Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CONFLICT OF LAWS
EVIDENCE
BATCH 1
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal. 11 The appellate court held: cdrep
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present petition for
naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name
appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No.
270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for
naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a
decision in his favor . . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow
those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to
come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection
which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for
naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and
"Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and
former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and
failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As
explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the
public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government,
upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed
thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing
to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public
and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose
of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his wife for several
years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his
wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and
irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law," and
therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization. . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of
P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not
lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because
he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. .
." It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough
for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the
object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their
old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time
on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata. 14Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the
State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of
the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did,
in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus:
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background
of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or
another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set
forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the
rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument
of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. LLpr
SO ORDERED.
well as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, in clear violation of the
principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman. 8
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to
the affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the
test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without
precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC 9squarely grapples a
similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation
of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that "the argument that the
affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not
persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only."
In Rase v. NLRC, 10 this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it
was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by
counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale
and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC 11 succinctly states that
under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do
not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to
deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties
of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules
of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent,
citing People v. Sorrel, 12 that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay
evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from
that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor
Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing.
Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based
on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant
case, we only need to follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC 13 which
outlines the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers and quitclaims
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If
the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not
Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and
Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as regular employees, and to pay them their
full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet
to be computed upon proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that
herein petition is DENIED insofar as it concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a valid
and binding Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim with
respondent company. ECTIcS
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, [June 10, 2003], 451 PHIL
839-848)
from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latter's lack of personality to
represent the workers in the present case.
The motion is bereft of merit. aIEDAC
Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule
65. Due, however, to the nature of the case, one involving workers' wages and
benefits, and the fact that whether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the reglementary period
under Rule 45) from petitioner's receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals'
Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it due
course. As Almelor v. RTC of Las Pias, et al. 2 restates:
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This is to
prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes.However,
like
most
rules,
it
carries
certain
exceptions. After all, theultimate purpose of all rules of procedures
is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in ruling on a question of
fact, it bears recalling that a QUESTION OF FACT arises when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged fact, 3 while a QUESTION OF
LAW exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set
of facts.
The present case presents the primordial issue of whether the Secretary of
Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his authority to
assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.
Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination and application of existing
law, the provisions of the Labor Code,and prevailing jurisprudence. Intertwined with
the issue, however, is the question of validity of the MOA and its ratification which,
as movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and one which is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however,
is not without exceptions, viz.: SaCIDT
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law,
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we
are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence
because it was validly entered into by the parties, the Court notes that even those
who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the
MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must thus
be given a liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical
construction, with due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
the purpose for which it is intended. 9
The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary did not have the
authority to give an arbitral award higher than what was stated in the MOA. The
conflicting views drew the Court to re-evaluate the facts as borne by the records,
an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45.
As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the
FFW during the pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to
represent the Union, the same does not affect the Court's upholding of the
authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was
supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the
"unavoidable issue of disaffiliation" bears nosignificant legal repercussions to
warrant the reversal of the Court's Decision.
10
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for
the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned
Order basically on the same reasons stated in his
comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its
Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit
the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative
value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a
look at it through the process of admission. . . . . 3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOM's Orders which admitted Editha
Sioson's (Editha's) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. HaECDI
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY
WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06
DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED
26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT
BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN
IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH
CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL
LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE'S LIVELIHOOD. 4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits
of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of
an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the
11
case. 5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy
left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Embedded in the CA's finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in
grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in
her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha:
(1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and
authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their
purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
xxx xxx xxx
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. 6Although
trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7 in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful
or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them. 8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same
pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals 9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not
the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not it proves an issue. CIaHDc
Second, petitioner's insistence that the admission of Editha's exhibits
violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced.
Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
12
13
G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1)
Civil Case No. 36089, entitled: "Augusto Gomez, as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff,
versus Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez,
and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal,
Defendants"; and (2) Civil Case No. 36090, entitled: "Augusto
Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez,
Jr., Defendants", both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were
sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS
Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR.
while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint
that CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979, was the owner of
the following real properties:
"(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon,
situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, . . .;
"(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon,
situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, . . .,"
"(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon,
situated in Pasig, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name, . . .;"
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus
fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of
Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated
the above described properties to defendants Rita and Jesus; that
the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature
of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgement on the
said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis
of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the
certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of
new ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of
DonationIntervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio,
14
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No.
11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6252 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373 valued at
P200,000.00, more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM031643, Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and
LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at P50,000.00,
more or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued
interests on money market placement with the BA Finance
Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9,
1978.
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently
prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of
Donation Intervivos; that in the said document Consuelo donated
the above described properties to defendants Ariston, Sr. and
Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged
the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgment on the said document was antedated to April
21, 1979; that on the basis of the said document defendant Ariston,
Sr., [in] December 1978, effected or tried to effect a change of the
LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr.,
for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA
Finance and received checks in the sums of P187,027.74 and
P4,405.56; that with the exception of the jewelries, which are with
the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to
benefit from the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the dividends
earned by the shares of stocks.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of
Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio,
and/or be nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to
deliver the stock certificates, jewelries, collector's items, and
vehicles in his possession plus all the cash dividends earned by the
shares of stock and reasonable compensation for the use of the
two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to
pay the amount of P191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance,
with interest from the time he received the amount until he fully
pays the plaintiff; and, damages, by way of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their
answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and
asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation was submitted to
the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2,
1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or
otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being
15
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the
RTC's Joint Decision in the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence of record. 13
Weight and Credibility of the
Expert Witnesses
The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner was able
to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper
signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of
Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner 14 of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz,
Chief of Document Examination 15 of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct
evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the
Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of
Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and
that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who
allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of petitioner, it
is imperative to examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing her testimony,
and the contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.
16
Zenaida Torres's testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the
two Deeds of Donation, denominated as Documents No. 401 andNo. 402, and her
findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo. However, she
opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one
continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some variances horizontally.
Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any variance. IDSETA
Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten
words "Consuelo C. Gomez" were typed after the handwritten signature "Consuelo C.
Gomez." This is based on her analysis of the letter "o" in the handwritten signature, which
touches the letter "n" in the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." She could not,
however, make any similar findings with respect to Document No. 402, because the
typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" and the handwritten signature "Consuelo C.
Gomez" "do not even touch" in the latter document.
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not
prepared in one sitting:
To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the
signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 are genuine.
(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint;
wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo were forged. In
fact, as per the allegations, in Augusto's complaint, the signatures
were forged, after the death of Consuelo).
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a
scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank,
and thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were
both typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on how
he arrived at this conclusion.
Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the
same, thru the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and
402 were prepared in one continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz,
if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after that, the
typewriter is used again, the color tone will most probably be
different.
He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical
alignments are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at this
conclusion.
17
analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial
court arrived at the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRES'S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE
HANDWRITTEN LETTER "O", WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN
INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N". BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT
MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME
"CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE
"CONSUELO C. GOMEZ".
We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities
Torres was confronted and which authorities she had to admit),
which read as follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is often
stated that is possible to determine whether an ink line
which intersects typescript was written before or after the
typing. The theory is simple; most typewriter inks are
greasy and an ink line tends to shrink in width as it passes
over a greasy place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink line is
observed to suffer a distinct reduction in width every time
it intersects the typescript it may safely be concluded that
the ink line was written after the typescript.
In practice, however, ink lines written across typescript are
rarely seen to suffer any appreciable shrinkage in width,
since the amount of oily medium transferred from the
ribbon to the paper is rarely sufficient to have any effect.
Indeed, if the ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink,
instead of shrinking, may spread out into the typescript to
increase the width of the inkline at the intersection. In the
case the proof that the ink followed the typescript would
be the presence of a swelling rather than a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any
definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the
paper for intersecting ink lines and typescript to be
justified on the [meager] amount of evidence which
generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for carbon
paper and waxer; which have much in common with
typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they make on
paper react with intersecting ink lines". (Wilson, Suspect
Documents; Exhibits "19"; "19-A"; "37"; "37-D"; underscoring
ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as
follows:
18
"Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive patterns,
depending upon the order of writing the lapse of time
between the two writings, the density of the two strokes
and the kind of inks, writing instruments, and paper used.
With a binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided
by skillfully controlled light and photography, the true
order of preparation may be revealed and demonstrated
to a lay observer.
What appears to be the obvious solution may not always
be the correct answer. For example, the line of deepest
color usually appears on top even if it was written first.
Careful study and testing is necessary before reaching a
conclusion. Some of the more common criteria for
determining sequence are considered in the following
paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of two writing strokes or
the intersection of writing and typewriting the majority of
problems are covered. Substantial, repeated intersections
of two writings offer a higher probability of success than a
single indifferent intersection, such as a weak stroke
crossing another which only very infrequently can
produce a clear indication of the order of writing".
(Exhibits "V" and "V-1" (underscoring ours). 18
The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, 19that it is
impossible to determine accurately which came first, because there
were no intersections at all. 20 The trial court added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without
more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the typewritten and the
handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which
came first." 21 The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial
court. 22
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that
the handwritten signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in both Deeds of Donation were
affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot possibly be
overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was "neither here not there." 23
Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert,
as opposed to Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner
also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground that he had once testified in
favor of respondent Ariston, Jr. 24
Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon
originals of both Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial
Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with
respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. cTDaEH
On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence 25 is, as a general rule,
more credible than negative evidence. 26 However, the reason for this rule is that the
witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it
is impossible to remember what never existed. 27
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to
testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to
forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be
the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to
be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that positive
evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it
comes to expert witnesses,28 the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their
conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the
larger proportion of the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a knowledge
derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or in substance,
conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names
responsible for them. 29 In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases
of their observations. Francisco Cruz's statement that "no finding or conclusion could be
arrived at," 30 has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres.
Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words
"Consuelo C. Gomez" barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten signature
Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words
and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be
arrived at," was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating
that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The former
expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by
both experts.
As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals
of both Deeds of Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely
examined the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with respect to Document No. 401,
suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After the
examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The
carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents burned in the fire. Petitioner
never rebutted respondents' manifestation concerning this incident, nor accused
respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioner's attack on the entire testimony of
Francisco Cruz (including the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one
continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida Torres was court-
19
appointed, Francisco Cruz's testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had
previously solicited such testimony for another case.
As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only direct
evidence presented by petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely
intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also presents the
following circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same, claiming that
there are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation:
1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a
letter size (8" 1/2" x "11") paper, instead of the usual legal
size (8" 1/2" x "14") paper, and typed single spaced, with
barely any margin on its four sides; 34
2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different
municipalities were purportedly donated to two donees
in the same document; 35
3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and
collector's items in a bank deposit box, two registered
cars, cash and money placement in another bank, and a
bodega were donated to three donees in the same
document; 36
4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by
Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by Consuelo, she
would surely have known this fact as she was the treasurer
of V-TRI Realty Corporation; 37
5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of
Consuelo on both documents appear almost in the same
place; 38
6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial
acknowledgement portion and the TAN Numbers and
Residence Certificates of the signatories, were typed with
only one typewriter. The only portions that seemed to
have been typed with a different machine are the date
("21st") below the acknowledgement and the filledin numbers of the "Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page No.
___'" portion, the name "Jose R. Sebastian" above the
words NOTARY PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date and
place of issue; 39
7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the
right hand side of the name and signature of Jose
Sebastian, instead of below it; 40
20
8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine
used for typing the name of notary public Jose Sebastian)
is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands in Quezon
City, on the 20th day of April/1979" (which was typed with
another machine; the one used in typing the body of the
deed and the body of the acknowledgment); 41
That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in
two sheets of paper does not militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate
length with importance. The simplicity and practicality of organizing the properties to be
donated into real and personal properties, and using one-page documents to convey
each category, are clearly appealing to people who value brevity. The same appeal of
conciseness had driven petitioner to make a single-spaced Supplemental
Memorandum whose only object was to summarize the arguments he has laid down in
the original twice-as-long Memorandum, 46 an endeavor that we, in fact, appreciate.
Legal documents contained in 8 1/2 x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even
uncommon. The same is true with regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact,
petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.
The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of
Donation, including the notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence
certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the legal profession for many years, we are
aware that it is common practice for the parties to a contract to type the whole
document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and
the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.
21
Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of
Donation was intentional, for brevity's sake. While the ensuing litigation could now have
caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for
brevity's sake, there still appears noindication that he did so maliciously. Indeed, law
professors remind bar examinees every year to leave margins on their booklets. Despite
the importance examinees put into such examinations, however, examinees seem to
constantly forget these reminders.
The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson
(Maria Rita), and Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that there were one original
and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these documents, it was
the original of Document No. 402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which
were actually presented by petitioner himself before the trial court, through the
representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon City, who testified pursuant to a
subpoena. The latter two documents were submitted to the NBI for examination by
petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the
Bureau of Records Management. He, however, was able to find certified true copies of
these documents with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation
Commission. 50
According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was
separated from the brown envelope, containing the other copies of the Deeds of
Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to fit the same
into a certain red album. On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy each of
the duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria Rita
explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her sister in Palma de
Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate
originals of the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma de
Mallorica. 51 Maria Rita explained in detail how her handbag was stolen as she was
praying in a chapel while waiting for the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de
Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate originals of the said
Deeds of Donation, but also other important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita
presented the police report of the Spanish police authorities 52 and her letter to the
Valley National Bank of U.S.A., 53 regarding these losses.
Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his files.
Jose Sebastian explained that he did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each
document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the Notarial Registrar duplicate
originals of the document, he had to photocopy the same to keep as his own copies,
and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever duplicate original copies he had. Jose
Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate original of Document No.
402, what was left with him was the original. 54
While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by
respondents do arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita, and
Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial court, which found them to be
credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court
respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before
the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the result of
the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court. 55
All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While
such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs
in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the
trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It
must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a conviction of the lower court
based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on
preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales
shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant. 56
Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said
Deeds of Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged
irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court was never
given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have given a rational, logical
and acceptable explanation for the same.
Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate
bad faith on the part of respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront
respondents with these observations. Respondents would not have thought that the
Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that they were written on
short bond paper, or that their margins are small. Respondents were thus deprived of a
chance to rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were
forced to explain the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where
these observations started to crop up. It would have been different if the date of the
documents had been after Consuelo's death, or if there had been obvious alterations
on the documents. In the latter cases, it would have been the responsibility of
respondents' counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment of donor's tax before the
death of Consuelo
In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of
Donation, the Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the
finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donor's tax of the
properties subject of the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount of P119,283.63, and (2) the testimony
and certification dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents
were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979. 57 Respondents had presented
evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of P119,283.63 for the
Donor's Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency of
P2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that
Consuelo herself paid the donor's tax of the properties subject of the donation on 9
22
October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donor's Tax was paid on 4
December 1979, or a month after Consuelo's death. 58Petitioner thereby calls our
attention to his Exhibit "O," a certificate dated 4 December 1979 issued by Mr. Nestor M.
Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR, confirming the payment of the
donor's tax. The certificate reads:
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
December 4, 1979
that Philippine Trust Company Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on 4
December 1979 as a collection agent of the BIR.
Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment
of the Donor's Tax before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:
1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and prepared
by Mariano A. Requija, accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which included the
Donor's Tax Return for the properties covered by the two Deeds of Donation. The letter
was stamped received by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 61
6) An "Authority to Issue Tax Receipt" issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21 October 1979
for a total amount of P119,283.63. 66
Total P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD.) NESTOR M.
ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real
Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A7 59
Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation
Receipts for the payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by
respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December 1979 bore consecutive numbers, despite being
issued months apart. Petitioner also points to the fact that the tax was stated in the
certification to have been paid "on even date" meaning, on the date of the
certification, 4 December 1979.
Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donor's Tax, which, petitioner
himself admits, was signed by Consuelo. 60 Petitioner draws our attention to the words
"RECEIVED BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC. 4." Petitioner concludes
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum 67petitioner is
trying to establish here is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank
pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. Thefactum probans 68 this time
around is the alleged payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if
successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by
respondents, payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo does not
necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of
paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.
Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB
Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared and
issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally
delivered the same to the BIR. 69 On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered
to the BIR before or after the death of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented
all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however, merely
formulated conjectures based on the evidence he presented, and did not bother to
23
present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he
meant with the words "on even date" in his certification. Neither did petitioner present
any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated,
thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties
stand. This is in contrast to respondents' direct evidence attesting to the payment of said
tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents' evidence, all that
petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence:
the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the
notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court
had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian. 70 Petitioner posits that the
dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as
a witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative proceedings against
him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed others to distort the
truth.
Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November
1979 Certification by Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable
circumstances surrounding such certification. Said certification, marked as petitioner's
Exhibit "P," reads:
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE R.
SEBASTIAN
Notary Public 71
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and
claims that the same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an
opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos,
"despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by
Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter."72
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a
witness for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
prohibits petitioner from impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with
respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of
section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the
party into calling him to the witness stand.
24
and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastian's subsequent
dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case. ETHIDa
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez, 76 which, in turn cited Cordial v.
People, 77 that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense, they
"can perceive and perceiving can make known their
perceptions to others."
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to
discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of
other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility.
. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose
Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but
wasinstead administratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing
the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals
did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose Sebastian's
testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the
documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which
was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
Alleged unusual circumstances
relative to the execution and
notarization of the subject Deeds of
Donation
The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged
intercalation of the subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by Consuelo
are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the execution and
notarization of the said deeds. According to petitioner:
1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on
21 April 1979 is highly improbable and implausible,
considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for
the United States on a pleasure trip; 78
2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And
even assuming that the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as
contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding
procedures require Consuelo to be at the airport at least
two hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner
points out that respondents' alleged time frame (from 7:00
25
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to
the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she
did not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom
she didn't like had access to him and she wanted to keep the
execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:
Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular
Notary Public for the preparation and notarization of legal
documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now
Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular
Notary Public, but way before that date. But after that, he
fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not anymore that
regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie,
year before that?
A: I don't specifically remember but what I do know is such
confidential document like this, we would not really go to
Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature,no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than
Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.
Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles
in connection with the latter's performance of his duty as
Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERRY:
26
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the
execution of the two documents in question dated April
20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie
and you added that as a consequence, your auntie did
not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it
comes to confidential matters, is that correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the documents are
confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what
these confidential matters are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the
category "confidential".
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document
by Atty. Angeles with your auntie such that she made
known to you this falls under confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty.
Angeles would possibly notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or
information that these documents should be notarized by
other notary public other than Angeles, because it is
confidential?
A: It came from her.
"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of
the properties in your name?
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that
these two documents are of confidential matters?
"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed
by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos, meaning,
it takes effect during her lifetime?
27
While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out
that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions as to
the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition by circumstantial evidence. In
such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances established
must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also inconsistent with any
other rational theory. 94
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again,
while such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases,
plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility
by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioner's evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing
in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the
court will find for the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weaknesses of the defendant's
claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than
that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on
his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause
of action." 95 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner's liability for damages
The last part of the trial court's decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, involves the award of damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held
Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo "jointly and solidarily liable" for
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The trial court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence
to support his charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed the
defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence
contradictory to his legal position and which actually happened,
when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr.,
and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere
desire to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo, but rather by
his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for
himself and the rest of the Gomez brothers and nephews, other
than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of
by Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos. 96
28
Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary.
Respondents never assailed the authenticity of petitioner's evidence, and merely
presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As previously stated,
petitioner's evidence had successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the
subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge petitioner's
burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioner's institution of the
present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against
respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner's counsel to represent
its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.
While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank
sheets of paper signed by Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the
opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the respondents. Having failed to
discharge this burden to prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case,
petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be held liable for moral
damages.
This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary
damages are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages
mentioned. 97
The attorney's fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence
of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff. CaAIES
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED.
The Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil CasesNo. 36089
and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the following portion be DELETED:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. RODEGELIO TURCO,
JR., a.k.a"TOTONG", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gregorio dela Pea III for accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J p:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a "Totong") was charged with the crime of
rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the
9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information:
SO ORDERED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
||| (Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, [February 6, 2007], 543 PHIL 436-483)
(p. 6, Rollo.)
29
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its
witnesses Alejandra Tabada, mother of the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the
police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim;
Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the
medical record clerk who used to be the medical officer under Dr. Rimberto
Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after the incident is
abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise:
30
31
32
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt considering that other than the written statement of the complainant before the
Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and
her testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to
conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only presumed that it was
accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon
opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in
her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to identify accusedappellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant only
because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that noactual proof was presented
that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a
medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same
was not presented in court to explain the same.
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of
rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590
[1998];People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75
[1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
33
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
(Continuing)
A Yes, sir.
34
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A My shortpants and panty, sir.
Q You stated that the accused while on
top of you removed your pants
and panty, did he totally
remove it from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Q After removing your shortpants and
panty, what else did the
accused do?
A He abused me, sir.
Q You said that he abused you, how did
he abuse you?
35
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez,
294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature
girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter
about which they testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In
addition, we take cognizance of the trial court's observation on the segment of the
Filipino society to which the victim belongs almost illiterate, having attended school
up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to
watch television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped
and broken . . . can no longer be pieced together not ever," this being "true among the
Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor and helpless everything is entrusted
to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having
intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that
the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim
what transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a
witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience
so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478
[1998]). Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such
an offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth
recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds
and casts a stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or
subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]).
These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness
positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further,
the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by
truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355
[1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had nomotive to falsely testify against accusedappellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court
(People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People
vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the
victim. At this juncture, we reiterate the trial court's observation thereon the mother of
accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the
victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives.
Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit
and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a
younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of
her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim
would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive
36
to file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really
happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state
that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her
virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of
her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did
not disclose the incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of
accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelveyear-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points
presented by the defense that must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between
accused-appellant and the victim? The theory initially advanced by the defense in the
proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, we agree
with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accusedappellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs.
Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused
was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the
like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot
just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were
sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this
theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly
abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was
between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship
but by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident,
when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the
victim knew right away that her caller was accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si
Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the
victim Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent friendship between them, as
follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know
the complainant, why do you
know the complainant Escelea
Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in
jail, sir.
37
7- State of Missouri v. William Arthur Bull, 339 S.W. 2d 783 Mo. 1960, 14 November 1960
38
"to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the officers ran
after him, Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired
one shot high in the air but Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two
at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed
that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too remote from the date of
the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course prejuducial
*785 that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even
thirty days after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance (State v.
Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d 147, 153), the remoteness of the flight goes to the
weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p. 274.
When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took from his person and
impounded a brown felt hat, "a brownish" windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt
and shoesthese were exhibits one and two, Ball admitted that they belonged to him
although his evidence tended to show that he had purchased the jacket after October
15. In identifying Ball, in addition to the scar on his face, Krekeler was impressed with and
remembered the brown ensemble, particularly the "tall brown hat." These items were of
course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no objection to them. State v.
Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d 787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a
new trial that a police officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two
pennies were taken from his person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was
"immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues
involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither
identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly
stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October,
1958; that said evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant
convincingly."
The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were these: After the clothes
were identified and introduced as exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney
inquired of officer Powell, "Did you also seize his personal effects?" Defense counsel
immediately objected to any testimony relating to personal effects found on the
defendant "at the time." The court overruled the objection and state's counsel inquired,
"Well Officer, what personal effects were seized?" Defense counsel, evidently knowing
and anticipating, objected "to any testimony relevant (sic) to any personal effects
seized upon this Defendant at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is
immaterial and irrelevant and tends to neither prove nor disprove any facts involved
and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial be declared." The court overruled the
objection and the officer said, "Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred and fifty
eight dollars and two cents in cash, with the denominations of the bill(s), two one
hundred dollar bills, a twentytwo twenties, a ten, a five, three ones and two pennies. He
had a ladies ring and a man's wristwatch. He had a crusifixion along with a small pen
knife and a black leather wallet. Maybe one or two other personal articles." All of these
items were then marked as exhibits, from three to nine, offered in evidence and
described by the officer, exhibit three being the bills and pennies comprising the
$258.02. According to the officer Mr. Krekeler was unable to identify any of these articles
or the money as having come from the jewelry store robbery and there is no objection
in the motion to any of the items other than the money and some of them were
obviously not prejudicial, for example the keys, a small penknife and wallet.
39
Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356, the testimony as to the
$258.02 was not offered in proof of the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the
five-dollar roll of dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was found on the defendant
the same day of the burglary and while the fact was a circumstance admissible in
evidence it was held to not constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with the
hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of burglary. In State v. Gerberding, Mo., 272
S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to the proof but $4,000 was taken in
a robbery and *786 the appellant had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when
captured the day of the robbery. The proof of the money here was evidently on the
theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his
person prior to the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p.
410. As to this the facts were that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight
months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no visible means of
support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from
robberies. Of course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had worked
intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment house and that he had won the
$258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to
identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the jewelry
store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the
charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and
$140 in cash from the cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the
money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had
elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02
(annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The mere possession of a
quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money
charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and
material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money
taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154,
p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in
Ball's possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the
robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the
robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the
evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for
if it did not tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial the jury may
have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v. Bray, Mo. App., 278 S.W.2d
49; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal. App. 2d 614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation 123 A.L.R.
loc. cit. 132-134 and compare the facts and circumstances in State v. Garrett, supra.
The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a
fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court en banc.
WESTHUES, EAGER, STORCKMAN and HOLLINGSWORTH, JJ., concur.
HYDE, C. J., and LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., dissent.
8- Lopez v. Heesen, 69 N.M. 206, 365 P. 2d 448 N.M. 1961, 22 August 1961
40
rifle in this dangerous condition known to appellee, Sears, was sold to appellee, Heesen,
with the knowledge that it would be used for hunting purposes and that appellee,
Sears, negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the dangerous and defective
condition of the rifle.
The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax
County, New Mexico, appellee, Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge
while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent negligence of
both appellees, appellant sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his
chest, requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the
amount of $55,000 against both appellees, jointly and severally.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint.
Appellee, Sears, also answered denying the allegations and raising additional
affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's injuries were caused by an unavoidable
accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole cause thereof; that
the rifle involved was of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned
properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when used with reasonable care;
that rifles of this type had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters
generally and by the government of the United States and foreign countries; that the
safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and obvious, and had been seen and
inspected by Heesen prior to the accident; that Heesen knew of the tendency of the
safety mechanism to come off safety to "fire" position while hunting in heavy brush and
climbing up and down mountain *450 terrain when pressure was applied to the safety
mechanism; that appellee, Sears, had no duty to warn appellee, Heesen, of the
method of operation and use of the safety mechanism; and that it could not have
been foreseen that appellee, Heesen, would continue to hunt in heavy brush and
mountainous terrain knowing that the safety mechanism would come off safety without
taking proper precautions to handle the rifle in a reasonable manner.
The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both appellees and against appellant.
Judgment was entered for appellees and this appeal followed. Appellant abandoned
any contention that the verdict in favor of Heesen was erroneous and this appeal
concerns only appellee, Sears.
The facts are substantially as follows. In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958,
appellee, Heesen, an Air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle
from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action known more particularly as
a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familar. Heesen, although experienced
in hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a rifle.
The safety mechanism on the rifle is what is known as a "Class 1" safety, meaning that it
interrupts the firing pin directly. The safety lever is mounted on the left side of the gun to
the rear of the bolt assembly. It is a two-position safety with the action locked when the
safety lever is in a raised position. To release the safety, you push the safety lever to the
left and down to a horizontal position and the gun is then ready to fire.
Heesen first telephoned appellee's store about obtaining a Higgins rifle which they
advertised. Later he went to appellee's store and purchased the rifle. At the time of the
purchase Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which he read. Said pamphlet
explained the composition of the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the
method to be pursued to make the gun "safe," i.e., how the gun is put in a safety
position and how it may be released and have the gun ready to fire. It appears that
Heesen first talked to a salesman, John C. Villella, over the telephone and requested
that the rifle be put aside for him. However, another salesman, Roger Perkins made the
actual transfer of the rifle to Heesen. Perkins' whereabouts is unknown and nothing is
known as to Perkins' conversation with Heesen. Villella did not give Heesen any
instructions as to the use of the safety mechanism. There was a telescopic sight
advertised for sale for use with this rifle but Heesen did not care for the sight and did not
purchase it.
Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area
known as Ute Park near the town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park
that night and began hunting the next morning on October 15, 1958. Heesen hunted
without success and had seen no game up until the time his gun discharged and
appellant was wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M.
When Heesen commenced hunting that morning he placed a live cartridge in the
chamber and placed the gun on safety position. He traveled a good deal during the
hours before the shooting and on one or two occasions he discovered the gun off
safety position. This was when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and
boulders and he assumed that he had hit it against a rock or something. Thereafter
Heesen checked the safety position on frequent occasions. Heesen carried the gun on
his right shoulder with the sling at port arms or ready position, with his left hand on the
forearm of the gun and his right hand on the stock, and by the forearm of the gun with
his right hand at the "balance" of the rifle. In each of these positions the safety lever was
toward Heesen's body or right leg. Heesen changed the position in which he carried the
rifle during the course of his walking up and down mountain slopes. He also carried it in
a different position in going through brush and in climbing or stepping upon rocks.
Although the gun moved from "safe" to "fire" position at least twice during the hours
before*451 the shooting, Heesen was not aware of this occurrence. Shortly before the
shooting, Heesen had been sitting on a knoll for about twenty minutes checking the
wind and watching for deer. While sitting on the knoll he checked or observed the
safety lever on the rifle several times and it was on safety position. At a time not more
than ten minutes before the shooting he left the knoll and started down a draw which
ran in a southerly or southwesterly direction. Heesen was not sure whether he checked
the safety lever after he left the knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder by the
sling as he proceeded down the draw toward the point where the gun discharged.
At about this time, appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, was sitting next to a tree about fifty yards
away from the point where Heesen's gun subsequently discharged. Appellant in the
company of two hunting companions, Bennie Aragon and Ramon Barela, had gone
from Albuquerque to Ute Park on the afternoon of October 14, 1958, and after spending
the night in the area, commenced hunting on the morning of October 15th, the first day
of deer season. After hunting all morning and again in the early afternoon, the party
stopped to rest at the location where appellant was shot. It was then about 3:00 P.M.
and appellant, dressed in bright hunting clothes, was sitting about twenty feet away
from his two companions and scanning the area for game. After sitting there about four
or five minutes, appellant observed an object to his right which was moving but which
he could not identify. This was shortly before the shooting.
41
As appellee, Heesen, proceeded down the draw after leaving the knoll, he heard a
"rustle" and saw a deer go between some trees to the left of his line of travel about 50 to
100 yards away. The deer, when observed, was in a direction about 80 or 90 degrees to
the left of where appellant was sitting and Heesen did not observe appellant or his
companions before the shooting. At about this time Heesen removed the rifle from the
sling on his shoulder and held it by his right hand at or near the balance position of the
weapon. He then came to a dead log in his path which was about eight or ten inches
in diameter and was lying horizontally a foot or less off the ground with several dead
limbs sticking upward from it. One of these limbs was a dead sapling sticking up about
eighteen inches above the log and had a "fork" shaped like a thumb and forefinger
extended. Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better, and as he stepped
across the log his left foot caught on a little limb sticking out and caused him to stumble.
His left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of the log and his right foot
slipped on the grass. This brought the gun down and the gun discharged, the bullet
striking appellant. Heesen testified that he had his hand at least six inches away from
the trigger when the gun discharged. Immediately after the gun discharged he
observed that the gun was on "fire" position.
Appellant was sitting on ground higher than Heesen at the time the gun discharged
and subsequent investigation showed that the bullet had gone uphill, hit a dead tree
and ricocheted several degrees to the left, and had thereafter struck some seedlings
before hitting appellant in the chest. The bullet traveled approximately fifty yards
altogether. Heesen went quickly to the spot where appellant was sitting, observed the
seriousness of his condition, and Heesen and Lopez' companions made immediate
arrangements to care for appellant. Heesen obtained medical aid.
There was testimony at the trial that when Heesen was going to the place of the
accident with Dr. E.L. Lindsley, he told Dr. Lindsley that the gun discharged as he was
moving it from "fire" position to the "safe" position.
Under point I, appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting
testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same
modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. A witness for appellee, Sears, Paul
A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun designing and testified *452 that the
following companies had an excellent reputation in the small arms field: Fabrique
Nationale of Belgium, Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to this testimony on the
ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case.
Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was
in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, design,
assembly or maintenance, in that the safety mechanism thereof moved readily and in a
dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an allegation of an ultimate issue
of fact which the jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper understanding of which
by a jury composed of six men and six ladies, requires specialized knowledge or
experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made
and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that
expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon
facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of experts was not binding
upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony.
Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins
Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness,
Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears', objection, expressed the opinion that the safety
device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long
and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony of
certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the
opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another
witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins
Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge.
Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small
arms field or experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that
he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who
manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with
many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and
building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La
Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High
Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified
extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and
stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as
does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt,
Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins
Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard
Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company
has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also
opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods
standards.
Appellant appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the
modified leaf safety device, and the fact that other companies manufacture guns with
the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper. Appellant also
seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of Belgium may be
relevant to the issue.
Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who
use a similar safety device as the Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr.,
testified without objection that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial
sporting goods standards, and that the design of the safety device of the
Higgins *453 Model 51 was not negligent or defective. He also testified, without
objection, that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is excellent for hunting
and fulfills the requirements of a good designer. The witness, Thomas Raymond
Robinson, Jr., testified that in his opinion the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in
the field for a prudent hunter, and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness
called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair
reputation, and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.
On an issue such as we have here we believe the applicable rule to be as stated in
Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II, 461, p. 489, as follows:
42
"(1) The conduct of others evidences the tendency of the thing in question; and such
conduct e.g. in using chains on a hill, felt shoes in a powder-factory, railings around a
machine, or in not using them is receivable with other evidence showing the
tendency of the thing as dangerous, defective, or the reverse. But this is only evidence.
The jury may find from other evidence that the thing was in fact dangerous, defective,
or the reverse, and the maintenance was or was not negligence, in spite of the above
evidence. * * *"
The conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider in determining whether
the tendency of the thing is dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Chicago Great
Western Ry. Co. v. McDonough, 8 Cir., 161 F. 657; Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II,
461, p. 495.
Under our Rule, 21-1-1(43) (a), which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which
favors the reception of the evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which
throws light on the question in issue should be admitted, leaving it to the trial court to
hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. Mourikas v. Vardianos, 4 Cir., 169 F.2d 53;
Lawrence v. Nutter, 4 Cir., 203 F.2d 540.
