UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY

POLICE SCHOOL
ADVANCED LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING DIVISION

SPECIAL REACTION TEAM TRAINING

COMMITTEE

CONTENTS
SUBJECTS

SECTION

PAGE

Special Reaction Team Concepts

Terrorism

Operational Preplanning

10

Effects of Fired Rounds

15

SRT Equipment

19

Movement in Urban Terrain

25

Improvised Explosive Device

29

Less Lethal

31

Building Entry / Clearing

40

Basic Rappelling

68

Team Member Recovery

72

Vehicle Assaults

75

Sample Special Reaction Team SOP

Annex

83

Breachers Brief

Annex

94

Operation Order

Annex

97

References

SECTION A

CONCEPTS
Why SRT
Authority For SRT (Army)
DOD DIR 2000.12 DOD Combating Terrorism Program
AR 525-13 Anti-terrorism Force Protection: Security of personnel, Information, and Critical
Resources
AR 190-58 Personnel security
Definition of SRT: A trained team of seasoned Military Police armed and equipped to contain and
neutralize a special threat
Special Threats
Barricaded Criminals
Hostage Situations
Terrorist Situations
High Risk Warrants
Drug Raids
Combat role of SRT
Maneuver/Mobility Support Operations
Route reconnaissance
MSR over watch

Area Security Operations

Anti-terrorism/Force Protection
Response Force
Counter Reconnaissance
Security (CP, VIPs, etc.)

Law & Order Operations

Customs Support
Law Enforcement

Raids

Barricaded situations

Threatened suicides
Criminal Investigations

Internment/Resettlement Operations. Controls EPW, CI, & U.S. military prisoners by providing:
Response force
Select marksman
Police Intelligence Operations. Assist MP & CID activities when collecting, analyzing, and
interpreting criminal/law enforcement information by providing:
Reconnaissance
LP/OP

Development considerations for the SRT.

Needs of the installation/community
Threat analysis for installation/community
Crime history data
Resource protection data
Time required
Minimum of two hours response time.
Actual response time must be determined for each community.

Personnel resources
Personnel not generally assigned to SRT as primary duty
Training often difficult to accomplish due to conflict in work schedules or commitments

Command Policy (SOP) covering:

Mission
Training & Performance Standards
Organization of the Team and responsibilities
Chain of command
Selection Standards
Planning and recall procedures
Employment of the team (when & how)
Use of special equipment
Communications
Mutual aid agreements & support
Use of force
Note: SOP must be in writing and reviewed by the entire chain of command.
Command Responsibilities
Provide time for training (resident and abroad)
Support in recruiting personnel
Support in obtaining equipment
Support in stabilizing personnel
Note: Command support at all levels is essential to the success of the SRT.
Selection of personnel(recommendations)
Volunteer
1 yr. experience in law enforcement
Pay grade E-4 or above or civilian equivalent
Highly disciplined and Morally sound
Mature and able to handle pressure
Ability to work with others
Prior combat, small unit operations, or law enforcement experience
Good eyesight
1 year Retain
No derogatory background information
270 on APFT
Expert weapon qualifications
Specialty training (Air assault, demolitions, Combat Life Saver)
4

Selection Phases
Administrative
Review
Stress
Psychological
SRT organization and responsibilities.
SRT OIC
Develops SRT training
Coordinates/supervises
Develops SOP
Conducts quarterly evaluations
Prepares AARs
Reports to provost marshal
The SRT consists of two (2) Elements.
Entry Element
Team Leader (NCOIC)
Organization / supervision
Develops SOP (with OIC)
Execute / record training
Develop preplanning strategies
Acquire equipment
Plan and execute assaults
Controls entry and cover element
Assists in preparing AARs
Determining special needs
Other duties as assigned
Entry team members
Skilled in:
Weapons proficiency
BC
Physically fit
Assist in planning / rehearsal
Conducting reconnaissance
Rappelling
Breaching
Employment of less lethal
Security during movement and clearing (forward, rear, etc.)
Carry additional equipment
Assume duties as team leader
Additional duties as directed
Remember team members should be cross-trained to create flexibility within the team. The
team configuration should match mission needs
5

Cover Element
Marksman
Surveillance
Intelligence
Selective fire
Observer
Record all events
Provide security
Assist marksman
Provide relief
Employ chemical agents
SRT priority of actions
Protect life
Safe release of hostages
Apprehension of offender(s)
Isolate/contain incident
Gather intelligence
Protect Property and equipment
Secure evidence
Deployment of an SRT is the commanders final force option to resolve a special threat
situation.
Crisis Management Organization
Installation Commander
Chief of Staff
Crisis Management Team
G-1 Administrative
G-2 Intelligence
G-3 Training
G-4 Logistics
Staff Judge Advocate
Public Affairs
DEH, Engineers
Emergency Operations Center (operational control)
Threat Management Force
Special Reaction Team
Initial Response Force
Hostage Negotiations Team
Investigative Team

Training ratio

60% Tactics

20% Marksmanship (Weapons skills)

20% Conditioning (Mental & Physical)

SRT INITIAL TRAINING

PHASE I ENTRY COURSE
PHASE II MARKSMAN OBSERVOR COURSE
UNIT LEVEL TRAINING
Concentrate on tactics, marksmanship, and physical & mental conditioning
Realistic
Test teams capabilities
Time required for training
Recommend equivalent of 8 hours per week, minimum 4.
Civilian Law Enforcement recommends 10% of working time per week. (this relates to 4 hrs)
Outside training sources
FBI
Joint training with nearby military teams and local law enforcement
Tactical schools
Fire department
EOD

SECTION B

TERRORISM
Characteristics of Terrorist Operations
Simple
Hit and run
Impact on our lives
Well planned and rehearsed
Small groups
Multiple targets
Surveillance
Undefended and weak targets
The five phases of a terrorist operation
Pre-incident
Initiation
Negotiation
Climax
Post-incident
The most common terrorist attack
Bombing is the most common
Assassination
Kidnapping
Hostage Taking
Hijacking
Sabotage
Civil Disturbance
Raids
Ambush
Arson
Hoaxes
Maiming
Tactics used by Terrorist
There are a number of steps that are common to all terrorist acts. The common steps are as follows.

Target selection is based on intent and capabilities of the terrorist group.

Surveillance of the target to gather all information and intelligence necessary to successfully
complete the operation.
Operation planning is based on all successfully complete the operation.
Rehearsals and dry runs
Carry out the act
Escape
Exploit the acts
8

Bombing is the most widely used attack method used by terrorist. Following steps usually take
place.

Rehearsals and dry run

Gather materials and construct devices
Plant the device

Kidnapping is a difficult operation for a terrorist group to successfully accomplish. Following

steps are common to Kidnapping are:

Penetration
Gain control of victim
Remove the victim
Transfer the victim to a holding area

Phases of kidnapping from vehicle

Reconnaissance
Select attack site
Isolate the attack site
Stop vehicle
Neutralize security
Gain control of victim
Escape from attack site
Transfer victim

Phase of skyjacking
Selection of target country
Identify the type of aircraft and select location and time to initiate the skyjacking
Reconnaissance of the airport and type of selected aircraft to be skyjacked
Penetrate security measures
Initiate aircraft takeover
Issue demands and deadlines
Negotiations phase, if applicable
Climax phase

SECTION C

Operational Preplanning
Equipment, tactics, and training.

The three most important factors of an SRT

Preplanning

Preparation conducted before a high-risk situation arises.

To be prepared to react to an emergency situation

ANNEX B Training

Simunitions
Role players
Targets
Video cameras

Sources of intelligence

Pre-Intelligence: Information gathered before a high-risk situation arises.

Sources of Pre-Intelligence

Undercover officers
Fly over recon
Drive-by surveillance
Building contractors
Informants
Family / Friends
Ruse

On-scene Intelligence: Information gathered during a high-risk situation.

Sources of On-scene Intelligence

Responding patrols
Released hostages
Surrendered / Arrested suspects
Witnesses
Neighbors
Marksman / Observers

10

Sectorization

Used to divide an area into sectors using letters and numbers as designators.
Its imperative that all members involved in the operation
how the objective is sectorized.

and relaying information, understand

4A1

2
1
Levels are numbered from the
bottom to the top
C

A
Walls are alphabetically designated
In a clockwise pattern

3
2
1
Each window, door, or other
Opening is numbered from right
To left.

3A3

3A2

3A1

2A3

2A2

2A1

1A2

1A1

1A3

A SIDE OF BUILDING
This illustration is a example
Of the alpha side of the
affected building completely
sectorized. All other sides
would be designated the same.

Obtaining Blueprints

Government office
Fire department
Contractors
Private businesses / apartments

11

Verifying Blueprints

Landlords / Business owners

Family / Friends
Contractors
CIs / Undercover agents

Blueprints depict

Doors
Windows
Hide-spaces
Bathrooms
Lighting
Tactical angles

What to look for when utilizing blueprints

Movement (AOAs, adjacent bldgs, danger areas, etc.)

Entry points
Clearing (inside the objective)

Incident Notification

MPs response
Outer perimeter
SRT Recall
Warning order

Actions of the SRT

Receives situation and mission brief

Establish inner perimeter
Deployment of MOs
Deploy recon

Team Leader Duties

Write Operation order

Brief plan
Conducts rehearsal
Back brief
Executes plan
Assigns tasks
Develop planning diagrams
Gather intelligence
Request support

12

Operation Order

Situation
Mission
Execution
Service and Support
Command and Signal
Situation (identifies essential information in order to
understand on-going events)

Normally briefed to you

Threat (identify terrorist composition, disposition, methods of operation, estimate strength,
and capabilities which could influence the crisis management operation.
Response force (explain response force abilities and responsibilities. Response force ability
can influence the crisis management mission.
Attachments and detachments
Location and security
Demands / weapons
Backgrounds
Assumptions (provides assumptions used as a basis for the plan {e.g., strengths, of
response force to be supported, support available from other agencies}.
Legal situations (possibilities)

Mission (to detect, deter, to contain and neutralize threats and actions aimed at the disruption of
installations)

Protect and save lives

Arrest suspects

Secure the scene

Use of force

Officer safety

Bring to conclusion
Execution (tasks which identifies specifics tasks for each element of the command charged with
executing a crisis management mission).

Written by team leader in detail

Placement of M/O teams
All movement and maneuvers
Breachers brief
Entry / clearing procedures
Contingency plans
Reorganization / evacuation

Service and Support

Team members duties / uniform

Equipment
Food / water
Medical, aviation, fire, EOD, other (provide a plan for the evacuation, hospitalization of the
sick, wounded, or injured persons)
13

Personnel (provide required information and instructions to supportive units and personnel).

Command and Signal

Whos in charge?

Frequencys / channels

Call signs / code words

Hand and arm signals / other signals

Everything should be in SOP

Backward planning

Must have drop dead time

Set time limits for each step
Dont skip steps
Post them
Table is adjustable

Standard operating procedures

Implementation
Alert procedures
Equipment
Hand and arm signals
Occupant control
Training
Team member recovery
Anything that would enhance mission success.
Your SOP will spell out your mission and its parameters.
Emergency exception rule
Rehearsals

14

SECTION D

EFFECTS OF FIRED ROUNDS

Miami/Dade County FBI Shoot Out 1986:
On April 11, 1986, Miami Based FBI Agents confronted two armed (William Russell Madix and Michael
Platt) suspects. When agents in three FBI vehicles succeeded in stopping the suspects vehicle,
suspects Madix and Platt emerged, firing should fired weapons.
North Hollywood Bank of America Shootout:
Feb 28, 1998, North Hollywood CA, two armed suspects entered the Bank of America with the
intent to commit a bank robbery.
Shot placement:
Penetration:
Shooting skills:
There are four components of projectile wounding:
Penetration
Permanent Cavity
Temporary Cavity
Fragmentation
Bullet Deformation:
Bullet deformation occurs when the bullet begins to deform. This is common with hollow-point type
ammunition.
Bullet Velocity:
Bullet velocity refers to the speed of the bullet. The maximum temporary cavity depends on the striking
velocity. Kinetic energy is released here.
Perfect Ammo Will:
Penetrate it target at an optimum 12-18 inches. We look for two things in the rounds we choose for law
enforcement:
Performance.
Consistency.
Under Penetration:
Under penetration delays the incapacitation of a adversary employing deadly force which could allow
the suspect (s) to cause further injury to LE, other friendly, or innocents.
Over Penetration:
Over penetration occurs when the projectile exits the suspect body and wounds other friendly, or
innocents and some projectiles can actually be increased as a result of intervening barriers.
Over or under, which is worse?
Under penetration poses dangers to both the officer and innocents/friendly personnel. A round that
under-penetrates its target will fail to eliminate the threat, which could cause further injury to team
members.

15

Disadvantages of the .223 round:

The disadvantage of .223 ammunition includes noise. Some .223 cal weapons are long and are
difficult to maneuver in close quarters. Training ammunition is more expensive and 9-mm is in very low
supply.
Shotguns
Shotgun although a viable asset to law enforcement for the past 75 years, it has limited capability in
the tactical application. Shotguns used in tactical operations should have limited use and should be
limited to deployment of less lethal munitions.
The Brain Continues:
Consciousness is dependent upon the continuous supply of oxygen to the brain. Medical research
indicates that after complete occlusion of the brain's blood vessels, it may continue to function with its
residual oxygen for 10 to 15 seconds - permitting purposeful actions, such as pulling a trigger.
Suitable Aiming Points:
Except for shots to the central nervous system, reliable and reproducible incapacitation is not possible.
Head Shots:
Across the top of the cerebrum are two critical reflex control areas called neural motor strips. They
extend down to the top of the ears, very similar to a set of stereo headphones.
Brain:
Medulla - portion of the brain connecting the spinal column trunk to the middle brain; located
where the spinal column enters the skull.
Cerebellum regulates all automatic body rhythms such as heartbeat and breathing; site of
basic emotional responses such as fear and anger; located at the lower back of the skull.
Cerebrum expanded portion partially covering the cerebellum; center of intellect and
intelligence and directed thought processes; cerebral activity is not necessary to sustain life or
maintain basic body functions.
Spine Shot:
The spinal cord, encased within the spinal column, will produce instant paralysis with no reflex action if
a projectile completely transects the cord, regardless of the impact point along the spinal column.
Target Neutralization:
The previously described suitable aiming points will normally produce rapid, if not instantaneous
death. The body engages survival patterns, the well-known "fight or flight" syndrome.
Instant Incapacitation:
Instant incapacitation sometimes referred, as flaccid paralysis cannot be guaranteed. You must
continue firing until the threat no longer exists.
Marksmanship:
Your particular weapon must function and shoot precisely where you ail it. No weapon of any caliber
or configuration will help you if you cannot put rounds on target.
Engagement Situations:
Most engagements are short range, seven meters or less, and time is minimal. In this situation the
team member cannot wait for aggression to stop.

16

Shooting and How the Body Reacts:

Of many variables affecting tactical firearm's performance, the relationship between stress,
excitement and accelerated heart rates are the most overlooked in training.
Perceptions By the Team Member:
Force on force training scenarios:
Visualizing the tasks and being successful will assist in better decision-making.
The threat is in close proximity during most shooting situations. SRT members need to train in
environments conducive to actual situations.
The time needed to control the threat is minimal. Create reactionary distance between yourself
and the threat if necessary.
Physiological Changes To The Body During A Shooting:
During a shooting, a team member may go through several physiological changes within the body.
Visual performance will decrease to include peripheral vision, depth perception and in some cases the
team member could loose theyre near vision. The high heart rate may severely inhibit an officers
ability to fire and effectively engage a close target.
Shooting Skills (Fine, Complex, and Gross):
Fine Motor Skills: Fine motor skills, which are performed by small muscle groups, such as
hands, and fingers frequently involve hand and eye coordination - like the Weaver Shooting
Stance.

Complex Motor Skills: Complex motor skills are skills, which involve a series of muscle groups
in action, which require coordination and timing. Survival skills that would be considered
complex motor skills are a shooting stance that has muscle groups working together in different
or asymmetrical movements, or a take down that has more than three movements from
different muscle groups.

Gross Motor Skills: Gross motor skills generally involve large actions or muscle groups. An
example of a gross motor skill would be simple actions such as a straight punch, a forward
baton strike, or an isosceles shooting
stance. It appears that when the heart rate accelerates above 145 BPM,
fine and complex motor skills begin to deteriorate. Gross motor skills
appear to be more natural or instinctive, and are more conducive to high
stress environments.

Firearms Training:
Firearms training should be based upon training team members to fire at a human opponent who is
exhibiting a life threatening stimuli. Without this philosophy, leaders cannot expect team members to
respond automatically and accurately in high stress situations. The following are a few considerations,
which should be observed when designing training exercises:
The exercises should have clear goals and objectives, which relate to an actual field
encounter.
The role players should be dedicated to making the exercise a true learning experience,
not a match of physical prowess or a battle of the egos.
After the exercise, the student should receive clear feedback on the exercise to include
cues and proper response.
Second, third and fourth exercises should immediately follow so the student can learn the threat cues
earlier, learn to select proper response quicker and become comfortable with their ability to manage
the threat.
17

U.S. Army STRAC (Standard in Training Commission) messages for increased ammo for SRT:
Go to Internet address: www.atsc.army.mil/atmd/strac/messages
Find and open: DA message Fy01fsc.doc
Scroll to bottom of message to find: ENCL R SPECIAL REACTION TEAM (SRT) STANDARDS.
The last two pages of this message are for SRT.
Important ARs, FMs and DA Pams:
All information regarding ammunition requirements can be found using AR 350 10, FM 9-13, DA
Pam 350-38 (Standards in Weapons Training) This PA Pam will be changing however. The SRT
portion is will be located in 1-2 pages instead of spread throughout the book.
Hollow Point Ammunition Rumor:
Ammo is for CID not for MP SRT
DODAC (Department of Defense Ammunition Code):
FM 9-13, AR 310 50 Regulates the allotment of ammunition.

18

SECTION E

EQUIPMENT/COMMUNICATIONS
Equipment sources
(SSSC) Self Service Supply Center
(TASC) Training Aid Service Center
(GSA) General Services Administration Supply Catalog
Local purchase
Equipment Authorization
(CTA) Common Table of Allowances
This is equipment that is authorized for requisition by all Army units.

(TOE) Table of Organization and Equipment

A table listing how a specific unit is organized and equipped.

(TDA) Table of Distribution and Allowances

This is equipment that is common only to your specific unit.

Procurement Considerations
Realistic in nature
Cost effective
Protect and enhance the teams overall capabilities
Size and type of SRT
Geographical location and climate conditions
Number of personnel required to operate
Comfort and durability
Warranty and field service agreements
Network with other agencies
INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
Body Armor Spectra or Kevlar should be at least level IIA/preferred IIIA. Replace body armor
when shot, wet, exposed to direct sunlight for a prolonged period of time, and every 5 years (shelf
life).

Load bearing vest Whether integrated or nonintegrated with body armor the vest should provide
access to gear during stressful situations. Avoid large amounts of velcro and metal. Minimize gear
placement to the front and sides of the vest. Develop an SOP for gear placement.

Helmets Whether Spectra or Kevlar the helmet provides ballistic protection from small arms fire.

19

Protective mask The M40 protective mask will provide protection against chemical agents. The
disadvantages of wearing the M40 are It hinders peripheral vision, affects communication and
target acquisition. The M40 protective mask filter is attached on the outside of the mask. The
filters can be placed on either left or right side enabling better weapon to cheek fit. Regardless of
the type of protective mask the SRT chooses, it is important that the team train with them.

Uniforms The United States Army Military Police School recommends the woodland battle dress
uniform for tactical operations. The team may look at having different sets of uniforms for various
situations, such as the woodland battle dress uniform for normal operations and the black battle
dress uniform for situations the suspect may also be wearing the woodland battle dress uniform. If
a uniform other than the woodland battle dress uniform is worn, the installation commander must
approve it.

Footwear The selection of footwear for the team is important because the team must be quiet not
only on approaches to the objective but inside the objective as well. You should select footwear
that has soft soles, supports the ankles, are quiet, durable, and comfortable.

Personal protective gear The selection of personal protective gear should include items that
protect an individual from potential hazards encountered during SRT operations. These items
include eye protection to prevent injuries to the eyes, fire retardant nomex hood and gloves which
can help prevent injuries sustained from flash burns and gives the team member a more
aggressive

Utility Equipment Considerable thought should be given to selecting a holster to fit the M9 pistol.
It should have two retention systems to secure the pistol. Additionally, you must ensure that it will
accommodate weapon-mounted lights, laser, or infrared optics and extended magazines.
Considerable thought should also be given to the selection of equipment pouches and belts. These
items help place your gear in readily accessible locations to provide you the ability to obtain an
item from your gear as quickly as possible.

Miscellaneous individual equipment Lighting systems are one of the most important tools in
tactical operations they allow the team member to see in a low light environment. It is
recommended that teams deploy with integrated light systems for their weapons. Laser sighting
systems should primarily be used in conjunction with the ballistic shield due to the difficulty in the
aiming process with the ballistic shield. The use of flexible restraints in tactical operations is
recommended over the use of hand irons due to the possible number of suspects a team may
encounter.

