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Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb:

Continuity or Rupture?
Soage, Ana Beln

. The Muslim World 99.2 (Apr 2009): 294-311.

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According to Muslim Sister Zaynab al-Ghazali, General Guide al-Hudaybi initially sanctioned
Qutb's most radical work, Ma'dlim fi'l-tariq Signposts on the road; he is reported to have said
that it vindicated all the hopes he had placed in Sayyid. [...] both considered violence a legitimate
tool to bring about the Islamic order for which they longed.

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In the history of Islamism, two characters stand out over the rest: Hasan al-Bann, who founded
the Muslim Brothers' Society fam'iyyat al-Ikhwdn al-Muslimin) in the late 1920s, and Sayyid
Qutb, who was the Society's main ideologue for much of the 1950s and 60s. Al-Banna was a
charismatic leader who inspired hundreds of thousands of Muslims with his project to regenerate
society through Islam. He was not a prolific author, but he wrote a series of "epistles" addressed
to his followers and to Egyptian, Arab and Muslim leaders in the 1930s and 40s setting out his
reform. Following a series of murders and other acts of violence committed by members of his
organization, al-Banna himself was assassinated - probably by the Egyptian secret police - in
1949. As for Qutb, he was already an accomplished author by the time he joined the Society in
the early 1950s, and was rapidly put in charge of its propaganda section. He was imprisoned by
the Nasserist regime in 1954 and spent most of the rest of his life in prison, where his thought
became increasingly radical and Utopian. He was finally executed in 1966. In the Society's
mythology, both al-Banna and Qutb are considered "martyrs."

But Qutb's uncompromising discourse was a liability for an organization that aspired to return to
legality, and the Society's leadership soon started to distance themselves from his writings. In
1969 Hasan al-Hudaybi, who had been appointed as al-Banna's successor as the Society's
General Guide, wrote in his prison cell Du 'at, Id qudat Preachers, not judges), in which he
criticized a series of concepts and notions introduced into Islamist thought by Abu al-A'l
Mawdudi. Although ostensibly a criticism of Mawdudi, the book was a less-than-veiled
denunciation of Qutb, who had been very influenced by the Pakistani author. In early 1982, the
condemnation became explicit: Third General Guide 'Umar al-Tilimsani unequivocally declared
that "Sayyid Qutb represented himself alone and not the Muslim Brethren."1 Islamist authors
like Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Farid Abd al-Khaliq have emphasized the discrepancies between alBanna and Qutb, whilst at the same time excusing the latter's radicalization by stressing his
suffering under the Nasserist regime.2 The supposed dichotomy between al-Banna and Qutb is
also one of the main themes of Tariq Ramadan's apologetic Aux sources du renouveau
musulman.3
Western scholarship has accepted this interpretation of events, neglecting al-Banna and
concentrating on Qutb when analyzing on Islamic radicalism. However, another school of
thought dismisses the assumption that Qutb deviated significantly from al-Banna's path.
According to Muslim Sister Zaynab al-Ghazali, General Guide al-Hudaybi initially sanctioned
Qutb's most radical work, Ma'dlim fi'l-tariq Signposts on the road); he is reported to have said
that it "vindicated all the hopes he had placed in Sayyid."4 Similarly, Islamist author Muhammad
al-Danawi has written that "the principles set by the martyred imam Hasan al-Bann were
clarified by the 'signposts' drawn by Sayyid Qutb."5 Among the critical voices, Moussalli
characterizes both al-Bann's and Qutb's writings as "fundamentalist," as opposed to that of
"reformist" Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh or Muhammad
Iqbal.6 And in any case, it is difficult to imagine that Qutb's ideas would have been accepted by
the Muslim Brothers had they substantially differed from those of the venerated founder of the
Society.
This article seeks to support this second view, showing the analogies in the writings of the two
men in order to prove that Qutb's thought was, in reality, the logical continuation of al-Banna's.
Key Ideas
Al-Banna and Qutb shared a number of tenets: both saw Islam as a comprehensive system that
provides guidelines for every area of life. Both identified their interpretation of Islam with Islam
itself, and believed that alternative readings were not legitimate. Both distrusted reason, and
prioritized action over thought. Both had similar ideas of what the future Islamic government
would entail. Finally, both considered violence a legitimate tool to bring about the Islamic order
for which they longed.
Totalitarian conception of Islam
As we have argued elsewhere,7 Hasan al-Banna's main contribution to Islamism was his
totalitarian interpretation of Islam. Strongly influenced by the Fascist ideologies that were
popular in the 1920s and 30s, he sought to

