Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71581 March 21, 1990
CARMEN LABATAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Guerrero, Carmelo, De Silva, Lagmay & Lazo Law Office and
Pedro R. Lazo for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) * in Criminal Case No. 4799,
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 217, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.
From January 1978 to December 1980, petitioner Carmen
Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the
Mindanao State University MSU General Santos City. She filed
a leave of absence for the months of March, April and May
1978 and did not discharge her duties for the said period.
On 1 October 1980, Francisco T. Rivera, under Commission on
Audit (COA) General Order No. 8022-117 (Exh. C) was
designated leader of a team to conduct the examination of
the cash and accounts of the petitioner. When the team
conducted the examination, the petitioner did not have any
cash in her possession, so she was asked to produce all her
records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and
remittance advices and her monthly reports of collections.
Based on the official receipts and the record of remittances for
the period from January to August 1978, the audit
examination disclosed that the petitioner collected the total
amount of P113,205.58 (Exhs. A-1 and A-2) and made a total
remittance to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
the depository bank of the university, in the amount of
P78,868.69, leaving an unremitted amount of P34,336.19.
On the basis of similar official receipts and record of
remittances, the audit examination further disclosed that for
the period from January 1979 to June 6, 1980, the petitioner
made a total collection of P327,982.00 (Exhs. B, B-1, and B-1a) and remitted to the DBP the total amount of P256,606.25
(Exhs. B-2 and B-2-a) incurring a shortage of P71,365.75.
The petitioner signed without exception both Reports of
Examination (Exhs. A and B) as well as their supporting
summaries.
Thereafter, Francisco T. Rivera submitted his report on the
examination to the Chairman, Commission on Audit, through
the Regional Director, COA, Region IX (Exhs. A-4 and B-4).
Subsequently, Rivera prepared the letters of demand
corresponding to the two (2) audit reports (Exhs. A-3 and B-3)
and served them personally on the petitioner who signed both
letters. Despite the demand letters, the petitioner did not
submit any explanation of her shortages.
Hence, on 27 October 1981, the Tanodbayan filed with the
Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds, committed as follows:

That between the periods January 1978 to August 17, 1978,

and January 1, 1979 to June 6, 1980, in General Santos City,
Philippines, the said accused a public officer being then the
Cashier and Collecting Officer of the Mindanao State
University, General Santos Unit, General Santos City, who, by
reason of the duties of her office was charged with the duty of
collecting school dues and tuition fees of the students of said
school, and of remitting to, or depositing with, the school's
depository bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines,
General Santos City branch, all money collections by way of
school dues and tuition fees she collected as Cashier and
Collecting Officer, was responsible and accountable for the
funds collected and received by her, by reason of her position
as Collecting Officer, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, and with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, and embezzle the total sum of ONE HUNDRED
FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN AND 94/100
P105,711.94), Philippine Currency, out of her collection of
P441,187.58, during the aforesaid period, which sum of
P105,711.94 she appropriated and converted to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
Republic of the Philippines in said amount. 1
During the trial, petitioner in her defense claimed that she
signed the audit reports on the understanding that her
shortage would amount to only P2,000.00; that she could not
be held accountable for the collections for March, April and
May 1978 because she was on maternity leave; and that
several disbursements in the total amount of P49,417.12 were
not credited in her favor by the auditors. She claimed further
that she should not be held accountable for the alleged
misappropriations between the months of January 1978 and
August 1978 in the amount of P34,336.19 because those who
appropriated the amounts were her superiors and that the
amounts taken were properly receipted but that the receipts
were lost.
Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight nor
credence to her defense. Hence, as previously stated,
petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation of public funds.
The petitioner then filed the instant petition, and alleged the
following reasons why the petition should be granted; (1) that
respondent court made manifestly mistaken inferences and
misapprehended the significance of the evidence which
resulted in the erroneous decision rendered in the case; and
(2) that respondent court erred in finding the petitioner guilty
of the crime charged when there is ample evidence submitted
showing that she did not put the missing funds to her
personal use.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
guilt of the petitioner has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
The established facts show that respondent court did not err
in convicting petitioner for the crime of malversation. As held
by said court:
There is no merit in the accused's defense. Her claim that she
signed the audit report and statement of collections and
deposits prepared by the audit team of Francisco Rivera on
the understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is
belied by the figures clearly reflected on the said documents.
Exhibit A, the audit report which she signed without
exception, shows that she incurred a shortage of P34,336.19
for the period from January to August 1978; while Exhibit A-1,
the statement of her collections and deposits for the same
period which she certified as correct, indicates the same
amount of P34,336.19 as her shortage.

Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution's rebuttal witness,

confirmed that she assisted the accused in the collection of
fees; that the accused filed application for maternity leave in
March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that
month; that the accused did not report for work in April 1978;
and that she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the
fees in her stead. Miss Guanzon, however, explained that she
turned over all her collections to the accused during all the
times that she was assisting her in collecting the fees; and
that even in April 1978 when the accused was physically
absent from office, she also turned over her collections to the
accused ill the latters house with the duplicate copies of the
receipts she issued which the accused signed after satisfying
herself that the amounts I turned over tallied with the
receipts.
There is color of truth to Mrs. Guanzon's explanation. All the
collections for the months of March and April 1978 are fully
accounted for they are itemized in the reports of collection,
(Exhs. F and G) and shown to have been duly remitted in the
remittance advices for those months. (Exhs. F-1 to F-5; G-1
and G-2).
The auditor was correct in refusing to credit the accused with
the three (3) different amounts mentioned in her letter of
October 22, 1980. (Exh. 5) The first sum, P7,140.20,
purporting to be refunds of tuition fees to students granted
tuition privilages is hot supported by any official authorization
for such refunds by the University authorities. Besides, the
supposed list of students who were recipients of the refunds
(Exh. 10) is incompetent evidence being a mere xerox copy
uncertified as a true copy of an existing original.
The second sum, P4,494.80 was purportedly spent for the cost
of uniforms of the school and basketball balls. P2,100.00 in all
(Exhs. 6 and 6-A), and the balance taken by Alikhan
Marohombsar and Auditor Casan, (Exh. 6-B). The third
amount, P6,702.12, was supposedly covered by vouchers
submitted to the Auditor's office through Rosa Cabiguin. (Exh.
12-K) Again, the auditor did not err in not crediting the
aforesaid sums to the accused's accountability. The P2,100.00
cost of uniforms and balls, unsupported by a duly
accomplished and approved voucher, was not a valid
disbursement. And since the alleged vouchers for P6,792.12
were not presented in evidence nor was any effort exerted to
compel their production in court by subpoena duces
tecum, the same was properly refused to be deduced from the
incurred shortage of the accused.
All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by
Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor Casan
totalling P31,070.00. (Exhs. 12, 12-A, etc., 13-A and 14-A),
supported as they are by mere pieces of paper, despite the
admission by Director Osop of having signed some of them
(Exhs. 12-A, 12-D, 12-E and 12-I) were not valid
disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the
chits were really secured by the persons who signed them, the
responsibility to account for them still rests in the accused
accountable officer. Malversation consists not only ill
misappropriation or converting public funds or property to
one's personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to
make use of or misappropriate them. 2
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the questioned
decision of respondent court and the issues raised in this
petition being essentially factual, the petition for review is
DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102356 February 9, 1993

CALINICO B. ILOGON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Florecita V. Bilbes for petitioner.

1. Vales P 8,846.00
2. Cash shortage (paid vouchers)
already reimbursed and/or paid and
received by you P 48,028.58
3. Cash items disallowed (paid
vouchers) already reimbursed and/or
paid and received by individual
creditors P 5,787.97
4. Cash items disallowed (paid
vouchers) amount disallowed by the
Regional Office P 31,036.85

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

5. Cash items disallowed (paid

vouchers) amount still payable
non-budgetry expenses as
certified by the accountant P 19,555.84

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

6. Actual shortage P 4,747.86

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision * of

the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9776 entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Calinico B. Ilogon", dated May 14, 1991
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to the indeterminate
penalty of from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law; to suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine in the
sum of P118,003.10, an amount equal to the amount
malversed, with costs.

Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the

Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to
January, 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting
payments, making collections and effecting disbursement as
there was no cashier employed during the period of his
incumbency. He was adept at this work because, before his
designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact,
a duly-appointed cashier.
On September 19, 1983, Commission on Audit Auditors Robin
S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the
cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from
September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The examination
showed that the petitioner incurred a shortage in his accounts
amounting to P118,871.29 itemized in the following manner:
Accountability:
Balance shown by your
cashbook on September 12, 1983
certified correct by you
and verified by us P171,999.42
Credits to Accountability:
Deduct:
Cash, checks, and treasury
warrants P 40,116.13
cash items
allowed 13,012.00 P 53,128.13

Shortage P 118,871.29 1
=========
The amount of shortage was later reduced to P118,003.10.
This shortage represents the following:

P 118,003.10 2
=========
On November 27, 1984, petitioner was charged with the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in an
Information 3 which reads as follows:
That on or about September 13, 1983 or prior and subsequent
thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Tribunal, the said accused, a
public officer, being the Acting Postmaster of the Bureau of
Posts of the said City, and as such accountable for the public
funds collected and received by reason of his position, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
grave abuse of confidence misappropriate, misapply and
embezzle for his own personal use and benefit from the said
funds, the total sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
AND THREE PESOS AND TEN CENTAVOS (P118,003.10)
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before the Sandiganbayan, herein petitioner put up the
following defense:
1. In respect to the shortage of P8,846.00, Item 1 in the
auditor's letter of demand, the amount represents vales (cash
advances) granted to postal employees of Cagayan de Oro
City in payment of salaries or wages which the accused paid
out to them, even before the period for which they were
supposed to be paid. He received reimbursement checks on
the 20th or 25th September, 1983 in payment thereof, but he
remitted these payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines
only on October 17, 1983, per Official Receipt Number
312164. . . .
2. As regards that category of shortage amounting to
P48,028.58, the accused claims that this amount represents
the aggregate of the cash advances to salaries of the Regional
Director, Postal Inspector, and postal employees of Davao,
Iloilo and other places who were assigned in Cagayan de Oro
City. The accused did not have these amounts on hand when
his cash and account were audited on September 13, 1983,
because the reimbursements for the said cash advances were
not yet in his possession. If they were, the amounts given
were less than the amounts stated in the voucher, consisting,
therefore, of partial liquidations. In case of a partial
liquidation, he would simply annotate the partial payment in

the voucher. He would not enter partial payments in the cash

book.
3. Respecting that category of shortage amounting to
P5,787.97, the accused explained that this shortage
constituted cash advances to postal employees. While
reimbursement checks had already been paid to the
employees involved by the Regional Office of the Bureau of
Posts, these employees had negotiated or encashed their
reimbursement checks without turning over the proceeds
thereof to the accused Acting Postmaster.
The accused claims that the shortage had later been paid
through a remittance he made in the Sum of P20,438.60,
Exhibit "14", and in the amount of P65,000.00, Exhibit "10"
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, as regards the cash shortage of P4,747.86, the
accused admitted the fact that he did not actually have this
amount of cash when, during the audit, he was told to present
all his cash on hand. It is his claim that all the while, this
amount had in fact been in the possession of his teller. While
he forgot to tell the auditors that the cash was actually with
the teller, he remitted this amount to the Land Bank on
September 19, 1983, as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
31176, Exhibit "11". 4
After trial, the respondent Sandiganbayan found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Hence,
this appeal.

Auditing Code of the Philippines, specifically Section 69

thereof, which provides that postmasters are only allowed to
use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic
transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank
whenever their cash advances for the purpose are
exhausted." 8
The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing
funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate him from
his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent
Sandiganbayan, "the fact that (the) immediate superiors of
the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the
practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not
legalize the disbursements".
The fact also that petitioner fully settled the amount of
P188,003.10 later is of no moment. The return of funds
malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting
circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the accused's
criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance. 9
In the light of the above finding and under the plain language
of the applicable laws, We hold that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the petitioner guilty of
the crime charged. The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is
hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner would try to evade the application of Article 217 of

the Revised Penal Code by arguing that he never
misappropriated the amount of P118,003.10 for his own
personal use as the bulk of it was given as cash advances to
his co-employees. He pleads:
. . . the act of petitioner in giving out vales and/or cash
advances should not be condemned or be considered as a
criminal act but should instead be lauded not only because
the same was done purely for humanitarian reasons and that
is to alleviate the plight of his co-employees during those hard
times when the salaries of lowly government employees were
very much below the ordinary level of subsistence and his
desire to see to it that the public interest will not be
jeopardized, . . ., but also because this has been the
undisturbed practice in their office since time immemorial,
even before the accused's incumbency . . . . 5
Petitioner's argument fails to persuade Us.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received
public funds and that he did not have them in his possession
when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of
direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there
is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot
satisfactorily explain the same. 6
In this case, petitioner was the official custodian of the
missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of
P118,003.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster
but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same. he
would invoke what he calls "humanitarian reasons" as the
justification for the said shortage. But, like the
accused Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, 7 petitioner herein knows
that his granting of "chits" and "vales" which constituted the
bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and
regulations. Such practice, it was held in Cabello, is also
prohibited by Memoramdum Circular No. 570, dated June 29,
1968, of the General Auditing Office. This Court went further
to state that "giving vales" is proscribed under Presidential
Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
ALFREDO RODILLAS Y BONDOC, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Santiago R. Robinol for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition brought by Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc asking
for the reversal of a decision of the Sandiganbayan which
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224,
RPC). The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in the crime of Evasion through Negligence, as
defined and penalized under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider,
hereby sentences him to suffer the straight penalty of FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, to suffer eight
(8) years and one (1) day of temporary special disqualification
and to pay the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of