Circuit Judge Bratton, in a specially concurring opinion in United States v. Bowman, 10
Cir., 73 F.2d 716, 720, in stating the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry,
8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows:
"It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that
the general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their
knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the
statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the
jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their
province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule,
which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any
reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the
tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably
possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a
certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the
ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only
when it plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the
questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * *"
Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of
Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and
the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms
Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same
modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of
whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and *454 that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
Under point II appellant also contends that the trial court committed error in permitting
evidence to be introduced as to the poundage pressure required to move the safety
levers of various rifles from "safe" to "fire" position. There is no merit in this contention.
Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, testified fully as to his experience with guns and
particularly with the Higgins Model 51 safety device, which he termed the dangerous
feature of the safety mechanism in that it was "so easy to knock off." Doyle's testimony
was introduced under appellant's contention that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was unsafe
and thus the issue arose as to the pressure required to move the safety lever from "safe"
to "fire" position. Under the circumstances it was proper for appellee, Sears, to show that
the poundage pressure required to move the safety lever on a Higgins Model 51 from
"safe" to "fire" measured two-and-one-half pounds, and also to show the poundage
pressure required in rifles with identical safety devices. The evidence discloses that the
pound pressure required to move the safety lever on other similar devices was
sometimes a little less and sometimes more than the Higgins Model 51.
Under point III appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the witnesses, La
Violette, Thomas Robinson and Edwards Brown, to give opinion evidence that the safety
mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was negligently or defectively designed.
Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that this was an opinion upon a
subject which is within the province of the jury to determine and that the question asked
calls for an opinion as to a question of law and fact.
This contention, we think, must be rejected. The testimony of these witnesses, all experts
in their field, was upon the ultimate issue of fact of whether the safety device on the
Higgins Model 51 was dangerous and defective or unsafe, and was properly the subject
of expert testimony. Opinion evidence on an ultimate issue of fact does not attempt or
have the power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this evidence could not usurp the
jury's function because the jury may still reject these opinions and accept some other
view. Opinion evidence offered by both parties in this case was not binding upon the
jury and they were so instructed. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. VII, 1920, p.
17; Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.
In Millers' National Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 10 Cir., 257 F.2d 93, 100,
the court said:
"The insurance companies assert that McDonald was improperly permitted to invade
and usurp the province of the jury in that the sole issue was whether there was an
explosion and McDonald was allowed to testify that there was an explosion. The
controlling rule as stated by the United States Supreme Court is that where the matter
under inquiry is properly the subject of expert testimony, it is no objection that the
opinion sought to be elicited is upon the issue to be decided. That rule has been
followed in this circuit and applied in two recent decisions."
See also Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122; United
States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407; Nelson v. Brames, 10 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d
256; and Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 8 Cir., 47 F.2d 1038.
In 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, 775, p. 647, the rule is stated as follows:
"* * * In such cases, witnesses possessing requisite training, skill, or knowledge,
denominated `experts,' may testify, not only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting
the facts, so far as necessary to enlighten the jury and to enable it to come to a right
43
verdict. * * * Issues of this kind are said to create a necessity for the admission in
evidence of the opinions or conclusions of witnesses who are *455 shown to be specially
skilled or experienced in the particular field in question."
Appellant's final objection to the opinion testimony is that the question asked of the
witnesses calls for an opinion as to a question of law and fact.
Many of the cases cited by appellant on this point are automobile accident cases
which hold that an expert or a non-expert witness cannot express an opinion that the
defendant was negligent. The reasoning behind these cases is that this is within the field
of knowledge and understanding of the jury and is not a matter requiring technical
assistance of persons having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill,
experience, or knowledge.
The parties agree that the ultimate issue of liability is for the jury to determine and that a
witness cannot express an opinion on a matter of law, as distinguished from an ultimate
fact. The ultimate issue in this case was whether the safety mechanism on the Higgins
Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent design, in
that it moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position.
Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety
mechanism "dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the
safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight.
Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism
and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle
was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was
not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and
then fix the liability.
would "usurp the functions of the jury." Other courts say that the opinion should not be
received because "that is the question which the jury must decide." If we are to add to
this, the additional confusion which exists in the decisions as to whether negligence is a
question of law or fact, or is a mixed question of law and fact, we would tend to create
more confusion and add to the fine distinctions and limitations.
Opinion evidence is admissible on the basis that it will aid the jury to understand the
problem and lead them to the truth on the ultimate facts, and opinions may be
disregarded by the jury in whole or in part. It is left to the jury to decide the issue. See
Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797; and Hooper v. General
Motors Corp., supra.
From a careful consideration of the record, we have come to the conclusion that when
we consider all of the testimony *456 bearing upon the question of whether the rifle was
dangerous and defective due to its negligent design, that when appellee used the term
"negligent or defective," he was using the word "negligent" in a narrow sense and as to
an ultimate and provable fact. This excluded the element of liability. It was for the jury to
fix the ultimate liability of either party. All of the facts went to the jury and it is our view
that under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the expert opinions expressed
were not improperly admitted.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their
opinion. Bunton v. Hull,51 N.M. 5, 177 P.2d 168; State v. Padilla, 1959, 66 N.M. 289, 347
P.2d 312; and Wells Truckways v. Cebrian, 1954, 122 Cal. App. 2d 666, 265 P.2d 557.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so
ordered.
COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.
The word "negligence" is sometimes used in a broad sense and sometimes in a narrow
sense. In the broad sense it includes the elements of liability. In the narrow sense the
element of liability is excluded. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 78 Ind. App.
361, 130 N.E. 546, 553.
"* * * An allegation of negligence as applied to the conduct of a party is not a mere
conclusion of law, unless made so by the law, but the statement of an ultimate
pleadable and provable fact. * * *"
Peavy v. Hardin, Tex.Civ.App. 1926, 288 S.W. 588, 589. See also Gower v. Lamb, Mo. App.
1955, 282 S.W.2d 867; Ege v. Born, 212 Iowa 1138, 236 N.W. 75; Cohen v. Swiller, 1959, 17
Misc. 2d 921, 186 N.Y.S.2d 844; Louis v. Smith-McCormick Const. Co., 1917, 80 W. Va. 159,
92 S.E. 249; and Hooper v. General Motors Corp.,123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER
BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337, follows the rule that an expert
witness can express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, but cannot testify as to the
ultimate issue of liability.
There is much confusion among the decisions due to the language used by the courts in
explaining why opinion testimony should be excluded. Some courts say that the opinion
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
44
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 2 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. cDAIT
S
crystalline substance. 7When asked about the contraband articles, the accused
explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the
suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The accused and the seized items were
later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the
PAOCTF Headquarters, 9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the
NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic
Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March
13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer,
Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing
jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to
search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. 4 The suspect
was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily
searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents
back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite
suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the
accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took
pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN
Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the
Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items
the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag 6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00
p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who
has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite
suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's
brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying
a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and
brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. 11 He stayed
at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock
at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section
to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari
Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a
woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabinno. 106 came and told him
that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to
cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so
he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's
Samsonite suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear
that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he
voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite
suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security
personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance
inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the
Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. 12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher
Bongcarawan yMacarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No.
6425 as amended byR.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
45
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.
SO ORDERED." 13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG
CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT
OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite
suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly
opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also
contends that People v. Marti 15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. 16 Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is
against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in
the case of People v. Marti, 18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." 19 The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the
owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained
"shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he
cannot be convicted of the crime charged. 21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The
first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We
are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, 23 this Court has ruled that to
warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
such articles. 24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. 25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated,
self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We
find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 27 Moreover, evidence must
46
be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accusedappellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected. 28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and
which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims
that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he brought
the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and
even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.31 To
overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly
observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he
really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex
Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall
selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented
to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood
person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to
the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow
businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the
claim of the accused." 32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the
keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be
fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that
a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to
possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal
Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant. IaHCAD
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Bongcarawan y Macarambon, G.R. No. 143944, [July 11, 2002], 433 PHIL
918-946)
10- People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRE
MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for accused-appellant.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section
21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II and Section 2 (e)(i), Article I of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant
and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley
Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that
he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment
and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes nolonger insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for
shipment (Decision, p. 8). LLpr
"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita
(Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
47
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box
and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated
address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested
assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming
his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.
48
49
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed bythe Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is
not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search
that is prohibited by the constitution(US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v.
State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the
property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager
and where the search was initially made by the owner there is nounreasonable search
and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in
his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as
follows:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom?Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas;
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,
1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. cdphil
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitutionhas been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles
of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern
relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the
issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the
judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No.
13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced
deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable
search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not
shift to anyone else.
50
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result
in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through
private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental
as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in
convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while
under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the
case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec.
5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there
being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
"Fiscal Formoso:
"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job
Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
"WITNESS:
"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together
with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written
statement, sir." (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the
defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof
by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated.
What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere
is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial
investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second
assignment of error is therefore misplaced. cdphil
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to
believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs
but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along
Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested
him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN,
pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated.
An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have
pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the
purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without
first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply
entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops,
and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere sayso" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand,
appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs.
Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of
the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in
the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland
(TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA
342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172
SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full
name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise. LexLib
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the
assailed judgment.
51
crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further
asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because
further evaluation of the evidence disclosed nosufficient evidence against him. 3
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr . and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, [January 18, 1991], 271 PHIL 51-65)
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of
accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently
arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail.4 He
categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness
in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information5 with only
Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
52
of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker, P41,681.00 representing actual
expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs." LLjur
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back
of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she
ran to the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, she went near the
door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta
opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they
saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the
door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the
moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough,
that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of
water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and
meticulous summary thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace
William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita
had checked as was her wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had
been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a
househelp of the Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp,
Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to
wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the
toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante
very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the
Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante
had acquainted her on her chores. LLphil
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie
happened to turn her face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a highbridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda.
After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted
for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of
her bed and upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket
and short pants with his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in
front of her. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as the man she saw
then. She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned
as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for
help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed
and went out of the room, leaving behind her husband who was still asleep. She
went down the stairs and proceeded to the dining room. She saw Salvamante and
a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly, the two rushed
towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they
want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27, August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark
Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba,
Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw
two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed,
he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a
right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black
bag on his right shoulder.
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the
road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did
not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and
driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men boarded it. Mike
again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the
latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney
as he boarded it. In the investigation conducted by the Tuba police, he identified
through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed
to Maqueda as the taller man.
53
Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location. They went around
the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt (Exhibit
"CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe
(Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two
househelps who provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left,
leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod
prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK"). LibLex
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he
saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet.
He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, and
observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through
and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet.
Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker
house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived
at the Barker house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime
was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from
the Barker house by the Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral
Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P.
Cabotaje, Municipal Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. He found in it twenty-seven
injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the
cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits
"P," "O," and "R"). LexLib
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center where she was treated and confined for eight days. The
attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00
a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she
sustained multiple lacerations primarily on the left side of the occipital area,
bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her
eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr.
Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like
a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left unattended, she
would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic
shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station,
Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several
persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed
to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the
investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for
them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully
recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual
acuity was impaired, and she had double vision. LexLib
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs.
Barker was then discharged from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to
determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get
back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave
them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio
cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were
missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then
executed an affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X").
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City.
It was revealed that she sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could
cause blindness. She then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in
New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise
received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the
BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the
police in determining the whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In
Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain,
Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in
September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanio Mendoza, and three others
went back to Guinyangan to find out whether Salvamante and "Putol' had
returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had
not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or
"Putol" returned to Guinyangan. cdll
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him
that "Putol," who is none other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested
in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police
Station, together with another policeman, proceeded to Guinyangan. The
Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then
brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken
to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria,
Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3
Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him,
he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter
signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in
the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to
Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to
be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
54
among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda
regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante
on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an
affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the
motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor
Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then
led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante
brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante
then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity
thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio
City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to
it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was
already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs.
Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe
provided him by Salvamante. After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in
beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were
already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes
later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes,
went out of the house, walked toward the road where they saw two persons from
whom they asked directions and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they
were informed by the two persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and
Salvamante boarded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio
City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they
boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. His
testimony is summarized by the trial court in this wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the
crime. He stated that on August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron
factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21,
Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa. Metro Manila. He
was employed as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he worked
continuously there up to August 27, 1991. It was his sister, Myrna
Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. As caretaker, it was
his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever
his employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He
and his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not
recall what he did that day. He slept inside the factory that night
and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how
to make the seasoning for the polvoron.
55
56
not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and the failure of the star
witnesses for the prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when
investigated at the hospital, pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene
Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi
is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of
Mrs. Barker and the househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and
misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and
the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to
positively identify Maqueda. The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial
confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence.
He should have focused his attention and arguments on these. LibLex
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an
extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial
admission the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A
perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between the
former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court which read as follows:
SEC. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense with which he is charged. 13Wharton distinguishes a confession from an
admission as follows:
57
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the
rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution andhis rights
after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot
agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer, [has] the
right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness
and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were
so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is
deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive
application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights
under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined
to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are
available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of
an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the rights against selfincrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the
second paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution was an
acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the
holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of
principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its
ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages
which follow but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that
58
admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are
arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled
to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. cdll
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused
is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the
warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the
offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such
investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of theConstitution and the jurisprudence
thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the
former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not
even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement
was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang
Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant toparagraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution which reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate
and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by
the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made
them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection
with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other
admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are
primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that
government has the duty to protect; 28or restrictions on the power of government
found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power
is not unlimited." 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of
arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the
Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party,
are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an
accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in
evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness,
who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the
oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to
oral extrajudicial admissions.
59
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the
requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case. cdphil
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the
appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled
that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be
strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when
the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which
Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that
Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the
house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to
have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover,
Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in
her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his testimony
that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and
the appealed decision of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet in
Criminal Case No. 91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto. LLphil
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983, [March 22, 1995], 312 PHIL 646-678)
60
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia
Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that
the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney,
Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that
case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed
malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In
dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent
[Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an
order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983,
however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition
for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date
which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of
the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time,
would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's
admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case
pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits
it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel
but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission
constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence
against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia
to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her
action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to nomore than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not constitute a violation
of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case
establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
61
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 63-69)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997.]
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO,petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
Atty. D.P. Mercado & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
IHCSD E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
"Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with
the Seller." 1
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private
respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby
assailing the 30 September 1993 decision 2 and 2 December 1993 Resolution 3 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which
sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent 4 and
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter
WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice PresidentGeneral Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees
chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On
the same date, Co issued another memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as
this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not
authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the
medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was
given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look
into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.8
In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E.
Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper
documents."
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he
noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter
YSP), which he described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase
Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing
purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit.
Previous P.O.'s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00 while P.O.No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of
P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC CheckNo. 222832 dated December 15, 1988,
Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy
62
and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed
that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles
of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check
voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to
Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989 . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but
she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the
overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC
Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting
to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of
fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
"talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question
(P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. 10 aisadc
Forthwith, in her memorandum 11 dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico
to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity.
Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, 12 and she was
granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February
1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she
would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the
company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales
Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she
protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope
addressed to Catolico. 14
In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained
that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of
overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it
sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memorandum 16 notifying Catolico of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter
dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively regarding our
imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty.
However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our
possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at
Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils.,
Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous
price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the
amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of
said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP
Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the
interest of the company. Accordingly, you are hereby terminated
effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. 17
In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found noproof of
unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico
because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty,"
and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties.
Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's
pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of
P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the
award in favor of Catolico as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside
because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and
that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor
Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's
dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the
check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw
when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. 20 It
concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
63
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG,
the NLRC contends that petitioners miserably failed to proved their claim that it
committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss
this petition. cda
In her Comment, Catolico assets that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her
dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her
employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from
clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund
for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the
constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly
held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response
that she never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied
having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of
overprice, consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that
can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge,
with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She
thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of
WATEROUS because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential
information or sensitive properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs
and making requisitions when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to
the third ground, the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that
an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer
the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted
by a representative if the employee so desires. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every
kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she
was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. Nohearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's
memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not,
however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the
check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to
prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that
burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. 25 Here, WATEROUS
proved unequal to the task.
64
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of
an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence
does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who
claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 26
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31,
1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure, made
an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed
medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per
bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy
and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes
confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the
difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552
which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico,
through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information.
Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we
have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence
carries no probative value. 27
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez
informed Co, through the former's memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990, that
WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was
never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by
petitioners. cdrep
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not
indicate an overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 29stated that the
Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October
1989 30 priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then
be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which inno case
can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of employment; 31 and even the dismissal of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on
the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. 32 Besides, Catolico was not
shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and
confidence" is restricted. 33
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we
find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti34 that the Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement
would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to
Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for
every year of service. 35 In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the
separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as
to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against
private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches
and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets
were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M.
Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase
orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was
objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the
transaction. Consequently, petitioners hadno one to blame for their predicament but
themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed
by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the
opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate,
Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion
for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table
deal" with YSP.
||| (Waterous Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113271,
[October 16, 1997], 345 PHIL 983-997)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004.]
65
66
The CA sustained the trial court's assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to
having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza's land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in
this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that
the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of
Rule 133 6 of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts:
1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted
that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son
Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees
cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of
Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the
trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latter's participation in
the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios
acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 7 of the Rules of Court would be violated by
binding Jeniebre to petitioner's admission, which did not constitute any of the
exceptions 8 to this provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 ofthe
Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition. 9
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged
author under oath in open court, is admissible in evidence against
him.
"II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential
prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media
representatives is admissible in evidence against the author
because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is
believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it]
correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not
(U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
"III
67
"IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial
admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] . . . the
same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?" 10
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his
purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution
witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the
sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses.acCITS
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof, "only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth" may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner
actually raised questions of fact the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to
take cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of
the proper administration of justice. 11
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had
heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies
cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present
and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they
testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance
was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were
true. On. this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is
admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. 15Gotesco Investment Corporation
v. Chatto 16 ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from
questioning the admission of Dangalan's testimony, because he failed to object to it at
the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay
evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be
admitted. 17 The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as
follows:
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for
a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
68
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of
having observed their demeanor as they testified. 27 Equally established is the rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even
more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, 28 as in this case. This
Court refrains from disturbing the CA's findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. 29 We have no reason to depart
from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts' assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended, 30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products
without the legal documents. 31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. 32 It was thus necessary for the prosecution
to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however,
is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of
69
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances
sufficiently proved petitioner's culpability:
". . . (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel
Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused
the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990,
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] . . . Rosalio Bon[,] went to
private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter . . . pay the
value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February
13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask
forgiveness for cutting the trees." 37
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the
following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, 38 the
investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, 39 and the CENRO's
computation of the value 40 of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact,
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the
differing penalties imposed by the appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an
indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the penalty to imprisonment
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No.
277,41 provides that any violation thereof "shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 42 and 310 43 of Revised Penal Code." This amendment which
eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" has already been interpreted by this
Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute
distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is
provided under these articles. 44
Both the trial court 45 and the CA 46 found that the value of the lumber was P12,000.
Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty should be two degrees
higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; 47 or prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, 48 however, reduces the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal as maximum.
Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable
range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty it imposed was more
in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the
trial court's indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
ofprision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision mayor as
minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant. aSTHDc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
70
||| (Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, [January 13, 2004], 464 PHIL 125-145)
15- People v. Ulysses Garcia, G.R. No. 1451761, 30 March 2004
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PERALTA y
POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at
large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO,
LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO,
LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y
SALISI,appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent
representation. The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to
the signing of an extra-judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses
Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola
y Salisi, as well as their co-accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin
Jr. y Granados were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando
Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y
Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are
hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central Bank of
the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in
the sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from
the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully
paid." 2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused were
charged as follows:
71
salvaged if he would not tell the truth. When the occupants of the
car mentioned perforated notes, he told them that he does not
know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and . . .
up and down . . . the stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he
felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his coaccused and he told them that he does not know his co-accused.
. . . Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused, somebody
would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accusedappellant Garcia's nose while lying on the bench. He was able to
spit out the water that had been poured on his nose [at first], but
somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear
the torture anymore, he decided to cooperate with the police,
and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard
somebody utter, 'may nakikinig.' Suddenly his two ears were hit with
open palm[s]. . . . As he was being brought down, he felt
somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accusedappellant Garcia's personal belongings consisted of [his] driver's
license, important papers and coin purse.
"He was forced to ride . . . the car still with blindfold. His blindfold
and handcuffs were removed when he was at the office of police
officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District, U.N.
Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the
latter's name, age and address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of
the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted
the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get
accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and examine the contents
thereof. SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three pieces of P100
perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and the former
insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from
accused-appellant's wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the
statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia,
who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcia's
alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 1992,
November 5, 1992 and . . . November 6, 1992. cASIED
72
and delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court
held that the coordinated acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that
they had conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP.
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer
was "an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial
court found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by
evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills
from Garcia's wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt
of the accused.
Hence, this appeal. 10
Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three
Sworn Statements of Accused-appellant Garcia and the alleged
three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of
qualified theft." 11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of
errors:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three
sworn statements of Accused Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits 'I', 'J' and 'K')
and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes (Exhibits 'N'
to 'N-2') over the objections of the accused-appellants.
"2
The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of
Accused-appellants De Leon, Loyola and Flores;
"3
The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order denying the demurrer to evidence;
"4
73
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was
not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was
affixed after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically
testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police,
and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. 14
"5
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of
qualified theft." 12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against
appellants, including the admissibility of Garcia's confessions and of the three
perforated P100 currency notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to
evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions
given by Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him
upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are
inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained
without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12
(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the
Public Attorney's Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the
ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the
Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower court's action is manifest
error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime.
The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in
writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only
ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its
nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from
the time the first question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confession.
Hence, the lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused. 15 The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and
independent counsel. 16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not
enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary
relevance. 17 The Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in
violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence. . . ." Hence, the
trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of
Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was
tortured becomes moot.CADSHI
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2")
allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and,
hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the
illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion
from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of
the trial court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a
passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At
the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to
74
commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a
reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter
before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note,
however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made
as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during
the search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature.
Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional
circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk
situations, and (6) consented search. 19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal. 20 Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. 21 In the present case, the
perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a
warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general's argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores
and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising
objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully
arrested and searched, not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an
arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby.
Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot
avail themselves of it. 22
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes
for retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to
appellants as the authors of the crime.
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to
evidence filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents
offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the
alleged qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence
showed appellants' participation in the commission of the crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge's determination of the
sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss
may not be disturbed. 24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become
apparent until after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated
perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the
confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants.
On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any
other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
submit his report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued
detention within five (5) days from notice of this Decision. Nocosts.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Garcia y Tupas, G.R. No. 145176, [March 30, 2004])
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who
had similar access to the shredding machine area and the currency retirement
vault. 23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call
informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained
increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income. Labita, however,
did not submit sufficient evidence to support his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining
evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Second Issue:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO;
ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Demurrer to Evidence
75
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario,
Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV
of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, they lodged
the present appeal.
ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario
to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat.
The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this," 8 but the latter ignored
Vinecario and instead called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that
marijuana was found in Vinecario's possession.
SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario
grabbed it, 7 resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of
marijuana wafted in the air.
On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants
along with two bundles of marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the
battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were turned over to one PO2
Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said
battalion office, however, the incident was blottered 9 by PO3 Edward Morado at the
Buhangin Police Station. 10
On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual
Padasay brought the confiscated suspected marijuana to the camp's crime laboratory
for examination 11 which determined it to weigh 1,700 grams 12 and to be indeed
positive therefor. 13
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the
Philippine army stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan, 14 approached motorcycle driver
Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and requested him to bring him to his elder
brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he paid. 15 The two thus
proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate with Wates as
driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang.16
On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother
Teofanis to shoulder the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking
of snacks at Teofanis' residence, appellants left for Davao City. aIDHET
Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecario's former co-employee at
Emerson Plywood where he previously worked, blocked the motorcycle. 17Vinecario
thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands with Datolarta 18who asked where
they were headed for and requested that he ride with them. Vinecario turned Datolarta
down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then asked if he
(Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas,
Tagum. Without examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolarta's bag and
left with his co-appellants. 19
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a
checkpoint, 20 sped past it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the
checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the
76
whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to go back to the
checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed
them to alight from the motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was,
and Vinecario identified himself as a member of the Philippine National Police. 21 The
officer asked for identification and when Vinecario could not produce any, the former
got the backpack slung on Vinecario's shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario
acquiesced, two officers opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained
marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to confirm if there was indeed
marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and brought him, together
with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of
counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not
allowed to read. 22
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of all three accused beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC Victor
Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II
in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the
supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep Act 8177
in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec.
24 of Rep. Act 7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside
and reconsidered, only insofar as the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act No.
8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn
Wates, are instead sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV
of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, as decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case
of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R.No. 123872 dated January 30,
1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all
aaccused (sic) of the offense charged, is (sic) sustained. The
corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all accused
through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the offense
charged, is denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 dated September 14, 1995 of
the above-mentioned Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the
offense charged against appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in
that it was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, thus warranting the
imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal 26 on September 15,
1999. Vinecario followed suit and filed his Notice of Appeal. 27
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecution's Motion.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court
of RTC 16 Davao City, is ordered to elevate the entire records of
this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the
automatic review of this Decision, after its promulgation.
SO ORDERED. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and
disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this
aspect, on the imposition of the penalty against all accused, even
if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de
oficio, will apply to all accused since there exists conspiracy of all in
the commission of the offense charged.
77
78
and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-andfrisk situations. 34
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 35 For
as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. 36
. . . [C]heckpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is
on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in
grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the
government.
xxx xxx xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share
with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices,
or commend its political, social and economic policies or
performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic right
to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its
program of government intended for public welfare; and in the
pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right,
under its police power, to select the reasonable means and
methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one
of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption", but
it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. . . .
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even
less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the
motoring public. First, the potential interference with
legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways
are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain
knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will
not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized
manner in which established checkpoints are operated is
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles
may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies
a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law
offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense. 39
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any
fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 40 (Emphasis supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at
the checkpoint is gathered from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
79
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your
unit do when these three persons approached?
A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and
speeded away.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding
away?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the
contents of that backpack?
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.
Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?
A: Venecario.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that
backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
80
Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your
men to scatter, what happened next?
Q: Why?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was that incident all about?
Q: After that what happened?
A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw
this motorcycle passing and flagged them to stop and
there were three (3) persons and one was manning and
they briefly stopped but speeded away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what
happened?
A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.
A: Sgt. Goc-ong.
Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?
81
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes.
Q: A former soldier?
A: Sgt. Goc-ong. 42
A: No, Sir.
In light then of appellants' speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures
when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another,
and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from
the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt
to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were
instruments of some offense. AEHTIC
As to Vinecario's allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the
custodial investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and
material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused
becomes the basis of his conviction. 43 In the case at bar, the trial court convicted
appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those
of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:
Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any
unusual incident that took place?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What was that?
A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked
us.
Q: Where?
A: Parang Highway.
Q: Coming here to Davao?
82
A: Not yet.
Vinecario's account that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his coappellants were cruising along the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but
who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged down45 the
motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to bring a backpack to
Datolarta's cousin without checking its contents is incredible, contrary to human
experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented
at the trial, thus further eliciting serious doubts on Vinecario's tale.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 46
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to
falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi
and unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the
same fails.
Q: Where in Tagum?
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. 47 Where the acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals. 48 To exempt himself from criminal liability, the
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
unlawful plan to commit the crime. 49
A: Roxas, Tagum.
A: Yes, Merly.
Q: What is the family name?
A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.
Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his
cousin in Tagum?
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents?
Q: What did he answer you?
A: He answered clothes.
Q: What did you do?
83
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark
and it was 10:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: There was light.
Q: The place was well-lighted?
A: Yes, sir. 52
On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or
apprehensive when he flagged them down as they crossed the checkpoint. 53
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that
backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervousas
Vinecario's backpack was being opened. 54
As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following
arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval,
should dispose of the same:
84
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y
GARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
For automatic review is the judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric
Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In an Information dated March 23, 1998, appellant was charged by State Prosecutor
Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
piece of wood and a saw, with intent to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of
wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F.
Keyser, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
When arraigned on April 3, 1998, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
guilty to the charge. 3
On April 23, 1998, however, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed
for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on April 28, 1998, he was rearraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 The case
then proceeded to trial.
The facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows.
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic
Manufacturing Corp. (Keyser Plastics for brevity), with principal place of business at Sitio
Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. 5 Keyser Plastics shared its building with
Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. 6 Separating the respective spaces
being utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which
was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was
of lawanit boards. 7 The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which
could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. 8
85
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned
to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo
enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be
one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser
arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the
area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by
Keyser Plastics. 9 Campos paid scant attention to Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he
heard some loud noises ("kalabugan") coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped
to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make
plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound. 10
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties
when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall.
According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and
needed Campos' assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where
he could burn it. 11 Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to
telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not
let the suspect escape, 12 while a reaction team was being dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and
Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP)
Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police
photographer. 13 They were immediately met by Campos, who informed them that
Guillermo was still inside the building. The law enforcers tried to enter the premises of
Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to
Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled
the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately
accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito."
("Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the
consequences.") 14 Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up.
SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to
some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the dismembered
limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victim's head was found stuffed inside a
cement bag. 15
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo
said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell,
he dismembered the body with a carpenter's saw. He then mopped up the blood on
the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained,
two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter's saw. 16 Photographs were
taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing
the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had
been maltreating him and his co-employees. 17 He expressed no regret whatsoever
about his actions. 18
The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation.
SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his
constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos
86
He said he was then brought to the police station where he was advised to admit
having killed his employer since there was no other person to be blamed. 35 When he
was made to face the media reporters, he said the police instructed him what to
say. 36 He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told the reporters. The
appellant denied having any grudge or ill feelings against his employer or his family.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's version of the incident, but found the prosecution's
evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the appellant,
thus:
The guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt to the crime of murder as charged in [the] information.
WHEREFORE, the accused is meted the maximum penalty and is
hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the mother of the
victim, Victor Keyser, the following amounts:
1. Death Indemnity P50,000.00
2. Funeral Expenses P50,000.00
3. Compensatory Damages P500,000.00
4. Moral Damages P500,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages P300,000.00
6. Attorney's Fees P100,000.00
plus P3,000.00 per Court appearance.
SO ORDERED. 41
Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
II
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE FOLLOWING
DAMAGES: DEATH INDEMNITY P50,000.00; FUNERAL EXPENSES
P50,000.00; COMPENSATORY DAMAGES P500,000.00; MORAL
DAMAGES P500,000.00; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES P300,000.00; AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P 100,000.00 PLUS P3,000 PER COURT
APPEARANCE. 42
Briefly stated, the issues for resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence to prove the appellant's guilt beyond .reasonable doubt; (2) the propriety of
the death penalty imposed on appellant; and (3) the correctness of the award of
damages.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points
out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor
was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he
was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police
precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial
investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he had
waived his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him,
including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence
clearly shows that the appellant admitted committing the crime in several instances, not
just during the custodial investigation. First, he admitted having killed his employer to the
security guard, Campos, and even sought Campos' help in disposing of Keyser's body.
This admission may be treated as part of the res gestae and does not partake of
uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said
statement is admissible as evidence against the appellant. Second, the appellant's
statements before members of the media are likewise admissible in evidence,
according to the OSG, as these statements were made in response to questions by
news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer. The OSG stresses that
appellant was interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he
made free and voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. He
even supplied the details on how he committed the crime. Third, the OSG points out
that appellant voluntarily confessed to the killing even before the police could enter the
premises and even before any question could be posed to him. Furthermore, after the
police investigators had entered the factory, the appellant pointed to the place where
Keyser's corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in time, appellant was
87
not yet under custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the police at the crime
scene were spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and hence
must be treated as part of the res gestae and thus, says the OSG, admissible in
evidence.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the police by a suspect in a crime
falls within the ambit of constitutional protection. Hence, if not made under "custodial
investigation" or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is
not protected by the Bill of Rights.
However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation
by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of
the protective standards laid down by the Constitution.Under Article III of the
Constitution, 43 a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the
confession must be in writing. 44 In the instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on
cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said
constitutional guarantees. This can readily be gleaned from the transcript of Reyes'
testimony, which we excerpt:
Q: What did you do next upon arriving at the police station?
A: When we arrived at the police station, I pointed to him and
asked him to read what was written on the wall which
was his constitutional rights.
COURT:
Proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Who were present at the police station during your investigation?
A: There were many people around when I conducted the
investigation at the police station. My companions were
there but I do not know the other persons who were
present.
Q: How was the investigation that you conducted at the police
station?
A: I inquired again from Eric Guillermo why he did it, the reason
why he did it.
Q: And was your investigation being recorded in the police
station?
A: No, ma'm.
Q: Let me just clarify, I did not mean like a tape recorder. Was it
written?
A: Yes, ma'm.
A: None, ma'm.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a
counsel during the investigation?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort
to provide him with counsel before you asked him
questions?
A: No, ma'm.
88
Q: Why?
A: Because during that time, it was Sunday afternoon and there
wasno counsel around and because he already
admitted that he perpetrated the crime and that was
explained to him, his constitutional rights which was on
the wall. We did not provide anymore a counsel.
Q: I would just like to ask the reason why you made the accused
read the written rights that was posted on the wall of your
police station?
A: So that he would be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Q: So, you mean that you made him understand his rights?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: So, you mean to say before you asked him to read his rights, you
presumed that he does not understand what his
constitutional rights are?
A: I think he knows his constitutional rights because he admitted
the crime.
Q: And did the accused understand his rights?
A: I believe he understood because he answered, "wala akong
dapat pagsisihan." ("I have nothing to regret."). 45
Appellant's alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the
Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of
his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of
the appellant's right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to
provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of
counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of
any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession
of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given. 46
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation
on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. 47Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that
the person has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the
communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
89
The TV news reporters' testimonies on record show that they were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and
control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The
record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once.
Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser's killing. As
held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a
televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence. 51
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant's
alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant's guilt
in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court
pales in contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to
security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The positive
evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as
well as the testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that
appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly
described before the trial court.
But was appellant's offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death penalty,
or only homicide for which a lesser penalty is appropriate?
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove either treachery or evident
premeditation to qualify the killing as murder. He points out that there was not a single
eyewitness to show how the crime was committed and hence, absent an eyewitness to
show the manner in which the crime was committed, he cannot be held liable for
murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted by the appellant himself, he
repeatedly struck the victim, with a piece of coco lumber (dos por dos), at the back of
his head, while the victim's back was turned towards him. The suddenness of the attack,
coupled with the manner in which it was executed clearly indicates treachery. The OSG
agrees with appellant, however, that evident premeditation was not adequately
established. Hence, we shall now deal only with the disputed circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. 52 Two essential requisites must concur for
treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 53
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases
the imposable penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. 54 In the instant case, we find insufficient the prosecution's
evidence to prove that the attack on the victim came without warning and that he had
90
I would like also to ask from your medical knowledge thru the
blows that the deceased received in his head which
caused the head injury, would you be able to ascertain
also in what position was the attacker or where the
attacker was?
