Rule 74

G.R. No.
92436 July 26, 1991

MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYESTIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES,
ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and
EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their
mother,
MARIA
VDA.
DE
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO
GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on
20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1 October
1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial
Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTCBCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses
Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola, 2 and the
resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the
parties, the following facts have been preponderantly
established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of
land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at
Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to
bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System
of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921
without the title having been issued to him. The
application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who
was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided
by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each
resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to
a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of
which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael
Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan
Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations
for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of
Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole
property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however,
kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who
was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were
not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land
with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5").
According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.
1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of
sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14.
The vendee immediately took possession of the property
and started paying the land taxes therein.
Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the

original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted, the new title
is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh.
"D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"),
the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was
already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of
the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario
Martillano signed the deed in representation of her
mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several transfer
certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were
issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of
them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title
were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10
January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a
case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession
before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the
defendants in said case is herein private respondent
Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18
September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the
trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer
certificates of title in his possession. 3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No.
1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in
Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-ininterest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with
the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case
No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents
(defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the
alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages.
They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered
that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No.
1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his
lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to
surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land
belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the said land to herein
plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on
8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been
deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and
enjoyment of the property since September 1969 which
coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No.
1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material
averments in the complaint and assert that they are the
owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from
Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null
and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that
they have been in possession of the property and have
been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners
are barred by prescription and/or laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to
implead as additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M.
Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the
following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
Page 1
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of

the defendants spouses Dalmacio
Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's
evidence the former testified that they
mortgaged the subject land to the Rural
Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to
redeem the mortgage the same was
foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1)
year from such foreclosure the
questioned land was redeemed by the
original defendants' son in the person of
Ricardo
M.
Gardiola,
who
was
knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of
the
above
captioned
case.
The
corresponding redemption was effected
through a deed of conveyance, . . . . 6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the
alternative relief for indemnification for the reasonable
value of the property "in the event restitution of the
property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court
concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property
is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its
possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone
acting for and in their behalf are hereby
ordered to relinguish possession or
vacate the property in question which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of
the parties relative to this case are
dismissed
for
lack
of
proper
substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that
(a) there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes
entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936
based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity
between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private
respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the
description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale
(Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former;
and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants
covered the land in question Lot No. 1A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means
of fraud, the claim of the defendants over
the said property is already barred.
Action for reconveyance prescribes in
four (4) years from the discovery thereof.
If there was fraud, the defendant could
have discovered the same in 1967 when
the partition was made in as much as
defendant Rosario Martillano was a party
to that partition. Let us grant further that
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr.
created a constructive or implied trust in
favor of the defendants, again, the claim of
the defendants is also barred. From 1967

to the filing of their answer (let us
consider this as an action for
reconveyance) to this case sometime in
July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16)
years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility
of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is ten (10)
years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession
by private respondents, which it found to have started in
1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time,
the property was already registered, hence it cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the
Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the
respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before
it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in
declaring that the property of the late
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares
was partitioned only in 1967 by his
grandchildren after discovery of the
existence of OCT No. 255 and that no
actual partition was made in 1936 by the
decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in
concluding that the parcel of land sold by
the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the
late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same
parcel of land under litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the
lower court committed a reversible error
when it declared that the landed estate of
the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned
only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren;
and that no actual partition was made in
1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The
evidence on record bears out the
existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6)
which was not controverted nor denied
by the appellees. In like manner, the
lower court itself recognized the fact that
the property of the late Gavino Reyes
consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed
and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by
the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With
the existence of a subdivision plan, and
from the uncontroverted testimony of
appellants' witness, We can only infer
that at least an oral partition, which under
the law is valid and binding, was entered
into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes
regarding his properties in 1936. As held
in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial
partition can be done orally, and the same
Page 2
would be valid if freely entered into

(Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953).
The reason for this is because a partition
is not exactly a conveyance for the reason
that it does not involve transfer of
property from one to the other but rather
a confirmation by them of their
ownership of the property. It must also be
remembered that when Gavino Reyes
died on March 7, 1921, his property was
admittedly not yet covered by a torrens
title, as it was only in 1941 when said
properties were brought into the
application of the torrens system. With
this factual milieu, it can also be
concluded that his heirs have indeed
settled, subdivided and partitioned
Gavino Reyes' landed estate without
formal requirements of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court when a parcel of land is
covered by a torrens title. As told earlier,
the
Subdivision
Plan
(Exh.
6)
undisputedly showed on its face that the
70 hectares of land belonging to the late
Gavino Reyes was subdivided and
partitioned by his children in 1936. On
this score, the partition of the said
property even without the formal
requirements under the rule is valid as
held in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78
Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated
December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein
was described as "na aking minana sa
aking ama." This alone would confirm the
contention of the appellants that there
was already an actual partition (at least
an oral partition) of the property of
Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the
presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6)
is an (sic) evidence of such partition
which appellees failed to controvert not
to mention the fact that the lower court
itself recognized the existence of said
plan, in the same manner that it
concluded that the property was already
surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936
(page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is
evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by
the grandchildren of the late Gavino
Reyes in 1967 is of no moment
considering that the property subject of
the partition in the deed was already
partitioned in 1936 by the children of
Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the
lots supposedly inherited by the
grandchildren named in the deed of 1967
were the same lots inherited and given to
their respective fathers or mothers in
1936 while the land was not yet covered
by the torrens system. Hence, in the case
of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by
him was two (2) parcels of land known as

Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in
the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6),
which were the same parcels of land
allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr.
from Gavino Reyes in representation of
his father, pursuant to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for
which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower
court likewise erred when it concluded
that the parcel of land sold by appellee's
predecessor-in-interest
to
appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same
parcel of land under litigation. It must be
pointed out that the identity of the parcel
of land which the appellees sought to
recover from the appellants was never an
issue in the lower court, because the
litigants had already conceded that the
parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT
No. 27257 was the same parcel of land
identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and
1235 described in Tax Declaration No.
4766. Despite this admission, however,
the lower court declared that "as
described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the
land's description does not tally with the
description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in
litigation." As correctly pointed out by the
appellants however, the discrepancy in
the description was due to the fact that
the description of the land sold in the
Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's
language whereas the description of Lot
No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in
technical terms. This was so because,
when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property
in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola
on December 3, 1943, the only evidence
of title to the land then available in so far
as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was
Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that
time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was aware of the existence of
OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was
issued only in 1967. Consequently, the
land subject of the Deed of Sale was
described by the vendor in the manner as
described in Tax Declaration No. 4766.
However, the description of the land
appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was
exactly the same land identified as Lot No.
1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of
1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the
lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation,
he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1A-14" is bereft of merit under the
foregoing circumstances. Interestingly
enough, the appellees never denied the
identity of the subject lot during the
hearing at the lower court. What they
were denying only was the sale made by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola which does not hold true
because of the document denominated as
Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
Page 3
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the

private respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to
relinquish the possession or vacate the property in
question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is
ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is rendered declaring appellants
to be the lawful owners of the lot
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No.
27257.
No
costs. 12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March
1990, 13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April
1990 after having obtained an extension of time within
which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants
Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has
decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with
law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D")
executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in
1967 is of no moment considering that the property
subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by
the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they
claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land;
the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by
petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this
Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should
have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private
respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the
extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said
registration is the operative act that gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also
constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The
court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally,
the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private
respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question
"militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible
character of the torrens title," 14 and allows reconveyance
which is not tenable since the action therefor had already
prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents
to comment on the petition. But even before it could do so,
petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed
on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in
Support
of
The
Petition
For
Review
On certiorari 15 wherein they assert, among others, that:
(a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary
to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by
the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this
Court; 16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the
facts in this case and its findings are based on speculation,
conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack
on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not
allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already
prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed
their Comment. 17 We required petitioners to reply
thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A
rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August

1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990
and required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's
Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990, is
the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August
1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili
and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also
involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition
thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial
settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although
oral, was valid. The requirement in Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which
have for their object the creation,
transmission,
modification
or
extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a
public instrument is only for convenience
and not for validity or enforceability as
between the parties themselves. [Thunga
Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The
subsequent execution by the heirs of the
Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not
alter the oral partition as in fact the share
pertaining
to
Angustia
Reyes
corresponded to that previously assigned
to her father. Considering that Angel
Reyes sold this property to Basilio de
Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to
respondents, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired
the property and are entitled to
ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that
petitioners deliberately failed to cite this resolution, the
latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991
and filed three days thereafter, allege:
Our
failure
to
mention
the
aforementioned resolution before this
Honorable Court is not deliberate nor
with malice aforethought. The reason is
that to date, we have not yet received any
resolution to our Motion For Leave of
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable
Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we
honestly feel that the resolution that will
be issued therein will not be applicable to
the case before this Honorable Court's
Second Division. It should be mentioned
that in the Durumpili case before the
Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied
on the alleged confirmation of the sale
executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the
Reyes case before this Second Division,
there was no sale that was executed by
the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-ininterest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
Page 4
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R.

No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a) On 18
September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De
Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of
petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b)
This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October
1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein,
through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc And/Or
Motion
For
Reconsideration 21 wherein they specifically admit that
said case and the instant petition have "identity and/or
similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even
going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where such
similarities lie. 22d) This motion was denied in the
resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was
furnished the attorneys for petitioners. 23 e) Entry of
judgment had already been made therein and a copy
thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of
Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial
Records Office dated 20 December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the
parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting
aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is
inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual
conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and
clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to
agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding
that: (a) there was no partition among the children of
Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in
support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and
subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific
subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the
land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not
identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and
adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement;
and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14
and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the
remedy open to the vendee was an action for
reconveyance, which should have been brought within
four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the
Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private
respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a
party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition
made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although
oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires
partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid. 24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court,
interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held
that the requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law. There is
nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the

validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is
valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the
reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered
by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or
right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of
another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has
been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of
20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral
partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason
or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion
for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel
of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. 26 The estate of the
decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs.
The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share
or interest in the property subject to the condition that the
portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493
of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir
has the absolute ownership of his share in the community
property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same,
except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any
such transfer is limited to the portion which may be
awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the
estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same
property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and
heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirspetitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial
court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation
that the description of the former does not tally with that
of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No.
1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed
since at that time, the property had already been
partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition
to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent
Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be
stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation
Page 5
purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the

basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale.
Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee herein
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately
took possession of the property. This is the very same
property which is the subject matter of this case and which
petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents.
The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership
and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate
of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and
concede that the property claimed by private respondent,
which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none
other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the

petition with costs against petitioners.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola

in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private
respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT
No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private
respondents, she signed it in representation of her
deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of
Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her
husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr.
RESOLUTION
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share
of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as
mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of
Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr.
could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never
became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by
his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the
name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never
became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not
create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in
the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification
of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any
title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the
settlement did not improve his condition, and the
subsequent registration of the deed did not create any
right or vest any title over the property in favor of the
petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot
give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest
quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here.
Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael
Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private
respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the
latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover
from private respondents the ownership and possession of
the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically
admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended
complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to
them, that they definitely discovered that they were the
owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full
knowledge that private respondents were in actual
physical possession of the property, it was only about
thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they
decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As
stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial
court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no
basis for the trial court to place the burden on private
respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within
four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the
transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115181
March 31, 2000
MARIA
SOCORRO
AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON
AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO,
PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated
April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition
for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and
compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his
first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy,
Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are
likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an
American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other
private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989.
She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the
estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their
opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial
proceedings to an action for judicial partition which
petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the
assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for
Judicial Partition", considering that the petitioner is the
only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the
other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an
expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial
partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The
parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all
the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set
the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at
8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their
counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
The instant petition then is without merit.
Page 6
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June
16, 1993.
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the

office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of

Appeals,
a
petition
for certiorari,
prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to
convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.

Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased
person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear
to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate
by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing,
which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months from the date of the last publication
of a notice which shall be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such other notice to
interested persons as the court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if
proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine
who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the
payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then
find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they
are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall
thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to
them respectively. The court shall make such order as may
be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all
orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the
order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall
be recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court

rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved
reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
for
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following

errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER
UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY
PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER
AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this
case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate
court committed an error of law and gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a
partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is
possible in the instant case as no determination has yet
been made of the character and extent of the decedent's
estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v.Montejo,
26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the
existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter
still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are
the proper mode of resolving the same.4 In addition,
petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being
depleted for want of an administrator to manage and
attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not
provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.
The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally
inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal
basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this
rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 6 which
provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and

properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's
death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows
heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need
of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not
required to submit the property for judicial
administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case
"the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are
all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an
administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to
partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have
yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete
inventory of the estate may be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting
petitioner's action for letters of administration into an
action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of
the trial court converting an action for letters of
administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in
the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for
the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as
to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition
may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that
where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of
Page 7
them may not be compelled to submit to administration

proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted
petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit
for judicial partition, upon motion of the private
respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the
Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action
procedurally in order.
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994

involving the same property had been published in the
Catanduanes Tribune.6
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and

the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
29th June 1995
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Sir:
G.R. No. 156536
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,8 (c/o Atty.

Prospero V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs of the late
Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.
October 31, 2006
JOSEPH
CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON
VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND
GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the decision1 dated March 26,
2002, and the resolution2 dated December 17, 2002, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria
A. Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Vargas,
Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square
meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left
behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a
notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely
Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas,
Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and
adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one
of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the
document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three
consecutive weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale4 was again executed by and among
the same heirs over the same property and also with the
same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan,
Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their
respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to
Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas
and one of respondents herein, she came to know of the
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated
November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on
the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. 5 She
likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to

petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property,
with the following letter7 sent to petitioner on her behalf:
Mr.
Joseph
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Cua
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement

Among Heirs with Sale" was executed by some of my
client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other coheirs, by virtue of which document you acquired by
purchase from the signatories to the said document, five
(5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of
the above-described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her
right of legal redemption of said five (5) shares as well as
other shares which you may likewise have acquired by
purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree to
legal redemption within a period of fifteen (15) days from
your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within
said 15-day-period, proper legal action shall be taken by
my client to redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having
failed to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay
level,9 Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra
Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes
against petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000
which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of
Court on May 20, 1996.10 Joining her in the action were her
children with Santiago, namely, Aurora, Ramon, Marites,
Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of
the alleged primitive owner of the lot in question, Pedro
Lakandula, intervened in the case.11
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property,
they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise
alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice
by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the
right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no
written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed
that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null
and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.12
Page 8
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision13 in

favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the
complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and declaring
the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with
Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to
petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred
after the partition of the property among the co-owner
heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could validly
dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC
found that although there was a failure to strictly comply
with the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil
Code14 for a written notice of sale to be served upon
respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the
former's right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by
respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was
more than 30 days before the filing of their complaint, and
their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of
Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the
MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by
competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the
portion of the property owned by respondents' co-heirs.15
Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good

faith.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of

Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC decision in a
judgment dated November 25, 1999. The matter was
thereafter raised to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex

parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with
the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the

assailed decision dated March 26, 2002, declaring that the
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February
4, 1994 and November 15, 1994, respectively, were void
and without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon
respondents considering the latter never participated in it
nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and
bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by
an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when
the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly
published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and
partition does not bind persons who did not participate
therein, whether the written notice required to be served
by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of
hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under
Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with
when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale such
that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise
the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall
commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject
property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was
valid because the partition was duly published. The
publication of the same constitutes due notice to
respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence
thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from
denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late
stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the
property.
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint

because its subject matter was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The complaint should have been filed with the
RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties,
the co-heirs who sold their interest in the subject property
not having been impleaded by respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as
it was not properly verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas
failed to indicate that she was authorized to represent the
other respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the
petition. Moreover, the verification was inadequate
because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth
and/or correctness of the material allegations in the
petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute

constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in
the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either
of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs
cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons
even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who
actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of
their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound
by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right
to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the
Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because
respondents were never notified in writing of the actual
sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a
need for written notice to start the period of redemption,
thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may
be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time
they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Page 9
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be

reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing
by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is
indispensable and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time
advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated
sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time
written notice of the actual sale within which to make up
his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the
redemption.21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of
written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption, the method of notification
remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by
law.22 This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088,
which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint
ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders
be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in
a position to repurchase the share sold.23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve
written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because
the latter are in the best position to know the other coowners who, under the law, must be notified of the
sale.24 This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the
sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any
doubt that the alienation is not definitive.25 As a result, the
party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may
still contest the alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to
comply with this requirement, there is no legal
impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares
sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness
and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a
builder in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own
without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's
title.27 Petitioner derived his title from the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15,
1994. He was very much aware that not all of the heirs
participated therein as it was evident on the face of the
document itself. Because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could have been
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale.
This is because the alienation made by respondents' coheirs was limited to the portion which may be allotted to
them in the division upon the termination of the coownership. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests
of respondents, petitioner still constructed improvements
on the property. For this reason, his claim of good faith
lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped
from raising the same for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below
and sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts to
uphold the validity of the sale to him of a portion of the
subject property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement
among heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise this
defense, he cannot, under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the
lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, an
exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a

case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.
One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure
affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to
obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse.28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of
indispensable parties, similarly lacks merit. An
indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of an action and who is
required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.29 The
party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought is so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties that the former's legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an
indispensable party is one whose interest will be directly
affected by the court's action in the litigation. In the
absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a
resolution of the controversy before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.30
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the
complaint filed by respondents ultimately prayed that they
be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by
their co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to
sell their undivided share in the property to petitioner is
not in dispute. Respondents concede that the other heirs
acted within their hereditary rights in doing so to the
effect that the latter completely and effectively
relinquished their interests in the property in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the shoes of the
other heirs to become a co-owner of the property with
respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is
absolutely required for a complete and final determination
of the controversy because what respondents seek is to be
subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by
respondents with the CA should have been dismissed
because the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping appended to it were defective, citing specifically
the failure of respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that
she was authorized to represent her co-respondents in the
petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged truth of the
allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping,
which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate
and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded.32 Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that although
it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the
Page 10
rules.34The co-respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in

this case were her children. In order not to defeat the ends
of justice, the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the
petition on their behalf and as their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 45904
September 30, 1938
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G.

UTULO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano
B.
Gardiner
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
for
appellant.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac
appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the
property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the
administration of his property (special proceedings No.
3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse
and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial
administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children,
named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia
who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs.
Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during
the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said
deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate
descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and
her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the
judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife
(special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that
her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the
oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased
consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her
father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named
administrator of the property of said deceased. The
oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the
appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged
that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness,
there was no occasion for the said judicial administration;
but she stated that should the court grant the
administration of the property, she should be appointed
the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better
right than the applicant. After the required publications,
trial was had and the court, on August 28, 1936, finally
issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted
and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was
certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, but these assigned errors
raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether
upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the
property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the
consequent appointment of an administrator, and whether
the appellant has a better right to the said office than the
appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code
of Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is
named in the will, or if a person dies intestate,

administration shall be granted" etc. This provision
enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living
property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be
judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established
in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein.
This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established
by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally
amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they
may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. According to the second,
if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the
heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required
publications, to proceed with the summary partition and,
after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves
pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly
held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator
are
superfluous
and
unnecessary
proceedings
(Ilustre vs.Alaras
Frondosa,
17
Phil.,
321;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on
the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil
Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property left
by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case
of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661),
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs
succeeded immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for
the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing
against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they
desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by
mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code
of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may
be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not
mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts
existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion
for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement
and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs
are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs
and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate
among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided
estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of
the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the
appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened
in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are
Page 11
any heirs of the estate who have not received their

participation, they have their remedy by petition for
partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs.
Bondad, supra, and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the
same doctrine was reiterated. And in the case of Fule vs.
Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same
doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit
an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the
estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is
admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at
the time of his death no debts existed against his estate
and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of
articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the
property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies
intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To
Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27
Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate,
passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are
no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of
a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them
and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad
vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the
Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to
all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In
the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs
may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they
may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves
and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that
privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides
how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in
case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections
182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts
there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the cost and expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs
when they are adults and when there are no debts against
the
estate.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their
relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same
as that of any other coowners or owners in common, and
they may recover their individual rights, the same as any
other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of
Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187;
Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx
xxx
The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are

discussing, also exist in the divisions of personal as well as
the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division,
then a suit for partition of such personal property among
the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable where the
estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is
no administration upon the estate and no necessity
thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property
susceptible of being held in common which may not be
divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as
well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a
single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent
tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well
as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R.
A.,
698;
Pipes vs.Buckner,
51
Miss.,
848;
Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the
abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are
convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to
which it has application, their files would not have been
replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as
they are now. There is no weight in the argument adduced
by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as
judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have
legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased
Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said
intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice
for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn,
would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary
party if she were living . In order to intervene in said
intestate and to take part in the distribution of the
property it is not necessary that the administration of the
property of his deceased wife be instituted an
administration which will take up time and occasion
inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine
which of the parties has preferential right to the office of
administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of
this instance to the applicant-appellee. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-10474
February 28, 1958
BENNY
SAMPILO
SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE
COURT
OF
SINOPERA respondent.
and
HONORATO
APPEALS
Clodualdo
P.
Surio
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
for
and
FELISA
petitioners.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third
Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring
plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land
described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was
rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera,
administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover
from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of
land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro
Tolete.
xxx
Page 12
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals,

Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for
parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176
of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left
as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews
and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On
July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow
executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro
Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants
or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to
inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This
affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a
deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of
Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold
the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000
and this sale was also registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C",
attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for
the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special
Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her
appointment as administratrix, brought the present action
on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was
recorded on certificates of title covering the said
properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was
subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor
of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had
no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that
Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to
him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any
right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an
amended answer alleging that the complaint states no
cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is
barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants are
innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is
malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and
inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit
of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B",
and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void;
declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four
parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the
usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties
are terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit
of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct
but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C",
insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is
concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the
heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the
judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and
void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed
exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon.
Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the
plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, onehalf of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved
to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure
adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said
properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his
right to bring an action for the damages that he may have

suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to
this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following
errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent
Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her coheirs' participation to the lands in question had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's
denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that
as the action was instituted almost four years after the
affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of
action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed
because the same was not brought within the period of
two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy
Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855
869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall
appear at any time within two years after the settlement
and distribution of an estate in accordance with the
provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule,
that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his
lawful participation of the such heir or such other person
may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying
such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as
follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the
heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate
to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in
the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two years after the death
of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted
contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which
there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a
deceased person, and the second in which there is only one
heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act
No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
Page 13
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal

Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who
died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and
there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts
have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed
in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of
Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or
more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more
imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the
addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of
Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial
settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no
mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or
had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any
doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the
law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the
extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or
interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such
rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in
accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the
prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as
to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no
notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement,
there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims
within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had
no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision
to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right
to due process
of
law. In
the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this
case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that
the order of distribution may be had upon the application
of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested
in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by
publication or otherwise, of such application. The
proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex
parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and
incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service
or by publication, by which the court undertakes to
distribute the property of deceased persons, can be
conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented
therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of
extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex
parteproceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or
affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made,
either directly or by implication. We have examined the
two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at
all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein
had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and
so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring

distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial
partition after the expiration of two years from such
extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons
who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians. The
case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because
not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found
that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is
barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the
Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention
is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to
support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing
therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of
limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is
only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the
extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not
Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of
limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No.
190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been
meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have
been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it
is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one
based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the
lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the
deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except
herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which
has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190;
Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed
the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where
instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have
been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any
case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their
claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense,
and they have not proved that when the action was
instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date
that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the
fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendantsappellants are innocent purchasers for value was rejected
as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have
sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of
Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does
not find support in the evidence of record. As regards
defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a
nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the
latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased
who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel,
Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny
Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that
he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces,
children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro
Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo
accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison,
Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao
Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of
conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she
Page 14
conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had

adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged
before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there
is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the
conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens
our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased
Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the
property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to
him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's
rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim
that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the
certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he
acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the
property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis
pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26,
1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a
purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is wellsettled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of
registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should
put him upon inquiry and investigate as to the possible
defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such
inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as a
purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a
valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37
Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we
hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 161220
July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOSBENATIRO substituted by their heirs, namely:
Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr.,
surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C.
BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria CuyosTalian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos,
and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-infact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to
annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3
Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty.

Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties
together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date
issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half
accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently
died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian
who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a
nominal bond of P1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the
CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was
called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother,
oppositor Francisco, together with their respective
counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel,
manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to
settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that
the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement
of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the
approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to
make a project of partition within 30 days from December
12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty.
Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by
telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on
February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu,
where the properties are located, for a conference or
meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine
heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three
heirs could not be located in their respective given
addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided
outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead
with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were
present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the
estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the
heirs, was administering the properties of the estate
(without appointment from the Court) as having been
properly and duly accounted for.
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos

were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco,
Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo
died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos.
000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all
under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the

estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian,
(duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as
having been properly and duly accounted for.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian

(respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot
Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu,
Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration,
docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but

instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00
subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would
be in a position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest
of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand
Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings

demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria
Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to

be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.9
Page 15
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro

(Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in
the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the
estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered
her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the
submission of the Report was due to the request of
respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make
some consultations on what was already agreed upon by
the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976
that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty.
Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was
amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be
given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since
one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in
order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the
assailed Order10 dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not
contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied
in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The
Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the
deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in
favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her
of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall
remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have
been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court,
be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the
sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly
disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed
Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate,
purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve
respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already
residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental
to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels of land constituting the
intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of
Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos,
namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly
learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728,
000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in
the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129,
20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134,
were issued in Columbas name; and that later on, Original
Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos
were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these
parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the
names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M.
Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of
petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they
subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio
Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on

June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and
mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in
representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos,
namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed
with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated
December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No.
24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged
that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and
void and of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of
due process in claiming their share of their father's estate;
that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as
well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no
meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how
to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never
received any payment from the supposed sale of their
share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close
confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be
benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation, should
the same be approved by the probate court; that since the
report was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was
invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor
of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity,
since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not
appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it
could divide the remainder of the consideration equally
among the heirs after paying all the administration
expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not
yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the
case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice
Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share
in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in
manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to
a denial of their right to the property without due process
of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused
them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation
that they discovered the assailed order dated December
16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as
respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate
proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to
client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim
that they filed the petition for annulment within the
statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in
possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979
when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed
Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud
attended the issuance of the assailed order; that
Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to
having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18,
1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the
Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained
the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled
the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December
16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the
name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent
Page 16
transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and

Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered
reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to
be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the
Commissioners Report, which was used by the trial court
as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that
to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the
concerned parties to be present in the conference;
however, such was not the scenario since in their separate
sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent
attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever
happened among them; that although under Section 3(m),
Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption
of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the
same may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that
the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the
Commissioners Report never mentioned the names of the
heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only
the names of those who were absent, when the names of
those who were present were equally essential, if not even
more important, than the names of those who were
absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of
conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as
letting them sign the report to signify their consent as
regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates settlement;
(3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence
attached to the report indicating that the respondents
were indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence
of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the
compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that
notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty.
Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively,
the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise
cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was
the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client;
that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not
duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no
legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void
compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal
effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained
by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the
initial transfer of the properties to Columba CuyosBenatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that
Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator
as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of
Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of
the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that
he received; that even so, such alleged payment was
incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial
courts order for the administratix to execute the deed of
sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the
administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of
money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the
claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes

shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of
the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale
was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money
placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the
Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk
of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been
terminated and that the last Order in the special
proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels
of land, which included the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the
issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates
of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud.
Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise
agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made
by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis
of their ownership over the properties, since to do so
would result in enriching them at the expense of the
respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud
attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since
respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate
their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to
assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved
party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial,
appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take
through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's
Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a
strong presumption of regularity - based merely on
belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of
said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a
sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a
Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of
waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope
Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on
February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively.
In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more
interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the
settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties
had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had
already received their share of the purchase price. Another
heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier
executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001, stating
that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she
had already received her share of the purchase price on
May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a
certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted
by any of the parties, that he had already
received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be
the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of
Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing
of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a
reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated
December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners
Page 17
Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement

entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona
Arrogante Cuyos.
who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of

service, could not be located in their respective given
addresses.
We rule in the negative.
However, there is nothing in the records that would

establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by
telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled
conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact,
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs,
who was presumably present in the conference, as she was
not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an
affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact
that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any
telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While
Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an
Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this case, it
was only for the reason that the subject estate properties
had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she
had already received her corresponding share of the
purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that
retracted her previous statement that she was not called to
a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized
statement32 that there was no meeting held. Thus, the
veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the
heirs was doubtful.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in

character25 and will not so easily and readily lend itself to
abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to
it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the
annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an
RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial
of due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud
will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was
prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be
annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is
no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the
heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed
order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to
prepare the project of partition for submission and
approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty.
Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the
heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated
that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where
the subject properties were located for settlement, by
sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for
them to attend the conference scheduled on February 28
to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs,
only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly
found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those
present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the
conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs

indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an
agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were
not even required to sign anything to show their
attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the
Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged
agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the
alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity
thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was
for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the
estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all
the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard
to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance
was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged
agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by
the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was
indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement
stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer
of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule
133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a
presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that
everything done by an officer in connection with the
performance of an official act in the line of his duty was
legally done, such presumption may be overcome by
evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned
by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons
present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the
heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of
evidence showing that respondents were notified of the
conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that
rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in
ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in
annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003
issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court
Page 18
of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the

Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs, except
Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as
enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the
Report with the accompanying registry receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs
were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an
extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate,
regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the
extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly
published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of
an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.
It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition
is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of
the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in
the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either
of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what
matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before
the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not
established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that
the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report.
The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite
the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the
other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action
was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due
process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all
the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial
court were duly represented by respective counsels,
namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray
for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to
settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention
through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January
30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his
interest in the estate is represented by the judicial
administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a
judicial administrator is the legal representative not only
of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors
whose interest he represents; that when the trial court
issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976
approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers
were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21,
1976 as shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003
of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers
should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party
is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and
pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon
receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the
respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy
such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper
time, but they failed to do so without giving any cogent
reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners
Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were
the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not
the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the
pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was
Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of
administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer
when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and his Motion to Order administrarix
Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the
estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by
counsel were not given any notice of the judgment
approving the compromise. It was only sometime in
February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax
declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in
the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in
Columbas name, and Original Certificates of Titles were
subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could
not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for
lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot
be the source of any right or of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we
consequences of a void judgment, thus:
stated
the
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while

admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal
timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become
final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void
decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no
effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison,
this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in
which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by
none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no
legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not
entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the
void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other
words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the
situation is the same as it would be if there were no
Page 19
judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the

same position they were in before the trial.
No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo

Cuyos.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be

the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
No costs.
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed

anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting
such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever
it
is
invoked,
unless
barred
by
laches.41Consequently, the compromise agreement and the
Order approving it must be declared null and void and set
aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are
barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24
years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an
action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches
or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used
to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the
better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will
not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong
or injustice would result.44
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118680
March 5, 2001
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN,
MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ,
ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN
TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA,
JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT
CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA,
IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN
EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil
Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and
Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the
CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein
petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1,
1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner
Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between
themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action
to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of
Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent
Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld
the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private
respondents appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals.
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only

sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for
annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that
respondents' right to due process is the paramount
consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears
stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe.45
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the

Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of
Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had
no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void,

it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence,
the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of
Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of
titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent
transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered

fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883
square meters. These properties were divided among Jose,
Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were
given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square
meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9,
respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of
Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision

dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13,
2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and

Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure
new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to
transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2
Page 20
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3,

designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents
Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed of
Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent
Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No.
T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon,
Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots
560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering
500 square meters was transferred to respondent
Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently transferred to
Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under
TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla 5 and was later
transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who
registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot
560-C was transferred and registered under the name of
respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D
was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of
Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square
meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion
College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T10208.6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to
annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint
Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the
adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to
claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes.
The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were
not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25,
1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward
a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the
defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was
premised on the following grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped
her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since
she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria
Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped,
applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the
partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent
claim that the partition would have been alright had she
been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had
been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4
year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
December 20, 1994.10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the
following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals in -
I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT
JUREDINI
AND
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN
SAID TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2)
YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS
CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN
CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
WHO
WERE
THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM
THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF
MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM
TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND
HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND
560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES
WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY
FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT
NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE
ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT
THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES
FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1)
whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already
prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3)
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots
which had already been transferred to the respondent
buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the
prescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962).
She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a
two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements.
One, the party assailing the partition must have been given
notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have
participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements
are not present in her case,12 since she did not participate
in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She
cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we
held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and
consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is
an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13
Page 21
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were

buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the
necessary due diligence required before purchasing the
lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to
redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent
Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the
New Civil Code.15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the
partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of
the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil
Code.16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of
petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue
that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have
their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in
the compromise agreement they entered into with the
respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally,
respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena
in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her
status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any
case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were
adequately protected in the said partition.17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive
period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part
or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs
of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in
the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year
prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as
provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964),
which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement"
upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when said instrument was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title
were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after
the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11,
1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable
rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of all
persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or
issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is
agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, not after, which was when publication was done
in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling

in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate
in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply
when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be
annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs,
who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel
together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the
lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil
Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim
that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since
they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption.
Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since
the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at
the time they executed the deed of partition. The
complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only
twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently
a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of
adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it
is patent that private respondents executed the deed of
partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in
gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir
or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after
the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate
under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74.
Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right
will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled
to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule,
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial
court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the
partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,
was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina,
only represented her own interests and not those of Maria
Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal
shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include
Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers?
Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to
hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.
The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner
are now all registered under the name of third parties.
Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. 26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts,
agreements or any other documentary evidence was
Page 22
presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual

damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for
moral damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence
of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated testimony of
Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative
value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not
be
awarded
on
the
basis
of
hearsay
evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to
substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that
she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law,
nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right,
which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
vindicated and recognized.30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained
injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and
properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of
her legal participation in the partition of the estate of
Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had
transferred portions of the properties involved to third
parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a
decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor
nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.31 The amount to be awarded as such
damages should at least commensurate to the injury
sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and
purpose of said damages.32 Such award is given in view of
the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons
extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages
is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11,
1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is
hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by
private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733
January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE

DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other
HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA
VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA
DELGADO
PERLAS,
CAROLINA
DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS
and
MELINDA
DELGADO
CAMPOMADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA
CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and

GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA,
as
Oppositors;1 and
2
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor, Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to
reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668,
which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals
in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates
of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in
this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that
complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged
heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and fullblood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of
Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa,
five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings
were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in
Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one
without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the
answer will determine whether their successional rights
fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession
between
legitimate
and
illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and
therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He
and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado
were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no
evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so
much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained
the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon
Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Page 23
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa

Delgado" (the
natural
child
of
Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name
and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a
record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean
that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will.
She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral
relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on
June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of
selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her
estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to
Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place
is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually
lived together as husband and wife but were never
married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out
that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa
Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand,
insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of
necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September
8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and
friends to have in fact been married. To support their
proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1,
1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia
on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for
Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or
Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503
(VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of
the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia
indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any
children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect
as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did
manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenorrespondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia

treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and
she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact,
Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by
Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one
of their children. Also, her report card from the University
of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that
Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of
Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as
an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new
Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of
Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He
stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural
children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will.
He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda.
deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children
of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman
Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia
Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter
of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia RustiaCruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother,
Roman
Rustia,
Sr.,
and
(3)
the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was
grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao
and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa
Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only
surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents
herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of
administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed
a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the
estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was
denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners
and the other claimants remained in issue and should be
properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
Page 24
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa

substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao,
who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The
dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and
her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado
listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this
Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila
on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same
among themselves in accordance with the proportions
referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby
declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of
the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and
the other parties hereto.
oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the

reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which
nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court
allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent
portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be
followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts
pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents
and the party entitled to the administration of their estate,
which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too
technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa

Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June
15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and
effect.
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise

valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have
been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been

settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated
in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single
administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and,
as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has
established her right to the appointment as administratrix
of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR.
GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF

ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise
ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her
collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of
the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt
of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was
denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not
filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and
after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of
Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed
the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November
27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415,
for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set
aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended
decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally
married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio
Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves
the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with
the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to
herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia
as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia;
thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositorsappellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the
Page 25
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND

PESOS (P500,000.00).
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to

Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby

ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration
of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes
due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon
notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite
bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice
of the administrators qualification and posting of the
bond.
We are not persuaded.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication

executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba DelgadoEncinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or nonexistence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw
from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary

evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that
no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of
marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in
support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough
to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These
are public documents which are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness
whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support
their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had
proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually,
the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of
marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only
of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized
the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged
single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following

presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not
what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living
in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.47
xxx xxx xxx
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as

husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are,

the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either

conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn
them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on
only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the

presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of
more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and
friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition
for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of
the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the
testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of

Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as
Page 26
"hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa

Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never
married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out
of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with
another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers
and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between
illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child
to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former,
would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than
a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply
to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for
its basis the difference in category between illegitimate
and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and
if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were
related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her halfbrother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are
already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the
new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral
line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be
exercised
by
grandnephews
and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who
were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it
is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children

survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo
Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents
entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an
illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however,
claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29,
1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary
rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in
the new Civil Code which granted certain successional
rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that
they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of
a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds:
first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
and second, voluntary recognition through authentic
writing.
Page 27
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the

status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death
of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by
which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February
28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second
ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case,
Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a
private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did
intervenors report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by
Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the
new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had
no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which
was published in the Sunday Times on September 10,
1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan,
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption
was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and
was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her
a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which
[created] between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance
with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law
at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the
relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.
The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to
the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor
Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to
administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint
administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of
Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the
May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of selfadjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half
of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining
half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of
Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of
Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
Page 28
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia

and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 20021 Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after
trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to
state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations
sought to prove by testimonial and documentary
evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal)
married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a
boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein
co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later
baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein
respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal,
who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed,
Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in
Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292
covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q.
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit

of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of
land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugals name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No.
15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan
City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila
Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and
still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to
the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before
the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the
Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer
certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is
not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence,
not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that
she perjured herself when she made false representations
in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit
of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void
and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to
cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its
stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court
issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due
course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims
under the complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18,
2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses and of their documentary
evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pretrial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the
ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs
had not been established before a probate (sic) court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial
court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not
dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage
Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and
testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the
decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and
right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be
determined herein. However, the establishment of a
Page 29
status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through

a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative
term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is
"to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative
heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet,
the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without
jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their
status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the
personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs.
1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing
the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following
ruling in Cario v. Cario,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial,
et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such
cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court
of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in
2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to
be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in
the Cario case
was
the validity of
the
two
marriagescontracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention
between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan
Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he
married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario
contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two
marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death
benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely
an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a
different
milieu. The
main
issue
here
is
the annulment oftitle to property. The only undisputed
fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during
his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come

two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and
defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the
parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively
established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such
questions as to such status or right must be properly
ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection
or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil
suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow
indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or
the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose,
is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x21 (Emphasis in the
original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24,
2002,22 thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence,
the
present
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred
when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory
complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary
ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the
lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence
presented
relative
to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision
be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the
prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in
the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme
Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a
decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the
determination of the issues of which of the two marriages
is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy
of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of
the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises
are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in
effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is
discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows;
that Carioallows courts to pass on the determination of
heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so
long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and
that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had
established their status as compulsory heirs.
Page 30
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether

petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the
case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it

rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not
the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is
Marcosa.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel

Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March
17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants"
of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered
on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots
had been titled in the name of the therein respondent
Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in
turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a
complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents
moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove
their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss in this wise:
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two

issues raised for determination was whether they are the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the

said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs
of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics
in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit
holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera28and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held
that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy
Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters
of administration before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and
is survived by him and his therein named seven (7)
siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage
to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage
with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a
will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving
spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and
issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request,
her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court,
against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio
Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian
of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in
his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of
a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage
of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to
some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether

Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and
whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et
al., found "substantially correct" the trial courts findings of
fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of
the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein
as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of
birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in
the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged
marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin
and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the
lower court should not have declared, in the decision
appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the
decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil
case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court
in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero,
filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding,
Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia
Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his
mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents
paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the
courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil
case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered
judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia,
the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia
who posed, among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the
RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action]
for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share
of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate]
proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the
same court," this Court held that "[i]n the interest of
orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court
should
not
interfere
with
[estate]
proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas
v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that
the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless
[therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva]
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of
her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an
heir of the decedent.
Page 31
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an

adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez
Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of
the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the
probate court directed that the records of the case be
archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her
adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the
ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her
adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She
subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court,
noting the parties agreement to suspend action or
resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted
to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been
decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the
order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged
the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of
which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to
set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for
hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to
her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the
delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The
trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before
this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and
directive that the records of the case be sent to the
archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate
estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received
his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would
be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executedand re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,;
Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960,
107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order
of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing,
but allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves

no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or
if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under
the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be
raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir
has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment
of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a
property or properties belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly
that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on
February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section
1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances
of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light
of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals
estate to administration proceedings since a determination
of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil
case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due
course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim
under the complaint.40
Page 32
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial
court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987
LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB
AMEROL,
DIBARATUN
AMEROL,
DIBARATUN,
MATABALAO, MINDALANO DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN
MORO,
and
MANUCAO
MORO, petitioners,
vs.
MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Sur, Branch III, Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 1354,
entitled, "Molok Bagumbaran vs. Liwalug Amerol et al.,"
under Republic Act No. 5400, "as only question of law is
raised." 2
The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of
an action for reconveyance of real property which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered under the
Torrens System in another's name. In other words, what is
the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title
to real property arising from an implied or constructive
trust and, corrolarily reference. The petitioners herein,
defendants in the trial court, assert that they have ten
years to bring the action, while the respondent, plaintiff in
the court below, claims the prescriptive period is four
years. The trial court ruled tor the plaintiff, now
respondent.
We reverse. We hold that the prescriptive period for such
an action for reconveyance, as this case, is ten years. The
point of reference is, or the ten-year prescriptive period
commences to run from, the. date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the real property.
There is no issue as to the facts, this case having been
elevated to this Court, as aforestated, on purely a question
of law. Be that as it may, in order to satisfy constitutional
requirements as well as to place the question of law in
proper perspective, there is need to state the facts of the
case. On this regard, the findings of the trial court would
best serve the stated purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence submitted during the trial there is no
dispute concerning the fact relative to the Identity of the
land in litigation. It is commonly known as Lot No. 524,
Pls-126 and technically described and bounded in the
sketch (Exh. "7 "). This is the very tract of land alleged by
the plaintiff to have been forcibly entered into by the
defendants and which plaintiff now w&s to recover
possession thereof. It has also been proven that the same
lot was covered by two free patent applications: (l) that
of defendant Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed

Amerol) which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953,
and (2) that of Molok Bagumbaran which was filed on
December 27, 1954. There is also no question regarding
the fact that as to these two free patent applications, that
of plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran was given due course as a
result of which Free Patent No. V-19050 was issued on
August 16,1955 by authority of the President of the
Philippines Ramon Magsaysay, by Jaime Ferrer,
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Lanao (now Lanao del Sur) in the mm year
whereupon Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 was duly
issued, owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished
the herein plaintiff.
This court is also inclined to believe that defendant
Liwalug Datomanong had never known of plaintiff's free
patent application on the land in question nor was he ever
notified or participated in the administrative proceedings
relative to plaintiff's free patent application. In the
meantime, since the date he purchased the land from
Mandal Tondo, said defendant has been and up to the
present in con. tinuous occupation and cultivation of the
same. His co-defendants named in the complaint are
merely his tenants.
It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did not
take appropriate action to annul the patent and title of the
plaintiff within one year from issuance thereof and that the
first step taken by him to contest said patent and title was
a formal protest (Exh. "12", p. 408, Record) dated April 24,
1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of
Nine (9) long years from the issuance of patent in favor of
the plaintiff. The second step he took was his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in the above
entitled case, which answer was filed with this court on
December 4, 1964. In said counterclaim, defendant
reiterated his stand that plaintiff secured patent on the
land by means of deceit and fraud, wherefore, defendant
prayed that said title be annulled, or, alternatively, plaintiff
be ordered to reconvey the said land to the said defendant
Liwalug Datomanong.
First question to be resolved is whether or not the plaintiff
is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in securing the Free
Patent No. V-19050 covering the land in question.
Upon a thorough examination of the evidence, proofs are
sufficient to support defendant's contention that plaintiff is
guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. In the first place,
proofs are abundant tending to show that since 1952 when
Mandal Tando transferred the land to said defendant, the
latter occupied, took possession thereof and cultivated the
same continuously, publicly, adversely against any
claimant and in the concept of owner up to the present;
that said defendant had introduced considerable
improvements such as coconut and coffee plantations and
other fruit trees besides his farm house, a mosque, cassava
plantation and clearing and full cultivation of the entire
area. The fact of possession on the part of said defendant
has been attested to by competent and creditable
witnesses like Mandal Tando who conveyed the land to the
defendant; Hadji Sirad Gomandang, the barrio captain of
Montay, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Hadji Rasol Maruhom
and Hadji Abdulcadir Pagayawan, both of Pialot, Malabang,
Lanao del Sur who are farmers and barrio-mates of said
defendant; and also Disomnong Dimna Macabuat, an
employee in the office of the District Land Officer at
Marawi City who had officially conducted occular
inspection and investigation of the premises in connection
Page 33
with the protest of said defendant found thereon the

above-mentioned improvements introduced by the said
defendant.
What is more, on or before filing his free patent
application, plaintiff knew that the land in question which
was covered by his free patent application was then
actually occupied and cultivated by defendant Liwalug
Datomanong if not by Mandal Tando, the original
occupant. Be it remembered that Mandal Tando had
transferred to defendant Liwalug Datomanong Twenty
Four (24) hectares, more than eleven hectares of which is
(sic) outside the military reservation and designated as Lot
No. 524, Pls-126 and the rest which is in the southern
portion lies within the military reservation. Now,
immediately adjacent thereto on the south is the land
claimed and occupied by the herein plaintiff also consisting
of Twenty Four (24) hectares but wholly within the
military reservation. It appears that plaintiff declared this
Twenty four hectares for the first time on October 24,
1950 for taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No. 1529,
Record) and stated in said tax declaration (Exhs. "8" and
"8-A," p. 414, Record) regarding the boundaries that the
adjacent owner on the north is Mandal Tando. In other
words, plaintiff had expressly recognized the fact that
Mandal Tando is an adjacent land owner north of plaintiff's
property. On February 19, 1951 herein plaintiff revised the
above-stated tax declaration and secured another (Tax
Declaration No. 1794, Exh. "9" and "9-A," p. 413, Record)
and still plaintiff stated therein that his boundary land
owner on the north is Hadji Abdul Gani. 3[a.k.a.Liwalug
Datomanong(Amerol)]. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the aforequoted findings, very
unequivocal to be sure, the trial court denied the
counterclaim of the defendants, now petitioners, for the
affirmative relief of reconveyance on the ground of
prescription. Said the court:
xxx xxx xxx
The patent of the plaintiff having been registered back in
1955 and in contemplation of law registration thereof is
notice to the whole world and yet defendant exerted no
effort whatsoever either to annul the title or institute
proceedings for reconveyance except in his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in this case at bar
which answer and counter-claim was filed on December 4,
1964, some nine long years from the date of registration of
the patent, defendant unfortunately lost his right to
reconveyance within the period of four (4) years from the
date of registration of said patent. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows: (1) declaring the herein plaintiff the registered
owner of Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and sustaining and
respecting the validity of the plaintiff's Original Certificate
of Title No. P-466 covering the said land; (2) ordering the
defendants to vacate the premises of Lot No. 524; Pls-126
and deliver possession thereof to the herein plaintiff under
certain terms and conditions herein below stated; (3)
denying and hereby dismissing the counterclaim of the
herein defendants and consequently the prayer to annul
the title and/or for reconveyance of the land to said

defendant Liwalug Datomanong must Likewise be denied;
(4) that before plaintiff could take possession of said
premises he must reimburse defendant Liwalug
Datomanong the total sum of Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Fifty-Two Pesos and Sixty-Two Centavos (P6,752.62)
which he incurred for the necessary and useful expenses
on the land in question with the right of said defendant to
retain possession of the premises if said reimbursement be
not completely made. No pronouncement as to costs. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, this petition. 7
The petitioners in their Brief 8 assign the following two
errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW TOTHE
EFFECT THAT PETITIONERS RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE FOR VIOLATION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST
PRESCRIBED AFTER FOUR YEARS FROM THE
REGISTRATION OF THE PATENT OF RESPONDENT.
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE AS BASIS IN THE
ASSESSMENT OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
IMPROVEMENT INTRODUCED ON THE LAND IN GOOD
FAITH BY PETITIONERS INSTEAD OF BASING SUCH
ASSESSMENT UPON PURE AND SIMPLE GUESS WORKS
AND WILD ESTIMATIONS.
The first assignment of error is well-taken as adverted to
at the outset.
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that
he was in actual possession and occupation of the property
in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of
Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied trust in
favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil
Code provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in
respondent's name by and through his false pretenses.
Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he
was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in
question when he was not because it was Liwalug
Datomanong. Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there
was no prior applicant for a free patent over the land but
there was Liwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent
acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the
property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug
Datomanong. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he,
even being already the registered owner under the
Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to
reconvey the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong.
After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield
and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
Further, contrary to the erroneous claim of the
respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set aside and
put under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau
Page 34
of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of

registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and
legal owner, 10 or to one with a better right. That is what
reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to extinctive
prescription. 11 Happily, both parties agree on this point.
The seeming impediment however, is that while the
petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years,
the respondent avers that it does in only four years.
In support of his submission, the respondent invokes
several cases. We have examined the invocations and find
them inapplicable. For instance, the case of Fabian vs.
Fabian, 12 relied on by the respondent, does not square
with the present case. In Fabian, the party who prayed for
reconveyance was not in actual possession and occupation
of the property. It was instead the party to whom title over
the property had been issued who occupied and possessed
it. Further, the litigated property had been in the adverse
possession of the registered owner for well-nigh over
twenty-nine big years, hence, reconveyance had been
irretrievably lost.
Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 13 is, likewise, inapplicable. In
Miguel, the actual occupant and possessor of the
controverted parcel of land, after having been enticed by
Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public, with promise
of help, engaged and retained the services of the latter to
facilitate the issuance of a patent for the said land in his
(Miguel's) favor. Thus, there existed between the parties a
relationship very much akin to that of lawyer-client and
which is similarly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite
of his compensation of one-fifth of the yearly produce of
the property, still violated the trust reposed on him and
instead worked for the issuance of the patent in the name
of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor Reyes, the
property was fraudulently patented and titled in his
widow's favor. The reconveyance of the property was
decreed by the Court based on "breach of fiduciary
relations and/or fraud." It was shown that the parties were
legally bound to each other by a bond of fiduciary trust, a
bond lacking in the case at bar.
Finally, the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 14 can not
be availed of because the period of prescription was not
there definitely and squarely settled. In fact, Ramirez
underscores a vacillation between the four-year and the
ten-year rule. There it was stated that "an action for relief
on the ground of fraud to which class the remedy
prayed for by Paguia belong scan only be brought
within four years after accrual of the right of action, or
from the discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed
pat on that statement, there would be merit in the
respondent's presentation. But Ramirez continues:
"(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged fraud on the part
of Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance prescribes
after 10 years from accrual of the cause of action, June 22,
1944, the date of registration of the patent and of the
issuance of OCT No. 282- A in his name." 15
Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to
buttress his position and support the ruling of the trial
court have a common denominator, so to speak. The cause
of action assailing the frauds committed and impugning
the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to
the effectivity of the present Civil Code. The accrual of the
cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February,

1950, and in Ramirez, 1944. It must be remembered that
before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the
new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited-Civil actions other
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought
within the following periods after the right of action
accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the
ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the
fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just
as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the
law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding
obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis
prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years
and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court,
and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. 16 The only discordant note, it
seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous
reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. 18 But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section
43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not
coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned
earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article
1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis
of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action
of petitioner Datomanong for reconveyance, in the nature
of a counterclaim interposed in his Answer, filed on
December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of
possession instituted by the respondent, has not yet
prescribed. Between August 16, 1955, the date of
reference, being the date of the issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title in the name of the respondent, and
December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription was
Page 35
interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim,

is less than ten years.
The respondent also interposed as a deterrent to
reconveyance the existence of a mortgage on the property.
It is claimed by the respondent that reconveyance would
not be legally possible because the property under
litigation has already been mortgaged by him to the
Development Bank of the Philippines. 19 This claim is
untenable otherwise the judgment for reconveyance could
be negated at the will of the holder of the title. By the
simple expedient of constituting a mortgage or other
encumbrance on the property, the remedy of
reconveyance would become illusory. In the instant case,
the respondent being doubly in bad faith for applying
for and obtaining a patent and the Original Certificate of
Title therefor without being in possession of the land and
for mortgaging it to the Development Bank knowing that
his Original Certificate of Title was issued under false
pretenses must alone suffer the consequences.
Besides, given the undisputed facts, we cannot consider
the mortgage contracted by the respondent in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines as valid and binding
against petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. It would be most
unjust to saddle him, as owner of the land, with a mortgage
lien not of his own making and from which he derived no
benefit whatsoever. The consequences of the void
mortgage must be left between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee. In no small measure the Development Bank of
the Philippines might even be faulted for not making the
requisite investigation on the possession of the land
mortgaged.
Premises considered, we deemed it superfluous to rule on
the second assignment of error raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision
dated June 3, 1970 of the then Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No. 1354 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING the
respondent to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No.
P-466 in favor of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong, free of
any encumbrance. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76148 December 20, 1989
ELISEO CARO, CARLOS CARO, BENITO CARO, CARMEN
CARO, BATAYOLA AND LORENZO CARO,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SERAFIN V. RONZALES, JOSE
RONZALES, JR. AND GEMME RONZALES,respondents.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for petitioners.
Tirol & Tirol for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 01016 entitled,
"Epifanio Caro, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Serafin V. Ronsales, et
al., Defendants-Appellees," dated January 28, 1986
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo; and its resolution dated
September 11, 1986 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The subject matter of the present controversy is a 260

