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G.R. No. 167798

April 19, 2006

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO

UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND

CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR
IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

x-----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 167930

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary
and costly redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for
individuals to be holding several identification cards;

April 19, 2006

BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIO, and JOEL G.

VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS
Representatives RAFAEL V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G.
ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR. CAROL
PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of
KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A.
TAPANG of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA,
AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,
SHARON R. DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES,
and BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS
SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as
Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and
the Administrator of the NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), Respondents.

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of
identification cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those
transacting business with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity
and reliability of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent
violations of laws involving false names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for
government.1avvphil.net All government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the
attainment of the following objectives:

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on
the ground that it is unconstitutional.

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government
and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of
redundant database containing the same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government
and those availing of government services;

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c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as
provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive
order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by
the participating agencies shall be limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common
reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five
items listed above, including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as
collected and stored, shall appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification
purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to
Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic

Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID

systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority. In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the DirectorGeneral, National Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified
government ID system containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section
3 above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of
governors or mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other
branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of ensuring
government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in
government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or
technical working groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required
for the effective performance of its functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the
objectives of this executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority,
and the pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to
ensure that the right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service
delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of
establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of
this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons
right to privacy shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be
instituted;

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d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features
and cryptographic technology; and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any
correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating
agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power
to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not
appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any
violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO
420.
4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive
Order was issued without public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results
in the discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID. 2

Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are
inconsistent with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and
Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they
allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. 1
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this
Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also
violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.

Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of
legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the
citizens right to privacy.
Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even
assuming that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised
under the circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental significance to the
people. The petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination
because all government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement
EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance
of the petitions.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by
this executive order." EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of

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their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID
cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the
GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayors Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-purpose ID
system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws
are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420
enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government
and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of
redundant database containing the same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government
and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as
provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs,
achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people
served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to
only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature;
(6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11)
Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features
like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by
government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers
license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for
identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the

ID databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for
identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems,
either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under
their existing ID systems, some government entities collect and record more data than what EO
420 allows. At present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate,
and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court,9 the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including
the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code
Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood
Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14)
Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we
consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the employee, the Courts
ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only "the first five items
listed" in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or
only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than
the proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained
in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification
Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID
formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms
of procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software,
ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID
format for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of
their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these
government entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420.
Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government
entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

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A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First,
the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement
making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their
own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings,
greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does
not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities
under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience
to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need
any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and
does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420
does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized
to issue voters ID cards.10 This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches
of government.

Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department.
EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420,
the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed
existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and
user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under
existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID
card does not require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees.
Private and public schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and
associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to
insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These
ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a
person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First,
when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is
no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on
all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as
compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually
required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and
in general, improve public services.11 The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format
under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public
services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID
card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or
funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all
citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data
while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under
EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to
EO 420.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The
President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to
have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already

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collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government
entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only
difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus
the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number which is needed for
cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of identification.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent
of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can
collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition,
government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data
than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should
undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and
systems, and provide user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of
ID cards are day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the
Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level
courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely
the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing
safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect
the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary.
The same is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities
under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card
issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does
not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not
constitute usurpation of legislative power.
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing
ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints
from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There
have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities
prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even
have less basis to complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and
stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID
card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system
under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate
systems prior to EO 420.

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of
establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of
this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons
right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be
instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features
and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any
correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating
agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that
can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government
entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data
collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such
as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which

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do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public
services.12 Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have
compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services,
and other specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot
perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable
ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial
losses arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will
suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.
The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v.
Connecticut,13U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 14 and
Whalen v. Roe.15 The last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is
inapplicable to the present case.
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use
and distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry
into the bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship." Because the facts and the issue involved in Griswold are materially different from
the present case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store
information on individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold
such information from the press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the
State can collect and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public
records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and
preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification records nationwide. The law also authorized
the Department of Justice to exchange such information with "officials of States, cities and other
institutions." The Department of Justice treated such information as confidential. A CBS news
correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members of
a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would "constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and the information demanded falls under that
category of exempt information.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These
data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution grants the "right of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal
matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of
public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and
not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the
ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity
EO 420.
Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over
information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that
required doctors to furnish the government reports identifying patients who received prescription
drugs that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized
database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the
prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to
privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:
Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance
companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice
even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such
disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community
does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)
Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen,
the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far
less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are
routine data for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of
patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.

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Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,16 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required
doctors performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the
inspection of such records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
"recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and that properly respect a patients confidentiality and privacy are permissible."
Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 17 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a law that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that
included the doctors name, the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions
that the woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the
marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information
publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "The collection of information with
respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the
requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion more difficult."
Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have
upheld in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure
requirements under EO 420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to
privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data
that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show
such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data
collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v.
Torres18 is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on
the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is
decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition
is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government
entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed
executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification

Reference System,"19 a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new
national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.In the present
case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient,
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance
under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive
department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.

9
TINGA, J.:

G.R. No. 144681

June 21, 2004

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE,

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN
RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE
RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M.
PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS,
KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S.
LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT,
ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B.
BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S.
ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O.
RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO,
MA. LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ,
MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL
L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY,
BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M.
BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G.
BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA,
ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D.
DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q.
MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR,
ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
DECISION

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the D
E C I S I O N,1dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents
to take their physicians oath and to register as duly licensed physicians. Equally challenged is
the R E S O L U T I O N3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in
February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical
licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical
licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne),
were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in BioChem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and
twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who
passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a
mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other
schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were
true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the
history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians
of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. 4 The PRC asked the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February
1993 Physician Licensure Examination.

10
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert
mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University,
to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores
in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De
La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima
College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He
concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two
subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should
expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." 5
For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to
the test questions."6
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro,
Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V.
De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as
intervenors.

On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive
portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby nullified
and set aside.
SO ORDERED.7
Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No.
112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show
reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial
conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the
testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without
prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that
the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to
cross-examine the witnesses.

Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The
case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.

On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons
for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing
parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also
denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was
notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.

On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the
physicians oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.

Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the
respondents herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted
in its Order dated April 4, 1994.

The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside
the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.

The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to
annul the Ordersof the trial court dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4,
1994. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
34506.

11
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993,
February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52,
and all further proceedings taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners
counsel to cross-examine the respondents witnesses, to allow petitioners to present
their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on
the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The
petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the
scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No.
93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners
waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28,
1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for
alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard,

petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil
Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the
fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners
and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this
decision) [sic],9 to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative
disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes
and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon.
David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No.
117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the
alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial
court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 9366530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise:

12
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The
petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M.
Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with accordingly.

In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents
complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination for
physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the
requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,14 they should be allowed to take their oaths as
physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.

SO ORDERED.12

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera,
one of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to
wit: Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan,
Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M.
Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. RaquenoRabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L.
Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. VicencioGamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose
Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the
case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by
intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A.
Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma.
Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick
D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo,
Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The
Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby
AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO
THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL
EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE
THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY
LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME
DOCTORS.15
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in
sustaining the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a
writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus,
mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not
a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own
pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701
that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes discretionary on the
PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements
of the law. The petitioners stress that this Courts Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No.

13
112315 held that there was no showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in rendering the questioned judgment" in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out
that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the
petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their
certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 20 16 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the requirements
of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the
licensure examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No.
2382, the petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state
or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 17 Section 3 of
Rule 6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus
may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as
Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned,
has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory authority for
the performance of the act,20 and the performance of the duty has been refused. 21 Thus, it must
be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and
register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:

It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have

fully complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure
examinations for physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-appellants
on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of
them successfully passed the same examinations.22
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should
allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would
enable respondents to practice the medical profession 23 pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical
Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding
that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to
respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that
each part of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section. 24 The intent or meaning of the
statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the
provision. Accordingly, Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in
conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had
the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as
physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word
"shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners "shall sign
and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the
requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is
given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of
his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a
physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 25 of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the
satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high
scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant
of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests.
These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.

14
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct
administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration,"
pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 26 thereof. In this case,
after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the
respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by
Section 927 of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[] examination papers
in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS
them from taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the
date of the promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the
scheduled examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the
BOARD.

Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians
who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as
"sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or
ignorance."31 Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not
find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead
sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established
by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the
writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.32 There must be a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to practice
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. 34

SO ORDERED.28
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to
petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic
Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate
of registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a
court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been
found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has
been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in
their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution No.
26,29 dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima
College of Medicine for "immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology
and Biochemistry examinations." It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained by
the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice
medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right 35 of every citizen to select a profession
or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be
so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. 37 Thus, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a previous
case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its
resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine
and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines,
without first passing the examination required by the Philippine Medical Act. 38 In another case
worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into
medical schools through admission tests.39
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic,
or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such
conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to

15
acquiring the license.40 Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary
power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down
license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on
some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and
conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. 41
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a
license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the
applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as
being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable
from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that
the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant
the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the
petition for mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies
had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time that petitioners have
sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704,
which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court
and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar
as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision, dated
July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo
opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been

rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the filing of this petition and
denial thereof should follow as a logical consequence. 42 There is no longer any
justiciable controversy so that any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.43 It should be recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court
granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was
received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December
1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was to
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of
appeal on 26 December 1994.44
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their
reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case
advance their cause any.
Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that
respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a)
appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to
elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be
unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of
certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still
available.46 However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised. 47 On this issue, no reversible error may,
thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to
dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia
C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon,
Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat,
Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa,
Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen
D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M.
Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P.
Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court
of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in
proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar
manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L.

16
Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica,
Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli
A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J.
Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver,
Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions,
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to them.
Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate courts ruling in CAG.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will
similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H.
Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma,
Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein
decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de
Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S.
Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M.
Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision dated
May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment
dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 9366530, ordering petitioners to administer the physicians oath to herein respondents as well as
the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED
AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

17

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does

hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The
respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the
Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City
Council null and void.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and
respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court,
therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the
instant petition.

City Fiscal for petitioners.

Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation
not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities
but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the
following resolution:

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant
to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation
of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.

18
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of
power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent
points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the
property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to
promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the
destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be
well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void
Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not
reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee,
and regulatesuch other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs.
Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12,
1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon
conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall
be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in
effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the
ordinance in question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of
Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to-

'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of

population of the city and provide for their burial in such
proper place and in such manner as the council may
determine, subject to the provisions of the general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12,
Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as
euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in
question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City
is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as
the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that
'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which
the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

19
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted
in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If
he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather
to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential
of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the
least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39
PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power
embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10
PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching
in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives
its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation
and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under
the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of
police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand
the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state
seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez,
L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the
due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the
Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the

taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where

there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden
shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or
local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts
resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts
that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence
to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in
favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all
the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice
that the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an
affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as
announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil.
369.)

20
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of
Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general
welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to
the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of wellordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide

for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from
said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers
of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their
exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot
stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be
considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted
the permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

21

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that
we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated
by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as
follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not
totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

22
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;

massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise

public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:

Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system
shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference

System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers is hereby established.

Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the
status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating

Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the
Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS
and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

23
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN
PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring
suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to
be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started
the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the

manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres
has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to
pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the
rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.
308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to
privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is
"the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress
is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance. 17

24
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This
means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
"incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and
procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty
and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three
branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the
Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the
organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,

personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside
government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308
involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID,
a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative
legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As
well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy
which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, 31 viz:

25
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . .
various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in
any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
32

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization

operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of
the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.

26
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, 39 and trespass to dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property
Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number
(PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies"
through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad
category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the
use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological
characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's
personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication
systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric
measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the
legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a

fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt.
The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an
individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time
service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology
employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology
produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the
"artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted
from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram.
Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat
distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all
contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are
now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an
individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological
characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state
what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to
identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data
with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O.
No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed
as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of
the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the

27
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address
and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will
not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear
and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who
shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These
factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well
to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of
sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the
data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which
will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse
and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider
that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on
an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the
computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue
adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is
simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be
extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the information is putty in
the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss
its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance
such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the
people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but
would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on
quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other
factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve
to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O.
No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology
advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer
technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and
regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC
virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the
individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public
disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74These laws, however, apply to records and
data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other
government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal
aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy
by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to
streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by
avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He
cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of
R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We
declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his
assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing

28
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. 78

infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As
we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.

The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what
practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case
at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a
fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or
regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that
their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling
state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This
approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect
human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean
towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains
the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our
bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and
private industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of the computer
to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public
services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of
telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the
computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for
those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has
revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of
cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his
personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and
databases connected to the net.

The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could
keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained
certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act
of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the
statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the
names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State
Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people
might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be
readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them
as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone
of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the
right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation.
The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of
an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially
appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was
narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The
statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the
informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public
disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by
this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in
all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to
the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV

29
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists,
etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely
to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that
everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the
threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling
the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy
was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the
development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of
science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit psychological,
anthropological sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by
elevating it to the status ofa right, specifically a private right.
Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the
publication in the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine Constitutions and
statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field
for the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the
Filipino language. Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it
perfectly natural and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs.
One has only to sit through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for
wholesome entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee
embarrassed and outraged by turns.

Separate Opinions

With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with
its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill
of Rights of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in
essence facets of the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of
government.

Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is
endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he has
the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral and
ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense of
shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself and
the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and ears
and their extensions, whether form individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.

So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads
into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulder, that it must,
without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion;

What marks offs man from a beast?

I, therefore, VOTE for the nullification of A.O. No. 308.

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of
God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened" forthwith
"they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down the corridors of time, we
find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate
themselves from the rest of humanity.

One can appreciate the concern expressed by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, echoing that of the petitioner, the Honorable Blas F. Ople, on the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 308 by the President of the Philippines and the dangers its
implementation could bring. I find it hard, nevertheless, to peremptorily assume at this time that
the administrative order will be misused and to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be

30
derived from, or the merits of, a nationwide computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile. The
imperatives, I believe, would instead be to now install specific safeguards and control measures
that may be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. Here, it may be
apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario 1 that
As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 2
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed,
allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable
comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.

to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute
be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the
issue is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. 1
Be that as it may, the scholarly discussions of Justices Romero, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza
on the constitutional right to privacy and freedom of thought may stil become useful guides to our
lawmakers, when and if Congress should deliberate on a bill establishing a national identification
system.
Let it be noted that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on
these points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is only
on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;
The pioneering efforts of the executive to adopt a national computerized identification reference
system has met fierce opposition. It has spun dark predictions of sinister government ploys to
tamper with the citizen's right to privacy and ominous forecasts of a return to authoritarianism.
Lost in the uproar, however, is the simple fact that there is nothing in the whole breadth and
lenght of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.