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

Transportation Whatever means of transportation a team chooses it should be large enough to

transport the team and their equipment, equipped with a warning system and adapted for use as a
command post.

Ballistic shields The ballistic shield is used to protect the team, not just any one individual. The
shield should be lightweight, big enough to protect the team (approx. 28" x 40"), certified by the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), as a minimum Level IIIA, and have an ample size viewport for
visibility. In the past most shields were made of kevlar however, now shields made of lightweight
spectra are available. It is highly recommended a tactical light with a battery pack and pressure
switch may be attached to the shield for operations during times of limited visibility.

20

Mechanical Breaching Tools Breaching tools come in a wide variety of applications dependent
on the type of target a SRT may encounter. Most tools will fall into one of four categories and they
are Prying, Striking, Cutting and Pulling. It is important that each team member be trained in the
proper use and deployment of the breaching tools in their inventory. The battering ram, grappling
hook, T-bars, and J-bars, are some examples of entry equipment that can be made through an
installation's TASC for virtually little if any cost to the Special Reaction Team. If a grappling hook is
obtained by the team ensure that it has at least three biting hooks. All steel used in the making
and welding of these pieces of equipment must be of a high grade and have a high tensile strength
for safety purposes. Crowbars, boltcutters, and sledgehammers, are a few of the items that may be
purchased in your local hardware store, or procured through the military system. They will handle
the majority of forced entries. Ensure that you have a large and small size because of the different
size locks used to secure structures. These items will cause damage to the structure.

Surveillance Equipment Mirrors obtained should have an adjustable extension handle and a 4
convex shaped mirror with light attached to the end of the handle. Surveillance equipment is an
expanding market. Currently there are several fiber optic cameras available to tactical teams.
They have night vision capabilities, and can be deployed rather easy in the field. The use of a
thermal viewer is helpful to the SRT it gives you the ability to look in a room or building for
personnel from the outside. The use of digital cameras could be used during a recon and
previewed by the team before making entry.

Night Vision Devices The night vision devices available to SRT are the AN/PVS-7, AN/PVS 14,
AN/PVS 10, and the PEQ/2A or PEQ/4. The AN/PVS-7 has one objective lens and works off both a
passive active (infrared) energy sources. It comes with an adjustable head harness. The
AN/PVS14 or Monocular night vision device (MNVD) has one objective lens and one ocular lens. It
may be used by the soldier in several modes: hand held, head mounted, helmet mounted or affixed
and boresighted to a rifle with aiming light.

It has a 3x magnifier and is capable down to overcast starlight.The AN/PVS-10 day/night sight for use
with the sniper weapon system (SWS), most commonly the M-24 rifle provides both day and night
firing capabilities for the SWS. The AN/PVS-7, 10, and 14 can be used in conjunction with the
AN/PEQ-2A and the AN/PAQ-4C infrared aiming devices. These devices are small lightweight, easy to
mount and zero infrared aiming lights. The AN/PEQ-2A also has the ability to flood a target with
infrared illumination which when activated may only be observed with a night vision device.
Diversionary Devices

M116A1
3 part system
one time use
9 second delay
147 grams
Light: 2,000,000 cp
Sound: 183 decibels
Smoke: High volume

Def-Tec 25
3 part system
Recharges 25 times
1.5 second delay
1.5 lbs
Flash point of 2,700 degrees F
21

Light: 2,420,000 cp
Sound: 174.5- 180 decibels
Smoke: 50% of the M116A1

M-84
3 part system
1.5 second delay
1 lbs
Flash point of 2,700 degrees F
Light: 1 mil- 2.5 mil cp
Sound: 170- 180 decibels
Smoke: 50% of the M116A1

Rappel Equipment There is a wide variety of rappelling equipment available to the SRT
manufactured for many applications. The key to procuring rappel equipment is to have only
properly trained or certified personnel in rappelling operations order the equipment. This action will
prevent the waste of funds on inappropriate gear.

Tactical ladders There are a wide variety of ladders available to the SRT and just as with any item
of equipment great thought should be given when procuring one. It is important to understand that
it may be required to have multiple ladders of different lengths or expandable ladders. There are
certain characteristics that should be looked for in tactical ladders. The ladder should be light in
weight and easily transported. They should be made of sturdy construction and have non-slip pads
on both ends.

Miscellaneous Support Equipment Another item, which is extremely important in SRT

operations, is an advanced trauma kit. Due to the violent nature of SRT operations it is possible
someone may become injured whether its a team member or a suspect the ability to provide
medical attention with the properly trained personnel is important. An individual gear bag must hold
the team members equipment in an organized fashion allowing the gear to be stored without
causing damage. This bag can aid in the quick response time of an entire team by placing an
individuals team member equipment in one location.

ENTRY WEAPONS
Beretta 92F (Secondary weapon ensure it fits assigned holster)
H&K Benelli Shotgun (Ballistic Breaching/Less lethal)
H&K MP5A3 (Primary weapon)
PERIMETER WEAPONS

M16A2/203

M24 Sniper rifle

TRAINING EQUIPMENT
Special Effects Small Arms Marking System
(SESAMS) Protective Equipment

22

COMMUNICATIONS
Radios
Multi-channel
Secure
Surveillance packages
Establish call signs
Code words
All team members must have one
Hand & Arm Signals
Prearranged (established in SOP)
Easy to understand
Dont make them confusing
Dont make them as you go
Alternate means
Smoke (only outside)
Voice commands
Finger snaps
Flashlights
Chem-lights
Commercial. Mainly used by the command personnel
Hostage Negotiator phone (throw phone)
Primary means of communication between the negotiator and the suspect(s). (If available, or can
be brought to the suspect)
EQUIPMENT UNDER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Directed energy weapons These weapons include acoustic and electro magnetic weapons. The
acoustic weapons produce and direct an ultra low frequency sound that induces internal organs to
reverberate this may create feelings of nausea, gastrointestinal pain, headache and burred vision.
The electro magnetic weapons produce and direct a magnetic field that produces many of the
same symptoms as acoustic weapons.

Chemical agents Some manufactures are researching chemical agents that have the ability to
render a human unconscious in a few seconds with no ill effects.

Through wall surveillance A portable, briefcase-sized, through-the-wall surveillance device has

been developed for use by law enforcement officials. It employs radar that can locate and track an
individual through concrete or brick walls. It measures and displays the distance to that individual.
It demonstrated the ability to consistently track the activity of an individual moving behind an eightinch thick concrete wall to a range of more than 75 feet from the radar. NIJ received a number of
prototypes for technical evaluation at the end of FY2000. A nationwide demonstration of the
system is planned.

Laser Distracter this is a handheld device that uses random, flashing, green laser light to disorient
and distract a subject. The prototype resembled a flashlight with an overall length of 24 inches and
a weight of 4.8 pounds. Ten prototypes were assessed for an eye safety and effectiveness
23

assessment. That assessment is expected to be completed in FY2000. Since the delivery of the
ten prototypes the developer has modified the design reducing the size to 12 inches. NIJ is
considering funding the Air Force to test these modified devices in FY2000, depending on the
results of the assessment of the initial prototypes.

Ballistic Shields Modern technology has given the manufactures of ballistic shields new materials
to include spectra and plastic polymers that enable them to develop lightweight and transparent
shields. These shields give the SRT more mobility and visibility.

Some manufactures have even developed directional shields that allow team members to fire through
the shield from the back while still providing protection from the front.

P-90 Machine gun The P-90 is a blowback operated magazine fed automatic or semi automatic
shoulder fired rifle. The weapon weighs 6.6 lbs. has a 50 round capacity, fires at a max rate of 900
rounds per minute. The P-90 fires a 5.7mm round that will penetrate 48 plies of kevlar and the
kevlar PASGT helmet at 200 meters.

Remington model 700 etronx has an electronic firing system: This new weapon system has no
moving parts it looks, operates and feels the same as the normal model 700. The etronx system
utilizes patented technology to electronically discharge the round, resulting in nearly instant
ignition. A standard 9-volt battery in the stock sends current through a special contact in the bolt
face and to the specially designed electronic primer. There are no moving parts to delay ignition.
This weapon system will aid marksman in accuracy by almost removing trigger control as one of
the fundamentals of marksmanship.

DEVELOPMENTAL AGENCIES http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/JNLW_Links.htm This web

site provides links to DOD, USAF, USMC, USA, USN, DOC, DOE, DOJ, and DOT sites that pertain to
research and development of equipment. For the U.S. Army Military police corps the foremost is the
Directorate of Combat Development for the Military Police School. DCD may be reached at:
MANSCEN Combat Developments
ATTN: ATZT-CD
320 Engineer Loop, Suite #141
Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929
(573) 596-0131, ext 32205

24

SECTION F

MOVEMENT IN URBAN TERRAIN

Definitions
Compromised authority: is when the SRT leader is granted total decision making authority
for the actions of the SRT by the appropriate command level. No further authorization is
required by the command elements until the completion of the mission. Decisions are based on
the SOP, training, and experience of the SRT. All SRT and security assets come under the
direct control of the team leader. The use of deadly force is granted IAW AR 190-14.
High barricade: is a movement executed by the number two-man at and above eye level. This
team member leans out from his cover, exposing as little of himself as possible, lines up to the
rear of the number one man, locates the threat, and gains target acquisition of any threats
above eye level.
Low barricade: is a movement executed by the number one man to cover threats at and
below eye level. The number on-man leans out from his cover, exposing as little of himself as
possible, locates the threat, and gain target acquisition.
Stack: is a stationary formation used to minimize space and maximize speed before entry or
movement. It is similar to a file movement, however team members are stationary. This should
not be used as a movement technique. All team members are located together on one side of
the door within arms length.
Stage: is a stationary formation used to minimize space and maximize speed of access and
tactical angles. Stage is similar to a stack, however the team is split into two elements, one
located on each side of the entry point.
Cover and Concealment.
Cover

Protection from small arms fire.

Always selected in advance by recon.
Briefed by team leader during final briefing.
Always use cover to your advantage.
Always use best cover available.
Basic rule for movement in urban terrain is always move Cover to Cover.
Acronym S.E.E. (See - Evaluate - Eliminate)

Concealment

To be obscured from observation.

Selected in advance by the recon.
Briefed by team leader during final briefing.
Balaclava hood for the shock effect, protection from fire.

25

Crawl Techniques
Low Crawl

Used when cover and concealment is scarce and speed is not available.
Heels flat on ground
Head, eyes, and weapon towards threat.
Very time consuming.
Frequently overlooked technique.

High Crawl

Used when speed is required and/or cover and concealment is available.

Body is higher than a low crawl.
Head, eyes weapon, towards threat.
Much faster than a low crawl, but still time consuming.

Movement Formations

All movement from the Command Post to the Rally Point should be made between the inner and
the outer perimeter.
The formation generally used by the team is the File Formation
Pointman - 1st in line since he/she actually conducted the recon.
The team leader will direct all other positions in the formation.
The team leader directs distance between team members.

Rally Point
Area out of sight and sound of the objective utilized by the team for making final preparations for
the operation.
What happens at the Rally Point?
Personnel check
Equipment check
Contact TMF for updates
Contact M/Os for updates
Prepare weapons for departure
Assemble team for departure
Last cover and concealed positioned.

Obtain Compromise Authority from TMF.

Weapons positions

Firing position
In-close ready (Close in ready)
Low Ready

Approach Methods

Consolidated Team movement

26

Slow and Deliberate

Ruse

Movement Considerations

Avoid physical contact with objective

Be aware of position
Be prepared for threat at all times
Use M/O for maximum coverage
Focus forward, use M/O to cover rear
Keep team together
Use existing buildings to mask movement

Team Crossings

Consolidated team crossing

Maximum use of the shield
Use of two shields to split up team

Considerations

Targets assigned
Obstacles identified
Cover and concealment identified.
What to do if compromised

Ruse deployment

Used in unfriendly areas when risk of compromise exists.

Vehicle deployments
Prep vehicle for easy entry and exit
Ensure proper team line up
Back brief during movement(moving rally point)
Initiate countdown
Ascending and descending heights
Ascending

Team lifts.
Two man lift unsupported
Two man lift supported
Two man heel lift press
One man lift with one man pull using climbers grip
Two man pull using climbers grip
Knee boost with weapon drawn
Knee boost without weapon drawn
Two man body climb
Team rope pull or knotted rope climb
27

Support methods
2x4 boards
steel pipe
tactical ladders
Descending
nylon tubing
ladders
rappelling
Use of helicopters.

Advantages
Disadvantages

Diversions

Used to distract attention of suspect away from your location

Examples
Aircraft in area
Break and rack teams
Hostage negotiator
Bull horn
Diversionary device

Night movement

Daytime reconnaissance is preferred prior to a night operation if possible.

Tactical considerations
Night vision (takes approx. 30 minutes to obtain)
Avenues of approach.
Cover and concealment.
Obstacles.
Clothes lines
Ditches.
Fences.
Communications
Limitations of communications while moving at night:
Portable radios.
Hand and arm signals.
Voice commands.
Alternate means.

28

SECTION G
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
EXPLOSIVE IDENTIFICATION
IED - Improvised explosive device.
An improvised explosive device is any explosive or incendiary device constructed from readily
available materials used to cause death or property damage.
INFORMATION - Information sources
Information is available from many sources.
Materials are available with many controls, but where there is money, explosives can be found.
Knowledge is more common than people think.
EXPLOSIVES:
Low explosives - Burn at 1300 to 2700 feet per second and have a pushing effect.
High explosives - Detonate at 3280 to 28000 feet per second and have a shattering effect.
COMMON EXPLOSIVE:
Ammonium Nitrate - Fertilizer (Needs booster
charge).
PETN - Active ingredient in Det cord.
RDX - Active ingredient in plastic explosives (C4).
TNT - Most common explosive used in construction work.
NITROGLICERN - Active ingredient in civilian dynamite
(unstable). Freezes at 56 degrees F.
BLACK/SMOKELESS POWDER - Little or no controls available in retail stores used for reloading.
ELEMENTS OF IED:
Electric - Non-Electric
Explosive - Explosive
Blasting cap - Blasting cap
Wire - Fuse
Power source -Ignition system
Delay
ACTIONS ON CONTACT:
Stop radio communication.
Identify.
Notify command.
Make a decision.
Attempt to bypass.
Do not touch.

29

BOOBY TRAPS Any device explosive or non-explosive designed to kill, seriously injure, delay or compromise an
entry team.
COMMON BOOBY TRAPS:
Punji pits
Treble hooks
Butt slappers
Foot traps
Animal traps
WARNING DEVICES:
Alarms
Bells
Cans
Any noise producers

Remember: Be pro-active and conscious of your surroundings, if it looks out of place dont
touch it.

30

SECTION H

USE OF FORCE / NON/LESS LETHAL

Use of force / Less lethal
Not everybody we deal with, as an SRT, dictates the use of force. The emotionally disturbed,
elderly, and children, even normal, healthy people, in some cases may be effectively apprehended
with less lethal options. Our primary mission is to save lives, and with a rich blend of caution and
preparation for escalation, using less lethal means may allow us to do that without increasing risk
to others and ourselves.
Use of force regulations

Army: AR 190-14.
Marine Corps: MCO 5500.6F.
Navy: SECNAV 5500-29A.
Air force: AFI 31-207.
DOD: DOD reg. 5210.56.

Seven levels of force

Verbal persuasion.
Unarmed self-defense.
Chemical agents
MP club / Side handle baton / Expandable baton.
Military working dog (IAW AR 190-12).
Presentation of deadly force capability.
Deadly force.

Definition of deadly force

That force which a person uses with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or which a
reasonable and prudent person would consider likely to create a substantial risk of causing death
or serious bodily harm.
When deadly force is used.

As a last resort.
When all lesser means have failed.

When deadly force is authorized.

Threatened:

In self-defensive when in imminent danger of death or serious bodily

To prevent serious offenses against persons involving death.

Order to shoot. When directed by the lawful order of a superior who is governed by use of force
regulations. This is no longer outlined in AR 190-14. The team leader directing the marksman to
shoot is an example of order to shoot.

harm.

31

Wartime. Rules of engagement stipulate use of force guidelines.

Four situations where the use of force regulations do not apply.

In a combat zone in time of war.

In a designated hostile fire area in time of war.
Assigned duties as Secret Service.
In a civil disturbance objective area.

Rules of engagement. Policies on use of force applicable to these situations will be based on rules of
engagement issued for that situation.
Three deciding elements used to determine if deadly force is applicable.

Opportunity
Intent
Ability

Excessive force. Using a force greater than reasonable to obtain threat compliance or control.
Qualification training

SRT entry personnel must receive weapon qualification training on their assigned weapons
quarterly (every three months). Marksman/Observers must receive weapon qualification training
on their assigned weapons every 60 days.
Must receive familiarization-training monthly (stress courses, familiarization fire, shoot/dont shoot).
Must receive safety function, capabilities, limitations, and maintenance training every 12 months.
Must demonstrate knowledge and skills through periodic refresher training on all weapons and
equipment carried.

Precautions in the use of firearms

Halt! When possible, give the order to halt before firing.

Four safety rules.

Always assume weapon is loaded.

Never muzzle anything you are not willing to shoot.

Be sure of target and beyond.

Keep finger straight and off trigger until ready to fire.

Warning shots are prohibited!

Negotiations. The attempt to bargain with an individual in an effort to reach an agreement. SRT uses
negotiations in an attempt to gain advantage over the threat.
Hostage negotiations. The attempt to bargain with a hostage taker into reaching an agreement. SRT
personnel are not hostage negotiators.
Skills

Verbal skills
Non-verbal skills
32

Analytical skills

People who become hostage takers

Terrorist (crusaders)
Criminals (criminals)
Mentally disturbed (crazies)

Authorization for the use of chemical agents.

Installation commander gives the authorization for the use of chemical agents.
The team leader determines what type of agent is to be used.
SOP should provide guidance in helping the team leader make his decisions.

Control

Be aware of how the affected personnel may react.

Ensure innocent bystanders are aware of your intentions.

Support personnel

Fire department
EMS
Decontamination team

Orthoclorobenzalmalononitrile (CS). Derived from B.B. Courson and R.W. Stroughton. Developed in
1928. Adopted by U.S. Army in 1960. Adopted by law enforcement in 1965. 10 times more irritating
than CN. Most effective indoors and confined spaces.
CS is not a gas

Crystalline powder.
Smells like pepper in small quantities.

Effects of CS

Produces effects within 10-15 seconds.

Effects last 10-20 minutes after removed to fresh air.
Burning sensation to moist skin.
Watering and involuntary closing of the eyes.
Runny nose.
Tightness of the chest.
Burning in the lungs and throat.
Can induce panic.
Long duration effects are worse than CN.

Oleoresin Capsicum. Derived from oleoresin capsicum, which is an active ingredient in the cayenne
plant. The ingredient causes a burning sensation in the mouth by triggering the trigeminal nerve. The
pepper plant was used 2500 years ago by the chinese, and japanese warriors. Formula developed by
Aerko International in 1973. Adopted by law enforcement 1973. International color is orange. 750
times more powerful than CS.
33

Gas or Chemical?

OC is not a gas or chemical.

All natural, organic substance.
Micro-pulverized particles are used to make the agent.

Effects of OC

Inflammatory agent which causes swelling of the mucus membranes and the upper respiratory
system.
Very effective against the emotionally disturbed, those under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol,
and domestic/wild animals.
Produces instantaneous effects.
Effects last 30-45 minutes after being removed to fresh air.
Intense burning of the exposed skin.
Dilation of the capillaries and swelling of the eye lids.
Involuntary closure and extreme eye burning.
Uncontrollable coughing.
Gagging.
Gasping for air.
Temporary loss of strength and coordination.
Exposed skin will range from a slight discoloration to a bright red discoloration.
There is no permanent damage due to the effects of OC.
OC does not persist in clothing, CS does.

Disadvantages of OC

Pressure can be lost in canister.

Must be checked on a regular basis.
Criminals have access to OC, which can be used against officers.
Canister must be shaken on a regular basis.

Improper terminology used while referring to OC

OC does not blind.

OC does not choke.
OC does not cause pain.

Certain cultures are not always affected by OC. People that commonly eat cayenne peppers
sometimes become immune to OC.
Four methods of dissemination

Pyrotechnic
Advantages. No advantages to the tactical team when used indoors.
Disadvantages:
Causes fire.
Slow saturation time.
Can be thrown back.
34

Bursting
Advantages:
No risk of fire.
No risk of throw back.
Quick dissemination time.
Very effective, easy to carry, easy to control.
Highly recommended for SRT operations.

Disadvantages:
Slight possibility of fragmentation.
The amount of agent disseminated and the direction that the cloud will form may be
unpredictable.

Aerosol
Advantages:
Easy to carry and has excellent deployment system.
Quick dissemination time.
Easy to control.
Projectile is fin stabilized.
Disadvantages. May cause injury if fired from close range and strikes weak portion of
structure.

Fogging
Advantages:
Capable of covering a large area.
High volume of fog in a short period of time.

