INTRODUCTION

Hugo Grotius was a Dutch legal scholar, who was born in Delft in 1583 and who is nowadays
said to be the father of international law. He enjoyed a Humanist and Aristotelian education and
was surrounded by many intellectuals when he started University in Leiden at the age of only 11.
Later he became and advocate in The Hague as well as the official historiographer for the States
of Holland. When the Dutch were at war with Spain and Portugal and captured a Portuguese
ship, Grotius was hired to write a defence edict. This occasion marks his first opportunity to
systematically discuss issues of international justice. Grotius enjoyed great success in his
political career. He became Advocate General of Zeeland and Friesland as well as the major in
Rotterdam. Later in life, he even became the Swedish ambassador in France. The theological
controversy between Arminians and Calvinists lead to a dispute about whom university can
employ as staff. When Grotius joined the debate, he argued in favour of the universitys power to
employ anyone independently of their religious views. The States of Holland adopted this view
of religious toleration. Grotius views were written down in his work Decretum pro pace
ecclesiarum in 1613/14. But the conflict escalated and he ended up in prison, i.e. Loevenstein
Castle where he wrote a justification of his position. He famously escaped his prison in 1621.
Grotius flees to Paris where he lives in exile under Louis XIII. In France he wrote his most
important works, influenced by the 30 year war, its conflicts between religion and nation states
as well as the political struggles that came with them. Grotius- published De Jure Belli in 1625.
It becomes evident that he believed that wars as well as the deaths of innocent people could be
avoided if shared moral values were used. These values were said to be timeless and universal as
they were accepted by everyone as reasonable and natural. He called this a common law between
nations which was based on natural law principles. It applied to all people and nations, no matter
which religion they believed in. This meant that the natural law was secularized. Natural law was
a notion crucial in his work. His definition of natural law however changed over time. First he
followed the so-called voluntarist theory. Here, natural law is seen as a creation of God.
Therefore, God determines the content of all normative categories. Since the Bible and Natural
Law were both created by God, they could not contradict each other. Later on, he followed the
non-voluntarist theory. Here, human nature is seen as the mother of natural and it was sufficient
to study it in order to learn the essentials of law, politics and ethics. For Grotius, human nature
entailed the desire for self-preservation as well as the need for society. From these emotional and
cognitive aspects, two rules followed for him: We ought to abstain from what belongs to others
and we ought to engage in reasonable pursuit of what serves our interest. Natural law was
binding for him because he said that we are less than human if we did not obey its rational rules.
Grotius is sometimes also called the founder of human rights. This term might be misleading. His
understanding of human rights is indeed very different from ours today. Nowadays, we see
human rights as universal, unconditional rights which every human enjoys simply because he or
she was born. In Grotius view, these rights are transferable and conditional. They are rather
universal human state rights than individual rights. Furthermore, the individual did not enjoy a
right of action against the state in case the state abused its powers. Grotius died at the age of 62
in 1645. He can be seen as a pioneer in regards to international law and human rights, even
though these notions further developed and entail very different contents nowadays than they did
at his time.