Prescinding from the foregoing, and most importantly to this instance, the subject covered by the
questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all
individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and
appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the
policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.

A.O. No. 308 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December 1996 reads:

WHEREFORE, I vote for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and
impermissible exercise of legislative power by the Executive.

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

ADMTNISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents

with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic services and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;

I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally
sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country.
The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate
without a legislative enactment.

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently

identify persons seeking basic services and social security and reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

I reserve judgmeht on the issue of wherher a national ID system is an infringement of the

constitutional right to privacy or the freedom of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law

31
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:
Sec. 1 Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:
Head Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System
Administrator, Social Security System
Administrator, National Statistics Office

Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the

Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Offices, the GSIS
and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system
shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on
the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8 Effectivity. This Administartive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
In seeking to strike down A.O. No. 308 as unconstitutional, petitioner argues:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
THE ISSUACE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Managing Director, National Computer Center

Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
The National Computerized Identification Reference system to which the NSO, GSIS and SSS
are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish uniform standards for ID cards
isssued by key government agencies (like the SSS) 1 for the "efficient identification of

32
persons." 2 Under the new system, only one reliable and tamper-proof I.D. need be presented by
the cardholder instead of several identification papers such as passports and driver's license, 3 to
able to transact with government agencies. The improved ID can be used to facilitate public
transactions such as:

2. It does not establish a national I.D. system neither does it require a

national I.D. card for every person.
3. The use of the I.D. is voluntary.
4. The I.D. is not required for delivery of any government service. Everyone
has the right to basic government services as long as he is qualified under
existing laws.
5. The LD. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent one to travel.
6. There will be no discrimination Non-holders of the improved I.D. are still
entitled to the same services but will be subjected to the usual rigid
identification and verification beforehand.

1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits

2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport,
marriage license, death certificate, NBI and police
clearances, and business permits
3. Availment of Medicare services in hospitals
4. Availment of welfare services
5. Application for work/employment
6. Pre-requisite for Voter's ID. 4
The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
1. Opening of bank accounts
2. Encashment of checks
3. Applications for loans, credit cards, water, power,
telephones, pagers, etc.
4. Purchase of stocks
5. Application for work/employment
6. Insurance claims
7. Receipt of payments, checks, letters, valuables, etc. 5
The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote, facilitate and
speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with private and business
entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and inconveniences the public has to suffer in
availing of basic public services and social security benefits because of inefficient and not too
reliable means of identification of the beneficiaries.
Thus, in the "Primer on the Social Security Card and Administrative Order No. 308" issued by the
SSS, a lead agency in the implementation of the said order, the following salient features are
mentioned:
1. A.O. 308 merely establishes the standards for I.D. cards issued by key
government agencies such as SSS and GSIS.

I
The issue that must first be hurdled is: was the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the
President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress?
It is not.
The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative
powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders and circulars and general or special orders. 6 An administrative order, like the one under
which the new identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987
Administrative Code:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established pursuant to the
aforaquoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as expressly stated in the order, is
to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently transact business" with the various
government agencies providing basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is
unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the
government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry
constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security
System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO). The national computerized ID system is one
such advancement. To emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to
streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The
project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the

33
Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his
administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.
Understandably, strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of power spawns differences of
opinion. For we cannot divide the branches of government into water-tight compartment. Even if
such is possible, it is neither desirable nor feasible. Bernard Schwartz, in his work Administrative
Law, A Casebook, thus states:
To be sure, if we think of the separation of powers as carrying out the
distinction between legislation and administration with mathematical
precision and as dividing the branches of government into watertight
compartments, we would probably have to conclude that any exercise of
lawmaking authority by an agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous
application of the constitutional doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible; the
only absolute separation that has ever been possible was that in the
theoretical writings of a Montesquieu, who looked across at foggy England
from his sunny Gascon vineyards and completely misconstrued what he
saw. 7

The courts have perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction of

a state constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the
government into three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of
separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition to
the fact that then may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the
three powers of the government. Moreover, the doctrine of separation of
powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to
all the ramifications of state or national governments; government would
prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the
letter. 9
In any case A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasi-legislative
powers expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as administrative head.
Hence, the contention that the President usurped the legislative prerogatives of Congress has no
firm basis.
II

A mingling of powers among the three branches of government is not a novel concept. This
blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the complexities brought about
by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty
coping with. 8
It has been said that:
The true meaning of the general doctrine of the separation of powers seems
to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
department, and that no one department ought to possess directly or
indirectly an overruling influence over the others. And it has been that this
doctrine should be applied only to the powers which because of their nature
are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments exclusively.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation
is either desirable of was ever intended, for such a complete separation
would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be-and frequently areareas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap;
and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one
of these heads.

Having resolved that the President has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O. No. 308, I
submit that it is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide
constitutional issues, the following requisites must first be satisfied:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination;
2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. 10

In this case, it is evident that the first element is missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual
case or controversy which is defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." 11 Justice Isagani A. Cruz further expounds
that "(a) justifiable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical
or abstract character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and

34
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real
and substantial controversy admitting of special relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. . . ." 12 A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or substantial controversy. It
provides the general framework of the National Computerized Identification Reference System
and lays down the basic standards (efficiency, convenience and prevention of fraudulent
transactions) for its cretion. But as manifestly indicated in the subject order, it is the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) which is tasked to research, study and formulate the guidelines
and parameters for the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs that
will and define give substance to the new system. 13 This petition is, thus, premature considering
that the IACC is still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and formalize the
details of the new system.
The majority opines that the petition is ripe for adjudication even without the promulgation of the
necessary guidelines in view of the fact that respondents have begun implementation of A.O. No.
308. The SSS, in particular, has started advertising in newspapers the invitation to bid for the
production of the I.D. cards. 14
I beg to disagree. It is not the new system itself that is intended to be implemented in the
invitation to bid but only the manufacture of the I.D. cards. Biometrics Technology is not and
cannot be used in the I.D. cards as no guidelines therefor have yet been laid down by the IACC.
Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that the guidelines be issued first.
III
Without the essential guidelines, the principal contention for invalidating the new identification
reference system that it is an impermissible encroachment on the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy is plainly groundless. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient
basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacy. Said order
simply provides the system's general framework. Without the concomitant guidelines, which
would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived violation of
the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation.
What has caused much of the hysteria over the National Computerized Identification Reference
System is the possible utilization of Biometrics Technology which refers to the use of autnomated
matching of physiological or behavioral characteristics to identify a person that would violated the
citizen's constitutionally protected right to privacy.
The majority opinion has enumerated various forms and methods of Biometrics Technology
which if adopted in the National Computaized Identification Reference System would seriously

threaten the right to privacy. Among which are biocrypt retinal scan, artificial nose and
thermogram. The majority also points to certain alleged deficiencies of A O. No. 308. Thus:
1) A.O. No. 308 does not specify the particular Biometrics Technology that
shall be used for the new identification system.
2) The order dots not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes;
3) There is no provision as to who shall control and access the data, under
what circumstances and for what purpose; and
4) There are no controls to guard against leakage of information, thus
heightening the potential for misuse and abuse.
We should not be overwhelmed by the mere mention of the Biometrics Technology and its
alleged, yet unfounded "far-reaching effects."
There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted.
The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and
unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to
provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; the
computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misreprentation; the national identification reference system is established among the key basic
services and social security providers; and finally, the IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and extent of Biometrics
Technology that will be applied and the parameters for its use (as will be defined in the
guidelines) will necessarily and logically be guided, limited and circumscribed by the afore-stated
standards. The fear entertained by the majority on the potential dangers of this new technology is
thus securedly allayed by the specific limitations set by the above-mentioned standards. More
than this, the right to privacy is well-esconced in and directly protected by various provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, and certain laws, all so painstakingly
and resourcefully catalogued in the majority opinion. Many of these laws provide penalties for
their violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages. These laws will serve as powerful
deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative rule that will violate the
constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such right.

35
Relevant to this case is the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe. 15 In that case, a
New York statute was challenged for requiring physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs of the statute's "Schedule II" category (a class of drugs having a potential for
abuse and a recognized medical use) so the names and addresses of the prescription drug
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file maintained by the New York State
Department of Health. Some patients regularly receiving prescription for "Schedule II" drugs and
doctors who prescribed such drugs brought an action questioning the validity of the statute on
the ground that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of privacy.
In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute on the
ground that the patient identification requirement is a reasonable exercise of the State's broad
police powers. The Court also held that there is no support in the record for an assumption that
the security provisions of the statute will be adiministered improperly. Finally, the Court opined
that the remote possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of
stored information will not provide adequate protection against unwarranted diclosures is not a
sufficient reason for invalidating the patient-identification program.
To be sure, there is always a possibility of an unwarranted disclosure of confidential matters
enomously accumulated in computerized data banks and in government records relating to
taxes, public health, social security benefits, military affairs, and similar matters. But as
previously pointed out, we have a sufficient number of laws prohibiting and punishing any such
unwarranted disclosures. Anent this matter, the observation in Whalen vs. Roe is instructive:

To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave

responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We
may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our
opinion, the measure is arbitary, capricious or unreaonable. We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by he Court
applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold. 17
Again, the concerns of the majority are premature precisely because there are as yet no
guidelines that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for determining the constitutionality
of the new identification system. The Court cannot and should not anticipate the constitutional
issues and rule on the basis of guesswok. The guidelines would, among others, determine the
particular biometrics method that would be used and the specific personal data that would be
collected provide the safeguard, (if any) and supply the details on how this new system in
supposed to work. The Court should not jump the gun on the Executive.
III

. . . We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of

vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other
massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of
our Armed Forces and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the
orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. . . . 16
The majority laments that as technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. That may be true. However, court should tread daintily on the field of social and
economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve
public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's
constitutionally protected rights. In the sobering words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:

On the issue of funding, the majority submits that Section 6 of A.O. No. 308, which allows the
government agencies included in the new system to obtain funding form their respective budgets,
is unconstitutional for being an illegal transfer of appropriations.
It is not so. The budget for the national identification system cannot be deemed a transfer of
funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by the member government
agancies. Morever, thses agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS have been issuing some form
of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards that will be issued under this new
system would just take place of the old identification cards and budget-wise, the funds that were
being used to manufacture the old ID cards, which are usually accounted for under the "Supplies
and Materials" item of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, could now be utilized to
fund the new cards. Hence, what is envisioned is not transfer of appropriations but a pooling of
funds and resources by the various government agencies involved in the project.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition.

36
In support of his contention, petitioner quotes the following publication surfed from the Internet:
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;
My vote is to dismiss the petition in this case.
First. I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the
Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. So far as I
can see, all the Administrative Orders does is
establish an Identification Reference System involving the
following service agencies of the government:
Presidential Management Staff
National Economic Developemnt Authority
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Department of Health
Government Service Isurance System
Social Security Office
National Computer Center
create a committee, composed of the heads of the agencies
concerned, to draft rules for the System;
direct the use of the Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the National Census and Statistics Office as the
common reference number to link the participating agencies into an
Identification Reference System, and the adoption by the agencies
of standards in the use of biometrics technology and computer
designs; and
provide for the funding of the System from the budgets of the
agencies concerned.
Petitioner argues, however, that "the implementation of A.O. No. 308 will mean that each and
every Filipino and resident will have a file with the government containing, at the very least,
his PRN and physiological biometrics such as, but not limited to, his facial features, hand
geometry, retinal or iris pattern, DNA pattern, fingerprints, voice characteristics, and signature
analysis."

The use of biometrics is the means by which an individual may be

conclusively identified. There are two types of biometrics identifiers; Physical
and behavioral characteristics, Physiological biometrics include facial
features, hand geometry, retinal and iris patterns. DNA, and fingerprints
characteristics include voice characteristics and signature analysis. 1
I do not see how from the bare provisions of the Order, the full text of which is set forth in the
majority opinion, petitioner and the majority can conclude that the Identification Reference
System establishes such comprehensive personal information dossiers that can destroy
individual privacy. So far as the Order provides, all that is contemplated is an identification
system based on data which the government agencies involved have already been requiring
individuals making use of their services to give.
For example, under C.A. No. 591, 2(a) the National Statistics Office collects "by enumeration,
sampling or other methods, statistics and other information concerning population . . . social and
economic institutions, and such other statistics as the President may direct." In addition, it is in
charge of the administration of the Civil Register, 2which means that it keeps records of
information concerning the civil status of persons, i.e., (a) births, (b) deaths, (c) marriages and
their annulments; (d) legitimations, (e) adoptions, (f) acknowledgments of natural children, (g)
naturalizations, and (h) changes of name. 3
Other statutes giving government agencies the power to require personal information may be
cited. R.A. No. 4136, 23 gives the Land Transportation Office the power to require applicants for
a driver's license to give information regarding the following: their full names, date of birth, height,
weight, sex, color of eyes, blood type, address, and right thumbprint; 4 while R.A. No. 8239, 5
gives the Department of Foreign Affairs the power to require passport applicants to give
information concerning their names, place of birth, date of birth, religious affiliation, marital
status, and citizenship.
Justice Romero, tracing the origin of privacy to the attempt of the first man and woman to cover
their nakedness with fig leaves, bemoans the fact that technology and institutional pressures
have threatened our sense of privacy. On the other hand, the majority would have none of the
Identification Reference System "to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, once regarded as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."" 5 Indeed,
techniques such as fingerprinting or electronic photography in banks have become
commonplace. As has been observed, the teaching hospital has come to be accepted as offering
madical services that compensate for the loss of the isolation of the sickbed; the increased
capacity of applied sciences to utilize more and more kinds of data and the cosequent calls for

37
such data have weakened traditional resistance to disclosure. As the area of relevance, political
or scientific, expands, there is strong psychological pressure to yield some ground of privacy. 6
But this is a fact of life to which we must adjust, as long as the intrusion into the domain of
privacy is reasonable. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 7 this Court dealt the coup de grace to claims of
latitudinarian scope for the right of privacy by quoting the pungent remark of an acute observer of
the social scene, Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil:
Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word for it in Filipino, and as far as
I know any Filipino dialect and there is none because there is no need for it.
The concept and practice of privacy are missing from conventional Filipino
life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary imposition, an
eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric Western
afterthought smacking of legal trickery. 8
Justice Romero herself says in her separate opinion that the word privacy is not even
in the lexicon of Filipinos.
As to whether the right of privacy is "the most valued right," we do well to remember the
encomiums paid as well to other constitutional rights. For Professor Zechariah Chafee, "The writ
of habeas corpus is "the most important human rights provision in the fundamental law,"" 9 For
Justice Cardozo, on the other hand, freedom of expression "is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 10
The point is that care must be taken in assigning values to constitutional rights for the purpose of
calibrating them on the judicial scale, especially if this means employing stricter standards of
review for regulations alleged to infringe certain rights deemed to be "most valued by civilized
men.''
Indeed, the majority concedes that "the right of privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy . . . [only that such] incursions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards
and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions." 11 In the case of the
Identification Reference System, the purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with
service agencies of the government and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation. The personal
identification of an individual can facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of
emergency. On the other hand, the delivery of material assistance, such as free medicines, can
be protected from fraud or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it possible for
unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from more than one government agency.