compete with them with his notion of Islam as a holistic and all-embracing system. He wrote:
Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It is country and homeland,
government and umma [Muslim community]. It is ethics and power, mercy and justice. It is
culture and law, knowledge and judiciary. It is matter and wealth, gain and prosperity. It is jihad
[holy war]8 and da'wa [call to Islam], militia and idea. It is true creed and correct worship,
indistinctively.9
In al-Banna's eyes, Islam was superior to all systems devised by men, and successfully tackled
the questions others have tried to come to grips with:
Internationalism, nationalism, socialism, capitalism, Bolshevism, war, the distribution of wealth,
the relationship between producer and consumer. . . . Everything related, directly or indirectly, to
those questions that concern politicians and philosophers alike, we believe that Islam has
thoroughly dealt with, establishing the systems that allow the world to benefit from everything
that is good and avoid dangers and calamities.10
Thus convinced that Islam provides guidance for every facet of life - social, political, economic,
cultural, military, etc., al-Banna proposed an "Islamic" blueprint for government.11 His project
combined a stern Muslim morality and measures borrowed from the programmes of the radicals
of his time although al-Banna insisted time and again that it was "completely Islamic."12 It
prescribed the banning of alcohol and gambling, the flogging of adulterers and the segregation of
the sexes, side by side with industrialization, land reform and universal social security.13 After
his assassination, Muslim Brothers Muhammad al-Ghazali and 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Awda
developed al-Banna's ideas into what became known as "Islamic socialism," an alternative to
both "greedy" capitalism and "godless" communism.14 Qutb initially adhered to that pseudosocialist program, as shown by his writings of the period.15
The Muslim Brothers' Society wholeheartedly backed the 1952 Revolution. Gamal Abdel Nasser
himself might have been a member of the Society's paramilitary wing, al-Nizam al-Khass,16 and
the Free Officers went to see al-Hudaybi before the coup to ask for his support.17 For a brief
honeymoon period, the Muslim Brothers constituted the Free Officers' grassroots, and Qutb was
the only civilian to sit at the revolutionary council, as adviser on cultural affairs.18 However,
Nasser was unwilling to submit to the Society's "tutelage," and came to see it as a dangerous
competitor.19 The inevitable clash was precipitated by an assassination attempt on Nasser in
October 1954.20 Following the incident, thousands of Muslim Brothers were arrested, tortured
and condemned to lengthy jail sentences. Qutb received fifteen years with hard labor,21 although
due to his ill health, he would spend most of the time in the prison's infirmary. Released after the
intercession of the Iraqi prime minister in 1964, he was rearrested a few months later, accused of
planning a coup, and finally hanged in 1966.
In prison, Qutb developed al-Banna's totalitarian notion of Islam into an elaborate philosophical
framework: Islam, he wrote, provides a conception tasawwur) that integrates divinity, the
universe, life and humankind. Both religious precepts and natural laws are manifestations of
God's will sunan allah or nawamis allah).22 Furthermore, the term din (religion) is a virtual
synonym of system nizam) or programme manhaj), depending on the context. Conversely, any

