Vol. 16, No.

19

November 18, 2016

Can Turkey and Israel Reconcile?

Pinhas Inbari

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then-Prime Minister of Turkey, left, confronts Shimon Peres, President of Israel,
right, before storming out of a debate in Davos, Switzerland, 2012 (AP Photo)

Turkeys entry into Gaza has several implications: challenging Turkeys enemies in
the Middle East, Egypt and Iran; and placing Gazas rehabilitation in Turkeys hands,
which pulls the rug out from under Europes patronage.

During the attempted coup in Turkey, Fatah and Hamas expressed common support
for Erdogan, while leftist Palestinian organizations linked to Syria did not. The
Popular Front and Islamic Jihad, which favor Iran, issued statements criticizing the
Israeli-Turkish agreement.

Since Iran cut back its support for Hamas, Turkey has been its main supporter, and
the organization has relied on Erdogans backing in all of its struggles against Israel.

Will Turkeys reconciliation with Israel, along with the lessons of the failed rebellion
against him, lead Erdogan to be less Islamic and more Turkish?

Turkey and Israel signed a reconciliation agreement in June 2016, which was
controversial in Israel.1 The agreements main points are Israeli compensation for the
families of those killed in the Marmara flotilla, the cancellation of Turkish claims against
IDF soldiers, and Turkish access to Gaza. Before the ink had dried on the pact, Turkey
was rocked by a coup attempt that failed. Then, Turkey was absorbed in the Iraq crisis
when the anti-ISIS coalition and Shiite government in Baghdad launched an attack on
Mosul, leaving Turkey out of the picture.

Palestinian Authority President Abbas meeting with Turkish President Erdogan in the presidential palace
in Ankara in 2015 in the presence of an Ottoman military honor guard. The 16 soldiers represent 16
united Turkish states. (Getty Images)

Where do these events lead Israeli-Turkish relations? To answer, another question first
must be addressed: Where is Turkey heading?

3
Turkey is in the midst of defining its identity
as Turkish first or Muslim first with a neoOttoman underpinning. If Turkey chooses its
"Turkish" identity, a true Israeli-Turkish
reconciliation may be possible, but if
Erdogan chooses his neo-Ottoman Moslem
path, obstacles may block the reconciliation.
Flag of the new Turkish Ottoman Party with an
Arabic emblem

Their relations are also affected by Turkeys

ties with the Palestinians, which have several
dimensions: Turkeys ties with Gaza,
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the reactions in Gaza and the West Bank to the
developments involving Israel.
There are also repercussions for Israels gas deal,2 but this paper will not deal with them.

Eyes on Gaza
Turkeys entry into Gaza has several implications:
1. A challenge to Turkeys enemies in the Middle East: Egypt and Iran.
2. A challenge to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.3 The agreement on Gaza
was reached behind the PAs back, and the opening of the Ashdod Port to Turkey
means the PA has no access point to Gaza. For example, Egypt restricts the Rafah
crossing by demanding that it be manned by personnel who are loyal to PA
Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
3. Placing Gazas rehabilitation in Turkeys hands pulls the rug out from under
Europes status it was Europe (Norway in particular) that initiated the Gaza
rehabilitation conference in Cairo and from under the businesses that Ramallah
chose to carry out the rehabilitation.
Thus, with regard to weakening the PA, which is waging an all-out diplomatic assault on
Israel, Turkeys entry into Gaza has its advantages. The same pertains to the possibility
of making Ashdod Port a port of exit, which would relieve pressures in overcrowded
Gaza.
Undermining Europes status also has its advantages given Europes problematic
positions toward Israel.
There is, however, a problem involved in posing a challenge to Egypt, as well as Iran.
While Egypt has grown very close to Israel, it is an enemy of Turkey and does not look
favorably on Turkeys entry to Gaza.

4
Challenging Iran, too, may have negative outcomes. If Iran feels threatened it may play a
spoilers role in Gaza, as has occurred in the past.

Turkeys Involvement in Jerusalem and the West Bank

Turkey is already well entrenched in east Jerusalem, acting without hindrance in the
Israeli capital. Although currently there are no frictions between Turkey and Israel, they
may well emerge, particularly in light of the elements that are cooperating with Turkey
in east Jerusalem.

Turkish flags fly at a solidarity rally in the West

Bank town of Jenin, July 2016

Furthermore, Turkeys involvement is also

likely to affect the West Bank. That poses a
danger to the PA, but it also challenges Iran,
which may support anti-Turkish groups by,
for instance, facilitating Hizbullah/Shiite
infiltration and strengthening the Popular
Front and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad;
indeed this is already happening. In other
words, Israel will find that the conflicts now
tearing the Middle East apart are at its
doorstep.