Disadvantages:
Too noisy for enclosed tactical operations.
Very cumbersome, and not recommended for tactical operations.

Health considerations
Those with heart disease, emphysema, asthma, or other breathing related problems might be
affected to a greater degree.
The elderly may be affected to a greater degree.
Infants and children may be affected to a greater degree.
Most chemical agents will have little to no affect on the mentally disturbed, or individuals that are
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Two methods of saturation
Methodical:

Saturate a structure to move an individual to a desired location.

Always saturate from the top level and work towards the bottom.

The desired outcome is for the suspect to give up or move to an outside part of the structure.

When possible, try to leave an avenue of escape for the suspect.

Selective:
Saturate a particular room within a structure.
Very useful in large buildings, where the entire structure does not need to be saturated.

35

Decontamination

Dos:
Take the suspect to fresh air.
Face the suspect toward the wind.
Get the suspect to calm down and breath normally.
Irrigate their eyes with cool water.
If wearing contacts, remove them and thoroughly clean them before replacing them into the
eyes.
Closely monitor and verbally reassure the suspect.
OC can be washed off with soap and water.

Donts
Use a commercial eye wash station.
Rub eyes or face.
Use cremes, oil based soaps, saline eye washes.
Use ice to cool the skin or eyes.

When a suspect should be transported to the emergency room.

The suspect requests medical attention. DO NOT DENY IT!!!

The suspect has compounding medical problems (heart problems, respiratory problems,
etc.).

Chemical agent symptoms persist for more than 45 minutes.

Deployment considerations

Windows with security bars.

Windows with blinds and/or curtains.
Energy efficient windows.

Tactical considerations for the team

Heat
Visibility
Communication

Items used to defeat chemical agents

Vent fans
Sprinkler systems
Garden hose
Bathtub and shower
Wet towels
Scuba equipment
Protective masks

36

Lethal concentration table. This formula gives you the amount of time in minutes, which will cause
death to 50% of the exposed group providing the agent is 100% effective.
LCT 50 = L x W x H x .71 = Minutes divided by grams of agent used.
Example: LCT 50 = 10 x 10 x 10 x .71 = 710.0 divided by 25 gr.
=

28.4 minutes

Non/Less lethal philosophy. Defined as the concept of planning and force application, which meets an
operational objective, with less potential for causing death or serious injury than conventional police
tactics.
Adopting the philosophy in the military

SRT must be committed to reducing the potential for loss of life.

It should be understood that non/less lethal applications are not intended to replace lethal weapons
and applications.

Non/Less lethal is being used in other countries

Haiti
Somalia
Bosnia
Several third world countries.

Stability and support operations (SASO):

Humanitarian missions
Disaster relief
Noncombatant evacuations
Various types of peace keeping functions.

Proposed munitions

12 gauge munitions that are being considered:

Point / beanbag round.
Point / fin stabilized round.
Wood baton round.
Diversionary / flash bang round.

37 / 40mm munitions that are being considered:

(Point) sponge grenade.
(Point) foam rubber baton.

Non/Less lethal capability set (NLCS). Is designed to support Army units selected to participate in
operations where a Non / less lethal capability is required. The NLCS enhances the commanders
force option throughout the full spectrum of peace and conflict operations. This includes, but is not
limited to stability and support operations (SASO), selected wartime operations (internee and
resettlement operations), and special threat situations on individual installations. The concept outlined
in FM 100-23 Peace operations is prescribed for balancing our wartime preparedness against the
37

need to conduct these other operations.

Threat:
The NLCS is designed to counter a variety of threats. The primary focus of the components is on
counter personnel capabilities (for personnel and vehicles). These components are ideally
suited for use against noncombatants, whos presence or acts jeopardize a units ability to
accomplish its assigned mission. Typical examples of this are the use of noncombatants as
human shields by combatants, or when noncombatants themselves become a threat. For
example, a special threat situation may threaten the health and welfare of personnel or
endanger critical facilities, but the threat may not justify the use of deadly force options.

In other cases the threat may use noncombatants or pose as noncombatants in order to gain
some sort of tactical advantage through their close proximity. NL components in the NLCS
enable team members to engage these threats with the reasonable expectation of minimizing
serious noncombatant casualties.

Description. The NLCS is a versatile package comprised of: Type classified militarized munitions
similar to many commercial NL ammunition and munitions previously fielded in contingency stocks
released under emergency release authorizations. Commercial and developmental items
(CANDI); Government off the shelf items (GOTS) and common table of allowances (CTA) items or
equipment already in the supply system; The sets are configured to outfit all teams with NL
munitions, protective equipment (commonly required for emergency threat situations), and
additional support equipment that can augment NL capabilities for a units assigned vehicle or
support element.

Four categories of the NLCS:

Individual protective equipment.

Weapons

Enhanced devices.

Training devices / allocations.

Occupancy control

Four Cs of occupancy control:

Contact

Control

Cuff and Search

Counter

Hasty tactical belt line search:

Conducted on every occupant, unless emergency evacuation procedures are in affect.

Use the crush and feel technique.

Waistline is searched 360 degrees, and visible hiding places.

Never step over body to search.

Search-man will secure any weapons or contraband found.

Detailed search. Conducted by the apprehension team.

Prepare occupant for evacuation:

Security of the occupant is a must, (at all times).

38

Utilize the ballistic shield or team member as a body bunker.

Brief occupant quickly on what to do and who to follow.
Begin your evacuation procedures.

Weapons retention / Defensive tactics

The survival stress response. The body automatically changes when exposed to a threat stimulus.

Hypervigilance. The bizarre actions taken by officers and soldier are in combat, resulting from
survival stress.

Controlling distance. The most important element in defensive tactics is controlling the distance
you are from the threat.

Weapons retention:

Grab

Undo

Neutralize

Strikes and kicks:

Front punch

Palm heel strike

Edge fist strike

Elbow strike

Knee strike

Front kick

Retaining the sub-machine gun:

Kick, push and pull

J method

Redirect and shoot

Strike and shoot

Drop, draw and shoot

Retaining the long gun:

For a muzzle grab: Circular motion by moving the stock, and controlling the barrel.

For a middle or butt grab: Utilize vertical or horizontal butt strokes.

Retaining the holstered pistol

Gun side grab: Utilize the outside twist.

Behind grab: Turn into threat and kneel.

Grabbed from the front: Strike knee or kick to a vulnerable area.

39

SECTION I

BUILDING ENTRY AND CLEARING

Definitions
Breacher. Breacher is a team member assigned the duties of breaching an objective. They provide
an immediate and positive access to an objective through an obstruction/barrier (door, window, wall,
etc).
Breaching. Breaching is the making of a hole or gap in the objective that allows the entry team
access to the objective.
Ballistic Breaching. Ballistic Breaching is an alternate means of gaining entry into a structure
through an existing opening with the use of shotgun or rifle ammunition.
BC. Building clearing. A coordinated team effort of entering, dominating, searching and clearing an
objective.
Compromised Authority. SRT leader is granted total tactical decision making authority by the
appropriate command level.
Coordinated Operations. Coordinated operations are the use of two or more entry teams positioned
to assault (enter and clear) one or more objective(s). These teams may be collocated or separated,
entering the same point or at separate locations, and execute entry simultaneously or delayed, all
depending on the desired effect of the plan. All teams involved are capable of operating
independently.
Deliberate Clearing. Deliberate clearing is a systematic method of clearing with the goal of
controlling the objective.
Dynamic Clearing. Dynamic clearing resembles in many ways the deliberate clearing method with
the goal to immediately control the objective.
Diversion. Diversion is a maneuver that draws the attention of the threat away from the planned point
of attack.
Dominating Position. The dominating position is a position that offers the best control of an area.
Fatal Funnel. Fatal Funnel is any entrance or constricted area (window, door, or breach point) that
will be the focal point of attention or anticipated avenue of approach. The fatal funnel will likely draw
fire from the threat.
Flagging. Flagging is the unintentional alerting of the threat to the teams presence. This may occur
by extending a muzzle of the weapon or part of the body (foot, elbow, etc.) in an area being observed
by the threat.
Fratricide. Fratricide is the accidental killing of friendly forces by other friendly forces during battle.
Fratricide is avoided by doctrine; by tactics, techniques, and procedures; and by training.
Hides. Hides are places the threat uses for cover and concealment within an objective.
40

Immediate Threat. Immediate threat is any person or danger area that blocks/slows the path to the
team members dominating position. It prevents or slows the establishment of security.
A subject or target in your immediate threat zone preventing you from moving to your dominating
position is characterized as an immediate threat. The distance in which you can accurately engage a
target while moving to your dominating position will dictate the size of your immediate threat zone.
Long Wall. Long wall is the distance from the entry point to the furthest joining wall.
METT-TC. Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, and Troops
Phase Lines. Phase lines are merely imaginary lines within the objective that are used to coordinate
and control the movement of the team members and or other teams.
Ready Squeeze Up. Ready squeeze up is a silent form of communication used by the entry team to
signal they are ready. Team members signal they are ready by squeezing the shoulder to their front;
the signal travels from the rear of the formation to the front.
S.E.E. See, Evaluate, and Eliminate the threat.
Tactical Angle (TA). Angle and or position of observation and fire.
Thumb Back. Thumb back is a silent form of communication used by the entry team to signal they
are ready. Team members signal they are ready by giving the thumbs up signal with the support
hand; the signal travels front to rear of the formation.
Principles of BC.
The three principles of BC are Surprise, Speed, and Aggressive action.
Surprise. Surprise is gained through extensive and thorough planning, rehearsals, and the proper
combinations of overt and covert actions.
The element of surprise ensures that the entry team has the advantage before room entry. The goal is
to catch the threat unprepared. Surprise is achieved by deceiving, distracting, or startling the threat.
Speed. Speed provides a measure of security, and when used with surprise, it maximizes the
advantage.
Speed is not defined by how fast you move, but how fast you dominate and or eliminate the threat
within the objective. A team member should not move faster than he can accurately engage targets in
the room. Be smooth.
Speed of movement is best described as a careful hurry. Move as fast as you can, but as slow as you
have too.
Aggressive Action. Aggressive action can best be described as a sudden and explosive force that
eliminates the threat and or threat options with the least chance of compromise or chance of inflicting
team casualties.
When coupled with speed, aggressive action enables the entry team to multiply the effects of the
element of surprise. Preventing the opponent from delivering any coordinated or planned reaction.
41

Mental and physical attitude and actions affect how the threat interprets the teams aggressiveness. A
mindset of complete domination must be maintained throughout any BC operation.
Tactical fundamentals
Tactical fundamentals of building clearing are:
Mental Preparedness. Be mentally prepared for the physical changes your body will experience as a
result of the flight or fight response during these operations:
Increased blood pressure, heart rate, and blood flow to major muscle groups.
Decreased blood flow to extremities, making simple movements, and dexterity almost impossible.
Visual difficulties in tracking, ability to focus deteriorates; the peripheral field narrows.
Visualize success performing tasks under various challenging conditions. Control fear, it is normal,
and everyone experiences it:
Do not let it overpower you.
Channel it into anger or aggression.
Remain in control, and you will be fine.
Have confidence in yourself.
Fight as you have trained. Hence the importance of Train as you fight.
Train to a conditioned response.
Move Without Detection. The importance of this fundamental speaks for itself.
Tactically and silently.
Be in the correct order.
Avoid unnecessary movement (foot shuffling, fidgeting, etc).
Carry a minimal amount of equipment to reduce noise and fatigue.
Secure loose items (jump check).
Assume proper positions (stay off walls, keep your balance, etc).
Control the Distance. An important fundamental of BC is controlling the distance to the threat. Avoid
distances closer than six feet for a standing threat and four feet for a threat on the ground.
At a distance:
Increased reaction time.
Increased options in use of force, finding cover, and verbal persuasion.
More team members and weapons on threat.
Up close:
Less reaction time.
Fewer options.
Weapon retention concerns.
May block target acquisition of other team members.
Create distance by:
Use M/O capabilities (eyes on target and or precision shooting).
Use thermal or other night vision imagery.
Use lighting.
Use less lethal options.
42

Dominate the Area. An area is dominated when a minimum of two members of the entry team move
to points that allow total control of the area with proper interlocking fields of fire.
Occupation of these points with interlocking fields of fire serve to overwhelm the threat (create a
dilemma) and provide different angles of fire to cover potential dead space.
Be aware of your position and surroundings. Scan to break tunnel vision.
Eliminate the Threat. Team members will identify the threat using the three criteria of S. E. E.
Eliminating the threat may be accomplished with lesser means of force than deadly force. When
deadly force is used, the team must effectively eliminate the threat as quickly as possible with
accurate and discriminating fire. This can be accomplished from or while moving to their dominating
positions. As stated in Army FM 23-35, Combat Pistol, the battle is not won with the first shot! It is
won with the first accurate shot.
Control the Situation and Personnel. It is essential that in the initial few moments of a clearing
operation the team maintain total control of the situation and all personnel in the room. Lost control is
not easily regained.
The dilemma, disorientation, confusion, and sometimes panic created in the mind of the threat must
be fully exploited as a measure of control. Team members must communicate clearly and always
ready to take charge.
Search the Area. A quick but complete search of the room is critical in determining if any potential
threat to the team exists. Search anything that may conceal a threat (behind doors, furniture, etc).
The room search is conducted by a minimum of a two-man team. One covers and the other searches.
Great consideration should be given when searching the room if the possibility of booby traps exists.
What is the benefit or need? What are the likely results?
Search the Living, Injured, and Dead. The living, injured, and dead must be searched to ensure that
they no longer pose a threat. The search is conducted by a minimum of a three-man team in large
areas that contain a threat but are not cleared:
One man searches the threat.
One man covers the threat.
One man covers the room.
Remove any weapons on or near the body. Cautiously check for signs of life on motionless and
unresponsive threats. Provide medical attention if necessary.
Evacuate Personnel and Equipment. If personnel or equipment recovery was the purpose of the
clearing operation, these assets should be evacuated immediately. Account for all organic personnel
and equipment.
Refer to team SOP and or rules of engagement for evacuation procedures of the threat(s), wounded,
and dead.
Entry
Planning Considerations
Determine number of necessary personnel for mission. Mandated by METT-T. A minimum of five
personnel are necessary to conduct building clearing. Three (3) personnel per threat should be
committed to any mission when multiple threats are expected. Three (3) to four (4) team members per
room is ideal. The team must be prepared to deny the threat any chance of escape or effective
43

retaliation. The following details must be considered when determining the number of entry team
members for the mission:
Number of threats, non combatants, or bystanders and their equipment capabilities.

Size, complexity, number, type of structures, areas, and exterior danger areas.
Entry point number and type.
Control and apprehension of the threat.

What equipment is necessary in order to effect a successful entry and clearing operation.
What environment is the team likely to encounter?
What is the anticipated reaction by the threat.
Approach the Entry Point
Time and distance from the last covered and concealed position (LCC) to entry must be as short as
possible.
Move with 360-degree security with cover from Marksman/Observers. Team must be in proper order
for necessary actions at the entry point. Have primary and alternate entry point selected prior to
departing CP and have a contingency plan for compromise. Depart the LCC with compromise
authority. Attempt a deliberate approach when possible.
Actions at the Entry Point
Make a quick check of the entry point.
Plan to breach two entry points.
When entering at ground level with a small clearing team, it is preferable to enter at the end of the
building rather from the middle. This will limit possible threats to the front. Entering the building in
the middle will cause the small team to split-up. When entering at ground level with a large
clearing team, a middle assault working outward can offer the fastest and safest method of
clearing.
Enter from the top.
Enhances element of surprise, speed, and aggressive action.
Maximizes the high ground tactical angles.
Decreases the possibility of encountering booby traps.
Minimizes team member physical stress by working with gravity.
Drives the threat down and out of the objective. A threat forced to the top of the building may
become cornered, feel trapped, and causes physical harm to innocent bystanders, SRT members,
or himself out of desperation. Give the threat, when feasible, the option of fight or flight. A threat
forced down to ground level may attempt to escape becoming vulnerable to SRT marksmen or
capture by inner security personnel.
Actions Outside the Entry Point
Select a position based on the characteristics of the entry point. Team members must train to
immediately recognize the characteristics of various entry points and setup to provide maximum
security and the smoothest entry possible.
Position on the side that provides the least path of resistance.
44

Inward opening doors:

Team members position themselves to either side of the door.
Maximize coverage whenever possible by positioning team members left and right of the opening.
Team members lining up on the hinge side will have first view and easiest access.

Outward opening doors:

I-6
Team members position themselves on the door knob side.
Prevents team members from having to deal with the door.
Easy access to typical locks and doorknobs.
Minimizes obstacles.
Maximizing speed.

Individual Position. Keep in mind that a threat may come from any angle. Each member must be
prepared to meet and defeat it. A simple thing such as foot position or muzzle may give away your
location to the threat. The body must be positioned correctly to avoid compromise and facilitate
surprise, speed, and aggressive action.
Head and Eyes: aligned with threat and or area of responsibility.

Shoulders
Align with hands and eyes, maximizing body armor protection.
Stay off the wall.

Weapon
Cover the entry point at the close in ready or low ready position. The number 2-man may be at
the high ready.
Finger indexed off the trigger.
Ideally, weapon is carried in the hand opposite the wall side. However, careful consideration
must be given to the skill of the entry team member. Can he shoot well with both hands. If not,
keep it in the strong hand.
Muzzle directed to indicate movement direction or aligned with threat and or area of
responsibility.

Feet
Positioned as close to the door opening as possible to expedite entry.
Feet comfortable distance apart, similar to boxers stance.
Always think angles. Do not allow your foot position to compromise your position.

Stance
Knees slightly bent.
A stable base is critical.

Body
Weight is slightly forward in a crouched position.
Never off balance.

Mind. Ask yourself:

45

Is this a safe entry point?

Is there sufficient manpower (2 men per room, 3 men per threat)?
Is the team position compromised? (If so, create a diversion or use another entry point)
Trust your senses (see, listen, smell, and feel).
Focused and prepared to meet and defeat the threat.
S.E.E.

Equipment
Keep to a minimum to reduce noise and bulk.
Do you have proper weapons and equipment for entry and clearing?

Three methods of entry include:

Deliberate
Dynamic
Ruse
Deliberate entry is used to enter quietly in an attempt to reduce the distance to the threat. Deliberate
entry is used in friendly environments where the threat does not have sympathizers in the area to alert
or assist them. Also known as the stealth or covert method. Very effective when entering large
structures, particularly when the exact location of the threat is unknown and the size of the entry team
is limited.
Dynamic entry may be used during any mission that requires immediate access into the objective.
Virtually the same as deliberate. Distinguishing characteristics are speed and the method of
breaching. The use of various tools is often required to gain immediate access into the structure.
Ruse Method
Ruse entry is the use of a non-threatening posture during movement and gaining access to the
objective. Examples include team member acting as an UPS driver, pizza delivery, maintenance man,
etc. It is an effective and safe method of approach and entry when well planned and rehearsed.
Requires same security as any other method of entry. Advantages of a ruse include:
Point of entry is opened by the threat, thus achieving a successful breach and reducing risk to the
team and building occupants.
Approach to the objective can be accomplished without the need for concealment. Cover should
be planned when available.
Apprehension of one or more threats at the entry point.
A ruse is not recommended in a barricaded situations, however, may be effective in raids. If the ruse
fails, an entry team must be prepared to immediately execute entry and clearing. Attempting a ruse
entry can be difficult due to the need for inconspicuous movement of equipment and personnel to the
entry point and difficult transitioning from the ruse.
Breaching
A positive method of breaching must be determined during planning. Additionally, an alternate/back-up
method should also be selected. Ideally, enough personnel and equipment resources should be
dedicated to the operation to allow for a breach of the primary and alternate entry point. All entry team
members must be capable of performing all breaching techniques.
Breacher
Improper breaching denies access into the objective and may cause injury to the team members,
innocent bystanders, or the threat. Improper breaching may result in mission failure. Breachers must
be capable of:
46

Provide positive, safe entry for the SRT.

Recognizing.
Potential entry points.
Potential danger areas.
Analyze.
Determine which potential entry points would make the best primary and alternate breach
points.
Determine the best primary breaching method/technique to use for the primary, alternate,
and unknown breach points.
Remaining prepared to effect more breaching.

Breaching Techniques include:

Manual and mechanical breaching.
Ballistic breaching.
Thermal breaching.
Explosive breaching.
Manual and mechanical breaching is forced entry by manual and mechanical means. Examples of
manual breaching include the battering ram, hooligan tool, etc. Examples of mechanical breaching
include the use of hydraulic tools and all-purpose saws. The nature of a particular mission or target
may make manual or mechanical tools inappropriate or impossible to use. Even when other entry
methods are used, manual and mechanical breaching should be considered and incorporated into
plans as an alternate or secondary means for achieving entry.
Application of mechanical techniques is limited by the hardness of the target and the teams load
carrying capacity. Most manual and mechanical breaching tools are heavy, bulky, and awkward to
carry. Tool use requires time on target that may compromise the teams mission. Tools include:
Battering ram
Hooligan tool
Sledge hammer
Hydraulic spreader
T-bars and J-hooks
Bolt cutters
Crowbar
Center punch
Fire fighting equipment
Key
Ballistic breaching is an alternate means of gaining entry into a structure through an existing opening
with the use of shotgun or rifle ammunition. It does not provide a positive means of entry. Fratricide,
non-combatant casualties, and collateral damage may occur.
Ballistic entry may become necessary during some situations for gaining access to subsequent rooms
within the structure. The shotgun should be used as an alternate or secondary breaching tool
because of the limited ammunition capacity and the difficulty of reloading. The M16A2, M4, or MP5
should be used as a last resort breaching tool and should be reserved for combat operations.
WARNING
The breacher must open the door. Attempts by the #1 man to open
the door prior to the successful breach may result in injury or death.