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na
lamang kainit ito. Bigla niya akong inano dito sa batok ko
tapos itinuturo niya ang dito ko (pointing to his head)
itinuturoturo niya ang dito ko.
Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko
iyong kahoy.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Noteworthy, Dr. Baluyot pointed out that based on the injuries sustained by the victim,
there is an indication that he tried to defend himself against the blows being inflicted
upon him, thus:
ERIC GUILLERMO:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: The wound that you found at the back of the hand, which is at
the back of the right hand, would you characterize this as
[a] defense wound?
A: It is a defense wound. All injuries especially at the upper
extremities they could be tagged as defense wounds to
fend off. . . attacks and these upper extremities are
usually used to protect the head and the body. 58
The gap in the prosecution's evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation.
Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner in which the
aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in the victim's
demise. 59 Any doubt as to its existence must, perforce, be resolved in favor of
appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecution's evidence
which shows that the victim's corpse was sawn by appellant into seven (7) pieces. Under
Art. 248 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, "outraging or scoffing at the corpse" is a
qualifying circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of outraging
or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. 60 In the instant case, the corpse of Victor F.
Keyser was dismembered by appellant who sawed off the head, limbs, and torso. The
Information categorically alleges this qualifying circumstance, when it stated that the
appellant "thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser." This being the
case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is guilty not just of homicide but of
murder.
91
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances in the instant case, the lesser penalty ofreclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon appellant. 61
Both appellant and appellee claim that the trial court erred in awarding damages. They
submit that the trial court's award of P50,000.00 for funeral expenses has insufficient
basis, for only receipts amounting to P38,068.00 as proof of funeral expenses were
presented in evidence. Thus, this award should be reduced accordingly. Concerning
the award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000, compensatory damages also
for P500,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000, appellant submits that
these cited sums are exorbitant, and not in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The
OSG agrees, hence modification of said amounts is in order.
The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, as the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for
the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. 62Award of exemplary damages is
justified in view of the gruesome mutilation of the victim's corpse, but the amount
thereof should also be reduced to only P25,000, following current case law.
The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted.
The victim's mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around
P50,000.00 a month 63 as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils.
Co. 64 However, said receipt shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim.
Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the actual
value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the
loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not
only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof. 65
Civil indemnity for the victim's death, however, was left out by the trial court, although
now it is automatically granted without need of proof other than the fact of the
commission of the crime. 66 Hence, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be awarded in favor of the victim's heirs.
Nothing on the record shows the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of the victim for
attorney's fees and lawyer's appearance fees. Attorney's fees are in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages and allowed under the circumstances provided for
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 67 one of which is when the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees should be recovered. 68 In this case, we find an award of
P25,000 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses reasonable and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
73, dated March 7, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant ERIC
GUILLERMO y GARCIA GUILTY of the murder of Victor Francisco Keyser is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant's sentence is hereby REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, the sum of
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142356. April 14, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LITA AYANGAO y
BATONG-OG, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This is an appeal from the February 29, 2000 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal Case no. 99-1261 convicting the appellant of
violating Section 4, Article 2 of RA 7659, as amended, also known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. ACIESH
Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana in
an information 2 that read:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1999, in the Municipality
of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, without any authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit
or transport fifteen (15) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with the
actual total weight of FOURTEEN KILOGRAMS AND SEVENTY FIVE
HUNDREDTHS (14.75) of kilogram, a prohibited drug. IEAa
cS
92
The appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense. This was denied by the trial court. Upon
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO3 Nestor Galvez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum
and Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy Panganiban-Babor. The prosecution's version 4 of the
facts, as aptly summarized by the trial court, was:
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and
PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members of the Criminal Detection and
Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago,
Angeles City, received information from one of their informants that
a certain woman from Mountain Province delivers dried marijuana
leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some
drug pushers. Said information was also relayed by the informant to
C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to
conduct surveillance operation against their target female who
was described by their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in
height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their
informant went to their headquarters and informed them that their
suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum
and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to
Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the entrance of the road
going to Sapang Biabas. While they were in their car, the informer
pointed to them a woman bearing the same description given by
the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently
loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. The two officers
proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed
marijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the
sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers
and requested the woman to put out the contents of the said
sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like
substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick,
which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers
revealed dried marijuana leaves. The woman who was arrested
identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of
Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the
suspected dried marijuana leaves were brought to the police
officer's headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. The
evidence confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas where it was examined by Chief
Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor. The Initial Laboratory Report issued
indicated that the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves weighing 14.75 kilograms were found to be
positive for marijuana.
93
inadmissible since the warrantless search was invalid, not having been made pursuant
to a lawful arrest.) This contention is without merit since this Court has repeatedly ruled
that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, an
accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless
search. 10 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. 11 Here, in submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she
entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial, the appellant waived any
irregularity that may have attended her arrest. 12
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant to People
vs. Barros,13 reiterated in People vs. Aruta, 14 the waiver of the non-admissibility of the
"fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure is notto be
casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was
actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, an act
prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on
appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting
police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons
and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. 15
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a
peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit
an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred by probable cause in making
the arrest. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. 16The determination of probable cause must be
resolved according to the facts of each case. In this case, the arresting officers had
probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their informant.
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search. 17 Although the apprehending officers received the tip two
weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant
inasmuch as the exact date of appellant's arrival was not known by the informant.
Apprehending officer PO3 Sagum testified 18 as follows:
Q So what were the information given you by your informer?
A Ang kausap po nila iyong hepe namin[g] si Maj. Rhodel
Sermonia tapos po sinabi lang po sa amin ni
Maj. Sermonia ang sinabi ng informant.
Q So you did not hear the report of the informant?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the information given by your superior?
94
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what were the instruction given by your superior?
Q What time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from that, was the quantity of the drugs given to you that
was to be brought?
A No, sir.
95
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August
13, 1999 and informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just
an hour later) that day. The circumstances clearly called for an immediate response
from the officers. In People vs. Valdez, 25 this Court upheld the validity of the warrantless
arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the officer made the arrest on
the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent
details were known by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a
search warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days. 26 Considering that
the officers did not know when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them
act the way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi.
Appellant's alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the
prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak 27 and for it to serve as basis for an
acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the
physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. 28 The appellant failed to meet
these two requirements. Jaime Alarcon's house where appellant claimed to be sleeping
at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was
arrested by the officers. 29 Thus, the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of
appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
With the effectivity of RA 7659, Section 4 of RA 6425, provides the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 if the marijuana
involved weighs 750 grams or more. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, the rules for applying the penalties in Article 63 of theRevised Penal Code are
applicable, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Simon 30wherein the Court recognized
the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by RA
7659. Thus, as the appellant was found to be transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana,
the trial court was correct in imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua since
there was no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which is not applicable when indivisible penalties are
imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City,
finding the appellant guilty of transporting a prohibited drug and sentencing her
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Ayangao y Batong-Og, G.R. No. 142356, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 379394)
96
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128587. March 16, 2007.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this
Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolution 1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wang'sDemurrer to
Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely:
(1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section
2 (e) (2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal
Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential DecreeNo. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No.
2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known
as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags
weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law. 2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup
pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying
the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public
place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without
first securing the written permission or authority from the
Commission on Elections, as provided by the COMELEC Resolution
2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations
and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not
Guilty" be entered for him. 5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases
followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely,
Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal,
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known
as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck,
alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and
company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives
that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively,
of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
Wang. 6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the
97
following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at
the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for
Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa
Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. TCacI
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of
17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness)
together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that
he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. 7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right
pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in
the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an
unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search. 8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang
was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to
Evidence. 9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed aManifestation 10 to the effect
that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two
cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest
and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution's evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang
filed an Amplification 12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12
February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition 13 alleging that the warrantless
search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is
now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the
herein assailed Resolution 14 granting Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him
of all charges for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is
hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of the charges against
him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation
of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu
with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed
pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are
ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch
clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the
Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms
to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC,
Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return
the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the
confiscated BMW car to its registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition 15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial
court erred
I
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION,
AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER
JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND
THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
II
. . . IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
III
. . . IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
. . . IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A
RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH
AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
. . . IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND
OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
98
In its Resolution 16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition,
required the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from
notice. Private respondent Wang filed his comment 17 on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, 18 which the Office
of the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial
court's resolution granting Wang's demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal
by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to
this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised
only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals 21 ). Although
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may
appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made
subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic
that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review
by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily
puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of
acquittal.
An order granting an accused's demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents one exception to the
rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or
suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory
decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on
99
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence. In point is
the fairly recent case of People v. Uy, 23 which involved the trial court's decision which
granted the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both
with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due
to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this
Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the
rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a
safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to
the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In
this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United
States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v.
Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few,
are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and safeguard him from government oppression
through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly
observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
100
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done viathe special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of
the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of
Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with
the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
101
102
as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26 However, if
there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows
that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully
arrested in flagrante delicto 27without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar,
the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of
all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial
court's ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to
Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful
as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the
defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace
officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another. None of these
circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The
accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers
arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was
not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither
was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or
that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT
Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants.
And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not
give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside
the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting
officers had noinformation and knowledge that the accused was
carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession
thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo
Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from
the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.
The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver's seat of the car. The
police officers had noinformation, or knowledge that the banned
articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them
there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that
there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police
Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo are hereunder
quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL'S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along
Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen
effected the arrest of the accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by
one of those whom we have previously apprehended in
connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in
Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa,
what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during
that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
103
A. Yes, Sir.
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr.
Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him
and we asked him to open the back compartment of his
car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one
loaded magazine and likewise when the compartment
was opened several plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were
found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm,
a Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further
investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did
you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the
NBI for laboratory examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN,
pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).
104
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and
search were made, is it not?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they
were investigated, Teck mentioned the name of
Lawrence Wang as his employer. cCHITA
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three
(3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a
certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they
divulged the name of the source.
105
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the
car, what did you do with that?
A: Yes, Sir.
COURT: When?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also
investigated by your team?
A. We approached him.
A: Yes, Sir.
106
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you
confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me
that they were working for the accused.
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was
intending to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was
another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of
(stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is
scheduled on?
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to
prevent your team from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask
him to shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of
these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and
did your team suspect the accused as being involved in
the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor
and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you
know whether he was carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in
possession of the gun is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when
Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing
anything else?
107
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless
arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a)
of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. 29
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from theMaria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open
the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David
Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30
arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.
Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of
the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo's declaration that
there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17,
which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the
description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin, 31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the
marijuana found in appellant's possession during a search without a warrant, because it
had been illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification of the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The People's contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his
arrest and the search on his person and belongings. 32 The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33 Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment
bolsters Wang's claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was
108
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name
of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I
think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. HScCEa
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL
GALLARDE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sansano-Suyat Law Office for accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan,
Branch 51, finding accused-appellant Radel Gallarde 1 (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. T-1978, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay the heirs of Editha
Talan (hereafter EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages. 2
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: cdtai
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst
the field located at Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy
Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez,
and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant and material facts established by their
testimonies are faithfully summarized in the Appellee's Brief as follows:
In the evening of May 26 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo
and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their
neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Radel
Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez,
Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel
Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as
they partook beer (TSN dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to
dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, appellant
suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate.
Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking
to each other. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding
him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house
(Id., pp. 4-6). dctai
Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene
lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha
answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left
enroute to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed
but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place
where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and
informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to
help look for her (Id., p. 10).
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario
Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter,
together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie
109
110
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died. She
was still alive when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home.
From the time he arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers
knew it for a fact. 7
On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting GALLARDE of the
crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the
lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It observed:
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangin's testimony thereon show that the late
Editha Talan sustained slit wounds inflicted as a means of
suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion of her
vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her
vagina was blood, coupled with dirt. Had there been observed the
presence of even just a drop of seminal fluid in or around her
vagina, the Court would readily conclude that the laceration and
rupture resulted from phallic intrusion. Without such observation,
however, "carnal knowledge" as element of rape would be an
open question.
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as
a mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code because GALLARDE's alleged inebriation on the night of 6 May 1997, was not
satisfactorily proven.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties
on 27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and
leaving the matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court. The trial court was
not inclined to award moral damages because the "evidence before it tends to
disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected
child."
Accordingly, in its decision 8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the accused RADEL
GALLARDE YHERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. 9
His motion for reconsideration, 10 having been denied by the trial court in its
Resolution 11 of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us. cdphil
We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder
in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory
portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying
circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex
crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape, 13 it
is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence
fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be
convicted of the other. 14 In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in
case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must
be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. 15 It is
fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out
in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. 16
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance,
GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under
which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the
complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right. 17
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution,
although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA. cdasia
In his Appellant's Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the trial court
committed the following errors:
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 18 The prosecution is not always
111
15. When asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen
empty, Gallarde said he was with Kiko and he slept at the
latter's house, which answer Mario Bado promptly refuted
saying, "Vulva of your mother . . . Kiko was with me
drinking." Bado and Kiko were not at the place of the
Talans that night.
16. Yanked out of the dark toilet near his own house, Gallarde
joined Kgd. Mario Fernandez sans protest.
17. Dr. Tebangin found on Editha's cheeks two slit wounds, each
being an inch away from her nostrils. Both wounds were
fresh and reddish.
112
We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I", "J" and
"K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same
were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police." The taking of
pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination 26 proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence
the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 27 The essence of the right
against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. 28 Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; 29 and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as
to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; 30 to
expel morphine from his mouth; 31 to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its
identity with bloody footprints; 32 and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done. 33
There is also no merit in GALLARDE's argument that the failure of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is
fatal and will justify his acquittal.
The place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of
the crime of rape with homicide. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge
of a woman and that on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide
was committed. Conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime
provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the
date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period of the statute of
limitation, and within the jurisdiction of the court. 34
The allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of
the essential ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the
court. 35 The rule merely requires that the information shows that the crime was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Court may even take judicial
notice that said place is within its jurisdiction. 36
As to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase "on or about" employed in the
information does not require the prosecution "to prove any precise date or time," but
may prove any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the
defendant." 37
113
Contrary to the claim of GALLARDE, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate
time of the commission of the crime, which was sometime between 9:00 p.m., when
GALLARDE left the house of Talan followed by EDITHA, and 10:30 p.m., when the body of
EDITHA was found. This was further corroborated by the examining physician who
testified, on the basis of the degree of rigor mortis, that EDITHA died more or less, at
10:00 p.m. of 6 May 1997. 38
Likewise, GALLARDE's alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. He did not present
witnesses who could confirm his presence in his house. No member of his family
corroborated him on this matter. The defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in
law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. 39
Moreover, even assuming that GALLARDE's claim is true, his stay in his house did not
preclude his physical presence at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The place
where the body of EDITHA was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place
pointed to in the alibi and can be reached in a short while. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to
prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. 40
Besides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution
that might prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is
settled that when there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the witnesses were not so
actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit. 41 Testimonies of
witnesses who have nomotive or reason to falsify or perjure their testimonies should be
given credence.42
With respect to GALLARDE's claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say
that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea. 43 The records show no objection was ever interposed prior to
arraignment and trial. 44 GALLARDE's assertion that he was denied due process by
virtue of his alleged illegal arrest is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered
during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter. 45 It is settled
that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 46 It is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the
accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him. 47 Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused. 48
Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the
114
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her
liberty.
The facts are not in dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon.
Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal
for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, now
become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused
to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be
committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
The sole legal issue arising from the admitted facts is whether the
compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal
Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and
practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence,
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . (President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United
States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such
bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is
brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical
question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the
conservative courts emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of the constitutional
provision and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that its mantle may cover
any fact by which the accused is compelled to make evidence against himself.
(Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259 with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14
Nev., 79. See further State vs. Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902],
117 Iowa, 650; Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this
view and almost directly in point is People vs. McCoy relating to self-incrimination.
Thereupon she was found ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A woman was charged with
the crime of infanticide. The coroner directed two physicians to go to the jail and
examine her private parts to determine whether she had recently been delivered
of a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened with force,
yielded, and the examination was had. The evidence of these physicians was
offered at the trial and ruled out. The court said that the proceeding was in
violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Continuing, the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and
compelled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been
delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look
into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel the
prisoner now to submit to an examination of her private parts and breasts, by
physicians, and then have them testify that from such examination they are of the
opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has
that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained
would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain
from saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially
the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant case
was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the court
should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to disclose
only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. But having disabused
our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and
having been able, as we think, to penetrate through the maze of law reports to the
policy which lies behind the constitutional guaranty and the common law principle,
we have come finally to take our stand with what we believe to be the reason of
the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem
to us more progressive in nature. Among these can be prominently mentioned
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of these
Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of
Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection based upon
what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." (See
also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York
[1903], 192 U. S., 585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions,
has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23 Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong
[1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567,
568, citing the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands as authority.)
Although we have stated a proposition previously announced by this
court and by the highest tribunal in the United States, we cannot unconcernedly
leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes, to which we have alluded, there was inserted the careful proviso that "we
need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit
himself." Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact
location of the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this
very broad constitutional field. But here before us is presented what would seem to
be the most extreme case which could be imagined. While the United States
Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree that testimony that an accused person
put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the constitutional provision,
115
while the Supreme Court of Nevada could go so far as to require the defendant to
roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands could permit substances taken from the person of an accused
to be offered in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an
order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity
to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent to the retention of a
principle which would permit of such a result by adhering steadfastly to the
proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to
prohibit testimonial compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them
entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the agreeable state of breaking new
ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason
and justice than on a weak one of blind adherence to tradition and precedent.
Moreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the history of the
constitutional provision will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the
causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was
recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world,
in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against
odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary
to the fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the
American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine
Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English
days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but
with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses.
(Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15
Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610, found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and
U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], 3 Phil., 143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back
once more to elementals and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal
trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of
persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided,
not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be so
rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the
truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend
to establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make
the defendant admit her guilt might only result in inducing her to tell a falsehood.
But noevidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to
account a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent
right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to
one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of
the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891], 141 U. S.,
250) said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault,
and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the same court, even
superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which
the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too
frequently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without
any mental evasion, questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to
degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of
disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of
delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an
unwarranted extent that criminal trials have sometimes seemed to be like a game
of shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal as
guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a loose
extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense,
which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless
enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and
reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once' again we lay
down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or
force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary
and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, noobjection
to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the
assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was
phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the
limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed
for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
116
includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippinesversus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
22- Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 20 September 1996
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996.]
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ,
JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN,
and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996.]
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Manuel G. Abello for petitioners.
Roco Bunag Kapunan & Migallos for Raul S. Roco.
Mario E. Ongkiko for Presidential Commission on Good Government.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J p:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the
workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are
based the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty
of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of
trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we
have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to
the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31,
1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P.
Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA
Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply,
as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of
the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in
the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the
course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent
Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good government
(hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. 3 Respondent
PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the
following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of
the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices
(ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated
with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of
the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
117
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT
118
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
119
our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some
are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really
just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There
are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the
time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial
year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care
of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records.
These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these
nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion
as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such
being the case, respondent PCGG hasno valid cause of action as against petitioners
and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Italics ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division,
entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government"
respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on
December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so
called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco"; that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in
Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds
of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish
through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that
these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are
important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being
held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they
also executed deeds of assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to
120
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust
and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles
of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer
them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious,
to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedureenacted by
the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically
"forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by
the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of theRules of Court, the attorneyclient privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk
be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken
or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum
the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is
to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his
client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve
several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege
gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to
counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without
effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets
revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away
from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too
high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed
thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once selfevident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to
a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is
largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and
client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a
matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.30 Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
121
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent
is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a
lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the
relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege
actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed
his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or
that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that
she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not
remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for
contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the
lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the
circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name
of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is
privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the
client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of
the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United
States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including
the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to
Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding
payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements
may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can
show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity
for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680.
While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California
law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that
the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy
behind the attorney-client privilege. "In order to promote freedom
of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's
consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra Sec.2291, at 545. In furtherance of
this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For
instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.Terminal Cab
Corporation, 37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the
latter to civil litigation. llcd
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding,
owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of
the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when
the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact
was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of
legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The
state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his
professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the
insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders
seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney
for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or
claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx.
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the
purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged,
whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any
other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the
communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it
122
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the
IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his
clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients
involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined
to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or
investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the
exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity
exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court
held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception
to the general rule. Here money was received by the government,
paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a
sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the
past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but
one purpose to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or
several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of
guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.
Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship
has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential,
the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46
123
substantiating
the lawyer-client
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or
used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not
have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney
client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that
it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission
of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed
and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under
such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at
the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a
suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any
personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to
be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other,
are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications." 50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within
the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in
the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which
would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably
linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained inIn re Grand Jury
Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek to
avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition
by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which
do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available
source of information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure
of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench
amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we
cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be
revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by
the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s)
a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them
to invoke the privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if
the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon
evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information
which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or
may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about
124
here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and
lonely passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by
which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the
facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege
under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it
would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the
strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties. LLphil
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including
herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their
client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment;
hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to
submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link, "that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private
respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he
acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts
and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of
the principal." 59
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient
to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but
also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel,
claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering." 60 Being
"similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other
125
conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed
to show and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the
undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco
and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special
treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking.
Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the
purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed
certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal
services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the
PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in
the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that
Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the
basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions based on real
differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench,
in violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a
particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to
the liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: 'Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. 63
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 64 it is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's
demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on
documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorneyclient privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever
way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorneyclient confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should
wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere
witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional righ t
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full
course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of
further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction
an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real
and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should
not be allowed to continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth,
we will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right
against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. LibLex
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
execute petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Conception, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as partiesdefendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
126
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise . . . to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the
next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR
Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards
did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would
seem thatno compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from
March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to
the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
". . . with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and
there willfully . . . defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch,
. . . in the following manner, to wit: said accused . . . having been
entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for
one-way-trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with
the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for it and/or to return those unsold, . . . once in possession
thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to
defraud, did then and there . . . misappropriate, misapply and
convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in
spite of repeated demands, . . . failed and refused to make good
his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party
. . ."
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under
the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6 which included "the (above mentioned) statement of
accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office,"
which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission . . . given on
February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs
Evidence." 7Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said
document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed
under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.' "
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part
of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever
they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A
"inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos
127
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition
for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the
name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court
required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed
issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People . . .
vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the
aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments
of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor
General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be
given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent
Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The
Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the
institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by
lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it
was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11to
which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The
section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealth with in
the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right
against self-incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a
person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now
contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
128
altogether. The witness receiving asubpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the
stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed
to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on
the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one
is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not
come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said,
group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of
an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what
makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in
any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not
in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of
law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of
an offense"
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of each right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of . . . (these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a
person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24
129
130
were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby,
annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free
and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that
the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger . . (of) the violation of
the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by
the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because
being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary
interest to protect, they may in their overeagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their
hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere
of moral coercion, undue ascendancy, and undue influence." It suffices to draw
attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary
sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be
informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity
to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by
the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to
solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he
should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to
reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his
making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations.
Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position
paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted
and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation
of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's
expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure
or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for that
matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended.
In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating
consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but
24- Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, 26 May 1969
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969.]
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and
ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torresand Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil & Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever
appropriately invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the
adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v. Castillo, 3 decided in 1937, was quite
categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the
constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not
a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the
person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision,
as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of
the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
131
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of
Cabal v. Kapunan, 5 where it was held that a respondent in an administrative
proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand at
the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was
sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first
witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against
the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that
at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitionerappellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitionerappellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional
right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the
Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to
testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness
stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion
for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being
quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling
him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a
bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ
of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue
against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further
proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the
matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner-appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against selfincrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses
interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law," precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board,
therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton,
the complainants in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee,
asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted
and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the
power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take
the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to
incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self- incrimination cannot
be availed of in an administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of
petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this appeal both by
respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for
the petitioner-appellee.
1.We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle
announced by us in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative
charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft
Act, 9 the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be
ordered to take the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal
to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of
respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this
proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle
that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter
referred to an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act
authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may
acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is
clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in
character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar;
petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of
property but the revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even
greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus be distinguished, it suffices to refer
to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the
language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude .. that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by
imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for
asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding
that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2.The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board
and intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which
could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of
such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is the protection
132
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in
a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If
that were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905,
we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his
silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not
be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most
heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . . . must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of
humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or
compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis
on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with
the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16
In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could
be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold
that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L. (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Capistrano,
JJ.,concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on official leave.
||| (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, [May 26, 1969], 138
PHIL 361-369)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19052. December 29, 1962.]
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and
THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T . Reyes for respondents City of Manila.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to
restrain the Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, and to set aside an
order of said respondent, as well as the whole proceedings in said criminal case.
On or about August 2, 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the
Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel F. Cabal,
then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman, dictatorial
tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally
reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a
committee of five (5) members, consisting of former Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor,
as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and
Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and
recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, on
September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant, Col. Maristela,
ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon,
petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela
and to the aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand
and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
133
the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor and that it fails to specify
whether said offense shall be treated as contempt of an inferior court or of a superior
court; (3) that more than one offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to
petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court, as contempt of a
superior court and as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court; (4) that
the Committee had no power to order and require petitioner to take the witness stand
and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch
as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
By resolution dated October 14, 1961, respondent Judge denied said motion to quash.
Thereupon, or on October 20, 1961, petitioner began the present action for the purpose
adverted to above, alleging that, unless restrained by this Court, respondent Judge may
summarily punish him for contempt, and that such action would not be appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being
conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in
nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary
investigations (Section 38-C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic ActNo.
1201) is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580, of the Revised
Administrative Code, contempt against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as
contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only one offense;
and that, under the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein
may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only
to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils
down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil
or criminal in character.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to
investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to
beno question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he nolonger
holds such office. It seems, likewise, conceded that the purpose of the charge against
petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a
public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of
the nature of a penalty.
"In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property
without compensation, in consequence of a default or an offense,
and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as
thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere
convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a
prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary
by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and
to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a
134
forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner
to the sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599) (Emphasis ours.)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring
of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the consequence of
violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with
some requirement of law.' It may be said to be a penalty imposed
for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to
be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that
seek nojudgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are
deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are
criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res
illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture
proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held
to be so far in the nature of criminal proceedings that a general
verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one count is
good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the
owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from being a
witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production
of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612; Emphasis ours.)
"Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the later decisions
are to the effect that suits for forfeitures incurred by the commission
of offenses against the law are so far of a quasi-criminal nature as
to be within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of .
. . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . . It has frequently been held upon
constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution that a
witness or party called as a witness cannot be made to testify
against himself as to matters which would subject his property to
forfeiture. At early common law no person could be compelled to
testify against himself or to answer any question which would have
had a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture, or to form a
link in a chain of evidence for that purpose as well as to incriminate
him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection against
compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to
a forfeiture, such protection was claimed and availed of in some
early American cases without placing the basis of the protection
upon constitutional grounds." (23 Am. Jur. 616; Emphasis ours.)
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and
in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing
that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be
135
Bengzon, C . J ., is on leave.
||| (Cabal v. Kapunan, G.R. No. L-19052, [December 29, 1962], 116 PHIL 1361-1370)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32025. September 23, 1929.]
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a
proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a
certain revenue law, "though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a
criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal
proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the U.S. which declares that noperson shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in
Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said
portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecuted is
not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons
charged with the commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is an action, suit
or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with this object in
view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . .". This
view was, in effect confirmed in Lees vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151). Hence, the Lawyers
Reports Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent cases,
concludes that said constitutional provision applies whenever the proceeding is
not "purely remedial", or intended "as a redress for a private grievance", but primarily to
punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending in a like
manner . . ."
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30,
1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to
substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon
the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however,
to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined
permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Regalaand Makalintal, JJ ., concur.
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
Barrera,
Paredes,
Dizon,
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J p:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains
that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to
take dictation in his won handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaints filed in these
proceedings; but the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the
remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and
later granted by the court below, and against which the instance action was
brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and
on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs.Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United
States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United Statesvs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited
by counsel for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62)
cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and
the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at
136
the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks
refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated
in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the
constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute
what is enjoined upon him by the order against which these proceedings were
taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which
(in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General
Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56.
As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the
English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall
he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover,
as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution
and in the constitutions of several states of the United States, but expressed
differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common
conception.
"In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon
the variations of wordings in the constitutional clauses; this much is
conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the
witness is protected by one Constitution from 'testifying,' or by
another from 'furnishing evidence,' or by another from 'giving
evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various
phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of
the protected disclosure. What is that conception?" (4 Wigmore on
Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but
extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
"The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional
provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their
relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the
evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to construe
the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit
any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the wellestablished doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
137
For this reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert 941
Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that the defendant could not be compelled to write his
name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
"The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the
indorsement.
"He was then cross-examined and questioned in regard to
his having signed papers not in the case, and was asked in
particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior to
the note in suit, and whether he would not write his name there in
court. The judge excluded all these inquiries, on objection, and it is
our these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the
questions was to bring into the case extrinsic signatures, for the
purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think the judge was
correct in ruling against it."
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4,
page 878), says:
"Measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or
shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to
make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to
move his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of his last
assertion on specimens of handwriting. We noted that in the same
paragraph 2265, where said author treats of "Bodily Exhibition," and
under proposition "1. A great variety of concrete illustrations have
been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among them that of
People vs.Molineux (61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen,
has no application to the case at bar because there the
defendant voluntarily gave specimens of his handwriting, while
here the petitioner refuses to do so and has even instituted these
prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the
present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which to our mind
is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in
his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
". . . 2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and
Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of documents or
chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in
138
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 7081. September 7, 1912.]
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil.,
145), where the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the
substance later used as evidence against him.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that
the court preferred to rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on
blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case there consisted in that it
was a case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and
doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner
therein to furnish evidence by means of a testimonial act. In reality she was not
compelled to execute any position act, much less a testimonial act; she was only
enjoined from something, preventing the examination; all of which is very different
from what is required of the petitioner in the present case, where it is sought to
compel his to perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of
his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Beside, in the case of
Villaflor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while
in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is
precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by means,
evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously
incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of
United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was to
compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth the
morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to
furnish, much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for
his own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that
the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for
the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns and Villa-Real,
JJ., concur.
||| (Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, [September 23, 1929], 53 PHIL
570-579)
139
"IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the
evidence."
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party,
Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of September, 1910,
staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila;
that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house;
that some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister
of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after having
taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room
and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of
the face powder upon his private parts, he threw the said Oliva upon the floor,
placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position for some little time.
Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered
that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at
the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon
the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot an
investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected
together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The
defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once
as the one who had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined
the defendant swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of
the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the
Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same.
The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from
gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the
testimony of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony
should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her with
reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had
sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her
testimony with full faith and credit. With the conclusion of the lower court, after
reading her declaration, we fully concur.
The defense in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal
disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such
as is described in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of
supporting that contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question said:
"We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to
whether or not this disease might, in exceptional cases, arise from
other than carnal contact. The medical experts, as well as the
books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if
this was an exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the
defense to bring it within the exception."
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private
parts upon hers for some moments. The defendant was found to be suffering from
gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have
been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do
the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which
Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the
defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva contracted said obnoxious disease from the
defendant is not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only
corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution
was brought for the purpose of compelling him to pay to the sister of Oliva a
certain sum of money.
The defendant testified and brought other Chinamen to support his
declaration, that the sister of Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not
pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to believe that the sister, after having
become convinced that Oliva had been outraged in the manner described
above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest
women do not consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of their near
relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the
scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from
his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as
proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge Lobingier,
in discussing that question in his sentence, said:
"The accused was not compelled to make any admissions
or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found
on his person was examined; seems no more to infringe the rule
invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen
property taken from the person of a thief."
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the
result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property
upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So
also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had
furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have
been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as
proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing
140
in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as
evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give
testimony against himself.
caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the jury, and
witnesses who had observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the commission
of the crime were permitted to compare them with what they had observed at
that place.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first
assignment of error is not a new question, either to the courts or authors. In the case
of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this
question, said:
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence
against him.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the
testimony of a physician or a medical expert who had been appointed to make
observations of a person who plead insanity as a defense, where such medical
testimony was against the contention of the defendant. The medical expert must
necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making such
examination. (People vs. Austin, 199 N. Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by the
appellant would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the body
of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have been
received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the
injured parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions.
The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme
court of the State of New Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71 N. J) Law Reports,
527). In that case the court said, speaking through its chancellor:
"It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in
which the accused was confined, to testify to wounds observed by
him on the back of the hands of the accused, although he also
testified that he had the accused removed to a room in another
part of the jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made
by the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him,
was in no sense a compelling of the accused to be a witness
against himself. If the removal of the clothes had been forcible and
the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of
their character and appearance would not have been
objectionable."
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his
hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was committed, for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not his hand would have produced the bloody print. The
court said, in discussing that question:
"It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the
coincidence between the hand of the accused and the bloody
prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was
committed, the hand of the accused having been placed thereon
at the request of persons who were with him in the house."
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints
was produced before the jury and the testimony of such comparison was like that
held to be proper in another case decided by the supreme court of New Jersey in
the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N. J., Law Reports, 271). The defendant
141
testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from
the accused, is not testimony by his body but his body itself.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.]
(U.S. v. Tan Teng, G.R. No. 7081, [September 7, 1912], 23 PHIL 145-154)
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower court
and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, 4whereupon
he was tried.
28- People v. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55, 19 April 2001
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame,
142
Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant
Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accusedappellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from
a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with
one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the
warrant. 6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it.
They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then
forced the door open and entered the house. 7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house. 8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing
a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint 9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255
grams. 10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. 12
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house
while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag
containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting
handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon
City, where accused-appellant was detained. 18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony.
Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took
away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec.
16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months
of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic
ActNo. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
143
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)
BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN
USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the
"plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
issuance. 22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal
requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO.
160
For: Violation of RA
6425
SEARCH WARRANT
A Yes, sir.
Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for
monitoring or surveillance?
A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without
anumber located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,
sir.
144
A Yes, sir. 24
A Yes, sir.
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the
amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00)
pesos, sir.
Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert,
do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done
inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him
inside his cabinet.