square meter parcel of land which, according to
petitioners, is included in the parcel of land purchased by
their predecessor, Epifanio Caro, from Simeon Gallego; but
contradicted by the private respondents by claiming it as
their own evidenced by a certificate of title issued in their
favor. We gathered from the records that the questioned
land is the eastern portion allegedly included in the parcel
of land purchased from Simeon Gallego. The trial court
ruled in favor of the private respondents on the grounds of
estoppel, absence of fraud in the registration of the
questioned land and prescription. This ruling was affirmed
by the respondent court. Likewise, We affirm, based on the
first two grounds but not on the ground of prescription.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that on May 14, 1946, Simeon Gallego bought a
parcel of land from Loreto Martinez, Presentacion Jereza,
Hermenigildo Jereza, Maria Luz Nele Jereza and Maria
Elena Jereza, situated within the poblacion of Jordan, SubProvince of Guimaras with an area of 5,031 square meters
and bounded on the North by Jordan River, Joaquin Galve
and Custodia Jalandoni; on the East by Roman Catholic
Church and the Municipality of Jordan; on the South by
Graciana Martinez; and on the West by Jordan River. The
above-described parcel of land was then declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6437. This
land was later on sold by Simeon Gallego to Epifanio Caro
in 1948. On May 15, 1962, Trinidad Castem, Rolando
Iranaya and Eriberto Iranaya sold a parcel of land which
they inherited from Custodia Jalandoni, situated in the
poblacion of Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras, with an
area of 1,011 square meters and bounded on the North by
Jordan River; on the East by Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Jaro; on the South by Rafael Gaylan; and on the West by
Jordan River, to Epifanio Caro. The land was then declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 4135. In
the same year, Epifanio Caro bought another parcel of land
from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan, situated in the poblacion of
Jordan, Sub-Province of Guimaras, with an area of 1,750
square meters and bounded on the North and East by the
heirs of Custodia Jalandoni; on the South by Simeon
Gallego; and on the West by Jordan River, and declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 3638.
In 1963, Epifanio Caro had those three (3) parcels of land
surveyed and were then designated as Lot No. 54. When
Blas Gonzales conducted the survey, he prepared a plan.
Epifanio Caro was given a copy of the plan and he just kept
it. During that survey, Epifanio Caro pointed the
boundaries of his parcels of land to the survey team. These
parcels of land were relocated in 1968 by the Sirilan
Surveying Company and Plan Psu-207820 was prepared.
The parcels of land of Epifanio Caro were denominated as
Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the private respondents
Serafin V. Ronzales, Jose Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme
Ronzales, as Lot No. 55. Epifanio Caro had the three lots
consolidated after the survey into one lot, and Tax
Declaration No. 7688 was issued. During the cadastral
proceeding, Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot 54. There
is no showing whether or not a title was issued to him.
On the other hand, the private respondents claim that the
questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson
and was declared in her name under Tax Declaration No.
4234. Pascuala Lacson was married to Domingo Ronzales.
Long before World War II, private respondents and their
predessors-in-interest had been living on the questioned
land. When Epifanio Caro bought a parcel of land from
Simeon Gallego, Jose Ronzales, Sr., his brother Serafin
Page 36
Ronzales, and sister Gemme Ronzales children of Domingo

Ronzales, and Pascuala Lacson, were already living in a
house of semi-strong materials on the questioned land.
Sometime in 1964, another survey was conducted. The
parcels of land claimed by Epifanio Caro were
denominated as Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the
private respondents was denominated as Lot No. 55.
Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot No. 54 and
Purificacion Ronzales, mother of private respondent Jose
Ronzales, Jr. filed an answer for Lot No. 55. No other
person or persons filed an answer for Lot No. 55.
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 was
issued in the names of the private respondents, in equal
shares of 1/3 portion each on September 17, 1970.
In June 1973, the spouses Epifanio Caro and Paz Caro filed
an ejectment case against Augusta Chavez, Naciso Galila,
Timoteo Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and Rafael Galotera,
involving Lot Nos. 56, 59 and 60. In 1974, the spouses filed
an ejectment and illegal detainer case against Ramon
Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno and Augusta Chavez,
involving Lot No. 54.
On June 4, 1975, Epifanio Caro flied a complaint before the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 10235) for
cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 0-6836,
reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages on the
ground of fraud. During the pendency of the case, Epifanio
Caro died, so he was substituted by his heirs, namely,
Eliseo Caro, Carlos Caro, Benito Caro, Carmen Caro
Batayola and Lorenzo Caro.
On November 22, 1982, the trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the
respondent Court of Appeals. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.
The issues may be limited to the following:
1) Whether or not the action in Civil Case No. 10235 has
prescribed;
2) Whether or not fraud attended the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836; and
3) Whether or not the plaintiff in said civil case was in
estoppel.
Petitioners contend that since private respondents do not
own the questioned land, they are mere trustees and this
being the case, prescription does not lie in an action for
reconveyance.
In this regard, the trial court held (p. 413, Records):
An action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud
prescribes in four (4) years from the time of the decree of
registration, for the reason that the registration of the
decree constitutes constructive notice to the whole world
(Gerona v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964,
citing the cases J.M. Tuason and Co. vs. Magdangal, G.R. No.
L-15539, June 30, 1962; Abdon v. Abella, C.A. G.R. No. L29846-R, August 31, 1964).
Affirming, the respondent court said (p. 29, Rollo):
... even if a trust relationship had existed, the right to seek
reconveyance prescribed ten (10) years after 1948 when
Epifanio Caro was informed by the wife of Jose Ronzales,
that she inherited the land from her grandmother (de la
Cerna vs. de la Cerna, 72 SCRA 515; Alzona vs. Calupitan, 4

SCRA 450; Carantes vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 516).
Since there is no trust relationship between the ancestors
of and between plaintiffs and defendants, the same action
prescribed in 4 years from the issuance of title on
September 17, 1970, because the complaint was filed only
on June 4,1975, as ruled by the lower court (de la Cerna vs.
de la Cerna, 72 SCRA 515).
We disagree. The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok
Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, September 30, 1987,154
SCRA 396 illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to
real property and, corollarily, its point of reference:
... It must be remembered that before August 30,1950, the
date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of
Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It
provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions
other than for the recovery of real property can only be
brought within the following periods after the right of
action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: .... An action for relief on the ground
of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just
as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the
law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding
obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis
prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
xxxxxxxxx
(Emphasis supplied).
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and
not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems,
is Balbin vs. Medalla which states that the prescriptive
period for a reconveyance action is four years. However,
this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance
on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was
discovered on June 25,1948, hence Section 43(3) of act No.
190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect
until August 30,1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be
stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article
1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in
the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the
latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year
Page 37
prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title

of real property acquired under false pretenses.
what did they, if any, suggest to you regarding their

occupancy of the land?
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53,

paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
provides:
ATTY. ALINIO:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner

may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration
on the original petition or application, ...
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article
1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:
We would like now to object to this line of questioning

because this is irrelevant, immaterial, and impertinent, not
being raised in the complaint. Not one of the issues in this
case.
ATTY. GRIJALVO:
Subject to the objection, witness may answer.
WITNESS:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or

fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes.
A They told me that they will just pay the rent.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to

reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil
Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In the
present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235
was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within the
prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on
September 17, 1970.
A I agreed. I consented, but they merely promised and

promised to me, but they did not pay anything.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, We agree with

the respondent court and the trial court that the private
respondents did not employ any fraud in securing title to
the questioned land. A perusal of the pertinent portions of
the deposition of Epifanio Caro supports this finding, to
wit:
ATTY. TANEO:
Q Did you agree?
Q In other words you mean that after they suggested to

rent the land and you agreed, you made several demands
from them to pay the rentals?
A Yes, sir, I demanded from them the rentals. But later
when I demanded from them the payment of the rent, they
told me that it is not my land being occupied by their
house, but it is the land of the municipality.
Q Around how many times did you demand from them for
the payment of the rentals?
A Two times. And on the second time you demanded for
the payment of rentals and they did not still pay, what was
their reason, if any?
ATTY. ALINIO:
ATTY. TANEO:
Objection, because the witness has already answered the

same or similar questions.
Q Now, at the time you bought this land from Simeon

Gallego in 1948, who was residing in that shack?
ATTY. TANEO:
A There was no more shack, but there was a big house.

Q And who was residing on that big house?
A Jose and his wife and children, and his sister.
Q Since according to you at the time you bought this land
from Simeon Gallego there was already that big house
occupied by Jose Ronzales and his wife, their children and
sister, did you make any demand from them to vacate the
premises since you have already purchased the land from
Simeon Gallego?
A I informed them that I have already bought the lot from
Simeon Gallego, and I demanded from them rental of the
house, because their house was already there at the time I
bought the land.
Q And what was their answer, if any, to your demand?
A They promised me that they will also pay the rent, or if I
wish to sell the land to them, they will buy the same. But I
told them that I will not sell the land.
Q Now, since you told them that you did not want to sell to
them the portion of the land occupied by their big house,
The witness stated that he made around two demands for