Second. Thus, the issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No. 308 violates the right of
privacy formed by emanations from the several constitutional rights cited by the majority. 12 The
question is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience guaranteed in the following
provisions of our Bill of Rights (Art. III):
Sec. 4. No law Shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall be forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
More specifically, the question is whether the establishment of the Identification Reference
System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their
use for identification, can become instruments of thought control. So far, the next of A.O. No. 308
affords no basis for believing that the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose. As
already stated, nothing that is not already being required by the concerned agencies of those
making use of their servides is required by the Order in question. The Order simply organizes
service agencies of the government into a System for the purpose of facilitating the identification
of persons seeking basic services and social security. Thus, the whereas clauses of A.O. No. 308
state:
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic services and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services and social security, and reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system:
The application of biometric technology and the standardization of computer designs
can provide service agencies with precise identification of individuals, but what is
wrong with that?

38
Indeed, A.O. No. 308 is no more than a directive to government agencies which the President of
the Philippines has issued in his capacity as administrative head. 13 It is not a statute. It confers
no right; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no office. 14 It is, as its name
indicates, a mere administrative order, the prescise nature of which is given in the following
excerpt from the decision in the early case of Olsen & Co. v. Herstein: 15
[It] is nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. It
creates no relation except between the official who issues it and the official
who receives it. Such orders, whether executive or departmental, have for
their object simply the efficient and economical administration of the affairs of
the department to which or in which they are issued in accordance with the
law governing the subject-matter. They are administrative in their nature and
do not pass beyond the limits of the department to which they are directed or
in which they are published, and, therefore, create no rights in third
persons. They are based on, and are the product of a relationship in which
power is their source and obedience their object. Disobedience to or
deviation from such an order can be punished only by the power which
issued it: and, if that power fails to administer the corrective, then the
disobedience goes unpunished. In that relationship no third person or official
may intervene, not even the court. Such orders may be very temporary, they
being subject to instant revocation or modification by the power which
published them. Their very nature, as determined by the relationship which
prodecued them, demonstrates clearly the impossibility of any other person
enforcing them except the one who created them. An attempt on the part of
the courts to enforce such orders would result not only in confusion but,
substantially, in departmental anarchy also. 16
Third. There is no basis for believing that, beyond the identification of individuals, the System will
be used for illegal purposes. Nor are sanctions lacking for the unauthorized use or disclosure of
information gathered by the various agencies constituting the System. For example, as the
Solicitor General points out. C.A. No. 591. 4 penalizes the unauthorized use or disclosure of
data furnished the NSO with a fine of not more than P600.00 or imprisonment for not more than
six months or both.
At all events, at this stage, it is premature to pass on the claim that the Identification Reference
System can be used for the purpose of compiling massive dossiers on individuals that can be
used to curtail basic civil and political rights since, if at all, this can only be provided in the
implementing rules and regulations which have yet to be promulgated. We have already stated
that A.O. No. 308 is not a statute. Even in the case of statutes, however, where implementing
rules are necessary to put them into effect, it has been held that an attack on their

constitutionality would be premature. 17 As Edgar in King Lear puts it, "Ripeness is all." 18 For, to
borrow some more Shakespearean lines,
The canker galls the infants of the spring
Too oft before their buttons be disclos'd. 19
That, more than any doctrine of constitutional law I can think of, succinctly expresses
the rule on ripeness, prematurity, and hypothetical, speculative, or conjectural claims.
Of special relevance to this case is Laird v. Tatum. 20 There, a class suit was brought seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the claim that a U.S. Army intelligence surveillance of civilian
political activity having "a potential for civil disorder" exercised "a present inhibiting effect on
[respondents'] full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights." In holding the case
nonjusticiable, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger. said: 21
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent or ''chilling," effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights. [Citation of cases omitted] In none of these cases,
however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental
to that individual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged exercise of
governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,
and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the
regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging. . . .
[T]hese decisions have in no way eroded the "established principle that to
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he was sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action. . . .
The respondents do not meet this test; [the] alleged "chilling" effect may
perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' perception of the system as
inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising
from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be
concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents'

39
less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at
some future date misuse the information in some way that would cause direct
harm to respondents. Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm: "the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89, 91 L Ed 754, 766, 67 S Ct 556 (1947).
Fourth. Given the fact that no right of privacy is involved in this case and that any objection to the
identification Reference System on the ground that it violates freedom of thought is premature,
speculative, or conjectural pending the issuance of the implementing rules, it is clear that
petitioner Blas F. Ople has no cause of action and, therefore, no standing to bring this action.
Indeed, although he assails A.O. No. 308 on the ground that it violates the right of privacy, he
claims no personal injury suffered as a result of the Order in question. Instead, he says he is
bringing this action as taxpayer, Senator, and member of the Government Service Insurance
System.
Insofar as petitioner claims an interest as taxpayer, it is sufficient to say that A.O. No. 308 does
not involve the exercise of the taxing or spending power of the government.
Insofar as he purports to sue as a member of the GSIS, neither does petitioner have an intertest
sufficient to enable him to litigate a constitutional question. Petitioner claims that in providing that
the funds necessary for implementing the System shall be taken from the budgets of the
concerned agencies. A.O. No. 308 violates Art. VI, 25(5) which. provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
But, as the Solicitor General states:
Petitioner's argument is anchored on two erroneous assumptions: one, that
all the concerned agencies, including the SSS and the GSIS, receive
budgetary support from the national government; and two, that the GAA is
the only law whereby public funds are appropriated. Both assumptions are
wrong.

The SSS and GSIS do not presently receive budgetary support from the
National Government. They have achieved self-supporting status such that
the contributions of their members are sufficient to finance their expenses.
One would be hard pressed to find in the GAA an appropriation of funds to
the SSS and the GSIS.
Furthermore, their respective charters authorize the SSS and the GSIS to
disburse their funds (Rep. Act No. 1161 [1954], as amended, Sec. 25; Pres.
Decree No. 1146 [1977], as amended, Sec. 29) without the need for a
separate appropriation from the Congress.
Nor as Senator can petitioner claim standing since no power of Congress is alleged to have been
impaired by the Administrative Order in question. 22 As already stated, in issuing A.O. No. 308,
the President did not exercise the legislative power vested by the Constitution in Congress. He
acted on the basis of his own powers as administrative head of the government, as distinguished
from his capacity as the Executive. Dean Sinco elucidates the crucial distinction thus:
The Constitution of the Philippines makes the President not only the
executive but also the administrative head of the government. . . . Executive
power refers to the legal and political function of the President involving the
exercise of discretion. Administrative power, on the other hand, concerns
itself with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. These two functions are often confused by
the public: but they are distinct from each other. The President as the
executive authority has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. As administrative head,
his duty is to see that every government office is managed and maintained
properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations.
. . . The power of control vested in him by the Constitution makes for a
strongly centralized administrative system. It reinforces further his position as
the executive of the government, enabling him to comply more effectively
with his constitutional duty to enforce the laws. It enables him to fix a uniform
standard of a administrative eficiency and to check the official conduct of his
agents. The decisions of all the officers within his department are subject to
his power of revision, either on his own motion or on the appeal of some
individual who might deem himself aggrieved by the action of an
administrative official. In case of serious dereliction of duty, he may suspend
or remove the officials concerned. 23

40
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be DISMISSED.
# Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
What marks offs man from a beast?
Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is
endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he has
the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral and
ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense of
shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself and
the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and ears
and their extensions, whether form individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.
Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of
God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened" forthwith
"they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down the corridors of time, we
find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate
themselves from the rest of humanity.
Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the
development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of
science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit psychological,
anthropological sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by
elevating it to the status ofa right, specifically a private right.
Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the
publication in the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine Constitutions and
statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field
for the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the
Filipino language. Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it
perfectly natural and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs.

One has only to sit through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for
wholesome entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee
embarrassed and outraged by turns.
With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with
its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill
of Rights of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in
essence facets of the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of
government.
So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads
into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulder, that it must,
without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.
I, therefore, VOTE for the nullification of A.O. No. 308.
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
One can appreciate the concern expressed by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, echoing that of the petitioner, the Honorable Blas F. Ople, on the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 308 by the President of the Philippines and the dangers its
implementation could bring. I find it hard, nevertheless, to peremptorily assume at this time that
the administrative order will be misused and to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be
derived from, or the merits of, a nationwide computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile. The
imperatives, I believe, would instead be to now install specific safeguards and control measures
that may be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any such device. Here, it may be
apropos to recall the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario 1 that
As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 2

41
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed,
allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable
comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and most importantly to this instance, the subject covered by the
questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all
individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and
appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the
policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the
authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
WHEREFORE, I vote for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 308 for being an undue and
impermissible exercise of legislative power by the Executive.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally
sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country.
The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate
without a legislative enactment.
I reserve judgmeht on the issue of wherher a national ID system is an infringement of the
constitutional right to privacy or the freedom of thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law
to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper petition, may the provisions of the statute
be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their constitutional foundation. Until such time, the
issue is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative and academic. 1
Be that as it may, the scholarly discussions of Justices Romero, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza
on the constitutional right to privacy and freedom of thought may stil become useful guides to our
lawmakers, when and if Congress should deliberate on a bill establishing a national identification
system.
Let it be noted that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on
these points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is only
on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion;

The pioneering efforts of the executive to adopt a national computerized identification reference
system has met fierce opposition. It has spun dark predictions of sinister government ploys to
tamper with the citizen's right to privacy and ominous forecasts of a return to authoritarianism.
Lost in the uproar, however, is the simple fact that there is nothing in the whole breadth and
lenght of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint constitutional infirmity.
A.O. No. 308 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December 1996 reads:
ADMTNISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic services and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services and social security and reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Repubic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the
following:
Sec. 1 Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key
basic services and social security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the
implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:

42
Head Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System
Administrator, Social Security System
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN)
generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall
coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to
establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer
application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the
Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Offices, the GSIS
and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a
massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system
shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on
the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8 Effectivity. This Administartive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.

In seeking to strike down A.O. No. 308 as unconstitutional, petitioner argues:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
THE ISSUACE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
The National Computerized Identification Reference system to which the NSO, GSIS and SSS
are linked as lead members of the IACC is intended to establish uniform standards for ID cards
isssued by key government agencies (like the SSS) 1 for the "efficient identification of
persons." 2 Under the new system, only one reliable and tamper-proof I.D. need be presented by
the cardholder instead of several identification papers such as passports and driver's license, 3 to
able to transact with government agencies. The improved ID can be used to facilitate public
transactions such as:
1. Payment of SSS and GSIS benefits
2. Applications for driver's license, BIR TIN, passport,
marriage license, death certificate, NBI and police
clearances, and business permits
3. Availment of Medicare services in hospitals
4. Availment of welfare services
5. Application for work/employment
6. Pre-requisite for Voter's ID. 4
The card may also be used for private transactions such as:
1. Opening of bank accounts
2. Encashment of checks

43
3. Applications for loans, credit cards, water, power,
telephones, pagers, etc.
4. Purchase of stocks
5. Application for work/employment
6. Insurance claims
7. Receipt of payments, checks, letters, valuables, etc. 5
The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote, facilitate and
speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with private and business
entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and inconveniences the public has to suffer in
availing of basic public services and social security benefits because of inefficient and not too
reliable means of identification of the beneficiaries.
Thus, in the "Primer on the Social Security Card and Administrative Order No. 308" issued by the
SSS, a lead agency in the implementation of the said order, the following salient features are
mentioned:
1. A.O. 308 merely establishes the standards for I.D. cards issued by key
government agencies such as SSS and GSIS.
2. It does not establish a national I.D. system neither does it require a
national I.D. card for every person.
3. The use of the I.D. is voluntary.
4. The I.D. is not required for delivery of any government service. Everyone
has the right to basic government services as long as he is qualified under
existing laws.
5. The LD. cannot and will not in any way be used to prevent one to travel.
6. There will be no discrimination Non-holders of the improved I.D. are still
entitled to the same services but will be subjected to the usual rigid
identification and verification beforehand.
I

The issue that must first be hurdled is: was the issuance of A.O. No. 308 an exercise by the
President of legislative power properly belonging to Congress?
It is not.
The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with quasi-legislative
powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders and circulars and general or special orders. 6 An administrative order, like the one under
which the new identification system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987
Administrative Code:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
The National Computerized Identification Reference System was established pursuant to the
aforaquoted provision precisely because its principal purpose, as expressly stated in the order, is
to provide the people with "the facility to conveniently transact business" with the various
government agencies providing basic services. Being the "administrative head," it is
unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the
government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry
constantly transact with, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security
System (SSS) and National Statistics Office (NSO). The national computerized ID system is one
such advancement. To emphasize, the new identification reference system is created to
streamline the bureaucracy, cut the red tape and ultimately achieve administrative efficiency. The
project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the
Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his
administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers, quoted above.
Understandably, strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of power spawns differences of
opinion. For we cannot divide the branches of government into water-tight compartment. Even if
such is possible, it is neither desirable nor feasible. Bernard Schwartz, in his work Administrative
Law, A Casebook, thus states:
To be sure, if we think of the separation of powers as carrying out the
distinction between legislation and administration with mathematical
precision and as dividing the branches of government into watertight
compartments, we would probably have to conclude that any exercise of
lawmaking authority by an agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous

44
application of the constitutional doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible; the
only absolute separation that has ever been possible was that in the
theoretical writings of a Montesquieu, who looked across at foggy England
from his sunny Gascon vineyards and completely misconstrued what he
saw. 7

In any case A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President pursuant to the quasi-legislative
powers expressly granted to him by law and in accordance with his duty as administrative head.
Hence, the contention that the President usurped the legislative prerogatives of Congress has no
firm basis.
II

A mingling of powers among the three branches of government is not a novel concept. This
blending of powers has become necessary to properly address the complexities brought about
by a rapidly developing society and which the traditional branches of government have difficulty
coping with. 8
It has been said that:
The true meaning of the general doctrine of the separation of powers seems
to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
department, and that no one department ought to possess directly or
indirectly an overruling influence over the others. And it has been that this
doctrine should be applied only to the powers which because of their nature
are assigned by the constitution itself to one of the departments exclusively.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that an entire and complete separation
is either desirable of was ever intended, for such a complete separation
would be impracticable if not impossible; there may be-and frequently areareas in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers blend or overlap;
and many officers whose duties cannot be exclusively placed under any one
of these heads.
The courts have perceived the necessity of avoiding a narrow construction of
a state constitutional provision for the division of the powers of the
government into three distinct departments, for it is impractical to view the
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. Thus, the modern view of
separation of powers rejects the metaphysical abstractions and reverts
instead to more pragmatic, flexible, functional approach, giving recognition to
the fact that then may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the
three powers of the government. Moreover, the doctrine of separation of
powers has never been strictly or rigidly applied, and indeed could not be, to
all the ramifications of state or national governments; government would
prove abortive if it were attempted to follow the policy of separation to the
letter. 9

Having resolved that the President has the authority and prerogative to issue A.O. No. 308, I
submit that it is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide
constitutional issues, the following requisites must first be satisfied:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination;
2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. 10
In this case, it is evident that the first element is missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual
case or controversy which is defined as "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory." 11 Justice Isagani A. Cruz further expounds
that "(a) justifiable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical
or abstract character or from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real
and substantial controversy admitting of special relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. . . ." 12 A.O. No. 308 does not create any concrete or substantial controversy. It
provides the general framework of the National Computerized Identification Reference System
and lays down the basic standards (efficiency, convenience and prevention of fraudulent
transactions) for its cretion. But as manifestly indicated in the subject order, it is the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) which is tasked to research, study and formulate the guidelines
and parameters for the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs that
will and define give substance to the new system. 13 This petition is, thus, premature considering
that the IACC is still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and formalize the
details of the new system.
The majority opines that the petition is ripe for adjudication even without the promulgation of the
necessary guidelines in view of the fact that respondents have begun implementation of A.O. No.