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT
SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I
proceeded back to our office and reported the progress
of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12
grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant
is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court, 25 the warrant properly described two obscene books but
improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does
not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would
mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the
warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid
portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization
relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of
the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books,
if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles . . . In so holding we do not mean to
suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as
severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that
warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in
character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under
them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be
upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
145
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause
and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not
supported by the evidence. 26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession
of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. 27 It
will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is
in connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as
theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes
alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is
the subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there
is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search
warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso 29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425,"
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search
and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was
issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of
shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for
more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory,
there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one
for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special
law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. 33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As
146
it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both
the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor.
However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris
Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass." 34 In this case, the location of accusedappellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt
that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's
residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the
ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is
contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. 35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification;
(b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police. 36 The question is whether these requisites were complied
with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. 37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However,
a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control. 38 The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach
for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.AHDcCT
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his deposition, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to
justify their seizure. This case is similar to People v. Musa 39 in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were
contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging
in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible
to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could
not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the
bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the
object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic
bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer. 40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when
he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 41 In this
case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the
form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana.
Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly,
for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the
marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
147
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by
the searching party in effecting the raid.
817-837)
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house
to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by
reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons,
like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to
attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain
entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant,
refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door
several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people
inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into
the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accusedappellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of
the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. TaCDIc
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
||| (People v. Salanguit y Ko, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, [April 19, 2001], 408 PHIL
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 93516. August 12, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASILIO
DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon
@ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess,
Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p.
3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons
except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The amended information
reads:
"That on or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing SerialNo. 1249935 with magazine
and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance of, or incident
to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, filed against said
accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of Republic Act
1700, as amended by Executive order No. 276. prLL
"Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866." (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
(Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered
its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed his objections to
the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay,
148
immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he,
thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN,
December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias
Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and
considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or
in connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.
"The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition
and all the articles and/or items seized on June 19, 1988 in
connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as
evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine
Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS DOCUMENTS
AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY
ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED
THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OR OF INCIDENT
TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION." (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
"On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary
officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the
presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, ArellanoBani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended
Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and
Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse
at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with
the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the
house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio,
a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October
23, 1989). LLpr
"After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City,
and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie
Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein
appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by appellant.
When they reached the house, the group found that it had
already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was
hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group
looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him
to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again
required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house,
the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At
first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the
group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group,
as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox copiers and a computer machine. They
also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the
persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales,
Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the
articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that
appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn,
October 31, 1989)." (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against
lawless elements in our society, We must, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this
end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did We
find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining
evidence against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented
against him is weak to justify conviction.
149
We reverse.
"Q: That underground house, do you know who was the principal
occupant of that house?
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole
violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact
that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The
prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
"Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
"Q: How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the
house?
"A: He was not around at that time, but according to Luz
(Tanciangco) who mentioned the name Bernie Mendoza
(as) the one who was renting the house and at the same
time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the
said items." (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
"Q: I am showing you another picture which we request to be
marked as Exhibit 'K-2,' tell us if it has any connection to
the house?
"A: The same house, sir.
"Q: Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the
house at Bonuan Gueset, by the name of Bernie
Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you
find out the identity?
"A: I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de
Guzman. Cdpr
"Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could
tell the true identity of Bernie Mendoza?
"A: The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
"Q: Can you name these officers?
"A: Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico
Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
"M/Sgt. Artemio Gomez
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are
admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People v. Valero, We emphatically
declared that:
"The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the
striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence
admissible. Butadmissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence.Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not has no probative value." (L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA
675, italics supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who
knew the appellant as the lessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the
appellant could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show
any other evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the
house and the owner of the subversive items. To give probative value to these
hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be to
render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house,
the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed
to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. prLL
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in theConstitution
Article III, Section 2. The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in
150
person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (see Rivero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right
is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes
valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle, and (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986,
143 SCRA 267, 267). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims, that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered
the appellant's house upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados,
helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw
a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more
subversive items, that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was
voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly
conducted without a search warrant with the consent of the person searched as in this
case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around
the appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the
authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We find no evidence
that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it
was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such
an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling
cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
(Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted
by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here
demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a
search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the
house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the
license to go inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:
"The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid
because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners
were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before
making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded
the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the
menace of a military invasion." (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151
SCRA 279, 286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accusedappellant is in the identification of the gun which he was charged to have illegally
possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an
M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different
serial number thus:
"FISCAL:
Q. Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the
house? Lt. Quijardo:
A. When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for,
we immediately saw different kinds of books of which we
believed to be used for subversive orientation and the M14 rifle. prcd"
Q. In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which
you mentioned?
A. In the same room of which the subversive documents were
placed.
Q. If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to
identify the same?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a rifle bearing
a serial number 1249985 which for purposes of
identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle
be marked as Exhibit 'D.'
COURT:
Mark it.
"FISCAL:
Q. Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the
relation of that firearm to the firearm which according to
you found inside the room allegedly occupied by one
Bernie Mendoza?
A. This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the
same house." (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, italics
supplied)
151
The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its
correction or lack of it could spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of
the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to
prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the
firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified at the
trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not
been fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's
connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the
prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument
raised by the defense that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with the crime of
subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of
subversion. The defense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed
this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,
We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
"If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and
violence are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its
distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683,
1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976])., the Court categorically
distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:
'Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or
subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime
distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of
rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up
arms against the Government for any of the purposes
specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while
the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700)
punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive
organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must he
a public uprising and taking of arms against the
Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in
a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of
arms by a member of a subversive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises the
penalty to be imposed upon the offender.' (Italics
supplied)
"Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission
(G.R.58284, 109 SCRA 289 [1981]), this Court said that subversion,
like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a
crime against public order. Rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government is the very element of the crime of rebellion. On
the other hand, R.A. 1700was enacted to outlaw the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP), other similar associations and its
successors because their existence and activities constitute a
clear, present and grave danger to national security.
"The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only
constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private
respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in
fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials,
where force and violence is neither necessary or
indispensable." llcd
"Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga
impliedly ruled that if an accused is simultaneously charged with
violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes as applied in rebellion could have found
application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this
Court when it said:
' . . . in the present case, petitioner is being
charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE
IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus, the rulings of the Court inHernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.'
"This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld
the validity of the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1
of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez
case is not applicable in that case, considering that the legislature
deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal
possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866 and (2)
subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the
Government (R.A. 1700). `The practical result of this may be harsh
or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to
those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the
legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws is
something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . " (G.R. Nos. 8383742, April 22, 1992)
152
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the
charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection
with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the
accused on reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costsde oficio.
one
(1)
small
plastic
bag
containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing more
or less fifteen (15) grams, which is a regulated
drug, without any authority whatsoever.
Criminal Case No. 96-513 2
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs.
||| (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, [August 12, 1992])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136066-67. February 4, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ola & Asso. Law Offices for accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two
separate Informations which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-507 1
That on or about the 21st day of September 1996,
in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
and under his control two (2) plastic bags
containing
Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride
(SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and
153
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags
containing crystalline substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at
the PNP Headquarters revealed that the seized items contained shabu. 4Thereafter,
SPO2 Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items for further laboratory
examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After
due testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline
substances yielded positive results for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815
grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms ofshabu. 5
Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his
wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old
route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn
Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he
noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called the
attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made
him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to
open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search
his car. At this time, the police officer's companions arrived at the scene in two cars.
PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby
bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a
bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Gutierrez arrived, who ordered his men to
call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Gutierrez opened the box and
accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. 6
Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points.
He testified that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security
check around the premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel. 7
On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a
decisions, 8 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession
of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession
of 1,955.815 grams ofshabu, accused
Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charge
B. THE
GRAVELY
IN
ITS
154
155
towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accusedappellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation
of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted" 19 accused-appellant and
later on "introduced themselves as police officers." 20 Accused-appellant was arrested
before the alleged drop-off ofshabu was done. Probable cause in this case was more
imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delictoarrest preceding
the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant
that he had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a
crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 21 Hence, inPeople
v. Amminudin, 22 we ruled that "theaccused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).
The reliance of the prosecution in People v.Tangliben 23 to justify the police's actions is
misplaced. In the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police
officers conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San
Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on
those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening,
the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag
were marijuanaleaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of
the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the
very same informant of accused-appellant's activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud,
the team leader of the arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been
telling them about the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual
arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals
the illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:
Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to
you the name of this chinese drug
pusher?
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo
Chua.
156
A. Yes, sir.
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir.
157
warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team's contention that their arrest of
accused-appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.
apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot
be deemed as a valid "stop-and-frisk".
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk
was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s) 25 or contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing
for possibly concealed weapons. 26 The apprehending police officer must have a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. 27 It should therefore be emphasized that a search
and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. 28
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in
accused-appellant's possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline
substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20
rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into
the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on ascertain that the
crystalline substance was shabu. There wasno clear showing that the sealed Zest-O juice
box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small
plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22
caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the
arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals. 29 In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish
eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we
upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao,30 we
also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions,
the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the
peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons where roaming the vicinity.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stopand-frisk" in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first
arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
accused-appellant's business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they
already had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accusedappellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough
to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was,
therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant's
arrest.
Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given
to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the
arrest, the arresting officers had nopersonal knowledge that accused-appellant had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accusedappellant's warrantless arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid
"stop-and frisk". For a valid "stop-and frisk" the search and seizure must precede the
arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the
information about the illegal activities of accused-appellant was not unknown to the
158
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 72564. April 15, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANITA CLAUDIO Y
BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P20,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
"That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited
drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to
Olongapo City." (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
prosecution's evidence as follows:
"To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the
following documentary and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit
"A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried
leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B"
plastic container; "B" marijuana contained in the plastic container;
"B"-1-a" another plastic container; "C" Chemistry Report No. D668-81;"C " Findings: Positive for marijuana; "D, "D-1," D-2 and "D-3;"
"E" and "E" photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and
Paulino Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F Victory Liner
Ticket No. 84977; "G" Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by
P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo; "H"-1 date of receipt of the request; "L"
Certificate of Field Test dated duly 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2-a"
additional wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the
prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obia, Cpl.
Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
"Theresa Ann Bugayong - 22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and
a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila, testified that she
received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo
City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen of marijuana submitted for
examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected
dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in
a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
159
160
161
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II
of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is
not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution
and transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of
marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the
possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1
kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v.
Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three
plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of
prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell,
distribute and deliver said marijuana."
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as
unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
" . . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
162
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the
trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of
testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed
their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).
We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate
their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista,
147 SCRA 500). cdphil
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but
rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat.
Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the
accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony
(People v. De La Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Claudio y Bagtang, G.R. No. 72564, [April 15, 1988], 243 PHIL 795-805)
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six
(6) live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long
and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
revolver." 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
under P.D. 1866 2 thru the following Information: 3
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120
with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions,
one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6)
live ammunitions and one (1) 380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with
clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW." 4
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997.]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,respondents.
Raval and Lokin, Robert A. Padilla and Philip Jurado and R.A.V. Saguisag and Gina C.
Garcia for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J p:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, 5 but granted his application for
bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused, 7 upon advice of counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner
waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case. 10
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25,
1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas
minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice
of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of
Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence
of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The
resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's
decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the
163
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9, 1995 he filed
a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" 17 but the same was
denied by respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution,18 copy of which was
received by, petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review on certiorariwith application for bail 19 followed by
two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental
petition" 21 and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail.
Again, the Solicitor-General22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the
Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court also granted
the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and
thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However, after his vigorous
resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this
Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent
court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation
In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. 25
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and
given credence by respondent court, is as follows: 26
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique
Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the
Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where
they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February
15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 56, ibid.) along Mac Arthur Highway (ibid). While inside the
restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero,
running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement
weather. (p. 7, Ibid.) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis
na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid.). True
enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant,
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the
sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 78, ibid.) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting
something (p. 8, ibid.). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had
happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had
been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p.
11, ibid.). During the chase he was able to make out the
plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15,
1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid.) reporting that a vehicle heading north with
plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p.
20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan,
upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all
units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle
(p. 20,ibid.). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by
the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the
Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja
III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately boarded a mobile
patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the
south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable
way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid.). It took them about ten (10)
seconds to cover the distance between their office and the
Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash
message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal
Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico
Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben
Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid.). SPO Ruben
Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur
Highway to intercept the vehicle with platenumber PMA 777 (p.
10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle
which figured in the hit and run incident, even passing through a
flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in
front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with
the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that
the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to
Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not
164
appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident
(p. 13, ibid.). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the
plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the
hood were dented (p. 12, ibid.). Appellant,
however,arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with
the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to
SPO2 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp.
13-15, ibid.). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture
exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's
back right pocket (p. 16, ibid.). SPO Mercado saw this and so when
appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his
vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp.
16-17, ibid.). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening
himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid.). He saw a baby
armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's
seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semiautomatic mode (pp. 17-21,ibid.). He asked appellant for the
papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they
were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid.). SPO Mercado modified the
arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession of
firearms (p. 28, ibid.). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake
Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid.) where appellant voluntarily
surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a
single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid.)
loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily
surrendered a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine(Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 3637, ibid.) After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the
Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation
Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall Building where he
and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene
Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993) During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating
that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid.). He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the
three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by
Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch
of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993).
The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from
appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 1312 80, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SNA35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p.
6, ibid.). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued
165
by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also
registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the
penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution. cdtai
After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced
that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the
Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There
is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did
not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: 28
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while
he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the
presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as
it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense
committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created
thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard
the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero
vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the
bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at, the scene of the hit and run. 32 We
beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest,
did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most
prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have
put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains
more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is
precisely through this cooperation that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,
cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a
warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take
action. 33 The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, a moving
vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court acknowledges police
authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. 36 Moreover, when caught inflagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense
(illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a
peace officer. 37
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves
the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as
reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. 39 These formed
part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily
then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not
on unreliable hearsay information. 40
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection,
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in
estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner
patently waived such irregularities and defects.43
166
167
168
169
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO
M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector,
PNP
Chief,
Records
Branch" 78
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of,
or a certification from, the. PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of illegal possession of firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we
reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license.
From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or
permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may
even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence 81 that an M-16 rifle and any short
firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be
licensed to a civilian, 82 as in the case of petitioner The Court, therefore,
entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find noplausible
reason and none was presented, to depart from the factual findings of both the trial
court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect
and finality. 83
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applyingP.D.
1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non subversive context" and adds that
respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession
of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed underP.D. 1866 no longer
exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple
illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution. 85
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's
commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it
stands. 87 And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it
should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum toreclusion
170
disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the
basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
investigation."5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accusedappellant, who was eventually convicted. 6
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
||| (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, [March 12, 1997], 336 PHIL
383-414)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y
AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court,
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of
their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they
waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that
she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the
basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag
was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11 He alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood
in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that
he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at
the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to
mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a
secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was
bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 1 6 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away
171
the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend
whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial
judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the
opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful
pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or
expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of
this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the
accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it
later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is
possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention
by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984
and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim
that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly
found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The
decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this
after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the
bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest, 20another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks
before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:
"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to
the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the
possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25,
1984 we have already reports of the particular operation
which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before
June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence
report?
"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal
gambling operation.
"COURT:
"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive any report
regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin?
"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
"Q What were those activities?
"A Purely marijuana trafficking.
"Q From whom did you get that information?
"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot
identify the person.
"Q But you received it from your regular informer?
"ATTY. LLARIZA:
"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
"A Marijuana, sir.
172
"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he
was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when
I received the information that he was coming. Regarding
the reports on his activities, we have reports that he has
already consummated the act of selling and shipping
marijuana stuff.
"COURT:
"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you sure of that?
"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect
that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25,
1984?
"A Only on the 23rd of June.
"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or
search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence
report?
"A No, more.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could
not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can
be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught redhanded, as result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics
173
agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered
his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he
must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen
years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained
without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that
kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the
Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea JJ. concur.
SECOND DIVISION
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own
words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty.
The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally.
It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search
was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would
inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including
the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the
innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminal should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
174
175
the criminal act they were about to commit. That these circumstances played out
in their presence supplied probable cause for the search. The police acted on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. 7 Since the seized shabu resulted from a
valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the accused.
It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the
appropriate court for a search warrant since their suspicion found factual support
only at the moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida
Quebral rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the
hand over of the drugs. An immediate search was warranted since they would
have gone away by the time the police could apply for a search warrant. 8 The
drugs could be easily transported and concealed with impunity. 9
The case of People v. Aminnudin 10 cannot apply to this case.
InAminnudin, the informant gave the police the name and description of the
person who would be coming down from a ship the following day carrying a
shipment of drugs. In such a case, the Court held that the police had ample time to
seek a search warrant against the named person so they could validly search his
luggage. In the present case, all the information the police had about the persons
in possession of the prohibited drugs was that they were two men and a woman on
board an owner type jeep. A search warrant issued against such persons could be
used by the police to harass practically anyone.EIDTAa
Two. The accused-appellants point out that the testimony of PO3 Galvez
cannot support their conviction since it does not bear the corroboration of the
other officers involved in the police operation against them. But the failure of these
other officers did not weaken the prosecution evidence. The lone declaration of an
eyewitness is sufficient to convict if, as in this case, the court finds the same
credible. 11 Credibility goes into a person's integrity, to the fact that he is worthy of
belief, 12 and does not come with the number of witnesses. 13
The accused-appellants also point out that, since the chemist who
examined the seized substance did not testify in court, the prosecution was unable
to establish the indispensable element of corpus delicti. But this claim is
unmeritorious. This Court has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist
in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. 14The corpus delicti in
dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. This means that proof
beyond doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential. 15
Chemical Officer Sta. Maria that the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez gave to her for
examination contained shabu is conclusive in the absence of evidence proving
the contrary. At any rate, as the CA pointed out, the defense agreed during trial to
dispense with the testimony of the chemist and stipulated on his findings. 17
Parenthetically, the accused-appellants raised their objection to the police chemist's
report only on appeal when such objection should have been made when the
prosecution offered the same in evidence. They may, thus, be considered to have
waived their objection to such report. 18 The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the
inadmissibility of certain documents, if not urged before the court below, cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 19
The accused-appellants take advantage of PO3 Galvez's testimony that
they conducted their operation on September 2, 2002, the date that the informant
gave them, and that the following day was September 8, 2002 20 to attack his
credibility. But inconsistency is trivial and appears to be a pure mistake. Lapses like
this even enhance the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness as they erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed declaration. 21 Besides, PO3 Galvez corrected this mistake
on cross-examination. He said that their informant gave them his tip at 7:00 p.m. of
September 7, 2002. 22
Finally, the accused-appellants contend that the prosecution evidence
failed to show compliance with the requirements of law for handling evidence. But,
as has been held in a recent case, 23 failure to comply strictly with those
requirements will not render the seizure of the prohibited drugs invalid for so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers. Besides, the accused-appellants did not raise it
before the trial court, hence, they cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal. 24 ECaSIT
The CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Galvez and
this Court finds no reason for disagreement. His narration was clear and candid. On
the other hand, the accused-appellants' claim of a "frame-up" was easy to
concoct and so has been the common line of defense in most cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 25 Such defense requires strong and
convincing evidence which the accused-appellants failed to satisfy.
As the trial court correctly observed, the accused-appellants failed to
provide any reason why of all the people plying through the roads they had taken,
the police chose to frame them up for the crime. They also failed to explain why
the police would plant such huge amount of shabu if a small quantity would be
sufficient to send them to jail. 26 No arresting officer would plant such quantity
of shabu solely to incriminate the accused who have not been shown to be of
good financial standing. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 13, 2008 and of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
dated March 18, 2004.
176
SO ORDERED.
Reply. 10 AFP-RSBS, 11 Espreme Realty, 12and, BPI 13 filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss which respondents opposed.HDIaET
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136051. June 8, 2006.]
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P.
ROSETE,petitioners, vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45400 dated 24 August 1998 which upheld the
Orders of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q95-25803 dated 22 July 1997 2 and 27 August 1997, 3 allowing the taking of deposition
upon oral examination of petitioners Oscar P. Mapalo and Chito P. Rosete, and its
Resolution 4 dated 19 October 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Relevant to the petition are the following antecedents:
On 5 December 1995, respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before Branch 77 of the
RTC of Quezon City a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages
against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and
Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo,
Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the
Province of Mindoro Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-25803. 5 It asked,
among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain
parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the
latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute
the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands to respondents,
and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the
name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.
On 18 January 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit and that venue has been
improperly laid. 6 A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner Alfredo P.
Rosete on 23 January 1996. 7 Respondents opposed the Motion to Dismiss filed by
petitioners 8 to which petitioners filed their Reply. 9Respondents filed a Comment on the
In an Order dated 12 March 1996, the Motions to Dismiss filed by all the defendants
were denied. 14 The Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners15 and BPI, 16 which
respondents opposed, 17 were also denied in an Order dated 24 May 1996. 18
On 6 June 1996, BPI filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim 19 to
which respondents filed their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 20Respondents also
filed a Motion 21 to Serve Supplemental Allegation against BPI and petitioner Chito
Rosete which the trial court granted in an order dated 28 July 1996. 22
On 7 June 1996, petitioners manifested that on 5 June 1996, they filed a
Petition23 for Certiorari and Prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. SPNo. 40837, challenging the trial court's Orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May
1996 that denied their Motions to Dismiss and Reconsideration, respectively. 24They
likewise informed the trial court that on 6 June 1996, they filed an Ex-ParteMotion 25 to
Admit Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela. 26
On 7 August 1996, petitioner Chito Rosete filed a motion asking that the order granting
the Motion to Serve Supplemental Allegation against BPI and him be reconsidered and
set aside, and that respondents be ordered to reduce their supplemental allegations in
the form and manner required by the Rules of Court.27 Same was denied in an order
dated 12 August 1996. 28 This denial was appealed to the Court of Appeals on 26
August 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41821. 29
Petitioner Chito Rosete filed his Supplemental Answer (Ex Abudanti Cautela) on 9
September 1996. 30
On 28 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
giving notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of
petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. 31
On 13 June 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination. 32 They argued that the deposition may not be
taken without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not
yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela, pending resolution of
the Petition for Certiorari challenging the orders dated 12 March 1996 and 24 May 1996
that denied their Motions to Dismiss and for Reconsideration, respectively. This is in
addition to the fact that they challengedvia a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals the lower court's Orders dated 23 July 1996 and 12 August 1996 which,
respectively, granted respondents' Motion to Serve Supplemental Allegation Against
Defendants BPI and Chito Rosete, and for the latter to plead thereto, and denied Chito
Rosete's Motion for Reconsideration of the order dated 23 July 1996. Moreover, they
contend that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of
Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the present case
wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private complainant and petitioners are the
177
respondents, to permit the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right
against self-incrimination because by means of the oral deposition, respondents would
seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the allegations
of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.
On 24 August 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorariand
Prohibition, and upheld the Orders of the lower court dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August
1997 (CA-G.R. SP No. 45400). 52 The Motion for Reconsideration 53which was
opposed 54 by respondents was denied on 19 October 1998. 55
Petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review onCertiorari.
They anchor their petition on the following grounds:
In an Order dated 22 July 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' motion and
objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled the taking
thereof. 35 On 7 August 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 36They filed
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 11 August 1997. 37
On 13 August 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Cancel or Suspend the
Taking of the Deposition Upon Oral Examination. 38
In an Order dated 27 August 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, and scheduled the
taking of the Deposition Upon Oral Examination. 39
On 22 September 1997, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: (1) To Strike Out Answer
of Defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete; (2) to Declare Defendants Mapalo and Chito
Rosete In Default; and (3) For Reception of Plaintiffs' EvidenceEx-parte, 40 which
petitioners opposed. 41
On 29 September 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
forCertiorari and Prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 45400) assailing the Orders of the lower
court dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997. 42
In an Order dated 29 October 1997, the lower court: (1) ordered the striking out from the
record of the Answer ex abudanti cautela filed by petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete
for their continued unjustified refusal to be sworn pursuant to Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; (2) declared defendants Mapalo and Chito Rosete in default; and I
allowed plaintiffs to present their evidence ex-parteas regards the latter. 43 On 25
November 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Omnibus Motion (1) For
Reconsideration; (2) To Lift Order of Default; and (3) To Hold In Abeyance Presentation
of Plaintiffs' Evidence Ex-parte. 44 The day after, petitioners filed an Amended Omnibus
Motion. 45
On 28 November 1997, respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Ex-partePresentation
of Evidence 46 which the lower court set for 11 December 1997. 47
In an Order dated 11 December 1997, the lower court denied petitioners' urgentexparte omnibus motion. 48 On even date, the ex-parte presentation of evidence against
petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete was terminated. 49
On 10 February 1998, petitioners filed a Petition 50 for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 46774) questioning the lower court's Orders dated
29 October 1997 and 11 December 1997. 51
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN ITS ORDER DATED AUGUST 27, 1997
THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION OF
OSCAR MAPALO AND CHITO ROSETE WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED BY
THE TAKING OF THEIR DEPOSITION IN THE CIVIL CASE FILED IN THE
LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALSO RESPONDENTS OR
DEFENDANTS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CRIMINAL CASES FILED BY
HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT JULIANO LIM INVOLVING THE SAME
OR IDENTICAL SET OF FACTS; AND EAcCHI
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DECLARING IN ITS ORDER DATED JULY 22, 1997
THAT (A) THE NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION UPON ORAL
EXAMINATION NEED NOT BE WITH LEAVE OF COURT BECAUSE AN
ANSWER EX ABUDANTE CAUTELA HAS BEEN FILED; AND (B) JOINDER
OF ISSUES IS NOT REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT THE SECTION 1, RULE
23 56 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MAY BE AVAILED OF.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to recognize petitioners Oscar Mapalo
and Chito Rosete's constitutional right against self-incrimination when, through its Orders
dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997, it allowed and scheduled the taking of their
depositions by way of oral examination. They explain they refuse to give their
depositions due to the pendency of two criminal cases against them, namely, Batasan
Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa, because their answers would expose them to criminal
action or liability since they would be furnishing evidence against themselves in said
criminal cases. They allege there can be no doubt that the questions to be asked during
the taking of the deposition would revolve around the allegations in the complaint in
the civil case which are identical to the allegations in the complaint-affidavits in the two
criminal cases, thus, there is a tendency to incriminate both Oscar Mapalo and Chito
Rosete. Moreover, they explain that while an ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the privilege against self-incrimination as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether
178
refuse to answer any and all questions because the right against self-incrimination
includes the right to refuse to testify.
In short, petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete refuse to have their depositions taken in
the civil case because they allegedly would be incriminating themselves in the criminal
cases because the testimony that would be elicited from them may be used in the
criminal cases. As defendants in the civil case, it is their claim that to allow their
depositions to be taken would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination
because said right includes the right to refuse to take the witness stand.
In order to resolve this issue, we must determine the extent of a person's right against
self-incrimination. A person's right against self-incrimination is enshrined in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself."
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It
cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required,
take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. 57
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the
stand as a witness. In People v. Ayson, 58 this Court clarified the rights of an accused in
the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. We said:
An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and AIDTSE
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him.
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from
being a witness against himself" signifies that he cannot be
compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in
which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoenaor other process or order of
179
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr. JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
||| (Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, [June 8, 2006], 523 PHIL 498-515)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MICHAEL
BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE
COL,accused-appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
For review is the Amended Decision 1 dated 14 November 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael
Bokingco 2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. DIEcHa
On 31 July 2000, an Information 3 was filed against appellants charging
them of the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of
Angeles, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw
hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident
premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul
NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his
body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION
fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. 4
180
loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both
informed him of the incident. 12 He prepared a police report on the same day
narrating the result of his investigation. 13
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon,
jotted down notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco
admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing
several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the
following findings: DaACIH
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the second floor of
the house when she heard banging sounds and her husband's moans. She
immediately got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col
blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly
ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her
chin. Elsa was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. 9 Col
then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that
she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col
dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her
backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door
and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya." 10Col immediately let her go and ran
away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her
husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood. 11
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4
inBarangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he
received a phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp.
Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He
noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw
hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the
kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the
nearby construction site. The police went to Angeles University Medical Center
afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was still
181
182
183
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In the instant
case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised.
Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in
the head. 34 Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly
by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the
attack. STCDaI
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his
and Col's plan to kill Pasion. 35 Bokingco's confession was admittedly taken without
the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga, 36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain
pretrial proceedings that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process.
The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations
by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution." 37 In said
case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later
acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation.
Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel,
for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually
denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held
inadmissible. 38In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his
confession was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is
anchored on the presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled
however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating
circumstance of
nighttime
cannot be properly appreciated.
There
was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion.
However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate
the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for
Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying
circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be
applied in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17
years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum
to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision
mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in its medium
period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Therefore, the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum is appropriate under the circumstances. 39 The award of exemplary
damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends
that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco's uncounselled testimony that appellants
planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there
was no other evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's
statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing
her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard
from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support the finding of
conspiracy. DcHaET
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col's conviction of
murder by conspiracy by mentioning that starting from the declaration of
Bokingco, the victim's wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and
attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left
alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For
the OSG, appellants' acts are indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the
prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the
crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between
appellants.
We disagree.
184
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the
factual findings of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. 40 However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial
court's findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on
record, or 2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the
outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the
assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 41The second exception
obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be
proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. 42Unity of purpose and unity
in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy. 43
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof
as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. 44
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that appellants
fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen
at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at
Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that
time and date when you were in your master's bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our
building where we reside.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours
of the morning on that day when you were in your
master's bedroom?
185
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of
your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear
gas?
A: It was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see
something or a sharp weapon under your chin?
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him
poke the sharp object under my chin and I bowed my
head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under
my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of
the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your
residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did
Reynante Col do about it? DAaHET
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
186
SECOND DIVISION.
[G.R. No. L-71092. September 30, 1987.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANACLETO Q.
OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte
sitting in Dipolog City. 1 The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985
following the death sentences imposed on each of the three accused-appellants,
Romulo Villarojo, Leonardo Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named,
Anacleto Olvis, was acquitted), over which, under theConstitution then in force, 2 we
exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 3 With the promulgation of the 1987 Charter,
abolishing the death penalty and commuting death penalties already imposed
to reclusion perpetua, 4 we, on May 14, 1987, issued a death penalty abolition
resolution requiring the three accused-appellants to file a statement, personally signed
by them with the assistance of counsel, stating whether or not they wished to continue
with the case as an appealed case. 5 We have since observed this procedure with
respect to all pending capital cases. LLjur
In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed
a statement informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed
case. 6
This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four
accused with the murder of Deosdedit Bagon. The same reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO
Q. OLVIS, as principal by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, as principals by
direct participation, of the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in
the Municipality of Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another and acting upon
the direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who masterminded the bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the
conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with
intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
and for a consideration of a price or reward, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab
one DEOSDEDIT BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple
incised (hack) and stab wounds which caused his instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation and the generic aggravating
circumstances of superior strength, nighttime and in consideration
of a price or reward. 7
xxx xxx xxx
The four accused entered identical "not guilty" pleas.
187
After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion
whereof reads as follows:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO
Q. OLVIS, SR., there being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether
testimonial, documentary or physical evidence, that tend to
establish his complicity in this case, said accused has to be, as he
hereby is, ACQUITTED.
On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, the
degree of moral, certainty establishing their authorship of the crime
is irreversibly positive. The three (3) accused conspired and
confederated with one another to successfully achieve their
ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances
in this case of MURDER. But said offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of superior strength and
nighttime. No mitigating circumstance has been shown to offset
the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a consequence of
which, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the
accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and
DOMINADOR SORELA, to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
The said accused are further sentenced to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of the Murder victim, DEOSDEDIT BAGON, the
sum of P12,000.00 as death indemnity, P60,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, and costs.
SO ORDERED." 8
We come to the facts.
On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the
local Integrated National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to
report their brother, Deosdedit Bagon, missing. The station commander, Captain
Ruperto Encabo, received their report.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in
the afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they
resided. She did not, however, find him there when she arrived in the evening. She then
set out to locate him in three probable places, but her efforts were in vain.
It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter
of police procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible
witnesses. There, Captain Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who
informed them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with Dominador Sorela,
one of the accused herein. Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up
Sorela.
Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck, and arms when the police found him.
According to him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently
unconvinced. Captain Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he
sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela allegedly broke down, and, in what
would apparently crack the case for the police, admitted having participated in the
killing of the missing Bagon. By then, the police of Polanco knew that they had a murder
case in their hands.
Sorela allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the
evening of September 7, 1975 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They were met by
Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise
friends of the deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields. It does not
appear from the records how the three were able to have the deceased join
them. LLphil
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several
parts of the body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into
thick cogon grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were
turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito
directed Sorela to lead them to the grounds where Deosdedit Bagon was supposed to
have been buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere
in the ricefields, where the sack covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a
shallow grave.
The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen
and Civilian Home Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was
transported to the Polanco municipal hall the following day, September 10, 1975. It was
displayed, morbidly, in front of the building where Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the
deceased, and her four children viewed it. The exhumation, as well as the transfer of
Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a photographer. (Exhibits "I", "J", "K", "L",
"M", and "N").
The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco, where the body of the
victim was transferred. It was laid on the altar, in full public view. Again the proceedings
were recorded by the camera of a photographer. (Exhibits "Q", "R", "S".)
But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had
concealed it. (Exhibits "T", "U", "V".) Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the
deceased suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be
fatal.
188
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the
victim was boloed to death. Exhibit "Y," a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in
the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another, while Solera and Cademas look on.
Exhibit "X", another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the murder
weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after having done the victim in.
The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twenty-inch long bolo, the
shovel used to inter the victim's remains, a nylon rope with which the dead body was
tied, and the sack itself.
Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and
Cademas executed Deosdedit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco
municipal mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00 each.
While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first
confessions were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary
headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. On September 18,
1975, the three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of
Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975,
they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the
police of Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and
September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto
Olvis as principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00
each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the killing. We
note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a
request on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro, daughter of Olvis, and upon
complaint by her of harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies.
Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on
the three accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated
Olvis was acquitted, while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of
murder. prLL
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions
pointing to him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as
he was concerned. It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants
would carry out Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in
fact no money changed hands. It likewise noted that Olvis had, two days after the
murder, been in Cebu City, and who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in fact informed
by the Philippine Constabulary that he was a "wanted" man, "to which said accused
(Olvis) meekly complied" 9 (that is, he assented, ambiguously, to the remark). According
to the court, this was inconsistent with a guilty mind. LibLex
The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased
arising from alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his
landholding (the deceased having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having
reached the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. It dismissed insinuations that his children
had a score to settle with the victim, who had earlier brought a physical injuries suit
against the former, that case having been dismissed. It observed, furthermore, that he
was not questioned by the police after the killing, notwithstanding efforts by the three
herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It relied, finally, on the retraction of the
accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It was satisfied, overall, that he had
a "clean bill of health" 10 in connection with the murder case. cdphil
With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accusedappellants. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions
in open court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they
refused to "cooperate" in the solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were
instructed by the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacleto Olvis in the case.
They insisted on their innocence. The accused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically,
that it was the deceased who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-defense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of
Polanco had but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claims. The
fundamental issue then is whether or not these statements, as any extrajudicial
confession confronting us, can stand up in court.
We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants'
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo. 11 In that decision, we
laid down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant, may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates
in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, so police
may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or voluteered some statements on his own does
not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consent to be questioned."
xxx xxx xxx
189
190
What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. For one,
there was no trace of grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives, more
so his widow and children, upon witnessing his cadaver wrapped in a sack and all
although it was supposedly the first time that they saw his remains after two days of
frantic search. 32 Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "R", for another, depict the deceased's
relatives in fixed poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the foreground. 33
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely
required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit
criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an
uncounselled confession.
Accordingly, we hold that an evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in
violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police
custody when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such
circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application. As for the accused
Dominador Sorela, we cannot accept the trial judge's finding that he acted "with
unexpected spontaneity" 27 when he allegedly "spilled the beans" 28before the law
enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be borne in mind is that Sorela was himself
under custody. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to
the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. 29
We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his
voluntary statements. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 30 tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant." 31
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two
months before the information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an
application for habeas corpus. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we
are puzzled why they, the accused, had to be made to suffer preventive imprisonment
for quite an enormous length of time. Cdpr
Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hall building and then
subsequently, to the parish church, again, for a photographing session an unusual
procedure when the perfunctory police procedure should have been to bring the
corpse to the health officer for autopsy.
It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Deosdedit Bagon's remains were
unwrapped, at the parish church at that, as if pursuant to a script or as part of some
eerie ceremony.
To the mind of this Court, the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual
grandstanding, for reasons as yet unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable
impression that each scene was an act in some contrived tragedy.
We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal,
at the expense of the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted
that the three appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was
never invited for the usual questioning.
To us, there is more to Exhibit "20," the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of
the National Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it
happened, happily for Olvis, the three accused-appellants while under NBI custody,
retracted their earlier statements indicting him as a co-conspirator. Why the NBI should
intervene in the case when the Polanco police had apparently "solved" it, is, in the first
place, suspicious enough, but why the three appellants should, in an instant, make a
turn-about there leaves us even more disturbed. LLjur
While we do not challenge the verdict of acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis, for it is not
within our power to overturn acquittals, 34 what is our concern is the apparent design to
use three ill-lettered peasants, 35 the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident
network of political intrigue.
Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three
accused-appellants.
191
In his counter-affidavit, 36 marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense, the accused Romulo
Villarojo admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that
he did so in self-defense. ("[H]e pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in
order also to defend my body, I hack[ed] him.") 37 He completely absolved his coaccused Dominador Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any liability.
This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the
Decision 1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and Resolution 2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of
the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on
him. 38 But it is still our business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny.
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by
a sharp instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost
separated from his body. This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense. 39
In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate
superior strength or nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the
court a quo on the basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused,
statements we reject for the reasons earlier discussed. In the absence of any other
proof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not, by
themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain
homicide. LLjur
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30,
1984. The accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo
Villarojo is found guilty of homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Deosdedit Bagon in the sum of P30,000.00.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
38- Jaime dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200748. July 23, 2014.]
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II
ofRepublic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by
the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
Visayas, in an Information 3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer,
having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position
as Police Officer 2 of thePhilippine National Police (PNP) assigned
in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive
for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known
as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test
conducted on said accused. TAIaHE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for
extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents
and special investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas
Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin
(Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m.
of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police
office, they met "James" who demanded from them PhP100,000, later lowered to
PhP40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants
proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the
meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls
supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.
192
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the
complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment
operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a
pre-marked PhP500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the
amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to
the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by
forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in
the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and
testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for
extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine
for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however,
denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated 6 June
2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article
II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a
period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation
of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City. 5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC's validation of the result of the urine
test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its
admission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his
constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked
prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing conducted under circumstances
similar to his would violate a person's right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless
denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the
use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances
surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment, 6saying that
"petitioner's arguments cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the subject thereo f; after
his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of
the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct evidence; and the
manner in which the laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on a valid
and existing law. SCDaET
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue
of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner's non-compliance with the Resolution 7 ordering him to submit
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and
Resolution.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent
provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended
or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous
drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center
for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this
Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second
time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00):Provided, That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have
in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply. 8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section
15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to
drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner's objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower
court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is
required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to
make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one's body is
193
194
195
drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of
evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case,
though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken;
and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for
his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
||| (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, [July 23, 2014])
196
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set
aside the Resolution 1 dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision 2 dated April 10,
1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, 4 and the Orders 5 dated
August 29, 1994 6 and February 2, 1995 7 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18394. 8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
questioned Decision 9 , are as follows: dctai
"On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff
went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it
was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they
agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When
they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after
he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy
and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued
her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
BATCH 1
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.]
1. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
197
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah
continued to serve in the international flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed
of the cause. LLpr
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against
Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15 . Saudia
filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was
dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18 .
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on
September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated August 29,
1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration). cdrep
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since
its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the
Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on
appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial
interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated February 2, 1995,
denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed
Order reads as follows:
198
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court.
After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now deemed
submitted for decision. LLjur
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
"I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the
proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private
international law as a 'conflicts problem'. Otherwise, the Republic
of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another
sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of
leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable
Court required the respondents to comment on petitioner's April 30,
1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further,
the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof. prcd
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled 'Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al.' and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order
on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary
period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533 has not
yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can
take cognizance of this case." 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge
for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO
199
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. prcd
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994:
"2.Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign
airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be
served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero
St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
6.Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7.On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see
MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put
pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against
Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight
out of Jeddah. Cdpr
8.One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered
to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary
to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9.Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation
was routinary and that it posed no danger to her. Cdpr
10.In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter
about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take
off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to
take that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to
go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport
and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further
orders. prLL
11.On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12.Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff
sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter
helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To
pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of
defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served
the international flights." 39
200
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court the venue, Quezon
City, is appropriate:
"SEC. 2.Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial
Court]
(a). . .
(b)Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the
election of the plaintiff." llcd
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily
in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative
201
advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by
choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex', 'harass', or 'oppress' the defendant, e.g. by
inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That
would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Cdpr
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein.
By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent
has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50 praying for the
dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from
the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably,
petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for
the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction. LLpr
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51
"We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside
from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over defendant's
person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such
second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of
an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to
resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the
said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent of
the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its
special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court."
202
(4)the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as
the place where a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts:
(5)the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g.,
the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place
where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6)the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7)the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the forum is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
'procedure' not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law, and cdll
(8)the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such.
It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment." 60 (Emphasis ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced
that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was
already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she
would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two
SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it
turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. cdtai
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or "turning
over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have
acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act contributed to and
amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of
private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer,
taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly
found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private
respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon
her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct
or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According
to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in
the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty
and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts
or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our
view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent).
All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort. LibLex
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commisi,
modem theories and rules on tort liability 61 have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship"
rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged
in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in
the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor
law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established. cdll
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort comp lained of
and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's
insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64 As aptly said by
203
private respondent, she has "no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she
never alleged that Saudi Law should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead
and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the
trial court's denial of defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case; Not
only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the country's system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the
light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner whatsoever. cdphil
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-9318394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N.
Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14,
1949, approving among other things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc.,
in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The
will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
"3.I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named Maria Lucy
Christensen (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
"4.I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendents except my above named daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney.
xxx xxx xxx
"7.I give, devise and bequeath unto Maria Helen Christensen, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not
in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of Three Thousand Six Hundred
Pesos (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of
the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
"12.I hereby give devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said Maris Lucy Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard
Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime:
. . ."
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen
Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen.
204
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a)
that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said
order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone,
but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of
the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been
declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and
intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied. Hence this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
"In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875, in New York City, N. Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport 'Sheridan' with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
"In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during
which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
"Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
"Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees'
Collective Exhibits '6', CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622. as Exhibits 'AA', 'BB'
205
206
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory or doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the corresponding rule of the Conflict
of Law of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal
rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law, minus its Conflict of Laws rules?
"On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined that the Conflict of Laws principle is the
rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should
not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the 'endless chain of references' which has so often
been criticized by legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would
have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting
therenvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling
logical reason why the original reference should be to the internal
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point applying
internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in
the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above,
had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for
the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both
courts accepted the renvoi.
207
208
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce
the conflict of law rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
law of California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict of laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 thatthe national of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities
cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of
law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.,
105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130;
and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil., 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can
not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each
case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of
which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
209
210
case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under
this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the
husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by
succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though
acquired by himself. . . . It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he
takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second
paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is
a legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second
paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has
taken place in the Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands
and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second
paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has
taken place in the Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands;
and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the
extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10
can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law. ed., 1028,
1031), the court said:
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the
state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which
govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances. (United
States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6
Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed.,
545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)"
(See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental
principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil
Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the
nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the
country in which it is situated."
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
"In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sit, the respective rights of husband and wife in such
property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are
determined by the law of the place where the property is situated,
irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the place where the
marriage was celebrated." (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin
[N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S.
W., 99 [Texas].)
211
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested
in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question
must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sit.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as
community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her
husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
"All the property of the spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Article 1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
of law applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in
which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by
will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership."
Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder
of the partnership property shall be divided share and share alike
between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs." Under
the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing
here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property,
becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein
equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the
decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal
property is transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659,
661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at
the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax
in this case would be nor that the appellee (petitioner below) in any way
challenged the power of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity
of the statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a certificate of
transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine lands
included in the three certificates of title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with
directions to dismiss the petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers,
JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104776. December 5, 1994.]
4. BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1, 767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru
and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 104911-14. December 5, 1994.]
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the
Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from
the date of their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee himself
believed that his wife was vested of such a title and interest is manifest from the
second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in
evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of
section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a
tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession"
or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would
212
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1)to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L85-10-779 and L-86-05-460;
(2)to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in
default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia
International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc.
(BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring
Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case
No. L-86-05-460; and
(3)to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of the NLRC, denying
the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp.
8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al.,
v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court:
(2)to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it
denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the
decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to 149
claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and
to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial
evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division
while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the Resolution
dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third
Division (G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the
motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos.
104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 10491114, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the
Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p.
1109; G.R. No. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I
(2)to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the
motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 825; 26-220).
213
practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of
BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among
other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the
reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the
appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default.
214
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates
asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of
the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the
claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims
(POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin,
a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on
February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme
Court by the claimants, namely G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and
Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme
Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA
Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with
deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489),
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said
order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by
informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the
hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on
September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the
POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely
referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request
for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on April
28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC
and BRII for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R.
Santos, Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of
violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its
motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for extension of
time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order
of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied
the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the
complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from
said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987
claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer
was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement to Urgent
Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988,
claimants filed their "Ex-parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position
paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed
their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and
BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed
its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants
submitted their "Ex-parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental
Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments and service
records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in
POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the
amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. cdphil
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum for
Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its
motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed
earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for
the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants'
Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting
of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation,"
stating among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April
20, 1989, the claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were
1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the
Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on
time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the
labor cases.
215
follows:
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC
and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our
approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as
the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex
A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a
compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the
agreements were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:
1)Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez
and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 470-615);
2)Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin
and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364507);
216
III
217
(7)Overtime Rate
Per Hour:
11.BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be
accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of this
contract.
218
suit.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a
quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service
in that year."
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a
period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either
party thereto after giving the other party thirty days' prior
notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect
of other workers. The party terminating a contract without
giving the required notice shall pay to the other party
compensation equivalent to the amount of wages
payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay
to such worker, upon termination of employment,
a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment
calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each
year of the first three years of service and of one month's
wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker
shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a
quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year."
All the individual complainants-appellants have
already been repatriated to the Philippines at the time of
the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: Whether or not complainants are entitled to the
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a)Whether or not the complainants who have worked in
Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b)Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly
prescribing a more favorable treatment of alien
employees) bars complainants from enjoying its benefits.
219
(Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without regard to the
technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
should form part of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the
claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator
in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing
of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the
labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the
complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the action,
the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all
the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal
rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA
Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of the
evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII
during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that
BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that
BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect
employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in
denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on
the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1)that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for
refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants
should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate government agencies;
220
(2)the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims
which are not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976;
(5)that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(3)that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral
and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages
was not established;
(4)that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
their contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;
(5)that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated
prior to the expiration of their overseas contract was not established; and
(6)that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the
cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L)
86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said
case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing
POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in
POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same
claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the
following grounds:
(1)that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file their
answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on
April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;
(2)that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and
BRII in default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3)the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor
cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4)that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and
(1)that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the
labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all the records of the more
than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the addition of
hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(2)that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was
impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC
Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987,
said party had already filed its answer, and that considering the staggering amount
of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by
the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3)that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that there was no
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy which was
the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims
varied, some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the
contracts while others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded
separate claims peculiar only to himself and depending upon the particular
circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4)that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one
prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5)that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor
lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out
the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11,
1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements
subject of said manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante
M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said agreements. He also claimed
that the claimants were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty.
De Castro collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was
entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise
agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion
to strike out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992
(G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
221
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to
Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise
agreements with AIBI and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed
a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 8381535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to
cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of
Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers
allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered
into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in
fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 15601614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against
Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims
submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on
the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the threeyear prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied
the claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three hours a day
(Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during
the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as
shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain
(Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No.
104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special
law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method
of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound
by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a
subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was approved by the
Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was
discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the
dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission
by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they
disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the
prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking
different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period
applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as found by the
POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive
period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he
deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
"These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor
Code) refer to those arising from the employer's violation of the
employee's right as provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not
the rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso
facto amended the worker's contracts of employment.
222
223
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims
"arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the
Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on the violation of their
employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article 1144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster
their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be
enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it
(Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of
Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed
under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines
a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that
where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law conflicts
rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section
48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action
arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines
Islands."
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S.
Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
public policy on the protection to labor.
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
"Sec. 3.The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all."
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the
filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as
provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
224
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
"The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the right of action accrues:
(1)Upon a written contract;
(2)Upon an obligation created by law;
(3)Upon a judgment."
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
"Money claims-all money claims arising from employeremployee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code
shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx"
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is
inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct
computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining agreements
and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any
reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation provided in
the collective bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the
claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between
the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New
Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A.
No. 1993) provides:
"Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act
shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrued otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . . "
The court further explained:
differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not
on a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the
instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much
because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but
because the claim is demandable right of the employees, by
reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining agreement."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period
for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other
hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive
period for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee relations." The claim
is the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is
broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective
bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive
period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code does not find support in the plain
language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. No.
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation
of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial
reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A.As the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants
aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case
was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy
disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have
declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
"Sec. 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies."
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial
and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
225
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy
disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy
disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been
violated, thus:
"In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial"
has been violated, certain factors may be considered and
balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for
the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in
answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy
disposition of cases."
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain.
The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del
Mundo, included:
"1.Unexpired portion of contract;
2.Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3.Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4.War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
5.Area Differential pay;
6.Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7.Salary differential pay;
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a
copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default for failure to file their answers within the ten-day period
provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA.
At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the
records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to the order of
the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their
final disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their inception,
cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on
April 3, 1985.
226
227
the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned
their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their
respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs
brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others
(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the
claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a
judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of
Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable
parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the
decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision
is adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their selfappointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
C.The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator
and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of "forum shopping,
ambulance chasing activities, falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional
activities" and his appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal
(Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to
put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve
the same issues. Said Rule however, applies only to petitions filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional Requirements For Petitions
Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping
or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular
expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the
anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies, said
circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to
investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838810; 1525).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or
administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment secured
by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be
delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should
have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered and executed the
judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De
Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be filed in a separate and appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting
their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime
payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during the
negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in
estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain
dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
"After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and
the Area Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the
Summary of the compensation offered by the Company to the
employees in respect of the difference of pay of the wages of the
overtime and the difference of vacation leave and the perusal of
the documents attached thereto e.e.., minutes of the meetings
between the Representative of the employees and the
management of the Company, the complaint filed by the
employees on 14/2/83 where they have claimed as hereinabove
stated, sample of the Service Contract executed between one of
the employees and the company through its agent in (sic)
Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has
been provided for 48 hours of work per week and annual leave of
12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly
wage.
Attorney's Lien
xxx xxx xxx
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14,
1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees
228
A.NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form
part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the
observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in
the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it
refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of
the parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a
contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts
executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and
BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those
stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that:
"The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he
will not engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek
employment with anyone other than the Employer; that he shall
devote his entire time and attention and his best energies, and
abilities to the performance of such duties as may be assigned to
him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to the
direction and control of the employer; and that the benefits
provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of
all other benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of
course, that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that
of the host country regulation or custom, it being understood that
should applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or other such
benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed cannot be
waived, Employee agrees that such compensation will be adjusted
downward so that the total compensation hereunder, plus the
non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation
herein agreed" (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the employee
may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the
non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed,
another part of the same provision categorically states "that total remuneration
and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
229
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486
(1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management co. and the
late husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of
illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment
and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the
vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of
the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the time of his
death, granted a better compensation package, we applied said foreign law in
preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is
inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was whether
the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined
under the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or the
Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract was controlling,
the court differentiated said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter
case there was an express stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign
law would be applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B.AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due
process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential, holidaypay differential, annual-leave differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants
listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA
Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the POEA Administrator
failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of
fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that
some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a new
hearing, which means further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided
to pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII
complain of as being irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted
on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally
submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 3739).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to
the POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted
for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in
resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence
of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the opportunity to
rebut said evidence and to present their counter-evidence before NLRC. As a
matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC
additional evidence which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to
"use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process."
230
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.]
5. ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Region Pasay City, and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they
begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as
of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this Certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
231
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 We consider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt, Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the
divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file
an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
"1.That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
"2.That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
232
Without costs.
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]
6. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to
be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated
in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure
of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that
the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and
to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while
the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered
by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of
the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main
233
ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. LexLib
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely
a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The socalled exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens partriae,was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,
it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it
may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes", or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison
d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined
by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity
or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not
exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity
to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse
must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law
can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to
the present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of
a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter. cdphil
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
" 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
234
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before
the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same
as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows,
even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that
the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where
the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, herein before
cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in
favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one
at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ ., concur.
235
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000.]
7. PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA
F. LLORENTE, respondents.
E.A. Dacanay for petitioner.
Pardalis, Navarro & Sales for private respondents.
DECISION
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father's name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo's salary and all other obligations for
Paula's daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve
their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement
was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula's father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10
PARDO, J p:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 modifying
that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together
as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. 4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York. 6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U.S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines. 7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula
was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. CADHcI
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula,
who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized
by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1)I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively
my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing
therein;
"(2)I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
236
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo's surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo's will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. 24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula's petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol
Star". 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus: ISaCTE
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not
entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the
status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the
will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then onethird should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her
to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same,
237
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the
trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and
at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law.
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia's motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him. 29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente
as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate. 30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED." 32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. 33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, 34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. 35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised, 36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
238
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. 39 Second,there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is
called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial court's opinion was a mereparamour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 41 that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. 43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"ARTICLE 17.The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
239
240
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. AETcSa
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. 11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way ofobiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent. 12
241
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. AHDTIE
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that
he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
242
demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner herein, Idonah Slade
Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard. The answer prays that the adverse
claimants be made parties to the action and served with notice thereof by
publication, and that thereafter all such parties be required to interplead and settle
the rights among themselves. On September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered
respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins to include in his complaint as parties defendant
petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard. The complaint was
accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed for in the original
complaint,-respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and
George H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question
and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by
publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins
and George H. Engelhard, pursuant to the order of the trial court. On December 9,
1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint, and on December 10,
1938, petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins, through counsel, filed her pleading entitled
"objection to venue, motion to quash, and demurrer to jurisdiction" wherein she
challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person. Petitioner's objection,
motion and demurrer having been overruled as well as her motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial, she now brought the present petition for
certiorari, praying that the summons by publication issued against her be declared
null and void, and that, with respect to her, respondent judge be permanently
prohibited from taking any action on the case.
The controlling issue here involved is whether or not the Court of First
Instance of Manila has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the present
petitioner as a non-resident defendant, or, notwithstanding the want of such
jurisdiction, whether or not said court may validly try the case. The parties have filed
lengthy memorandums relying on numerous authorities, but the principles
governing the question are well settled in this jurisdiction.
Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a nonresident defendant is sued in the Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint
or by affidavits, that the action relates to real or personal property within the
Philippines in which said defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
such person from any interest therein, service of summons may be made by
publication.
We have fully explained the meaning of this provision in El Banco Espaol
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921, wherein we laid down the following rules:
(1)In order that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and over the persons of the parties. Jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is acquired by concession of the sovereign authority which
organizes a court and determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
and thus fixes its jurisdiction with reference to actions which it may entertain and
the relief it may grant. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is acquired by
their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority, or by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over their persons.
(4)As before stated, in an action in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident defendant, jurisdiction over his person is non-essential, and if the law
requires in such case that the summons upon the defendant be served by
publication, it is merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. If
any be said, in this connection, that "many reported cases can be cited in which it
is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of
this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is
sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology
was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the analogy
between service by publication and personal service of process upon the
defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer
243
v. Neff (supra), the difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service
was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which had
already been mounded into legal tradition before that case was decided have
been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here
involved is not affected by the peculiar language in which the courts have
expounded their ideas."
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the person of a non-resident, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, may be found in a recognized principle of public
law to the effect that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. L., ch. 2; Wheat, Int. L., pt. 2, ch.
2. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of
one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as
an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it
can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or
property to its decisions. Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,' says
Story, 'is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any
other tribunals.' Story, Confl. L., sec. 539." (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714; 24 Law.
ed., 565, 568-569.)
When, however, the action relates to property located in the Philippines,
the Philippine courts may validly try the case, upon the principle that a "State,
through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned by nonresidents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the
exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State
where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens;
and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of
authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to
satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the
property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into
the non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be
carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the
non-resident has no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals
can adjudicate." (Pennoyer v. Neff, supra.)
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by
Eugene Arthur Ferkins in his amended complaint against the petitioner, Idonah
Slade Perkins, seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property located in the
Philippines. That property consists in certain shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines
under the provisions of the Spanish Code of Commerce, with its principal office in
the City of Manila and which conducts its mining activities therein. The situs of the
shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the
certificates evidencing the ownership of those shares are within or without that
jurisdiction. (Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent ed., Vol. 11, p. 95).
Under these circumstances, we hold that the action thus brought is quasi in rem,
for, while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in
rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent
partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem." (50 C. J., p. 503). As held by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff (supra):
"It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one
taken directly against property, and has for its object the
disposition of the property, without reference to the title of
individual claimants; but, in a larger and more general senses the
terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct
object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of
some interest therein."
The action being quasi in rem, the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the same even if it can acquire no jurisdiction over the person of
the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process,
summons has been served upon her by publication. There is no question as to the
adequacy of the publication made nor as to the mailing of the order of publication
to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United States. But, of course,
the action being quasi in rem and notice having been made by publication, the
relief that may be granted by the Philippine court must be confined to the res, it
having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the non-resident. In
the amended complaint filed by Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money judgment or
other relief in personam is prayed for against the petitioner. The only relief sought
therein is that she be declared to be without any interest in the shares in
controversy and that she be excluded from any claim thereto.
Petitioner contends that the proceeding instituted against her is one of
interpleading and is therefore an action in personam. Section 120 of our Code of
Civil Procedure provides that whenever conflicting claims are or may he made
upon a person for or relating to personal property, or the performance of an
obligation or any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to several
actions by different persons, such person may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in the controversy, and the court
may order them to interplead with one another and litigate their several claims
among themselves, and thereupon proceed to determine their several claims.
Here, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its answer to the complaint
filed by Eugene Arthur Perkins, averred that in connection with the shares of stock in
question, conflicting claims were being made upon it by said plaintiff, Eugene
Arthur Perkins, his wife Idonah Slade Perkins, and one named George H. Engelhard,
and prayed that these last two be made parties to the action and served with
summons by publication, so that the three claimants may litigate their conflicting
claims and settle their rights among themselves. The court has not issued an order
compelling the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another and litigate
their several claims among themselves, but instead ordered the plaintiff to amend
his complaint including the other two claimants as parties defendant. The plaintiff
did so, praying that the new defendants thus joined be excluded from any interest
in the shares in question, and it is upon this amended complaint that the court
ordered the service of the summons by publication. It is, therefore, clear that the
244
publication of the summons was ordered not in virtue of an interpleading, but upon
the filing of the amended complaint wherein an action quasi in remis alleged.
Had not the complaint been amended, including the herein petitioner as
an additional defendant, and had the court, upon the filing of the answer of the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, issued an order under section 120 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, calling the conflicting claimants into court and
compelling them to interplead with one another, such order could not perhaps
have validly been served by publication or otherwise, upon the non-resident
Idonah Slade Perkins, for then the proceeding would be purely one of
interpleading. Such proceeding is a personal action, for it merely seeks to call
conflicting claimants into court so that they may interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves, and no specific relief is prayed for against them,
as the interpleader simply disclaims any personal interest in the controversy. What
would be the situation if, after the claimants have appeared in court, one of them
pleads ownership of the personal property located in the Philippines and seeks to
exclude a non-resident claimant from any interest therein, is a question which we
do not decide now. Suffice it to say that here the service of the summons by
publication was ordered by the lower court by virtue of an action quasi in rem
against the non-resident defendant.
Respondents contend that, as the petitioner in the lower court has
pleaded res adjudicata, lis pendens and lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, she has submitted herself to its jurisdiction. We have noticed, however, that
these pleas have been made not as independent grounds for relief, but merely as
additional arguments in support of her contention that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over her person. In other words, she claimed that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over her person not only because she is a non-resident, but also
because the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and
that the issues therein involved have already been decided by the New York court
and are being relitigated in the California court. Although this argument is obviously
erroneous, as neither jurisdiction over the subject-matter nor res adjudicata nor lis
pendenshas anything to do with the question of jurisdiction over her person, we
believe and so hold that the petitioner has not, by such erroneous argument,
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Voluntary appearance cannot be
implied from either a mistaken or superfluous reasoning but from the nature of the
relief prayed for.
For all of the foregoing, petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire
amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, on October
17, 1985, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA and ATHONA in
the United States for payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for damages for
breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in
misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District Court of Texas, 165th Judicial
245
District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-57746, the venue of the action was later
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where
1488, Inc. filed an amended complaint, reiterating its allegations in the original
complaint. ATHONA filed an answer with counterclaim, impleading private respondents
herein as counterdefendants, for allegedly conspiring in selling the property at a price
over its market value. Private respondent Perlas, who had allegedly appraised the
property, was later dropped as counterdefendant. ATHONA sought the recovery of
damages and excess payment allegedly made to 1488, Inc. and, in the alternative, the
rescission of sale of the property. For their part, PHILSEC and AYALA filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their person, but, as their motion was
denied, they later filed a joint answer with counterclaim against private respondents
and Edgardo V. Guevarra, PHILSEC's own former president, for the rescission of the sale
on the ground that the property had been over-valued. On March 13, 1990, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the counterclaim against
Edgardo V. Guevarra on the ground that it was "frivolous and [was] brought against him
simply to humiliate and embarrass him." For this reason, the U.S. court imposed so-called
Rule 11 sanctions on PHILSEC and AYALA and ordered them to pay damages to
Guevarra.
On April 10, 1987, while Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States,
petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment" against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the allegation of
petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-86-440 of the United
States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by
selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00.
Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private respondents' fraudulent
misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC and AYALA were induced to enter into the
Agreement and to purchase the Houston property. Petitioners prayed that private
respondents be ordered to return to ATHONA the excess payment of US$1,700,000.00
and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against the real and personal properties of private respondents. 2
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1)
litis pendentia, vis-a-vis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S.,
(2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a
cause of action. Ducat contended that the alleged overpricing of the property
prejudiced only petitioner ATHONA, as buyer, but not PHILSEC and BPI-IFL which were
not parties to the sale and whose only participation was to extend financial
accommodation to ATHONA under a separate loan agreement. On the other hand,
private respondents 1488, Inc. and its president Daic filed a joint "Special Appearance
and Qualified Motion to Dismiss," contending that the action being in personam,
extraterritorial service of summons by publication was ineffectual and did not vest the
court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc., which is a non-resident foreign corporation, and
Daic, who is a non-resident alien.
On January 26, 1988, the trial court granted Ducat's motion to dismiss, stating that "the
evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum
of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum
non conveniens," even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic's motion to dismiss. On
March 9, 1988, the trial court 3 granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia considering that
the "main factual element" of the cause of action in this case
which is the validity of the sale of real property in the United States
between defendant 1488 and plaintiff ATHONA is the subject
matter of the pending case in the United States District Court
which, under the doctrine offorum non conveniens, is the better (if
not exclusive) forum to litigate matters needed to determine the
assessment and/or fluctuations of the fair market value of real
estate situated in Houston, Texas, U.S.A. from the date of the
transaction in 1983 up to the present and verily, . . . (emphasis by
trial court)
The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they
were non-residents and the action was not an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that
extraterritorial service of summons was ineffective. The trial court subsequently lifted the
writ of attachment it had earlier issued against the shares of stocks of 1488, Inc. and
Daic.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens and in ruling that it
had no jurisdiction over the defendants, despite the previous attachment of shares of
stocks belonging to 1488, Inc. and Daic.
On January 6, 1992, the Court of Appeals 4 affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563
against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia, thus:
The plaintiffs in the U.S. court are 1488 Inc. and/or Drago Daic,
while the defendants are Philsec, the Ayala International Finance
Ltd. (BPI-IFL's former name) and the Athona Holdings, NV. The case
at bar involves the same parties. The transaction sued upon by the
parties, in both cases is the Warranty Deed executed by and
between Athona Holdings and 1488 Inc. In the U.S. case, breach of
contract and the promissory notes are sued upon by 1488 Inc.,
which likewise alleges fraud employed by herein appellants, on the
marketability of Ducat's securities given in exchange for the Texas
property. The recovery of a sum of money and damages, for fraud
purportedly committed by appellees, in overpricing the Texas land,
constitute the action before the Philippine court, which likewise
stems from the same Warranty Deed.
246
The Court of Appeals also held that Civil Case No. 16563 was an action in personam for
the recovery of a sum of money for alleged tortious acts, so that service of summons by
publication did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Drago Daic.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563 on the ground of forum non conveniens was
likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the case can be better
tried and decided by the U.S. court:
The U.S. case and the case at bar arose from only one main transaction, and involve
foreign elements, to wit: 1) the property subject matter of the sale is situated in Texas,
U.S.A.; 2) the seller, 1488 Inc. is a non-resident foreign corporation; 3) although the buyer,
Athona Holdings, a foreign corporation which does not claim to be doing business in the
Philippines, is wholly owned by Philsec, a domestic corporation, Athona Holdings is also
owned by BPI-IFL, also a foreign corporation; 4) the Warranty Deed was executed in
Texas, U.S.A.
In their present appeal, petitioners contend that:
Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact."
Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this court has given the effect of res judicata
to foreign judgments in several cases, 7 it was after the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. 8 It
is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.
This is because in THIS jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 9 Rule 39,
50 provides:
SEC. 50.Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
Thus, in the case of General Corporation of the Philippines v. Union Insurance Society of
Canton, Ltd., 10 which private respondents invoke for claiming conclusive effect for the
foreign judgment in their favor, the foreign judgment was considered res judicata
because this Court found "from the evidence as well as from appellant's own
pleadings" 11 that the foreign court did not make a "clear mistake of law or fact" or that
its judgment was void for want of jurisdiction or because of fraud or collusion by the
defendants. Trial had been previously held in the lower court and only afterward was a
decision rendered, declaring the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington to have the effect of res judicata in the case before the lower court. In the
same vein, in Philippine International Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 12 this court
held that the foreign judgment was valid and enforceable in the Philippines there being
no showing that it was vitiated by want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear
mistake of law or fact. The prima facie presumption under the Rule had not been
rebutted.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of
the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure
a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were
247
exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata. As the trial court stated in its disputed order dated March
9, 1988.
On the plaintiff's claim in its Opposition that the causes of action of
this case and the pending case in the United States are not
identical, precisely the Order of January 26, 1988 never found that
the causes of action of this case and the case pending before the
USA Court, were identical. (emphasis added)
It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners' action is
barred by the principle of res judicata. Petitioners in fact questioned the jurisdiction of
the U.S. court over their persons, but their claim was brushed aside by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. 13
Moreover, the Court notes that on April 22, 1992, 1488, Inc. and Daic filed a petition for
the enforcement of judgment in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 92-1070 and assigned to Branch 134, although the
proceedings were suspended because of the pendency of this case. To sustain the
appellate court's ruling that the foreign judgment constitutes res judicata and is a bar to
the claim of petitioners would effectively preclude petitioners from repelling the
judgment in the case for enforcement. An absurdity could then arise: a foreign
judgment is not subject to challenge by the plaintiff against whom it is invoked, if it is
pleaded to resist a claim as in this case, but it may be opposed by the defendant if the
foreign judgment is sought to be enforced against him in a separate proceeding. This is
plainly untenable. It has been held therefore that:
[A] foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in
the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought. Hence, in
the interest of justice, the complaint should be considered as a
petition for the recognition of the Hongkong judgment under
Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the
defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence of
lack of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact
and law, if applicable. 14
Accordingly, to insure the orderly administration of justice, this case and Civil Case No.
92-1070 should be consolidated. 15 After all, the two have been filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, albeit in different salas, this case being assigned to Branch 56
(Judge Fernando V. Gorospe), while Civil Case No. 92-1070 is pending in Branch 134 of
Judge Ignacio Capulong. In such proceedings, petitioners should have the burden of
impeaching the foreign judgment and only in the event they succeed in doing so may
they proceed with their action against private respondents.
