and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid.). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3
Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with platenumber PMA
777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and
run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2)
feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same
vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went
towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was
not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid.). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3
and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run
incident (p. 10, ibid.). Upon learning that the two police officers already knew about the
incident, Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid.). When Manarang
was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run
incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15,
1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the
identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid.) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10,
TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their
position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated
the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid.). They cut into
the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (p. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993).
SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate numberPMA 777 and instructed its driver to
alight (p. 12, ibid.). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising
both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p.
13, ibid.). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja
noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant
(p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant
was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted
with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed (p. 15; TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid.). SPO2 Borja
made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former' s hand alleging that
the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid.). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the
gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p.
16, ibid.). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident
which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17,ibid.). By that time, a crowd had formed at
the place (p. 19, ibid.). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live
bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado,
SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most
senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed
appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid.). He pointed

out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing
and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid.). Appellant, however,arrogantly denied his misdeed
and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to
SPO2 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid.). Because
appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle
tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid.). SPO Mercado saw this and so when
appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid.). Suspecting that appellant could
also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of
appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid.). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally
at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semiautomatic mode (pp. 17-21,ibid.). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and
appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid.). SPO Mercado
modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p.
28, ibid.). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard
(pp. 31-32, ibid.) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta
pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid.)
loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag
containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine(Exhibits M, N, and O,
pp. 36-37, ibid.) After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division,
he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City
Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene
Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993) During the investigation, appellant admitted
possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid.). He was not
able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms
(pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office
(pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated
from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 1312 80, a .357 caliber revolver Smith
and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the
name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid.). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992
issued by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the
name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that
he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution. cdtai
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt
of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute
that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at
the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then
sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds
at once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud,
saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to
the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding
policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest
of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at, the scene of the hit and run. 32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to
seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting
petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most
prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as
policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like
herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained
civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is
precisely through this cooperation that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an
additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the
arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted
by an urgent need to render aid or take action. 33 The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, 34 a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a situation in
which speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of
the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when caught inflagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported
by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police
officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. 40

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity

attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge
thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail,
petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.43
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, 44 are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized underSection 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence; 46
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: 47
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 48
3. Search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 50
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back
pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they
took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has
been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . .
police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti. 53
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant." 54
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against
the alleged search and seizure, 56 and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect. 57
Even assuming. that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can
still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was
effected, the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger compartment and containers
in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. 60 This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle)
was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by

the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle
are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 63
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D.
1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and
ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt.
Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention
lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond dispute as
the subject firearms and ammunitions 66 were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless
search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous
review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's
incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts
and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated
from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced
indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed
long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to
possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge
against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the
ample time given him, present any proper document showing his authority. If he had, in
actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is
authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and
Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have
produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not
even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant
to possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James
Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even
mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the defense.
Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found Superintendent Gumtang who
appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994" 67
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses
that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the
Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further
compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein
petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in
question and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering

inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of
Staff, is explicit in providing that: cdtai
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnel
such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order
should be shown without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be
carried out through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In
the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such violation." 68
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the
dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf.69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit
Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts
under the Guidelines on the Issuance of Mos, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued
petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office,
but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers
"Recom 1-12-Baguio City." 72 areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior
approval "by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also
unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense
which pertinently provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms withoutcorresponding
certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP
unit that such firearm has been officiallytaken up in that unit's property book, and that
report of such action has been reported to higher AFP authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the
PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or
Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's
counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt.
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry
firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation
for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be
included in a special law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project
which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the
project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other
major services of the AFP, INP and-NBI, or at higher levels of command." 75
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they
must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved
in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they are
rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the

firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed
or registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol,
Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked
whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the
caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the same
serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of
one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a
pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the
accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir. 77
xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5 November 28, 1992
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with
serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM
under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch" 78
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the. PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person
has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or
permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed
with in the light of the evidence 81 that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol,
akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner The Court,
therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find noplausible reason

and none was presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court
which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applyingP.D. 1866 in a democratic
ambience (sic) and a non subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied
instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed
underP.D. 1866 no longer exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years
for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are
bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum toreclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The
severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed
in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
'flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community." 88
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature
of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of
imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality
of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent
laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . .
" 92 Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the
province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum),
we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en
banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1 )
day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation
by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or
proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People
v. Simon, 94 although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein
were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by
degrees or determining the proper period should be applied

Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the
medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1
day to 20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules
therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the
maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be
taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is,prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period. 95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction
by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED
EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
||| (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, [March 12, 1997], 336 PHIL 383-414)

33- People v. Amminudin, G.R. No. 74869, 6 July 1988

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y
AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE BASED ON AN INFORMER'S TIP, AT A TIME WHEN ACCUSED WAS NOT
COMMITTING A CRIME, ILLEGAL; EVIDENCE OBTAINED, INADMISSIBLE. Where it is not disputed that the
PC officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was carrying, and that their only justification was the tip they had
earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there
was no warrant of arrest and warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained was inadmissible.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO URGENCY COULD BE INVOKED IN PRESENT CASE TO DISPENSE WITH OBTENTION OF
ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANT. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

AQUINO, J., Dissenting:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
ARREST AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME IS LAWFUL; SEARCH LIKEWISE LAWFUL. I hold that the
accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his
arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of
marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was
committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules of
Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also
lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time
to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida
Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
investigation."5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted. 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he
was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 1 6 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although
the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even

know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge
sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received
the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before
June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano
Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:
"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that
particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular
operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect
to the coming of Wilcon 9?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
"COURT:
"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984,
did you also receive any report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin?
"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
"Q What were those activities?
"A Purely marijuana trafficking.
"Q From whom did you get that information?