the Court of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato
Building, Caloocan City, to face trial for an alleged Violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as the policewoman officer
who was supposed to escort the said detainee was then sick.
He and the detainee proceeded to the court building and
arrived thereat between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
while waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat.
Orlando Andres, who happened to be in the court and a
relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida,
approached the accused and requested the latter if he could
permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused
consented and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her
husband. After a short while, the presiding judge deferred the
decision against her because of a new Presidential Decree
revising some provisions regarding violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida
requested the accused to allow them to have lunch as they
were already very hungry. He consented to the request and
they proceeded to the canteen located at the mezzanine floor
of the court building (Exhibit 1).<re||an1w> He took a
seat beside Zenaida and Pat. Andres while the relatives of said
detainee were seated at a separate table. While eating, the
husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife
to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like
defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady
companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second
floor of the building (Exibit 2). Zenaida and her lady
companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard
along the alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the door
thereof (Exhibit 5). Not long after, the lady companion of
Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she
was going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter
was then bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go
out of the comfort room.

Petitioner Rodillas was charged with having committed the

said crime in an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of
Caloocan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, being then a policeman duly
appointed and qualified as such, hence a public officer,
specially charged with the duty of keeping under his custody
and vigilance and of conducting and delivery from the City
Jail, Caloocan City to the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXIV,
Caloocan City and return, one Zenaida Sacris Andres, a
detention prisoner being tried for violation of Section 4, R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, under Crim. Case No. C-12888, did then and there with
great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence, allow and
permit said Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter
the comfort room at the second floor of the Genato Building,
Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said case,
v,,ithout first ascertaining for himself whether said comfort
room is safe and without any egress by which the said
detention prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said
Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away and escape thru the
window inside the comfort room, as in fact she did run away
and escape from the custody of said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 6)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the court based its
finding of guilt is summarized as follows:
... accused herein is a Patrolman of the Integrated National
Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned with the jail section
thereof. On March 27, 1980, when he reported for work, he
was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano,
officer-in-charge in assigning police officers to escort
prisoners, to escort Zenaida Sacris deadline Andres, a

After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of

Zenaida coming back, the accused became suspicious and
entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida
no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the
window of said comfort room was not provided with window
grills. He tried to peep out of the window by stepping on the
flush tank which is just about 3 feet from the window and
noticed that outside of the window there was a concrete eave
extending down to the ground floor of the building which he
presumed that Zenaida might have used as a passage in
escaping (Exhibits 2-A, 3 and 4 to 4-C). He immediately went
out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of
Pat. Andres but they were not able to see her. Pat. Andres
advised him to go to Zenaida's house as she might be there,
which home is located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Pat.
Andres having told him that the husband of the escapee is
from Rizal, Nueva Ecija, the accused borrowed the car of his
brother-in-law and proceeded to said town. Upon arrival
thereat, they contacted the relatives of Zenaida and asked for
information as to her whereabouts, but they answered in the
negative. They went back to Caloocan City and went again
directly to Bagong Barrio to the house of Zenaida, arriving
thereat at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. While at the
residence of Zenaida, Cpl. Victoriano arrived and the accused
related to him about the escape of Zenaida. He formally
reported the matter of his superior officer at the City Jail Capt.
Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared further that as a
jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by his superiors
regarding the manner of delivering prisoners. However, he
admitted that he did not inspect first the comfort room before
he allowed Zenaida to enter because there were many
females going in and out of said comfort room, and that he
did not promptly report the escape earlier because they were
then pressed for time to intercept Zenaida at the highway.
(Rollo, pp. 18-21).
The petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN BASED ONLY ON HIS ADMISSIONS WITHOUT
THE PROSECUTION HAVING PRESENTED EVIDENCE TO PROVE
HIS NEGLIGENCE WILL LIE.
II
WHETHER THE ACTS OF PETITIONER COULD BE QUALIFIED AS
DEFINITE LAXITY AMOUNTING TO DELIBERATE NONPERFORMANCE OF DUTY TO SUSTAIN HIS CONVICTION. (Brief
for the petitioner, p. 5)
In essence, the sole question to be resolved in the case at bar
is whether, under the foregoing facts and circumstances, the
respondent Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in
holding the petitioner guilty of infidelity in the custody of a
prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan was based merely on his admissions without
the prosecution presenting evidence to prove his negligence.
Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "the act,
declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. The admissions and
declarations in open court of a person charged with a crime
are admissible against him. (See U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil.
578).
The records show that the elements of the crime for which the
petitioner was convicted are present. Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the

prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence of the
officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the
escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and temporary special disqualification.
The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article
are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is
charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either
detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and c) that
such prisoner escapes through his negligence (See Reyes,
L.B., Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1977 ed., p. 407).
There is no question that the petitioner is a public officer.
Neither is there any dispute as to the fact that he was charged
with the custody of a prisoner who was being tried for a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting
in the escape of detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The
negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such
definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate nonperformance of duty on the part of the guard (Id., p. 408).
It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted
negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he
permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her
escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations
compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take lunch
and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.
As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return
the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was
clearly a violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take
lunch with the prisoner and her family when he was supposed
to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner
and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a coofficer.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner
to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any
means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will
make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to
deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of
arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions
could plan and make good her escape should have aroused
the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.
The request for lunch and the consequent delay was an
opportunity for the prisoner to learn of a plan or to carry out
an earlier plan by which she could escape. The plan was in
fact carried out with the help of the lady who accompanied his
prisoner inside the comfort room. The use of a toilet is one of
the most familiar and common place methods of escape. It is
inconceivable that a police officer should fall for this trick. The
arrangement with a lady friend should have aroused the
petitioner's suspicion because the only pretext given by the
petitioner was that she was going to answer the call of nature.
It was, therefore, unnecessary for her to be accompanied by
anyone especially by someone who was not urgently in need
of a toilet if the purpose was merely to relieve herself. Despite
this, the petitioner allowed the two to enter the comfort room
without first establishing for himself that there was no window
or door allowing the possibility of escape. He even allowed the
prisoner's companion to leave the premises with the excuse
that the prisoner was having her monthly period and that
there was a need to buy sanitary napkins. And he patiently
waited for more than ten minutes for the companion to return.
This was patent negligence and incredible naivette on the part
of the police officer.

Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a

confluence of facts and,circumstances which were not
foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of things. Not
only should they have been foreseen but they should have
been guarded against.
Considering that the city jail was only a kilometer away and it
was only 11:30 a.m., it would not have been inhuman for the
petitioner to deny the prisoner's request to first take lunch.
Neither would it have been inhuman if he cleared the toilet of
female occupants and checked all possible exists first and if
he did not allow the lady companion to go with Zenaida
Andres to the comfort room. These human considerations,
however, are immaterial because the fact remains that as a
police officer, he should have exercised utmost diligence in
the performance of his duty.
The supposed confluence of facts does not alter his liability.
That he was not trained in escorting women prisoners is
likewise unacceptable as there are no hard and fast rules of
conduct under all conceivable situations for police officers
acting as guards. However, they are expected to use
prudence, diligence, and common sense. That Judge Pardo did
not immediately pronounce judgment so the petitioner could
have immediately brought Zenaida back to jail is
inconsequential. In the first place, the escape would not have
materialized had he immediately escorted her back to jail
after the hearing. That he cannot follow the prisoner inside
the comfort room because it would create a commotion, he
being a male, is a lame excuse. There is nothing wrong in
asking the ladies for permission so he could check the comfort
room first to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. The fact
that the building is made of concrete and the outside windows
covered with grills should not make a police officer
complacent especially because well-planned escapes are not
uncommon. Escapes are, in fact, even presumed so much so
that two (2) guards are usually assigned to a prisoner. (Tsn,
August 4, 1981, p. 40)

It is high time that the courts should take strict measures

against law officers to whom have been entrusted the custody
and detention of prisoners, whether detention prisoners or
prisoners serving sentence. Laxity and negligence in the
performance of their duties resulting in the mysterious
escapes of notorious criminals have become common news
items, involving as it does the suspicion that monetary
considerations may have entered into the arrangements
which led to the successful escape of such notorious criminals
even from military custody. No quarters should be extended to
such kind of law officers who, deliberately or otherwise, fail to
live up to the standard required of their duties, thus directly
contributing not only to the clogging of judicial dockets but
also to the inevitable deterioration of peace and order. (Brief
for Respondents, pp. 17-18)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

There appears to have been no genuine effort on the part of

the petitioner to recapture the escapee. Instead of promptly
reporting the matter so that an alarm could immediately be
sent out to all police agencies and expert procedures followed,
he allegedly tried to look for her in the latter's house in
Caloocan and failing in this, proceeded to Nueva Ecija. It was
only later in the evening that he formally reported the matter
to his superior. This even gave the escapee greater
opportunity to make good her escape because the chances of
her being recaptured became much less. Such action requires
concerted police effort, not a one-man job which petitioner
should have been or was probably aware of.
The petitioner further contends that he cannot be convicted
because there was no connivance between him and the
prisoner. In support of his claim, he cites the case of Alberto v.
dela Cruz, (98 SCRA 406). The citation, however, is erroneous.
It creates the impression that for one to be held liable under
Art. 224, there must be a showing that he first connived with
the prisoner. This was not the ruling in said case. Conniving or
consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under Art. 223 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under
Art. 223 but for evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of
the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that connivance
be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners.
We quote the Solicitor General that the Sandiganbayan's
observation regarding escaped prisoners is relevant and
timely. The Court stated:

JOSE REYES

VS

PEOPLE

DECISION

-----

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioner appeals by petition for review on certiorari the

decision dated January 15, 2007 rendered by the
Sandiganbayan, finding him guilty in Criminal Case No. 24655
of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,[1] and
in Criminal Case No. 24656 of usurpation of judicial functions
as defined and penalized under Article 241, Revised Penal
Code. [2]

In the meanwhile, Belen discovered for the first time through

a letter-inquiry to the IAC Clerk of Court that her appeal in ACG.R. CIV No. 5524-UDK had been dismissed for non-payment
of docket fees. She thus filed in the IAC a motion to
reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted her motion.[6] The
reinstated appeal was re-docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 02883.

On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its decision in ACG.R. CV No. 02883, granting Belens appeal,[7] thus:

Antecedents
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute
owner of two parcels of agricultural land with an area of
197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag,
Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
209298 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On March 19,
1975, Belens son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of
sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold the
land to him. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
cancelled TCT No. 209298 by virtue of the forged deed of sale
and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos name.
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan
(Ricardo). On the same date, Ricardo registered the deed of
sale in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, which cancelled TCT
No. 210108 and issued TCT No. 210338 in Ricardos name.
Subsequently, Ricardo mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco
(Simeon).
Upon learning of the transfers of her land, Belen filed
on December 20, 1975 an adverse claim in the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan. Her adverse claim was annotated on TCT
No. 210338. She also filed in the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Baliwag, Bulacan a civil action for cancellation of sale,
reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and
Simeon, docketed as Civil Case No. 655-B.
On January 20, 1981, the CFI decided Civil Case No. 655-B,
dismissing Belens complaint and affirming the validity of the
deeds of sale between Belen and Carlos and between Carlos
and Ricardo. Belen filed a motion for reconsideration but her
motion was denied.
Belen appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC),
docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 5524-UDK.
On April 19, 1983, the IAC dismissed Belens appeal due to
non-payment of docket fees. The dismissal became final
on May 17, 1983, and entry of judgment was issued on June
21, 1983. The records were remanded to the CFI on July 6,
1983.[3]

Thereafter, the tenants of the land, namely, Paulino Sacdalan,

Leonardo Sacdalan, Santiago Sacdalan, Numeriano Bautista
and Romeo Garcia (tenants), invoked their right to redeem
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.
[4]
Acting thereon, Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyance in
favor of the tenants on October 24, 1983.[5]

Upon registration of the deed of reconveyance, TCT No.

210338 was cancelled, and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the
names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into several
lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the
tenants.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE and another one entered:
(1) declaring as null and void and without any effect
whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and between
appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant Carlos de
Guia, Exhibit A;
(2) declaring defendant-appellant Ricardo San Juan as a
purchaser in bad faith and ordering him to reconvey to
appellant the two (2) parcels of land described in the
complaint;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or
annul TCT No. 210338 in the name of defendant-appellee
Ricardo San Juan as well as TCT No. 210108 in the name of
defendant-appellee Carlos de Guia for being null and void and
to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of appellant as the
true and valid title over the lands described therein; and
(4) ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986, and entry
of judgment was made on November 7, 1986.[8] The records
were remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baliwag,
Bulacan (RTC).
On December 18, 1986, Belen filed in the RTC a motion for
execution vis--vis the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. The
RTC granted her motion. However, when the writ of
execution was about to be executed, Belen learned that
Ricardo had sold the land to the tenants through a deed of
reconveyance. Thus, Belen filed in the RTC a motion to declare
Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for
circumventing the final and executory judgment in AC-G.R. CV
No. 02883.

On October 12, 1987, the RTC held Ricardo and the tenants in
contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay a fine
ofP200.00. It directed Ricardo and the tenants to reconvey the
land to Belen and to deliver to her the share in the harvest.

Ricardo and the tenants appealed the RTC order to the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
14783 entitledMariano Bautista, et al vs. Hon. Felipe N.
Villajuan, Jr. as Judge RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XIV and
Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia.

On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her daughter and

attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a

complaint for ejectment and collection of rents against the

tenants, entitled Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorneyin-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo
Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago
Sacdalan and docketed as DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.[9]

In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of

the DARAB Central Office,[16] and ordered the tenants: (a) to
vacate the land; (b) to deliver its possession to Belen; and (c)
to pay to Belen the rents on the land corresponding to the
period from 1981 until they would have vacated.