45
308. The SSS, in particular, has started advertising in newspapers the invitation to bid for the
production of the I.D. cards. 14

There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the right of privacy will be adopted.

I beg to disagree. It is not the new system itself that is intended to be implemented in the
invitation to bid but only the manufacture of the I.D. cards. Biometrics Technology is not and
cannot be used in the I.D. cards as no guidelines therefor have yet been laid down by the IACC.
Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that the guidelines be issued first.

The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption of the new system are clear-cut and
unequivocably spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the order, namely, the need to
provide citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; the
computerized system is intended to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services or social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misreprentation; the national identification reference system is established among the key basic
services and social security providers; and finally, the IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of
Biometrics Technology. Consequently, the choice of the particular form and extent of Biometrics
Technology that will be applied and the parameters for its use (as will be defined in the
guidelines) will necessarily and logically be guided, limited and circumscribed by the afore-stated
standards. The fear entertained by the majority on the potential dangers of this new technology is
thus securedly allayed by the specific limitations set by the above-mentioned standards. More
than this, the right to privacy is well-esconced in and directly protected by various provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, and certain laws, all so painstakingly
and resourcefully catalogued in the majority opinion. Many of these laws provide penalties for
their violation in the form of imprisonment, fines, or damages. These laws will serve as powerful
deterrents not only in the establishment of any administrative rule that will violate the
constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also to would-be transgressors of such right.

III
Without the essential guidelines, the principal contention for invalidating the new identification
reference system that it is an impermissible encroachment on the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy is plainly groundless. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient
basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacy. Said order
simply provides the system's general framework. Without the concomitant guidelines, which
would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived violation of
the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation.
What has caused much of the hysteria over the National Computerized Identification Reference
System is the possible utilization of Biometrics Technology which refers to the use of autnomated
matching of physiological or behavioral characteristics to identify a person that would violated the
citizen's constitutionally protected right to privacy.
The majority opinion has enumerated various forms and methods of Biometrics Technology
which if adopted in the National Computaized Identification Reference System would seriously
threaten the right to privacy. Among which are biocrypt retinal scan, artificial nose and
thermogram. The majority also points to certain alleged deficiencies of A O. No. 308. Thus:
1) A.O. No. 308 does not specify the particular Biometrics Technology that
shall be used for the new identification system.
2) The order dots not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes;
3) There is no provision as to who shall control and access the data, under
what circumstances and for what purpose; and
4) There are no controls to guard against leakage of information, thus
heightening the potential for misuse and abuse.
We should not be overwhelmed by the mere mention of the Biometrics Technology and its
alleged, yet unfounded "far-reaching effects."

Relevant to this case is the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe. 15 In that case, a
New York statute was challenged for requiring physicians to identify patients obtaining
prescription drugs of the statute's "Schedule II" category (a class of drugs having a potential for
abuse and a recognized medical use) so the names and addresses of the prescription drug
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file maintained by the New York State
Department of Health. Some patients regularly receiving prescription for "Schedule II" drugs and
doctors who prescribed such drugs brought an action questioning the validity of the statute on
the ground that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of privacy.
In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute on the
ground that the patient identification requirement is a reasonable exercise of the State's broad
police powers. The Court also held that there is no support in the record for an assumption that
the security provisions of the statute will be adiministered improperly. Finally, the Court opined
that the remote possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of
stored information will not provide adequate protection against unwarranted diclosures is not a
sufficient reason for invalidating the patient-identification program.

46
To be sure, there is always a possibility of an unwarranted disclosure of confidential matters
enomously accumulated in computerized data banks and in government records relating to
taxes, public health, social security benefits, military affairs, and similar matters. But as
previously pointed out, we have a sufficient number of laws prohibiting and punishing any such
unwarranted disclosures. Anent this matter, the observation in Whalen vs. Roe is instructive:
. . . We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of
vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other
massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of
our Armed Forces and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the
orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. . . . 16
The majority laments that as technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. That may be true. However, court should tread daintily on the field of social and
economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve
public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's
constitutionally protected rights. In the sobering words of Mr. Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We
may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our
opinion, the measure is arbitary, capricious or unreaonable. We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by he Court
applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold. 17
Again, the concerns of the majority are premature precisely because there are as yet no
guidelines that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for determining the constitutionality
of the new identification system. The Court cannot and should not anticipate the constitutional
issues and rule on the basis of guesswok. The guidelines would, among others, determine the

particular biometrics method that would be used and the specific personal data that would be
collected provide the safeguard, (if any) and supply the details on how this new system in
supposed to work. The Court should not jump the gun on the Executive.
III
On the issue of funding, the majority submits that Section 6 of A.O. No. 308, which allows the
government agencies included in the new system to obtain funding form their respective budgets,
is unconstitutional for being an illegal transfer of appropriations.
It is not so. The budget for the national identification system cannot be deemed a transfer of
funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by the member government
agancies. Morever, thses agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS have been issuing some form
of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards that will be issued under this new
system would just take place of the old identification cards and budget-wise, the funds that were
being used to manufacture the old ID cards, which are usually accounted for under the "Supplies
and Materials" item of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, could now be utilized to
fund the new cards. Hence, what is envisioned is not transfer of appropriations but a pooling of
funds and resources by the various government agencies involved in the project.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion;
My vote is to dismiss the petition in this case.
First. I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the
Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. So far as I
can see, all the Administrative Orders does is
establish an Identification Reference System involving the
following service agencies of the government:
Presidential Management Staff
National Economic Developemnt Authority
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Department of Health
Government Service Isurance System
Social Security Office
National Computer Center

47
create a committee, composed of the heads of the agencies
concerned, to draft rules for the System;

their annulments; (d) legitimations, (e) adoptions, (f) acknowledgments of natural children, (g)
naturalizations, and (h) changes of name. 3

direct the use of the Population Reference Number (PRN)

generated by the National Census and Statistics Office as the
common reference number to link the participating agencies into an
Identification Reference System, and the adoption by the agencies
of standards in the use of biometrics technology and computer
designs; and

Other statutes giving government agencies the power to require personal information may be
cited. R.A. No. 4136, 23 gives the Land Transportation Office the power to require applicants for
a driver's license to give information regarding the following: their full names, date of birth, height,
weight, sex, color of eyes, blood type, address, and right thumbprint; 4 while R.A. No. 8239, 5
gives the Department of Foreign Affairs the power to require passport applicants to give
information concerning their names, place of birth, date of birth, religious affiliation, marital
status, and citizenship.

provide for the funding of the System from the budgets of the
agencies concerned.
Petitioner argues, however, that "the implementation of A.O. No. 308 will mean that each and
every Filipino and resident will have a file with the government containing, at the very least,
his PRN and physiological biometrics such as, but not limited to, his facial features, hand
geometry, retinal or iris pattern, DNA pattern, fingerprints, voice characteristics, and signature
analysis."
In support of his contention, petitioner quotes the following publication surfed from the Internet:
The use of biometrics is the means by which an individual may be
conclusively identified. There are two types of biometrics identifiers; Physical
and behavioral characteristics, Physiological biometrics include facial
features, hand geometry, retinal and iris patterns. DNA, and fingerprints
characteristics include voice characteristics and signature analysis. 1
I do not see how from the bare provisions of the Order, the full text of which is set forth in the
majority opinion, petitioner and the majority can conclude that the Identification Reference
System establishes such comprehensive personal information dossiers that can destroy
individual privacy. So far as the Order provides, all that is contemplated is an identification
system based on data which the government agencies involved have already been requiring
individuals making use of their services to give.
For example, under C.A. No. 591, 2(a) the National Statistics Office collects "by enumeration,
sampling or other methods, statistics and other information concerning population . . . social and
economic institutions, and such other statistics as the President may direct." In addition, it is in
charge of the administration of the Civil Register, 2which means that it keeps records of
information concerning the civil status of persons, i.e., (a) births, (b) deaths, (c) marriages and

Justice Romero, tracing the origin of privacy to the attempt of the first man and woman to cover
their nakedness with fig leaves, bemoans the fact that technology and institutional pressures
have threatened our sense of privacy. On the other hand, the majority would have none of the
Identification Reference System "to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, once regarded as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."" 5 Indeed,
techniques such as fingerprinting or electronic photography in banks have become
commonplace. As has been observed, the teaching hospital has come to be accepted as offering
madical services that compensate for the loss of the isolation of the sickbed; the increased
capacity of applied sciences to utilize more and more kinds of data and the cosequent calls for
such data have weakened traditional resistance to disclosure. As the area of relevance, political
or scientific, expands, there is strong psychological pressure to yield some ground of privacy. 6
But this is a fact of life to which we must adjust, as long as the intrusion into the domain of
privacy is reasonable. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 7 this Court dealt the coup de grace to claims of
latitudinarian scope for the right of privacy by quoting the pungent remark of an acute observer of
the social scene, Carmen Guerrero-Nakpil:
Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word for it in Filipino, and as far as
I know any Filipino dialect and there is none because there is no need for it.
The concept and practice of privacy are missing from conventional Filipino
life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary imposition, an
eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric Western
afterthought smacking of legal trickery. 8
Justice Romero herself says in her separate opinion that the word privacy is not even
in the lexicon of Filipinos.
As to whether the right of privacy is "the most valued right," we do well to remember the
encomiums paid as well to other constitutional rights. For Professor Zechariah Chafee, "The writ

48
of habeas corpus is "the most important human rights provision in the fundamental law,"" 9 For
Justice Cardozo, on the other hand, freedom of expression "is the matrix, the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 10
The point is that care must be taken in assigning values to constitutional rights for the purpose of
calibrating them on the judicial scale, especially if this means employing stricter standards of
review for regulations alleged to infringe certain rights deemed to be "most valued by civilized
men.''
Indeed, the majority concedes that "the right of privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy . . . [only that such] incursions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards
and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions." 11 In the case of the
Identification Reference System, the purpose is to facilitate the transaction of business with
service agencies of the government and to prevent fraud and misrepresentation. The personal
identification of an individual can facilitate his treatment in any government hospital in case of
emergency. On the other hand, the delivery of material assistance, such as free medicines, can
be protected from fraud or misrepresentation as the absence of a data base makes it possible for
unscrupulous individuals to obtain assistance from more than one government agency.
Second. Thus, the issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No. 308 violates the right of
privacy formed by emanations from the several constitutional rights cited by the majority. 12 The
question is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience guaranteed in the following
provisions of our Bill of Rights (Art. III):
Sec. 4. No law Shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall be forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
More specifically, the question is whether the establishment of the Identification Reference
System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their
use for identification, can become instruments of thought control. So far, the next of A.O. No. 308
affords no basis for believing that the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose. As
already stated, nothing that is not already being required by the concerned agencies of those
making use of their servides is required by the Order in question. The Order simply organizes

service agencies of the government into a System for the purpose of facilitating the identification
of persons seeking basic services and social security. Thus, the whereas clauses of A.O. No. 308
state:
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic services and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services and social security, and reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system:
The application of biometric technology and the standardization of computer designs
can provide service agencies with precise identification of individuals, but what is
wrong with that?
Indeed, A.O. No. 308 is no more than a directive to government agencies which the President of
the Philippines has issued in his capacity as administrative head. 13 It is not a statute. It confers
no right; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no office. 14 It is, as its name
indicates, a mere administrative order, the prescise nature of which is given in the following
excerpt from the decision in the early case of Olsen & Co. v. Herstein: 15
[It] is nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. It
creates no relation except between the official who issues it and the official
who receives it. Such orders, whether executive or departmental, have for
their object simply the efficient and economical administration of the affairs of
the department to which or in which they are issued in accordance with the
law governing the subject-matter. They are administrative in their nature and
do not pass beyond the limits of the department to which they are directed or
in which they are published, and, therefore, create no rights in third
persons. They are based on, and are the product of a relationship in which
power is their source and obedience their object. Disobedience to or
deviation from such an order can be punished only by the power which
issued it: and, if that power fails to administer the corrective, then the
disobedience goes unpunished. In that relationship no third person or official
may intervene, not even the court. Such orders may be very temporary, they