"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for
security reason and we cannot identify the person.
"Q But you received it from your regular informer?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. LLARIZA:
"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming
with drugs?
"A Marijuana, sir.
"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was
received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days before?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that Aminnudin was coming?
"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June
23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming.
Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he has already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
"COURT:
"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you sure of that?
"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June
25, 1984?
"A Only on the 23rd of June.
"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject
mentioned in your intelligence report?
"A No, more.
"Q Why not?
"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a
search warrant anymore?
"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for

violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded
a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the
PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search
warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt
its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it
a less evil that some criminal should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is

simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is
the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea JJ. concur.
Separate Opinion
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante for he was carrying marijuana leaves
in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel." The
unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime, (Sec.
4, Rep. ActNo. 6425). Since he was committing a crime his arrest could be lawfully effected without a
warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves)
without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment
of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
||| (People v. Aminnudin y Ahni, G.R. No. 74869, [July 6, 1988], 246 PHIL 424-435)

34- People v. Zenaida Quebral, G.R. No. 185379, 27 November 2009

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185379. November 27, 2009.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ZENAIDA QUEBRAL y MATEO,
FERNANDO LOPEZ y AMBUS and MICHAEL SALVADOR y JORNACION, appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized prohibited drugs and the conduct
of warrantless search of a suspect by the roadside based on probable cause.
The Facts and the Case
The provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged the accused Zenaida Quebral, Eusebio Quebral,
Fernando Lopez, and Michael Salvador before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case 3331-M-2002 with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 or
theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
At the trial of this case, the prosecution presented PO3 Cecilio Galvez of the police force of
Balagtas, Bulacan, who testified that at 7:00 p.m. on September 7, 2002, the Chief of the Drug
Enforcement Unit called him and other police officers to a briefing regarding a police informer's report
that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate numberwould
deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, on the following day at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas to
Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list. 1
After a short briefing on the morning of September 8, 2002, PO3 Galvez and six other police
officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit at Burol 2nd, watching out for the owner
type jeep mentioned. They got there at around 7:45 a.m. Since the informer did not give the exact time
of the delivery of shabu, the police officers staked out the expressway exit until late afternoon. At
around 4:00 p.m., such a jeep, bearing the reported platenumber and with two men and a woman on
board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two men as accused Eusebio Quebral, who
drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as accused-appellant Zenaida
Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the town proper of Balagtas and entered a
Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway. AaSIET

After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused-appellant Michael Salvador
alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a white
envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters in a tinted car,
signaled his back-up team to move. The police officers alighted from their vehicles and surrounded the
jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael, opened it, and saw five plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance which he believed was shabu.
The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office later examined the substance and submitted a
chemistry report, 2 stating that it was shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.
Appellants denied having committed the crime, claiming only that PO3 Galvez and his fellow
police officers merely framed them up.
On March 18, 2004 the RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5 million.
On May 20, 2005, while the Court of Appeals (CA) was reviewing the case on appeal in CAG.R. CR-HC 01997, accused Eusebio Quebral died, prompting it to dismiss the case against him. On
February 13, 2008, the CA rendered judgment, 3 entirely affirming the decision of the RTC. The
remaining accused appealed to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Appellants basically raise two issues for this Court's resolution:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not excluding the evidence of the seized shabu on the
ground that, having illegally arrested the accused, the police officers' subsequent search of
their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal; and
2. Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof of appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Rulings of the Court
One. The accused claim that since the police did not have valid ground to arrest them, their
subsequent search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot be admitted in
evidence against them. With the exclusion of the seized drugs, there would not be proof that they were
passing them.
The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even without a warrant
only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the
arresting officer pursued him, or c) if he escaped from a legal confinement. 4 But in the first two
instances, the officer must have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target
person's observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident from those acts, no valid
arrest can be made. An informant whispering to the police officer's ear that the person walking or
standing on the street has committed or is committing a crime will not do. The arresting officer must
himself perceive the manifestations of a crime. 5 ETIHCa
The accused-appellants point out that in this case the police officers cannot say that what they
saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two men and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas
station. A third man approached the jeep, spoke to the woman and she handed him a folded white
envelope that appeared to contain something. These acts do not constitute a crime per
se. Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal. The subsequent search of their persons, not
being based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.
But, actually, it was more of a search preceding an arrest. The police officers had information
that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and hand over a
consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer whose name was on the police
watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes as they watched from a distance, the police
came down on those persons and searched them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a quantity