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Thermal breaching involves the use of devices, tools, and materials that produce extremely high
temperatures to melt, burn through, or vaporize objects and mechanisms to gain entry to secure areas
or locations. The use of thermal tools is viewed as a secondary means of entry when other methods
are inappropriate for technical or tactical reasons. This breaching method has certain disadvantages
and limitations that must be considered during breach planning, to include the following:
Thermal tools cause violent reactions on target.
Oxygen tanks can be detonated when struck by bullets or shell fragments (shrapnel).
The use of thermal tools requires the use of special clothing and equipment.
Tactically, thermal tools require varying lengths of time on target.
Tactically, they produce heat, light, and noise signature that may compromise the mission.
Explosive Breaching. This often the fastest and most effective method of breaching. Engineers
should support explosive breaching/demolition operations. If engineers are not available, SRT can
prepare breach entry points themselves if properly trained and or assisted by other experts (EOD,
infantry unit advisors, etc).
Advantages of using explosives for entry include:
Guarantee entry.
Gain speed when innocent bystanders or vital evidence is involved.
Create shock and stunning effect.
Breach/bypass entry points that have been reinforced.
Disadvantages of using explosives for entry include:
Over pressure (if approved change is not used).
Cannot be used in drug lab raids.
Shot Initiated Entry
Shot initiated. Although not an entry method, the shot initiated entry in conjunction with other entry
methods may increase the opportunity for mission success and decrease potential for injury to team
members and potential innocent bystanders. The team is prepared to enter. The subject is within
sight of the marksman/observer.
It is determined that the subject(s) must be eliminated for hostage or team safety with precision
shooting. The shot is fired and the team immediately executes entry to exploit the situation.
A great deal of training must be conducted in order to safely operate under these conditions. All team
members require a great deal of confidence. The responsibility of success or failure rests on the skill
of the marksman and the entry team. As an entry team member, having a shot taken only feet or
inches from your position takes much discipline. Do not attempt this without prior training.
Synchronized shooting is described and practiced during the SRT Marksman/Observer Course to help
support shot initiated entries.
Gain Entry
The use of a deliberate means of entry is preferred however may be unlikely under many
circumstances. Careful coordination of all SRT elements is critical. The use of a countdown to
execute the entry plan (breaching, shot initiation, and distractions). Timing is critical. All elements
must be in their ready positions.
Primary and alternate breaching must be positive. Immediately cover all tactical angles during the
establishment of a dominating position/foothold. Remain flexible and make timely decisions. All
actions should be made in a careful hurry.
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Stun Grenades/Diversionary Devices

Stun grenade, flash/bang, stun munitions, diversionary devices, distraction devices, the list goes on.
These titles describe devices developed to produce a loud bang and brilliant light resulting in various
physiological and psychological effects experienced by the threat. A diversionary device/stun grenade
is most effective against an inattentive, poorly trained threat rather than one that is well trained. These
devices will be identified as diversionary devices from this point forward.
Why are these devices used? Quite simply, to decrease the chance of injury to entry team members,
innocent bystanders, threat, and increase probability of success.
When considering the use of a diversionary device SRT tactical planners must take into account the
following:
Authorization: Used when the TMF commander or the local commander gives permission.
Justification: Used when the device will facilitate entry, enhance control and apprehension, or
reduce risk of injury.
Circumstances: Used by tactical and non-tactical forces while performing hostage rescue, capture
of criminals, terrorists, and other threats.
Prior to the deployment of the diversionary device, SRT tactical planners must consider if there are
children, elderly, flammables, explosives, or other intelligence or circumstances that would restrict the
its use.
Effects of the Diversionary Device/Stun Grenade
Generally, diversionary devices affect the human body (physiologically and psychologically) and the
environment. The effects will last only five to ten seconds.
Physiological effects:
Hearing: The loud bang will cause the ears to ring.
Vision: The brilliant flash will cause the pupils to constrict even if the eyes are closed. Smoke my
obscure sight.
Balance: May be affected due to pressure on the ears.
WARNING
Detonation within 5 feet will cause permanent hearing damage.
Psychological effects:
Disorientation and confusion: Because disorientation and confusion are closely related, the teams
goal by using a diversionary device is to cause the threat to draw a false conclusion as to what will
happen next, giving the team the advantage.
Panic. When the diversionary device detonates, a sudden, unreasoning, hysterical fear may
develop in the threat and other objective occupants. This may result in unpredictable behavior
ranging from occupants assuming the fetal position to aggressive action.
NOTE: These effects last 5 to 10 seconds and may be experienced by team members.
Environmental effects. The SRT tactical planners must anticipate the following environmental effects
and what hazards may be created when a device is used. Potential hazards include:
Fire. Prepare a fire plan and assembly necessary equipment. Alert fire department. Do not
account on fire equipment being in the objective. Place a fire extinguisher at the cache (outside
49

the breach/entry point). Team leader must decide if the mission will continue or evacuate
immediately if a fire breaks out.
Secondary explosions. May result when the diversionary device detonates near or comes in
contact with corrosives, flammables, or other flammables stored in the objective.
Falling debris. Created from the overpressure caused by the detonation of the device. Falling light
fixtures and broken glass are common.
Halon system. Immediately, but temporarily, removes oxygen from enclosed areas. Extremely
hazardous.
Sprinkler systems. Decreases the stability of fighting positions. Interferes with communications
and visibility.
Secondary projectiles. Loose objects near the target area of the device will be propelled about the
area.
Holes. Can create holes in the carpeting, padding, and sub-flooring.
Stepping on device. Stepping on the spent device will cause personnel to loose their balance.

Post Deployment Actions

Post deployment actions. An immediate check of the objective must be conducted without delay
following the completion of clearing. These actions include:
Assure all fires are out.
Mark hazardous areas.
Account for diversionary device components.
Recharge devices.
Check pull-rings on unused devices.
Dud procedures
During operations bypass the dud and deploy another.
procedures.

During training, follow USAMPS safety

WARNING
Do not touch duds during training. Notify instructors immediately.
Deploy the Diversionary Device/Stun Grenade
When deploying the 84 always be sure of your target. When possible avoid throwing a device where
the area has not been visually cleared. Ideally the device should be thrown in the center of a room to
maximize the effects. An alternate method of deploying the device is to toss it just inside the doorway
to be entered, just clearing the threshold. The effects are the same on the threat. The drawback to
this technique is the flash can have a greater effect on the night vision of team members.
Inside Buildings
Dont pass unclear areas. Maintain coverage of all tactical angles towards unclear areas. Coordinate
all movement. Communications are necessary, but keep them brief, to the point, and exact. Always
be systematic and thorough. And always move at a speed where you are in control. Be prepared for
changes. Stay on your feet. Enter and clear with three (3) personnel when possible, minimum two
(2). Keep it simple.
Door Entry Techniques
Suspect and Team View
The threats view of his environment is very different than that of the entry team member. The threat
knows the environment better and may have already made a decision to shoot. The entry team
member is concerned with 360 degree security including up and down, entering an unknown, and use
of force constrictions. Although these circumstances seem hopeless to the entry team member, the
50

use of proper tactics in combination with BC principles and fundamentals will provide the team with the
advantage.

Threat View

Team View

Crisscross
Entry is not required to achieve target acquisition; areas of responsibility are immediately visible.
When team members use the crisscross, they must decided who will enter the room first based on
which side of the door is hinged and room layout.

Buttonhook
Area of responsibility is not visible until entry. This technique allows
simultaneous entry of two men through a large door.

Combination
A combination of the buttonhook and crisscross are used to establish
a split team entry technique. If your partner goes left, then go right
in order to effect a split team entry. If a mistake is made, fill the gap.

Limited penetration
Limited penetration is used to barricade at the entry point when
there is not enough room to execute a crisscross or buttonhook,
and there is no chance team members will be confronted by a
threat from his flank inside the entry point (i.e. pantry, closet
or similar area).

51

Establish Dominating positions

These dominating positions include the:
Opposing corners.
Split team.
Same side.
Select the dominating position that gives maximum security and allows coverage of sectors of fire
without having to know where other team members are positioned.
Because there is no margin for error in establishing dominating positions, the team members must
become highly proficient. This is done through training.
In order for team members to feel confident about performing these tactics, their feelings of
vulnerability must be addressed. The first reaction when confronted by danger is flight or fight. Flight
is an unacceptable reaction by a team member. They must stand and fight. In a fight team members
will protect themselves first, then team members, and innocent bystanders, and finally the threat.
Feelings of vulnerability can be alleviated to a great extent by understanding the following:
Initially team members feel vulnerable from 360-degrees. Forward movement, clearing while moving,
combined with protection from follow-on team members reduces vulnerability to 180-degrees. If team
maneuvers along walls, this reduces vulnerability to 90-degrees. All clearing is done in two man
teams.
These dominating positions and their sectors of fire are illustrated in the following slides. Each
member of the team must know their sector of fire and how the sector overlaps with other team
members. Each clearing team member has a designated sector of fire and understand that it will
change depending on individual location. It is critical they overlap with other team members. Note the
sectors of fire extend to within 1 meter in front of their partner.
Opposing Corners
This is the preferred dominating position. Communications and visual awareness between team
members is critical. During opposing corners entry, team members execute entry and position
themselves in opposite corners of the room. The first man evaluates the door and enters to the side
opposite of the hinges, freeing him from having to pin the door, and continues along the long wall. It is
very effective on small to medium sized rooms. Team members must use caution when establishing
these positions due to the deep penetration of their areas of responsibility. Never bypass anything
that may conceal a person and avoid exposing yourself to adjoining rooms.
If the first man cannot go long, the #2 man visually recognizes this and may attempt to go long.
Advantages include:
Provides good view of tactical angles.
Puts the threat at a disadvantage by forcing a decision.
Greater perspective of the room layout, eliminating dead space.
Greater chance of survivability if one team member activates an
IED or booby trap.
The disadvantage is that team members may
be moving alone.
52

Split Team
During split team entry, team members initially position
themselves on opposite sides of the entry point on the
same wall. This is the preferred position for the following
reasons:
Greater view of the room and better angles.
Threat is put at a disadvantage because he must decide
which targets to engage.
Quickly allows the establishment of an
effective shooting platform and security.
Minimizes the chances of team members
exposing themselves to unseen areas and
or threats.

Same Side
During same side entry, team members initially position
themselves on the same side of the room. This may
be necessary because of the close proximity of
adjoining rooms or the area is so small it restricts
movement. This is the least preferred dominating
position. It results in lesser coverage of
angles and team members are a larger target
for the threat to engage.

Immediate Threat. Expect to encounter an immediate threat upon entry. Move to dominating
positions. Do not change in mid-stream. Every effort must be made to stick to the plan even if an
immediate threat is encountered. The engagement of the perceived immediate threat cannot
slowdown the entry team. The first man encountering the threat is responsible for the threat and
checking their sector of fire.
Ballistic Shield Entry
Apply the above mentioned entry techniques when employing a ballistic shield. Overall, tactics are the
same as maneuvering without the shield. The difference being that the shield is placed forward of the
team for ballistic protection. Entry with the shield can be executed during deliberate or dynamic
operations.
First entry team member enters with a shield.
Shield is carried to position forward of the entry point, only far enough into the room to allow remaining
team members complete access.
Remaining team members establish dominating positions.
All team members establish and collapse sectors on line.
Never allow the forward security to enter any area alone.
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Window Entry
Breaching and entering various types of windows and heights of windows are as important as door
entry and may be necessary in the event door entry cannot be made. Consider the following
advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages:
Windows provide an alternate entry method.
Window entry may not be expected by the threat.
Disadvantages:
Lack of speed.
Noisy.
Awkward fatal funnel.
Increased risk of injury.
Complex.
All equipment must be passed through the window.
Methods of Window Entry. Although entry methods and techniques may vary, all previously outlined
entry fundamentals and considerations apply. The key to success is training and rehearsal. The two
methods of entry are:

Deliberate window entry. Requires an open/unsecured window or the team has to have a way to
unlock the window from the exterior. Interior window coverings often make covert movement
impossible. Determine negative characteristics that may interfere with opening a window (painted
shut, alarms, etc.) before arriving to the objective.

Dynamic window entry. The ability to breach/break windows during dynamic window entry is
critical. If the window cannot be safely reached or the glass/window frame cannot be breached,
dynamic window entry is not an option.

Window Selection
The ideal window will provide a simple, unobstructed entry into the objective. Look for the following
characteristics:
Located the farthest from the threats position.
Allows a minimum of two ladders teams to enter the same room.
Unlocked or open window.
High enough for the tallest man to enter quickly while maintaining proper position.
Wide enough to allow team members to work without exposing their flanks or catching equipment
on windows.
Sills are low enough to allow members to easily step into the dominating positions.
Minimum obstructions.
Easily reached and breached.
Stable ground below the window for footing or ladder placements.
Window Entry Safety Equipment
Team members must be prepared for broken glass and possible falls from the ladders. Shards in the
window frame, on the ground, and floor only serve to increase the risk of injury during entry. Using the
proper equipment may reduce risks. This includes:
Carry a minimum amount of equipment to accomplish the mission.
54

Helmet: Offers protect from falling window frame and shards of glass.
Gloves: May not stop glass from cutting team members hands, but they will help control bleeding
and gripping the weapon.
Ballistic eye protection: Protection from flying glass during breaching.
Long sleeves, balacalava, and buttoned up collar: Protection from flying glass during breaching.
Ladders and other ascending equipment: Must be rated to hold three entry team members and
equipment.

Building Clearing
At this point the SRT must clear the building or objective. It is critical that all principles and
fundamentals previously described in BC are carried on throughout the entire objective. Every room is
approached using techniques and tactics previously described during entry.
Select a Clearing Method and Scheme of Maneuver
Select a clearing method and scheme of maneuver based on potential consequences of delay
(hostage lives, evidence, etc.). Minimize risk to team members and occupants. Understand resource
capabilities and limitations (personnel, equipment, and weapons).
Methods of Clearing
There are two primary methods of building clearing with variation of both which are directly influenced
by the number of personnel in the clearing element or the configuration of the objective. The type of
operation may directly effect the method used and how it is modified. These methods include
deliberate and dynamic clearing.
Deliberate clearing: The base or minimum team size is five members. This method may allow the
entry team to get closer to the threat or target before being compromised. The use of non-verbal
communication, night vision devices, (ie. Nods, IR aiming devices, IR chem lights), and the use of
stealth as a means of surprise may be very effective in some tactical situations. Deliberate to dynamic
if compromised.
Dynamic clearing: Resembles the deliberate clearing method. The goal is to control the objective
immediately. Normally requires larger teams.
(Scheme of maneuver)
Determine the Scheme of Maneuver
The team leader will determine which clearing technique will work best for each situation. The threat
must feel there is an opportunity for surrender (not to be confused with escape) and resistance is
futile. The selected technique must deprive the threat of space and provide the SRT time. SRT
tactical planners and team leaders must keep in mind that clearing techniques may be combined
depending on the special threat situation. The following clearing techniques can be employed within
most objectives to include multi-story and multiple objectives.
Coordinated Entries and Clearing
Either deliberate or dynamic. Multiple teams clearing the same objective or separate objectives.
Coordination and communications are extremely important to prevent crossfire and fratricide when two
or more teams work the same objective.

55

Room-by-room. Room by room: Minimum team size is 5. The clearing element enters the objective
clearing systematically one room at a time before moving to the next room. The size and layout of the
structure may allow a 5-man team to clear more than one room at a time. The larger the clearing team
the faster the objective will be cleared. Room by room may be done deliberate or dynamic.

Advantages:
Easily controlled.
Low fratricide potential.
Minimum personnel required.
Economy of forces.
Disadvantages:
Time consuming.
Mentally and physically fatiguing.
Flood. The clearing element consisting of enough personnel to enter each room with a 2 man team,
shield man designated to provide forward security and a team leader to control the movement.
Support members may follow team leader. A 2-man team will enter each room moving to a split team
dominating position and secure their room, which may reduce the possibility of fratricide or collateral
damage. Team leader will check status of each room, after each room is secured team leader will tell
each room one at a time or two opposing or staggered rooms to clear their room. If support is needed
team leader may pull 1-man out of a secure room to send support where needed. Since the object is
to secure the objective in a rapid manner it should be done dynamic. Intelligence such as layout and
number of rooms is needed to conduct a flood.
Advantages:
Aggressive action.
Rapid security of the objective.
Reduced opportunity for threat
fortification and arming.
Apprehension of threat with
minimum resistance.
Preservation of evidence.
Disadvantages:
Fratricide potential.
Manpower intensive.

Direct to threat. The clearing element breaches the objective and moves directly to the known
location of the threat or target within the objective as quickly as possible. The entry team maintains
360 security from the breach point to the threat or target, bypassing unclear areas. Once at the target
area within the objective the team must maintain security, exiting the same way it entered 360 degree
security back to the breach point, clearing the objective room by room, or wait for a follow on support
force. Used only in extreme emergency situations (ie. life threatening situation, recover of a target or
object such as WMD). During room by room clearing an entry team may conduct a direct to threat.
56

The entry team sees a threat or target, a code word is given, the team comes together (360 degree
security) and moves to the threat or target. Direct to Threat may be done deliberate or dynamic.
Advantages:
Aggressive action.
Rapid security of threat.
Reduced opportunity for threat
fortification and arming.

Disadvantages:
By pass unclear areas.

Increased opportunity for threat from 360-degrees.

Cutoff from support.
WARNING
360 security must be maintained throughout direct to threat scheme of maneuver!

Ambush: An ambush may be conducted inside or outside an objective, to allow the entry team to wait
for the threat to come to their location. An ambush may give an entry team the surprise needed to
resolve a special threat situation without incident. An ambush brings the threat out of his environment
and into the entry teams, giving the entry team the advantage.
Advantages:
Reduces threats reactionary gap.
Decreased possibility of compromise because threat is unaware of teams presence.
Improves possibility of apprehension without incident.
Decreases the chance of encountering hazards.
Disadvantages:
Time consuming.
Requires high degree of patience and discipline.
Minimal contact with outside resources.
Open-air ambush. Used with the deliberate method of movement. A team establishes an ambush at
a preselected site and waits for the threat to approach. The ambush site selected is based on
intelligence indicating the probability that the threat will be present at a specific location and time. A
minimum of one 5-man team is required.
Advantages:
Reduces threats reactionary gap.
Decreased possibility of compromise because threat is unaware of teams presence.
Improves possibility of apprehension without incident.
Decreases the chance of encountering hazards.
Disadvantages:
Time consuming.
Requires high degree of patience and discipline.
57

Minimal contact with outside resources.

Subject to elements.

Enveloping: The objective is surrounded and limited penetration is made at every possible porthole to
dominate and clear as much as possible from the outside, denying the threat access to the controlled
areas. Once control of the objective is achieved an entry element enters and clears the objective
room by room. This should be considered when clearing a clandestine lab.
Advantages:
Surprise, speed, and aggressive action.
Reduced opportunity for threat fortification and arming.
Limit contact with improvised explosive devices (IED) and
Multiple barrier penetration.
Control of fleeing threat.

other hazards (clandestine drug labs).

Disadvantages:
Potential for fratricide.
Difficulty in reaching windows.
No immediate coverage on windowless
interior areas.
Labor intensive.
Split: Entry team enters the center of an objective, half the team clears to the right and the other half
of the team clears to the left. Team size should be relative to the objective. You may use a room by
room, flood, scout/snake, or a combination. A split may be done deliberate or dynamic.
Advantages:
Minimized coordination requirements.
Rapid security of objective.
Easily controlled.
Low fratricide.
Disadvantages: Communication problems upon splitting team.
Hammer and anvil: This is a coordinated entry, two teams enter simultaneously. One team enters
and clears towards the other team, pushing the threat towards the awaiting team. The hammer and
anvil works best in a L shape structure. May be done deliberate or dynamic or combination.
Advantages:
Surprise, speed, and aggressive action.
Confuses the threat.
Increases tactical angles and overlapping sectors.
Very effective in L-shaped objectives.
Threat faced with multiple fronts.
Disadvantages:
Fratricide potential.
Labor intensive.

58

Scout or snake: The clearing element, which is usually small, (2 or 3 man clearing element), clears
the objective room by room. A support element follows the clearing element through the objective.
May be done deliberate or dynamic.
Advantage. Effective for coordinated operations.
Disadvantage. Fatigue and mental stress experienced by scout team.

