City of Mandaluyong Vs Aguilar PDF

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CityofMandaluyongvsAguilar:137152:January29,2001:J.Puno:FirstDivision
FIRSTDIVISION
[G.R.No.137152.January29,2001]
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA

N.,EUSEBION.,RODOLFON.,allsurnamedAGUILAR,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtoftheOrdersdatedSeptember17,1998
and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City[1] dismissing the petitioners
AmendedComplaintinSCANo.1427forexpropriationoftwo(2)parcelsoflandinMandaluyongCity.
Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:
OnAugust4,1997,petitionerfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourt,Branch168,PasigCityacomplaintfor
expropriation entitled City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N., Francisco N., Thelma N., Eusebio N.,
RodolfoN.,allsurnamedAguilar,defendants.Petitionersoughttoexpropriatethree(3)adjoiningparcelsofland
withanaggregateareaof1,847squaremetersregisteredunderTransferCertificatesofTitleNos.59780,63766
and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay
Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong on a portion of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several
decadesagowhichtheyhadsinceleasedouttotenantsuntilthepresentonthevacantportionofthelots,other
families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied in 1983, the lots were classified by
ResolutionNo.125oftheBoardoftheHousingandUrbanDevelopmentCoordinatingCouncilasanAreafor
PriorityDevelopmentforurbanlandreformunderProclamationNos.1967and2284ofthenPresidentMarcos
as a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from
respondents,butthelatterrefusedtosellonNovember7,1996,theSangguniangPanlungsodofpetitioner,upon
petitionoftheKapitbisig,anassociationoftenantsandoccupantsofthesubjectland,adoptedResolutionNo.
516,Seriesof1996authorizingMayorBenjaminAbalosoftheCityofMandaluyongtoinitiateactionforthe
expropriationofthesubjectlotsandconstructionofamediumrisecondominiumforqualifiedoccupantsofthe
landonJanuary10,1996,MayorAbalossentalettertorespondentsofferingtopurchasethesaidpropertyat
P3,000.00persquaremeterrespondentsdidnotanswertheletter.Petitionerthusprayedfortheexpropriationof
thesaidlotsandthefixingofjustcompensationatthefairmarketvalueofP3,000.00persquaremeter.[2]
Intheiranswer,respondents,exceptEusebioN.Aguilarwhodiedin1995,deniedhavingreceivedacopyof
Mayor Abalos offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation,whilepetitionerhasseveralpropertiesinventoriedforsocializedhousingthefairmarketvalueof
P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
P7,000.00persquaremeter.Ascounterclaim,respondentsprayedfordamagesofP21million.[3]
RespondentsfiledaMotionforPreliminaryHearingclaimingthatthedefensesallegedintheirAnswerare
validgroundsfordismissalofthecomplaintforlackofjurisdictionoverthepersonofthedefendantsandlackof
causeofaction. Respondents prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the
complaintbedismissed.[4]Petitionerreplied.
On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant
VirginiaN.Aguilarand,atthesametime,substitutedEusebioAguilarwithhisheirs.Petitioneralsoexcluded
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jan2001/137152.htm
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from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3)
parcelsoflandtotwo(2)parcelstotalling1,636squaremetersunderTCTNos.63766and63767.[5]
TheAmendedComplaintwasadmittedbythetrialcourtonDecember18,1997.Respondents, who, with
the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and
copiesoftheAmendedComplaint,filedaManifestationandMotionadoptingtheirAnswerwithCounterclaim
andMotionforPreliminaryHearingastheiranswertotheAmendedComplaint.[6]
Themotionwasgranted.AtthehearingofFebruary25,1998,respondentspresentedAntonioAguilarwho
testifiedandidentifiedseveraldocumentaryevidence.Petitionerdidnotpresentanyevidence.Thereafter,both
partiesfiledtheirrespectivememoranda.[7]
OnSeptember17,1998,thetrialcourtissuedanorderdismissingtheAmendedComplaintafterdeclaring
respondentsassmallpropertyownerswhoselandisexemptfromexpropriationunderRepublicActNo.7279.
Thecourtalsofoundthattheexpropriationwasnotforapublicpurposeforpetitionersfailuretopresentany
evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents of
Mandaluyong.Thecourtthusdisposedofasfollows:
WHEREFORE,theAmendedComplaintisherebyordereddismissedwithoutpronouncementastocost.
SOORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied the motion. Hence this
petition.
Petitionerclaimsthatthetrialcourterred
INUPHOLDINGRESPONDENTSCONTENTIONTHATTHEYQUALIFYASSMALLPROPERTY
OWNERSANDARETHUSEXEMPTFROMEXPROPRIATION.[9]
Petitionermainlyclaimsthatthesizeofthelotsinlitigationdoesnotexemptthesamefromexpropriationin
viewofthefactthatthesaidlotshavebeendeclaredtobewithintheAreaforPriorityDevelopment(APD)No.
5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1517.[10] This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property,
ipsofacto,regardlessoftheareaoftheland.
PresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.1517,theUrbanLandReformAct,wasissuedbythenPresidentMarcosin
1978.The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from blight, congestion and
hazard,andpromotionoftheirdevelopmentandmodernization,theoptimumuseoflandasanationalresource
forpublicwelfare.[11]Pursuanttothislaw,ProclamationNo.1893wasissuedin1979declaringtheentireMetro
Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by
ProclamationNo.1967andin1983byProclamationNo.2284whichidentifiedandspecified245sitesinMetro
ManilaasAreasforPriorityDevelopmentandUrbanLandReformZones.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992. The law lays down as a policy that the state, in cooperation with the private sector,
undertakeacomprehensiveandcontinuingUrbanDevelopmentandHousingProgramuplifttheconditionsof
the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and resettlement areas by making available to them
decenthousingataffordablecost,basicservicesandemploymentopportunitiesandprovidefortherationaluse
anddevelopmentofurbanlandtobringabout,amongothers,equitableutilizationofresidentiallandsencourage
more effective people's participation in the urban development process and improve the capability of local
governmentunitsinundertakingurbandevelopmentandhousingprogramsandprojects.[12] Towardsthisend,
allcityandmunicipalgovernmentsaremandatedtoconductaninventoryofalllandsandimprovementswithin
theirrespectivelocalities,andincoordinationwiththeNationalHousingAuthority,theHousingandLandUse
RegulatoryBoard,theNationalMappingResourceInformationAuthority,andtheLandManagementBureau,
identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the
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underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, acquire the lands, and dispose of said lands to the
beneficiariesoftheprogram.[13]
Theacquisitionoflandsforsocializedhousingisgovernedbyseveralprovisionsinthelaw.Section 9 of
R.A.7279provides:
Sec.9.PrioritiesintheAcquisitionofLand.Landsforsocializedhousingshallbeacquiredinthefollowing
order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries
(b)Alienablelandsofthepublicdomain
(c)Unregisteredorabandonedandidlelands
(d)Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum
ImprovementandResettlementProgramsiteswhichhavenotyetbeenacquired
(e)BagongLipunanImprovementofSitesandServicesorBLISSSiteswhichhavenotyetbeenacquired
(f)Privatelyownedlands.
Whereonsitedevelopmentisfoundmorepracticableandadvantageoustothebeneficiaries,thepriorities
mentionedinthissectionshallnotapply.Thelocalgovernmentunitsshallgivebudgetaryprioritytoonsite
developmentofgovernmentlands.
Landsforsocializedhousingaretobeacquiredinthefollowingorder:(1)governmentlands(2)alienable
landsofthepublicdomain(3)unregisteredorabandonedoridlelands(4)landswithinthedeclaredAreasfor
Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
(SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired and (6)
privatelyownedlands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privatelyowned and therefore last in the order of
priorityacquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within the declared APDs which have not yet
beenacquiredbythegovernmentarefourthintheorderofpriority.Accordingtopetitioner, since the subject
lotsliewithinthedeclaredAPD,thisfactmandatesthatthelotsbegivenpriorityinacquisition.[14]
Section9,however,isnotasingleprovisionthatcanbereadseparatefromtheotherprovisionsofthelaw.
ItmustbereadtogetherwithSection10ofR.A.7279whichalsoprovides:
Section10.ModesofLandAcquisition.ThemodesofacquiringlandsforpurposesofthisActshallinclude,
amongothers,communitymortgage,landswapping,landassemblyorconsolidation,landbanking,donationto
theGovernment,jointventureagreement,negotiatedpurchase,andexpropriation:Provided,however,That
expropriationshallberesortedtoonlywhenothermodesofacquisitionhavebeenexhausted:Provided,
further,Thatwhereexpropriationisresortedto,parcelsoflandownedbysmallpropertyownersshallbe
exemptedforpurposesofthisAct:Provided,finally,Thatabandonedproperty,ashereindefined,shallbe
revertedandescheatedtotheStateinaproceedinganalogoustotheprocedurelaiddowninRule91oftheRules
ofCourt.[15]
Forthepurposesofsocializedhousing,governmentownedandforeclosedpropertiesshallbeacquiredbythe
localgovernmentunits,orbytheNationalHousingAuthorityprimarilythroughnegotiatedpurchase:Provided,
Thatqualifiedbeneficiarieswhoareactualoccupantsofthelandshallbegiventherightoffirstrefusal.
LandsforsocializedhousingunderR.A.7279aretobeacquiredinseveralmodes.Amongthesemodesarethe
following:(1)communitymortgage(2)landswapping,(3)landassemblyorconsolidation(4)landbanking
(5)donationtothegovernment(6)jointventureagreement(7)negotiatedpurchaseand(8)expropriation.The
mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of
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acquisitionhavebeenexhaustedand(b)parcelsoflandownedbysmallpropertyownersareexemptfromsuch
acquisition.
Section9ofR.A.7279speaksofprioritiesintheacquisitionoflands.Itenumeratesthetypeoflandstobe
acquired and the heirarchy in their acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the
processofacquiringlandsforsocializedhousing.Thesearetwodifferentthings.Theymeanthatthetypeof
lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes
authorizedunderSection10.Theacquisitionofthelandsintheprioritylistmustbemadesubjecttothemodes
and conditions set forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the
instantcase,maybeacquiredonlyinthemodesunder,andsubjecttotheconditionsof,Section10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized
housingunderR.A.7279andadheredtotheprioritiesintheacquisitionforsocializedhousingundersaidlaw.
[16]It,however,didnotstatewithparticularitywhetheritexhaustedtheothermodesofacquisitioninSection9
ofthelawbeforeitdecidedtoexpropriatethesubjectlots.Thelawstatesexpropriationshallberesortedtowhen
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by
negotiatedpurchase.Petitioner,throughtheCityMayor,triedtopurchasethelotsfromrespondentsbutthelatter
refusedtosell.[17]Astotheothermodesofacquisition,nomentionhasbeenmade.Not even Resolution No.
516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the
expropriationofthesubjectpropertystateswhetherthecitygovernmenttriedtoacquirethesamebycommunity
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, orjoint
ventureagreementunderSection9ofthelaw.
Section9alsoexemptsfromexpropriationparcelsoflandownedbysmallpropertyowners.[18] Petitioner
argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not anymore conditioned on the size of the land
soughttobeexpropriated.[19]Bytheexpandednotionofpublicuse,presentjurisprudencehasestablishedthe
conceptthatexpropriationisnotanymoreconfinedtothevasttractsoflandandlandedestates,butalsocovers
smallparcelsofland.[20]Thatonlyafewcouldactuallybenefitfromtheexpropriationofthepropertydoesnot
diminishitspublicusecharacter.[21]Itsimplyisnotpossibletoprovide,inoneinstance,landandshelterforall
whoneedthem.[22]
While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the Urban
DevelopmentandHousingActof1992introducedalimitationonthesizeofthelandsoughttobeexpropriated
forsocializedhousing.Thelawexpresslyexemptedsmallpropertyownersfromexpropriationoftheirlandfor
urban land reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey Lina[23] and
HouseBillNo.34310.SenateBillNo.234thenprovidedthatoneofthoselandsnotcoveredbytheurbanland
reform and housing program was land actually used by small property owners within the just and equitable
retentionlimitasprovidedunderthisAct.[24]SmallpropertyownersweredefinedinSenateBillNo.234as:
4.SmallPropertyOwnersarethosewhoserightsareprotectedunderSection9,ArticleXIIIoftheConstitution
ofthePhilippines,whoownsmallparcelsoflandwithinthefairandjustretentionlimitprovidedunderthisAct
andwhichareadequatetomeetthereasonableneedsofthesmallpropertyownersfamilyandtheirmeansof
livelihood.[25]
TheexemptionfromexpropriationoflandsofsmallpropertyownerswasneverquestionedontheSenate
floor.[26] This exemption, although with a modified definition, was actually retained in the consolidation of
SenateBillNo.234andHouseBillNo.34310whichbecameR.A.No.7279.[27]
ThequestionnowiswhetherrespondentsqualifyassmallpropertyownersasdefinedinSection3(q)of
R.A.7279.Section3(q)provides:
Section3xxx(q).Smallpropertyownersreferstothosewhoseonlyrealpropertyconsistsofresidentiallands
notexceedingthreehundredsquaremeters(300sq.m.)inhighlyurbanizedcitiesandeighthundredsquare
meters(800sq.m.)inotherurbanareas.
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Smallpropertyownersaredefinedbytwoelements:(1)thoseownersofrealpropertywhosepropertyconsists
ofresidentiallandswithanareaofnotmorethan300squaremetersinhighlyurbanizedcitiesand800square
metersinotherurbanareasand(2)thattheydonotownrealpropertyotherthanthesame.
Thecaseatbarinvolvestwo(2)residentiallotsinMandaluyongCity,ahighlyurbanizedcity.Thelotunder
TCTNo.63766is687squaremetersinareaandthesecondunderTCTNo.63767is949squaremeters,both
totalling1,636squaremetersinarea.TCTNo.63766wasissuedinthenamesofhereinfive(5)respondents,
viz:
FRANCISCON.AGUILAR,widowerTHELMAN.AGUILAR,singleEUSEBION.AGUILAR,JR.,
widowerRODOLFON.AGUILAR,singleandANTONION.AGUILAR,marriedtoTeresitaPuigalloflegal
age,Filipinos.[28]
TCTNo.63767wasissuedinthenamesofthefive(5)respondentsplusVirginiaAguilar,thus:
FRANCISCON.AGUILAR,widowerTHELMAN.AGUILAR,singleEUSEBION.AGUILAR,JR.,
widowerRODOLFON.AGUILAR,singleandANTONION.AGUILAR,marriedtoTeresitaPuigand
VIRGINIAN.AGUILAR,single,alloflegalage,Filipinos.[29]
RespondentAntonioAguilartestifiedthatheandtheotherregisteredownersareallsiblingswhoinherited
thesubjectpropertybyintestatesuccessionfromtheirparents.[30]Theirfatherdiedin1945andtheirmotherin
1976.[31]BothTCTswereissuedinthesiblingsnamesonSeptember2,1987.[32]In1986,however,thesiblings
agreedtoextrajudiciallypartitionthelotsamongthemselves,butnoactionwastakenbythemtothisend.Itwas
onlyeleven(11)yearslater,onNovember28,1997thatasurveyofthetwolotswasmade[33]andonFebruary
10,1998,aconsolidationsubdivisionplanwasapprovedbytheLandsManagementServiceoftheDepartment
of Environment and Natural Resources.[34] The coowners signed a Partition Agreement on February 24,
1998[35]andonMay21,1998,TCTNos.63766and63767werecancelledandnewtitlesissuedinthenamesof
theindividualownerspursuanttothePartitionAgreement.
Petitionerarguesthattheconsolidationofthesubjectlotsandtheirpartitionwasmademorethansix(6)
monthsafterthecomplaintforexpropriationwasfiledonAugust4,1997,hence,thepartitionwasmadeinbad
faith,forthepurposeofcircumventingtheprovisionsofR.A.7279.[36]
Atthetimeoffilingofthecomplaintforexpropriation,thelotssubjectofthiscasewereownedincommon
by respondents. Under a coownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.[37]Duringtheexistenceofthecoownership,noindividualcanclaimtitletoanydefiniteportionofthe
communitypropertyuntilthepartitionthereofandpriortothepartition,allthatthecoownerhasisanidealor
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[38] Article 493 of the Civil Code however
providesthat:
Art.493.Eachcoownershallhavethefullownershipofhispartandofthefruitsandbenefitspertaining
thereto,andhemaythereforealienate,assignormortgageit,andevensubstituteanotherpersoninits
enjoyment,exceptwhenpersonalrightsareinvolved.Buttheeffectofthealienationorthemortgage,with
respecttothecoownersshallbelimitedtotheportionwhichmaybeallottedtohiminthedivisionupon
terminationofthecoownership.[39]
Beforepartitioninacoownership,everycoownerhastheabsoluteownershipofhisundividedinterestinthe
commonproperty.Thecoownerisfreetoalienate,assignormortgagehisinterest,exceptastopurelypersonal
rights.[40]Hemayalsovalidlyleasehisundividedinteresttoathirdpartyindependentlyoftheothercoowners.
[41]Theeffectofanysuchtransferislimitedtotheportionwhichmaybeawardedtohimuponthepartitionof
theproperty.[42]
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Article493thereforegivestheownerofanundividedinterestinthepropertytherighttofreelysellanddispose
ofhisundividedinterest.[43]Thecoowner,however,hasnorighttoselloralienateaconcretespecificor
determinatepartofthethingownedincommon,becausehisrightoverthethingisrepresentedbyaquotaor
idealportionwithoutanyphysicaladjudication.[44]Ifthecoownersellsaconcreteportion,this,nonetheless,
doesnotrenderthesalevoid.Suchasaleaffectsonlyhisownshare,subjecttotheresultsofthepartitionbutnot
thoseoftheothercoownerswhodidnotconsenttothesale.[45]
Intheinstantcase,thetitlestothesubjectlotswereissuedinrespondentsnamesascoownersin1987ten
(10)yearsbeforetheexpropriationcasewasfiledin1997.Ascoowners,allthattherespondentshadwasan
ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the lots. This, however, did not mean that they could not
separatelyexerciseanyrightsoverthelots.Eachrespondenthadthefullownershipofhisundividedinterestin
the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his interest independently of the other coowners. And this
interestcouldhaveevenbeenattachedbyhiscreditors.[46]Thepartitionin1998,six(6)monthsafterthefiling
of the expropriation case, terminated the coownership by converting into certain and definite parts the
respectiveundividedsharesofthecoowners.[47]Thesubjectpropertyisnotathingessentiallyindivisible.The
rightsofthecoownerstohavethepropertypartitionedandtheirshareinthesamedeliveredtothemcannotbe
questionedfor"[n]ocoownershallbeobligedtoremaininthecoownership."[48]Thepartitionwasmerelya
necessaryincidentofthecoownership[49]andabsentanyevidencetothecontrary,thispartitionispresumedto
havebeendoneingoodfaith.
Uponpartition,four(4)coowners,namely,Francisco,Thelma,RodolfoandAntonioAguilareachhada
shareof300squaremetersunderTCTNos.13849,13852,13850,13851.[50] EusebioAguilarssharewas347
squaremetersunderTCTNo.13853[51]whileVirginiaAguilarswas89squaremetersunderTCTNo.13854.
[52]
ItisnotedthatVirginiaAguilar,althoughgranted89squaremetersonlyofthesubjectlots,is,atthesame
time,thesoleregisteredownerofTCTNo.59780,oneofthethree(3)titlesinitiallysoughttobeexpropriatedin
theoriginalcomplaint.TCT No. 59780, with a land area of 211 square meters, was dropped in the amended
complaint.EusebioAguilarwasgranted347squaremeters,whichis47squaremetersmorethanthemaximum
of300squaremeterssetbyR.A.7279forsmallpropertyowners.InTCTNo.13853,Eusebiostitle,however,
appearsthefollowingannotation:
subjecttoxxx,andtotheprov.ofSec.4Rule74oftheRulesofCourtwithrespecttotheinheritanceleftby
thedeceasedEusebioN.Aguilar.[53]
EusebiodiedonMarch23,1995,[54]and,accordingtoAntoniostestimony,theformerwassurvivedbyfive
(5) children.[55] Where there are several coowners, and some of them die, the heirs of those who die, with
respecttothatpartbelongingtothedeceased,becomealsocoownersofthepropertytogetherwiththosewho
survive.[56]AfterEusebiodied,hisfiveheirsbecamecoownersofhis347squaremeterportion.Dividingthe
347squaremetersamongthefiveentitledeachheirto69.4squaremetersofthelandsubjectoflitigation.
Consequently,theshareofeachcoownerdidnotexceedthe300squaremeterlimitsetinR.A.7279.The
secondquestion,however,iswhetherthesubjectpropertyistheonlyrealpropertyofrespondentsforthemto
complywiththesecondrequisiteforsmallpropertyowners.
AntonioAguilartestifiedthatheandmostoftheoriginalcoownersdonotresideonthesubjectproperty
butintheirancestralhomeinPaco,Manila.[57]Respondentsthereforeappeartoownrealpropertyotherthanthe
lotsinlitigation.Nonetheless,therecordsdonotshowthattheancestralhomeinPaco,Manilaandthelandon
whichitstandsareownedbyrespondentsoranyoneofthem.Petitionerdidnotpresentanytitleorproofofthis
factdespiteAntonioAguilarstestimony.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real property[58] and that they,
particularlytwoofthefiveheirsofEusebioAguilar,aremerelyrentingtheirhousesandthereforedonotown
anyotherrealpropertyinMetroManila.[59]Toprovethis,theysubmittedcertificationsfromtheofficesofthe
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City and Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered real property
declared for taxation purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were certified by the City Assessor of
Manila[60]QuezonCity[61]MakatiCity[62]PasayCity[63]Paranaque[64]CaloocanCity[65]PasigCity[66]
Muntinlupa[67] Marikina[68] and the then municipality of Las Pias[69] and the municipality of San Juan del
Monte[70]ashavingnorealpropertyregisteredfortaxationintheirindividualnames.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar
testified that he and the other coowners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of the land before the
MetropolitanTrialCourt,Mandaluyong,Branches59and60.Ordersofevictionwereissuedandexecutedon
September17,1997whichresultedintheevictionofthetenantsandotheroccupantsfromthelandinquestion.
[71]
INVIEWWHEREOF,thepetitionisDENIEDandtheordersdatedSeptember17,1998andDecember
29,1998oftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch168,PasigCityinSCANo.1427areAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Kapunan,Pardo,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
[1]PennedbyJudgeBenjaminV.Pelayo.
[2]Complaint,Records,pp.26.
[3]AnswerwithCounterclaim,Records,pp.7384.
[4]Records,pp.97109.
[5]AmendedComplaint,Records,pp.117121.
[6]Records,p.134.
[7]Records,pp.257283,285291.
[8]Records,p.297.
[9]Petition,p.3,Rollo,p.5.
[10]Petition,pp.4,6,Rollo,pp.6,8.
[11]Section2,P.D.1517.
[12]Section2,R.A.7279.
[13]R.A.No.7279,Secs.7and8,9and12.
[15]Emphasissupplied.
[18]LikewiseexemptareidleresidentiallandsalsoownedbysmallpropertyownersunderSection11ofthelawwhichreads:
Sec. 11. Expropriation of idle lands.All idle lands in urban lands in urban and urbanizable areas, as defined and identified in
accordancewiththisAct,shallbeexpropriatedandshallformpartofthepublicdomain.Theselandsshallbedisposedoforutilized
bytheGovernmentforsuchpurposesthatconformwiththeirlanduseplans.Expropriationproceedingsshallbeinstitutedif,afterthe
lapseofone(1)yearfollowingreceiptofnoticeofacquisition,theownerfailstointroduceimprovementsasdefinedinSection3(f)
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hereof,exceptinthecaseofforcemajeureandotherfortuitousevents.Exemptedfromthisprovision,however,areresidentiallands
ownedbysmallpropertyownersorthosetheownershipofwhichissubjectofapendinglitigation.
[19]Petition,pp.810,Rollo,pp.1012.
[20]Phil.ColumbianAssociationv.Panis,228SCRA668,673[1993]J.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,31
SCRA413,427428[1970].
[21]Phil.ColumbianAssociationv.Panis,supra,at673Sumulongv.Guerrero,154SCRA461[1987].
[22]Ibid.
[23]CoauthoredbySenatorsEstrada,Saguisag,Tanada,HerreraandRomulo.
[24]Sec.4(5),SenateBillNo.234,RecordoftheSenate,Sept.2,1991,Vol.I,No.20,p.740741.
[25]RecordoftheSenate,Sept.2,1991,Vol.I,No.20,p.741.
[26]SeeInterpellations,RecordoftheSenate,Oct.22,1991,Vol.II,No.47,pp.374376Oct.23,1991,Vol.II,No.47,pp.409412
Nov.26,1991,Vol.II,No.55,pp.689693Nov.28,1991,Vol.II,No.57,pp.764768Feb.3,1992,Vol.IV,No.60,pp.79,81.
[27]SeeConferenceCommitteeReport,RecordoftheSenate,Feb.3,1992,Vol.IV,No.60,pp.84,8586.
[28]Exhibit1,Records,p.123.
[30]TSNofFebruary25,1998,pp.1012.
[31]TSNofJune17,1998,pp.78,10.
[32]Exhibits1and2,Records,pp.123124.
[34]Ibid.
[35]Exhibit4,Records,pp.171175.
[37]Article484,CivilCodeAlejandrinov.CourtofAppeals,295SCRA536,548[1998].
[38]Oliverasv.Lopez,168SCRA431,437[1988]DiversifiedCreditCorp.v.Rosado,135Phil.491,495[1968]seealsocasesin
Aquino,CivilCode,vol.I,p.508[1990].
[39]Article493,CivilCode.
[40]Thetermpersonalrightsreferstothepersonalrelationsofonecoownertotheothers,aswhenthefamilyresidenceisusedbythe
childrenascoownersPadilla,CivilCode,vol.II,pp.300&301[1972]Tolentino,CivilCode,Bk.II,p.203[1992].
[41]Vda.DeCastrov.Atienza,53SCRA264,268[1973].
[42] Ramirezv.Bautista,14Phil.528,532533[1909]alsocitedinPadilla,CivilCode,vol.II,p.302[1972]andAquino,Civil
Code,vol.I,p.510[1990].
[43]Acebedov.Abesamis,217SCRA186,194195[1993]Tolentino,CivilCode,vol.II,p.201[1992].
[44]Abadv.CourtofAppeals,179SCRA817,826[1989]BailonCasilaov.CourtofAppeals,160SCRA738,745[1988]Santos
v.Buenconsejo,14SCRA407,409[1965]Ramirezv.Bautista,supra.
[45]BailonCasilaov.CourtofAppeals,160SCRA738,745[1988]Lopezv.GonzagaVda.deCuaycong,74Phil.601,607[1944]
Punsalanv.BoonLiat,44Phil.320,324[1923].
8/9
11/23/2016
[46]Gotauco&Co.v.RegisterofDeeds,59Phil.756,757[1934]seealsoTolentino,supra,at201,citingCadagv.Trinanes,(C.A.),
40O.G.,No.8,4thSuppl.324[1939].
[47]Tolentino,supra,at204,citing3Manresa508.
[48]Article494,CivilCodeseealsoFerrerv.Rilloraza,55O.G.,No.9,1575,1580[1959].
[49]Ferrerv.Rilloraza,(C.A.)55O.G.1575,1580[1959]alsocitedinTolentino,supra,at204205.
[50]Exhibits12to15,Records,pp.242245.
[55]TSNofFebruary25,1998,p.22TSNofJune17,1998,pp.67.
[56]Cidv.Peralta,24Phil.142,147148[1913]alsocitedinTolentino,CivilCode,Bk.II,pp.162163[1992].
[57]TSNofFebruary25,1998,pp.3536.
[58]Exhibits8,8e,and8f,Records,pp.179,184185.
[59]Exhibits8dddand8eee,Records,pp.235,236.
[60]Exhibits8g,8h,8ito8r,8fff,Records,pp.186196,237.
[61]Exhibits8rto8x,Records,pp.197203.
[62]Exhibit8y,Records,p.204.
[63]Exhibits8z,8aato8ee,Records,pp.205210.
[64]Exhibit8zz,Records,p.231.
[65]Exhibits8ffto8kk,Records,pp.211216.
[66]Exhibit8b,Records,p.181.
[67]Exhibit8rr,Records,p.223.
[68]Exhibit8ss,Records,pp.224.
[69]Exhibits8llto8qq,Records,pp.217222.
[70]Exhibits8ttto8yy,Records,pp.225230.
[71]TSNofFebruary25,1998,pp.2021Exhibits"5"and"6,"DeliveryReceiptsofsubjectproperty,Records,pp.176177.
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City of Mandaluyong Vs Aguilar PDF

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11/23/2016

CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO N., THELMA

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