of shabu in their possession. In such a case, the search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came
after it.
This Court held in People v. Bagista 6 that the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet, in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman fitting the description of the
accused would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search her
belongings since she fitted the given description. In such a case, the warrantless search was valid and,
consequently, any evidence obtained from it is admissible against the accused.
As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had an inkling of the
personal circumstances of the persons they were looking for and the criminal act they were about to
commit. That these circumstances played out in their presence supplied probable cause for the search.
The police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or is about
to be committed. 7 Since the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence
against the accused.
It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate court for a search
warrant since their suspicion found factual support only at the moment accused Eusebio Quebral,
Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for
the hand over of the drugs. An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away by
the time the police could apply for a search warrant. 8 The drugs could be easily transported and
concealed with impunity. 9
The case of People v. Aminnudin 10 cannot apply to this case. InAminnudin, the informant gave
the police the name and description of the person who would be coming down from a ship the following
day carrying a shipment of drugs. In such a case, the Court held that the police had ample time to seek
a search warrant against the named person so they could validly search his luggage. In the present
case, all the information the police had about the persons in possession of the prohibited drugs was
that they were two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep. A search warrant issued against
such persons could be used by the police to harass practically anyone.EIDTAa
Two. The accused-appellants point out that the testimony of PO3 Galvez cannot support their
conviction since it does not bear the corroboration of the other officers involved in the police operation
against them. But the failure of these other officers did not weaken the prosecution evidence. The lone
declaration of an eyewitness is sufficient to convict if, as in this case, the court finds the same
credible. 11 Credibility goes into a person's integrity, to the fact that he is worthy of belief, 12 and
does not come with the number of witnesses. 13
The accused-appellants also point out that, since the chemist who examined the seized
substance did not testify in court, the prosecution was unable to establish the indispensable element
of corpus delicti. But this claim is unmeritorious. This Court has held that the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. 14The corpus delicti in
dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. This means that proof beyond doubt of
the identity of the prohibited drug is essential. 15
Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory analyst. In fact,
this Court has ruled that the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state. 16Therefore, the report of Forensic Chemical Officer Sta. Maria
that the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez gave to her for examination contained shabu is conclusive in

the absence of evidence proving the contrary. At any rate, as the CA pointed out, the defense agreed
during trial to dispense with the testimony of the chemist and stipulated on his findings. 17
Parenthetically, the accused-appellants raised their objection to the police chemist's report only
on appeal when such objection should have been made when the prosecution offered the same in
evidence. They may, thus, be considered to have waived their objection to such report. 18 The familiar
rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents, if not urged before the court
below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 19
The accused-appellants take advantage of PO3 Galvez's testimony that they conducted their
operation on September 2, 2002, the date that the informant gave them, and that the following day
was September 8, 2002 20 to attack his credibility. But inconsistency is trivial and appears to be a pure
mistake. Lapses like this even enhance the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness as they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed declaration. 21 Besides, PO3 Galvez corrected this mistake on crossexamination. He said that their informant gave them his tip at 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2002. 22
Finally, the accused-appellants contend that the prosecution evidence failed to show compliance
with the requirements of law for handling evidence. But, as has been held in a recent case, 23 failure
to comply strictly with those requirements will not render the seizure of the prohibited drugs invalid for
so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Besides, the accused-appellants did not raise it before the trial court, hence,
they cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. 24 ECaSIT
The CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Galvez and this Court
finds no reason for disagreement. His narration was clear and candid. On the other hand, the accusedappellants' claim of a "frame-up" was easy to concoct and so has been the common line of defense in
most cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 25 Such defense requires strong and
convincing evidence which the accused-appellants failed to satisfy.
As the trial court correctly observed, the accused-appellants failed to provide any reason why of
all the people plying through the roads they had taken, the police chose to frame them up for the
crime. They also failed to explain why the police would plant such huge amount of shabu if a small
quantity would be sufficient to send them to jail. 26 No arresting officer would plant such quantity
of shabu solely to incriminate the accused who have not been shown to be of good financial
standing. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 13, 2008 and of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated March 18, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Quebral y Mateo, G.R. No. 185379, [November 27, 2009], 621 PHIL 226-236)

35- Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, 8 June 2006

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136051. June 8, 2006.]
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE,petitioners, vs.
JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45400 dated 24 August 1998 which upheld the Orders of Branch 77 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-95-25803 dated 22 July 1997 2 and 27 August
1997, 3 allowing the taking of deposition upon oral examination of petitioners Oscar P. Mapalo and Chito P.
Rosete, and its Resolution 4 dated 19 October 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Relevant to the petition are the following antecedents:

On 5 December 1995, respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before Branch 77 of the RTC of Quezon
City a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty),
Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of
Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-25803. 5 It asked, among
other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor of
Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and
Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said
lands to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the
name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.