The coup attempt shed new light on Turkish-Palestinian relations. Fatah and Hamas
expressed common support for Erdogan, while Palestinian leftist organizations linked to
Syria did not. The Popular Front and Islamic Jihad, which favor Iran, issued statements
criticizing the Israeli-Turkish agreement. The statements claimed that Turkey had
violated its commitment to remove the blockade from Gaza, and that its commitment
not to prosecute the IDF officers is a fatal blow to the Palestinians efforts to turn Israel
into a war criminal.4 Fatahs representative in Lebanon, Abdullah Abdullah, leveled
similar criticism at the agreement.5 Yet, unlike the pro-Iranian fronts, Fatah was pleased
that the coup failed, as we shall see.
Fatahs Abbas Zaki, a known Iran supporter, told Al Mayadeen TV in Lebanon6 that if
Turkey abandons the Palestinians in the wake of the agreement with Israel, it will mark
the end of the Palestinian issue. He expressed confidence that this will not happen,
saying that the agreement is a fruit of circumstances that will change and that Turkey
supports every Palestinian (and not only Hamas).

Turkey and Hamas

Although Turkey and Iran are the two regional powers with the greatest influence on
Hamas, instead of coordinating the influence, they fight over it. The struggle between
Turkey and Iran has also divided Hamas between Turkish supporters and Iranian

5
supporters, with the pro-Turkish leadership linked to the West Bank and the pro-Iranian
leadership situated in Gaza and Lebanon.7

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then Turkish Prime Minister, (right) during a meeting with Khaled Mashal, the
Hamas chief in exile, center, and Gazas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh in Ankara, Turkey, June 18, 2013.
(Prime Ministers Press Office)

The Turkish entry to Gaza disrupts these balances, and it is still too early to assess how
this will affect Irans behavior. Israel must pay attention to this issue because such
struggles usually work to its detriment.
One thing that has damaged Turkeys reputation in Gaza is the blockade. Although
Turkey has insisted that the blockade be lifted, the agreement on its use of Ashdod
Port under Israeli supervision was understood as a concession on the blockade in return
for direct Turkish benefits.8
In contrast to the pro-Iranian fronts, the pro-Turkish Hamas mouthpiece in Gaza, AlRisala, published an interview with Hamas foreign relations chief, Osama Hamdan, in
which he tried to defend the agreement. He said Turkey had not finished its struggle to
get the blockade lifted and meanwhile had succeeded to have it eased. Hamdans
statements are interesting because he is, in fact, considered a pro-Iranian Hamas
official.
Despite Hamas public support for Turkey, Israeli Palestinian-affairs expert Alon Eviatar
told the Galei Zahal radio station9 that Hamas did not look favorably on the agreement.
Since Iran cut back its support for Hamas, Turkey has been its main support, and the
organization has relied on Erdogans backing in all of its struggles against Israel. The loss
of that Turkish cushion will likely, in fact, lead to an escalation toward Israel aimed at
creating a new equation.

6
Before the agreement was signed, a Hamas source said10 that the movement put its
trust in Turkey, was leaving it to Turkey to announce the details of the emerging
agreement, and that Israel had also informed Turkey that it was interested in giving
Turkey access to Gaza in order to ease the residents lives and improve the
infrastructures.
Not long before the agreement was finalized, Ismail Haniyeh said11 Hamas had not
conceded on a port: No one does us favors, it is our right, and we will attain it by
force. In other words, he was threatening a war that would create an equation
whereby Gaza would be given a port. Haniyeh was probably briefed on the talks and
drew up a warning list beforehand. He made the statements in a Gaza mosque on
June 3, and the agreement was signed on June 27.
The Hamas official most identified with Turkey is Khaled Mashal. He is not popular in
Gaza, and the Gaza leaderships rejection of him leaves him to fight for his status in the
West Bank, where he was born near Ramallah. At one stage he considered quitting the
Hamas leadership. Turkey, however, talked him out of it. For one thing, it is not
acceptable in the Muslim Brotherhood for a leader to step down; for another, Turkey
saw Mashal as a key ally in promoting its aspirations in the West Bank.
Turkeys support for Mashal has come to the fore in the initiation and planning of West
Bank terror attacks. Mashals right-hand man Saleh al-Aruri,12 also originally from the
village of Aroura near Ramallah, has been the guiding hand of the attacks.
The operational arm of Mashals branch in Turkey was the Qawasmeh family in Hebron,
and the terror attacks they perpetrated may have been meant to have a spoiler
effect for Gaza at Israels expense. It was the kidnapping of three young Israelis in Gush
Etzion14 in the West Bank that led to Operation Protective Edge, which inflicted huge
damage on Gaza and created the need for the rehabilitation effort there.

13

Israel insisted that Turkey close the Hamas offices there and expel Aruri and his
associates. It is not clear whether this has really happened.15 New reports suggest that
the office still exists.16 The Palestinian faction that supports the Gulf States, headed by
Muhammad Dahlan, opposed the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation. It was undoubtedly
impelled to do so by the Gulf States, which oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, and
Turkey.17

Impact on the PA Municipal Elections

Turkeys entry into Gaza has no influence on the municipal elections there, directly or
indirectly, but it does indirectly influence the West Bank elections.