Second. Nor is the trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under
the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds
under Rule 16, 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. 16 The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is
more properly considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of
the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances" require
the court's desistance. 17
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed by private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed
to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the
defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the
latter's debt which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court
arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.
Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that
jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in
personam and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, 17 on
extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant
may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, "the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 1 8 It is not
disputed that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been
attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial court dated April 20,
1987. 19
Fourth. As for the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on June 29, 1994, to
suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 92-1445 filed by Edgardo V. Guevarra to
enforce so-called Rule 11 sanctions imposed on the petitioners by the U.S. court, the
Court finds that the judgment sought to be enforced is severable from the main
judgment under consideration in Civil Case No. 16563. The separability of Guevarra's
claim is not only admitted by petitioners, 20 it appears from the pleadings that
petitioners only belatedly impleaded Guevarra as defendant in Civil Case No.
16563. 21 Hence, the TRO should be lifted and Civil Case No. 92-1445 allowed to
proceed. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 16563
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati for consolidation with Civil Case No.
92-1070 and for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. The temporary
restraining order issued on June 29, 1994 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162894. February 26, 2008.]
11. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. STOCKTON W.
ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
248
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by
respondent against petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions,
illegal termination and breach of employment contract. 4 On 28 September 1995, Labor
Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay
respondent's money claims. 5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent's complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. 6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a
Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09
November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
Complaint, 7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations
in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due
him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The
complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and
functioned as one company.
In its Answer, 8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent's claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged
obligation of the said companies. 9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
249
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court. 32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW ARE TWO DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, AFTER
HEARING on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere. 34 Petitioner's averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the
parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected
its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign
elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower
courts because their findings are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a
cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general rule, the elementary test for
failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. 37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as
one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this
allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
. . . Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as
well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these
evidencealiunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing
and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors,
250
(1)Order of May 31, 1993. 3 Reversing and setting aside its earlier resolution of August 28,
1992. 4 The questioned order declared that the NLRC, not the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (hereinafter referred to as "POEA"), had jurisdiction over
private respondent's complaint;
(2)Decision of December 15, 1994. 5 Directing petitioners to jointly and severally pay
private respondent twelve thousand and six hundred dollars (US$12,600.00) representing
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract; three thousand six hundred dollars
(US$3,600.00) as extra four months salary for the two (2) year period of his contract,
three thousand six hundred dollars (US$3,600.00) as "14th month pay" or a total of
nineteen thousand and eight hundred dollars (US$19,800.00) or its peso equivalent and
attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award; and
(3)Order of March 30, 1995. 6 Denying the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners. EHSITc
In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo Santos (hereinafter referred to as "Santos")
was an overseas worker employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of
Oman. Subsequently, in June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing,
People's Republic of China and later terminated due to retrenchment.
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "MHC") and the
Manila Hotel International Company, Limited (hereinafter referred to as "MHICL").
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000.]
12. THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL.
LTD., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ARBITER CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G.
SANTOS, respondents.
When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. 7 MHC
is an "incorporator" of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock. 8
By virtue of a "management agreement" 9 with the Palace Hotel (Wang Fu Company
Limited), MHICL 10 trained the personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the Sultanate of Oman,
respondent Santos received a letter dated May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt,
General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent
Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his.
Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position as printer, but with a higher
monthly salary and increased benefits. The position was slated to open on October 1,
1988. 11
On May 8, 1988, respondent Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his acceptance of
the offer.
251
On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk mailed a ready to sign
employment contract to respondent Santos. Mr. Henk advised respondent Santos tha t if
the contract was acceptable, to return the same to Mr. Henk in Manila, together with
his passport and two additional pictures for his visa to China. TAIEcS
On May 30, 1988, respondent Santos resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press, effective
June 30, 1988, under the pretext that he was needed at home to help with the family's
piggery and poultry business.
"We sincerely regret that a decision like this has to be made, but
rest assured this does in no way reflect your past performance
which we found up to our expectations."
On June 4, 1988, respondent Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr.
Henk's letter. Respondent Santos enclosed four (4) signed copies of the employment
contract (dated June 4, 1988) and notified them that he was going to arrive in Manila
during the first week of July 1988.
The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his employment would
commence September 1, 1988 for a period of two years. 12 It provided for a monthly
salary of nine hundred dollars (US$900.00) net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a
year. 13
On June 30, 1988, respondent Santos was deemed resigned from the Mazoon Printing
Press.
On July 1, 1988, respondent Santos arrived in Manila.
On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos left for Beijing, China. He started to work at
the Palace Hotel. 14
Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended "employment agreement" with
the Palace Hotel, effective November 5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented
the Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of petitioner MHICL
Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word "NOTED."
From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent Santos was in the Philippines on vacation leave. He
returned to China and reassumed his post on July 17, 1989. AaEcDS
On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt's Executive Secretary, a certain Joanna suggested in a
handwritten note that respondent Santos be given one (1) month notice of his release
from employment.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by
Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due
to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. 15 We quote the
letter: 16
252
The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither
participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. 18
On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, decided the case against
petitioners, thus: 19
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1.directing all the respondents to pay complainant jointly and
severally;
"a)$20,820 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine currency as
unearned salaries;
"b)P50,000.00 as moral damages;
"c)P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
"d)Ten (10) percent of the total award as attorney's fees.
Subsequently, Labor Arbiter Tumanon was re-assigned as trial Arbiter of the National
Capital Region, Arbitration Branch, and the case was transferred to Labor Arbiter Jose
G. de Vera. 24
On November 25, 1994, Labor Arbiter de Vera submitted his report. 25 He found that
respondent Santos was illegally dismissed from employment and recommended that he
be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract. 26
On December 15, 1994, the NLRC ruled in favor of private respondent, to wit: 27
"WHEREFORE, finding that the report and recommendations of
Arbiter de Vera are supported by substantial evidence, judgment is
hereby rendered, directing the respondents to jointly and severally
pay complainant the following computed contractual benefits: (1)
US$12,600.00 as salaries for the unexpired portion of the parties'
contract; (2) US$3,600.00 as extra four (4) months salary for the two
(2) years period (sic) of the parties' contract; (3) US$3,600.00 as
"14th month pay" for the aforesaid two (2) years contract stipulated
by the parties or a total of US$19,800.00 or its peso equivalent, plus
(4) attorney's fees of 10% of complainant's total award.
"SO ORDERED."
"SO ORDERED."
On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the
NLRC had jurisdiction over the case.
On February 2, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Labor
Arbiter de Vera's recommendation had no basis in law and in fact.28
"SO ORDERED."
On October 9, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court an urgent motion for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and a motion for the
annulment of the entry of judgment of the NLRC dated July 31, 1995. 31
On September 18, 1992, respondent Santos moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution. He argued that the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was
not an "overseas contract worker." 21
On May 31, 1993, the NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The NLRC directed
Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon to hear the case on the question of whether private
respondent was retrenched or dismissed. 22
On January 13, 1994, Labor Arbiter Tumanon completed the proceedings based on the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented to and heard by him. 23
On November 20, 1995, the Court denied petitioner's urgent motion. The Court required
respondents to file their respective comments, without giving due course to the
petition. 32
On March 8, 1996, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that after going
over the petition and its annexes, they can not defend and sustain the position taken by
the NLRC in its assailed decision and orders. The Solicitor General prayed that he be
excused from filing a comment on behalf of the NLRC. 33
On April 30,1996, private respondent Santos filed his comment. 34
253
On June 26, 1996, the Court granted the manifestation of the Solicitor General and
required the NLRC to file its own comment to the petition. 35
Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as
to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve
controversies involving foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not have
power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an
"overseas contract worker," a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC,
would protect him. 39 He is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits
with conviction. 40
Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits,
the NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2)
that MHICL was liable for Santos' retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate and distinct
juridical entity cannot be held liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent (50%) of its capital stock.
However, this is not enough to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and
MHC.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is resorted to when the
corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend a crime. 41 It is done only when a corporation is a mere alter ego or business
conduit of a person or another corporation.
In Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals, 42 we held that "the mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities."
The tests in determining whether the corporate veil may be pierced are: First, the
defendant must have control or complete domination of the other corporation's
finances, policy and business practices with regard to the transaction attacked. There
must be proof that the other corporation had no separate mind, will or existence with
respect the act complained of. Second, control must be used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or breach of duty must be the
254
proximate cause of the injury or loss complained of. The absence of any of the elements
prevents the piercing of the corporate veil. 43
It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. 44 Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction. 45 In this case, we find no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one and
the same entity. DSHTaC
III. MHICL not Liable
Respondent Santos predicates MHICL's liability on the fact that MHICL "signed" his
employment contract with the Palace Hotel. This fact fails to persuade us.
First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and Development) of MHICL, Miguel
D. Cergueda signed the employment contract as a mere witness. He merely signed
under the word "noted."
When one "notes" a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval, as a
party would. 46 In Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, 47 the Court
recognized that the term "noted" means that the person so noting has merely taken
cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.
Mr. Cergueda merely signed the "witnessing part" of the document. The "witnessing part"
of the document is that which, "in a deed or other formal instrument is that part
which comes after the recitals, or where there are no recitals, after the parties (italics
ours)." 48 As opposed to a party to a contract, a witness is simply one who, "being
present, personally sees or perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator, or
eyewitness." 49 One who "notes" something just makes a "brief written statement" 50 a
memorandum or observation.
Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-employee relationship
between Santos and MHICL. In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the following elements are considered: 51
"(1)the selection and engagement of the employee;
"(2)the payment of wages;
"(3)the power to dismiss; and
"(4)the power to control employee's conduct."
MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned powers. It
did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the Palace Hotel. He was referred
to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage respondent
Santos to work. The terms of employment were negotiated and finalized through
correspondence between respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk, who were
officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL. Neither did respondent
Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the power to control his conduct. Finally, it
was the Palace Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated respondent
Santos' services.
Neither is there evidence to suggest that MHICL was a "labor-only contractor." 52 There
is no proof that MHICL "supplied" respondent Santos or even referred him for
employment to the Palace Hotel.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and MHICL are one and
the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the "Manila Hotel Group"
is not enough to pierce the corporate veil between MHICL and the Palace Hotel.
IV. Grave Abuse of Discretion
Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and considering further that no
employer-employee relationship existed between MHICL, MHC and respondent Santos,
Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana clearly had no jurisdiction over respondent's claim in
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90. AaCcST
Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original jurisdiction only over the following: 53
"1.Unfair labor practice cases;
"2.Termination disputes;
"3.If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
"4.Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from employer-employee relations;
"5.Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code,
including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and
"6.Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security,
Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from
employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement."
In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional
requirement.
255
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is
limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreements. 54
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
"To determine which body has jurisdiction over the present controversy, we rely on the
sound judicial principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein." 55
The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was obvious from the allegations of the
complaint. His failure to dismiss the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. 56
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited liability
company organized and existing under the laws of England.
V. The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders
and resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission dated May 31, 1993,
December 15, 1994 and March 30, 1995 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-02-01058-90).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133876. December 29, 1999.]
13. BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN REALTY
CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Agcaoili & Associates for petitioner.
William R. Veto for private respondent.
DECISION
BUENA, J p:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage
constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an
action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts? cdrep
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major
multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1)
Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania
Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of
private respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate
borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As additional security for
the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two
real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of
land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T78761, T-78762 and T-78763. Cdpr
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans
prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan, to wit:
"a)In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against Liberian
Transport Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A.,
El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eddie
Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
b)In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A.,
Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua
on July 2, 1992; cdrep
c)In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania
Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping
256
257
"3)Costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court
prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein petitioner BANTSA
ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignment of errors:
1.The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid
down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex
Philippines, Inc. vs.Intermediate Appellate
Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on
August 25, 1989 and Philippine Commercial International
Bank vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said
cases were duly cited, extensively discussed and
specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the
assignment of errors found on page 5 of the decision
dated September 30, 1997. Cdpr
2.The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it awarded the private respondent actual and
exemplary damages totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July
12, 1998 although such huge amount was not asked nor
prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary
to law and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1.Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit
against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy
of foreclosure.
2.Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondent ARC,
as third-party mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver of the
remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil
action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be
correspondingly rendered therein. cdrep
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the principal loan
does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and obtained in the personal action
so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be appreciated. To put it differently,
absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived
the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds the
jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15 and similar cases adjudicated thereafter, thus:
"In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor
may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action
for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words,
he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for
each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to
bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of
the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action
and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an
unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to
him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy
is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy
are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the
other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a
personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the mortgaged property,
would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice
(Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity
(Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the
defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the
place where the property lies." LexLib
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated
in Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs. RFC, 18invariably held:
". . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to
waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover
the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on
all the properties of the debtor, including the subject matter of the
mortgage . . .,subject to the qualification that if he fails in the
remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he
has waived. (Underscoring Ours)
258
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or
a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a
waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of
the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. cdphil
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over
its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private
respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law,
third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which
makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging
his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the
principal contract loan remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the
latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the
mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action for
collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. cda
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in said case, that
the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:
"A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy
of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the
personal property as security for the debt or value of the promissory
note when he seeks to recover in the said collection suit."
". . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not
foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for
relief, he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after
the mortgaged property as security for the promissory note . . . ."
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and
emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a
waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing
of the ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the
present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the
other necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is required
for the rule on waiver to apply. cdll
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23 a case relied
upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had occasion to rule
that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a
mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is nonpayment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment
and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to
violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc. vs. Icarangal. 24
"For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has
a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of
action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the
security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two
demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the nonpayment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single
cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute
separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there
exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first
complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a
single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor." prcd
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the doctrine
enunciated in Caltex, wherein this High Court relaxed the application of the general
rules to wit:
"In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the
letter but declare that it is the collection suit which was waived
and/or abandoned. This ruling is more in harmony with the
principles underlying our judicial system. It is of no moment that the
collection suit was filed ahead, what is determinative is the fact
259
260
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign
law would still not find applicability.
of the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal report composed of twenty
three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and submitted as evidence by private
respondent. The appraisal report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated
by the testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. LibLex
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
"If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others."
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable. Cdpr
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the
award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA
in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of
the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in
business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed,
the question of the value of property is always a difficult one to settle as valuation of
real property is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily
ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much
concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of the
witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing
that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on the
valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA questions the act
261
262
In the instant case, in as much as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to refute
and object to the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally offered by
private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed satisfied. In fact, the
testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny during the course of the crossexamination. Under these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its
jurisdiction and committed no reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount
of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower court's actuations are
sanctioned by the Rules and supported by jurisprudence. prcd
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to reduction. Exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and
should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case qualifies the test of
reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the amount
awarded as exemplary damages. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay
private respondent the sum of P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the costs of suit. LexLib
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]
14. YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SYBERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioner.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
263
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said
petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who
alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with
Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and
desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp.
12-13; Rollo, p. 107.]
After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1)Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27;
Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2)Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chum Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp.
65-68;] and,
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to
give due course to this petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN
PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND
264
go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Kiat;
that during her wedding, Sy Chiok, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat,
signed the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts
of that document, she and Sy Kiat were married for 46
years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now; that it was left in the
possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many
years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already
eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they
lived immediately together as husband and wife, and from then
on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines
sometime in March or April in the same year they were married;
that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to
China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with
Sy Kiat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy
Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and
that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed
by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court
to the effect that (a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom;
and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married
according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status Married"; "If married give
name of spouse Yao Kee"; "Address China"; "Date of marriage 1931"; and "Place
of marriage China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where
the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status Married"; and, "If married, state
name and address of spouse Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at
the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese
were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
265
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition
for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta
and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil
Law, Fourth Ed. Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not
one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages,
as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) **
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45.Unwritten law. The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section
25, thus:
SEC. 25.Proof of public or official record. An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken
by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48
(1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a
marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as
found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of
marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in
the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is
competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
266
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony
of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for
adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March
31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no
solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when
her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it
therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not
only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2.The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law
husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which they
have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on
May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on
January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December
14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
II.The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1)Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of children Four"; and,
"Name All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2)the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had
five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze
Sook Wah Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977,
pp. 9-11;] and,
(3)an affidavit executed on March 22, 1961 by Sy Kiat for
presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze
Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat
expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho she
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6, 1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And
they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of
Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her
sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents
267
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Caloocan"; with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
268
CONCEPCION, J p:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is
of the following tenor:.
"The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled
under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of
P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the
recommendation of the Commissioner with the above-stated
modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to
the sum of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS
(P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden's share
in the conjugal properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M.
Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the
Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said
Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount
above-stated." It appears that sometime in July, 1941, appellant,
Mrs. Harden, and appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the
following:
"CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to
Fred M. Harden, and temporarily residing in the Philippines, with
address at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have engaged the services of
Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act as my counsel in the
action which I will file against my husband, Fred M. Harden, for the
purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support being
received by me from the conjugal partnership of myself and said
Fred M. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting and
preserving my rights in the properties of the said conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to
file against him in the competent Court of California and of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this contract of
services to be under the following conditions:
"1.That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the
circumstances I am not in a position to pay, I hereby agree to pay
Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly,
during the pendency of the litigation and until the termination of
the same, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in
allowance or pension which may be awarded to me by the court
269
ACCEPTED:
s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO"
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the appellee, as counsel for
Mrs. Harden, commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled "Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides."
In the complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other things: (a) that Mrs.
Harden be given the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of
the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (b) that, in the event of denial of
this prayer, the defendants be ordered to inform her "of everything pertaining to
the administration of said business and properties", as well as to render accounts
thereof and to permit her to examine the books and records pertinent thereto; (c)
that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this
jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by him from the Philippines
or sent by him to Hongkong on April 1, 1941; (d) that defendant Salumbides be
ordered to account for all moneys, amounting to P285,000.00, belonging to the
business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited by him in a safety
box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from January 23 to December
23, 1940; (e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of certain shares of stock,
allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said defendant
ordered to transfer said shares of stock in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr.
and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to continue as administrator of said
partnership; ( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or by defendant
Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining
Company, to some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned
to the assets of the conjugal partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs.
Harden; (g) that the monthly allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500 to
P15,000; (h) that, pending final decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the
allowance or pension of Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to P10,000
a month; and (i) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the
defendants from disposing of the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs.
Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said
writ, upon the filing of the corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an
agreement submitted by both parties, and with a view to avoiding unnecessary
embarrassment, restraint or inconvenience in the financial operations of the
business enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the same was
amended by an order dated July 19, 1941, in the sense that.
". . . without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties
in this case, a separate bank account be established in the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila, and all
transactions in connection with the aforesaid businesses passed
through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized
representative, who at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the
necessity of securing a particular order from this Court on each
270
271
for dismissal and in appellee's motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as
counsel for Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent
part of which reads:
"It will be seen from the above that the defendantsappellants pray for the complete dismissal of the above entitled
case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent claim
of Attorney Claro M. Recto on the property under receivership,
other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company
which belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney
Claro M. Recto agrees to the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all other
interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case,
with the exception of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal
of the case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an
auxiliary remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain
pending for the purpose of maintaining the receivership to
safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due him.
"Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or
referee be immediately appointed by this Court to receive
evidence in support of his allegations as to his attorney's lien and its
enforcement. Counsel for the defendants-appellants does not
object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by
him be observed. However, this Court does not have the proper
facilities for receiving evidence in order to determine the amount
of the fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed
advisable that this matter be determined by the Court of First
Instance. This is specially so considering the opposition to the claim
of Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in
behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
272
secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh,
inequitable and oppressive.
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute
does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs.
Harden merely bound herself or assumed the personal obligation to pay, by
way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither
gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in
and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for
the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable.
Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the
Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional
Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is,
likewise, the rule in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
". . . in the United States, the great weight of authority
recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided
such contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is
only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable
advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned." (See 5
Am. Jur. 359 et seq.; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to
show that appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable
advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the
contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not
to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It
merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership,
during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the
United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to
Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time
of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the
contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein appellee, is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto,
one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al.,vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., 93 Phil., 195; 30 C. J. S. 475), and appellants have not done so, for the
circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their
aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences
between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or
273
4.On June 21, 1947, the defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L1499 of this Court, entitled "Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbidesvs. Emilio Pea,
Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden" for the purpose of annulling and setting
aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July
12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the
meantime, the enforcement thereof. After appropriate proceedings, in the course
of which appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like counsel for the
petitioners therein, filed several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda,
decision was rendered on November 21, 1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed
for.
5.On or about September 9, 1947, appellee filed a motion alleging that
despite the writ of preliminary injunction above mentioned, the defendants had,
fraudulently and without judicial consent, remitted abroad several sums of money
aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to return this
sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the
account of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China. Mr. Harden objected to said motion. Appellee filed a
rejoinder, to which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder to the rejoinder.
On October 7, 1947, the Court granted appellee's motion. Mr. Harden sought a
reconsideration, which was opposed by the appellee on October 27, 1947, and
denied by an order dated November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November
18, 1947, for the suspension of this order, which was immediately objected to by the
appellee and then denied by the Court.
6.Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied
with, appellee filed on November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be
declared in contempt of court and punished accordingly. Meanwhile, or on
November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this Court
against Hon. Emilio Pea, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mrs.
Harden. In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari
annulling said orders of Judge Pea of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and
prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the respondents therein from enforcing said orders, particularly
through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower court deferred action on the
aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a
resolution dated February 12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for. Subsequently, or on November 21, 1950, decision was rendered
denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7.Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816,
dated February 12, 1948, or to be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued
an order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five (5) days from notice, with the
order of October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, appellee filed with the lower court the
corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due
hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty as charged and
ordered confined "until he complies with the aforementioned orders" of October 7,
1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was
suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested and placed in
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he
filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of
Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled "Fred M. Harden vs. The Director of Prisons"),
which, in due course was denied in a decision promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8.During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the
appellee made representations with the Japanese Government to prevent the
commandeering of a business establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs.
Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former's deposit in
a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her
money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of the
records and papers pertaining to the business and other properties of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9.Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such
capacity, took all steps essential for the proper discharge of the duties of the
former. Among other things, appellee sought and obtained judicial authority for
some important acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He
(appellee) secured judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership, including orders for the delivery of certificates of
stock, the return thereof and/or its deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise,
represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
10.In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred M. Harden" for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was
decided, through appellee's intervention, that the conjugal assets would bear the
payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively against Mr.
Harden's share of the conjugal partnership.
11.Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled "Abelardo Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China
and Fred M. Harden", for the recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock
certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12.He (appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a millionpeso federal tax case against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
13.Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden's attempts to withdraw: (1)
$53,000 and forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles,
California; (2) $50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax
assessment against him in the United States; and (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business
interests and its assets were worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions,
oppositions, rejoinders, and memoranda filed, and the evidence introduced, in the
aforementioned cases in which appellee was pitted against one of the most
experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar were numerous, extensive
274
and exhaustive. For instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely,
G. R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the
appellee, the nature and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of
labor, time (1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in
connection with said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy,
the professional character and standing of the appellee, the risks assumed and the
results obtained, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in
question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, appellants maintain that:
"The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the
evidence that the legal services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs.
Esperanza P. de Harden, payment, for which is sought by him in this
case, have already been paid by his immediate execution
pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R-59634 (SCG.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for
all such legal services."
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of
P175,000 represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and
Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to"
appellee's share of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his
attorney's fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second
assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:
3.The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share
of the wife, Esperanza P. de Harden, in the undissolved and
unliquidated conjugal partnership properties of the Harden
spouses, is capable of certain valuation before such dissolution
and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Harden's
share in such conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4."The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate
share to Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs. Harden's interests in the
Harden conjugal properties, summarily assessing such 20%
inchoate share as of a value of P384,110.97, and ordering the
payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the
provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services."
Appellants' arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows:
The contract of services in question provides that appellee's contingent fees shall
be 20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the
share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership,
which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the
dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this
relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney's fees due to appellee herein
should not have been determined in the decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was
made, principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs.
Harden, she intended to file before a competent court in California, "and of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between" her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed
said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership
would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden
therein would have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in
the foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned agreements between Mr.
and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident purpose of defeating
appellee's claim for attorney's fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time
contemplated by the parties bearing in mind the nature of, and the
circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of services of the
event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by
Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a
period, she may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the
rights of the herein appellee, for "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the debtor shall
lose every right to make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in
consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for
appellee's services, consists of three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the
allowance of Mrs. Harden; (b) litis expensae; and (c) 20% of her share in the
conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first paragraph of their
contract of services. The second and third parts were the object of the second and
third paragraphs, respectively. The firstparagraph limited the rights of appellee
thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case or amicable
settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such
limitation appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the
same were intended by the parties to be fully operative under any and all
conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has
been assessed, not summarily, but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the
course of which both parties introduced testimonial and documentary evidence.
Appellants presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the appellee were so
numerous that, having begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary
evidence was marked Exhibit 26 Y's. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten
(10) days, covers over 220 pages.
The other assignments of error made by appellants herein are mere
corollaries of those already disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is
necessary.
275
production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted
Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention
to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines;
Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and
Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services
of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be
employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the
Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a
permanent basis. 4
Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 5 TIDcEH
In its Order dated January 4, 1999, the RTC of Makati, Branch 147, denied herein
petitioners' respective motions to dismiss. 6 Herein petitioners, as defendants, filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion 7 for the reconsideration of the trial court's Order of January 4,
1999 but the trial court denied it via its Order8 dated June 3, 1999.
On August 3, 1999, herein petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. 9 On
October 31, 2000, the CA rendered its presently assailed Decision denying herein
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002.
Hence, herein Petition for Review on Certiorari based on the following assignment of
errors:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES
A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS. THE ANNEXES TO THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY BELIE THE
ALLEGATION OF EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONERS.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT INDUBITABLY
SHOWS THAT IT IS AN ACTION FOR AN ALLEGED BREACH OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, AND HENCE, FALLS WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION.
276
C
THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF "FORUM NON CONVENIENS" AS A VALID GROUND
FOR DISMISSING A COMPLAINT. 10
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that there was no perfected employment
contract between PIL and herein respondent. Petitioners assert that the annexes to
respondent's complaint show that PIL's offer was for respondent to be employed as the
manager only of its pre-mixed concrete operations and not as the company's
managing director or CEO. Petitioners argue that when respondent reiterated his
intention to become the manager of PIL's overall business venture in the Philippines, he,
in effect did not accept PIL's offer of employment and instead made a counter-offer,
which, however, was not accepted by PIL. Petitioners also contend that under Article
1318 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites for a contract to be perfected is the
consent of the contracting parties; that under Article 1319 of the same Code, consent is
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract; that the offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute; that a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Petitioners assert that since PIL did not accept respondent's counter-offer, there never
was any employment contract that was perfected between them.
With respect to the third assigned error, petitioners assert that the principle of forum non
conveniens dictates that even where exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts
may refuse to entertain a case involving a foreign element where the matter can be
better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case
transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there
and the plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural advantage or to annoy
or harass the defendant. Petitioners also argue that one of the factors in determining
the most convenient forum for conflicts problem is the power of the court to enforce its
decision. Petitioners contend that since the majority of the defendants in the present
case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not subject to compulsory processes
of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of requiring their attendance
during trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned, their appearance would entail
excessive costs. Petitioners further assert that there is no allegation in the complaint from
which one can conclude that the evidence to be presented during the trial can be
better obtained in the Philippines. Moreover, the events which led to the present
controversy occurred outside the Philippines. Petitioners conclude that based on the
foregoing factual circumstances, the case should be dismissed under the principle
of forum non conveniens. IaHCAD
Petitioners further argue that respondent's claim for damages based on the provisions of
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is baseless because it was shown that there was no
perfected employment contract.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that PIL may be held liable for breach of
employment contract, petitioners contend that PCPI and PPHI, may not also be held
liable because they are juridical entities with personalities which are separate and
distinct from PIL, even if they are subsidiary corporations of the latter. Petitioners also
aver that the annexes to respondent's complaint show that the negotiations on the
alleged employment contract took place between respondent and PIL through its
office in Hongkong. In other words, PCPI and PPHI were not privy to the negotiations
between PIL and respondent for the possible employment of the latter; and under
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, a contract is not binding upon and cannot be enforced
against one who was not a party to it even if he be aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof.
As to the question of jurisdiction, respondent contends that the complaint he filed was
not based on a contract of employment. Rather, it was based on petitioners'
unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ respondent. This breach,
respondent argues, gave rise to an action for damages which is cognizable by the
regular courts.
Petitioners further assert that petitioner Klepzig may not be held liable because he is
simply acting in his capacity as president of PCPI and PPHI and settled is the rule that an
officer of a corporation is not personally liable for acts done in the performance of his
duties and within the bounds of the authority conferred on him. Furthermore, petitioners
argue that even if PCPI and PPHI are held liable, respondent still has no cause of action
against Klepzig because PCPI and PPHI have personalities which are separate and
distinct from those acting in their behalf, such as Klepzig.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that since herein respondent's
claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged
Even assuming that there was an employment contract, respondent asserts that for the
NLRC to acquire jurisdiction, the claim for damages must have a reasonable causal
connection with the employer-employee relationship of petitioners and respondent.
Respondent further argues that there is a perfected contract between him and
petitioners as they both agreed that the latter shall employ him to manage and
operate their ready-mix concrete operations in the Philippines. Even assuming that there
was no perfected contract, respondent contends that his complaint alleges an
alternative cause of action which is based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.
As to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, respondent avers that
the question of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to
277
determine whether special circumstances require that the court desist from assuming
jurisdiction over the suit.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. 11
In Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, 12 this Court held:
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether
the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid
judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can
be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense
that may be presented by the defendants. 13
Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on
the merits of the case. 14 To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. 15
Hence, in resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case states a cause of
action, the trial court correctly limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Complaint as well as the annexes thereto. It is proscribed from
inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of
the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed
hypothetically admitted by the respondent.
This Court has reviewed respondent's allegations in its Complaint. In a nutshell,
respondent alleged that herein petitioners reneged on their contractual obligation to
employ him on a permanent basis. This allegation is sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for damages.
The issue as to whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners and
respondent is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case; rather, this
issue must be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would necessarily entail
an examination of the veracity of the allegations not only of herein respondent as
plaintiff but also of petitioners as defendants.
The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that they were not privy to the
negotiations for respondent's possible employment. It is evident from paragraphs 24 to
28 of the Complaint 16 that, on various occasions, Klepzig conducted negotiations with
respondent regarding the latter's possible employment. In fact, Annex "H" 17 of the
complaint shows that it was Klepzig who informed respondent that his company was no
longer interested in employing respondent. Hence, based on the allegations in the
Complaint and the annexes attached thereto, respondent has a cause of action
against herein petitioners.
As to the question of jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that where no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved
which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. 18 In
the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under
the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged
breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an
action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. 19 In the
alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law,
and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. 20
With respect to the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens in the present
case, this Court's ruling in Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals 21 is instructive,
to wit:
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum
is inconvenient', emerged in private international law to deter the
practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident
litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit
for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages, to
annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets,
or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in
conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that ". . . [a] Philippine Court may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision."
278
G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the
Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, 10 April 28, 1997 11 and March 10, 1999. 12
The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
279
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from
General Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as
NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint 14 in the RTC of General Santos City on August
10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein
were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp.
(OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard
Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands,
Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A.
and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE);
Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac
Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred
to as defendant companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries
to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to
DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the
early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the banana plantations
where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where
such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were
due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they
produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said
products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly
injurious to the former's health and well-being.
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively
filed their Motions for Bill of Particulars. 15 During the pendency of the motions, on March
13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint, 16 excluding Dead Sea
Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical
Corp. as party defendants.
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of
Particulars. 17 On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim.18
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General
Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that
it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION
xxx xxx xxx
The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint
against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their
part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
280
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the
instant action, but rather were coerced to do so, merely to comply
with the U.S. District Court's Order dated July 11, 1995, and in order
to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S.
District Court. 21
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the
defendant companies therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSION TO
JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT
IS ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept
service of summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the
agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires
jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary
appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the
defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the "Defendants'
Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum
Non Conveniens" (Annex to the Complaint) filed with the U.S.
District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he authority of each
designated representative to accept service of process will
become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the
Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is
not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and
defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h), 3(i), Amended
Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the
defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final
adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the
defendants is also conditional. . . . .
The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a
suspensive condition, thus produces no legal effect and is
ineffective at the moment. 22
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the
case in the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis
pendencia. The trial court expounded:
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON
AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both
vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S. District
court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to
281
litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing the same cases
in another forum, violates the rule on 'forum shopping' so abhorred
in this jurisdiction. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S.
DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN
JURISDICTION
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court
of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District
Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The
case was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which
is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the
U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this
court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial
acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. . . . .
CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration 26 of the RTC
Order dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration 27 of the RTC
Order dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint
Motion for Reconsideration 28 of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
In an Order 29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had
already lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of
the counsel of NAVIDA, et al., which stated that the latter had already filed a petition
for review on certiorari before this Court.
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail
the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was docketed asG.R. No. 125078.
The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order 31 dated August 14, 1996, which
merely noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no
longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review
on Certiorari, 32 challenging the orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20,
1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred
in ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the
persons of the defendant companies.
In a Resolution 33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No.
125598 with G.R. No. 125078.
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 34 which sought the reversal of the
RTC Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a Resolution 35 dated November 13, 1996, the Court
dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 36 but the same
was denied through a Resolution 37 dated January 27, 1997.
282
283
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the
Orders dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This
case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the
case motu proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well
as over the persons of the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared before it.
CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case simply on the
basis of opinions of alleged legal experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially, this Court in its Resolution 43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by
CHIQUITA for submitting a defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA,
however, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in the
Resolution 44 dated October 8, 1997.
On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this
Court assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 127856.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,25196, as defined under the law and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over
its person by its voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill of particulars
and, later, an answer to the complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao
City, therefore, acted beyond its authority when it dismissed the case motu proprio or
without any motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the case.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court
consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.
The Consolidated Motion to Drop
DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL
as Party-Respondents filed by
NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al.
On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a
Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-Respondents). 45 The plaintiff claimants alleged
that they had amicably settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL
sometime in July 1997. This settlement agreement was evidenced by facsimiles of the
"Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement," which were
attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought
to withdraw their petitions as against DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
284
DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the
settlement entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and
SHELL.
The Memoranda of the Parties
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in
a Resolution dated June 22, 1998, 46 required all the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998; 47 SHELL asked to be excused from
the filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already executed a compromise
agreement with the plaintiff claimants. 48 DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12,
1998 49 while DEL MONTE filed on October 13, 1998. 50 NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., filed their Consolidated Memorandum on February 3, 1999; 51 and DOW and
OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on December 23, 1999. 52
The Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review in G.R. No. 125598
In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the
following issues for our consideration:
IN REFUTATION
I.THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
a)The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was
filed in bad faith with petitioners intending to
have the same dismissed and returned to the
Texas court.
b)The court dismissed the case because it was convinced
that it did not have jurisdiction.