the payment of rentals. When he made the demand later
after there was an agreement that they would just pay the
rental, they reasoned out that the land occupied by their
house is a portion of the land of the municipality. Since the
witness stated that there was a second demand, the
purpose now of the pending question is if there was any
other reason stated by them.
ATTY. GRIJALVO:
Subject to the objection, witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A They will not pay, because according to them the land on
which their house stands is a portion of the land owned by
the municipality. But actually it is my own, and the
municipality has nothing to do with it. (pp. 207-212,
Records) ...
ATTY. TANEO:
Q The last time you stated that you know Lot No. 55. When
for the first time did you know about this Lot 55?
Page 38
A I know this lot for the first time when I bought this lot
from Simeon Gallego.
Q At that time did you know that this lot already bears Lot
No. 55?
A I know it because one Purit told me that she inherited
the same from her grandmother.
Q This Purit you are mentioning, are you referring to
Purificacion Villanueva Ronsales, who is the widow of Jose
Ronsales?
A Yes, sir.
Q When was this when this Purit mentioned to you about
this Lot 55?
A When I bought said land. (pp. 215-216, Records)
It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1948, Epifanio Caro
was already aware of the adverse claim of the private
respondents. He should have been vigilant of his right as
the allegedly new owner of the questioned land. What he
did was the reverse, he slept on his rights for a number of
years. In the recent case of Bagtas v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. L-50732, August 10, 1989, We held that
considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court
of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his
claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his
right when same is threatened or invaded. Thus, he is
estopped by laches from questioning the ownership of the
questioned land. Not only that. There is also estoppel in
pais in this case because Epifanio Caro filed his answer
with respect to Lot No. 54 only while Purificacion
Villanueva flied her answer with respect to Lot No. 55 (see
Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., G.R. No. L-21450, April
15,1968, 23 SCRA 29). In addition, the trial court observed
(pp. 414-415, Records):
The Tax Declaration of the land bought by Epifanio Caro,
Exhibit 4, states that its adjacent owner on the east is
Pascual (sic) Lacson who is the grandmother of the
defendants. When said land was declared in the name of
Epifanio Caro in 1969, the adjacent owner on the East is
still Pascuala Lacson, Exhibit E. The Tax Declaration of the
land bought by Epifanio Caro from the heirs of Custodia
Jalandoni, Exhibit 8 shows that the land in question is not
an adjacent property. The same is true with the Tax
Declaration of the land bought by Epifano Caro from the
heirs of Rafael Gaylan, Exhibit 9. This clearly shows that
Lot No. 55 which originally belonged to Pascuala Lacson is
a different and distinct parcel from the lands bought by
Epifanio Caro from Simeon Gallego, from the heirs of
Custodia Jalandoni and from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan
(sic).
While We commiserate with the petitioners because of
Epifanio Caro's lack of formal education still, his
negligence and belated action were undoubtedly the root
cause of the present controversy:
Q Is this the same survey plan which Mr. Gonzales gave
you?
A That is the one but I have not read it because I do not
understand English or Spanish because I have never gone
to school (p. 217, Records).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when the cadastral survey was conducted, did you

take occasion to verify also the cadastral survey of your
lot?
A I did not bother anymore because I entrusted everything
to them (p. 232, Records).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you purchased the lot from Simeon Gallego
because you said you could not read English nor Spanish,
did you ask the help of somebody else to explain to you the
document?
A I have not asked the help of anybody. In other words you
did not read nor understand the sale in your favor
executed by Simeon Gallego?
A I have confidence in him because it was prepared by the
father of the mayor.
Q Did you not inquire from Simeon Gallego of the
boundaries of the church from him?
A Before that I knew that the boundaries of the lot of
Loreta Martinez was the municipal building, a road and a
church.
Q Now, before you purchase the property from Simeon
Gallego did you not also ask the help of somebody to
examine the tax declaration in the name of Simeon
Gallego?
A No, because I already knew that lot was owned by
Martinez.
Q And therefore, I gather from you that you relied on your
knowledge, own knowledge when you purchased the land
from Simeon Gallego about the boundaries of the land?
A I relied on my own knowledge because I know it fully
well. "
Q You did not, you said, anymore examine the tax
declaration?
A I did not bother because I knew that the lot was owned
by Martinez.
Q Did you inquire also from the Martinezes the boundaries
of their lots?
A I did not bother because I knew fully well because since
1909 I was aready there in the church (pp. 251-253,
Records).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision dated January 28,1986 and the resolution dated
September 11, 1986 of the respondent Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION regarding
prescription.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL
F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F.
MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN
F. MARQUEZ, respondents.
Page 39
ROMERO, J.:
In our society, tradition and law enshrine the family as a
basic social institution. In prose, poetry and song, it is
lyrically extolled. What a person becomes in adulthood, for
good or ill, is attributed to the influence of the home and
family during his formative years. In the family one
imbibes desirable values and personality traits. No matter
how far one roams, he invariably turns to his family for
security, approbation and love. Against the whole world,
members of the family stand solid as Gibraltar. It is thus
heartrending to find members of the same family at odds
with each other, each playing one against the other.
The facts of the instant case illustrate the inglorious and
unedifying spectacle of a "family feud." all because of a
property dispute.
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and
Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1)
Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5)
Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9)
Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.
Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte,
Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No.
47572, 1wherein the constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years
later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit
of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to
the property described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently,
TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 2 was
issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr.
executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" 3 covering the
land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house
constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1)
petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both
private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other
children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation,
TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was
issued in private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual
possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned
about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately
demanded that since they are also children of Rafael
Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective shares
over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle
the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents
ignored petitioners' demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference,
petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on
May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with
Damages" before the trial court 4 alleging that both the
"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took
advantage of the advanced age of their father in making
him execute the said documents.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that
petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of
limitations since the same should have been filed within
four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud. 5
After due proceedings, the trial court, on April 29, 1993,
rendered its decision 6 in favor of the petitioners, in this
wise:
Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a

document which is void ab initio does not prescribe. Both
the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter
Vivos" did not produce any legal effect and did not confer
any right whatsoever. Equally, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 33350 and 46461 issued pursuant thereto, are
likewise null and void ab initio. Therefore, the inexistence
of these documents and certificates of title is permanent
and cannot be the subject of prescription.
Private respondents, dissatisfied with the trial court's
ruling, sought recourse before the Court of Appeals. On
April 29, 1996, the said court reversed the trial court's
finding, thus: 7
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gerona v.
de Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at
bar on June 16, 1982, when the affidavit of selfadjudication was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificate of title (No. 33350) was issued in the name of
Rafael Marquez, Sr. (Exhibits E and 5, page 16, record).
Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when TCT
No. 33350 was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to
May 31, 1991, when appellees' complaint was filed in
court, is eight (8) years, eleven (11) months and fifteen
(15) days, appellants' action to annul the deed of selfadjudication is definitely barred by the statute of
limitation.
Petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration
proved
unavailing. 8 Hence, they are now before this Court to raise
the issue of whether their action for reconveyance had
prescribed.
Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet
prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent
"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation"
wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share
over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was
created. 9 Forthwith, they maintain that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years.
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus,
succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil
Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are
her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982,
Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire
property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased
wife Felicidad F. Marquez. 10
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or
another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he
was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children
were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust
under Article 1456 was established. 11 Constructive trusts
are created in equity in order to prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold. 12 Prescinding from
the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance
filed by the petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of
Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
Page 40
years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the

property. 13 For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive
period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued,
which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the
action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that
prescription had not yet barred the action.
To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeal's
reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman, 14 is misplaced. InAmerol
v. Bagumbaran, 15 we ruled that the doctrine laid down in
the earlier Gerona case was based on the old Code of Civil
Procedure 16 which provided that an action based on fraud
prescribes within four years from the date of discovery.
However, with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive periods
are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied
or constructive trusts are obligations created by law then
the prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in
ten years. 17
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal
property of the spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad,
ownership of the same is to be equally divided between
both of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee
of his wife's share, validly donate this portion to the
respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly provided
in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the
property entrusted to them.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not
belong
to
him. 18
Be that as it may, the next question is whether he can
validly donate the other half of the property which he
owns? Again, the query need not detain us at length for the
Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the inherent rights
of an owner is the right to dispose of his property. 19
Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another
matter which is not within the province of this Court to
determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production of
evidence not before it.
Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot
grant their plea for moral damages and attorney's
fees 20since they have not satisfactorily shown that they
have suffered "mental anguish" as provided in Article 2219
and Article 2290 of the Civil Code.
Similarly, the plea for attorney's fees must likewise be
denied because no premium should be placed on the right
to litigate. 21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Except as to the award of attorney's fees
which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of the trial court
in Civil Case No. 60887 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128254
January 16, 2004
HEIRS OF POMPOSA SALUDARES represented by

ISABEL
DATOR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE DATOR and CARMEN

CALIMUTAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is
the July 31, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals
reversing the August 27, 1992 decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 56, which in turn
dismissed private respondents petition for reconveyance
on the ground of prescription of action.
At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of land,
known as Lot 5793, measuring 8,916 square meters,
located at Mahabang Parang, Lucban, Quezon. The land
formed part of the conjugal properties of spouses Juan
Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate.
Pomposa died on May 1, 1923, leaving herein petitioners,
Enrica, Petra, Restituto, Amado, Delfina, Beata, Vicenta and
Isabel, all surnamed Dator, as her compulsory heirs
(hereinafter referred to as Heirs).
On February 28, 1940, the Heirs and their father Juan
executed a deed of extra-judicial partition of the share of
Pomposa in the Tanza estate. The settlement conferred the
eastern half of the Tanza estate to Juan and the western
half to the Heirs.
Before the aforementioned partition, Juan was in
possession of the entire Tanza estate. After the partition,
the Heirs took possession of their share and had the same
tenanted by a certain Miguel Dahilig, husband of Petra, one
of the Heirs, who in turn managed the land in behalf of the
other siblings. Juan, the father, remained in possession of
his half of the land until his death on April 6, 1940.
On December 13, 1976, Isabel Dator applied for a free
patent over the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793, in
behalf of the Heirs. On May 26, 1977, after all the
requirements were complied with, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon awarded Free Patent No. 4A-2-8976 and issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-23617 in the
names of the Heirs.
Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were informed by their
tenant that private respondents cut some 50 coconut trees
located within the subject lot. Thus, the Heirs sent a
letter,3 dated July 26, 1988, to private respondents
demanding an explanation for their intrusion into their
property and unauthorized felling of trees.
On August 25, 1988, private respondents retaliated by
filing an action for reconveyance against petitioners,
docketed as civil case no. 88-121, in the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City. Private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (a) they were the owners in fee simple and
possessors of Lot No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from
the successors-in-interest of Petra Dator, one of the heirs;
(c) they were in possession of the subject land from 1966
to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator obtained free
patent OCT P-23617 over Lot 5793 in favor of the Heirs by
means of fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, private
respondents prayed for the cancellation of OCT P-23617
and the issuance of a new title in their names.
In their answer, the Heirs denied having sold any portion
of the Tanza estate to anyone. They alleged that: (a) they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been and were still
in actual, continuous, adverse and public possession of the
Page 41
subject land in the concept of an owner since time

immemorial and (b) title to Lot 5793 was issued in their
favor after faithful compliance with all the requirements
necessary for the issuance of a free patent.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing
the action primarily on the ground of prescription of
action:
More telling is plaintiff Jose Dators admission that the
adjacent lot which is 5794 is his and he was a cadastral
claimant, in fact, filed (sic) an application for free patent.
By and large, if Jose Dator was personally claiming rights
on the property now denominated as Lot 5793, the Court
is intrigued and cannot see its way clear why Jose Dator
did not file any protest in the application of the heirs of
Pomposa Saludares, neither had Jose Dator filed any
petition for review within the time frame, instead it took
them eleven (11) long years to question the validity.
The doctrine of "stale demands" or laches is even
applicable in the case at bar. "Laches means the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time, to do that
which by exercising diligence could or should have been
done earlier." (Marcelino versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
94422, June 26, 1992)
xxx
xxx
xxx
The issues with respect to ownership have already been

amply discussed which brings us to the issue as to whether
or not the action has prescribed and whether the original
certificate of title in the name of the heirs of Pomposa
Saludares is already indefeasible.
The action for reconveyance at bar was filed on August 28,
1988 or more than eleven (11) years from the issuance of
the title, a fact plaintiffs cannot deny. They cannot claim
ignorance that the defendants-heirs of Pomposa Saludares
are applying for a free patent of Lot No. 5793 because
notices were sent.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the absence of competent and positive evidence that the