On July 6, 1989, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

14783,[10] affirming the RTC order dated October 12, 1987with
modification. It ruled that the RTC correctly ordered Ricardo
and the tenants to reconvey the land to Belen, but held that
the RTC erred in finding Ricardo and the tenants in contempt
of court. This decision became final and executory on July 31,
1989.

The tenants filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA

denied their motion.

On March 16, 1993, the petitioner, as Provincial Adjudicator,

rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88
entitledBelen Lopez vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact,
Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia,
Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan
and Santiago Sacdalan,[11] dismissing Belens complaint for
ejectment and collection of rents and affirming the respective
TCTs of the tenants, viz:

Thus, the tenants appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 128967),

which affirmed the CAs decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315.[17]

On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two

informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging the
petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and the
other with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of
the Revised Penal Code,[18] as follows:

Criminal Case No. 24655

(for violation of section 3 (e) of RA 3019)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the instant

case wanting of merit, the same is hereby dismissed.
Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of titles Nos. T-307845,
T-307846, T-307856, T-307857, T-307869, T-307870, T307871, T-307873 and T-307874 issued in the name of
Numeriano Bautista, Romeo Garcia, Leonardo Sacdalan,
Paulino Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan respectively are
hereby AFFIRMED. The plaintiff and all other persons acting in
their behalf are hereby ordered to permanently cease and
desist from committing any acts tending to oust or eject the
defendants or their heirs or assigns from the landholding in
question.

SO ORDERED.[12]

That on or about 16 March 1993, or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then
employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos,
Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as
such and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally render
his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the
tenants who were respondents in said agrarian case, thereby
ignoring and disregarding the final and executory decision of
the Court of Appeals in AC-GR CV-02883 which declared
complainant Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands
subject of the litigation in both cases, thus causing undue
injury and damage to the said Belen de Guia and to the public
interest.[19]

Belen filed a notice of appeal in the DARAB on March 26,

1993.
Criminal Case No. 24656
On March 31, 1993, the petitioner granted the tenants motion
for execution in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.[13]

(for usurpation of judicial functions under

Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code)

Aggrieved, Belen, through Melba, filed an urgent motion to

set aside the writ of execution in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88,
[14]
but her motion was denied.

On October 24, 1994, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the

petitioners ruling.[15]

After her motion for reconsideration was denied, Belen lodged

an appeal to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 39315).

That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior or

subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, abovenamed accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer being then
employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos,
Bulacan, while in the performance of his official function as
such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a
Decision in AC-GR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which
declared Belen de Guia as the true owner of the lands
litigated in said case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final
and executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by rendering a
decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby favoring and

emboldening the tenants-respondents in said DARAB case to

unlawfully continue occupying the lands of Belen de Guia, the
complainant, to her damage and prejudice, as well as to the
public interest.[20]

Elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, established

herein
RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt
practices or may lead thereto.[26] The law enumerates the
punishable acts or omissions and provides their corresponding
penalties.

Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner, assisted by

counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each information.[21]
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged
and found guilty, relevantly provides:
After trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered
its assailed decision,[22] finding the petitioner guilty of both
charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case
No. 24655 (for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019), an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years and
one month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions
under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor.

The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion for

reconsideration on March 15, 2007.[23]

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to

acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
xxx

Issues

The issues raised herein are:

a) Whether the petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3 (e)

of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in DARAB CASE NO. 034
BUL88; and

b) Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial

functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.[24]
Anent the first issue, the petitioner maintains that there was
no evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross
inexcusable negligence on his part when he decided DARAB
Case No. 034-BUL88; that his decision therein had been solely
based on what he had perceived to be in keeping with the
letter and spirit of the pertinent laws; and that his decision
had been rendered upon a thorough appreciation of the facts
and the law.[25]
As to the second issue, the petitioner insists that his rendition
of the decision did not amount to the felony of usurpation of
judicial functions.

Ruling
The petitioner was correctly held guilty of and liable for
violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, but his conviction for usurpation
of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal
Code is reversed and set aside.
A.

The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are

the following:

1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions;

2.
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including

the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.[27]

The first element was established. The petitioner was a public

officer when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL88, being then a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB
discharging the duty of adjudicating the conflicting claims of
parties.
The second element includes the different and distinct modes
by which the offense is committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant
conviction under Section 3 (e).[28]
Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side
or one person rather than another.[29] It is synonymous with
bias, which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are.[30]

10

Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the

part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage. [31] It
contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse
motive or ill will.[32]
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.[33]

The decision rendered on February 20, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No.

02883 nullifying the forged deed of sale between Belen and
Carlos; declaring Ricardo a purchaser in bad faith; ordering
Ricardo to reconvey the land to Belen; directing the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the respective TCTs of Ricardo
and Carlos; and reinstating Belens TCT became final on March
15, 1986. After the entry of judgment was made on November
7, 1986, the records were remanded to the RTC in Baliwag,
Bulacan, which eventually granted Belens motion for
execution.
Due to its finality, the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883
became immutable, and could no longer be modified in any
respect, whether the modification was to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, whether made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. [34] The reason
for such immutability is that a litigation must end sometime,
and an effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of
the verdict once a judgment becomes final.[35]
The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 prior to his promulgation of
the decisionin DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. Indeed, he
actually admitted having read and examined the following
documents (adduced by the Prosecution) prior to his rendition
of the decision,[36] namely:
(1) Belens position paper dated August 7, 1992 submitted to
him in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88, in which Belen stated that
the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 had become final and
executory;[37]

binding on him as Provincial Adjudicator and on all the parties

in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.
Worthy of note is that the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39315, and
this Court, in G.R. No. 128967, had characterized the
petitioners aforementioned conduct as an utter disrespect to
the judiciary, as vested with a dishonest purpose, and as
constituting a contumacious attitude which should not be
tolerated.[41] These acute characterizations fortify the holding
that he harbored a deliberate intent to do wrong to Belen.
Correctly did the Sandiganbayan find that the petitioner
had displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
rendering his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-BUL88.
The third element of the offense when the act of the accused
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or, gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused
was also established. In this regard, proof of the extent or
quantum of damage was not essential, it being sufficient that
the injury suffered or the benefit received could be perceived
to be substantial enough and was not merely negligible. [42]

Belen was constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and

to incur other expenses in order to protect and prosecute her
interest in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88. In all, her expenses
were in the substantial sum of P990,000.00.[43] Moreover, the
petitioners stubborn refusal to recognize and obey the
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 forced a further but
needless prejudicial delay in the prompt termination of the
cases. The delay proved very costly to Belen, for, in that
length of time (that is, from March 16, 1993 up to the
present), Belen has been unduly deprived of her exclusive
ownership and undisturbed possession of the land, and the
fruits thereof. The injury and prejudice surely equated to
undue injury for Belen.

Likewise, the petitioners ruling in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88

gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to the
tenants by allowing them to remain in possession of the land
and to enjoy the fruits.

(2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883; [38]

(3) Belens TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment
issued in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 and the cancellation of the
TCTs of the tenants-lessees by virtue of the decision in AC-G.R.
CV No. 02883;[39] and
(4) Addendum to Belens position paper, mentioning the
decree in the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. [40]

Given the foregoing considerations, the Sandiganbayan

correctly convicted the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655
for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
B.
Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Yet, the petitioner still rendered his decision in DARAB Case

No. 034 BUL88 that completely contradicted and
disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 by
invalidating Belens title on the land and upholding the TCTs of
the tenants. He thereby exhibited manifest partiality, for such
decision of his was a total and willful disregard of the final
decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting the
tenants motion for execution made his partiality towards the
tenants and bias against Belen that much more apparent.
Similarly, the petitioners evident bad faith displayed itself by
his arrogant refusal to recognize and obey the decision in ACG.R. CV No. 02883, despite his unqualified obligation as
Provincial Adjudicator to abide by the CAs ruling that was

xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period

to prision correcional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any officer of the executive branch of the government
who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the
execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge
within his jurisdiction.

In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a

judge, attempts to perform an act the authority for which the
law has vested only in a judge.[44] However, the
petitioners task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered
judgment in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL88 was to adjudicate the
claims of the opposing parties. As such, he performed a quasijudicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a

11

court of law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of

the Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the acts
constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were lacking
herein.
C.

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by

a special law, the accused is punished with an indeterminate
sentence the maximum of which does not exceed the
maximum fixed by the law violated, and the minimum is not
less than the minimum term prescribed by the law violated.

Penalties

The Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance

of old age in favor of the petitioner by virtue of his being
already over 70 years old.

The Sandiganbayan thereby erred. The mitigating

circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised
Penal Codeapplied only when the offender was over 70 years
at the time of the commission of the offense.[45] The petitioner,
being only 63 years old when he committed the offenses
charged,[46] was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 24655, the Sandiganbayan

correctly imposed on the petitioner the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month, as
minimum, to 10 years as maximum. The penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office was also correctly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the conviction of the
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of section
3 (e) of RA 3019), but reverses and sets aside his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial functions
as defined and penalized under Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code).

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six
years and one month nor more than 15 years, and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Pursuant to Section 1 of

SO ORDERED.

12