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
II.THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE CASE.
a.The acts complained of occurred within Philippine
territory.
On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
in G.R. No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said petition "is already moot and academic
and no longer presents a justiciable controversy" since they have already entered into
an amicable settlement with NAVIDA,et al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they
have fully complied with their obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise Agreements.
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004, 54 interposing no objection to the
withdrawal of the petition, and further stating that they maintain their position that DOW
and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant companies, should be retained as
defendants for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the
complaint below is reinstated.
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004, 55 stating that they
agree with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has
become moot and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had already been
amicably settled by the parties in 1997.
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598, 56 stating that it has no objections to
the withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
In a Resolution 57 dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion
to withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.
THE ISSUES
285
the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the
action for damages, specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or
omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the
use of and exposure to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into
the stream of commerce by defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said
fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the
case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of
Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as well as Article 2176 thereof, are
broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases
be remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute
a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states
that if there were no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the courts a
quo should have dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the Amended JointComplaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the
defendant companies. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining
the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil
Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of
insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of the
place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits that the
Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies
as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which
occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system
problems that they allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City
gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96
given that newspaper articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise,
the alleged legal opinions cited in the newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of,
without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however, opines that the dismissal of Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted
the cases with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of
convincing the U.S. Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought
approximately P2.7 million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of
the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution,
sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place
where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the
other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of
the proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand
of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. 59 Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other
than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8)In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). 60
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
2.The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended JointComplaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:
PRAYER
286
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action
and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for
each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases
filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. EaIDAT
287
8.The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT
or negligence of defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh
Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc.
and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in that they failed to
exercise reasonable care to prevent each plaintiff's harmful
exposure to DBCP-containing products which defendants knew or
should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that they,
AMONG OTHERS:
a.Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in
the safe and proper application of DBCPcontaining products;
b.Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of
application of said products, or to cause such to
be implemented;
c.Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to
said products or to cause them to be so warned;
d.Failed to test said products for adverse health effects,
or to cause said products to be tested;
e.Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the
observed effects of said products on Plaintiffs;
f.Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said
products;
g.Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said
products to warn them of the damages of said
products; and
h.Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or
to cause such substitutes to [be]
used. 62 (Emphasis supplied and words in
brackets ours.)
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which
led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects,
injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff
claimants a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission
288
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the
act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court
allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of
the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. 66 HCDAcE
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all
residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the
specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary
evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and
other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines.
Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not farfetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of
evidence to support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors,
coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the
Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are,
indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases. 67
The RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City validly
acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant
companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack
jurisdiction over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendant companies in the action below. All parties voluntarily,
unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this
connection, all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives
to receive summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a
quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings
below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, 68 held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases
is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority
or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness
to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or body's jurisdiction. 69
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject
matter of the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and
has been vested on the courts a quo,continues until the termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons
of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the
decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of
judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the
court of the jurisdiction over the case. 70
Plaintiffs' purported bad faith in
filing the subject civil cases in
Philippine courts
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith
merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of
their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are
unsupported by evidence on record. This Court does not rule on allegations which are
manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with facts, not
fancies; on realities, not appearances. When this Court acts on appearances instead of
realities, justice and law will be short-lived. 71 This is especially true with respect to
allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule that good faith is always presumed
and bad faith must be proved. 72
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints filed by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this
289
Court to order the remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
On the issue of the dropping of
DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL
as respondents in view of their
amicable settlement with NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and
SHELL be dropped as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly manifested that
they intended to file their cross-claims against their co-defendants who entered into
compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling
defendants did not aver any cross-claim in their answers to the complaint and that they
subsequently sought to amend their answers to plead their cross-claims only after the
settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were
executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert that the cross-claims are
already barred.
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., since the latter's Amended Complaints cited several instances of
tortious conduct that were allegedly committed jointly and severally by the defendant
companies. This solidary obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any
co-defendant the statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for the
payment of their respective shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., be granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of the action
to the trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of
their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their other co-defendants. Moreover, a
third party complaint or a separate trial, according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly
delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and DOLE similarly insist that the
motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as
respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96, be denied.
Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective
memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion 73 before the Court, stating
that similar settlement agreements were allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants
with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the
agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. Attached to the said
manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold
Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as well as the
Release in Full executed by the latter. 74 DEL MONTE specified therein that there were
"only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte
parties" 75and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely
satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise
agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the
dismissal of the Amended Joint-Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of
the above settlement agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL
MONTE stated that it no longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and
accordingly prayed that it be allowed to withdraw the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems
that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for appropriate
disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties,
by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not
excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected
by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. 76 Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. 77 A compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata 78 and this holds true even if
the agreement has not been judicially approved. 79 In addition, as a binding contract,
a compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to
it. 80
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City should first receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise
settlements involved in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of dropping any
party as a defendant therefrom.
The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was
filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and
SHELL in view of the latter companies' alleged compromise agreements with the plaintiff
claimants. However, in subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA
supposedly reached their own amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL
MONTE qualified that it entered into a settlement agreement with only four of the
plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617. These four plaintiff claimants were allegedly the
only ones who were asserting claims against DEL MONTE. However, the said allegation
of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and
Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be verified with certainty based on the
records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No.
5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying their claims against DEL
MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one plaintiff
claimant filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants
in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. IaDcTC
290
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged
compromise agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and obligations
therein. For this purpose, the courts a quo may require the presentation of additional
evidence from the parties. Thereafter, on the basis of the records of the cases at bar
and the additional evidence submitted by the parties, if any, the trial courts can then
determine who among the defendants may be dropped from the said cases.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in
which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is
entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the
debtors. 81
In solidary obligations, the paying debtor's right of reimbursement is provided for under
Article 1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217.Payment made by one of the solidary debtors
extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to
pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only
the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the
payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is
due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his
insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation,
such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each.
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of
the co-debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to
answer for an obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor. As succinctly held
in Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 82 "[p]ayment,
which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other
manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary
debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the [other]
debtors." 83
In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the
merits must necessarily be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant
companies are liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which
would necessarily give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no crossclaims have been interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and
when such a cross-claim is made by a non-settling defendant against a settling
defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the propriety of
allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant must remain a party to the
case purely in relation to the cross claim.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 84 the Court had the occasion to state that "where there are, along with the
parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken
part in concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel
prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in the same proceedings an
adequate relief therefor." 85
Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 86 the Court upheld
the ruling of the trial court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may
file a third-party complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his right to seek contribution
from his co-debtors.
Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above
situation, if proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements allegedly entered
into by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with some of the defendant companies.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDEthe Order dated May 20, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and
the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16,
and its subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil
Case No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional
Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein
that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints in
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R.
No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R.
No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND
TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta * and Perez, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149177. November 23, 2007.]
18. KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. MINORU
KITAMURA,respondent.
291
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects of foreign governments, 3 entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines. 4 The agreement provides that respondent was
to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999. 5 Nippon
then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog
Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy
contract with the Philippine Government. 6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000,
this time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the BongabonBaler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. 7Respondent was named as the project
manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1. 8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only
up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for
the ICA's expiry. 9 cDSAEI
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested
a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that respondent's contract was for a fixed term that had already
expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA. 10
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's
ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. 12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the
replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI
Project. 13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank 14 that
matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance, 15 denied the motion to dismiss. 16 The trial
court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 17 prompting them to
file with the appellate court, on August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60205]. 18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to
dismiss the petition on procedural grounds for lack of statement of material dates
and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping. 19 An Entry of
Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000. 20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000, still
within the reglementary period, a second Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 already
stating therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification and
certification. This second petition, which substantially raised the same issues as those in
the first, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827. 21 DTESIA
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed
April 18, 2001 Decision 22 finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of
the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci
celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was
the validity of the written agreement put in issue. The CA thus declared that the trial
court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci solutionis. 23
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the
assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution. 24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 25 imputing the following errors to the appellate
court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
CONTRACT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS
ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS,
WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN
TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS. 26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject
matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be
assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.
292
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters
raised by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first one) and the instant
petition for review thereof. cDEICH
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the
petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without
prejudice. 27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in
the formal requirement of verification 28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court on the statement of the material dates. 29 The dismissal being without
prejudice, petitioners can re-file the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto
the appropriate verification and certification as they, in fact did and stating
therein the material dates, within the prescribed period 30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the
said Rules. 31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the
merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as
though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other words, the termination
of a case not on the merits does not bar another action involving the same parties, on
the same subject matter and theory. 32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res
judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification
of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on procedural
grounds, 33 petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in their
certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second
certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an
omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that will not
constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a fatal defect. It
will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, considering that
the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no longer present. 34
The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is only
authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, thecertiorari petition filed with the
CA and not the instant petition. True, the Authorization 35 dated September 4, 2000,
which is attached to the secondcertiorari petition and which is also attached to the
instant petition for review, is limited in scope its wordings indicate that Hasegawa is
given the authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the petition
filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the instant petition
for review. 36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied the Rules
or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory explanation and a
subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been made. 37 Given that petitioners
herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this point and appended to their
Reply 38 an updated Authorization 39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company
in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules .
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the
verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which we agree,
Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The aforesaid
September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the subsequent August 17, 2001
Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by
the company's board of directors. In not a few cases, we have ruled that corporate
powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers,
can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board. 40 Considering
that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his behalf and not on behalf of
the other petitioner, the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman. 41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands strict
observance of the Rules. 42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to
frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the proper and
orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. 43 CSTDIE
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to
question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that
an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the
extraordinary petition for certiorari ormandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an
answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to
trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course. 44 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, 45 petitioners' case does
not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages
filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected
in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language.
Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the
parties 46 following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private
International Law. 47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they
elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss48 filed with the trial
court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely
argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of
respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus. 49 While not abandoning this stance in their petition
before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense
of forum non conveniens. 50On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped
their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced
their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule. 51
293
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the
change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo. 52 We only
pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their incorrect
assertion of conflict of laws principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases
are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or
should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced? 53 HDTISa
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine
the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of thelex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not
always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. 55 The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question
of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the
respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving
property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. 57 In assailing the
trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and
in the manner prescribed by law. 58 It is further determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. 59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, 60 the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power
to adjudicate the claims. 61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court
is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed,
Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. 62 What they
rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. DCASIT
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" 63 or the law of
the place where a contract is made. 64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed." 65 It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract 66 and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly. 67 Under the "state of the most significant relationship
rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a
case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. 68 This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved. 69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to
a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. 70 They
determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a
conflicts problem. 71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction,
choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact
that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. 72 Also, when the law of a
foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the
existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. 73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is
brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to
the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and
apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take
into account or apply the law of some other State or States. 74 The court's power to hear
cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign
law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns. 75 EASIHa
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, 76 be used to deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction herein. FIRST, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss
because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground. 77 SECOND, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 78 In this case, the RTC decided to
assume jurisdiction. THIRD, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense. 79
294
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the
civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that
jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the
petitioners' motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136804. February 19, 2003.]
19. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL
BANK, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
Sycip Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitan for petitioners.
P.C. Nolasco & Associates for respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of
Appeals 1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42310 2 affirming the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion for partial summary
judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or
Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for
brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes
charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check
worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized
conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation
Guerrero's account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of
Guerrero's claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero's claims for consequential,
nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees on the
same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited
to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a NEW YORK ATTORNEY, supported the Bank's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity)
stated that Guerrero's New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit. STHAaD
The RTC denied the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders.
In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On
December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden AFFIDAVIT does not serve as
PROOF of the New York LAW and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its
motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence AS
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19.Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx xxx xxx."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule
132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy ATTESTED by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a CERTIFICATE that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
295
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the
pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion? 5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. 6
A perusal of the parties' respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues
of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero's complaint before the RTC contains a
statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is
seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against
interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00
due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account." In
its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their
contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts
are asserted in Guerrero's complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are
set out in the Bank's answer. aHSTID
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use
the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for
consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is
warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule
35 on summary judgments and those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden
affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since
Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to
refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial
on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of
the old Rules of Court which reads:
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely
on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. However, as
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment
as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero's claims are
sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts
and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are
substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where
material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. 7 The resolution of whether a foreign
law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial
court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. 8 Foreign
laws are not a matter of judicial notice. 9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine
law applies to Guerrero's claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which
can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
296
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals 10 which held that:
"xxx xxx xxx:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance
with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule
123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove
the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time
the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish
the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the
Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, et al.,
upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California
as proved by the respondents' witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent "testified that as an active member of the California
Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of
the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible
personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b)
of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in
Derring's California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co.,
Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in
several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence
of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule
of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied
of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number
of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization
Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be
competent proof of that law." (Italics supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamete Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys
testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular
foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was
taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden
affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because
it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on
damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
"3.In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only,
trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded
both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a
cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove"
actual damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993).
Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for
nominal damages.
4.There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I
have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not
use the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also done
a computerized search for the phrase in all published New York
cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the
phrase used in American law.
5.The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of
a Bank's relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
Guerrero's claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000
check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful dishonor. However,
the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as
opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check
for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible
signature or a forgery, 3-510, Official Comment 2. . . . to the
Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature
card on . . . and could not verify Guerrero's signature. In my
opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable
reason not to pay.
6.Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of
a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither
consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except
as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law." UCC 4103 further provides that consequential damages can be
recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than
the New York common law, which may allow consequential
damages in a breach of contract case (as does the UCC where
there is a wrongful dishonor).
297
298
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank's motion for
partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment,
although he did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented
an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did
not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit,
expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank
still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not
present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has
the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that
any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant. 14
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an
opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very
subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the
Walden affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the
Bank's motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters
already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly
denied the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment. There is a need to determine
by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and
if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws. DTEScI
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank's resort to a motion for partial
summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully defeated the very purpose for
which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding
the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998
and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183622. February 8, 2012.]
20. MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A.
CATALAN-LEE, respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 25 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Burgos, Pangasinan a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition
with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis
pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already
pending. HcaDIA
On the other hand, Louella alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate
of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against Merope before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that Merope
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had ACQUITTED petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled
that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was
not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the MARRIAGE between him and petitioner
was NOT valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with
the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
299
300
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the reasoning
of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy,
while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She
insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the
presumption of validity.
301
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked
in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied) aTIEcA
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
Merope and Orlando. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court
for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has
the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise,
letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter
or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having LEGAL CUSTODY of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70
of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision. DcSEHT
302
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.]
21. EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007]
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had
a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting ABSOLUTE Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left
real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to
her. TAaIDH
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time
of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, Felicidad filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo
to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions
for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that Felicidad, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of
said motion.
303
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children. CDTHSI
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January
31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in
Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall . . . have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. . . . 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to
our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 andRomualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
304
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration. DScTaC
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied) STIcEA
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings
in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve
election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43Hence, it is possible that
a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively
apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through
a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
305
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to
wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Legislative Intent
306
307
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation. TIEHDC
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2.Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: . . . .
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be BENEFITED by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
308
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011
of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a)Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
309
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the
trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its
two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, . .
. ." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) . . . as a ground for dismissal of
this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court . . .
which is Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25The Court in Braza ruled
that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages . . . ." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] . .
. ." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground"
to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . . .
be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General citedJuliano-Llave v.
Republic 33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if
he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that
the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes
an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas, 36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." 37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person's legal capacity and status . . . ." 38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing
a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39and Nial v.
Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked." 41
310
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from
him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she
had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear
that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1)Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2)Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3)Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons, 52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial 55 and the
judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, 58 this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under
the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the
Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external
to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
311
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment,
it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, 66which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67 AIaHES
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) 68 his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime
of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the
wife of the union recognized by law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 it refers to
the husband or the wife of the SUBSISTING marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife
of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of
a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in
the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 JulianoLlave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
312
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] . . . can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, 83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words,
a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, 88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws
of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under
the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the
effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that the Filipino spouse
"should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the
marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce
decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on
the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the
foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
313
DECISION
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between
the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive
and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.
QUISUMBING, J p:
SO ORDERED.
I am aware that I still have to do a final settlement with the company and hope that
during my more than seven (7) [years] services, as the Saudi Law stated, I am entitled for
a long service award. 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172342. July 13, 2009.]
23. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARCELO B. DUPO, respondent.
According to DUPO, when he followed up his claim for long service award on
December 7, 2000, LWV CONSTRUCTION informed him that MMG did not respond. 6
On December 11, 2000, DUPO filed a complaint 7 for payment of service award against
LWV CONSTRUCTION before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
314
Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City. In support of his claim,
DUPO averred in his position paper that:
LWV CONSTRUCTION appealed. However, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the Labor Arbiter's decision. 14 The NLRC ruled that DUPO is entitled to longevity pay
which is different from severance pay.
Aggrieved, LWV CONSTRUCTION brought the case to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition and affirmed the NLRC. The Court of Appeals ruled that service award is the
same as longevity pay, and that the severance pay received by DUPO cannot be
equated with service award. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
This benefit was offered to complainant before he went on vacation, hence, this was
engrained in his mind. He reconstructed the computation of his long service award or
longevity pay and he arrived at the following computation exactly the same with the
amount he was previously offered [which is US$12,640.33]. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED. 15
DUPO said that he did not grab the offer for he intended to return after his vacation.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, LWV CONSTRUCTION filed the instant
petition raising the following issues:
For its part, LWV CONSTRUCTION offered payment and prescription as defenses. LWV
CONSTRUCTION maintained that MMG "pays its workers theirService Award or
Severance Pay every conclusion of their Labor Contracts pursuant to Article 87 of the
[Saudi Labor Law]". Under Article 87, "payment of the award is at the end or termination
of the Labor Contract concluded for a specific period". Based on the payroll, 9 DUPO
was already paid his service award or severance pay for his latest (sixth) employment
contract.
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
II.
LWV CONSTRUCTION added that under Article 13 10 of the Saudi Labor Law, the action
to enforce payment of the service award must be filed within one year from the
termination of a labor contract for a specific period. DUPO's six contracts ended when
he left Saudi Arabia on the following dates: April 15, 1993, June 8, 1994, December 18,
1995, March 21, 1997, March 16, 1998 and April 30, 1999. LWV CONSTRUCTION
concluded that the one-year prescriptive period had lapsed because DUPO filed his
complaint on December 11, 2000 or one year and seven months after his sixth contract
ended. 11 STcADa
In his June 18, 2001 Decision, 12 the Labor Arbiter ordered LWV CONSTRUCTION to pay
DUPO longevity pay of US$12,640.33 or P648,562.69 and attorney's fees of P64,856.27 or a
total of P713,418.96. 13
The Labor Arbiter ruled that DUPO's seven-year employment with MMG had sufficiently
oriented him on the benefits given to workers; that LWV CONSTRUCTION was unable to
convincingly refute DUPO's claim that MMG offered him longevity pay before he went
on vacation on May 1, 1999; and that DUPO's claim was not barred by prescription
since his claim on July 6, 1999, made a month after his cause of action accrued,
interrupted the prescriptive period under the Saudi Labor Law until his claim was
categorically denied.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
SERVICE AWARD OF THE RESPONDENT [HAS] NOT PRESCRIBED WHEN HIS COMPLAINT WAS
FILED ON DECEMBER 11, 2000. caCEDA
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THE CASE
AT BAR [ARTICLE 1155 OF THE CIVIL CODE].
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE NO.
7 OF THE SAUDI LABOR AND WORKMEN LAW TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING THAT THE BASIS OF
THE SERVICE AWARD IS LONGEVITY [PAY] OR LENGTH OF SERVICE RENDERED BY AN
EMPLOYEE. 16
Essentially, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that DUPO is entitled
to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi
315
Labor Law. Related to this issue are LWV CONSTRUCTION's defenses of payment and
prescription.
C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his
control. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
LWV CONSTRUCTION points out that the Labor Arbiter awarded longevity pay although
the Saudi Labor Law grants no such benefit, and the NLRC confused longevity pay and
service award. LWV CONSTRUCTION maintains that the benefit granted by Article 87 of
the Saudi Labor Law is service award which was already paid by MMG each time
DUPO's contract ended.
DUPO, however, has called the benefit other names such as long service
award and longevity pay. On the other hand, LWV CONSTRUCTION claimed that
the service award is the same as severance pay. Notably, the Labor Arbiter was unable
to specify any law to support his award of longevity pay. 18 He anchored the award on
his finding that DUPO's allegations were more credible because his seven-year
employment at MMG had sufficiently oriented him on the benefits given to workers. To
the NLRC, DUPO is entitled to service award or longevity pay under Article 87 and
that longevity pay is different from severance pay. The Court of Appeals agreed.
LWV CONSTRUCTION insists that prescription barred DUPO's claim for service award as
the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the sixth contract ended. LWV
CONSTRUCTION alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that DUPO's July 6, 1999
claim interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Such ruling is contrary to Article
13 of the Saudi Labor Law which provides that no case or claim relating to any of the
rights provided for under said law shall be heard after the lapse of 12 months from the
date of the termination of the contract.
DUPO counters that he is entitled to longevity pay under the provisions of the Saudi
Labor Law and quotes extensively the decision of the Court of Appeals. He points out
that LWV CONSTRUCTION has not refuted the Labor Arbiter's finding that MMG offered
him longevity pay of US$12,640.33 before his one-month vacation in the Philippines in
1999. Thus, he "submits that such offer indeed exists" as he sees no reason for MMG to
offer the benefit if no law grants it.
After a careful study of the case, we are constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals.
We find that DUPO's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already
been paid. Our computation will show that the severance pay received by DUPO was
his service award.
Considering that Article 87 expressly grants a service award, why is it correct to agree
with DUPO that service award is the same as longevity pay, and wrong to agree with
LWV CONSTRUCTION that service award is the same as severance pay? And why would
it be correct to say that service award is severance pay, and wrong to call service
award as longevity pay?
We found the answer in the pleadings and evidence presented. DUPO's position paper
mentioned how his long service award or longevity pay is computed: half-month's pay
per year of service and one-month's pay per year after five years of service. Article 87
has the same formula to compute the service award.
The payroll submitted by LWV CONSTRUCTION showed that DUPO received severance
pay of SR2,786 for his sixth employment contract covering the period April 21, 1998 to
April 29, 1999. 19 The computation below shows that DUPO's severance pay of SR2,786
was his service award under Article 87.
Service Award = 1/2 (SR5,438) + (9 days/365 days) x 1/2 (SR5,438)
DUPO's service award for the sixth contract is equivalent only to half-month's pay plus
the proportionate amount for the additional nine days of service he rendered after one
year. DUPO's employment contracts expressly stated that his employment ended upon
his departure from work. Each year he departed from work and successively new
contracts were executed before he reported for work anew. His service was not
cumulative. Pertinently, in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 22 we said that "a fixed term is
an essential and natural appurtenance" of overseas employment contracts, 23 as in this
case. We also said in that case that under American law, "[w]here a contract specifies
the period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period. A contract of
employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such
period." 24 As it is, Article 72 of the Saudi Labor Law is also of similar import. It
reads: HIACEa
A labor contract concluded for a specified period shall terminate upon the expiry of its
term. If both parties continue to enforce the contract, thereafter, it shall be considered
renewed for an unspecified period. 25
316
Regarding DUPO's claim that he was offered US$12,640.33 as longevity pay before he
returned to the Philippines on May 1, 1999, we find that he was not candid on this
particular point. His categorical assertion about the offer being "engrained in his mind"
such that he "reconstructed the computation . . . and arrived at the . . . computation
exactly the same with the amount he was previously offered" is not only beyond belief.
Such assertion is also a stark departure from his July 6, 1999 letter to MMG where he
could only express his hope that he was entitled to a long service award and where he
never mentioned the supposed previous offer. Moreover, DUPO's claim that his monthly
compensation is SR10,248.92 26 is belied by the payroll which shows that he receives
SR5,438 per month.
We therefore emphasize that such payroll should have prompted the lower tribunals to
examine closely DUPO's computation of his supposed longevity pay before adopting
that computation as their own.
On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with LWV CONSTRUCTION
that DUPO's action has prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies
is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator, 27 we held that Article 291 covers all money claims
from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a
specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but
applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. 28 The following ruling in Cadalin v.
POEA's Administrator is instructive:
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may
be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute". Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the
state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based
on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes", one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of
our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is
barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands."
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 [of the Code of Civil Procedure]
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of [Article] 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's
public policy . . . . To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor. 29
"A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse
of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract" . . . .
Thus, in our considered view, DUPO's complaint was filed well within the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already
been mooted by our finding that DUPO's service award had been paid, albeit the
payroll termed such payment as severance pay.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal,
and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685;
Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]). ScCIaA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 6, 2005
and Resolution dated April 12, 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76843, as
well as the Decision dated June 18, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RABCAR-12-0649-00 and the Decision dated November 29, 2002 and Resolution dated
January 31, 2003 of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. 028994-01 (NLRC RAB-CAR-12-0649-00)
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint of DUPO is hereby DISMISSED. DTaSIc
317
No pronouncement as to costs.
Corporations further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of ATCI
Corporation ATCI.
SO ORDERED.
By Decision 6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010.]
24. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTHKUWAIT, petitioners,vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Josefina Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-ATCI
Corporation, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA, 1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1)
year and are covered by Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
ECHIN was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on
February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied ECHIN's request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines
on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, ECHIN filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint 2 for illegal dismissal against ATCI Corporation ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by ATCI Corporation, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the
foreign principal.
By Decision 3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that ATCI Corporations
neither showed that there was just cause to warrant ECHIN's dismissal nor that she failed
to qualify as a regular employee, held that ECHIN was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered ATCI Corporations to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary
for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of ATCI Corporations ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision by Resolution 4 of January 26, 2004. ATCI Corporations' motion for
reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to
the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them;
and that ECHIN was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating
within the one-year period as required under Kuwait's Civil Service Laws. ATCI
In brushing aside ATCI Corporations' contention that they only acted as agent of the
Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate
court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. ATcaHS
As to Ikdal's liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos' Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and
partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
ATCI Corporations' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution 7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was
filed.
ATCI Corporations maintain that they should not be held liable because ECHIN's
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent
error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions
governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, ATCI Corporations argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act
(POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules
and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and
labor laws and legislation of the host country."
Finally, ATCI Corporations posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune
from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and
solidarily liable, ATCI Corporation ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministry's liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired
over it.
The petition fails.
ATCI Corporation ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for
the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the
mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed
with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal's liability must first be established
before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
318
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their
foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.Skippers United
Pacific v. Maguad 8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and
between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement,
the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which
the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect
and alleviate the plight of the working class. 9 Verily, to allow ATCI Corporations to
simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principal's liability before ATCI Corporation can be held
liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to ATCI Corporations' contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary
employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in ECHIN's employment
contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules
accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was
not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who
can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which,
in this case, ATCI Corporations failed to discharge. The Court's ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders
Int'l. v. NLRC 10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g., specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all
matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran. HcACTE
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FOREIGN LAW. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum
law.
Unfortunately for ATCI Corporation, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only
be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25.What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, ATCI Corporations submitted the following: MOA between
ECHIN and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is
subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country's Civil Service
Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy 11 (Arabic to English) of the termination
letter to ECHIN stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the
grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination, 12 both of
which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of
Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and
ECHIN's letter 13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed
due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that
ECHIN was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated
319
and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what ATCI
Corporations submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws,
ECHIN was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog
and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the
same WAS/WERE FOUND TO BE IN ORDER. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility
as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
Respecting Ikdal's joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order
too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz.:
SEC. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. cHDAIS
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120135. March 31, 2003.]
25. BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA, BANK OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, LTD., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL PADOLINA, EDUARDO LITONJUA, SR., and AURELIO K.
LITONJUA, JR., respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
November 29, 1994 decision of the Court of Appeals 1 and the April 28, 1995 resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 10, 1993, Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas, for brevity)
filed a Complaint 2 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against the Bank of America
NT&SA and Bank of America International, Ltd. (defendant banks for brevity) alleging
that: they were engaged in the shipping business; they owned two vessels: Don Aurelio
and El Champion, through their wholly-owned corporations; they deposited their
revenues from said business together with other funds with the branches of said banks in
the United Kingdom and Hongkong up to 1979; with their business doing well, the
defendant banks induced them to increase the number of their ships in operation,
offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels; 3thereafter, the defendant banks
acquired, through their (Litonjuas') corporations as the borrowers: (a) El Carrier 4 ; (b) El
General 5 ; (c) El Challenger 6 ; and (d) El Conqueror 7 ; the vessels were registered in
the names of their corporations; the operation and the funds derived therefrom were
placed under the complete and exclusive control and disposition of the BANK OF
AMERICAs; 8 and the possession of the vessels was also placed by defendant banks in
the hands of persons selected and designated by them (defendant banks). 9
The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account
of all the income derived from the operation of the vessels as well as of the proceeds of
the subsequent foreclosure sale; 10 because of the breach of their fiduciary duties
and/or negligence of the BANK OF AMERICAs and/or the persons designated by them
in the operation of private respondents' six vessels, the revenues derived from the
operation of all the vessels declined drastically; the loans acquired for the purchase of
the four additional vessels then matured and remained unpaid, prompting defendant
banks to have all the six vessels, including the two vessels originally owned by the
private respondents, foreclosed and sold at public auction to answer for the obligations
incurred for and in behalf of the operation of the vessels; they (Litonjuas) lost sizeable
amounts of their own personal funds equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the acquisition
cost of the four vessels and were left with the unpaid balance of their loans with
defendant banks. 11 The Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the revenues derived in
the operation of the six vessels and of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the
foreclosure proceedings instituted by BANK OF AMERICAs; damages for breach of trust;
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 12
320
Defendant banks filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and
lack of cause of action against them. 13
equal to 10% of the acquisition costs of the vessels in question, their 10% however
represents their investments as stockholders in the foreign corporations. 20
On December 3, 1993, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,
thus:
Anent the second assigned error, BANK OF AMERICAs posit that while the application of
the principle of forum non conveniens is discretionary on the part of the Court, said
discretion is limited by the guidelines pertaining to the private as well as public interest
factors in determining whether plaintiffs' choice of forum should be disturbed, as
elucidated in Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert 21 and Piper Aircraft Co. vs. Reyno, 22 to wit:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing consideration, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
DENIED. The defendant is therefore, given a period of ten (10) days to file its Answer to
the complaint.
"SO ORDERED." 14
Instead of filing an answer the defendant banks went to the Court of Appeals on a
"Petition for Review on Certiorari" 15 which was aptly treated by the appellate court as a
petition for certiorari. They assailed the above-quoted order as well as the subsequent
denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. 16 The appellate court dismissed the petition
and denied BANK OF AMERICAs' Motion for Reconsideration. 17
"Private interest factors include: (a) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (b)
the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (c) the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; or (d) all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Public interest factors include:
(a) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (b) the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home; (c) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law; or (d) the unfairness of
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty." 23
In support of their claim that the local court is not the proper forum, BANK OF AMERICAs
allege the following:
"1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE SEPARATE
PERSONALITIES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (MERE STOCKHOLDERS) AND THE FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS (THE REAL BORROWERS) CLEARLY SUPPORT, BEYOND ANY DOUBT, THE
PROPOSITION THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO PERSONALITIES TO SUE.
"i) The Bank of America Branches involved, as clearly mentioned in the Complaint, are
based in Hongkong and England. As such, the evidence and the witnesses are not
readily available in the Philippines;
"2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO REALIZE THAT WHILE THE PRINCIPLE
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IS NOT MANDATORY, THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME
GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE CHOICE OF FORUM SHOULD BE
DISTURBED. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INSTANT CASE, DISMISSAL OF
THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS IS MORE APPROPRIATE
AND PROPER.
"3. THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS NOT LIMITED TO FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE
PHILIPPINES. IN FACT, THE PENDENCY OF FOREIGN ACTION MAY BE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR
THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. COROLLARY TO
THIS, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING." 18
As to the first assigned error: BANK OF AMERICAs argue that the borrowers and the
registered owners of the vessels are the foreign corporations and not private
respondents Litonjuas who are mere stockholders; and that the revenues derived from
the operations of all the vessels are deposited in the accounts of the corporations.
Hence, BANK OF AMERICAs maintain that these foreign corporations are the legal
entities that have the personalities to sue and not herein private respondents; that
private respondents, being mere shareholders, have no claim on the vessels as owners
since they merely have an inchoate right to whatever may remain upon the dissolution
of the said foreign corporations and after all creditors have been fully paid and
satisfied; 19 and that while private respondents may have allegedly spent amounts
"ii) The loan transactions were obtained, perfected, performed, consummated and
partially paid outside the Philippines;
"iii) The monies were advanced outside the Philippines. Furthermore, the mortgaged
vessels were part of an offshore fleet, not based in the Philippines;
"iv) All the loans involved were granted to the Private Respondents'
foreign CORPORATIONS;
"v) The Restructuring Agreements were ALL governed by the laws of England;
"vi) The subsequent sales of the mortgaged vessels and the application of the sales
proceeds occurred and transpired outside the Philippines, and the deliveries of the sold
mortgaged vessels were likewise made outside the Philippines;
"vii) The revenues of the vessels and the proceeds of the sales of these vessels
were ALL deposited to the Accounts of the foreign CORPORATIONS abroad; and
"viii) Bank of America International Ltd. is not licensed nor engaged in trade or business
in the Philippines." 24
321
BANK OF AMERICAs argue further that the loan agreements, security documentation
and all subsequent restructuring agreements uniformly, unconditionally and expressly
provided that they will be governed by the laws of England; 25 that Philippine Courts
would then have to apply English law in resolving whatever issues may be presented to
it in the event it recognizes and accepts herein case; that it would then be imposing a
significant and unnecessary expense and burden not only upon the parties to the
transaction but also to the local court. BANK OF AMERICAs insist that the inconvenience
and difficulty of applying English law with respect to a wholly foreign transaction in a
case pending in the Philippines may be avoided by its dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens. 26
Finally, BANK OF AMERICAs claim that private respondents have already waived their
alleged causes of action in the case at bar for their refusal to contest the foreign civil
cases earlier filed by the BANK OF AMERICAs against them in Hongkong and England,
to wit:
Philippine laws, aside from the said corporate borrowers being but their alter-egos, they
have interests of their own in the vessels. 29 Private respondents also argue that the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition forcertiorari was justified because there
was neither allegation nor any showing whatsoever by the BANK OF AMERICAs that they
had no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law from the Order of the trial judge denying their Motion to Dismiss; that the remedy
available to the BANK OF AMERICAs after their Motion to Dismiss was denied was to file
an Answer to the complaint; 30 that as upheld by the Court of Appeals, the decision of
the trial court in not applying the principle of forum non conveniens is in the lawful
exercise of its discretion. 31 Finally, private respondents aver that the statement of BANK
OF AMERICAs that the doctrine of res judicata also applies to foreign judgment is merely
an opinion advanced by them and not based on a categorical ruling of this
Court; 32 and that herein private respondents did not actually participate in the
proceedings in the foreign courts. 33
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
"1.) Civil action in England in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against (a) LIBERIAN TRANSPORT NAVIGATION,
SA.; (b) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA SA., (c) EL CHALLENGER SA; (d) ESPRIONA SHIPPING
CO. SA; (e) PACIFIC NAVIGATORS CORP. SA; (f) EDDIE NAVIGATION CORP. SA; (g)
EDUARDO K. LITONJUA & (h) AURELIO K. LITONJUA.