49
being subject to instant revocation or modification by the power which
published them. Their very nature, as determined by the relationship which
prodecued them, demonstrates clearly the impossibility of any other person
enforcing them except the one who created them. An attempt on the part of
the courts to enforce such orders would result not only in confusion but,
substantially, in departmental anarchy also. 16
Third. There is no basis for believing that, beyond the identification of individuals, the System will
be used for illegal purposes. Nor are sanctions lacking for the unauthorized use or disclosure of
information gathered by the various agencies constituting the System. For example, as the
Solicitor General points out. C.A. No. 591. 4 penalizes the unauthorized use or disclosure of
data furnished the NSO with a fine of not more than P600.00 or imprisonment for not more than
six months or both.
At all events, at this stage, it is premature to pass on the claim that the Identification Reference
System can be used for the purpose of compiling massive dossiers on individuals that can be
used to curtail basic civil and political rights since, if at all, this can only be provided in the
implementing rules and regulations which have yet to be promulgated. We have already stated
that A.O. No. 308 is not a statute. Even in the case of statutes, however, where implementing
rules are necessary to put them into effect, it has been held that an attack on their
constitutionality would be premature. 17 As Edgar in King Lear puts it, "Ripeness is all." 18 For, to
borrow some more Shakespearean lines,
The canker galls the infants of the spring
Too oft before their buttons be disclos'd. 19
That, more than any doctrine of constitutional law I can think of, succinctly expresses
the rule on ripeness, prematurity, and hypothetical, speculative, or conjectural claims.
Of special relevance to this case is Laird v. Tatum. 20 There, a class suit was brought seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the claim that a U.S. Army intelligence surveillance of civilian
political activity having "a potential for civil disorder" exercised "a present inhibiting effect on
[respondents'] full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights." In holding the case
nonjusticiable, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger. said: 21
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent or ''chilling," effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights. [Citation of cases omitted] In none of these cases,

however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental
to that individual. Rather, in each of these cases, the challenged exercise of
governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,
and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the
regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging. . . .
[T]hese decisions have in no way eroded the "established principle that to
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he was sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action. . . .
The respondents do not meet this test; [the] alleged "chilling" effect may
perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' perception of the system as
inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising
from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be
concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents'
less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at
some future date misuse the information in some way that would cause direct
harm to respondents. Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm: "the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution do not render advisory opinions." United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89, 91 L Ed 754, 766, 67 S Ct 556 (1947).
Fourth. Given the fact that no right of privacy is involved in this case and that any objection to the
identification Reference System on the ground that it violates freedom of thought is premature,
speculative, or conjectural pending the issuance of the implementing rules, it is clear that
petitioner Blas F. Ople has no cause of action and, therefore, no standing to bring this action.
Indeed, although he assails A.O. No. 308 on the ground that it violates the right of privacy, he
claims no personal injury suffered as a result of the Order in question. Instead, he says he is
bringing this action as taxpayer, Senator, and member of the Government Service Insurance
System.
Insofar as petitioner claims an interest as taxpayer, it is sufficient to say that A.O. No. 308 does
not involve the exercise of the taxing or spending power of the government.

50
Insofar as he purports to sue as a member of the GSIS, neither does petitioner have an intertest
sufficient to enable him to litigate a constitutional question. Petitioner claims that in providing that
the funds necessary for implementing the System shall be taken from the budgets of the
concerned agencies. A.O. No. 308 violates Art. VI, 25(5) which. provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
But, as the Solicitor General states:
Petitioner's argument is anchored on two erroneous assumptions: one, that
all the concerned agencies, including the SSS and the GSIS, receive
budgetary support from the national government; and two, that the GAA is
the only law whereby public funds are appropriated. Both assumptions are
wrong.
The SSS and GSIS do not presently receive budgetary support from the
National Government. They have achieved self-supporting status such that
the contributions of their members are sufficient to finance their expenses.
One would be hard pressed to find in the GAA an appropriation of funds to
the SSS and the GSIS.
Furthermore, their respective charters authorize the SSS and the GSIS to
disburse their funds (Rep. Act No. 1161 [1954], as amended, Sec. 25; Pres.
Decree No. 1146 [1977], as amended, Sec. 29) without the need for a
separate appropriation from the Congress.
Nor as Senator can petitioner claim standing since no power of Congress is alleged to have been
impaired by the Administrative Order in question. 22 As already stated, in issuing A.O. No. 308,
the President did not exercise the legislative power vested by the Constitution in Congress. He
acted on the basis of his own powers as administrative head of the government, as distinguished
from his capacity as the Executive. Dean Sinco elucidates the crucial distinction thus:
The Constitution of the Philippines makes the President not only the
executive but also the administrative head of the government. . . . Executive
power refers to the legal and political function of the President involving the

exercise of discretion. Administrative power, on the other hand, concerns

itself with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. These two functions are often confused by
the public: but they are distinct from each other. The President as the
executive authority has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. As administrative head,
his duty is to see that every government office is managed and maintained
properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations.
. . . The power of control vested in him by the Constitution makes for a
strongly centralized administrative system. It reinforces further his position as
the executive of the government, enabling him to comply more effectively
with his constitutional duty to enforce the laws. It enables him to fix a uniform
standard of a administrative eficiency and to check the official conduct of his
agents. The decisions of all the officers within his department are subject to
his power of revision, either on his own motion or on the appeal of some
individual who might deem himself aggrieved by the action of an
administrative official. In case of serious dereliction of duty, he may suspend
or remove the officials concerned. 23
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be DISMISSED.

51
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 17th day of July, 1913, C.A. Sobral, assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila,
presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said city, charging the defendant with the
crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 310 of the
Philippine Commission. The complaint alleged:
That in, during, and between the months of January, 1911 and June, 1913, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Dominador Gomez Jesus having been suspended
from the practice of medicine on or about August 28, 1909, by the Board of Medical
Examiners, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of said Act No. 310, and
while his license as a physician and surgeon was revoked by the said Board of Medical
Examiners, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously treat, operate upon,
prescribe, and advise for the physical ailments of one Margarita Dolores and other
persons, for a fee, and presented himself by means of signs, cards, advertisements,
and otherwise as a physician and surgeon, duly admitted, empowered, and allowed to
practice medicine, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, when in truth and in fact as
the said Dominador Gomez Jesus well knew, he was not allowed to practice medicine
in any way in the city of Manila, or anywhere in the Philippine Islands, for a fee, and
when, as he well knew, the rendering of medical and surgical services by him to the
said Margarita Dolores and other persons in the city of Manila was for a fee, and not in
a case of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies, or through a call in
consultation with other duly admitted physicians or surgeons."

G.R. No. L-9651

August 4, 1915

On the 22nd day of July, 1913, the defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint, upon the
following grounds: (1) That the complaint was not in the form required by law; (2) that the facts in
said complaint did not constitute a crime; (3) that the complaint itself contains allegations which
in truth would constitute a justification or legal exemption for the accused."

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINADOR GOMEZ JESUS, defendant-appellant.

After hearing the arguments for the defense and the prosecution on said demurrer, the
Honorable Jose C. Abreu, in very interesting opinion in which he discusses fully said demurrer,
reached the conclusion that the complaint was sufficient, and overruled said demurrer.

Recarado Ma. Calvo for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.

On the 26th day of August, 1913, the defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The
cause was brought on for trial before the Honorable George N. Hurd, on the 9th of September,
1913.

52
After hearing the evidence, the said judge, in a very interesting and well-reasoned opinion, found
the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the same or any part thereof, and to pay the
costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
I. The court erred in declaring that the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310 are not in
conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill enacted by the Congress of the United
States on July 1, 1902.
II. The court likewise erred in declaring to be valid and effective that portion of section 8
of Act No. 310 which empowers the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the
certificate of a physician who may have been convicted of any offense involving
immoral or dishonorable conduct or for unprofessional conduct.

2. That some time prior to the said 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been accused,
arrested, tried, and found guilty of a violation of the Opium Law.
3. That in the month of August, 1909, the defendant was cited to appear before the "Board of
Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands," to show cause why his license to practice
medicine should not be revoked, in accordance with the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310.
4. That on the date set, the Board proceeded to make an investigation of the question of the
revocation of the license of the defendant to practice medicine, based upon the fact that he had
been theretofore convicted of an "offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct."
5. That after the conclusion of said investigation, the Board reached the conclusion (a) that the
defendant had been guilty of an "offensive involving immoral or dishonorable conduct;" and (b)
adopted a resolution revoking his license to practice medicine.

III. The court likewise erred in considering to be final the decision of the Board of
Medical Examiners revoking the certificate of the herein defendant, notwithstanding the
appeal carried to the Board of Health and not yet heard and finally decided thereby as
section 8 of Act No. 310 provides.

6. That the defendant was duly notified of the action of said Board.

IV. The court also erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the evidence
adduced by the defense tending to demonstrate that the defendant's certificate as
doctor of medicine represents a value greater than P600.

8. That later, and after the license of the defendant to practice medicine had been revoked, he
did practice medicine in the Philippine Islands by treating, operating upon, prescribing he
charged a fee, and that said treating, operating, and prescribing medicine for said various
persons were not in cases of emergency, or in the administration of family remedies.

V. The court likewise erred in holding that the "Hotel Quirurgico" is Doctor Gomez
himself and that such institution exists only to cloak the violation of the law by the
defendant.
VI. The court erred, finally, in sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P200 or, in
default thereof, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs of the trial.

7. That later the defendant appealed to the Director of Health, which appeal was finally
withdrawn by him.

9. That the defendant is not a medical officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy,
the United States Marine Hospital Service, nor a physician or surgeon from other countries called
in consultation, nor a medical student, practicing medicine under the direct supervision of a
preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.
Upon the foregoing facts, the lower court imposed the fine indicated above.

The facts disclosed by the record are as follows:

1. That some time prior to the 28th day of August, 1909, the defendant had been admitted, or
had been licensed to practiced medicine in the Philippine Islands.

The appellant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that section 8 of said Act No. 310
is in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), and is,
therefore, void. Act No. 310, among other things, provides:

53
1. (a) For the creation of "A Board of Medical Examiners for the Philippine Islands." (b) That said
Board shall examine candidates desiring to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands, and to
issue a certificate of registration to such persons who are found to be qualified, in accordance
with the provisions of said law, to practice medicine, etc.
2. That after the 1st of March, 1902, it shall be unlawful for any person to practice medicine,
surgery, etc., in any of its branches in the Philippine Islands, unless he hold such certificate of
registration.
3. That said Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue such certificate of registration to
any individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or
dishonorable conduct.
4. That said Board might revoke any certificate of registration theretofore granted to any person
in case he should be convicted of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct, or for
unprofessional conduct.

certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands,
the decision of which shall be final."
That part of the Act of Congress upon which the appellant relies to show that Act No. 310 is void
is paragraph 1 of section 5. Said paragraph reads as follows: "That no law shall be enacted in
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
The appellants gives three reasons why section 8 of Act No. 310 is void. They are: (a) That the
provisions of section 8 of Act No. 310 deprive the herein defendant of his rights or property
without due process of law. (b) That the power to revoke the certificate of a doctor of medicine
resides solely in the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. (c)
That the power granted to the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke the certificate of a physician
has been repealed by section 88 of the Philippine Bill.
While the assignments of error present various questions, the real questions presented are three:

5. That any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine, who shall treat, operate upon,
prescribe, or advise for any physical ailment of another for a fee, or who shall represent himself,
by means of signs, cards, advertisements, or otherwise, as a physician or surgeon.

1. The right of the state to require of those who desire to practice medicine and surgery, etc.,
certain standards of morality and general and special scholarship, as a prerequisite said
professions.

6. That said law did not apply to the rendering of services in case of emergency or the
administration of family remedies, or to medical officers of the United States Army, of the United
States Navy, or of the United States Marine Hospital Service, or to a physician or surgeon of
other countries called in consultation, or to a medical student, practicing under the supervision of
a preceptor who is a registered doctor of medicine.

2. The right of the state to revoke such a license, once granted; and
3. The right of the state to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, those attempt to practice the
professions of medicine, surgery, etc., without a license, and in violation of the law.
The appellant argues, in support of his right assignment of error:

It is the power of the Board of Medical Examiners to revoke a license, once granted, to which the
appellant especially directs his argument, in support of his contention that said Act is in conflict
with the said Act of Congress.
Section 8 of Act No. 310 provides: "The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of
the certificates provided for therein [in this Act] to an individual convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the
reason therefor shall be stated to the applicant in writing. The Board may also revoke any such
certificate for like cause, or for unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the person holding the

1. That section 8 of Act No. 310 is null and void because it deprives him of a right or of property,
without due process of law;
2. That the Board of Medical Examiners had no authority or right to revoke his license; that right,
if any exists of all, belongs to the courts, and
3. That said section 8 has been repealed by section 88 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
(The Philippine Bill).

54
Generally speaking, with reference to the general and inherent power of the state, we think the
following propositions are so well established that they no longer admit of dispute or discussion:
1. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its
borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity
and welfare of its inhabitants. (New York City vs. Miln, 11 Pet. (U.S.), 102, 139; Passenger
Cases, 7 How. (U.S.), 283, 423; Slaughterhouse House Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 62; Beer
Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S., 623; Dent vs. W. Virginia, 129 U.S., 114
(25 W. Va., 1); Hawker vs. N.Y., 170 U.S., 189; Case vs. .Board of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250.)
2. To make reasonable provision for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the
practice of medicine and surgery, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance
of such provisions. (Dent vs. W. Virginia, 129 U.S., 114 (25 W. Va., 1); Hawker vs. N.Y., 170 U.S.,
189; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505; State vs.Webster, 150 Ind., 607.)
This power of the state is generally denominated the police power. It has been held that the state
cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise
its constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the corner stones, of the state. For the state
to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote the general
prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals, and public
safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain
away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it,
much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these
things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi,
101 U.S., 814, 816.)
It has been held that a constitutional prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of
contracts does not restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, public morals, or
public safety, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Rights
and privileges arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for the protection of
the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same
extent as are all contracts and all property, whether owned by natural persons or
corporations. (New Orleans Gas Light Co. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S., 650, 672.)
In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions, become
necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of

property, when the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the
public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. For
example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or a fertilizing establishment may be located in such
proximity to the residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the public health and the
welfare of the inhabitants. In such a case the discontinuance or the removal of such institutions
may be ordered, under the police power of the state, even though it amounts to depriving
persons of their private property. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wal., 36, 62; Fertilizing
co. vs. Hyde Park, 97 U.S., 659.)
Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his valuable commentaries, in discussing the police power (2 Kent's
Commentaries, 340) says: "Unwholesome trades, slaughterhouses, operations offensive to the
senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to the propelling of cars, the
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead may all be interdicted by law, in
the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational principle that every person
ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests must be
made subservient to the general interest of the community."
This power is called the police power of the state. (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.),
53, 84.) The police power is so extensive and so comprehensive that the courts have refused to
give it an exact definition; neither have they attempted to define its limitations. Upon the police
power of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens, the
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life,
and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property
are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state. (Thorpe vs. Rutland & B.R. Co., 27 Vt., 140, 149; New York
City vs. Miln, 11 Pet. (U.S.), 102; Slaughter House Cases, 16, Wall., 36, 62.)
Neither will it be denied that the owner of a building, which, by reason of its decayed condition,
becomes a menace to public safety, may be ordered to destroy the same, and thus be deprived
of his property. He may be ordered to repair or destroy it. Private property, under the police
power, may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a conflagration in order to save lives and
property. The existence of bawdy houses which tends to greatly affect the morals of the people of
a community may be destroyed or may be removed. A manufacturing plant, so located in a
thickly settled community as to greatly disturb the peace and comfort of the inhabitants, may be
ordered closed or removed. The state, under its police power, may regulate or prohibit the