On 18 January 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly laid. 6 A Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner Alfredo P. Rosete on 23 January 1996. 7 Respondents opposed the
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners 8 to which petitioners filed their Reply. 9Respondents filed a
Comment on the Reply. 10 AFP-RSBS, 11 Espreme Realty, 12and, BPI 13 filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss which respondents opposed.HDIaET

In an Order dated 12 March 1996, the Motions to Dismiss filed by all the defendants were denied. 14 The
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners15 and BPI, 16 which respondents opposed, 17 were also
denied in an Order dated 24 May 1996. 18

On 6 June 1996, BPI filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim 19 to which
respondents filed their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 20Respondents also filed a Motion 21 to Serve
Supplemental Allegation against BPI and petitioner Chito Rosete which the trial court granted in an order
dated 28 July 1996. 22

On 7 June 1996, petitioners manifested that on 5 June 1996, they filed a Petition23 for Certiorari and
Prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SPNo. 40837, challenging the trial court's Orders
dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996 that denied their Motions to Dismiss and Reconsideration,

respectively. 24They likewise informed the trial court that on 6 June 1996, they filed an ExParteMotion 25 to Admit Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela. 26

On 7 August 1996, petitioner Chito Rosete filed a motion asking that the order granting the Motion to
Serve Supplemental Allegation against BPI and him be reconsidered and set aside, and that respondents
be ordered to reduce their supplemental allegations in the form and manner required by the Rules of
Court.27 Same was denied in an order dated 12 August 1996. 28 This denial was appealed to the Court of
Appeals on 26 August 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41821. 29

Petitioner Chito Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex Abudanti Cautela) on 9 September 1996. 30
On 28 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that
on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito
Rosete. 31

On 13 June 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination. 32 They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no answer
has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti
cautela, pending resolution of the Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders dated 12 March 1996 and
24 May 1996 that denied their Motions to Dismiss and for Reconsideration, respectively. This is in addition
to the fact that they challengedvia a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the lower court's
Orders dated 23 July 1996 and 12 August 1996 which, respectively, granted respondents' Motion to Serve
Supplemental Allegation Against Defendants BPI and Chito Rosete, and for the latter to plead thereto, and
denied Chito Rosete's Motion for Reconsideration of the order dated 23 July 1996. Moreover, they contend
that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and Pasig
City involving the same set of facts as in the present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private
complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of the deposition would be violative
of their right against self-incrimination because by means of the oral deposition, respondents would seek
to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the complaintaffidavits in the said criminal cases.

Respondents filed their Comment on the Objection to Deposition Taking 33 to which petitioners filed their
Reply. 34
In an Order dated 22 July 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' motion and objection to take deposition
upon oral examination, and scheduled the taking thereof. 35 On 7 August 1997, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. 36They filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 11 August 1997. 37

On 13 August 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Cancel or Suspend the Taking of the
Deposition Upon Oral Examination. 38

In an Order dated 27 August 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, and scheduled the taking of the Deposition Upon Oral
Examination. 39
On 22 September 1997, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) To Strike Out Answer of Defendants
Mapalo and Chito Rosete; (2) to Declare Defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete In Default; and (3) For
Reception of Plaintiffs' EvidenceEx-parte, 40 which petitioners opposed. 41

On 29 September 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition
(CA-G.R. SP No. 45400) assailing the Orders of the lower court dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997. 42

In an Order dated 29 October 1997, the lower court: (1) ordered the striking out from the record of the
Answer ex abudanti cautela filed by petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete for their continued unjustified
refusal to be sworn pursuant to Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) declared defendants
Mapalo and Chito Rosete in default; and I allowed plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-parteas regards
the latter. 43 On 25 November 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Omnibus Motion (1) For
Reconsideration; (2) To Lift Order of Default; and (3) To Hold In Abeyance Presentation of Plaintiffs'
Evidence Ex-parte. 44 The day after, petitioners filed an Amended Omnibus Motion. 45

On 28 November 1997, respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Ex-partePresentation of

Evidence 46 which the lower court set for 11 December 1997. 47

In an Order dated 11 December 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' urgentex-parte omnibus
motion. 48 On even date, the ex-parte presentation of evidence against petitioners Mapalo and Chito
Rosete was terminated. 49
On 10 February 1998, petitioners filed a Petition 50 for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 46774) questioning the lower court's Orders dated 29 October 1997 and 11
December 1997. 51

On 24 August 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition, and upheld
the Orders of the lower court dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997 (CA-G.R. SP No. 45400). 52 The
Motion for Reconsideration 53which was opposed 54 by respondents was denied on 19 October 1998. 55

Petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review onCertiorari. They anchor their
petition on the following grounds:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN ITS ORDER DATED AUGUST 27,

1997 THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION OF OSCAR MAPALO
AND CHITO ROSETE WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED BY THE TAKING OF THEIR DEPOSITION IN
THE CIVIL CASE FILED IN THE LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALSO RESPONDENTS
OR DEFENDANTS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CRIMINAL CASES FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENT JULIANO LIM INVOLVING THE SAME OR IDENTICAL SET OF FACTS;
AND EAcCHI
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN ITS ORDER DATED JULY 22,
1997 THAT (A) THE NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION NEED NOT BE
WITH LEAVE OF COURT BECAUSE AN ANSWER EX ABUDANTE CAUTELA HAS BEEN FILED;
AND (B) JOINDER OF ISSUES IS NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT THE SECTION 1, RULE
23 56 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MAY BE AVAILED OF.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to recognize petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete's constitutional right
against self-incrimination when, through its Orders dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997, it allowed and
scheduled the taking of their depositions by way of oral examination. They explain they refuse to give their
depositions due to the pendency of two criminal cases against them, namely, Batasan Pambansa Blg. 22
and Estafa, because their answers would expose them to criminal action or liability since they would be
furnishing evidence against themselves in said criminal cases. They allege there can be no doubt that the
questions to be asked during the taking of the deposition would revolve around the allegations in the
complaint in the civil case which are identical to the allegations in the complaint-affidavits in the two
criminal cases, thus, there is a tendency to incriminate both Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Moreover,
they explain that while an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege against self-incrimination as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an
accused may altogether refuse to answer any and all questions because the right against self-incrimination
includes the right to refuse to testify.