"2.) Civil action in England in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against (a) EL CHALLENGER S.A., (b) ESPRIONA
SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (c) EDUARDO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA and (d) AURELIO
KATIPUNAN LITONJUA.
"3.) Civil action in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992),
against (a) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A., (b) EL CHALLENGER S.A., (c) ESPRIONA
SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (d) PACIFIC NAVIGATORS CORPORATION (e) EDDIE
NAVIGATION CORPORATION S.A., (f) LITONJUA CHARTERING (EDYSHIP) CO., INC., (g)
AURELIO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA, JR., and (h) EDUARDO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA.
"4.) A civil action in the Supreme Court of Hong Kong High Court (Action No. 4040 of
1992); against (a) ESHLEY COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A., (b) EL CHALLENGER S.A., (c)
ESPRIONA SHIPPING COMPANY S.A., (d) PACIFIC NAVIGATORS CORPORATION (e) EDDIE
NAVIGATION CORPORATION S.A., (f) LITONJUA CHARTERING (EDYSHIP) CO., INC., (g)
AURELIO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA, JR., and (h) EDUARDO KATIPUNAN LITONJUA."
and that private respondents' alleged cause of action is already barred by the
pendency of another action or by litis pendentia as shown above. 27
On the other hand, private respondents contend that certain material facts and
pleadings are omitted and/or misrepresented in the present petition for certiorari; that
the prefatory statement failed to state that part of the security of the foreign loans were
mortgages on a 39-hectare piece of real estate located in the Philippines; 28 that while
the complaint was filed only by the stockholders of the corporate borrowers, the latter
are wholly-owned by the private respondents who are Filipinos and therefore under
It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to dismiss CANNOT be the
subject of petition for certiorari. BANK OF AMERICAs should have filed an answer to the
complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before making an appeal. As
repeatedly held by this Court:
"An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the
extraordinary petition forcertiorari or mandamus. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to
dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case
by appeal in due course. . . . Under certain situations, recourse
to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial court issued
the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from
the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless
action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and
clogging the court dockets by another futile case." 34
Records show that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Order denying BANK OF AMERICAs' motion to dismiss. Does the denial of the motion to
dismiss constitute a patent grave abuse of discretion? Would appeal, under the
circumstances, not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy? We will resolve said
questions in conjunction with the issues raised by the parties.
First issue. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants
since plaintiffs are merely stockholders of the corporations which are the registered
owners of the vessels and the borrowers of BANK OF AMERICAs?
No. BANK OF AMERICAs' argument that private respondents, being mere stockholders of
the foreign corporations, have no personalities to sue, and therefore, the complaint
322
should be dismissed, is untenable. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Lack of personality to sue can be
used as a ground for a Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.35 In San Lorenzo Village Association,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 36 this Court clarified that a complaint states a cause of action
where it contains three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal
right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent,
the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. 37 To emphasize, it is not the lack or absence of cause of action
that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint but rather the fact that the complaint
states NO cause of action. 38 "Failure to state a cause of action" refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, unlike "lack of cause of action" which refers
to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. "Failure to state a cause of action"
may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss the
complaint, while "lack of cause of action" may be raised any time after the questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented. 39
In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three elements of a cause of action. It
alleges that: (1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an
accounting from defendants (herein BANK OF AMERICAs), as trustees by reason of the
fiduciary relationship that was created between the parties involving the vessels in
question; (2) BANK OF AMERICAs have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an
accounting; and (3) BANK OF AMERICAs failed to do the same.
BANK OF AMERICAs insist that they do not have any obligation to the private
respondents as they are mere stockholders of the corporation; that the corporate
entities have juridical personalities separate and distinct from those of the private
respondents. Private respondents maintain that the corporations are wholly owned by
them and prior to the incorporation of such entities, they were clients of BANK OF
AMERICAs which induced them to acquire loans from said BANK OF AMERICAs to invest
on the additional ships.
We agree with private respondents. As held in the San Lorenzo case, 40
". . . assuming that the allegation of facts constituting plaintiffs' cause of action is not as
clear and categorical as would otherwise be desired, any uncertainty thereby arising
should be so resolved as to enable a full inquiry into the merits of the action."
As this Court has explained in the San Lorenzo case, such a course, would preclude
multiplicity of suits which the law abhors, and conduce to the definitive determination
and termination of the dispute. To do otherwise, that is, to abort the action on account
of the alleged fatal flaws of the complaint would obviously be indecisive and would not
end the controversy, since the institution of another action upon a revised complaint
would not be foreclosed. 41
Second Issue. Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum nonconveniens?
No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient',
emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum
shopping, 42 that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place
wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural
advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to
select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 43
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. 44 In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 45 this Court held that ". . . [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the
Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision." 46 Evidently, all these requisites are present in the instant case.
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 47 that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground
for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include
said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of
the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. 48
Third issue. Are private respondents guilty of forum shopping because of the pendency
of foreign action?
No. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present and where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. 49 Parenthetically,
for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must be: (a) identity
of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. 50
In case at bar, not all the requirements for litis pendentia are present. While there may
be identity of parties, notwithstanding the presence of other respondents, 51 as well as
the reversal in positions of plaintiffs and defendants 52 , still the other requirements
necessary for litis pendentia were not shown by BANK OF AMERICA. It merely mentioned
323
that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and England without however showing the
identity of rights asserted and the reliefs sought for as well as the presence of the
elements of res judicata should one of the cases be adjudged.
As the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
. . . [T]he BANK OF AMERICAs, by simply enumerating the civil actions instituted abroad
involving the parties herein . . ., failed to provide this Court with relevant and clear
specifications that would show the presence of the above-quoted elements or
requisites for res judicata. While it is true that the BANK OF AMERICAs in their motion for
reconsideration (CA Rollo, p. 72), after enumerating the various civil actions instituted
abroad, did aver that "Copies of the foreign judgments are hereto attached and made
integral parts hereof as Annexes 'B', 'C', 'D' and `E'", they failed, wittingly or inadvertently,
to include a single foreign judgment in their pleadings submitted to this Court as
annexes to their petition. How then could We have been expected to rule on this issue
even if We were to hold that foreign judgments could be the basis for the application of
the aforementioned principle of res judicata? 53
Consequently, both courts correctly denied the dismissal of herein subject complaint.
The Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs). 5 ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI
to process the documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for
OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of
qualified applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist." 7 In a facsimile transmission
dated November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants'curricula
vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer
Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of
employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal)
2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch. 8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment
contract 9 that granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years.
Gran was then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary his
employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the
assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month. 10
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was
terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter, 11 on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on
your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency[,] vide
OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993. 12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (nonsubmittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing
his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration 13 releasing OAB from
any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994, against
ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty
Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City, which was docketed
as POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
324
325
As for the charge of insubordination and disobedience due to Gran's failure to submit a
"Daily Activity Report," the appellate court found that EDI failed to show that the
submission of the "Daily Activity Report" was a part of Gran's duty or the company's
policy. The court also held that even if Gran was guilty of insubordination, he should
have just been suspended or reprimanded, but not dismissed.
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to furnish EDI with his
Appeal Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
The CA also held that Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB did not abide
by the twin notice requirement. The court found that Gran was terminated on the same
day he received the termination letter, without having been apprised of the bases of his
dismissal or afforded an opportunity to explain his side.
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal Memorandum
constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due process that would warrant
a rejection of the appeal.
Finally, the CA held that the Declaration signed by Gran did not bar him from
demanding benefits to which he was entitled. The appellate court found that the
Declaration was in the form of a quitclaim, and as such is frowned upon as contrary to
public policy especially where the monetary consideration given in the Declaration was
very much less than what he was legally entitled to his backwages amounting to USD
16,150.00.
As a result of these findings, on October 18, 2000, the appellate court denied the
petition to set aside the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.
The Issues
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal lapse,
an excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on petitions to review decisions
of the Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the
Court of Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the
petitions and simply require the petitioners to comply with the rule. 26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees Labor UnionFFW v. National Labor Relations Commission, 27 Pagdonsalan v. NLRC, 28 and in Sunrise
Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC. 29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish the adverse
party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect,
and hence, not a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal
should not be dismissed; however, it should not be given due course either. As
enunciated in J.D. Magpayo, the duty that is imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to
require the appellant to comply with the rule that the opposing party should be
provided with a copy of the appeal memorandum.
326
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is excusable,
the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the Appeal
Memorandum constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI a copy of
the Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to present proof of service. In
compliance with the order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of
mail/parcels sent on April 7, 1998. 30 The post office's list shows that private respondent
Gran sent two pieces of mail on the same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de
Guzman of Legaspi Village, Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B.
Garcia (or Gran), 31 of Ermita, Manila both of whom are not connected with
petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed received a copy of
the Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and completeness
of service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5. 32 Proof and completeness of service. The return is prima facie proof of the
facts indicated therein.Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the
addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office
within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take
effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed complete when
the addressee or his agent received the mail or after five (5) days from the date of first
notice of the postmaster. However, the NLRC Rules do not state what would constitute
proper proof of service.
Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service: AHacIS
Section 13. Proof of service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If
the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of
the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee (emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by Gran is not
conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his appeal memorandum to EDI, nor is it
conclusive proof that EDI received its copy of the Appeal Memorandum. He should
have submitted an affidavit proving that he mailed the Appeal Memorandum together
with the registry receipt issued by the post office; afterwards, Gran should have
immediately filed the registry return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC should not
have simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels sent; but it should have
required Gran to properly furnish the opposing parties with copies of his Appeal
Memorandum as prescribed in J.D. Magpayo and the other cases. The NLRC should not
have proceeded with the adjudication of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished petitioner EDI a
copy of the Appeal Memorandum before rendering judgment reversing the dismissal of
Gran's complaint constitutes an evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established
jurisprudence. Worse, this failure deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by
the Constitution which can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in the
appeal before the NLRC. One can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI,
and ESI experienced when they thought that the dismissal of Gran's complaint became
final, only to receive a copy of Gran's Motion for Execution of Judgment which also
informed them that Gran had obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level
playing field and absolutely unfair and discriminatory against the employer and the job
recruiters. The rights of the employers to procedural due process cannot be cavalierly
disregarded for they too have rights assured under the Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding the case for
further proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the records before us to avoid
a protracted litigation. 33
The second and third issues have a common matter whether there was just cause for
Gran's dismissal hence, they will be discussed jointly.
Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable
by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the
local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the
employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between the
parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. 34 HAaDcS
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all
matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of PROVING the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot
327
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum
law. 35
second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter 44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which
outlined the reasons why OAB had terminated Gran's employment.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. 36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. 37 Thus,
we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position
because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the]
ACAD system." 45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required
"Daily Activity Reports." 46 However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other
evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent,
insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden
of proving that Gran was validly dismissed.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to
incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that
the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and
just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code 38 states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative
if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the workers to contest
the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. . . .
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and therefore
illegal. 40 Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to
an employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and
convincing evidence to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal. 41 This is consistent
with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced
by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 42 aEAIDH
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed
for just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. To prove its
allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The first is the July 9, 1994 termination
letter, 43 addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The
328
is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the
dismissal of the worker. 48 aTADCE
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to incompetence,
insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC, 49 as used by the CA in its Decision, is
not applicable to the present case.
In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment, the
petitioners were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted by the
recruiting agency to insure employment of only technically qualified workers for the
foreign principal." 50 The CA, using the ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must have
passed the test; otherwise, he would not have been hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault
when it deployed Gran who was allegedly "incompetent" for the job.
According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case at hand,
Gran misrepresented himself in hiscurriculum vitae as a Computer Specialist; thus, he
was not qualified for the job for which he was hired.
We disagree.
The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is to weed
out incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is supposed to reveal
applicants with false educational backgrounds, and expose bogus qualifications. Since
EDI deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be presumed that Gran had passed the required
trade test and that Gran is qualified for the job. Even if there was no objective trade test
done by EDI, it was still EDI's responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure to
do so only weakened its position but should not in any way prejudice Gran. In any case,
the issue is rendered moot and academic because Gran's incompetency is unproved.
Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor laws and
regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules
on the requisites of due process relating to termination of employment shall apply.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer
must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying
the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and
after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if
the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices
30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. EAHcCT
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before
their employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of
their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their
employment is being terminated. In between the first and second notice, the
employees should be given a hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or
by counsel of their choice. 55
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing
Gran fell short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice
informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of
the charges against him, as prescribed by the Labor Code. 56 Consequently, he was
denied the opportunity to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a
hearing or conference with Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in support of
his defenses. Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was effective on the same
day. This shows that OAB had already condemned Gran to dismissal, even before Gran
was furnished the termination letter. It should also be pointed out that OAB failed to give
Gran the chance to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a
representative in accordance with Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there was no
intention to provide Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his
employment arbitrarily terminated on the same day, through the same letter, and for
unjustified grounds. Obviously, Gran was not afforded due process.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon, 57 an employer is liable to pay nominal
damages as indemnity for violating the employee's right to statutory due process. Since
OAB was in breach of the due process requirements under the Labor Code and its
regulations, OAB, ESI, and EDI, jointly and solidarily, are liable to Gran in the amount of
PhP30,000.00 as indemnity.
Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process, since he
was allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five months prior to his
termination. 51 EDI also claims that the requirements of due process, as enunciated
inSantos Jr. v. NLRC, 52 and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 53 cited by the CA
in its Decision, were properly observed in the present case.
This position is untenable.
In Agabon v. NLRC, 54 this Court held that:
We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period of
employment, in cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 58 (Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that when the contract is for a fixed term
and the employees are dismissed without just cause, they are entitled to the payment
of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract. 59 On the other
hand, for cases arising after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the termination of
employment is without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
329
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term
whichever is less. 60
In the present case, the employment contract provides that the employment contract
shall be valid for a period of two (2) years from the date the employee starts to work
with the employer. 61 Gran arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and started to work on
February 7, 1994; 62 hence, his employment contract is until February 7, 1996. Since he
was illegally dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is
therefore entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract,
which was equivalent to USD 16,150.
Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly relies on the
Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and voluntarily executed by Gran.
The relevant portions of the Declaration are as follows: aEDCAH
I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY FINAL SETTLEMENT ON
THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:
S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE SERVICES I RENDERED TO
OAB ESTABLISHMENT.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN MY FAVOUR AFTER
RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT IN CASH.
I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME IN WHATEVER FORM.
I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING MY SIGNATURE
VOLUNTARILY.
SIGNED.
ELEAZAR GRAN
Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or waivers, more
particularly those executed by employees. This requirement was clearly articulated by
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and Housing Development Corporation v.
Esquillo:
Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or contracts in favor
of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the disadvantaged. The
waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only to the words and terms used,
but also the factual circumstances under which they have been executed. 63(Emphasis
supplied.)
330
d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and
e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.
The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the Declaration and
constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if it was against his will since
he was told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh on July 12, 1994. He had no other choice
but to sign the Declaration as he needed the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of
his ticket. He could have entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or
safety in Saudi Arabia if he would not sign the quitclaim.
4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract of adhesion
which should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion contract is
contrary to public policy as it leaves the weaker party the employee in a "take-itor-leave-it" situation. Certainly, the employer is being unjust to the employee as there is
no meaningful choice on the part of the employee while the terms are unreasonably
favorable to the employer. 66
[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of the Bureau
of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final and binding upon the
parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved
therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence
that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only to labor
contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country agreed
upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the foreign laws shall apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 18, 2000 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
56120 of the Court of Appeals affirming the January 15, 1999 Decision and September
30, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner EDIStaffbuilders International, Inc. shall pay the amount of PhP30,000.00 to respondent Gran
as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128803. September 25, 1998.]
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers
of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following:
27. ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO
HERAS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR, J p:
In issue is the enforceability in the Philippines of a foreign judgment. The antecedents
are summarized in the 24 August 1990 Decision 1 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-52452; thus:,
The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint on December 3, 1987 against the
defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the
ASIAVEST LTD the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment dated
December 28, 1984 and amended on April 13, 1987 to wit:
1) US$1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong Kong currency at the time of payment with
legal interest from December 28, 1984 until fully paid;
2) interest on the sum of US$1,500.00 at 9.875% per annum from October 31, 1984 to
December 28, 1984; and
3) HK$905.00 at fixed cost in the action; and
331
4) at least $80,000.00 representing attorney's fees, litigation expenses and cost, with
interest thereon from the date of the judgment until fully paid.
On March 3, 1988 the HERAS filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, before the court could
resolve the said motion, a fire which partially razed the Quezon City Hall Building on
June 11, 1988 totally destroyed the office of this Court, together with all its records,
equipment and properties. On July 26, 1988, the ASIAVEST LIMITED, through counsel filed
a Motion for Reconstitution of Case Records. The Court, after allowing the HERAS to
react thereto, granted the said Motion and admitted the annexes attached thereto as
the reconstituted records of this case per Order dated September 6, 1988. Thereafter,
the Motion to Dismiss, the resolution of which had been deferred, was denied by the
Court in its Order of October 4, 1988.
Her knowledge is based on the fact that she was the personal secretary of Mr. Heras
during his JD Transit days up to the latter part of 1972 when he shifted or diversified to
shipping business in Hong Kong; that she was in-charge of all his letters and
correspondence, business commitments, undertakings, conferences and appointments,
until October 1984 when Mr. Heras left Hong Kong for good; that she was also the
Officer-in-Charge or Office Manager of Navegante Shipping Agency LTD, a Hong Kong
registered and based company acting as ships agent, up to and until the company
closed shop sometime in the first quarter of 1985 when shipping business collapsed
worldwide; that the said Company held office at 34-35 Connaught Road, Central Hong
Kong and later transferred to Caxton House at Duddel Street, Hong Kong, until the
company closed shop in 1985; and that she was certain of such facts because she held
office at Caxton House up to the first quarter of 1985.
On October 19, 1988 HERAS filed his Answer. The case was then set for pre-trial
conference. At the conference, the parties could not arrive at any settlement.
However, they agreed on the following stipulations of facts:
Mr. Lousich was presented as an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, and as a
representative of the law office of the HERAS's counsel who made a verification of the
record of the case filed by the ASIAVEST LIMITED in Hong Kong against the HERAS as well
as the procedure in serving Court processes in Hong Kong.
1. The HERAS admits the existence of the judgment dated December 28, 1984 as well as
its amendment dated April 13, 1987, but not necessarily the authenticity or validity
thereof;
In his affidavit (Exh. "2") which constitutes his direct testimony the said witness stated that:
2. The ASIAVEST LIMITED is not doing business and is not licensed to do business in the
Philippines;
3. The residence of HERAS, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City.
The only issue for this Court to determine is, whether or not the judgment of the Hong
Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact, such as to overcome the
presumption established in Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in favor of foreign
judgments.
In view of the admission by the HERAS of the existence of the aforementioned judgment
(Pls. See Stipulations of Facts in the Order dated January 5, 1989 as amended by the
Order of January 18, 1989) as well as the legal presumption in favor of the ASIAVEST
LIMITED as provided for in paragraph (b), Sec. 50, (Ibid.), the ASIAVEST LIMITED presented
only documentary evidence to show rendition, existence, and authentication of such
judgment by the proper officials concerned (Pls. See Exhibits "A" thru "B", with their
submarkings). In addition, the ASIAVEST LIMITED presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to show its entitlement to attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation . . .
On the other hand, the HERAS presented two witnesses, namely, Fortunata dela Vega
and Russel Warren Lousich.
The gist of Ms. dela Vega's testimony is to the effect that no writ of summons or copy of
a statement of claim of Asiavest Limited was ever served in the office of the Navegante
Shipping Agency Limited and/or for Mr. Antonio Heras, and that no service of the writ of
summons was either served on the HERAS at his residence in New Manila, Quezon City.
The HERAS was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the obligations of
Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A. There is no record that a writ of summons was
served on the person of the HERAS in Hong Kong, or that any such attempt at service
was made. Likewise, there is no record that a copy of the judgment of the High Court
was furnished or served on the HERAS; anyway, it is not a legal requirement to do so
under Hong Kong laws;
a) The writ of summons or claim can be served by the solicitor (lawyer) of the claimant
or ASIAVEST LIMITED. In Hong Kong there are no Court personnel who serve writs of
summons and/or most other processes.
b) If the writ of summons or claim (or complaint) is not contested, the claimant or the
ASIAVEST LIMITED is not required to present proof of his claim or complaint nor present
evidence under oath of the claim in order to obtain a Judgment.
c) There is no legal requirement that such a Judgment or decision rendered by the
Court in Hong Kong [to] make a recitation of the facts or the law upon which the claim
is based.
d) There is no necessity to furnish the HERAS with a copy of the Judgment or decision
rendered against him.
e) In an action based on a guarantee, there is no established legal requirement or
obligation under Hong Kong laws that the creditor must first bring proceedings against
the principal debtor. The creditor can immediately go against the guarantor.
On cross examination, Mr. Lousich stated that before he was commissioned by the law
firm of the HERAS's counsel as an expert witness and to verify the records of the Hong
332
Kong case he had been acting as counsel for the HERAS in a number of commercial
matters; that there was an application for service of summons upon the HERAS outside
the jurisdiction of Hong Kong; that there was an order of the Court authorizing service
upon Heras outside of Hong Kong, particularly in Manila or any other place in the
Philippines (p. 9, TSN, 2/14/90); that there must be adequate proof of service of
summons otherwise the Hong Kong Court will refuse to render judgment (p. 10, ibid);
that the mere fact that the Hong Kong Court rendered judgment, it can be presumed
that there was service of summons; that in this case, it is not just a presumption because
there was an affidavit stating that service was effected in [sic] a particular man here in
Manila; that such affidavit was filed by one Jose R. Fernandez of the firm Sycip Salazar
on the 21st of December 1984 and stated in essence that "on Friday the 23rd of
November 1984 he served the 4th HERAS at No. 6 First Street, Quezon City by leaving it
at that address with Mr. Dionisio Lopez, the son-in-law of the 4th HERAS the copy of the
writ and Mr. Lopez informed me and I barely believed that he would bring the said writ
to the attention of the 4th "HERAS" (pp. 11-12, ibid.); that upon filing of that affidavit the
Court was asked and granted judgment against the 4th HERAS; and that if the summons
or claim is not contested, the claimant of the ASIAVEST LIMITED is not required to present
proof of his claim or complaint or present evidence under oath of the claim in order to
obtain judgment; and that such judgment can be enforced in the same manner as a
judgment rendered after full hearing.
The trial court held that since the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly proved, it is
a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties; hence, the party impugning
it had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction over his person. HERAS failed to discharge
that burden. He did not testify to state categorically and under oath that he never
received summons. Even his own witness Lousich admitted that HERAS was served with
summons in his Quezon City residence. As to De la Vega's testimony regarding nonservice of summons, the same was hearsay and had no probative value. prLL
As to HERAS' contention that the Hong Kong court judgment violated the Constitution
and the procedural laws of the Philippines because it contained no statements of the
facts and the law on which it was based, the trial court ruled that since the issue related
to procedural matters, the law of the forum, i.e., Hong Kong laws, should govern. As
testified by the expert witness Lousich, such legalities were not required under Hong
Kong laws. The trial court also debunked HERAS' contention that the principle of
excussion under Article 2058 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was violated. It declared
that matters of substance are subject to the law of the place where the transaction
occurred; in this case, Hong Kong laws must govern.
The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized
and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal
presumption in favor of the foreign judgment It then decreed; thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering HERAS to pay to the ASIAVEST
LIMITED the following sums or their equivalents in Philippine currency at the time of
payment: US$1,810,265.40 plus interest on the sum of US$1,500,000.00 at 9.875% per
annum from October 31, 1984 to December 28, 1984, and HK$905 as fixed cost, with
legal interests on the aggregate amount from December 28, 1984, and to pay attorneys
fees in the sum of P80,000.00.
ASIAVEST moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial
costs and an increase in attorney's fees in the amount of US$19,346.45 with interest until
full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, HERAS no longer opposed the
motion and instead appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 29513.
In its order 2 of 2 November 1990, the trial court granted ASIAVEST's motion for
reconsideration by increasing the award of attorney's fees to "US$19,345.65 OR ITS
EQUIVALENT IN PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, AND TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT," provided
that ASIAVEST would pay the corresponding filing fees for the increase. ASIAVEST
appealed the order requiring prior payment of filing fees. However, it later withdrew its
appeal and paid the additional filing fees.
On 3 April 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision 3 reversing the decision of
the trial court and dismissing ASIAVEST's complaint without prejudice. It underscored the
fact that a foreign judgment does not of itself have any extraterritorial application. For it
to be given effect, the foreign tribunal should have acquired jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter. If such tribunal has not acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is void.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to service of summons upon the HERAS are governed by the lex
fori, which was, in this case, the law of Hong Kong. Relative thereto, it gave weight to
Lousich's testimony that under the Hong Kong law, the substituted service of summons
upon HERAS effected the Philippines by the clerk of Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan firm would be valid provided that it was done in accordance with Philippine
laws. It then stressed that where the action is in personam and the HERAS is in the
Philippines, the summons should be personally served on the HERAS pursuant to Section
7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. 4Substituted service may only be availed of where the
HERAS cannot be promptly served in person, the fact of impossibility of personal service
should be explained in the proof of service. It also found as persuasive HERAS' argument
that instead of directly using the clerk of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law
office, who was not authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons, ASIAVEST
should have asked for leave of the local courts to have the foreign summons served by
the sheriff or other court officer of the place where service was to be made, or for
special reasons by any person authorized by the judge. cdasia
The Court of Appeals agreed with HERAS that "notice sent outside the state to a nonresident is unavailing to give jurisdictionin an action against him personally for money
recovery." Summons should have been personally served on HERAS in Hong Kong, for, as
claimed by ASIAVEST, HERAS was physically present in Hong Kong for nearly 14 years.
Since there was not even an attempt to serve summons on HERAS in Hong Kong, the
Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over HERAS. Nonetheless, it did
not totally foreclose the claim of ASIAVEST; thus:
While we are not fully convinced that [HERAS] has a meritorious defense against
[ASIAVEST's] claims or that [HERAS] ought to be absolved of any liability, nevertheless, in
view of the foregoing discussion, there is a need to deviate from the findings of the
lower court in the interest of justice and fair play This, however, is without prejudice to
333
whatever action [ASIAVEST] might deem proper in order to enforce its claims against
[HERAS].
Finally, the Court of Appeals also agreed with HERAS that it was necessary that
evidence supporting the validity of the foreign judgment be submitted and that our
courts are not bound to give effect to foreign judgments which contravene our laws
and the principle of sound morality and public policy.
ASIAVEST forthwith filed the instant petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that
I.
. . . IT WAS NECESSARY FOR [ASIAVEST] TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 'SUPPORTING THE VALIDITY
OF THE JUDGMENT';
II.
. . . THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON [HERAS] WAS DEFECTIVE UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW;
III.
. . . SUMMONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERSONALLY SERVED ON HERAS IN HONG KONG;
IV.
. . . THE HONG KONG SUMMONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SERVED WITH LEAVE OF PHILIPPINE
COURTS;
V.
. . . THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT 'CONTRAVENES PHILIPPINE LAWS, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOUND
MORALITY, AND THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Being interrelated, we shall take up together the assigned errors.
Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 5 which was the
governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and respondent
Court of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by a court having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by the subsequent title. However, the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in the absence
of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on
grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is on
the party challenging the foreign judgment HERAS in this case.
At the pre-trial conference, HERAS admitted the existence of the Hong Kong judgment.
On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence to prove rendition, existence, and
authentication of the judgment by the proper officials. The judgment is thus presumed
to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. 6 Consequently, the first ground relied upon by ASIAVEST has merit. The
presumption of validity accorded foreign judgment would be rendered meaningless
were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity.
The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong
Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the
issue of whether summons was properly and validly served on HERAS. It is settled that
matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon
the HERAS are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, 7 i.e., the law of Hong
Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was
presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid service of summons on
him.
In his counter-affidavit, 8 which served as his direct testimony per agreement of the
parties, 9 Lousich declared that the record of the Hong Kong case failed to show that a
writ of summons was served upon HERAS in Hong Kong or that any such attempt was
made. Neither did the record show that a copy of the judgment of the court was served
on HERAS. He stated further that under Hong Kong laws (a) a writ of summons could be
served by the solicitor of the claimant or ASIAVEST LIMITED; and (b) where the said writ or
claim was not contested, the claimant or ASIAVEST LIMITED was not required to present
proof under oath in order to obtain judgment.
On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich testified that the Hong Kong
court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its jurisdiction, particularly in
the Philippines. He admitted also the existence of an affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez
of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm stating that he (Fernandez) served
summons on HERAS on 13 November 1984 at No. 6, 1st St., Quezon City, by leaving a
copy with HERAS's son-in-law Dionisio Lopez. 10 On redirect examination, Lousich
declared that such service of summons would be valid under Hong Kong laws provided
that it was in accordance with Philippine laws. 11
We note that there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on the qualification of Mr.
Lousich as an expert on the Hong Kong law. Under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
New Rules of Evidence, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority,
tribunal, official body, or public officer may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof, which
334
must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. The certificate may be issued by the secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Nevertheless, the testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a foreign law.
An authority 12 on private international law thus noted:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule,
however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamettee Iron and Steel Works
v. Muzzal, 13 that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court)
does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence
of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath
of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said
law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Fisher et al., 14upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of
California as proved by the respondents' witness. In that case, the counsel for
respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is
familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by
the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible
personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California
Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of
Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization
cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed
rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of
all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof
offered." 15 Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be
competent proof of that law. 16
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific
law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in
personam, and where the HERAS is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In
view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come
into play. It will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the
Philippine law. 17
As stated in Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 18 it will be helpful to determine first whether
the action is in personam, in rem, orquasi in rem because the rules on service of
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the
nature of the action. prcd
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. 19 An
action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as HERAS and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property. 20
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the HERAS is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident HERAS
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of
summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may he resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth
in Section 8; 21 (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service
by publication also with leave of court; 22or (4) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient. 23
However, in an action in personam wherein the HERAS is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. 24 This
method of service is possible if such HERAS is physically present in the country. If he is
not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. 25 An exception was laid down
in Gemperle v. Schenker 26 wherein a non-resident was served with summons through
his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and
attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere
offshoot of the first case.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the HERAS is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the HERAS
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements. 27 Thus, where the HERAS is a non-resident who is not found in the
Philippines AND (1) the action affects the personal status of the ASIAVEST LIMITED; (2) the
action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the
HERAS has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the HERAS
from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the
HERAS has been attached in the Philippines service of summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with
leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 28
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam, since
it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. Before
we can apply the foregoing rules, we must determine first whether HERAS was a resident
of Hong Kong.
Fortunata de la Vega, HERAS's personal secretary in Hong Kong since 1972 until
1985, 29 testified that HERAS was the President and part owner of a shipping company
335
in Hong Kong during all those times that she served as his secretary. He had in his
employ a staff of twelve. 30 He had "business commitments, undertakings, conferences,
and appointments until October 1984 when [he] left Hong Kong for good." 31 HERAS's
other witness, Russel Warren Lousich, testified that he had acted as counsel for HERAS
"for a number of commercial matters." 32 ASIAVEST then infers that HERAS was a resident
of Hong Kong because he maintained a business there.
It must be noted that in his Motion to Dismiss, 33 as well as in his Answer 34 to ASIAVEST's
complaint for the enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment, HERAS maintained
that the Hong Kong court did not have jurisdiction over him because the fundamental
rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-resident HERASs, so as to sustain a money
judgment, must be based upon personal service of summons within the state which
renders the judgment. 35
For its part, ASIAVEST, in its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 36 contended: "The
question of Hong Kong court's 'want of jurisdiction' is therefore a triable issue if it is to be
pleaded by the HERAS to 'repel' the foreign judgment. Facts showing jurisdictional lack
(e.g. that the Hong Kong suit was in personam, that HERAS was not a resident of Hong
Kong when the suit was filed or that he did not voluntarily submit to the Hong Kong
court's jurisdiction) should be alleged and proved by the HERAS." 37
In his Reply (to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), 38 HERAS argued that the lack of
jurisdiction over his person was corroborated by ASIAVEST's allegation in the complaint
that he "has his residence at No. 6, 1st St., New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines." He then
concluded that such Judicial admission amounted to evidence that he was and is not a
resident of Hong Kong.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations of facts,
among which was that "the residence of HERAS, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon
City." 39
Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no longer so in
November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be
made on him. As declared by his secretary, which statement was not disputed by
ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 "for good." 40 His absence in Hong
Kong must have been the reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus,
ASIAVEST was constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and
upon obtaining a favorable action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar
Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines.
In Brown v. Brown, 41 the HERAS was previously a resident of the Philippines. Several days
after a criminal action for concubinage was filed against him, he abandoned the
Philippines. Later, a proceeding quasi in rem was instituted against him. Summons in the
latter case was served on the HERAS's attorney-in-fact at the latter's address. The Court
held that under the facts of the case, it could not be said that the HERAS was "still a
resident of the Philippines because he ha[d] escaped to his country and [was] therefore
an absentee in the Philippines." As such, he should have been "summoned in the same
manner as one who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines."
Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with summons in
the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against
him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial
service on a resident HERAS who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if
HERAS be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he
left Hong Kong not only "temporarily" but "for good." cdll
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in
this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 29513.
No costs.
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement of the
Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never challenged the
service of summons on him through a security guard in his Quezon City residence and
through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question the
jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid service of
summons. What was in issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was
concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of
New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over
his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact,
ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him
was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on
him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and
did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the
Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]
28. GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
336
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
oncertiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must
first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted
to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office.
The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments, 14both support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT'S RULING
337
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 22 aCHDST
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; 25Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing
the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
338
herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law. DCASIT
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given
the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides.
339
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
340
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. STHDAc
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to
the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in
a newspaper of general circulation. 40As these basic jurisdictional requirements
have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed
as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
petition
for
review
on certiorari, andREVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order
the REMANDof the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
RegistrarGeneral. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438)
341