ORIGIN AND GENESIS OF GROTIUS THOUGHT

The importance of Grotius in the history of legal philosophy depends not on a theory of the state
( la Bodin or Hobbes), or on anything that he had to say about public-constitutional law, but
rather on his idea of a law regulating the relations between sovereign stateson what had
earlier been called the ius gentium. The practical importance of re-conceiving and re-stressing
the law of nations in the early seventeenth century can hardly be over-emphasized: The
relations between independent political powers had become steadily more chaotic with the
breakdown of the (always feeble) restraints which the medieval Church had fitfully applied; and
the rise of absolute monarchies recognizing no authority above or beyond themselves had
increasingly made sheer force the arbiter in the dealing of states with each other.
To this must be added the effects of the religious wars which followed the Reformation,
bringing to international relations the intrinsic bitterness of religious hatred and affording the
color of good conscience to the most bare-faced schemes of dynastic aggrandizement, and the
exploitation of newly dis-covered territory (Sabine 1937, 2567). There were ample reasons
why Grotius should have believed that the welfare of mankind required a comprehensive and
systematic treatment of the rules governing the mutual relations among statesin a modernized
version of the Roman ius gentium:
Such a work is all the more necessary because in our day, as in former times, there is no lack of
men who view this branch of law with contempt as having no reality outside of an empty name.1
The contribution of Grotius to international law is beyond the scope of a general history of
legal philosophy; with respect to this latter his importance lay in the philosophical principles
upon which he sought to found his special subject and which he set out especially in the
Prolegomena to his greatest work. In the 17th century it was a foregone conclusion that he
should appeal to the generally admitted idea of a fundamental law, of a law of nature, lying
behind the civil law of every nation, and binding, because of its intrinsic jus-tice, upon all
peoples and upon subjects and rulers alike. In the long tradition of Christian political thought no
writer had denied, or even doubted, the validity of such a law.
But with the breaking up of Christian unity and the decline of Christian authority the grounds of
this validity called urgently for reexamination. Neither the authority of the church nor the
authority of Scripture, in fact, no form of religious revelation, could establish the foundation of a
law binding alike on Protestant and Catholic peoples, and governing the relations between
Christian and non-Christian rulers. It was natural that Grotius, with his back-ground of
humanistic education, should turn back to the even older, pre-Christian tradition of natural law
which he found in the writers of classical antiquity. And so he chose, as Cicero had done before
him, to put his examination of the grounds of natural law into the form of a debate with the
skeptical critic of the Stoic philosophy, Carneades.2 As the eminent Grotius-scholar Richard Tuck
translates Grotius Prolegomena in The Rights of War and Peace:
1

(Grotius 1964, Prolegomena, pars 3)

22 Grotius must have derived his information from the fragments of Ciceros De Republica preserved by Lactantiussince the Vatican
MS

(palimpsest) of De Republica came to light only in 1818 (and is still radically incomplete).

When he [Carneades] undertook the critique of justice (which is my particular subject at the
moment), he found no argument more powerful than this: men have established jura according to
their own interests [pro utilitate], which vary with different customs, and often at different times
with the same people: so there is no natural jus: all men and the other animals are im-pelled by
nature to seek their own interests: so either there is no justice, or if there is such a thing, it is the
greatest foolishness, since pursuing the good of others harms oneself. We should not accept the
truth in all circumstances of what this philosopher says, nor of what a poet said in imitation
never by nature can wrong be split from right. For though man is an animal, he is one of a
special kind, further removed from the rest than each of the others species are from one another
for which there is testimony from many actions unique to the human species. Among the
things which are unique to man is the desire for society, that is for community with those who
belong to his speciesthough not a community of any kind, but one at peace, and with a rational
order. Therefore, when it is said that nature drives each animal to seek its own interests, we can
say that this is true of the other animals, and of man before he comes to the use of that which is
special to men.
When Grotius speaks of sociableness in Stoic thought, he is thinking above all of Cicerowho
defended Stoicism in De Finibus and in De Natura Deorum, but without actually being a full
Stoic. Grotius must especially have relished the remarkable page in De Finibus in which the
great Roman jurisconsult insists that in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is
nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance
and partnership of interests and that actual affection [caritas] which exists between man and
man, which, coming into ex-istence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children
are loved by their parents and the family as a whole is bound together by the ties of marriage and
parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then
by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of
neighbourhood, then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing
the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with
generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice;
connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other
graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared
by the remaining virtues. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate
element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of
every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and
Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion
of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this
general union and combina-tion of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral
Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in
harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent,
and in agreement with nature.3
For Grotius, as instructed by Roman jurisprudence, and especially by Cicero, the preservation of
a peaceful social order is itself an intrinsic good, and the conditions required for that purpose are
as binding as those which serve more strictly private ends. As Grotius argues,
3

A passage also cherished by Leibniz in his 1689 Rome commentary on Cudworths True Intellectual System of the Universe (Leibniz
1948b).

This maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly sketched, and which is consonant
with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called. To this sphere of law belong the
abstaining from that which is anothers, the restoration to another of anything of his which we
may have received from it, the obligation to fulfil promises, the making good of a loss in-curred
through our fault, and the inflicting of penalties upon men according to their deserts. 4
For Grotius, then, there are certain minimal conditions or values which must be realized, human
nature being what it is, if an orderly society is to persist. Specifically, these are, in the main, the
security of property, good faith, fair dealing, and a general agreement between the consequences
of mens conduct and their deserts. These conditions are not the result of voluntary choice or the
product of convention but rather the reverse; choice and convention follow the natural
necessities of the case.
For the very nature of man, which even if we had no lack of anything would lead us into the
mutual relations of society, is the mother of the law of nature. 5
And at one further remove, moreover, this natural law gives rise to the positive law of states; the
latter depends for its validity upon the underlying grounds of all social obligation and especially
upon that of good faith in keeping covenants (the notion that pacta sunt servanda):
For those who had associated themselves with some group, or had subjected themselves to a man
or to men, had either expressly promised, or from the nature of the transaction must be
understood impliedly to have promised, that they would conform to that which should have been
determined, in the one case by the majority, in the other by those upon whom authority had been
conferred. 6
Grotius believed that, within the framework of natural law, there was ample room for
considerations of utility, which may very well vary from people to people, and which also may
dictate practices looking to the advantage of all nations in their international dealings. But certain
broad principles of justice are naturalthat is, universal and unchangeableand upon these
principles are erected the varying systems of municipal law, all depending upon the sanctity of
covenants, and also international law, which depends upon the sanctity of covenants between
rulers.
Grotius accordingly gave the following definition of natural law:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is
not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity;
and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or conjoined by the author of nature,
God.

(Grotius 1964, Prolegomena, pars 8)

(Ibid., pars 16)

(Ibid., pars. 15)

This reference to the command of God is only negatively important: As Grotius was at pains to
make clear, it added nothing to the definition and im-plied nothing in the way of a religious
sanction. For the law of nature would enjoin exactly the same if, by hypothesis, there were no
God. Moreover, it cannot be changed by the Calvinizing will of God. The reason for this is that
Gods power does not extend to making true a proposition that is inherently self-contradictory;
such a power would be not strength but weakness, oras Leibniz would soon say- tyranny.
According to Grotius, there is nothing arbitrary in natural law, any more than there is in
arithmetic. The dictates of right reason are whatever human nature and the nature of things imply
that they must be. Will enters as one factor into the situation but the sic volo, sic iubeo of God or
man does not create the obligatory nature of the law. Referring to the authority of the Old
Testament, Grotius distinguished carefully between commands which God gave to the Jews as a
chosen people and which therefore depended merely upon divine will, and the evidence which it,
along with other important documents, affords of natural relationships. Nothing could show more
clearly his independence of the system of divine sovereignty implicit in Calvinismas will soon
be seen in -comparing Grotius with the anti-Calvinism of Leibniz.
GROTIAN :
The main features of grotian tradition, as summarized and explained by lauterpacht in one of his
articles are following:
1)The subjection of totality of international relation to the rule of law- The central theme and
main characteristics of grotians treaties that Grotius conceives of the totality of the relation
between state as governed by law.
2)The acceptance of the law of nature as an independent source of international law- According
to Grotius, law which was binding upon states was not solely the product of their express will.
He advocated and emphasized the law of nature as an independent source of international law.
By securing the concept of law of nature, Grotius enhanced authority and dignity by making it an
integral part of international law. By doing this he laid, more truly than any writer before him,
the foundation of international law.
3)The affirmation of the social nature of man as the basis of law of nature- According to Grotius,
the social nature of man was the basis of law of nature. He defined natural law as the dictate of
right reason, indicating that an act, from its agreement or disagreement with the relation and
social nature of man has in its moral turpitude or moral necessity, and such an act is either
forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.
4)The recognition of the essential identity of states and individual- At the end of the nineteenth
century, Weslake observed: The society of States .. is the most comprehensive form of society
among men, but it is among men that it exists. States are its immediate men ultimate members.
The duties and rights are only the duties and rights who compose them. But it was Grotius who
was the first to have recognized the essential identity of states and individuals and advocated the
rules and principles applicable upon individual should also be applied upon states.
5)The rejection of the reason of the state- Yet another characteristic feature of Grotius teaching
was his denial of the reason of State as a basic and decisive factor of international relations.