If an entry team has adequate personnel, equipment and training it may choose to do a coordinated
entry. It can be multiple teams clearing the same objective or separate objectives. Coordination and
communications are extremely important to prevent crossfire and fratricide when two or more teams
work the same objective.
Select a clearing method and scheme of maneuver based on potential consequences of delay
(hostage lives, evidence, etc.), minimum risk to team members and occupants, and available
resources (personnel, equipment, and weapons).
Entering Interior Doors
Entering interior doors is accomplished much the same as exterior doors. The techniques are the
same. Personnel must be prepared to immediately stack on both open and closed doors. Breaching
most interior doors may be accomplished most effectively with simple tools such as a 10-pound
sledgehammer or ballistic breaching. Use of diversionary devices is the same as on exterior doors.
Cutting the pie may be highly effective on some doors and useful for clearing other areas such as
dead space from dominating positions.
Cut the Pie
Cutting the pie is a method of clearing, which allows team members to visually check around a corner,
doorjamb, or any other object for a potential threat. When approaching a corner or object, where you
suspect a threat to be positioned, move in an arching pattern horizontally (sideways) while holding the
weapon at ready. Shuffle the feet side to side in small steps. The head, body armor and weapon are
aligned with the perceived threat area. Lean outward with the head and weapon, being careful not to
expose your feet first. Exposing your feet will give the threat the opportunity to identify your position
from his/her location. Then position your body upright by bringing your feet under your head and
weapon in a comfortable firing position. Edge your way a small slice at a time, gradually increasing
the field of view until the threat area is cleared to a point that the risk of entry is reduced. This
technique should be conducted far away enough from the suspected threat area to maintain weapon
retention. Remember to control the distance.
Room Clearing
Use two or more personnel to clear a room. Keep clearing as simple as possible. The sequence in
room clearing is:
Coordinated and communicated.
Break the plane of the door immediately. Do not stand in the fatal funnel.
Use the SEE acronym.
Clear the corners and center.
Move to dominating positions establishing control within the room.
Give a momentary pause to collect your self and assess the situation quickly.
Orientate yourself for the best clearing positions.
Make a decision on how to clear.
59

Act on that decision.

Room Search and Clearing Techniques

Once dominating positions and overlapping sectors of fire have been established, determine how each
room will be searched. Regardless of the technique used to search the room, one-man cover and one
man clear/search fundamentals must be used. Clearing techniques include:
Sectors.
Side-by-side.

Sectors
The clear by sectors technique is used by a 2, 3, or 4-man clearing teams upon establishing opposing
corners dominating positions. One team member maintains cover from their dominating position while
the other advances and clears their sector of fire. This technique is effective on small to medium
rooms. It should be avoided when connecting rooms, complex floor layouts, or heavy room clutter is
encountered. During 3-man clearing, the number 3 man carries the ballistic shield and supports the
clearing members.

1
2

2
1

2
C

1
2
2
D

2
F

Side-by-Side
Used by 2, 3, or 4-man clearing teams. During 2-man clearing, one team member maintains cover
from the flank position of a second clearing team member. Both advance and clear the entire room or
area. This technique is effective on small to medium rooms. A 4-man team is recommended while
clearing large areas, particularly when effective connecting rooms, complex floor layouts, or room
clutter is encountered. During 3-man clearing, the number 3 man carries the ballistic shield and
supports the clearing members.

60

Hallway Clearing
Hallways are corridors or passageways in a building connecting the various rooms within the structure.
they may be anything from a simple vestibule to a great hall stretching several hundred feet. The
width may vary from very narrow to several yards wide. Hallways offer an advantage to the SRT in
that they can assist in limiting access and movement of the threat. Halls may be:
Not part of the overall objective, but used to maneuver to other areas.
Part of the objective requiring clearing and domination.
Normally contain stairways for multiple story buildings.
Normally contain closets.
May contain attic or crawl space access.
Hallway Configuration
There are numerous hallway configurations. Their top down appearance best describes them. The
common configurations include:
Vestibule.
Straight.
L-shaped.
T-shaped.
U-shaped.
Combination of the above.
The threat will recognize hallways as avenues of approach and anticipate the teams attempt to use
them in gaining a dominating position. Serious consideration should be given to securing but avoiding
movement through halls when possible. Go through walls or use connecting room doors when
possible.
Regardless, all halls must be secured and cleared at some point. SRT members must be able to
correctly approach, evaluate, and maneuver in or around halls. This includes identifying and taking
proper actions at:
Various hallway and doorway configurations.
When confronted with various effects of hallway and room dimensions.
Danger areas within a hall.
Hall Door Layouts
The entry points for the majority of rooms within a structure are located in the hallway. The position of
rooms within that structure is limited only to the desired architectural affects or practical needs of the
occupants. Most entry points are in the form of basic doorway openings (layout) into the hall. They
include:
Opposing doorways: Doors located directly across from each other within the hallway.
Offset/staggered doorways: Doors alternating within the hallway, not positioned across from each
other.
Combination doorways: Any combination of opposing and staggered doorway layouts within the
same hall.
One-sided doorways: All doors are located on the same side of the hallway.
Hallway Movement
The four basic techniques for moving in hallways are:
File.
61

Double file.

File Movement
File movement is used in narrow hallways with or without the ballistic shield. The number 1-man
(forward security) provides security to the front. His sector of fire includes any threat that appears in
the hallway forward of the team. Remaining team members follow in the file formation directly behind
the number 1-man. The number 2 and 3-man covers the left and right sides of the number 1-man.
Their sectors of fire include any threat suddenly appearing from nearby doorways on either side of the
hall. They cover the number 1-mans flanks. The last man provides rear security against any threat
appearing behind the clearing team. This technique may be used with large or small teams. The file
may be the only option in very narrow hallways. The advantage of this technique is that it is effective
at providing protection to the team when a ballistic shield is used. The disadvantages are:
Limits field of vision for the number 2 and 3-man forward of the number 1-man.
Restrictive and slow when teams are confronted with opposing doors.
Double File Movement
Double file movement is used in wide hallways (at least 5 feet wide) with or without the ballistic shield.
Number 1-man (forward security) sector of fire includes any threats in his sector of fire including any
threats that appear in the hallway forward of the team. Remaining team members follow in the file
formation directly behind the number 1-man. The number 2 and 3-man covers the left and right sides
of the number 1-man. Their sectors of fire include any threat suddenly appearing from nearby
doorways on either side of the hall. They cover the number 1-mans flanks. The last man provides
rear security against any threat appearing behind the clearing team. This technique may be used with
large or small teams. 2 ballistic shields may be used to provide security to the front. This technique
allows teams to enter opposing doors within hallways more effectively than single file movement.
Clearing Stairs
Stairways and staircases are a series of steps and a supporting structure connecting separate levels.
A stairwell is a vertical shaft around which a staircase has been built in a multi-story building. Whether
a team must move up a short stairway or multi-level stairwell, these structures will constrict the SRT,
making the stairwell an area of tactical disadvantage. Careful movement planning for stairs is
important. The types and configuration of stairs are immeasurable, not to mention the danger areas
found in and around stairs. Never assume one stairwell will be identical to another, even if the
blueprints indicate they are built to the same specifications. The following guidelines are provided and
should be considered before taking entering the stairwell.
Guidelines for Stair Clearing
Movement in or on stairs is based on their construction and characteristics. All stairs are different.
Concrete stairwells will create ricochet problems. Enfilade (cover with gunfire) and defilade
(fortifications against enfilade) cannot be assumed in any stair movement.
Use blind side reconnaissance or other devices (infrared viewers, thermal imagery, mirrors,
existing cameras, etc.) when ascending or descending stairs when possible.
Consider eliminating lighting.
Apply slow foot pressure, avoiding squeaky stairs and floors.
Walk along the sides of the stairs where the steps are supported and they make less noise. This
may not always be possible.
Take advantage of tactical angles.

62

A diversion or the use of chemical irritants to facilitate entry in the stairwell may be an option
depending on the operation. Remember what goes up must come down. Use of fragmentation
grenades while climbing stairs is extremely dangerous and should be avoided.
Check stairwell doors to ensure that they allow the team to exit on any floor. Expect them to be
locked. Some fire stairs only allow an exit on the ground floor. A means of breaching must be
available.
Avoid bunching in stairwells. Normally, no more than 3-team members at any given location are
required. During clearing a 2-man scout team can adequately clear and control most stairwells.

Ascending Stairs
Ascending a stairwell puts clearing teams at a tactical disadvantage; however, this may be necessary
to accomplish the mission. When viewed from below, most stairwells reveal nothing more than the
bottom of landings and stairs. Careful movement, whether using deliberate or dynamic methods, is
necessary. Two methods of ascending include:
Side by Side Method. Split team into two elements during deliberate clearing (scout/advance and
follow on team).
Scout team consists of two personnel. These two team members ascend together side-by-side.
Number 1-man climbs forward covering the forward threat area (landings, floor, and lower stairs).
Positioned to the center of the stairs and slightly forward.
Number 2-man walks up stairs backwards covering the rear (balconies, railings, and upper
landings), positioned on the outside wall.
Support team is made up of remaining personnel with sectors of fire upwards through the center
areas of stairwells or other danger areas (landings, windows, etc.).
The weapon is in the shooting position and pointed at the threat area as you ascend. Advance to the
next step with one foot and stabilize it, apply pressure, and then pull the trailing foot up to the same
level. Never cross legs or feet over each other while moving. Maximize tactical angles at every step.
Ballistic shields carried by number 2-man or both men. Follow-on team provides cover and rear
security.
Upon reaching each landing, follow-on team members are moved up and positioned for rear security
and cover.
Back-to-Back Method. Split team into two elements during deliberate clearing (scout/advance and
follow on team).
Two team members ascend back-to-back. This is necessary in confined stairwells.
Close contact maintained between team members.
Maximize tactical angles at every step.
Ballistic shield carried by the number 2-man or both. The number 2-man may lift shield to provide
overhead security if visibility and sector of fire permits.
Support team is made up of remaining personnel with sectors of fire upwards through the center
areas of stairwells or other danger areas (landings, windows, etc.).

63

Upon reaching each landing, follow-on team members are moved up and positioned for rear security
and cover. Similar to side-by-side method.

ASCENDING
DIRECTION

Upper
landing

Descending Stairs
It is recommended that buildings be cleared top to bottom thus allowing team members to move down
stairwells. The advantages include the principle elements of speed, surprise, and aggressive action.
Additionally this type of clearing provides:
Improved tactical angle. The view looking down stairwells reveals the tops of stairs, landings,
doorways, and balconies (the likely location of threats).
Increases chance of detecting booby traps.
Minimizes physical stress.
Gives threat flight option which assists in driving the threat out.
When descending stairwells:
One man provides cover down the stairwell.
The scout team carefully descends the stairwell until a secure or dominant position is reached.
Similar to the back-to-back and side-by-side technique.
Move over watch to cover new stairwell position.
Repeat descent to the next landing if necessary.
Whether ascending or descending stairs, check the stairwell doors before entry to ensure that they
allow the team to exit on any floor. Some fire stairs only allow you to exit on the ground floor.
Attics
An attic is a room or space located directly beneath the roof of a house. Attic entry points may be
anything from a hole in the ceiling, pull down stairs, to a finished stairway. Clearing an attic is an
extremely dangerous undertaking. Entering into a darkened and confined area. Assuming entry is
successful, team members must step from rafter to rafter with only -inch sheet rock separating them
from the room below. One missed step and they may crash into the room below or are trapped with
the lower body hanging in the room below.
Team members must be prepared to deal with extreme heat, cold, light, humidity, and pests (bats,
rodents, insects, etc) when clearing an attic.
The attic will be the last area cleared and requires preparation before entry unless extreme
circumstances exist and immediate assault is necessary.
It must be assumed that a threat seeking coverage in an attic was prepared for the assault, was
fearful, mentally disturbed, or a combination of those factors.
64

NOTE: Consideration should be given to breaching attic areas from the roof or lower level ceilings
rather than using existing access points to better exploit surprise, speed, and aggressive action.
Gable vents may be removed and used as an entry point versus breaching holes.
Employing diversionary devices/stun grenades into attics should be avoided when possible due to the
possibility of fire and falling debris.
Drop Ceilings
A drop ceiling is false ceiling suspended from the overhead construction by a series of wires and
ceiling tile frames. Because of their unique characteristics, it is impossible to safely place any weight
on the ceiling. There may be only a few inches or several feet between the drop ceiling and the
permanent ceiling. The team must assume the threat has the capability to drop from the ceiling and
assault the team anywhere the drop ceiling exists. All areas with drop ceilings must be secured until
clearing is complete. Clear drop ceilings after all other areas are cleared. This will require more
clearing personnel.
To clear drop ceilings tear down large sections of the ceiling to expose hiding places. Use a long
firemans pole to pull down the tile to prevent a threat from locating the teams position. The ceilings
suspension wires may have to be cut with wire cutters. Very often attic accesses and potential hiding
places will be revealed during clearing procedures.
Crawl Spaces
Crawl spaces are areas located directly beneath the lowest floor of the house when basements are
not present. This area often shares many of the same characteristics as the attic. Access into the
crawl space may be from the interior, exterior, or both. Clearing may be accomplished using the same
clearing methods as n attic clearing. The only difference being the team moves down or horizontally
into a hole.
Hides
Hides are well-concealed hiding positions from which a threat may observe and or fire on the team
without fear of detection. Military and civilian law enforcement M/O or sniper teams commonly use the
hide. However, hides are becoming popular amongst criminals for their illegal activities. Threat hides
have been used very effectively recently resulting in devastating casualties. Some threats even go as
far as placing aiming points (tape) within the hide to cover all entry and exit points, providing accurate
fire on those areas without direct observation.
Attempt to identify potential hide locations within and around your objective during planning. When the
threat selects a hide, he will look for a position with the following advantages:
Maximum concealment for extended periods.
Maximum fields of fire.
Cover (sandbags and or concrete).
Use available natural and man made obstacles.
Provide drainage, food, shelter, etc.
Provide escape (tunnels, obstacles, etc).
Expect hostile fire from a hide to come from:
Halls or other fatal funnels.
The crest of prominent terrain features.
Anywhere between attics to below street level.
Corners of buildings.
Behind walls.
65

Windows.
Loopholes.
Peak of a roof.
Crawl space.

Clear a hide.
Use extreme caution.
Assume the hide will be booby-trapped.
Avoid entry into obvious access points (consider breaching walls, ceilings, or floors to create entry
points).
Once the area appears secure, consider using EOD to assist.
Use chemical irritants, diversionary devices, or working dog to clear these areas.
Use maximum ballistic protection.
Use smoke or other concealment techniques.
Marking Procedures
When the objective is cleared, area should be marked to positively identify cleared rooms, medical
needs, and danger areas. This is to aid follow on entry or support team members. There is a variety
of marking methods to include chalk, tape, chemical lights, etc. The preferred method is to use
chemical lights.
A variety of chemical lights are available (IR, high intensity, multiple colors). Chemical lights can be
seen in a variety of conditions (light, dark, smoke, etc. ). Identify a color indicating your marking SOP.
Mark cleared rooms by placing a chemical light in the center of the doorway, on the floor, just inside
the room. Mark medical needs by placing a chemical light, a different color than room clearing, in the
vicinity of the wounded. Mark hazardous areas by placing a chemical light in the vicinity of the hazard,
being careful not to disturb IEDs (photocell, pressure sensitive, etc.).
Upon clearing the objective an immediate back clear should be conducted. Conduct the back clear in
the same manner, with the same tactical intensity, as the initial clearing process. The only difference is
you are now clearing the objective in reverse sequence. Back clear everything! Upon clearing previous
rooms marked with chemical lights, remark the room by kicking the chemical light from the doorway to
the center of the room.
Establish Phase Lines
Plan phase lines inside the building only when control measures must be implemented to reduce risks
and coordinate clearing operations. They are imaginary lines located throughout the objective used to
control movement, make stopping points, and confirm locations.
Reorganization upon completion of the mission
Upon completion of the mission the entry team leader and team members must conduct the following.
Assess the situation. Ensure that all areas are clear and all hazards are addressed (fires, structure
damage, etc.).
Security posture positions.
Account for personnel (team members, occupants, innocent bystanders, and threats).
Account for equipment and sensitive items.
Provide immediate medical needs if not already addressed.
Obtain an accurate account of the situation and actions of entry team members. What did you see
and hear? What use of force options were used?

66

Ensure occupants, innocent bystanders, and threats have been secured, silenced, searched,
segregated, safe guarded, and quickly moved (speed) to appropriate holding areas.
Contact the Threat Management Force Commander and provide a situation report. Request
further guidance (security or evacuation procedures, etc.).
Move entry team and occupants to coordination area within or near the objective. Maintain
security inside and outside the objective with M/O and or AST.

Emergency Reorganization
In the event of an emergency situation (IED, structure fire, explosion, overpowering fire from the
threat) entry team leader and team members take the same actions as described above.
Additionally:
Assess the situation. Attempt to fight through and clear the objective. Attempt to eliminate hazards
(structure fires, structure damage, etc.).
If attempt is not feasible or unsuccessful, move entry team to the secondary entry point or
emergency rally point.
Evacuation
Upon completion of reorganization procedures, the entry team leader will evacuate team members
and occupants. Make these actions part of your standard operating procedures. Conducting the
following:
Contact the M/O and or AST and verify the exit point(s) from the objective. Use prearranged
signals to confirm this location between teams. This is critical during low light conditions. No other
exit point(s) should be used during the evacuation to enhance security and minimizing confusion.
Upon successful completion of the entry team evacuation, have the M/O and or AST initiate their
evacuation plan.
Potential Hazards
These operations have the potential of being dangerous. Every SRT member must be capable of
identifying and properly reacting to various hazards. Each team must develop an SOP for
recommended response/reaction to these potential hazards. Examples include:
Fire. Started by any number of means. What is the responsibility of the SRT? Bring reasonable
fire fighting equipment to the entry point cache. Who must be evacuated in the event of a fire and
under what circumstances.
Animals. Dogs are the major concern here. The teams surprise, speed, and aggressive action
upon entry may deter these animals, however, this should not be counted on. The animal will
instinctively assume a fight or flight posture. When you enter the room where the animal has fled
to, and has nowhere else to go, it will have no choice but to fight. Use the Use of Force
continuum for guidance on this issue.
Household chemicals, corrosives, flammables, explosives, toxins, and waste is always present in
some form. Count on it! What will you do? Teams encountering clandestine labs cooking
methamphetamine drugs have encountered residue so powerful that one smell of the vapors has
killed and permanently maimed team members. Reports of simply stepping in the waste produced
by the process of manufacturing this drug has the capability of burning soles off of boots.
Structural integrity. What is the condition of the objective. How will smoke, diversionary devices,
and personnel movement effect the objective.

67

SECTION J

BASIC RAPPELLING
Terms used when working with rappelling rope.

Bight- A bend in the rope that does not cross itself.

Loop- A bend in the rope that does cross itself.
Half Hitch- A loop of rope that runs around an object, in such a manner that it locks itself.
Running End- the free end of the rope, which should be at the bottom of the tower.
Standing End- the static or anchor end of the rope.
Lay- The twist of the rope. Nylon ropes are made with a right hand lay.

Types of ropes used in rappelling.

Nylon- 3180 lbs., Diameter 7/16, stretches 1/3 its length.
Gold Line- 4400 lbs., Diameter 7/16, stretches 1/3 its length.
Kernmantel- 6500 lb, Diameter 7/16, stretches 1/3 its length.
Types of rappelling gear.

Military Snaplink- Vanadium steel, 2,000 lb, 0 with gate open.

Locking Snaplink- Aluminum, 5,000 lb,
Large locking Snaplink- 9,020 lb,
Rescue Figure 8- Alloy Aircraft aluminum and anodized.
10,000 lb,

Types of knots.

Anchor Knots:
Bowline: The bowline knot is used to tie a single fixed loop in the end of a rope. It does not slip
under strain and is easily untied. This knot is always used when there is alternating tension. It
can also be used to tie the end of a rope to an anchor

STEP 1. Bring the working end of the rope around the anchor, from right to left (as the rappeller faces
the anchor).
STEP 2. Form an overhand loop in the standing part of the rope (on the rappeller's right) toward the
anchor.
STEP 3. Reach through the loop and pull up a bight.
STEP 4. Place the working end of the rope (on the rappeller's left) through the bight, and bring it back
onto itself. Dress the knot down.
STEP 5. Form an overhand knot with the tail from the bight
Checkpoints.
(1) The loop is locked into place by a bight.
(2) The short portion of the bight is on the inside and on the loop around the anchor (or inside the
fixed loop).

68

Figure 8
Step 1. Use a length of rope long enough to go around the anchor, leaving enough rope to work
with.
Step 2. Tie a figure-eight knot in the standing part of the rope, leaving enough rope to go
around the anchor. To tie a figure-eight knot:
Form a loop in the rope
Wrap the working end around the standing part.
Route the working end through the loop.
The finished knot is dressed loosely.
Step 3. Place the working end around the anchor point.
Step 4. With the working end, insert the rope back through the loop of the knot in reverse.
Step 5. Keep the original figure eight as the outside rope and retrace the knot around the wrap
and back to the long-standing part.

Check points
(1)
At least 6 inches of rope extends past the figure-eight knot.
(2)
The original figure eight, tied with the standing end, remains as the outermost rope
throughout the knot.
(3)
The knot is dressed tightly.
Joining Knot
Square knot: The square knot is used to tie the ends of two ropes of equal diameter

Tying the Knot.

STEP 1. Holding one working end in each hand, place the working end in the right hand over the one
in the left hand.
STEP 2. Pull it under and back over the top of the rope in the left hand.
STEP 3. Place the working end in the left hand over the one in the right hand and repeat
STEP 4. Dress the knot down and secure it with an overhand knot on each side of the square knot.
Checkpoints.
(1) There are two interlocking bights.
(2) The standing parts are on the same side and properly secured with overhand knots.
Middle of the rope knot
Butterfly- The single butterfly knot is used to form a single, fixed loop in the middle of the rope without
69

using the ends. The butterfly can be used for the middleman in a rope party as well as in a
transport tightening system. The knot can be hard to untie when heavy weight has been placed
on it for extended periods.

Tying the Knot.

STEP 1. Form a loop over the palm of the left hand.
STEP 2. With the right hand, cross the two long-standing ends; reach under and grasp the bottom
of the loop formed in STEP 1.
STEP 3. Route the bottom of the loop over the crossed standing ends and back through the top of
the loop.
STEP 4. Hold the newly formed loop and dress the knot down, removing all of the slack out of the
knot.
Checkpoints.
(1) The wings of the knot are dressed down tightly and as close together as possible.
(2) The ropes between the wings are parallel with no crossovers.
(3) The loop is no larger than a helmet but large enough to accept a snaplink.
(3) All ropes in the knot are tightly dressed.
Special Purpose Knot
Prusik- Used as a sliding locking knot, for ascending and descending heights.

Tying the Knot.

STEP 1. Double the short rope, forming a bight, with the working ends even. Lay it over the long
rope so that the closed end of the bight is 30 centimeters (12 inches) below the long rope and the
remaining part of the rope (working ends) is the closest to the rappeller; spread the working end
70

apart.
STEP 2. Reach down through the 30-centimeter (12-inch) bight. Pull up both of the working ends
and lay them over the long rope. Repeat this process making sure that the working ends pass in the
middle of the first two wraps. Now there are four wraps and a locking bar working across them on
the long rope.
STEP 3. Dress the wraps and locking bar down to ensure they are tight and not twisted. Tie an
overhand knot with both ropes to prevent the knot from slipping during periods of variable tension.
Types of rappelling seats
Swiss Seat
Ranger Seat
Commercial Seat
Hook up procedures
Fatal hookups
West point
Three rope
Five rope

SECTION K
71

TEAM MEMBER RECOVERY

Introduction
Those personnel selected as a member of a Special Reaction Team have a great responsibility in
setting high standards not only in tactical operations but all areas of police work. Obviously, being
technically and tactically proficient is one of these challenges. First aid and recovery techniques are
good examples of some technical and tactical skills you as an SRT member must be highly proficient
at.
Several elements of team member recovery come to play.

Recommended personnel
Responsibilities of recovery elements
Tactical angles
Medical support
Negotiations

Threat
Sniper
Barricaded
IED
Bystanders/Lookouts
Cover Element

Trained marksman/observer
Team members laying down pin point fire
Provides intelligence

Recovery Element

Bearer- Responsible for providing cover fire, dragging, the injured.

Ballistic shield- Provide suppressive fire for team members while retrograding.
Team leader/Controller- Responsible for controlling the direction of the team.
Driver- Operating the vehicle, must be trained

Casualty Response

SRT members
Law Enforcement Personnel
Civilians
Children/Elderly

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Training

Formal preparation
Hands on training
Team member Extraction
First Aid
Physical Training

SOP

Save guarded
Set the standards
Identify problem areas that may slow the team down

Tactical Angles

The threats tactical angle on the team

Ballistic shield usage
Suspects position above yours
Cover fire/suppressive fire
Vehicle rescue

Negotiate

Attempt to negotiate, if it will buy the team time

Pin Point location of suspect(s)
Time is a factor Take Charge

Dont Rush In

Blindly attempting to rescue

Fighting back your emotions
Movement in urban terrain
Approach to down team member, using cover and concealment
Suppressive fire !!

Recovery Procedures

Seriousness of injuries, extract, helps him by using first Aid pouch on vest.
Disarm down team member, dont risk your life to recover the weapon.
EMT/Combat lifesaver evaluate team members injuries
SCOOP AND RUM

Medical Support

A must, medics assigned to the team, dont have to be in

law enforcement.

Continue the mission ??

Number of injured team members

73

Accomplishing the job is priority

Self First Aid
Psychologically fit, the will to survive
Secure/hold position if overwhelmed by suspect, using suppressive fire.

Tactical Fundamentals

Diversions
Cover Fire
Movement
Communication

Diversion

Divert suspect(s) attention away from the team

Def-Tec 25/UPCO 25
Smoke in open area

Cover Fire

Laying down cover fire

Not all team members will fire at once
Bearers will provide suppressive fire first, once they have reached the down team member they will
attempt to secure his/her weapon.
Ballistic shields will then return fire
Team leader will then direct the team back

SECTION L
Vehicle Assaults

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Vehicle Assaults typically occur as a result of one of two situations: 1.) Barricaded persons and
hostage situations to include undercover officer duress situations 2.) Law enforcement buy-bust type
operations. Vehicles pose different problems and tasks for tactical teams. It must be noted that it is
preferable to secure the suspect away from the vehicle. Vehicle assaults should be used as a last
result. Vehicle assaults are very aggressive tactics and should be considered an advanced skill.

Cover element: The Marksman/Observer Team is capable of delivering accurate fire. The
primary mission of the M/O Team is to provide pre-intelligence or on-scene intelligence to the
command group.

Assault element are the primary approach personnel to the vehicle and comprised of the
following:
(1) Assault personnel are responsible for rapidly neutralizing threats within the vehicle. These
personnel should be well-versed in extraction, weapons firing, and movement.
(2) The assault team should consist of 5 or more personnel as needed to support and conduct
the operation.
(3) Shield personnel are responsible for leading the assault element on final approach to the
vehicle and protecting the team from small arms fire.

Support element are responsible for assisting the assault element and can be broken down
into the following categories:
(1) Apprehension teams are comprised of at least two personnel (one cover/one search) for
securing and removal of suspects.
(2) K-9 teams are used in cooperation with the apprehension team in the event a suspect exits
the vehicle and attempts to elude capture.
(3) Blocking teams are used in cooperation with the assault team. The blocking team could use
other vehicles, terrain or other items to limit or forbid the suspect from moving the vehicle.
Blocking elements should be versed in pitting or ramming techniques. Drivers require
extensive training and ramming and pitting should only be used in extreme circumstances.
Any vehicle assaulted should be immobilized and prevented from escaping. This may
require the assault team to position blocking vehicles just prior to the assault. Those
blocking vehicles should be no further than 10 15 feet from the objective vehicle at the
beginning of the assault. Blocking vehicles should be positioned at the front and rear
bumper (no more than one foot away) to prevent the suspects from ramming their way out.
The assault team needs to be aware of the location of the blocking vehicles and be in their
final positions just after the blocking vehicles stop. That position will determine the final
positions assault element. The assault team may decide to ram the suspect vehicle; This is
performed by hitting the suspect vehicle with the front right (passenger side) quarter panel
of the assaulters vehicle directly centered against the right rear (passenger side) tire of the
suspect vehicle. Or using the front left (drivers side) quarter panel of the assaulters vehicle
directly centered against the left rear tire (drivers side). When hitting the suspects vehicle,
the front right corner of the assaulting vehicle should hit the center of the tire. If done
correctly, the suspects vehicle will be then moved, immobilized and the suspect in complete
state of confusion. The assault team needs to be prepared for the final resting position of
the suspect vehicle
Communication during vehicle assaults is critical. A position should be selected that allows the
team leader to see movement of the team and have the ability to communicate with all team
members. The team members making contact with the suspect should use simple plain
language. The suspect may be ordered to place their hands on their face. Identify words to
signify specific events such as yelling runner for occupants who bail out of the vehicle.
Another consideration is using specific terminology to specify removal of the keys to open the
trunk such as shield back.

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Approach to the vehicle should be made with the coverage of a ballistic shield and/or from a
blind spot when possible. Weapon position and the areas of responsibility will vary depending
on the assaulters location in the assault formation. The approach should be conducted in such
a manner that the assault element obtains their final positions smoothly.
Assaulters may have to approach from varied positions to include deployment by vehicle. If
deploying from a vehicle, team members should position themselves for rapid and easy
deployment.
The location of team members inside a van for instance, should be choreographed prior to
the assault with all assaulters understanding their responsibilities and duties to get to the
final position. Distance to the to the vehicle may be close. The reasons for this are to reduce
fratricide and the angle that the suspect may have to shoot at the team.
Windows pose a great disadvantage to assault and M/O Teams. Due to federal regulations,
front and rear windows are thicker than side windows and could cause bullet deflection. Many
bus windows have front and rear industrial strength (DOT) glass averaging inch to inch
thick. Engaging targets through that glass could cause the bullet to significantly deflect and
miss its target. The M/O team is limited in position selection. In order to see inside the bus, the
M/O must be perpendicular to the windows. Any other angle may reflect light. But in doing so,
the M/O team places themselves in a position that may compromise the operation. Longer
shots and more powerful weapons systems may be required. On smaller compact vehicles,
assaulters should position their weapons pointed down and into the vehicle ensuring that any
rounds fired would not strike other assaulters.
Breaching the vehicle may be required. The suspect(s) may elect to lock themselves in the
vehicle. The assault element may be required to breach the window or door and remove the
suspect. Door locks are typically located in two places in automobiles.
One type of lock release is located directly above the key insert hole on the door. The second
type of lock release is located near the interior door handle. A simple pre-intelligence check as
to what type of vehicle could indicate what type of lock and the location of that lock. This is
particularly important when conducting bus assaults. Different busses and other vehicles have
many different characteristics or ways to stop, open or otherwise gain access too. Information
regarding the type of bus will be instrumental in entering the bus.
Diversion devices may be used by the assault team and deployed shortly before the assault
team is in their final positions. The placement of the device is characteristically on the hood of
the vehicle. Throwing the device under the vehicle places the device near gas lines and
detonation under the vehicle may not impact (noise and flash) the suspect(s) psychologically or
physiologically.
The assault team needs to be prepared to cut the seat belt from the suspect(s). An assaulter
should be holstered while pulling the suspect from the objective. During the removal, it must be
assumed that the suspect is going to resist. Efforts should be made to not only control the
threat but to avoid interfering with the firing positions of other assaulting members.
(1) Suspects/victims can be removed one at a time or multiple personnel at once (depending on
the situation and threat level), taken to a secure area. This concept removes the suspect
from potential hazards near the vehicle being assaulted then turned over to a support team.
The support team could be used to remove the suspect from the vehicle if necessary. This
may be the case if injury or pursuit reduces the assault team.
(2) Unlike a felony traffic stop, the assault element is in close proximity to the vehicle and
personnel securing the suspect should directly control all movements made by the suspect.
The use of OC, pressure point control techniques and gas delivery prior to the assault.
Searching the vehicle: Visually checking the passenger compartment may not be suitable. If the
assault member is able to visually check the front and rear compartment with no obvious
threats, the team does not have to enter the vehicle. If this is the case, the vehicle trunk
should be of great concern and checked immediately.
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After the initial contact by the assault element, the team should slow the process using clear
verbal commands to first search the front seat, then the back and finally the truck. The vehicle
should be sectored for search. New federal law requires new vehicles to have a glow in the
dark safety release located in the trunk.
(1) For buy/bust operations, when possible, prepare the vehicle for the impending assault. If
using a law enforcement vehicle, choose carefully a four-door vehicle that has large
windows, Manual lock and windows (no tinting).
(2) Remember to get a second similar vehicle for rehearsals. The operation may require the
team to do nothing to the vehicle.
Careful consideration and detailed planning should associate every vehicle assault operation.
(1) Position the vehicle for the best tactical approach. Take into consideration the M/Os fields
of fire. Select a predetermined target area where the vehicle may stop or will be stopped.
(2) While conducting drug-related operations, two or more vehicles may be used to block the
suspect and prevent further movement. The vehicles collapse forward and rearward onto
the suspect auto at which time the assault element moves to the objective. The law
enforcement vehicles should be placed in such a manner that the mobility of the suspect is
eliminated. The blocking vehicles can be use to deliver assaulters. Many suspects position
their vehicle in large open areas to see in all directions. Suspects also will not hesitate to
conduct transactions in largely populated areas. If an undercover buy is to happen, it should
take place with safety being the primary concern.
(3) The assault element may use natural terrain such as ditches; downed trees or other
structures to limit suspect mobility. Spotlights, flashlights and other illumination methods
may be used during the assault to enhance vision and officer safety and blind the suspect.
Ladders, milk crates or other items may be required for large sport utility vehicles or buses.
Weapons:
Weapon selection for these techniques should include long guns, pistols, sub-machine guns,
less lethal munitions and the various other types of munitions.
Weapon types and positions will vary depending on the objective. The team leader may want to
consider some team members carrying long guns while some others carry pistols. Especially
during bus or some SUV assaults, weapon position of assaulters on the outside of the bus
looking through the windows from the outside should be considered. Penetration factors should
also be taken into consideration.
L Shaped assaults: The L shaped vehicle assault will consist of a 5-6-person element The L
shape formation allows team members to quickly engage an adversary with low probability of
crossfire. The L shape assault should be used on smaller vehicles. One of the primary goals of the
team should be to remove the suspects first, then non-participants.
Once the team begins movement and deploys a diversion device, the team will position
themselves close to the vehicle in a L type formation.
The forward security (#1 in the formation typically a shield bearer and armed with a handgun)
will move directly to the front door and position themselves in such a manner so that the shield
acts as a block to the drivers/passenger side door. The final position of the shield may be
beyond the front of the door looking down in through the front windshield or directly in adjacent
to the door. One of the objectives of the shield is draw fire away from team members not
carrying a shield. The team leader must be aware of the limited ability of a shield bearer to
accurately engage targets through the small view port of the shield. This requires the #2 person
to accurately engage threats.
The next person (#2 in the formation and armed with a handgun) will be responsible for suspect
security and threat engagement. This team member normally deploys a distraction device prior
to the team deployment. If a shooting is going to occur, it will often occur with in the first few
seconds of the assault. This person (#2) will be one of the primary shooters in the event lethal
force is needed. The final position of the #2 person is on the driver/passenger side door where
77

the suspect is located. This team member needs to ensure that their body is squared off to the
door maximizing body armor, allowing for a more precise shot and coverage of tactical angles.
The #2 person should breach the vehicle in order to surprise the suspect and extract the
suspect shortly after the breach. As the #2 person approaches they should break the window
using a window punch, crow bar, expandable baton or other breaching tool.
The next person (#3 in the formation and armed with a handgun) will be responsible for suspect
security and threat engagement. This person will also be one of the primary shooters. The #3
persons final position is to the rear door or back seat area of the vehicle. This team member
needs to ensure that their body is squared off to the door or back seat area maximizing body
armor, allowing for a more precise shot and coverage of tactical angles. The #3 person should
be aware of breaching techniques and suspect extraction. As the #3 person approaches, they
may break the window to immediately distract the suspects attention or call for the # 4 person
to cover while they conduct the extraction. The #3 assaulter may be used for the breach and/or
extraction.
The next person (#4 in the formation and armed with a sub-gun or long gun) will position
himself or herself at the rear of the vehicle position on the same side of the flanking assault
team, to the left or right of the rear blocking vehicle (if used). This position allows the team
leader to use #4 as a cover officer for suspect removal. The #4 person needs to be familiar
with breaching, seatbelt removal and suspect extraction. In the event the vehicle needs to be
breached, #4 to come forward on command from the #2 or #3 assaulter and provide cover.
The next person (#5 in the formation and armed with a sub-gun or long gun) will take a position
adjacent to the rear compartment of the suspect vehicle. The #5 person (typically the team
leader) will position themselves at the rear of the vehicle position opposite of the flanking
assault team left or right of the rear blocking vehicle (if used). This position allows for command
and control of the assault element. After the suspects have been removed, the team leader will
instruct the remaining team members to search the front seat, back seat and finally the trunk
area of the vehicle. If there is no need to physically enter the vehicle dont, until the trunk has
been checked. Instruct one of the team members to remove the keys for access to the trunk.
The team leader will instruct the shield bearer to move to the rear area of the vehicle ensuring
the shield stays between the vehicle and team members. At which time the trunk will be
opened and cleared by remaining team members. Team members should make every attempt
stay behind the trunk area to reduce possible crossfire. The trunk key should be inserted using
the shield as ballistic protection as much as possible. This team member can act as a flank
security element in the event suspects attempt to exit the vehicle on the opposite side of the
primary assault location.
If a #6 person is available, #6 will position themselves at the rear of the vehicle. The #6 person
can assist the team leader in any way necessary or assist in removal, securing, breaching,
employment of less lethal, gas, or handling any suspects etc.

U Shaped assaults: The U shaped vehicle assault will consist of an 8 or more person element.
The other two-team members could be used as a chase team or for other support deemed necessary
by the team leader. The U shape formation allows team members to quickly engage an adversary
and remove an adversary, however, this technique has an increased possibility of crossfire. Suspects
will make the determination to resist shortly after the team is in place.
Two forward security (#1 in the formation typically a shield bearer and armed with a
handgun) officers will position themselves in such a manner so that the shields act as a
block to the drivers/passenger side doors. The final position of the shields will be beyond
the front of the doors looking down in through the front windshield on both sides of the
vehicle. One of the objectives of the shields is draw fire away from team members not
carrying shields. The team leader must be aware of the limited ability of shield bearers to
accurately engage targets through the small view port of the shield. This requires the #2 on
either side of the vehicle to accurately engage threats.
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The next team members (#2 on both side of the vehicle and armed with handguns) will be
responsible for suspect security and threat engagement. This team member can carry
diversion devices. If a shooting is going to occur, it will probably occur with in the first few
seconds of the assault. This person (#2) will be one of the primary shooters in the event
lethal force is needed. The final position of the #2 person is on the flank sides door where
the suspect is located. This team member needs to ensure that their body is squared off to
the door maximizing body armor, allowing for a more precise shot and coverage of tactical
angles. The #2 person can breach the vehicle in order to surprise the suspect and suspect
extraction. The # 2 person will call for the #4 person to cover as they remove the suspect.
The next people (#3 on both sides of the vehicle and armed with handguns) will be
responsible for suspect security and threat engagement. If a shooting is going to occur, it
will occur with in the first few seconds of the assault. This person will be one of the primary
shooters in the event lethal force is needed. Both #3 persons final positions is to the rear
door or back seat area of the vehicle. Both team members need to ensure that their body is
squared off to the door or back seat area maximizing body armor, allowing for a more
precise shot and coverage of tactical angles. The #3 person should be aware of breaching
techniques and suspect extraction.
The next team members (#4 in the formation and armed with a sub-gun or long gun) will
position themselves at the rear of the vehicle position directly behind the #3 person to the
side of the blocking vehicle. This position allows the team leader to use #4 as a cover officer
for suspect removal. The #4 person needs to be familiar with breaching, seatbelt removal
and suspect extraction. In the event the vehicle needs to be breached, #4 to come forward
on command from the #2 or #3 assaulter and provide cover.
The Team Leader will take a position suitable to observe the operation and maintain
command and control. If needed (#5 in the formation) will take a position adjacent to the
rear compartment of the suspect vehicle when blocking vehicle is not used. The team leader
will instruct the remaining team members to search the front seat, back seat, and finally the
trunk area of the vehicle. The team leader will instruct one of the team members to remove
the keys for access to the trunk. The team leader will instruct the shield bearers to move to
the rear area of the vehicle ensuring the shield stays between the vehicle and team
members. On the signal, the trunk will be opened and cleared by remaining team members.
Team members should make every attempt stay behind the trunk to reduce possible
crossfire. The trunk key should be inserted using both shields as ballistic protection as much
as possible.

Bus assaults. Careful consideration should be given to school buses due to the children and the
unpredictability of those childrens response to an assault.
Team assignments for both types of buses include the following:
(1) Driver Cover (#1) This officer will be responsible for neutralizing the driver whether the
driver was a suspect or not; in the assault element entering the bus or may be required to
neutralize the suspect from the outside. This concept keeps the bus from going mobile once
team members are on board. Shooting, laying, tackling, restraining or any other control
measure needed to subdue the driver and prevent the bus from moving could accomplish
this. After the assault element has obtained secure positions, the #1 will move to the outside
of the bus near the primary door and await evacuation procedures from #5.
(2) Controller [Passenger side-cover and the Team Leader (#2)] Member of the assault team,
upon entry moves to the drivers side of the cab and covers the drivers side seating row.
Carries a sub-gun or some type/form of long gun for accurate fire at greater distances. This
team member maintains a strict field of fire on the passenger side of the inner compartment.
This places the team leader in a position to see the events on the inside of the bus. The TL
positions themselves in a location where they have command and control inside the bus and
an assistant team leader on the outside where most of the operation can be viewed. The
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team leader will give all verbal commands. This team member has to be quite accurate with
their assigned weapon. They may be required to fire while the runners/walkers are moving
down the center isle of the bus. Once the assault team begins to move into the bus verbal
are as follows: Freeze do not move, take all instruction from me, (calming down phase),
slowly interlace your fingers behind your head, place your forehead on the seat in front of
you, is anyone injured or need medical attention, is there anything or anyone on the bus that
may harm us, at this time evacuation procedures would begin.
(3) Passenger side-cover (#3) Member of the assault team, upon entry clears the passenger
side of the cab. Carries a sub-gun or some type/form of long gun for accurate fire at greater
distances. This team member will maintain a strict field of fire on the passengers side of the
inner compartment. This team member has to be quite accurate with their assigned weapon.
They may be required to fire while the runners are moving down the center isle of the bus
and pinning a potential threat.
(4) Runner/Walker (#4)- Armed with a pistol, the runner/walker moves into the bus after breach
and runs the center isle and secure the bus. The runner/walker are members who run
the center isle and neutralize threats. After running the center isle on the primary assault,
those same team members become walkers; Walkers will then remove suspects/innocents
on the direction of the team leader from front first or from the rear depending on threat
location. These team members are armed with pistols and are extremely well versed in
shooting techniques (such as shooting on the move and small target engagement).
(5) Breacher and Runner/Walker (#5) Armed with a pistol, Guarantees entry point for assault
team is open and clear of obstructions. Breacher may throw additional flash bangs. The
breacher will also be used as runner/walker. The runner/walker moves into the bus after
breach and runs the center isle and secure the bus. The runner/walker will move down
the center of the bus and engage threats as necessary. This team member is armed with a
pistol and is extremely well versed in shooting techniques (such as shooting on the move
and small target engagement).
(6) Ladder/flanking teams: Other cover team members (#6 through 10 armed with pistols or
Sub-guns)- Take positions on the side of the bus looking into the bus. This technique
requires an elevation system (such as a ladder/one man lift/another vehicle) to get into
position. Depending on the size of the bus, officers will position themselves on the door
side of the bus, stand on an elevated platform, and neutralize threats as necessary. These
team members should be armed with pistols and very well verse in precision shooting skills,
shooting through glass and movement techniques. As many as six people may be needed
to perform this function. These team members can be used for support after the
Runner/Walkers have moved through the bus.
(7) After the runner/walkers have moved through the ladder teams area of responsibility within
the bus, these team members are not longer needed flank positions and are used as
support members to remove and secure personnel from the bus. Once the runners/walkers
have reached the back of the bus, the #5 person will become a walker and slowly move
back to the front looking additional threats. Once the #5 has reached the front, the team
leader will have the #5 begin to remove one person at a time. The #5 will pass each person
on the bus to the #1 then to other assaulters for securing.
(8) Diversionary officer and assistant team leader (#11) Employs the diversionary device and
responsible for diverting the attention of the suspect away from the assault team and usually
on the opposite side of the breach point to divert the suspects attention away from the
assault element.
(9) Engine disabler (#12) Turns off the rear engine cutoff switch and provides security from
the rear passenger side windows until team enters. This team member should be dedicated
to this specific job.
(10) Air system disabler (#13) Disables air tanks by hitting the bleed valve, which forbids
the vehicle from moving. After the air system is off this officer may serve another function.
This team member should be dedicated to this specific job.
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(11) Marksman/Observer (#14) Moves to a position perpendicular to the bus (reducing

round deflection and glare) and provides on-scene intelligence or lethal fire in coordination
to an assault. The marksman could be used as part of the assault element.
(12) Support personnel These personnel could assist in securing personnel removed from
the bus, area security, or any other function deemed necessary by the team leader.
Gathering Intel for buses includes the following (this is best provided by certified mechanics:
(1) Bus type (transit or school) and dimensions/construction.
(2) Best fields of fire for the M/O team.
(3) Location of all turn off valves and switches (mechanic assistance).
(4) Location of doors and how they are opened (manually or hydraulics).
(5) All suspect information to include weapons or explosives.
(6) Are there air vents on the roof (if gas is deployed).
(7) Obtain a similar bus.
(8) Height of windows, doors, and vents.
Systems:
(1) Air system Usually located forward of the rear axle. Will be several tanks, target the lowest
or most rearward tank. Use sledge to knock off bleed valve on the bottom of the tank. This
bleeds the entire air systems thus disabling the front door. This will also lock up the brakes
limiting the vehicles mobility. The bus will drop about 3 inches when air bleeds. On some
buses, a switch used to bleed the bus will be located under the steps leading into the bus.
(2) Engine Not all buses are the same. On some buses you can lift the rear engine cover, the
cover spring is operated with no latch. In the upper right (passenger side area) there are
three switches, two are side by side and are labeled Start, ignition, or engine. The two
switches side by side are to be placed in the off position; these shuts down the engine and
can not be restarted. A pre-intelligence check should be done to verify the exact location of
these switches. Different manufactures design different bus models and types. Be sure to
obtain current information about disabling the engine.
(3) Front (main door) Once air is bled, grab weather seal in the center and pull. The door will
open easily. A hooligan tool or similar device could be used to break the glass on the door
then used to pull the locking arm to the door. Obtain intelligence in the event the bus doors
are equipped with an alarm. Disabling the alarm may be required prior to or during the
operation.
a. School buses have many different doors, some open in the middle, some lock from the
inside.
b. A pre-intelligence check should be done to identify the type of door so the breacher
knows what instruments or technique will be required to open the door/windows.
(4) Rear doors The rear doors on transit buses may are electronic and cannot be opened
from the outside. On some of the transit buses, Inside, just above the rear door is a small
latch, open it and pull the red handle. After securing the bus, this door could be used to
evacuate personnel from the bus.
(5) Emergency exit windows Some windows on the bus are emergency exit windows. These
windows can only be opened from the inside are released by orange handles. The handles
are pulled and the windows can be pushed out.
Roof emergency exits Some buses have two emergency exits on the roof or floor, opened
only from the inside pulls the red handles and lift to open.
If the bus is mobile the team should wait till the bus stops. The pursuit/deployment vehicle
should accommodate the entire team so that a quick exit is possible. The block should occur at
a pre-designated location and the location should be prepared by pre-positioning the assault
team, cover teams, and support personnel. The bus should then be immobilized rapidly by the
team and should be done in an area that is secured by LE. Chase and ram vehicles could be
used to slow the bus and block escape by using larger vehicles. The draw back to this method
is the limited time to set perimeters and control the situation. Dissemination of information could
become difficult by LE. Ramming takes extensive training. Ramming the bus as a diversion to
81

knock the suspect (s) off balance while the bus is stationary could be considered. This is done
by physically ramming the bus to disorientate the suspect. Consideration should also be given
to removing the bus from the area after the assault. Coordination and points of contact should
be established prior to the assault.
(1) Spike strips can be used to remove air from the tires but may not stop the bus. New
electronic pulse technology should always be researched in the pursuit of stopping vehicles.
(2) Consideration should be given if the tires are to be flattened to the removal of the bus after
the situation is over, the bus will have to be removed by a large tow vehicle.
Another option is to choose a secure location and used then physically stop the bus. This
allows for perimeters to be established and controlled. The team should carefully review this
idea; Injuries to passengers could be high if the bus is forced from the roadway.
Ensure the below listed items are mentioned to the students as the animation displays. All
attempts should be made make sure students understand that the animation displayed is not
the only way or method to assault a bus. This is but one way used by some organizations.
Different scenarios (explosives, multiple suspects) are going to require different responses and
actions taken by the assault element.
(1) Get intelligence from M/O of suspect(s) position just before assault.
(2) Move to the objective using cover and concealment (blind spots) Using blind spots, cover
and concealment. It may be difficult for the suspect to see the team moving along side the
bus due to the elevated position the suspect may be in. The team should move along side
the bus ensuring that they stay close to the bus. Deploy flash-bangs as needed Distracting
the suspects attention away from the assault element.
(3) Ladder Teams move into position and neutralize threats.
(4) Assault team moves to breach point and other security positions.
(5) Disable the engine Turn Switches.
(6) Disable air tanks Knock off valve.
(7) Break and rake older model bus windows to distract.
(8) Breach the objective Using necessary means.
(9) Enter breach point.
(10) Neutralize threats.
(11) Maintain strict fields of fire Each team member of the entry element needs to identify
and maintain strict fields of fire.
(12) Clear the bus Done by runners/walkers.
(13) Use clear verbal commands Done by the team leader.
(14) Remove one person at a time through front and rear doors from the front to the back.
All people searched cuffed and secured by support team.

ANNEX A
SAMPLE
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SPECIAL REACTION TEAM SOP

I.

Purpose: To establish a planning guide for initial actions in situations involving barricaded
criminals and mentally disturbed persons with or without hostages, sniper incidents, threatened
suicides, combating terrorism operations, drug raids, warrant apprehension of dangerous
individuals, and protective services mission.

II.

A special threat is any situation involving a sniper, barricaded subject(s), terrorist activity, or
hostage taker(s) that is beyond the capability of normal police equipment, manpower or
training.

III.

The safety of hostages and their eventual release without injury must be the basis for plans and
actions taken during a special threat situation. Apprehension must be subordinate to hostage
safety. Specially trained personnel can gain the neutralization of offenders with a minimum risk
to bystanders and law enforcement personnel only through the application of a well thought out
plan.

IV.

Responsibilities.
A. SRT Commander:
1. Selects personnel for special reaction team based on the recommendation of the team
leader.
2. Prepares SRT for operations.
3. Trains SRT with existing law enforcement personnel.
4. Positions SRT in a high-risk situation as needed.
5. Ensures all sections of support personnel are notified when SRT is alerted.
B. Traffic Section:
1. Provides barricades to seal off threat areas.
2. Establishes traffic control around the threat area.
3. Provides on-duty, as well as off-duty, personnel to support mission.
C. Commander:
1. Provides special equipment as required.
2. Monitors SRT training.
3. Provides operations officer with a current roster of qualified personnel for SRT.
D. Investigation Branch:
Conducts an ongoing investigation during the special threat and complete the investigations
after the threat is resolved.

V.

Concept of operation:
A. Upon notification that a special threat situation exists:
1. The desk sergeant will direct necessary patrols to seal off the threat area and keep
all other patrols actively patrolling MEVAs.
2. All patrols arriving on the scene will take the following actions:
83

a. Take cover and isolate the threat area.

b. Evaluate the situation and report to the MP desk.
c. Obtain as much information as possible.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Objective of the hostage taker is possible.

Number, name, description(s), and injuries of the hostages taken.
Location of the hostages and hostage taker, building, floor, room, if possible.
Types of weapons and number of weapons in the possession of the hostage
taker or subject.
(5) What, if any, the hostage takers demands are.
3. The desk sergeant will notify the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Provost marshal.
CID.
SRT commander/members.
EOD.

4. The threat management force (TMF) commander will immediately proceed to the
threat area and take charge of the situation. The TMF command post should be
established at a vantage point close to the threat area. The TMF Commander should
ensure that the following actions are taken:
a. The threat area is sealed off using law enforcement patrols for the outer
perimeter. The SRT cover element establishes the inner perimeter.
b. The subject(s) are contained.
c. Bystanders are removed from the threat area.
d. Roads to the threat area are barricaded.
B. Upon arrival of the SRT, the team will fall under the direct control of the TMF.
C. Ensure standby assistance has been requested from:
1. Hospital.
Possible injuries to be treated.
Ambulance and medics on standby, ect.
2. Department of engineering and housing (DEH).
3. Fire department.
D. Consider the possible courses of action.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Containment (isolates and waits).

Negotiation.
Cutting off utilities.
Denial of food, drink, etc.
Use of Non-Lethal resources.
a. Flash bang device.
b. Chemical agents.
c. munitions
6. Select marksman fire.
7. Coordinated assault.
84

VI.

Courses of action need not be used individually or in any specific order, but will follow the below
guidelines.
A. Time is on the side of Law Enforcement.
B. If negotiations fail, protection of human life must constitute the first priority in formulating any
strategy. When the decision to use direct firepower is made, it must be centralized,
coordinated, and controlled by the TMF Commander. Minimum force will be used in
accordance with appropriate use of force guidelines.
C. Hostage negotiations.
1. The hostage negotiator will be course graduate from a hostage negotiations course, IAW
AR 190-58.
2. The hostage negotiator will consider the following points.
a. Never agree to the offenders demands without something in return.
b. Keep the offender in the decision making process.
c. A demand for weapons or ammunition for the exchange for a hostage will be denied.
These points are not negotiable.
3. Negotiations should be opened only after the situation has stabilized.
4. Make the subject feel important and show a genuine interest in his situation.
5. As far as the negotiations are concerned, all areas are negotiable. While the negotiator
strives to establish a conversation with the subject and keep the subject talking, the
subject will frequently make demands. All demands and other significant information will
be reported immediately to the on-site commander for a decision and/or further
instructions.

VII.

Use of deadly force.

A. The Provost marshal or TMF Commander should have the delegated authority to select the
course of action to be taken.
B. Under the use of force regulation, members of the SRT may use deadly force to protect their
lives or the life of someone else, in accordance with appropriate use of force guidelines.

VIII.

Logistics.
A. The following weapons, munitions and accessories will be maintained by the SRT.
1. Four sniper rifles with scopes IAW current doctrine and issue.
2. Night observation and illumination devices.
3. Binoculars
4. Noise flash diversion device (M84 stun grenade, etc.) 5. CS grenade (bursting).
6. Pistol, 9mm (M9)
7. M16A2 rifle or M4
8. Rifle, M21 or M24
9. Grenade Launcher, 40mm (M203)
10. Shotgun, M12, Lethal
11. Shotgun, M12, Non-Lethal
B. SRT uniforms and equipment.
1. High intensity flashlight / chemical lights.
85

2. Gloves, Nomex and work.

3. Eye protection, ballistic.
4. Battle dress uniform (various patterns).
5. Light weight boots.
6. Flex cuffs and hand irons.
10. Mirror inspection, expandable.
12. Door wedge.
13. Tactical load bearing vest.
14. Body armor (minimum of IIA)
15. Helmet
16. Nomex hood
17. Elbow and knee pads
C. SRT entry equipment.
1. Ballistic shield, Level IIIA or IV.
2. Sledge hammer.
3. Claw hammer.
4. Bolt cutters.
5. Crow bar.
6. Ladder, folding and straight.
7. Grappling hook (must have a minimum of 3 biting hooks).
8. Rappelling rope.
9. Snap link (locking).
10. Rappelling seats or harness.
11. Door harpoon.
12. T-bar and J-hook window extractors.
13. 1000 ml IV bags for explosive breaching of doors.
14. Flash bang device.
NOTE: Quantities of the above items will be based on the commands needs and availability of items.
D. SRT configuration and weapons assignment.
1. Entry team.
a. Team leader.
(1) Pistol 9-mm
(2) M4 rifle, MP5 submachine gun or M12 shot
gun.
b. Entry members (3).
(1) Pistol 9-mm
(2) M4 rifle, MP5 submachine gun or M12 shotgun.
c. Foward Security.
(1) Pistol 9-mm.
(2) M4 rifle, MP5 submachine gun, or M12 shot
gun.
NOTE: The selection of rifle or shotgun will be made on a case by case basis. Each mission dictates
or as selected by the team leader based upon threat assessment and potential for collateral damages
and fractricide.
IX.

Cover team.
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A. Marksman.
1. Pistol 9-mm
2. Sniper rifle (M24).
B. Observer.
1. Pistol 9-mm,
2. M16A2/M4 with M203 grenade launcher.
X.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

SRT members roles and responsibilities.

A. SRT OIC
Develops SRT training
Coordinates/supervises
Develops SOP
Conducts quarterly evaluations
Prepares AARs
Reports to provost marshal
B. Team Leader (NCOIC)
1.
Organization / supervision
2.
Assist in developing SOP
3.
Execute / record training
4.
Develop preplanning strategies
5.
Acquire equipment
6.
Plan and execute assaults
7.
Controls entry and cover element
8.
Assists in preparing AARs
9. Determining special needs
10. Other duties as assigned
C. Entry team members responsibilities
1. Skilled in:
2. Weapons proficiency
3. Building clearing
4. Maintain high level of physical fitness
5. Assist in planning / rehearsal
6. Conduct reconnaissance
7. Rappelling
8. Breaching
9. Employment of less lethal
10. Provide security during movement and clearing
11. Assume duties as team leader
12. Serve as forward / rear security
13. Carry additional equipment
14. Additional duties as directed
A. Marksman and Observer. Provide coverage for the entry team and are recorders for the
situation.
1. Take up predetermined positions and maintain surveillance on subject area and report to
the team leader at CP.
2. Provide intelligence on the subject area and information to the team leader while in the
surveillance mode.
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3. Neutralize, by select fire, a person whom if not removed by firing poses an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily harm against another person. The observer will serve
as back up for the marksman and employ pyrotechnics needed for cover and
apprehension.
4. Provide cover for the SRT entry element, recon, and personnel inside the perimeter
during movement.
5. Record all pertinent information in regards to SRT operations.
XI.

Training.
A. Training is essential to the mission performance of the SRT in responding to crises. SRT
members must be afforded adequate time to conduct training and will be tested at least
semiannually using varied scenarios in day and night operations. Evaluations will include
an alert assembly, issue of equipment, and operational briefing, a practical exercise, and
debriefing. Evaluation results will be kept on file for one year.
B. All training of SRT should be documented and placed on a training forecast as well as each
team members individual training record documenting all training received by team
members. All SRT members will familiarize monthly and qualify quarterly with their
assigned weapons. Periodic use of a weapons stress course is required. This will include
running, firing rapidly, and firing from varied and different positions.
C. SRT marksman will be familiarized monthly and qualify every 60 days. Qualification will be
at 100 meters using match grade, 2-inch bullseye,5 hits out of 5 shots. Marksman
qualification will be documented by the team leader and certified by the installation PM.
D. Training forecast will be set up and approved one year in advance with quarterly and
monthly forecasting. The training forecast should reflect training in areas of weakness as
well as regular training required by doctrine and local regulations. Training documents
should be updated and replaced to keep abreast of the most current tactics. See SOP 15
through 15. If training is cancelled, an MFR is prepared and make-up date indicated.

XII.

Criteria for team selection. Team selection is critical and members should meet rigid
requirements.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

XIII.

Military police/ Law Enforcement representatives.

Physically fit.
Mentally stable.
Mature.
Able to lead and follow.

Phase development of crisis management.

A. Preplanning phasebefore a situation develops:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Train.
Develop standing operating procedures.
Identify potential problem areas.
Develop contingency plans emphasizing potential problem areas.
Identify intelligence requirements and potential problem areas.
Develop general tactical plans for resolving high-risk situations.
Command and control considerations.
a. Chain of command.
88

b. Command post.
c. Communications.
8. Logistics requirements should consider the need for food, water, and special gear during
sustained operations.
9. Initiate liaison and coordination with other units and services.
10. Tactical preparation/SRT triangle.
a. Shooting skills.
b. Tactics.
c. Mental/Physical conditioning.
B. Immediate action phase.
1. Initial military response.
a. Protect and seal off the affected area.
b. Give warning by radio or other appropriate means.
c. Request back up military police units based on tactical assessment.
d. Make necessary notifications.
e. Seize control of environment and slow down.
f. Contain as long as needed and reduce level of tension.
g. Isolate the affected area completely from the rest of the installation.
h. Establish a solid perimeter control system with a positive entry control point.
(1) An inner perimeter is established for suspect containment.
(2) Outer perimeter and entry control points are established for traffic and personnel
control.
i. Key areas of concern when establishing perimeter control are:
(1) Readjusting the inner perimeter to include at least one square block to ensure the
suspect is still secured and to control entry and exit into the perimeter.
(2) Setting up outer perimeter to ensure that anyone not directly involved in the
incident is sent away and out of danger and that traffic control is maintained to
route the normal flow of traffic around the threat scene.
(3) Evacuating installation personnel within the danger/threat area zone.
j.

Establish command post.