title of the defendants has been secured thru fraud which
in the case at bar is wanting and which would necessarily
invalidate it, the presumption is it has been issued
regularly in the absence of actual fraud.
There being no positive evidence presented which would
establish actual fraud in the issuance of Free Patent Title
No. P-23617 in the defendants name, their title deserves
recognition.
In like manner, in an action for reconveyance after the
lapse of one year from the date of the registration, actual
fraud in securing the title must be proved (J.N. Tuazon Co.,
Inc. versus Macalindog, G.R. No. L-15398, December 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 938).
The plaintiffs claim for reconveyance therefore cannot
prosper.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs ordering the
dismissal of the case with costs against plaintiffs and
declaring defendants, heirs of Pomposa Saludares, as the
rightful owners of the land.
The claim of defendants in the matter of attorneys fees

and litigation expenses not having been proven by
concrete evidence, the Court opts not to award the same.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court
decision:
It is true that the Torrens title issued upon a free patent
may not be cancelled after the lapse of ten years from the
date of its registration because the statute of limitations
bars such cancellation. But this doctrine has long been
qualified thusly:
If the registered owner, be he the patentee or his
successor-in-interest to whom the Free patent was
transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land
described in the patent and in the Torrens belonged to
another who together with his predecessors-in-interest
were never in possession thereof, then the statute barring
an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent
does not apply and the true owner may bring an action to
have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled
and the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title
issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the
registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the
plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof.
(Vital vs. Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855, Underscoring ours.)
In this case, there is clear evidence to show that appellee
Isabel had full knowledge that Lot 5793 had been sold to
her brother-in-law Miguel Dahilig and her sister Petra, that
Lot 5793 no longer belonged to her and to the heirs she
claimed to represent. She was signatory to the deed of sale
dated April 16, 1940 in favor of appellant. (Exh. I) With
this knowledge, there is reason to conclude that appellant
Isabel misrepresented herself and the rest of the heirs as
owners entitled to the free patent.
WHEREFORE, all the above considered, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Reversing the August 27, 1992 decision of the court
below;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to
cancel OCT No. P-23617 in the name of the Heirs of
Pomposa Saludares and to issue another for the same
property in the name of plaintiffs Jose Dator and Carmen
Calimutan;
3. Ordering appellees to pay appellants ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos for attorneys fees, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved by the appellate court ruling, the Heirs filed the
instant petition, assigning the following errors:
The Court of Appeals erred in tracing the history of the
transactions involving the property way back to the year
1923 and render judgment based on its findings,
considering that petitioners are the registered owners of
the property under a torrens certificate of title which is
conclusive, incontrovertible and indefeasible.
The Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider that
the complaint filed by the private respondents for
reconveyance and cancellation of title before the trial court
Page 42
eleven (11) years after a torrens title over the property

was issued in the name of the petitioners (had)
prescribed.6
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the
registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the
registered property to its true owner. The rationale for the
rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject
to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a
better right.7
Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of registered
property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
prescription. In Caro vs. Court of Appeals,8 the prescriptive
period of an action for reconveyance was explained:
Under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an
implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art.
1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to
true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
xxx
xxx
xxx
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53,

paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner
may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration
on the original petition or application, x x x.
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article
1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
the person from whom the property comes.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to
true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil
Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
There is but one instance when prescription cannot be
invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.9
In a series of cases,10 this Court permitted the filing of an
action for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten years and
declared that said action, when based on fraud, is
imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an

innocent purchaser for value. But in all those cases
including Vital vs. Anore11 on which the appellate court
based its assailed decision, the common factual backdrop
was that the registered owners were never in possession
of the disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with
the better right or the legal owners of the land who had
always been in possession of the same. Thus, the Court
allowed the action for reconveyance to prosper in those
cases despite the lapse of more than ten years from the
issuance of title to the land. The exception was based on
the theory that registration proceedings could not be used
as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the
expense of another.12
In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the
exception which should apply.
This Court does not normally review the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. But when the findings of fact of the
appellate court differ from those of the trial court, the
Court in the exercise of its power of review may inquire
into the facts of a case.
The trial court declared the Heirs as having been in actual,
open and continuous possession of the disputed lot. On the
other hand, the appellate court ruled that it was private
respondents.
Private respondents presented documents purportedly
showing a series of transactions which led to the alleged
transfer of ownership of Lot 5793 from the Heirs to them,
namely: (1) a Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan,dated
April 16, 1940, wherein the disputed lot was allegedly sold
by the Heirs to their sibling Petra Dator and her husband
Miguel Dahilig; (2) an extra-judicial partition showing that,
upon the death of Miguel, his heirs Petra, Angel, Anatalia,
Catalina, Felimon and Jacinto, inherited Lot 5793 and (3)
two deeds of sale dated December 30, 1978 and March
15,1970 wherein Felimon and Jacinto, and later Catalina,
sold their undivided shares in Lot 5793 to private
respondents.
Other than the presentation of these documents, however,
private respondents failed to prove that they were in
actual, open and continuous possession of Lot 5793.
On the other hand, Isabel Dator, who testified for the Heirs,
vehemently denied having signed the Kasulatan Ng
Pagbibilihang Lampasan and pointed out the absence of
the signatures of her other siblings Vicenta, Barcelisa and
Adoracion.
The Heirs likewise presented proof of payment of realty
taxes from 1956 to 1974 in the names of their deceased
parents, and from 1975 to 1988 in their names.
More importantly, the Heirs convincingly established their
open and continuous occupation of the entire Tanza estate,
including Lot 5793, through their tenant Miguel Dahilig.
After Miguels death, he was succeeded by Marcelo
Saludares who testified during the trial that: (a) the farm
was under the administration of Beata and Isabel Dator
who took over its management after Petra Dator died; (b)
he had been consistently tending the land since 1947; (c)
he was the one who planted the various crops and trees
thereon, except for some 100 coconut trees which he
explained were planted by other people in response to the
Green Revolution project of then President Marcos.
Page 43
Saludares identified each and every landmark and

boundary of the subject lot. He also enumerated all the
trees planted on the subject lot and, when asked about the
fruits of the land, he told the court that he shared the
harvest with the surviving Heirs.
In stark contrast, private respondents witness, farm
worker Perpetuo Daya could not identify the boundaries of
the disputed property, its adjoining owners or recall the
dates he worked and tilled the subject lot.
Specially noteworthy was the fact that the recorded
cadastral claimant of Lot 5793, Angel Dahilig, testified that
he executed a waiver in favor of the Heirs because they
were the true owners of the subject parcel of land.13
Furthermore, we note private respondent Jose Dators
declaration that he was the cadastral claimant of and free
patent applicant for Lot 5794 which was adjacent to Lot
5793. This being the case, we find private respondents
inaction difficult to understand, considering that they were
among those who received notices of petitioners free
patent application dated January 2, 1979 from the Bureau
of Lands.14
If private respondents indeed owned Lot 5793, they
should have filed an application for free patent for it just as
they did for Lot 5794, or at least opposed the Heirs
application for free patent over Lot 5793, to protect their
interests. As a matter of fact, they were aware that the
Heirs tenant, Marcelo Saludares, repeatedly harvested the
fruits of Lot 5793.
But even assuming that private respondents indeed validly
acquired Lot 5793 in 1966 as they claimed, they
nevertheless slept on their right to secure title thereto.
Their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years
rendered
their
demand
for
reconveyance
stale. Vigilantibus
sed
non
dormientibus
jura
subverniunt. The law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep
on their rights. This legal precept finds perfect application
in the case at bar.
Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in disregarding the ten-year prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of registered real property
and in giving due course to said action despite the lapse of
more than 11 years from the issuance of title thereto,
which was clearly barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated July 31, 1996, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dated August 27, 1992, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194366
October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR,

VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND
VICTORIA
D.
ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM
UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri
(Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D.
Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa),
Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos
(Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to
reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2 and
October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October
25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new
one dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of
sale, damages and attorneys feesagainst herein
respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had
seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with
Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and
five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri
(Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas
and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique
and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters
located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608)
P-51536 and P-20551 (P-8348)7issued on February 15,
1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her
husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together
with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint
for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to
include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for
having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as
childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of
Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead
patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victorias exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and
sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the
defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering, among others, the annulment of the ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because
Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary
rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the
shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and
prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession
Page 44
of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that coownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the
RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia
and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such,
were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to
permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uys
possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and
Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than
two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in
1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not
preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and
the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to
Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they
have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they
consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and
Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to
have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon
reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set
in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following
errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA
AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA
AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION
HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are
indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her
first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique,
respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of
the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21,
1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in

her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique
9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets +

1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria
1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia
1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa
1/16
Douglas
1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of

the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated.
Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but
no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate
was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled
to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial
court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and
void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in
favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to
their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that
these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her
death11and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell
their undivided share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the
time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in
Page 45
the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws

prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with
powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
Anunciacion.
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one

who has been given no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers;
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at
the time of the execution of the settlement and sale,
provide:
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily

adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would
not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what
was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the
authorized act of the party so making the
ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as
when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the
contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it
was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the

legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be
considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to
the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also
provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the
child under parental authority is worth two thousand
pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian.
When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the childs property, with the
duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and
shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For
good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another
suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted
by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property
and even then only with courts prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of
Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in
behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles
1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another
without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by
law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:
xxx
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the

extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of
sale. In Napoleon and Rosas Manifestation18 before the
RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our
father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us
and our other two sisters and brother (the other
plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja
Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same
was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore
the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we
all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring
supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa
also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this
case since we do not have any intention to file a case
against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their
family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed
of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of
the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus,
purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution
and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16 share in
the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same,
however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of
evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with
sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties
have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A
person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell
and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article
493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
Page 46
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs

became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were
deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the
latters benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which states:"if property is acquired through mistake
or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
the person from whom the property comes." As such, it is
only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their
shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021 each or a total
of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal
interest.
SO ORDERED.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with

petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so
far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive
period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules
of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial
settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful
participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the
Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in trust
prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action
accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of
unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement with sale after the death of their father,
Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence,
the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April
27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late
spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards
the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon
Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers
and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. IllutPiala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERSof the
3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties,
covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as
Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the
respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas in the total amount of P 15,000.00, with legal
interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of
payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum
thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Page 47

Rule 74

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Rule 74

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G.R. No.

92436 July 26, 1991

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the

9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

the defendants is also barred. From 1967

would be valid if freely entered into

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

him was two (2) parcels of land known as

It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August

The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R.

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the

purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the

The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola

March 31, 2000

The instant petition then is without merit.

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for

they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the

On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of

Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.

On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court

Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and

them may not be compelled to submit to administration

Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and

29th June 1995

G.R. No. 156536

This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,8 (c/o Atty.

October 31, 2006

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to

I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement

After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision13 in

Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint

The publication of the settlement does not constitute

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a

rules.34The co-respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in

September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G.

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

named in the will, or if a person dies intestate,

any heirs of the estate who have not received their

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are

February 28, 1958

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals,

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates