FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

FACTS:

Plaintiff obtained the loan from defendant Bank dated July 1939, maturing on July 1944, secured by real
estate mortgage. On July 1959, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of
the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against defendants alleging that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity, July 1944. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as the defense of
prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when E.O No. 32 was issued, to July
26, 1948, when the said act, extending the period of moratorium, was declared invalid, were to be deducted
from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As
noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff. Hence
this appeal, which possesses merit

ISSUE: WON the period from 1945, when Debt Moratorium Law was promulgated, to 1953, when it was
declared unconstitutional, should not be counted for the purpose of prescription?

HELD: NO.

RA No. 342, the moratorium legislation (or Debt Moratorium Law), which continued EO No. 32, issued by the
then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable by war sufferers. Such enactment was considered "unreasonable and oppressive,
and should be declared null and void and without effect."

The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional should
not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time.

There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if the moratorium under an Executive Order
and later an Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the right to
foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court adhered that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as inoperative as if it had never

been. While a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of its character as a juridical norm, its having
been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal consequences.

Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt
Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose
his right to collect.

We find for appellant Philippine National Bank, and we reverse.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959
dismissed. No costs.