6)The distinction between just and unjust wars. Grotius denied the states of the absolute right of
war for he emphasized the distinction between just and unjust wars. According to him, a just war
is one which is fought for a just cause. It need not be overemphasized here that Grotius deserves
full credit for emphasizing this distinction between just and unjust war which was later on further
developed under the Covenant of the League of Nation, the pact of Paris of 1928 and finally, the
charter of the United Nations.
7)The doctrine of qualified neutrality The distinction between just and unjust war led Grotius
to enunciate the doctrine of qualified neutrality. According to Grotius, it is the duty of those
who keep out of war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause may be rendered
more powerful, or where by the movements of him who wages an unjust war may be hampered.
These duties, however, did not include the positive obligation to assist actively the state fighting
a just war. Thus, as remarked by lauterpacht , with the drastic limitation of the right of war as
adopted in the convenant of the League of Nations and in the General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War, the law restored the historic foundations of qualified neutrality as taught by
Grotius.
8)The binding force of promises- Grotius emphasized the binding force of promises and held the
view that obligation to abide by pacts of the essence of social contract. In modern terminology it
is referred as pacta sunt servanda but it is pointed out that the ultimate source of legal obligation
cannot logically, be explained in terms of law, Grotius held the view that law of nature was the
binding force of the Law of Nations.
9)The fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual- Though it appears alien to the spirit of
teaching, Grotius must be given some share on the development of the concept of fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual. He advocated the right of the individual to refuse to carry
arms in an unjust war and championed his claims such as right of expatriation, the right of
economic freedom, right to have plebiscite for transfer of part of national territory.
10)The idea of peace- Though he did not deny the right of the state to wage war, he advocated
the idea of peace and prosposed various methods for the settlement of disputes such as
negotiation and arbitration.
11)The tradition of idealism and progress- Grotian tradtion is a tradition of idealism and
progress. He initiated or gave support to progressive ideas in various fields in the sphere of
international relations. He was the one of the first to assist the suppression of the crime by urging
extradition of criminals as a matter of legal duty.
IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATION
Grotius wanted to create a theoretical foundation for a law of war and to develop rules for
nations and individuals. For him a resort to violence was a trait of nonrational creatures and
he saw violent practices as the inevitable result of evil which negated the sociability of men 7.
But he also validated war as a tool for fulfilling the natural purposes of men. In his view force
7 History of International Law, Prof. Dr. Laurens Winkel ;Erasmus University
Rotterdam - Faculty of Law, 2nd Term - 1999