55
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within its borders. Such a law may
destroy the established business of thousands of its inhabitants. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S.,
623; License Cases, 5 How., 504.) If any state deems that the retailing or trafficking in ardent
spirits is injurious to its citizens and calculated to produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, there is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restricting such
traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it think proper. The state may even declare that buildings
where intoxicating liquors are distilled or sold shall be a nuisance and ordered destroyed.
(Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S., 623.) The state may regulate its domestic commerce, contracts,
the transmission of estates, real and personal, and act upon all internal matters which relate to its
moral and political welfare. Over these subjects federal governments exercise no power. The
acknowledged police power of the state extends even to the destruction of property. A nuisance
may be abated. Everything prejudicial to the health or morals of a city may be removed.
(Licenses Cases, 5 How., 504; Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25, 33; Foster vs. Kansas, 112 U.S.,
201, 206; Case vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil. Rep., 250; Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U.S., 623.)
The police power of state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and the protection of all property within its borders. Under the general police
power of the state, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restrictions and burdens in
order to secure the general health, comfort, and prosperity of all. This power, or the right to
exercise it, as need may require, cannot be bargained away by the state. (Case vs. Board of
Health, supra.) Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the
quiet enjoyment of the same right by others. (Case vs. Board of Health, supra; Holden vs. Hardy,
169 U.S., 366, 395.)
It is as much for the interest of the state that public health should be preserved as that life should
be made secure. With this end in view, quarantine laws have been enacted in most, if not all,
civilized states. Insane asylums, public hospitals, institutions for the care and education of the
blind have been established, and special measures taken for the exclusion of infected cattle,
rags, and decayed fruit. States have enacted laws limiting the hours during which women and
children shall be employed in factories. (Case vs. Board of Health, supra.)
The present is not the first case which has been presented to the courts relating to the right of
the state to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, and to define the conditions under
which such practice may be continued and to revoke the license granted to exercise such
professions. Legislation or statutory regulations, similar to the one which we are now discussing,

have been adopted in practically every one of the States of the Union. The constitutionality of
such legislation has been questioned in practically all of States where such legislation exists.
Such statutes have been uniformly sustained. (State vs. Webster, 150 Ind., 607, 616; Dent vs.W.
Virginia, 25 W .Va., 1 (129 U.S., 114); Ex parte Frazer, 54 Cal., 94; Harding vs. People, 10 Colo.,
387; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mosher, 78 Iowa, 321; Iowa Eclectic
Medical College vs. Schrader, 87 Iowa, 659 (20 L.R.A., 355); Driscoll vs. Commonwealth, 93 Ky.,
393; Hewitt vs. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 353; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505;
People vs. Phippin, 70 Mich., 6; State vs. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn., 324;
State vs. Fleischer, 41 Minn., 69; State vs. District Court, 13 Mont., 370; Gee Wo vs. State, 36
Neb., 241; State vs. Van Doran, 109 N.C., 864; State vs. Randolph, 23 Ore., 74.)
The constitutionality of similar legislation, regulating the practice of dentistry, has been presented
in many of the States, and has been sustained. (Wilkins vs. State, 113 Ind., 514;
Gosnel vs. State, 52 Ark., 228; State vs.Vanderluis, 42 Minn., 129; State vs. Creditor, 44 Kansas,
565.)
So also have similar statutory regulations been sustained affecting the practice of pharmacy.
(Hildreth vs.Crawford, 65 Iowa, 339; People vs. Moorman, 86 Mich., 433; State vs. Forcier, 65
N.H., 42.)
Various States have attempted to regulate by statute the trade of plumbing, of horseshoeing, as
well as that of engineering. Even the trade of barbering is subject to statutory regulation in some
States, because it has relation to the health of the people. (Singer vs. State, 72 Md., 464;
People vs. Warden, 144 N.Y., 529; Smith vs. Alabama, 124 U.S., 465.)
Legislation analogous to that under discussion has also been adopted in various States relating
to the practice of the profession of law. The constitutionality of such legislation has been
uniformly sustained. (State vs. Gazlay, 5 Ohio, 14; Goldwaite vs. City Council, 50 Ala., 486;
Cohen vs. Wright, 22 Cal., 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal., 241.)
In every case where the constitutionality of similar statutes has been questioned, it has been held
that it is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety, and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.

56
The trade of plumbing vitally affects the health of the people. The lives of thousands of people
may depend upon the result of the work of an engineer. The property and life of citizens of the
state may depend upon the advice of a lawyer, and no profession or trade is more directly
connected with the health and comfort of the people than that of a physician and surgeon. The
practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation which very nearly concerns the comfort, health,
and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care most
important interests, and it is of almost imperious necessity that only persons possessing skill and
knowledge shall be permitted to practice medicine and surgery. For centuries the law has
required physicians to possess and exercise skill and learning. Courts have not hesitated to
punish those who have caused damages for lack of such skill and learning. The requirement of
the Philippine Legislature that those who may engage in such professions shall be possessed of
both knowledge and skill before entering the same is no new principle of law. It is an exercise of
the right of the state, under its police power, which has been recognized for centuries. No one
can doubt the great importance to the community that health, life, and limb should be protected
and not be left in the hands of ignorant pretenders, and that the services of reputable, skilled and
learned men should be secured to them.
In the case of Dent vs. W. Virginia (129 U.S., 114), the late Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the
court, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen [of the United States] to follow any lawful
calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex and conditions. This right may in many aspects be considered
as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are open to everyone
on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study
and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the estate acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution is often of great
value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken. But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right when its
exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for
the prosecution of society. The power (police power) of the state to provide for the general
welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure,
or tend to secure, them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different States, from
the time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits (professions or trades) a certain degree of skill
and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally
ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate
to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institutions established for instruction on the

subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. ... Few professions
require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal
with all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend and requires
not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetables and mineral substances, but of the human
body in all its complicated parts and their relation to each other, as well as their influence upon
the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, and prescribe
appropriate remedies for its removal. Everyone may have occasion to consult him, but
comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses.
Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by authority competent
to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration,
therefore, for the protection of society may well induce the state to exclude from practice those
who have not such a license, or who are found, upon examination, not to be fully qualified. The
same reasons which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which the physician is
allowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further conditions as new modes of treating
disease are discovered, or a more thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial properties
of vegetables and mineral substances, or a more accurate knowledge is acquired of the human
system, and of the agencies by which it is affected. ... We perceive nothing in the statute which
indicates an intentions of the legislature to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a right to
practice medicine without having the necessary qualifications of learning and skill; and the
statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering to the community his services as a
physician, that he possesses such learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate
or license from a body designated by the state as competent to judge of his qualifications."
The appellant contends, however, that the Legislature exceeded its authority in conferring upon
the Board of Medical Examiners the right to revoke his license. He contends that the right to
revoke it rests in the judicial department of the Government; that the courts only are possessed
of the right, if the right exists, to revoke his license and to deprive him of his right to practice his
profession of medicine and surgery. It will be remembered that the law conferred upon the Board
the right to grant the certificate, as well sa the right to revoke it, subject to the right of appeal to
the Director of Health. While, in some respects, the power exercised by the Board
is quasijudicial, the action of the Board is not judicial, any more than the action of a board
appointed to determine the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar, nor that of a
board appointed to pass upon the qualifications of applicants to be admitted to the profession of
teaching. In many of the States of the Union, no one can engage in the trade of barbering, or
horseshoeing, without passing an examination before a board specially appointed for that
purpose. States have deemed it wiser to place such power and discretion in boards composed of

57
men especially qualified, by reason of their learning and scientific knowledge, rather than in the
courts.

is nothing in said Act of Congress which is inconsistent with the provisions of Act No. 310, under
consideration, and that it is not repealed.

It is contended that the law provides no appeal from the decision of the board to the courts, and
is, for that reason, null and void. A law is not necessarily invalid, if it provides a remedy for those
affected thereby, simply because it does not provides for an appeal to the courts. Due process of
law is not necessarily judicial process. (Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land etc. Co., 18 How.
(U.S.), 372; Davidson vs. New Orleans, 96 U.S., 97; Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S., 265, 289;
Dreyer vs. Illinois, 187 U.S., 71, 83; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505.) Indeed, it not
infrequently happens that a full discharge of the duties conferred upon boards and commissions
or officers of a purely ministerial character requires them to consider and to finally determine
questions of a purely legal character. The legislature may confer upon persons, boards, officers,
and commissions the right to finally decide may questions affecting various interest of the people
of the state. If a remedy is granted, the law will be valid, even though no appeal to the courts is
provided. The right of appeal is a purely statutory right; it is not an inherent right. The right to
appeal was not at common law, and it is not now, a necessary element of due process of law.
(McKane vs. Durston, 153 U.S., 684, 687; Reetz vs. Michigan, 188 U.S., 505, 508.)

What has been said, we think also answers the argument of the appellant in support of his
second, third, and fourth assignments of error. It may be well, however, to observe in relation to
the third assignment that the appellant cannot object to the decision of the Board, when he
himself, after his appeal, voluntarily withdrew it.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, the record shows, beyond question, that the
appellant had personally engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, in clear contravention
of the law, without being authorized so to do. It is a matter of little importance whether the
appellant practiced medicine and surgery as the "Hotel Quirurgico" or not. The record shows that
he personally and illegally engaged in the practice of medicine. The poor sick patients who called
him for medical assistance certainly did not believe or think that they were calling the "Hotel
Quirurgico." They believed that they were being treated by the appellant. So ordered.
For all of the foregoing reasons the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.

The objection that the statute confers judicial power upon the Board of Medical Examiners is not
well founded. The law provided for an appeal to the Director of Health. Many executive officers,
even those who are are regarded as purely ministerial officers, act judicially in the determination
of facts in the performance of their duties, and in so doing "they do not exercise judicial power,"
as that phrase is commonly used, and as it is used in the Organic Act in conferring judicial power
upon specified courts. The powers conferred upon the Board of Medical Examiners are in no
wise different in character, in this respect, from those exercised by those of examiners of
candidates to teach in our public schools, or by tax assessors, or boards of equalization, in the
determination for the purposes of taxation, the value of property. The ascertainment and
determination of the qualifications to practice medicine, by a board appointed for that purpose,
composed of experts, is not the exercise of a power which appropriately belongs to the judicial
department of the Government. The same is true with reference to the power conferred upon
such a board to revoke a license, for the reasons given in the law. (People vs. Hasbrouck, 11
Utah, 291; Reetz vs. Michigan 188 U.S., 505, 507.)
The appellant further argues and contends that the present law is repealed by section 88 of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We think from the foregoing argument we have shown that there

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919

58
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a
failure,

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure
is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be
obtained toward educating these people.

MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a
slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in
every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of
state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political
existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to
resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in

order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive

order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

59
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant
to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do
hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.

province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a

course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any nonChristian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial
governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to
take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special
provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act
No. 387.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of
Act No. 2711.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will
later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order
to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government
of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of
all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "nonChristians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by
the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of
articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

II. HISTORY.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action
was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor.
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled
in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13,
1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of
1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

60
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the
evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and
ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has
always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means
most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with
success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the
prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in
the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved
that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and
separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all
spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are
obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our
kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration
of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and
gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently
settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they
be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same
be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall
entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx

xxx

LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY
HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in
the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect,
and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may
cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,
VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter
or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our
express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided,
however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent
to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often
made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law
be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.

LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the
facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and
passageway of one league long, wherein the indioscan have their live stock that they
may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.

xxx

LAW XIII.

xxx

THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

xxx

LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE
"INDIOS."

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We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of
the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors
and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should,
nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty
indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one
alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is
the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8,
1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip
IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one
following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to
live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found
that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of
troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless
men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and
provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also
some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we
desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby
order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts abovementioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys,
presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their
powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest.
As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to
separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones,"
is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881,
reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory

recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force
therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which
living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp
the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the
protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized
and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in
the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government
of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with
this most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with
the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives
to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of
Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed
been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against,
thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things,
taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty
which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws
on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in
the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after
finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila,
the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the
Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting
of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an
intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for
the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the
only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I
hereby promulgate the following:

62
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be
governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which
are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of
the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which
may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and
roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued
pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and
the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are
hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall
have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on,
with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of
the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the
necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet;
for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said
towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the
beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two
years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously
indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their
dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed
for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which
prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made
to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an
armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of
which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de
Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now
they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the
tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as
the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious
indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering
personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued
(aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary
submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and
the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for
their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom
to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct,
protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by
the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the
authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages
offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of
constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of
these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the
good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families
in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes,
that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their

63
rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and
vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's
Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such
tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors,
and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall
necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters
shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and
cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the
authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in
the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions
shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal
Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the
questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to
it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the
foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by
the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila,
No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the
best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later

expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of
these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic
Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a
legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department
of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law,
was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law
establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other nonChristian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.

64
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province
of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act
of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United
States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for
the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc,
Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No.
547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL
CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF
MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any
form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint
officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva
Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor
is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes

who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his
province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local
popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to
this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of
Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be
organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act
Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits
of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the
same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the
order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September
twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These
words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They

65
are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of nonChristian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which
contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397,
1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No.
1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in
giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian
religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial
corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code
and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor
Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of
Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300,
note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what
is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the
twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first
section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only
in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province,
Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine
Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not,
however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this.
( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of
their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the
Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty
of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United
States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to
provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections
701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No.
253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with
reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means
for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a
tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who

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surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:

afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and
you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.

. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal
marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within
that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no.
68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an
uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be
taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in
the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the
governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal
Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had
these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and
was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who
were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of
persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397,
to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which
are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all
cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to
enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'nonChristians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was
not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those
lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization
to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed.
For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of
your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced
Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has
the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no
other better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be
allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in
the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold
that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos
and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point,
who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment
of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law
to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone
subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to
mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes
are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns,
or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a
man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject
to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or
is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So
far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious
belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be

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subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to
this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian.
This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes
paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen,
Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition
similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns.
Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on
the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.)
JNO.
S.
HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding
cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the
hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the
Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and
digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the
fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life
and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as
members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the
cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode
of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized
community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject
to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from
and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and
other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons
arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the
expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be,

should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for
former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether
or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or
does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal
relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed
by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically
the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.)
ELLIS
CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.)
GREGORIO
Secretary of Finance and Justice.