In short, petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete refuse to have their depositions taken in the civil case
because they allegedly would be incriminating themselves in the criminal cases because the testimony
that would be elicited from them may be used in the criminal cases. As defendants in the civil case, it is
their claim that to allow their depositions to be taken would violate their constitutional right against selfincrimination because said right includes the right to refuse to take the witness stand.
In order to resolve this issue, we must determine the extent of a person's right against self-incrimination. A
person's right against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right
to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not

give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take
the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to which may
incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty. 57

As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand as a witness.
In People v. Ayson, 58 this Court clarified the rights of an accused in the matter of giving testimony or
refusing to do so. We said:

An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and AIDTSE
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be
cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against
himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the
criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to
do so even by subpoenaor other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be
a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other
words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to
testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory
question at the time it is put to him the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to
testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.
. . . (Underscoring supplied.)

It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right
to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings. The
parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the
exception a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand in
administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. 59 It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil
actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can
altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of
the proceedings that controls. 60
In the Ayson case, it is evident that the Court treats a party in a civil case as an ordinary witness, who can
invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is propounded. Thus, for a
party in a civil case to possess the right to refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must also
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.

In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their
depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand certainly
cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly
based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take the
witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an
ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question
is actually asked of them. Only if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to
answer on the ground of their right against self-incrimination.

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the taking of their oral depositions should not be
allowed without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined
because their answers were filed ex abudanti cautela pending final resolution of the petition
for certiorarichallenging the trial court's Orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996 that denied their
motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, respectively.

Section 1 of Rule 24 61 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of
the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23. Depositions shall be taken
only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be
taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person,
whether a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. In the
case before us, petitioners contend they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the
answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do
not consider the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers contemplated by the
Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.

We find petitioners' contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or
"to be on the safe side." 62 An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an answer.
A cursory look at the answers filed by petitioners shows that they contain their respective defenses. An
answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses 63 and the failure to file one within
the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in default. 64 Thus, petitioners,
knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their answers despite the pendency of
their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.

Petitioners' argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of
our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela.
Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute
are plain before the court. 65 In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners,
as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses of the parties
have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down. cHECAS

We cannot also sustain petitioners' contention that the lower court erred when it said that the joinder of
issues is not required in order that Section 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be availed
of. Under said section, a deposition pending action may be availed of: (1) with leave of court when an
answer has not yet been filed but after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or property
subject of the action, or (2) without leave of court after an answer to the complaint has been served. In the
instant case, the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without leave of court because
petitioners have already served their answers to the complaint.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr. JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
||| (Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, [June 8, 2006], 523 PHIL 498-515)

36- People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, 10 August 2011

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MICHAEL BOKINGO alias
"MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL,accused-appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
For review is the Amended Decision 1 dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco 2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty
as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. DIEcHa
On 31 July 2000, an Information 3 was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of
murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and
with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and
nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul
NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said
hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body
which caused his death. 4

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
Bokingco confessed to the crime charged. 5
The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur
Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also
maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one
of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion's brother-in-law,
while the other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying
in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion. 6
The prosecution's evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was
spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and
went out of the back door. 7 A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He
headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on
the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with
a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco's
neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by
a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the
kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion's body lying flat on
the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later
while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries. 8
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the second floor of the house when she
heard banging sounds and her husband's moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down.
Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col
suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa
was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. 9 Col then instructed her to open the
vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried
offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her
backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell
Col: "tara, patay na siya." 10Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to
Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood. 11
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 inBarangay Salakot,
Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the
incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an
investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw
hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe
measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The police went to
Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while
Vitalicio was still loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both
informed him of the incident. 12 He prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his
investigation. 13
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during
the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill
Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following
findings: DaACIH
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right of the
root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.

5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.