was allowable to maintain legitimate rights, and as such it was not irreconcilable with law. If
correctly used, war was an instrument of rational, civilized men and had 5 as its function the
preservation of society. In Grotius view, war should only be undertaken for the enforcement of
rights and within the bounds of law and good faith. But he also stressed that authorities
generally assign to wars three justifiable causes, defence, recovery of property, and punishment.
Due to the international anarchy and the lack of a superior authority force could be used as a
means for serving justice but it had to be moral in accordance with the laws of nature. Grotius
suggested three methods how disputes could be prevented to escalate to wars: a) by conference,
b) by arbitration involving a third party, and c) by lot or single combat. In the Grotian view,
international law places limits on the means of pursuing war and requires a distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, ideas that are reflected in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, and in modern humanitarian law. Grotius work had a lasting impact on both international
law and international relations. In 1983, four hundred years after his birth, it still provoked
controversial debates on its relevance for the presence and future. I will only briefly review the
comments by Falk, Rling and Bull. Richard A. Falk argued that Grotius provided a new
normative order in international society that acknowledges the realities of an emergent state
system while remaining faithful to the shared heritage of spiritual, moral, and legal ideas that any
Christian society could still be presumed to affirm as valid. Falk stated that the Grotian quest
remains important because it is both normatively grounded and future-oriented, synthesizes old
and new while it cherishes continuities and legitimizes discontinuities 8. For Bert Rling,
Grotius doctrine on just war has not only become obsolete, but outright dangerous. Positive
law as the product of interests, power positions, and prevailing values had to be changed once the
poor and developing countries formed a majority in the world legal community. But Grotius
remained an inspiring figure who did much to develop a modern international law suitable to
meet the needs of the new nation-states which had ari-sen on the ruins of the medieval world.
For Hedley Bull Grotius work is one of the great landmarks in modern thinking about
international relations. In his The Anarchical Society Bull claimed that Grotian perspectives
focus on organisations, regimes, networks of co-operation and integration. He argued: The
Grotian tradition describes international politics in terms of a society of states or international
society. The Grotians contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an
arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions. The
Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that sovereigns or states are the principal reality in
international politics; the immediate members of international society are states rather than
individual human beings. International politics expresses neither complete conflict of interest
between states nor complete identity of interest. In the Grotian view states are bound by rules of
prudence and by morality and law. These imperatives require coexistence and co-operation in a
society of states. From this perspective co-operation matters. Bull argued that Grotius work is
cardinal for international relations: because it states one of the classic paradigms that have since
determined both our understanding of the facts of inter-state relations and our ideas as to what
constitutes right conduct therein. Grotius advanced the third position, that states and the rulers of
8 What is the Grotian Tradition in International Law? By John T. Parry; University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law Volume 35 | Issue 2 Article 1

states in their dealings with one another were bound by rules and together formed a society. Even
without central institutions, rules and peoples might constitute a society among themselves, an
anarchical society or society without government. It is this idea which provides the core of what
we may call the Grotian tradition. Grotius most propagated the idea of international society that
was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia. Grotius may be considered the
intellectual father of the first general peace settlement of modern times. This peace did not
mark the beginning of the modern international system or states system but rather of an
international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of
rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common
interest in maintaining them. While Grotius concept of such universal international society was
a theoretical and normative one, in the 20th century this concept had become political and
economic reality. For Bull: The importance of Grotius lies in the part he played in establishing
the idea of international society. By raising the most fundamental questions about modern
international relations, by assembling all the best that has been thought, and by providing us with
a systematic exposition of his own conception of international society, Grotius [is] one of the
master theorists of the subject. Both Wight and Bull defined the Grotian tradition as the via
media between the Machiavellian and Kantian positions. Kingsbury and Roberts remained
sceptical that the literature and practice is sufficiently unified to constitute a Grotian
tradition. I use Grotius as an ideal type perspective of international relations. In my view, the
Grotian worldview may be best suited to counter the challenges of global environmental change
in multilateral institutions.9
GROTIUS INFLUENCE ON MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Examples of Grotius influence on modern international law can be retraced to his theory of jus
ad bellum, which is concerned with the justification of and the limits to the use of force (what
would make a war just). The principle of jus ad bellum governs the preengagement conduct of
states and non-states actors that are considering whether to engage war. Examples of such laws
are: the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), the Nuremberg Charter (1945), and the Charter of the
United Nations (1945). As he discussed jus ad bellum in his book on the Law of War and Peace,
Grotius had identified three types of justifications to war, one of which being self-defence.
Grotius defined it as the natural permission everyone has to protect oneself from injuries. He also
identified two necessary conditions for self-defence to be a valid justification for war:
imminence and certainty of the attack. Self-defence, as Grotius has presented it is a concept that
we can recognize as having carried over in modern international law and is especially present.
This can be seen in article 51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The principle has also been
officially recognized as part of Customary international law by the International Court of Justice
in the Nicaragua case (1986). It has even been taken further in the older Caroline case (18371842) by Daniel Webster who made the imminent attack requirement expressed by Grotius
9 PD Dr. Hans Gnter Brauch Free University of Berlin, Berlin, AFES-PRESS,
Chairman, Mosbach The Three Worldviews of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant Foundations
of modern thinking on peace and security Contextual Change and
Reconceptualisation of Security.

