Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial

Bayas vs Sandiganbayan (2002)

FACTS:
Three informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas charging them with
malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal
Code in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer
They pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
Pretrial
October 15, 1999 - cancelled because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Molintas was not prepared
November 5, 1999 - cancelled because of the absence of the counsel due to flu. Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by
Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero.
December 10, 1999 - parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had been duly
signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was supposedly
the day the pre-trial should resume so they could pass upon all other matters)
January 14, 2000 - Atty. Molintas was again absent; rescheduled to Feb 14.
Feb 7, 2000 - Att. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. Granted on Feb 14, 2000,
pretrial rescheduled to March 31.
March 31 - new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint stipulation of facts specifically when they
admitted disbursement of funds. Invoked consti right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
SB: denied motion to withdraw stipulation of facts
no vitiation of consent through fraud or mistake of a serious character
The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself is not a
ground for setting aside a pre-trial order
ISSUE/HOLDING:
1. W/N pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not
binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them.
a. NO. Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence.
Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and
more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time,
help unclog court dockets.
b. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be
enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound
public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made
them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation
as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will
serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly
made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed
on appeal.
c. Validity of joint stipulation: They wanted to be relieved of it without alleging falsity, fraud, mistake. They
did not even dispute the finding of the SB of no vitiation of consent. In fact, they admitted that they
freely gave their consent in signing the joint stipulation of facts.
a. They blame incompetence of previous counsel; he failed to consider their legal interests. To be a
ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact not, as in this case, a mere
lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it.
b. Hornbook doctrine applies: parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all
intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts
of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the
counsel.

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial

d. Presumption of innocence: However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to
stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There is nothing
irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is
consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that x x x everyone has a right to waive
and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large. In this case, there
could have been no impairment of petitioners right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or
right against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel
and is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
e. Necessity of a pretrial order: Not necessary. Section 2 of Rule 118
a. for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the
agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their
counsel. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the
case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
b. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels,
they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the
fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed
to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused
are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should
likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
c. Moreover, SB could not be faulted for not approving the stipulations as the pretrial was rescheduled
6 times.
f. Role of Lawyers in pretrial: The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused
and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack
of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
a. attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would
be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing
litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the
outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed
and that their clients fully assented to.
b. They were the ones who validly and voluntarily entered into the joint stipulation. If the Court allows it
to be withdrawn, there would be no end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements
the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however, that they are not merely
representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their
duties assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice is more significant than that of
acquitting their client, rightly or wrongly.
g. GAD: the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the
court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.
a. Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into.
Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the antigraft court for failing to immediately
act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the
continued absence of petitioners counsel.

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial

People vs. Sitao (2002)
FACTS:
Jovito Sitao alias Beto was charged with the crime of rape against his 14-year old daughter
Arraignment: not guilty
Pretrial: stipulated that the private complainant, Jovy Sitao, is the daughter of the accused and was only
fourteen years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offense.
Jovy:
According to her, she was born on February 15, 1985, and the accused-appellant is her father.
At the age of three (3), she was taken by her maternal grandparents to live in Wao, Lanao del Sur. They
transferred to Cagayan de Oro City in 1998. The following year, Jovy was sent back by her
grandmother to her parents in Purok 12, Barangay Tongantongan, Valencia, Bukidnon, to study at the
Batangan Elementary School. She enrolled as a grade IV student in the said school.
Defense:
He admitted that Jovy is his daughter, and that at the time of his testimony, Jovy was fifteen (15) years
old. He denied staying in the same house with Jovy after she was taken by her grandparents to live
with them in Wao, Lanao del Sur. He last saw her in 1998, before she was brought by her grandparents
to live in Cagayan de Oro City. Later, he was informed by his brother-in-law that Jovy was working there
as a household helper. He denied that Jovy enrolled as a grade IV student at the Batangan Elementary
School.
TC: found Sitao guilty of rape. Death penalty
Automatic review
ISSUE/HOLDING:
1. W/N the prosecution failed to prove the private complainants real age, thus the TC erred in imposing death
penalty? YES
a. Art. 266-B, as amended by RA 8353 provides for death penalty if the crime of rape was committed
against a minor by an ascendant, etc.
a. In prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form.
b. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims minority and her
relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof of age of the victim cannot consist merely of her testimony.
a. Jurisprudence: there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial of the accused. Admitted by

complainant even if corroborated by father IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

b. Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victims age be considered sufficient proof of
minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increases its penalty to death cannot be the
subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on
the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the
penalty of death.
c. Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the circumstance which would qualify the crime of rape,
the penalty of death imposed upon the accusedappellant by the trial court must be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.