ideology that seeks to organize society - e.g. Marxism - should be considered a religion.23 Qutb
also integrated in his discourse a series of concepts developed by Abu al-A'la Mawdudi. The
Pakistani author explained that Islam entails recognition of God's divinity uluhiyya) and lordship
rububiyya) and submission 'ubudiyya) to His sovereignty hakimiyya), which requires the
implementation of His law shari'a).24 Qutb saw Islam as a perfect system, because only God
knows what is suitable to human nature (fitra). All other systems are based on man's limited
intellectual capacity and selfish self-interest,25 and are characterized as barbarism jahiliyya).26
Only Islam, Qutb concluded, liberates man from the tyranny of other men by making them equal
in their submission to God.27
Another feature of Qutb's prison writings was his reluctance to propose concrete measures to
organize the future Islamic society. He claimed that, once this was in place, the necessary rules
and norms would "organically" emanate from it.28 Who was to know, for instance, whether
insurance companies or birth control would be necessary in a society that redistributed wealth
through zakat (legal alms) and was committed to open-ended jihad?29 Moreover, Qutb rejected
the adoption of rulings from Islamic jurisprudence fiqh), which were the result of different
circumstances, and deplored that the confusion between that fiqh and the shari'ah led some to
believe that God's law was no longer relevant.30 He was also critical of the gradualists who
suggested measures to 'Islamize' society or linked Islam to other systems to make people think
that the transition to an Islamic order was easy and straightforward.31 He warned that their
attitude was based on the misconception that the jdhiliyya could be reformed to become the basis
of an Islamic society.32 In Qutb's eyes, Islam and jahiliyya were antinomical, and a complete
epistemological break was therefore needed:33
Either Islam or jahiliyya. There is no other state, half-Islam and half-jahiliyya, that Islam can
accept. Islam clearly indicates that the truth is one, not multiple, that everything other than that
truth is perdition, and that the two cannot be mixed. Either God's government or jahiliyya
government. Either divine law or human whim.34
Claiming a monopoly on Islam
Al-Banna not only refused to admit that his program was anything but Islamic, he also sought to
identify his particular, politicized interpretation of Islam with Islam itself. He insisted that it was
Islam "as revealed to the Prophet," and that God himself had set the Muslim Brothers' goal.35 He
described that goal as "the hope of every Muslim, the wish of every believer"; their call da'wa),
as "the legacy of the messenger of God"; their program, as "the guidance of the Lord of the two
worlds" - and he regarded any deviation from it as tantamount to a deviation from Islam itself.36
Furthermore, he tried to instill in his followers the feeling of belonging to an elite, the chosen
few who understood Islam with everything it implies.37 He portrayed them as "a new spirit that
makes its way to the heart of this umma, reviving it with the Koran [. . .] a new light that shines,
dispelling the darkness of materialism with the knowledge of God."38 He addressed them as "the
preachers of Islam, the bearers of the Koran, the connection between heaven and earth, the heirs
of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the successors of his Companions."39
Not surprisingly, given the above, al-Bann did not admit any understanding of Islam that
conflicted with his own totalitarian vision. He rejected the "colonised, submissive and servile

Islam" that accepts its confinement to the private sphere, and condemned the distinction between
religion and state as a foreign illegitimate innovation bid'a).40 He wondered, rhetorically: "If
Islam is something other than politics, society, economy, culture . . . then, what is it?"41 And he
came dangerously close to declaring other Muslims apostates (a process known as takfir) by
affirming that those who did not work to realize the Society's program did not have any "share"
of Islam, and should "look for something else to believe in."42 Finally, he classified Muslims
into four groups, according to their attitude to his Society the believer, the undecided, the
opportunist and the prejudiced and urged his followers to deal with them on the basis of that
classification.43
For his part, Qutb insisted that his definitions of religion (din) and jahiliyya were not his but
God's,44 and that his interpretation constituted of Islam a return to the way it was understood by
the first Islamic community.45 But he went further than al-Banna in his condemnation of
Muslims who did not adhere to his project: with characteristic Manichaeism, he pretended that
those who are not in the party of God are, by default, in the party of Satan.46 Moreover, he
argued that given that Islam means total submission to God and that nowadays His shari'ah is not
implemented anywhere in the world, Islam has ceased to exist, "although there are still mosques
and muezzins, prayers and rites, to allay the conscience of those who conserve a vague emotional
attachment to this religion."47 Elsewhere, he explained:
[The basic meaning of Islam] consists in believing that divinity [uluhiyya] belongs to God, and
no other; addressing the rites of worship to God, and no other; and surrendering one's fate,
obethence and submission to God, and no other, in all the affairs of life [. . .]. Lack of
compliance with any of those requirements, like lack of compliance with all of them, takes
people out of Islam and into jahiliyya and inevitably associates them to impiety [kufr] or idolatry
[shirk].48
Anti-intellectualism
The Muslim Brothers and their advocates try to depict the Society as the heir to the movement of
Islamic reform initiated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, who awakened
their religion from its centuries-old slumber and tried to make it relevant to the present.49
However, independent observers have indicated that al-Banna and his followers had a radically
different approach to reform: as mentioned above, Moussalli considers al-Afghani and Abduh
"modernists," and al-Banna and Qutb, "fundamentalists." The crucial difference between them is
that the former tried to prove that religion and reason were in harmony, whilst the latter
distrusted the human mind.50 Nazih Ayubi points out that "whereas the earlier 'Islamic reformers'
such as Afghani and Abdu [sic] were striving to modernise Islam, the following generation of
Islamists such as al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers were striving to Islamise modernity."51
Al-Banna believed reason to be in constant need of divine guidance.52 He spoke of three stages
in its development: a stage of superstition, in which man sees hidden forces behind everything he
cannot account for; a stage of materialism and denial of the unseen al-ghayb), in which he feels
that he can explain everything, "although in reality what he knows is like a grain of sand in an
enormous desert"; and a stage in which he recognizes his incapacity to comprehend the truths
that surround him and recovers his faith in the unseen.53 He noted that "Islam does not restrict

ideas or imprison the mind, but rather it guides it to its proper limits"55 (my emphasis).
Furthermore, he demanded from the Brothers unquestioning compliance with his directives, "in
duress or in comfort, whether they are pleasant or unpleasant,"56 claiming that only "complete
obethence" would guarantee the success of their mission.57 They should see themselves as
"soldiers in the barracks, always awaiting an order."58
Al-Banna could even be accused of fomenting a personality cult: in one of his epistles he urged
his followers to ponder over his words, learning them by heart if they could, "because behind
each word lies a multitude of meanings."59 In another, he invited them to ask themselves:
1. Do you know your leader? Have you studied his life?60
2. Are you satisfied with his competence and sincerity?
3. Are you ready to consider any order from the leadership (except if it means disobeying God,
of course) as absolute and leaving no room for argument, hesitation, criticism or modification,
whilst offering advice if appropriate?
4. Are you ready to consider yourself wrong and the leadership right if an order you have been
issued is in conflict with what you have learnt of matters for which there is no clear religious text
and which are, therefore, open to interpretation?
5. Are you ready to put your life at the disposal of the call [da'wa]? And do you believe that the
leadership has the last word when the choice is between your personal interest and the general
interest of the call?61
Qutb was equally suspicious of human reason, which he believed unable to comprehend certain
aspects of reality - in particular, "the invisible" al-ghayb) - and to distinguish right from
wrong.62 He maintained that true knowledge is only to be found in Islam, which provides an
explanation of both the meaning of life and the laws of the universe, and that humans should
unquestionably submit to the Revelation.63 He believed, for instance, that the Qur'an should be
the final arbiter in both historical and scientific matters.64 And he argued that the first objective
of the Muslim religion was not thought but action.65 He regarded faith as a positive and dynamic
reality that manifests itself in every facet of existence; inversely, any action not based on faith
has no value in the eyes of God.66 Using a metaphor similar to that of al-Bann's, Qutb
explained that Muslims should imitate the first generation of believers, who did not approach the
Qur'an looking for knowledge or delight, but as soldiers who received orders.67
Islamic government
Like all Islamists, al-Banna and Qutb deemed government an integral part of Islam, necessary to
guarantee the implementation of the shari'ah, and that the model to follow was that of Prophet
Muhammad and his immediate successors, al-khulafa' al-rashidun (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs).
The two men painted an extremely idealized picture of that period: al-Banna considered the
Prophet's Companions noble knights who embarked on jihad not to acquire booty or satisfy their
personal ambition, but to civilize and guide to the Truth. In the lands they "opened" to Islam,

