Political Law Review Case Digests

ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION

AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS MORATO
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting
slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and
personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of
the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's)
consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character
and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination,
respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking
examination of the board's records.
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films
and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or
television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an
exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board
and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There
can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of
action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to
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Political Law Review Case Digests

clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their
official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is
guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the
exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency
charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition
of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the
members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by
this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer,
idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not
flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which
is called upon to devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the right
to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act
496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized,
should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official
records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of
this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in
the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with
its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the
examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would
otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra).

BALDOZA VS DIMAANO
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,
charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the
Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order
conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has
never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are
among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other
persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court
has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the
furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a
serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite
or to promote public scandal.
We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge,
the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under
certain conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and
conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated
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on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In an
earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the
Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the
records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic
institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the
manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise
their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit. Citing with approval People ex rel.
Title Guarantee & T. Co. vs. Railly, 2 this Court said:
"The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, to his (register of deeds')
discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the office are required to be
preserved for the accommodation of these persons. It is not his duty to permit the office
to be thronged needlessly with persons examining its books of papers, but it is his duty
to regulate, govern, and control his office in such a manner as to permit the statutory
advantages to be enjoyed-by other persons not employed by him as largely and
extensibly as that consistently can be done . . . What the law expects and requires from
him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all persons
resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderly
manner, shall be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation
formed in the manner in which the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the
information either by searches, abstracts, or copies, that the law has entitled it to
obtain.'
"Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers
to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking
access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the
records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it
be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials
having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. As to the moral or
material injury which the publication might inflict on other parties, that is the publisher's
responsibility and lookout. The publication is made subject to the consequences of the
law."
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on statutory grounds merely but on
the constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the essence of press freedom.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters
of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of
official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law.
The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus,
access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

TANADA VS TUVERA
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
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would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC :
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to
obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication.
The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect.

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a)

to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging
to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
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Political Law Review Case Digests

the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or
(b)

to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or

(c)

to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest.
whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech
is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information
ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent
information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the
extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto
can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But
this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in
the public service. *** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi,
The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest"
or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is
argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.
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Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards
the documents subject of this petition
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests
of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982
(1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is
an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for
relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80
N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)],
and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding
at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321
(1949).].
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private
in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538,
quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of
public concern.

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