6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 1/2 x 6 1/2 cm.
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple line,
0.8 cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the manubrium
sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior
median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4
1/2 on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both extremities round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 1/2 cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving all
layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 1/2 cm to the right of injury (18) 1 1/2 cm
below, wound involving the whole scalp.
20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the left
temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain tissue
out of the gaping wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions, with
gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear
extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage. 15
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal. 16 acAIES
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in
Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who
appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction
site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day,
Pasion suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They
both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident.
He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. 17 During the cross-examination,
Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.18
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however
resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta,
Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw
Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn't know
Bokingco very well. 19

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment 20 finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and
REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and
penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being the two aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both
accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused
Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Each
accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy
five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six
hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as
attorney's fees, Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs. 21
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court
but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances.
The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accusedappellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of
Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. 22
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration 23 and called the appellate court's attention on
the omission to rule on Bokingco's fate when it rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted
the absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingco's admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in
the instant case. Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as
evidence against his alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower
courts that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of
confidence attended the commission of the crime. 24
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco
in its dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads: CDAEHS
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants
MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and
with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence,
with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to
suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance
with Section 3 of the said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand
pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney's fees; and to pay
the costs. 25

Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required
the parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so
desire. 26 Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting
their arguments in the Appellant's Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. 27The appellee likewise
manifested that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. 28 The instant case was thus
submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1)
whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of
murder and 2) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate
and dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary
investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he
testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the
head. On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by
evident premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses
testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not
proven in the case. They belittle Bokingco's extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing.
The attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise
assailed by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely coincidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on
appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they
were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they
worked in the construction of the victim's apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was
defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself
from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial court's findings that
evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in
the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him. 29 Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack.
While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the
victim at that time. 30
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. 31 But the admitted manner of killing is
inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 32 It is indispensable to show how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In the
instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted
in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. 34 Despite the fact that
Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that
Bokingco planned the attack. STCDaI

It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col's plan to kill
Pasion. 35 Bokingco's confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, 36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings
that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can
be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a
preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution." 37 In said
case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same
admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary
investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to
Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held
inadmissible. 38In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco
because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation
has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There
was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the
trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the
prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant
case, the penalty should be applied in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range
of prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion
temporal in its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the
circumstances. 39 The award of exemplary damages should be deleted as no aggravating
circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as
co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco's uncounselled testimony

that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other
evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's statements during trial, such as
the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as
the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support the
finding of conspiracy. DcHaET
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col's conviction of murder by conspiracy by
mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victim's wife, Elsa, also positively
declared that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She
was left alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG,
appellants' acts are indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses
had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. 40 However, this rule admits of
exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the
evidence on record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of
the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 41The second exception obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. 42Unity
of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence
of conspiracy. 43
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself
and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. 44
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that appellants fled together after
killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where
Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to
open the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you
were in your master's bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that
day when you were in your master's bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the
kitchen was directly leading to the back door or back portion of the building where
the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this master's bedroom located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?

A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to
go out of the kitchen because I was blocked. DHcEAa
Q: You were blocked by whom?
A: By Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near
the back door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our
residence.
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object
under my chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away
from him. (Around 3 meters)
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp
weapon under your chin?
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object
under my chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded
under my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about
it? DAaHET
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door. 46
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in
killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually
the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for
murder. 47

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they
had to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of
the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were
united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was
killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise
inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission
of another.Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as
hearsay against them. 48 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or
declaration. 49 In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the
admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. 50 As we have previously discussed,
we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked
Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate
him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonable doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accusedappellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken
within ten (10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant
is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. ITcCSA
Carpio, Brion, Bersamin * and Sereno, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, [August 10, 2011], 671 PHIL 71-94)

37- People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, 30 September 1987

SECOND DIVISION.
[G.R. No. L-71092. September 30, 1987.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted,

ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, accusedappellants.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte sitting in Dipolog
City. 1 The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following the death sentences imposed on
each of the three accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the
accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over which, under theConstitution then in force, 2 we
exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 3 With the promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the
death penalty and commuting death penalties already imposed to reclusion perpetua, 4 we, on May 14,
1987, issued a death penalty abolition resolution requiring the three accused-appellants to file a
statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of counsel, stating whether or not they wished
to continue with the case as an appealed case. 5 We have since observed this procedure with respect to all
pending capital cases. LLjur
In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed a statement
informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case. 6
This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four accused with the
murder of Deosdedit Bagon. The same reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, as principal
by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, as
principals by direct participation, of the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in the Municipality of
Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and acting upon the
direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who master-minded the bizarre plot and
directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to
execute the conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with intent to kill
by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and for a consideration of a price or
reward, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and
stab one DEOSDEDIT BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple incised (hack) and stab
wounds which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime
and in consideration of a price or reward. 7
xxx xxx xxx
The four accused entered identical "not guilty" pleas.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion whereof reads as
follows:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, SR., there
being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial, documentary or physical
evidence, that tend to establish his complicity in this case, said accused has to be, as he
hereby is, ACQUITTED.
On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS,
and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral, certainty establishing their authorship of
the crime is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused conspired and confederated with
one another to successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this case of MURDER.
But said offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
nighttime. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to offset the two (2) aggravating

circumstances, as a consequence of which, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing

the accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
The said accused are further sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the
Murder victim, DEOSDEDIT BAGON, the sum of P12,000.00 as death indemnity, P60,000.00
as moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, and costs.
SO ORDERED." 8
We come to the facts.
On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the local Integrated
National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their brother, Deosdedit Bagon,
missing. The station commander, Captain Ruperto Encabo, received their report.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon of
September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She did not, however, find him
there when she arrived in the evening. She then set out to locate him in three probable places, but her
efforts were in vain.
It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter of police procedure,
the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, Captain Encabo's men chanced
upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with
Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein. Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up
Sorela.
Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck, and arms when the police found him. According to him, he
sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced. Captain Encabo had Sorela
take them to the ricefield where he sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela allegedly broke down,
and, in what would apparently crack the case for the police, admitted having participated in the killing of
the missing Bagon. By then, the police of Polanco knew that they had a murder case in their hands.
Sorela allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of September
7, 1975 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas,
Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the
ricefields. It does not appear from the records how the three were able to have the deceased join
them. LLphil
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of the body
until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon grasses where he suffered
facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned over to the
custody of Captain Encabo.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed Sorela to lead
them to the grounds where Deosdedit Bagon was supposed to have been buried. But it was Villarojo who
escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack covered, decomposing
cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.
The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and Civilian Home
Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was transported to the Polanco municipal hall
the following day, September 10, 1975. It was displayed, morbidly, in front of the building where Mrs.
Catalina Bagon, widow of the deceased, and her four children viewed it. The exhumation, as well as the
transfer of Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a photographer. (Exhibits "I", "J", "K", "L", "M",
and "N").
The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco, where the body of the victim was
transferred. It was laid on the altar, in full public view. Again the proceedings were recorded by the camera
of a photographer. (Exhibits "Q", "R", "S".)

But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had concealed it. (Exhibits
"T", "U", "V".) Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased suffered twelve
stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was boloed to
death. Exhibit "Y," a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike
another, while Solera and Cademas look on. Exhibit "X", another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of
concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after having done the victim in.
The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twenty-inch long bolo, the shovel used to inter
the victim's remains, a nylon rope with which the dead body was tied, and the sack itself.
Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and Cademas executed
Deosdedit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00
each.
While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first confessions were
taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary headquarters. The second were made
before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975, the three accused reiterated the same confessions
before the National Bureau of Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September
25, 1975, they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the police of
Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and September 25,
1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who
allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation,
however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the killing. We note that the three were
transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda
O. Adaro, daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by her of harassment against her father by his supposed
political enemies.
Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the three accused
on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was acquitted, while the three
were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder. prLL
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to him as the
mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was concerned. It rejected claims of
witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an offer
of a reward when in fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted that Olvis had, two days after the
murder, been in Cebu City, and who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in fact informed by the Philippine
Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man, "to which said accused (Olvis) meekly complied" 9 (that is, he
assented, ambiguously, to the remark). According to the court, this was inconsistent with a guilty
mind. LibLex
The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising from alleged
attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the deceased having been a
tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It dismissed
insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier brought a physical
injuries suit against the former, that case having been dismissed. It observed, furthermore, that he was not
questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to
implicate him. It relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability.
It was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of health" 10 in connection with the murder case. cdphil

With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-appellants. The
accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in open court alleging threats by the
Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They
likewise alleged that they were instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacleto Olvis in
the case. They insisted on their innocence. The accused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was
the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-defense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco had but the three
accused-appellants' statements to support its claims. The fundamental issue then is whether or not these
statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting us, can stand up in court.
We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo. 11 In that decision, we laid down the rule
with respect to extrajudicial confessions:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant,
may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, so police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or voluteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney
and thereafter consent to be questioned."
xxx xxx xxx
In People v. Duero, we added:
xxx xxx xxx
"At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.
"For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of
it the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.
"More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent
pressures of the interrogation atmosphere ..
"Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to
recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it ..
"The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that
anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed
in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of
foregoing it . . .
"An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not
constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be
recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.
The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be
the person who most needs counsel . . .
"If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation
occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the
individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney ..

"In order fully to apprise a person interrogated the extent of his rights under this system
then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney,
but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him . . .
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clears. If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease . . . If the individual cannot obtain an attorney
and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to policy, they must respect his
decision to remain silent . . .
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
retained or appointed counsel . . ." 12
xxx xxx xxx
Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In
their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not
assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel
"makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary,
technically." 13
With respect to the confessions of September 18, 1975, while it is stated therein that "[t]his Office had just
requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office,
Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you willing to accept the legal assistance of Atty.
NAVARRO to handle your case," 14 the same nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is nothing there
that would show that Atty. Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the
appellant Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is clear
therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting
on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. What we
said in People v. Galit, 15 applies with like force here:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. 16
We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975.
But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer to the forced
re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension.
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below, says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 17
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, 18 but this
has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" 19 acquired under circumstances of
duress. Essentially, the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." 20 This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the
inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt. 21 Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive,
that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, 22 or
compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth, 23 or making her submit to a pregnancy
test 24 or a footprinting test, 25 or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. 26 In each