1. The emergency operations center is the standard installation operations center. It
is the primary link between the installation and higher headquarters.
2. The on-site command post is established as the installation commanders rally
point for all responding forces. It is near the threat scene but far enough away
from the incident for safety. The following should be considered when selecting
a suitable OSCP and establishing control.
3. Establishing a staging area for fire and hospital personnel as well as vehicles
used by military police.
4. Establish communications with all personnel at the scene and at the emergency
operations center.
5. Setting up a separate frequency is desirable for command operations and for
avoiding unnecessary radio traffic at the scene.
6. Requesting assistance from the public affairs office to handle and cooperate with
the press on the outer perimeter to avoid the presence of rumors.
7. The need for SRT briefing and deployment.
8. The need for on-site command post security, limitation of entry, and number of
personnel. Consideration must be given to accessibility to responding units.
9. The need for mapping out the inner and outer perimeter.
89

10. The need for maintaining a separate log or blotter which must include the
location of the incident, responding forces and actions taken by:
11. Military police to include apprehensions of suspect(s).
12. Requests.
k. Notifications.
l. Time of initial response.
m. Time of on-site command post activation and deactivation.
n. Briefing of specialized units such as EOD, MPI, and CID.
2. Planning phase.
a. Analyze situation and plan use of time.
b. Determine strategy based on details concerning suspect(s) and hostages.
c. Develop tactical approach.
d. Determine resources needed.
e. Issue SRT warning order. Stress the use of force (AR 190-14).
f. Develop intelligence through research and reconnaissance.
g. Sectorize the affected building for target identification and ease of relaying information
concerning movement within the affected area.
h. Complete detailed plans based upon all available information and issue SRT
operations order.
i. Inspect and rehearse immediate action drills, approach, position, entry, and search
procedures.
j. Deploy SRT for assault or raid.
3. Execution phase.
a. Continue to control the environment.
b. Negotiate (not a tactical function).
c. Raid / deploy SRT using a cover element.
(1) Approach using all available cover and concealment.
(2) Position members to provide 360-degree security.
(3) Enter at highest possible level, ensure coordinated fields of fire, and expose as
little of the body as possible for the minimum amount of time.
d. Search in a systematic pattern.
4. Post execution phase.
a. Conduct debriefing of all SRT members.
b. Prepare after-action report to include lessons learned.
XIV.

SRT marksman / sniper responsibilities.

A. General. To provide highly accurate direct firepower at a suspect or location. Provides
cover for the inner perimeter, installation hostage negotiator, and the SRT.
B. Specific responsibilities.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Find a suitable location as the situation dictates.

Have all necessary equipment before departing the on-site command post.
Check equipment prior to leaving the CP.
Work with the observer to over-watch all windows, doors, etc., where suspects might
appear.
90

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Advise the observer when he/she is fatigued so they can switch functions or obtain
relief from the CP.
Make sure SRT members, upon entry to objective, are not silhouetted against
windows, doors, or the skyline.
Know the signal code for receiving fire control from the team leader.
Chemical agents will not be used until it has been established that the objective is
occupied and the suspect(s) has refused to negotiate or exit.
Attempt to ascertain if chemical agents would be harmful to anyone other than the
suspect inside the location.
Have fire-fighting apparatus standing by at the CP.
Formulate plan for launching chemical agents (hand, gun, location, timing, etc.).
Check wind direction.
Shut off all utilities if possible.
Maintain communications with the TMF or other command personnel authorized to
issue deadly force options.

YEARLY FORECAST
MONTH

SUBJECT
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February

Pistol stress course

March

Shotgun range

April

Sub-gun range

May

Explosive door breaching

June

Rappelling

July

PT diagnostic test

August

Pistol qualification

September

Daytime mission

October

S&W shotgun school

November

Night mission (eval. by PM)

QUARTERLY FORECAST

October 5-1

SRT TDY Ft. Leonard Wood

for m/o school.

November

Use of force briefing.

December

AR 190-14 review with SJA

January

Reily air field hostage rescue from vehicle.

February

Pistol stress crs.

March

Training with FBI HRT

April

SRT competition at FLETC.

May
Explosive class by EOD.
June

Pistol qualification

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July
Marksman school Ft. Benning Ga.
August

Seminar in police Problems

for SWAT, Miami FL.

MONTHLY TRAINING FORECAST

Date
5 Jan
28 Jan
6 Feb
9 Feb
16 Apr
18 Apr
5 May
9 May
10 Jun
15 Jun
2 Aug
4 Aug
11 Sep
26 Sep
13 Oct
29 Oct
7 Nov
8 Nov
7 Dec

Time

Location

0900-1700 Tower
0600-1500 Range 27
0915 Bldg.896
1845 Bldg.3181
1300 Hospital
0900 Hospital
0600 Range 27
0730 Range 27
0800 Chem field
0800 Equip room
1000 Bldg.804
0900 Bldg.421
0745 Parade Fld.
0900 MP station
0830 Range 27
1330 SRT Bldg.
0900 Range 27
0900 Range 27
0700 Bldg.423

Class
Rappelling
Pistol Course
Practice mission
Night mission
CPR Training
CPR Certification
Shotgun FAM
Pistol Qualification
Chemical Deployment
Inventory Equipment
Explosive door breaching
Film on use of force
Diag PT test
Meeting with PM
Sniper Qualification
Review deadly force reg.
Pistol Qualification
Shotgun stress course
Drug raid exercise

NOTE: NO CHANGES TO THIS TRAINING FORECAST WILL BE MADE

WITHOUT APPROVAL FROM THE TEAM LEADER!!!!

ANNEX B
93

Breachers Brief
The breachers brief is formatted to capture all the necessary information to make a sound decision on
which method is best for breaching the obstacle. Once the information has been gathered and
recorded, the breacher can then brief the leadership on the breaching options selected to enter the
obstacle. Following the conclusion of the mission, the breacher completes the brief, gives input to the
AAR, and the brief becomes part of the record.
1.

Primary Breach Point

a.
b.

c.

2.

Location (confirmed)
Type of obstacle to be breached:
(1)
Door:
(a)
Design
(b)
Material (wood, metal, glass).
(c)
Knob side (right, left, push bar, N/A).
(d)
Locks (deadbolt, knob, handle with thumb-latch).
(e)
Construction (flush with wall, recessed).
(2)

Windows
(a)
Design
(b)
Size (height and width)
(c)
Window frame (wood, metal, nylon).
(d)
Obstacles (screen, shutter, bars, mesh).

(3)

Other (wall, roof).

(a)
Construction (wood, frame, block).
(b)
Surface (clapboard, shingle, brick, block, stone).

Method of breaching and employer.

(1)
Slow and deliberate: employer
(2)
Battering ram: employer
(3)
Hooligan tool: employer
(4)
Jamb spreader: employer
(5)
Thermal: employer
(6)
Other methods: employer

Secondary Breach Point

a.
b.

Location (confirmed)
Type of obstacle to be breached:
(1)
Door:
(a)
Design
(b)
Material (wood, metal, glass).
(c)
Knob side (right, left, push bar, N/A).
(d)
Locks (deadbolt, knob, handle with thumb-latch).
(e)
Construction (flush with wall, recessed).
(2)

Windows
(a)
Design
(b)
Size (height and width)
(c)
Window frame (wood, metal, nylon).
(d)
Obstacles (screen, shutter, bars, mesh).
94

3.

(3)

Other (wall, roof).

(a)
Construction (wood, frame, block).
(b)
Surface (clapboard, shingle, brick, block, stone).

(4)

Method of breaching and employer.

(a)
Slow and deliberate: employer
(b)
Battering ram: employer
(c)
Hooligan tool: employer
(d)
Jamb spreader: employer
(e)
Thermal: employer
(f)
Ballistic: employer
(g)
Other methods: employer

Location of Breacher
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Movement to objective.
At entry point
During entry
During assault
4.

5.

Actions at Entry
(a)
(b)
(c)

6.

Actions at the last covered and concealed position (equipment check).

Visual checks for threats (IED, booby traps).

Verify entry point intelligence.
Employ breach

Emergency/Abort or Alternate Breach Signal

(a) Abort: Face stack and use push back hand & arm signal.
(b)
Hurry up: Push arm up & down.
(c)
Confirm ready: Thumbs up and shoulder squeeze.
(d)
Alternate breach: Hand over head, circular motion and point.
(e)
IED/booby trap: Cut throat and point.
(f)
Mechanical needed: Verbal (be specific).
(g)
Ballistic protection: Point violently to spot.

7. Misfire Procedures
8. Compromise Procedures
9. Breacher Casualty Procedures
(a)
Assistant breacher assumes control.
(b)
Leave breacher or determine medical evacuation needs.
10. Actions on contact with IED or Booby Traps
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Stop radio communications.

Identify the device.
Notify decision to bypass.
Mark device.

11. Post Conditions of Breach (smoke, debris, flash,

noise).
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12.

Questions

13.

Inspect Breachers
(a)
(b)

Back brief.
Gear and equipment.

96

ANNEX C
SITUATION
At 1200 hrs two men entered the Mansen and abducted the post commander (Major General Anders
B. Aadland) at gun point. The two men then fled in a tan in color sedan, after a short pursuit the
suspects drove into a post housing area where they received a flat tire. They are currently located in
an on post residence, building number 976.
Suspect Description:
1. Mark A. Washington, B/M/50, 73 inches tall, 220 lbs, black hair, brown eyes, no identifying marks,
scars, or tattoos. Last seen wearing BDUs, jungle boots, and a patrol cap.
2. Patrick J. Lohr, W/M/35, 73 inches tall, 210 lbs, light brown hair, blue eyes, no identifying marks,
scars or tattoos. Last seen wearing BDUs, jungle boots, and a patrol cap.
CID recovered the close circuit television tape from the Mansen. Both suspects were identified by an
agent who was working an under cover investigation of local militia groups. The suspects belong to a
local militia group known as the Missouri 51st. The group is reportedly using automatic weapons and
explosives during their training. Mark A. Washington spent 13 years as a Special Forces weapons
sergeant, and is trained in hostage rescue. Patrick J.Lohr retired from the United States Marine Corps;
he spent most of his career working in U.S. embassies and with Force Recon. Both suspects are
armed with semi automatic pistols (unknown make or models). It is unknown if the suspects carried
any equipment into the on post residence. The sedan was reportedly stolen the day prior out of
Newburg.
Hostage Description: Major General Anders B. Aadland, W/M/53, 72 inches tall, 200 lbs, brown hair,
green eyes, no identifying marks, scars, or tattoos. Last seen wearing BDUs, black boots, and a BDU
cap. General Aadland has no special needs. General Aadland possesses highly classified and
sensitive information as a part of his institutional position which is considered a National Security risk.
Objective Description: (See crisis site over head view and sectorization sketches of objective)
Building 976 is a one story family dwelling; it has two bedrooms, one full bath, living room, kitchen,
dinning room, laundry room, and a one-car garage. There are two solid core metal skinned exterior
doors which hinge inward, the front door opens to the left and the back door opens to the right. Both
doors have a glass screen door which hinge outward. These doors lead into the objective. The rear
screen door is stuck in the open position. The garage door is an aluminum-rolling door with electronic
opening device. All windows are double pane and slide upward to the open position. The windows
have heavy duty wood blinds, and there seems to be an abundance of furniture in the residence. The
walls are constructed of sheet rock. There are no security walls or fences; there is an attic space with
an entrance in the hallway, no basement or crawl space. There are no external or internal antiintrusion devices. Landscaping is made up of rock, bark, and dirt. There are no known hazards or
animals in or around the objective. The primary residents are on vacation and will not return for one
week.
Suspects Demands: The suspects demands at this time is safe passage to Forney airfield with the
General, a Blackhawk helicopter on standby with two sets of fast ropes, and an up-armored 1026
HMMWV delivered to the front door of the residence. For every demand that is not met the General
will lose a body part.
Deadline: The deadline is 1730 hrs for the delivery of the HMMWV to the residence, the Blackhawk
and fast ropes to be on standby at Forney airfield by 1745 hrs.
97

Response Force On Scene: The military police have set up an outer perimeter around the objective,
they have evacuated the surrounding residences and are on stand by to assist the SRT entry element
in a support role. The Waynesville Police Department and the Pulaski Sheriffs Department are on
stand by to provide support where needed.
Negotiations: Negotiators have made contact with the suspects via landline and negotiations are on
going. There is no indication that the SRT entry team has been compromised.
Weather: See up dated weather forecast
Terrain: See over head view and topography of crisis site and routes.

MISSION
When granted Compromise Authority, the SRT will move to and assault building 976, quickly gain
control of the hostage(s), apprehend the suspects, recover any and all weapons and equipment, and
secure the crisis site with minimum use of force. Deadly force is authorized to protect your life or the
lives of others IAW Army Regulation 190-14.
EXECUTION
Concept Of The Operation: When directed the SRT entry team, diversion team and apprehension
team will depart the command post, once at the release point the SRT entry team will move to the last
covered and concealed position. Once the SRT entry team is in position communication will be made
back to the CP confirming location, after receiving compromise authority from the TMF commander
the SRT entry team will contact the marksman/observer teams and the diversion team. The M/O
teams will report any on scene intelligence gathered. At 1720 hours the diversion team will initiate the
diversion by moving the up-armored HMMWV to the driveway of the objective (building 976). The
SRT entry team will then move to the primary entry point make entry, clear, secure, and recover,
hostage (s), suspects, weapons, and equipment. Upon completion the SRT entry team will
reconsolidate, account for personnel and equipment and send a sitrep to the TMF commander. The
SRT entry team and attachments will then evacuate the crisis site and move back to the command
post for a debrief.
Marksman/Observer Teams:
M/O #1: Will be observing the alpha/bravo side of the objective. They are located 75 meters away
from the objective located inside building 973-A.
M/O #2: Will be observing the charlie/delta side of the objective. They are located 125 meters away
from the objective located near a wooden structure.
The M/O teams will provide on scene intelligence, select fire on the objective, cover entry teams
movement to and from the objective, and monitor inner perimeter. See over head view of crisis site for
M/O positions and areas of responsibilities. After SRT entry team evacuates the crisis site M/Os will
return to the CP.

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SRT Entry Team:

Routes: See over head view and topography of primary and alternate routes.
LCC: See over head view and topography of location of release point and LCC.
Breach Points: See over head view of objective for primary and alternate breach points.
Breaching Technique: Primary breaching technique is a det. cord triple strand rigid charge with a 20
foot instantaneous dual shock tube firing systems with M-60/STI initiators (constructed IAW breaching
SOP). Alternate breaching technique is hooligan/sledge hammer.
Movement Technique: CP to release point in the diversion vehicle, Release point to LCC by foot,
LCC to breach point by foot. All danger areas will be negotiated in a file crossing. Order of movement
from Release point to LCC, LCC to breach point (shield, entry team member, breacher, entry team
member, team leader, and entry team member) (during movement from release point to LCC the
shield will be carried on back)
Entry Technique: Dynamic, utilizing the shield as forward security. Order of entry (shield, entry team
member, entry team member, entry team member, team leader, breacher)
Clearing Technique: Dynamic, room by room, clockwise until last room is cleared, counter clockwise
on back clear. The shield will stay in the hall providing forward security and neutralize tactical angles
not covered by the clearing element. All rooms will be marked IAW SOP.
Occupancy Control: Everyone will be flex-cuffed and hasty belt line searched before turnover to the
support element.
Reorganization: After back clear is complete, set up security posture positions inside primary breach
point (360 degree), account for personnel and equipment, send sitrep to TMF commander, coordinate
with M/Os, evacuate team out primary breach point.
Emergency Assault: As briefed in the Warning Order: prepared to conduct an Emergency Assault at
a moments notice.
Contingencies:
Compromise - If compromised between LCC and breach point, execute plan at faster pace calling
compromise over radio.
IED - If it can be by-passed, mark it and continue clearing; if unable to by-pass evacuate objective
IAW SRT SOP.
Fire - Attempt to put out, bring support team in with fire extinguisher; if unable to contain, evacuate the
objective IAW SRT SOP.
Support Element:
Diversion Team: (2 man team) Will transport SRT entry element to release point, stage at release
point until compromise authority is given to SRT entry team, at 1720 hrs diversion team will move the
up-armored HMMWV to the drive way of the objective (building 976). Leave the motor running, place
transmission in park, lock the steering wheel, get out and move by foot to the apprehension teams
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location at primary entry point. See over head view of crisis site for location of release point and route
to the objective.
Apprehension Team: (2 man team augmented by diversion team, 4 total) Will stage at release point,
after entry is made by SRT entry team, apprehension team will move to primary entry point by van and
stand by to support the entry team IAW SRT SOP. Will also bring a fire extinguisher and quickie saw
to breach point. See over head view of crisis site for location of release point.
Medic: Will stage at release point with apprehension team, after entry is made by SRT entry team,
medic will move to the primary breach point with the apprehension team and stand by to provide
immediate medical attention IAW SRT SOP.
Ambulance: Will stage at the command post: If needed the SRT entry team or SRT medic will call
forward on channel 2. See over head view for location of command post. Is prepared to transport
wounded or injured to Fort Leonard Wood Army Hospital.
Fire Truck: Will stage at the command post: If needed the SRT entry team or support team will call
forward on channel 2. See over head view for location of command post.

SERVICE AND SUPPORT

Arms and Ammunition: M-4 rifle with sure fire, 150 rounds of 5.56; M-9 pistol with sure fire, 60
rounds of 9mm; ballistic breaching shotgun, 10 rounds 12 gauge TKO (breacher only); 4 M-84 Stun
Grenades.
Uniform and Equipment: Nomex green flight suit, boots, nomex gloves, assault vest, body armor (5
sets for support teams), helmet, eye pro, holster, magazine pouch (pistol), flex-cuffs, tactical belt, pro
mask stored IAW SOP, Motorola radio with head set (TM LDR carries 2), medical gear (3 curlex, tape,
IV kit, and 2 cravats), 10 green chemlights, 2 red chemlights, 2 blue chemlights, 14 feet green tubular
nylon.
Special Equipment: 1 HMMWV up-armored 1026 (S-2)
Ambulance (S-4)
Fire truck (S-6)
Hooligan tool (E-2)
Exterior explosive charge (E-3)
Sledge hammer (E-4)
Bolt cutters (E-5)
Shield (E-6)
Ballistic shin guards (E-6)
Quickie saw (S-1)
Fire extinguisher (S-1)
SRT medic bag IAW SRT SOP (S-3)

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COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Location of Key Leaders and Chain of Command: The negotiator, CID, TMF commander, and the
Provost Marshal will be located at the command post.
Radio Channel: SRT entry team: Channel- 1
M/Os: Channel- 1
Diversion team: Channel- 1
Apprehension team: Channel- 1
SRT Medic: Channel- 1
TMF: Channel- 2
Ambulance: Channel- 2
Fire Truck: Channel-2
Call Signs: TMF commander: Zulu- 1
SRT team leader: Echo- 1
SRT entry team member: Echo- 2
SRT entry team member: Echo- 3
SRT entry team member: Echo- 4
SRT entry team member: Echo- 5
SRT entry team member: Echo- 6
Apprehension team: Sierra- 1
Diversion team: Sierra- 2
SRT medic: Sierra- 3
Ambulance: Sierra- 4
EOD: Sierra- 5
Fire truck: Sierra- 6
Marksman/observer: Mike- 1
Marksman/observer: Mike- 2
Code Words and Signals:
Running password- eagle eagle
Light signals: 2 flashes- yes/positive/clear
Light signals: 1 flash- no/ negative/ not clear
Chemlight: green- room cleared
Chemlight: red- hazard
Chemlight: blue- medical need
Hand and Arm Signals: IAW SRT SOP
Time Hack?

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BACKWARD PLANNING TABLE

____ DEADLINE
____ ENTER OBJECTIVE/TARGET
____ INITIATE DIVERSION
____ MOVE TO OBJECTIVE/BREACH POINT
____ ARRIVAL/ACTIONS AT LCC (Last Cover & Concealed Position)
____ ARRIVAL AT RALLY POINT/CHECK POINT
____ DEPART SRT CP
____ NOTIFY MARKSMAN/OBSERVER TEAMS OF MOVEMENT
____ BACK BRIEF
____ REHEARSAL/INSPECTION
____ BRIEF OPERATIONS ORDER
____ FINALIZE OPERATIONS ORDER
____ RECON RETURNS
____ PREPARE OPERATIONS ORDER
____ CONSTRUCT REHEARSAL SITE
____ DEPLOY RECON
____ DEPLOY MARKSMAN/OBSERVER TEAMS
____ ISSUE WARNING ORDER TO SRT
____ SITUATION BRIEF

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REFERENCES
Army Regulation 190-58 (Personal Security), 22 March 1989
Army Regulation 525-13 (Army Terrorism Counteraction Program), 4 January 1988
United States. Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 90-10-1 (An Infantrymans Guide to
Combat in Built-up Areas).
United States. Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 90-10-1 (An Infantrymans, Guide to
Combat in Built-up Areas). Change 1, Appendix K..
United States U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare School. ST 31-20-6-1 (Close Quarters Combat),
Fort Bragg, NC: 1993.
Musashi, Miyamoto. A Book of Five Rings. Translated by Victor Harris.
1974.

Overlook Press,

United States. U.S. Army 75th Ranger Regiment. RTC 350-1-2 (Advance MOUT Training).
United States. United States Marine Corps. Weapons Training Battalion.
Course: Guidebook for Assault Entry Techniques. Vol. 1. Quantico: 1995.

Assault Breacher

Mattoon, Steven. SWAT: Training and Employment. Boulder: Paladin Press, 1987.
Remsberg, Charles. The Tactical Edge: Surviving High-Risk Patrol. Northbrook, IL: Calibre
Press, 1988.
United States. Headquarters, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command.
Memorandum.
Safety Confirmation for Grenade, Hand, Nonlethal (Stun), XM84. Maryland: Aberdeen Proving
Ground, 1998.

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