7
Hamas problem in West Bank elections has been that its operatives are revealed to the
Israel Security Agency (Shabak) and to the Palestinian security mechanisms. That was a
mistake Hamas made in the 2006 elections.
The Israeli-Turkish agreement led Hamas to believe that Turkey would protect the
election results and would not allow Israel and the PA to cancel them as they did in
2006. It is very possible that Erdogan and Mashal agreed on these matters during the
Israeli-Turkish talks.18
Meanwhile, though, two things happened that were likely to alter Hamas view of the
West Bank elections, and they are both connected to Turkey. One was the coup
attempt, which distracted Turkey from the Palestinian issue as it focused on its internal
struggles instead, including the supreme priority it accords to the Kurdish problem. The
other was Israels arrest of the Hamas representative on the elections committee,
Hussein Abu Kweik19 of the el-Amari camp in Ramallah. The arrest made clear to Hamas
that Turkey would not provide protection to Hamas representatives who are elected,
and that if they are removed and arrested as occurred after the 2006 elections, there is
no power that can shield the election results, including Turkey.20
The fact that Turkeys involvement was on the agenda at all, however, also prompted
Iran to get involved. According to some reports it has supported the pro-Assad leftist
organizations, such as the Popular Front, and foiled Hamas attempts to create a joint
list with them.21

Palestinians Support for Erdogan against the Rebels

Despite the fact that at this stage Turkey is not involved in the West Bank, the
enthusiastic responses from both Fatah and Hamas to Erdogans quashing of the coup
will strengthen Turkeys desire to widen and deepen its involvement in Jerusalem and in
the West Bank as well.
Fatahs support is expressed on its members Facebook pages. For example, one of them
wrote: If Turkey leaves the regional equation, the result will be Israeli-Iranian
hegemony in the region.

The Big Problem: East Jerusalem

The real difficulty likely to arise between Turkey and Israel, however, concerns east
Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Turkey has ties with the most extreme elements,
such as former mufti Akrama Sabri, inciter Raed Salah, and Hamas. If it decides to
protect them against Israel to assume leadership of the al-Aqsa is in danger campaign,
thereby promoting its status as a regional Islamic power, Israel will find itself facing a
problem. 22

Three hundred Turkish demonstrators on the Temple Mount, 2015

Thus, the future of Israeli-Turkish relations depends on the question: will the
reconciliation with Israel, along with the lessons of the failed rebellion against him, lead
Erdogan to be less Islamic and more Turkish? In other words, will he prefer Turkeys
interests as a state to those of the Muslim Brotherhood?
***
Pinhas Inbari is a veteran Arab affairs correspondent who formerly reported for Israel
Radio and Al Hamishmar newspaper, and currently serves as an analyst for the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
***
Notes

http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/israel-q2_2016/Article-300ec673df59551004.htm

http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3691596,00.html

http://player.gl.bynetcdn.com/Players/ByPlayer/EmbedPlayer/GLZ?ClipID=retzuabit160628&Typ
e=aod&Width=300&Height=200 A day after the agreement was announced, the Gazan journalist
Saud Abu Ramadan told Israels Galei Zahal radio station that if it really were to lead to an easing
of the water and electricity crisis, it was a good agreement. He also expressed concern, however,
that it would harm the Palestinian states chances of being established.

http://www.alghad.tv/----/

Ibid.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2UMo4E57T-E&feature=youtu.be

On Irans relations with Lebanon and Gaza, see

http://www.amad.ps/ar/?Action=Details&ID=136778 When Iranian representatives visit Beirut
they make a point of meeting with Hamas representatives in the Lebanese capital. Iran, for its
part, conditioned a visit to Tehran by a Hamas delegation on the inclusion of Mahmoud al-Zahar,
a Gazan.
8

http://alresalah.ps/ar/post/131392

http://player.gl.bynetcdn.com/Players/ByPlayer/EmbedPlayer/GLZ?ClipID=retzuabit160628&Typ
e=aod&Width=300&Height=200
10

http://alray.ps/ar/post/146141/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84
11

https://youtu.be/bXta4sGk__M

12

http://www.al-masdar.net/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B7/
13

http://jcpa.org/the-fraying-palestinian-political-entity-in-the-west-bank/hebron-tornfundamentalism-nationalism-commercial-interests/
14

Aruri acknowledges that he was behind the kidnapping:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tiy_Co3YFDo
15

There are reports that Aruri left for Qatar, but the infrastructure for terror attacks in Israel
remains: http://news.walla.co.il/item/2941528 Also http://www.al-masdar.net/%D9%87%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B7/
16

http://samanews.com/ar/post/244261/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A
17

http://inlightpress.com/ar/index.php/123078---------.--html He used the same opportunity to attack the PA for its restraint regarding
the agreement.

10

18

According to a senior Fatah official in Ramallah in a personal conversation.

19

http://felesteen.ps/details/news/171105/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83.html Hamas accused Israel of wanting to torpedo the

elections on behalf of its partners in Ramallah. See also
http://www.elshaab.org/news/234906/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8B%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%83
19

According to a senior Fatah source in a personal conversation.

21

Conversation with the researcher Nurit Marzan.

22

http://jcpa.org/ottoman-return-jerusalem/

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:

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