evolve in the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation. Among his thoughts of what could make a war just,
Hugo Grotius also held the position that trans-border humanitarian protection of a population
subject to tyranny could be seen as a just war (bellum justum). This links directly to Grotius
second theory of jus in bello. By contrast to jus ad bellum, jus in bello comes into effect after
conflicts and war have started. It is concerned by the behaviour of the parties involved toward
combatants, noncombatants, property and the environment. In book III of De Jure Belli, Grotius
stated that those waging war ought to retain a sense of humanity by seeking to limit the impact of
the war on the innocents, even those on the side they are in conflict with. This conception led
Hugo Grotius to share ideas on an international humanitarian law. In the 19th century, the
codification of a universal humanitarian law started. Principles formulated by Grotius, such as
keeping from causing civilian casualties and treating war prisoners well, are now present in
humanitarian law. They can even be seen as having encouraged the creation of UN Peacekeeping
Missions, as well as the development of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Another
example of Grotius influence on modern international law, and still linked to the principle of jus
in bello, is international criminal law. It has developed in accordance with some of Grotius
ideals, like the Geneva Conventions (1949) which is an important public international law
document highlighting protection for those no longer involved in combat. Furthermore, in the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, talks were focused on rights within war and it was agreed
that states should not be unlimited in the manners they could pursue war. Finally, Grotius
expressed the idea of a society of nations governed by laws and an agreement among states to
enforce and respect those laws. A perfect modern example of such a society is the European
Union. As economic and political partnership between 28 states, the organization presents much
more than that. It also has an institutional structure making decisions and laws, as well as a legal
system and means to ensure that the member states follow what has been decided within the
European Union. Furthermore, it also acknowledges rights to which European Union citizens are
entitled to and which are laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
CONCLUSION
Authors who ere of the view the rules of international law derived from the positive law as well
as the law of nature were known as Grotians. They gave equal importance to both and therefore,
they stood midway between the Naturalists and the Positivists. Since, the view was initiated by
Grotius; his followers were known as Grotians. Majority of the authors of the seventeenth and
the eighteenth century became Grotians. Main exponents of the school were Wolf (1679-1754)
and Vattel (1714-1767). The chief deficiency of the school lies in its arbitrariness. The followers
of the school selected from the natural law legal maxim, incidents of state practice and the
decisions of the courts what appear to fit into their a prior images of International Law. The
proponents of this school have adopted a middle path between the extremes of the Naturalists
and Positivist School of international law. Since, they follow the middle path; they have been
designated as the eclectics. They followed the notion of Grotius and have accepted both- State
practice and natural law as the source of international law. However, unlike Grotius, the Grotians
attributed equal importance to both- state practices and natural law as source of international law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Grotius, Hugo, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625) in

M.G.Forsyth, The Theory of International Relations
2. H.Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law(The
British Year Book of International Law)
3. Dr. S.K. Kapoor, International Law and Human Rights

Other References
http://www.angelfire.com/bc/macedonia/grotious.html
http://www.law.lu.se/web.nsf/
(MenuItemByDocId)/ID51796961A3A6195BC1257D860028A760/$FIL
E/CL%20Group%204%20Summary.pdf
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2897&context=fss_papers
http://law.famu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/1.-ModernIntroduction-to-International-Law.pdf
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21433/1/The_English_Schools_Approach_to_Inte
rnational_Law_(LSERO).pdf

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am using this opportunity to express gratitude to everyone who supported me
throughout the course of this project. I am thankful for their aspiring guidance.
I express warm thanks to Prof. D.P. Verma, his guidance for the completion of this
project as I believe it would not have been possible without his support.
I would like to thanks my professor and the people who provided me with the
facility required and conductive conditions for my International law Project

Thank You,
Pavitra Shivhare
Roll No. 44

INTERNATIONAL LAW PROJECT

GROTIAN SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Submitted by
Pavitra Shivhare
Roll Number: 44
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Batch: 2014-19
Of Law School,
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi

In
November, 2016
Under the guidance of
Prof. D.P. Verma