ARANETA,

The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue,
and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice.
Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been
baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain nonChristian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does
he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the
provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same
authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that
the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating
liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution

68
under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the
provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said
phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian
inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but
simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines
who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach
of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the
common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish
a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression
which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741
of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to
members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident
intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null
and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P.
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the
Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive
Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title nonChristian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious

belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census
of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los
nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan,"
"negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos,
but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in
primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it today, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all
these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and
signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into
the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently
in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See
Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by
the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the AmericanIndian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the

69
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how
the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the
neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly
contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States,
and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the
position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both
before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been
an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American
towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the
States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right
to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But
they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this
paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or
the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only
mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private
persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the
Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always
have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their
tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These
Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the
United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights.
They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of
the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has
always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over
these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.
it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress
could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the
admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are
dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in
general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of
the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and
official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only
does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and
the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities
within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and
whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907],
204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911],

70
221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35
L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an
Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may
be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of
judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe
of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some
time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government;
that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the
General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the
relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused
the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment
by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the
Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the
Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of
Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian
country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon
the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is
wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough
to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be
upheld." The decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and
has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before
a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of
authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the
United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more
fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground.
And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so
ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is
a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ
in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and
for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere
to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists
for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States.

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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney,
and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by
the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of
Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of
Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good
deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been

exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian
Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S.
[1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation
of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs,
and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must
be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded;
religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional
guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants
according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low
grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

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The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of
to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be
enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional
limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for
the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness
that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a
legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never
understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . .
that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to
do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to
one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal
enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890],
137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized
society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the
right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a
sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and
rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any free

government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that
will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand."
(Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the
upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to
Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as
are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including
epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to
choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;
Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is
this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law."
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural
rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also
and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the
citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242
U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

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None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel
Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States
Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of
law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection
of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often
held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion
of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process
of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly
devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards
and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department
of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10
Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of
law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing
"That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that
the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the
United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has,
by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States
Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude,
together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly
involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under
what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their
freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if
section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the
government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There
can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and

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(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to
Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place.
There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been
made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be
encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which
they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are
necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was
naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila,
made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer
to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government
will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the nonChristian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the
non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized
Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health
throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate
their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among nonChristians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable
relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in,
the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the
non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of
them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild
habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it
is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to
live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their
children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized
brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification
with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department
for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the socalled non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674
in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards
the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and

75
foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the
moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and
complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the
provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity
is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of
the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates
advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude
upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method
was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same
class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these
few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a
few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that
the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men
are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are
Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and
Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code,
because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and
its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the
forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but
instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people
with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in
court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they
allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea
of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government
should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of
persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains
and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has
been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of

76
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity
and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and
more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be
citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed
encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they
will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which
has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the
noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of
the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending
sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of
ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously
invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left
in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those
who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they
are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed
and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is
being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make
them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do
not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other
places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact
that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual
property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and
the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater
part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public
lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain
fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire

territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the
lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes
and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they
will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a
penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble intention of
the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach
a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example
from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be
the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into
whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress
these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out
the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts,
it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is
a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred
to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that
the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some
extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the
particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights
of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

77
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread
belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately
have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this
progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there
exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead
to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to
tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise
enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from
time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called nonChristians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been
effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the
Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case
is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson
[1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty
in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145
of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to
the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

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CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the
prevailing, opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the
Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants,"
dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our
statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to which
they are applied. To this I would add that the tests for the determination of the fact that an
individual or tribes is, or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and
connection or lack of connection with some civilized community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal
Revenue dated September 17, 1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the
standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its
removal from the class embraces with the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used
in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within
the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership
the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the
conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which
does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the
members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives
or property of those who may be brought in contact with members of the tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of particular
province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found to have
advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the
statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a
"non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe;
and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "nonChristian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by
such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare
of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.

The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the
writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen
thousand Manguianes affected by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before
any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a
contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that degree
of civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an opportunity
for a real hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted
whether the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its
enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular
case, could the offices of any province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a
reconcentration order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one
of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose
individual members have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon the fifteen thousand
Manguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro.
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the practice
in the United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been placed upon
reservations; but since non-Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful
authority to bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have
the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded by
a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon
analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom or action of children and
persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good
and the general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is
properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual are found to be of such a
low grade of civilization that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life
or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and necessarily
paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular Government is well illustrated by the
following provisions found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). It shall
be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the work for advancement
and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and to foster by
all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the moral,

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material, economic, social and political development of those regions, always having in
view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete
fusion of all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. There shall be maintained in the
provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a special fund to
be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively,
for expenditures for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the province, and
non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction of the
courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action of the administrative
authorities in the enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145
of the Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "nonChristian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at
this time.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I
cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a
hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are
entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

or to go into the question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human
side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were
ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as
appears from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land,
which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred manguianes are confined.
One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the
provincial sheriff and placed in prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. The Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are
deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the majority
opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by
the Department Secretary ordered the placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture. They
have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They
are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act
No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under
any for of municipal government."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not
including smaller islands which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851
square miles and a populations of 28, 361 of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes
(Manguianes). This appears to be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total
population was less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.

I dissent.

It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and
by Manguianes.

I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice will not permit me
to let this decision go on record without expressing may strong dissent from the opinion of
Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion

The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long before
Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu. They have made little or no
progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people,"

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whom the Government of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like Dadalos
do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the
fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code,
2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion, are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3
of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:

They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want
it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes,
however humble they may be and "bought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the SolicitorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peacefully, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in
the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which is that

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws.

Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the
forests and making illegal caiginsthereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but,
instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of those
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are not fighting
in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of
their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that
accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision
to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not
considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in
the United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were
the result of separate treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations,
and, incompliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they lived
and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were
larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of
square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the
Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are
accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos.
They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat
and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights
and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines."

There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and
does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do
anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and
destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea
of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government
should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of
persons in question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand
liberty in its true and noble sense.

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In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has
been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity
and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and
more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be
citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the Manguianes
destroy the forest by making a caigin. What is a "caigin?" Simply this. These people move their
camp or place of abode frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to
clear the land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller
trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The
fires never spread in the tropical undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within
the caigin are killed and crops are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on
due to superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted
fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caigins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them
for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that
they are committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land
for incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." They have never been a
burden to the state and never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the
law punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit
crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to
involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they have
been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely confined on a narrow
reservation from which they may not escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that
they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding
themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and
clothe them in return of their services.?

It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to involuntary
personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be
persons who are willing to lend them money with which to buy food on the promise that they will
work for them. And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another law on
the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be fined
not more than two hundred pesos or imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and
when the sentence expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not appear
they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any
hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It seems they were gathered here and there
whenever found by the authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because
they are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is
no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian
Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These
non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others,
about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos,
have made great progress in civilization. The have beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor
they have herds of cattle and horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the nonChristians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but they are
one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their
homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior
approval of the department head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to show the
wickedness and illegality of the section of the law under which these people are restrained of
their liberty. But it is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever giving his
approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in the present case in
what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and unrestricted power to do harm should be
the measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no
arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely
personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these
provisions which the people have, the through the organic law, declared shall be the
measure and scope of all control exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth
amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the
individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it

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was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or
arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable
classification, or which singles out any particular individuals or class as the subject of
hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the
fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a
plain case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme
Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the
principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of
course, not subject to law, for its is the author and source of law; but in our system,
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And
the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must
always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final
decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment,
exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the
monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be
a government of law and not of men." For the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins,
118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the
law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.
In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of
law, but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches

that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow
confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in
the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from
their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which
they look down upon from their fields than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly
the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their
native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation in effect an open air jail then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine
governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department, have the power under this law
to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them
on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the court will
grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty,
and their lives, may be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some
political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter
what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of
the court might be in a distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is
final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion,
should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of my
country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so
strongly to my sympathy as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we
have a few of the remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak,
insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the other, we have the
representative of one of the most powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized
nations of modern times. On the one side, we have the representatives of this wasted
race coming into this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable
them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace, which have

83
made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side, we have this magnificent, if
not magnanimous, government, resisting this application with the determination of
sending these people back to the country which is to them less desirable perpetual
imprisonment in their own native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind
of the brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he
has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a
part so conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper
to say that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to freedom,
they would have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in their behalf
were closed. no examination or further thought would then have been necessary or
expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated by law, something more
satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and
basis of judicial action. It follows that this case must be examined and decided on
principles of law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their discharge under the
constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty, they must be remanded to the
custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory
which they left without the consent of the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during the
session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified,
praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus and their final discharged from
custody thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they had
some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal
relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or
assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and
without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested
and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the
distance between the place where the writ was made returnable and the place where
the relators were confined being more than twenty miles, ten days were alloted in
which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and detention
is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the additional statement
since filed, is that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the
Ponca Tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in

some place within the limits of the indian Territory had departed therefrom without
permission from the government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the
general of the army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and
return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said
order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and
that they were in his custody for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had
withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to which they
belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony produced by either party
hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to
be true; so that the questions to be determined are purely questions of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe
of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of
the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the
government agreed to protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how,
or why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and
went to the Indian Territory does not appear.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when

determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the right of the
government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned
to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not
vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a question like the one under
consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so much valuable material for discussion,
and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it as viewed from my own
standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not
specially invited, will be sure to follow.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation
bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000
for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home
therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
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xxx

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The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of
the same, until two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by
force or otherwise does not appear. At all event, we find a portion of them, including the
relators, located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony seems to
show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states
that out of five hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in
Dakota to the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and
a great proportion of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no
doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the survivors of his wasted
family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of followers, he determined to leave the
Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, to use his own language, "he might
live and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed
the agent of their final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers
had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the Ponca tribe of
Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to cut loose
from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and
customs of a higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and
laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha
Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long
continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make
them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus
employed, that they were arrested by order of the government, for the purpose of being
taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the justice, or reason,
or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from their own native plains and
blood relations to a far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made graves
opening for their reception. The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for
them. The love of home and native land was strong enough in the minds of these
people to induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die where they had
been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the
land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and protected and
formed a part of what was to them melancholy procession homeward. Such instances
of parental affections, and such love home and native land, may be heathen in origin,
but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle.
And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in
violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from
custody.
This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.

I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917
are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty,
and that they have been denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.

85
beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred
pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)

G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.
Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.
PARAS, J.:p
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR,
OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati
whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the
implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected
allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution
No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo,
Annex "D", P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by
petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the
following manner:
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to
wit:
1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and
the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power and
parens patriae and
2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated
June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to
implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter is to
allow the financial assistance in question.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or
rational relation to the public safety, health, morals, or
general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise
of the police power. The mere assertion by the
legislature that a statute relates to the public health,
safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute

86
within the police power of a state for there must always
be an obvious and real connection between the actual
provisions of a police regulations and its avowed
purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably
adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16
Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).
Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective
sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the
alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still
subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a
public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial
assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of
P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of
the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for
the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case. On this point
government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public
purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner,
through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA
Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan
del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must
be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent

powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be
inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the
things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p.
277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers
as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact
of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only
fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden,
28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such
measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions.
The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only
does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the
municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."
(Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health
and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local
government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al.
vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the
citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private
and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation
on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow

87
circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation
between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the
alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to
"public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great
public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it
is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of
them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation
(62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for
the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the
benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state

policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the
general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and
respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken
as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby
GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

88
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense;
Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes
devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of
Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations
issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L.
JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications;
and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of
fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the
interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do
hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the

89
sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or
more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user
or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four
meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as
herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He
shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary
or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No.
229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall
require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his
vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen
by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule
and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued
accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of
Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated
June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the
following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from
whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications
contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle ,
except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be
issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial
number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current
registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict
herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate
implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and
Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because
it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device,
or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both
the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations contained,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p
prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file
an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The
Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229
as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the

90
constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of
police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal
and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in
demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and
implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there
was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and
Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of
this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu
v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations
on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was
duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter
of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous
scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process
and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only
in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by
Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in

negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and

plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe
v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential,
insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the
great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The
police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24
2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary
factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in
an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the
opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying

91
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
in overthrowing the statute. 29

lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that
blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather
than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly
only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data
on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that
there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the
verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early
warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or
more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is
encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that
exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for
exaggeration.

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners
to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning
device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this
early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid
down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it
make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * *
* is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said
requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the
same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229
and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device
requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "batterypowered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because:
Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible
even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere
along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or
expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or

92
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated
the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of
a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of
law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may
be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is

equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought
to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed." 34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses

93
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v.
Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered
unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection"
is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully
expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land
Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32
[which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate
New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized
tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has
been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the
country;

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring
E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and
foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless

94
and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes
that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner
for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the
"all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and
property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land
Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32
[which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate
New Society," because of the following considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized
tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has
been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of

nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the
country;
3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion
that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring
E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P
48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;
4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and
5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest and
foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless
and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes
that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner
for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the
"all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the
wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and
property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

95

G.R. No. 118295

May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine
Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of
the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS
OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO
TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine
Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in
his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership
thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic

96
relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and
economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the thirdmillennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as
mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions
and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a
market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor"
policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services.
In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the
world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity."

of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments
into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit from the WTO
system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade
disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on
the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped
countries were at a disadvantage.

Brief Historical Background

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate
of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for
the establishment of three multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the
United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the
World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and
later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal
with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to
foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that
invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including
its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What
remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection
of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body
administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round,
the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body
the World Trade Organization with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and
the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with
the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of
improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President
also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction

The Petition in Brief

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying
(1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials
and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads
of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate
Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and
Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the

97
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11,
1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final
Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution."
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the
President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that
"the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate
adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it
is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 6 The
text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and
collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating
Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification,
declaring:

98
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the
aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one
(1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof,
signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm
the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of
the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his
Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents
as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and
decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least
developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to
trade and on dispute settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among
other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to
existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and
definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial
presence and new financial service.

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents'
comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due
course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also
requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations
stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista
Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said
agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter
in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate;
and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of
Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO
Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the
multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final
Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for
resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed
copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or
international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other
hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the
deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from

99
impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or

impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10
and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of

judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines";
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred
only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the
Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several
issues raised by petitioners into the following": 10
1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor
General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political
question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto
E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether
the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court
resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that
probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated
upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the
respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event,
this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are
petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be
taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question
the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such
issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and
serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public
interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather
than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11

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To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES
LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID,
CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in
the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress
from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this
petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO,
or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body.
Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing
tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will
only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse

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of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the
WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism

Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating
"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment"
clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the
Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10
and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO
provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19
a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for
brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under

GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of
GATT 1994.

xxx xxx xxx

Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
xxx xxx xxx

2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with

the obligations of general elimination of quantitative
restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of
GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement."
(Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol.
27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121,
emphasis supplied).

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The Annex referred to reads as follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which
are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of
domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of
volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported
products be limited to an amount related to the volume or
value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws
or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to
obtain an advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in
or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in
or related to its local production by restricting its access
to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise;
or

(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of

particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value
of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay
Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph shall
not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not
on the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947,
as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article
XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied).
(b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS,
for brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection
of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol.
31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432
(emphasis supplied)

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(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than
it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by
according to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member,
either formally identical treatment or formally different
treatment to that it accords to its own like services and
service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall
be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28,
Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis
supplied).

It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO
Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They
allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional
conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional
limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment
accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter
provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic
portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be
related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read
properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from
the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles
Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "selfexecuting provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement the, thus:

104
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal
Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of
principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and
effectuate such principles.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component

of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not

intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available remedy
was not judicial but political. The electorate could
express their displeasure with the failure of the executive
and the legislature through the language of the ballot.
(Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of

law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority
to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as
follows:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower
order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

Sec. 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to
propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.
At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the
legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.

105
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and
an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all
especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on
sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that
make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall
protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare
and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;

2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1)
by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures
that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange
on the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether
this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not

106
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does
not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to
protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's
vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the
majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement
or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths
vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to
MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all
members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the
expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy
rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles are
found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and

effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the
needs of their economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives
underlying this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.)
Specific WTO Provisos
Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic
principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to
tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of
tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT
requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within
a period of six (6) years while developing countries including the Philippines are required to
effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.

107
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support
to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing
countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to
reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export
subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction
rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10)
years within which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against
import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement
that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing
nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say
that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have
made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies.
As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages
and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition

basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it

means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy,
especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities. 36
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim
that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services
obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils
down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality?

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national

economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is
keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most

Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as
promised by its promoters expand the country's exports and generate more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most
reasonable rates to the Filipino public?

108
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they
are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the
answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense
that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the
same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became
effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a
diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter,
thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of
various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries
of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of
bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated
by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and
not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to
rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by
mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and
hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot,
like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow
with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of
the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality
that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the
sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation
that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform
with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of
investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . .
. 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which
is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and
restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their
arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and
all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country
from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles
of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the
oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international
agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45

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By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone.
The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in
administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that
money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were
"expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine
Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it
agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter,
the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again
the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although
"sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying
principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures
decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under

Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter
shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the sovereign
power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both
bilateral and multilateral that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are
enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income,
where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income
received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of
the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said
convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United
States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as
employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by
the Philippines.
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the
avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of
double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed
to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed
to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other

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similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular
equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines
granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to
Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas
where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding
59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding
59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed
that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its
agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes
and related charges.
(k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the
Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach "of international obligation."

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in
this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states
in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The
same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights,
the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political
sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless
anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases
we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh
the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties
that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive
norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger
countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization.
This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger
set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country
gaining enhanced success to the smaller country's market. 48
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures. 50
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full
text as follows:

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Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the
rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject
matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to
obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore,
Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that
any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been
obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is
new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of the
patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to
in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of
defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be
taken into account.
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in the
absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one
produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the
(illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented
product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made

with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the
exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof"
contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent
infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the
"burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless
of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the
genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product
or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present
law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law,
provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for
utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or
utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and
in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented
design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented
design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying. (emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there
is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process
owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either
of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue
derogation of legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the

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reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34
does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial. 52
Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not
in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn
was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority
of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up
of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of
treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of
the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The
text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of
the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification.
They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that
representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement
which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the
objectives of this Agreement." 56
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not
apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their
respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of
operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and
processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing
systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are
deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements
and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1,
2, and 3, (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral
parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4
(hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of
this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding
on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either
obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them.

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4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex
1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to
the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter
referred to as "GATT 1947").
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated
August 11, 1994, 59 the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission
came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the
observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate
was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the
final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator
Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon
understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was
acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee
as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the
submission could be clarified.
And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is
he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first
submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there
should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by
giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator
Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that
what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade
Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President
Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission
actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now
complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act
itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires
us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself
specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the
participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures.

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In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional
procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization
Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it
satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator
Gonzales.
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a
matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of
yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want
to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator
Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I
believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are
invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in
giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ
of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will
result in the dismissal of the petition. 63
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is
one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is
itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed
regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented
to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity
in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it
by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the
alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to
the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason
of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or
at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to

115
the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial
or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected
policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward
trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in
electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically,
politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as
the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding
objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only
viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic selfdestruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the
future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized
elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188550

August 19, 2013

DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This is a Petition for Review1 filed by Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch (petitioner) under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En
Banc) Decision2 dated 29 May 2009 and Resolution3 dated 1 July 2009 in C.T.A. EB No. 456.
THE FACTS
In accordance with Section 28(A)(5)4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997,
petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent on 21 October 2003 the amount of PHP
67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)
on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany)
for 2002 and prior taxable years.5
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers
Assessment and Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date,
petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. 6
Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review7 with the CTA on 18 October 2005. Petitioner reiterated its claim for the refund or

116
issuance of its tax credit certificate for the amount of PHP 22,562,851.17 representing the
alleged excess BPRT paid on branch profits remittance to DB Germany.
THE CTA SECOND DIVISION RULING8
After trial on the merits, the CTA Second Division found that petitioner indeed paid the total
amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 representing the 15% BPRT on its RBU profits amounting to PHP
451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years. Records also disclose that for the year 2003,
petitioner remitted to DB Germany the amount of EURO 5,174,847.38 (or PHP 330,175,961.88
at the exchange rate of PHP 63.804:1 EURO), which is net of the 15% BPRT.

The court likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 12000 cannot be relaxed for petitioner, unlike in CBK Power Company Limited v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.12 In that case, the rule was relaxed and the claim for refund of excess final
withholding taxes was partially granted. While it issued a ruling to CBK Power Company Limited
after the payment of withholding taxes, the ITAD did not issue any ruling to petitioner even if it
filed a request for confirmation on 4 October 2005 that the remittance of branch profits to DB
Germany is subject to a preferential tax rate of 10% pursuant to Article 10 of the RP-Germany
Tax Treaty.
ISSUE

However, the claim of petitioner for a refund was denied on the ground that the application for a
tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by the former of its BPRT and actual
remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential rate of
ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision. The court a quo held that
petitioner violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III paragraph (2) of
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.

This Court is now confronted with the issue of whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No.
1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.

Further, the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant (Philippines) Operations Corporation (formerly
Southern Energy Asia-Pacific Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue9 (Mirant) where the CTA En Banc ruled that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be
extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the
provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.

Under Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, any profit remitted to its head office shall be subject to a tax
of 15% based on the total profits applied for or earmarked for remittance without any deduction of
the tax component. However, petitioner invokes paragraph 6, Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty, which provides that where a resident of the Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in
the Republic of the Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch profits remittance tax
withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall not exceed 10% of the gross
amount of the profits remitted by that branch to the head office.

THE CTA EN BANC RULING10

The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Divisions Decision dated 29 August 2008 and
Resolution dated 14 January 2009. Citing Mirant, the CTA En Banc held that a ruling from the
ITAD of the BIR must be secured prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax
treaty. Applying the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, the CTA En Banc took into
consideration that this Court had denied the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed by Mirant for failure
to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment. 11 The CTA En Banc ruled that
once a case has been decided in one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner.

THE COURTS RULING

The Petition is meritorious.

By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines,
remitting to its head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.
On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1-2000, which requires that any availment of the tax
treaty relief must be preceded by an application with ITAD at least 15 days before the
transaction. The Order was issued to streamline the processing of the application of tax treaty
relief in order to improve efficiency and service to the taxpayers. Further, it also aims to prevent
the consequences of an erroneous interpretation and/or application of the treaty provisions (i.e.,
filing a claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment of taxes or for deficiency tax liabilities for
underpayment).13

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The crux of the controversy lies in the implementation of RMO No. 1-2000.
Petitioner argues that, considering that it has met all the conditions under Article 10 of the RPGermany Tax Treaty, the CTA erred in denying its claim solely on the basis of RMO No. 1-2000.
The filing of a tax treaty relief application is not a condition precedent to the availment of a
preferential tax rate. Further, petitioner posits that, contrary to the ruling of the CTA, Mirant is not
a binding judicial precedent to deny a claim for refund solely on the basis of noncompliance with
RMO No. 1-2000.
Respondent counters that the requirement of prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 is
mandatory in character. RMO No. 1-2000 was issued pursuant to the unquestioned authority of
the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of
the NIRC. Thus, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances which partakes the nature of a
statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality.
The CTA ruled that prior application for a tax treaty relief is mandatory, and noncompliance with
this prerequisite is fatal to the taxpayers availment of the preferential tax rate.
We disagree.
A minute resolution is not a binding precedent
At the outset, this Courts minute resolution on Mirant is not a binding precedent. The Court has
clarified this matter in Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue14 as follows:
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a
disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the
CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a
minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive
requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are
deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v.

Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same parties
and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution dated
February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous
case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject
matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly
and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed
only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published
in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.
Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding
precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief
Justice. (Emphasis supplied)
Even if we had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind
this Court in cases of a similar nature. There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods,
and treaties involved; more importantly, the disposition of that case was made only through a
minute resolution.
Tax Treaty vs. RMO No. 1-2000
Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of
the law of the land.15 The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty
must be performed by them in good faith. 16 More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of
law in this jurisdiction.17
Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties
and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions." 18 CIR v.
S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. further clarifies that "tax conventions are drafted with a view towards
the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which is defined as the imposition of
comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject

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matter and for identical periods. The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to
encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and
persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies.
Foreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment
climate and the protection against double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate." 19

to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be

remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty.
But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly
comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.
Prior Application vs. Claim for Refund

Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of
international juridical double taxation, which is why they are also known as double tax treaty or
double tax agreements.
"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken."20 Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties
are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. More
so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of
the benefits under said agreement.
Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We
recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTAs outright
denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in
harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted under tax
treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.
Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax
treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief
as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty.
The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed
period under the administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the
application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of
the taxpayer to the relief.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No.
1-2000.1wphi1 Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on
international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought

Again, RMO No. 1-2000 was implemented to obviate any erroneous interpretation and/or
application of the treaty provisions. The objective of the BIR is to forestall assessments against
corporations who erroneously availed themselves of the benefits of the tax treaty but are not
legally entitled thereto, as well as to save such investors from the tedious process of claims for a
refund due to an inaccurate application of the tax treaty provisions. However, as earlier
discussed, noncompliance with the 15-day period for prior application should not operate to
automatically divest entitlement to the tax treaty relief especially in claims for refund.
The underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as
the present case, where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment
arising from non-availment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. In this case, petitioner should
not be faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000 prior to the transaction. It could not have
applied for a tax treaty relief within the period prescribed, or 15 days prior to the payment of its
BPRT, precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not on the basis of the preferential tax
rate under
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, but on the regular rate as prescribed by the NIRC. Hence, the prior
application requirement becomes illogical. Therefore, the fact that petitioner invoked the
provisions of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the ITAD
before filing an administrative claim for a refund should be deemed substantial compliance with
RMO No. 1-2000.
Corollary thereto, Section 22921 of the NIRC provides the taxpayer a remedy for tax recovery
when there has been an erroneous payment of tax.1wphi1 The outright denial of petitioners
claim for a refund, on the sole ground of failure to apply for a tax treaty relief prior to the payment
of the BPRT, would defeat the purpose of Section 229.
Petitioner is entitled to a refund

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It is significant to emphasize that petitioner applied though belatedly for a tax treaty relief, in
substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000. A ruling by the BIR would have confirmed whether
petitioner was entitled to the lower rate of 10% BPRT pursuant to the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Nevertheless, even without the BIR ruling, the CTA Second Division found as follows:
Based on the evidence presented, both documentary and testimonial, petitioner was able to
establish the following facts:
a. That petitioner is a branch office in the Philippines of Deutsche Bank AG, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany;
b. That on October 21, 2003, it filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final Income
Taxes Withheld under BIR Form No. 1601-F and remitted the amount
of P67,688,553.51 as branch profits remittance tax with the BIR; and
c. That on October 29, 2003, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas having issued a
clearance, petitioner remitted to Frankfurt Head Office the amount of EUR5,174,847.38
(or P330,175,961.88 at 63.804 Peso/Euro) representing its 2002 profits remittance. 22
The amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 paid by petitioner represented the 15% BPRT on its RBU net
income, due for remittance to DB Germany amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior
taxable years.23
Likewise, both the administrative and the judicial actions were filed within the two-year
prescriptive period pursuant to Section 229 of the NIRC. 24
Clearly, there is no reason to deprive petitioner of the benefit of a preferential tax rate of 10%
BPRT in accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
Petitioner is liable to pay only the amount of PHP 45,125,702.34 on its RBU net income
amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years, applying the 10% BPRT.
Thus, it is proper to grant petitioner a refund ofthe difference between the PHP 67,688,553.51
(15% BPRT) and PHP 45,125,702.34 (10% BPRT) or a total of PHP 22,562,851.17.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc Decision dated 29 May 2009 and Resolution dated 1 July 2009 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered ordering respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner Deutsche Bank
AG Manila Branch the amount of TWENTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY ONE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (PHP
22,562,851.17), Philippine currency, representing the erroneously paid BPRT for 2002 and prior
taxable years.
SO ORDERED.

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