case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the
guiding hand of counsel. LibLex
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some
physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a
police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession.
Accordingly, we hold that an evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of
the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they
took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a
strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that he
acted "with unexpected spontaneity" 27 when he allegedly "spilled the beans" 28before the law enforcers
on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody. Any
statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 29
We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his voluntary
statements. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 30 tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it
may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his
will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 31
In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months before the
information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application for habeas corpus. For if the
authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be made to suffer
preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous length of time. Cdpr
What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. For one, there was no trace of
grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives, more so his widow and children, upon
witnessing his cadaver wrapped in a sack and all although it was supposedly the first time that they
saw his remains after two days of frantic search. 32 Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "R", for another, depict
the deceased's relatives in fixed poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the foreground. 33
Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hall building and then subsequently, to the parish
church, again, for a photographing session an unusual procedure when the perfunctory police
procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for autopsy.
It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Deosdedit Bagon's remains were unwrapped, at the parish
church at that, as if pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony.
To the mind of this Court, the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual grandstanding, for
reasons as yet unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable impression that each scene was an act in
some contrived tragedy.
We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at the expense of
the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the three appellants had initially
implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was never invited for the usual questioning.
To us, there is more to Exhibit "20," the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of the National
Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it happened, happily for Olvis, the three
accused-appellants while under NBI custody, retracted their earlier statements indicting him as a coconspirator. Why the NBI should intervene in the case when the Polanco police had apparently "solved" it,

is, in the first place, suspicious enough, but why the three appellants should, in an instant, make a turnabout there leaves us even more disturbed. LLjur
While we do not challenge the verdict of acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis, for it is not within our power
to overturn acquittals, 34 what is our concern is the apparent design to use three ill-lettered
peasants, 35 the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident network of political intrigue.
Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three accused-appellants.
In his counter-affidavit, 36 marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense, the accused Romulo Villarojo
admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did so in self-defense.
("[H]e pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to defend my body, I hack[ed]
him.") 37 He completely absolved his co-accused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any
liability.
Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him. 38 But it is still our
business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny.
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp
instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from his body. This
indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense. 39
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate superior strength or
nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the court a quo on the basis of the
extrajudicial statements executed by the accused, statements we reject for the reasons earlier discussed.
In the absence of any other proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not,
by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain homicide. LLjur
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30, 1984. The
accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs
of Deosdedit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring with reservations:
I concur on the ground that the extrajudicial confessions of the accused are inadmissible for having been
uncounselled. But I have reservations regarding the generalization that re-enactments performed while
suspects are under police custody should be considered as "forced." The effect of this pronouncement
would be to tie the hands of investigating authorities unduly and make it extremely difficult for them to
gather evidence to support a criminal charge. It should be up to the Courts to determine whether a reenactment was voluntarily staged or not. Cdpr
||| (People v. Olvis , G.R. No. L-71092, [September 30, 1987])

38- Jaime dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200748. July 23, 2014.]
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:

This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the Decision 1 dated
22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2
February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II ofRepublic Act No. (R.A.)
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman Visayas, in an Information 3 dated 14 February 2006, which
reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a
public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as Police
Officer 2 of thePhilippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group
of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous
drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused. TAIaHE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records do
not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special
investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or
simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The
complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of
Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the latter gave
the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them PhP100,000, later
lowered to PhP40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded
to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities.
While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the
money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants. A
team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee
branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime
dela Cruz by using a pre-marked PhP500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the
amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel
Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous
Drugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while
eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at
the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to
be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample,
to no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6 June 2007, found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him

to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu
Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC's validation of the result of the urine test despite its
dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that
the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in
clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing
jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a
person's right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of hearsay
evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug
test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6saying that "petitioner's
arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest
the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established
by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on
a valid and existing law. SCDaET
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not
the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or
jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner's non-compliance with the Resolution 7 ordering him to submit clearly legible
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which
reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is
found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be
imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center
for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended
using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00):Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person
tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein
shall apply. 8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were
established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner's objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also
reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because,

while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself.
Extracting urine from one's body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA,
erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not
cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or
arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A.
9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation", 9 "sale,
trading,
administration,
dispensation,
delivery,
distribution
and
transportation", 10 "manufacture" 11 and "possession" 12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or
meetings"; 13being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; 14 "maintenance of a den, dive or
resort"; 15 "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; 16 "manufacture
or delivery" 17 or "possession" 18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs
"during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; 19 "unnecessary" 20 or "unlawful" 21 prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof"; 22 and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals." 23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note
that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. cCaIET
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging
and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly
illustrated in People v. Martinez 24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to
the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers
of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis
for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the
intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate
first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory
test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph
of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while
the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue
alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on
the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs.
Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of

custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or
for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14
provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person
who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and
a fine of PhP50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this
Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to
exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous
drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test
required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to
afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as
provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 25 to wit:
. . .[M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being
haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would
violate a person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by
allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises
the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. 26 However, "a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest." 27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such
proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of
evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest. AIcaDC
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the

inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513
[1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo,
213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378
Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be
compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; (U.S. vs. Tan
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36
Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing things to be done. (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
[1950]) 28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC
and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes of
drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People, 29 the petitioner
therein and his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner
and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results.
Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs.
Gutang claimed that the latter's urine sample was inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect
from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang, et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material". The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under
the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of
the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to
unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not
compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when
they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of
credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the
culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner
in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his
urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the
present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and
finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the
use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of

petitioner's right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked
for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved
futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. AEaSTC
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders in
their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they
must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely
that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth
Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R.No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, [July 23, 2014])