there was no question of triumphant conqueror and defeated enemy; they all became loving
brothers.68 Qutb wrote that the first group of believers were chosen by God to show humanity
the model to follow.69 They were an extraordinary generation because they drank from a single
source, the Qur'an, and did not crave victory or power, only Heaven.70 The territories they
occupied were thus "opened for freedom, light and bliss."71 He explained:
Under the banner of Islam and for the first time in history, the Arabs had a world-role to play, and
were an international power to be reckoned with: A storming force that swept away kingdoms,
destroyed thrones and assumed the leadership of humanity [. . .] And their leadership remained
for as long as they continued that way.72
Al-Banna also attributed Muslim decadence to deviation from the teachings of Islam.73 Heedless
of the Qur'nic injunctions against intemperance, division and personal ambition, the Arab
leaders became decadent and fought amongst themselves, until power fell into the hands of nonArabs - Persians, Mamlukes, Turks ... - "who had not tasted true Islam" because they had not
been Arabized. In the meantime, the ulema embarked on sterile disputes that led to the
proliferation of sects and schools.74 These weaknesses were then exploited by the external
enemies of Islam: the Tatars and the Crusaders in the xn century, the European colonial powers
in the xix-xx.75 Qutb, however, believed that the crucial factor of decadence was the
introduction of foreign elements into Islam: Greek philosophy, Christian theology, Jewish
fables,76 Persian myths . . .77 But he also denounced the role of the enemies of Islam, in
particular, "crusading imperialism" and "international Zionism," who seek to destroy the Muslim
religion because it constitutes the largest obstacle in their path.78
The restoration of Muslim glory passed through the reestablishment of the Islamic state. AlBanna went as far as saying that until such a state was created "all Muslims are living in sin."79
Our two authors' political ideas owe much to Rashid Rida, who reformulated the medieval theory
of the caliphate in order to "prove" that the caliphal system contained the main elements of, and
was superior to, Western parliamentary democracy.80 Al-Bann wrote that government is an
integral part of Islam,81 and that Islamic government is based on three pillars: the responsibility
of the ruler before God and the umma; the unity of the umma; and the consultation of its will
(shurd).82 The relationship between ruler and ruled is based on a social contract ('aqd ijtima'i),
whereby the former becomes an employee ajir) of the latter.83 If the government fulfils those
conditions, its name and form are not important. He even argued that, of contemporary political
systems, parliamentary democracy is the closest to Islam.84
However, al-Banna's project for an Islamic government differs substantially from the Western
concept of democracy: He was against multi-party politics, which he considered inimical to the
spirit of unity dictated by the Qur'an, and therefore advocated a one-party state.85 He believed
that the duty of government should be to enforce the rulings and teachings of Islam, and not to
represent the will of the people.86 He stressed that the nation's representatives - whom al-Banna,
like Rida, refers to by the classic term ahl
al-hall wa'l-'aqd (those who bind and unbind) - could only be chosen amongst men87 belonging
to three categories: ulemas; technocrats; and "whoever has some kind of leadership role" (heads
of families, tribal sheikhs, leaders of organizations . . . X88 Finally, the ruler could only be

deposed if he disobeyed God's mandates89 - but given the lack of an organized opposition, it is
not very clear how that deposition could take place.
Qutb proposed a similar model: In his view, government, like any other aspect of life, must be
subjected to God's sovereignty. He added that Islamic government is based on justice on the part
of the ruler, obethence on the part of the ruled, and consultation shura) between the former and
the latter.90 The ruler, who is elected by the umma, should only be obeyed for as long as he
implements the shari'ah, and has no privilege over other Muslims.91 But Qutb refused to delve
into the details of government, and indicated that the form of election or consultation should be
left to the particular circumstances of time and place.92 In contrast, he devoted great energy to
criticizing the two prevailing systems of his time: capitalism and communism.
Qutb contended that Western democratic capitalism only serves the interests of a few who
accumulate great riches through usury - "that fundament of Jewish economy" - only to waste
them on gambling, alcohol and prostitution.93 On the other hand, he accused communism of
concentrating on man's most basic needs, those he shares with animals; of substituting one
domination - that of the capitalists - for another - that of the state and the party; and of being so
contrary to human nature that it can only survive through tyranny and repression.94 He also
mocked communism for claim that the instauration of the dictatorship of the proletariat turns
people into "angels" who produce as much as they can and only take as much as they need.95
Like al-Bann before him,96 Qutb denied that there was a significant ideological difference
between the two opposing blocks of the Cold War: both were equally evil, materialistic systems
that relegated men to the status of an animal or a machine.97 In his opinion, the real struggle
would be between both of them and Islam.98
Strategy for change
Both al-Banna and Qutb argued that all existing political systems had failed, and that the world
was in dire need of Islam. In an epistle addressed to King Faruq in 1936, al-Bann tried to
persuade him of the merits of an Islamic order: Egypt, he wrote, is before a crossroads, and has
to choose between "the way of appetites and vanities," i.e., the Western model, and "the way of
Truth," i.e., Islam. And he urged the King: "Take the umma down this way, and may
God grant you success! Be the first to come forward in the name of the prophet of God, peace be
upon him, with the medicine of the Koran, to save this tormented, ailing world!"99 Qutb
similarly considered both the capitalist and the communist systems unable to provide the moral
and spiritual values that humanity needs, and that, as a consequence, the Western world is sunk
in a "putrid swamp" of mental illness, sexual perversion, moral degeneracy and crime.100 He
wrote in his introduction to Ma'dlim fi'l-tariq, alluding to the Cold War:
Humankind stands today at the edge of an abyss, not because of the threat of extermination that
hangs over its head - for that is only a symptom of the disease, and not the disease itself - but
because of its bankruptcy in the area of the values under the shadow of which human life can
grow and prosper [. . .] All individualistic or collectivist systems have ultimately failed. The turn
of Islam has anived.101

For both men, the strategy to bring about change was double-pronged. Al-Banna prioritized
preaching to indoctrinate the masses, and spoke of the inexorable spread of the Muslim Brothers'
message from the individual to the family, to society at large, to the government, to the umma
and, finally, to the whole world.102 However, he warned that other measures would be needed,
"some soft, others hard," because the Society would have to confront the opposition and the
hostility of those who did not understand the truth of Islam.103 He threatened that the Brothers
would declare war on anybody "who d[id] not work for the victory of Islam," and that if their
advice went unheeded, they would be forced to take over power themselves.104 But their
mission did not end with the installation of Islamic governments in the Muslim world. Al-Banna
was in no doubt that God had designated Muslims as the guardians of mankind and granted them
dominion over it to guide it to Islam. 105 He predicted that the colonizing powers would be
chased back to their countries "until everyone follows the teachings of the Koran and calls out
the prophet's name, and the shadow of Islam stretches over the whole world."106
Qutb wrote that God would only fulfil His promise to the Muslims if they took the initiative and
were willing to sacrifice.107 The process would be similar to the establishment of the first
Muslim state: A small vanguard tali'd) of believers would cleanse their conscience from the
pollution of the surrounding jahiliyya, then it would invite the rest of humanity to follow their
example.108 Once people understood the message of Islam, their nature (fitra) would answer the
call da'wa) and they would make the leap from jahiliyya to Islam.109 However, Qutb insisted
that preaching would not be enough, because the usurpers of God's divinity would not
voluntarily give up their power.110 Jihad would be necessary to protect the call and eliminate the
physical
and mental obstacles that prevent people from becoming Muslims.111 Islam wants peace, he
conceded, but not the "cheap peace" of limiting itself to a small territory, because it is concerned
with the whole of humanity.112 And given that truth and falsehood cannot coexist, jihad is a
constant state that will only end on Judgement Day, when Islam will be imposed on the whole
world.113
But what to do about those people who insisted on ignoring the call to Islam? Our authors
adopted an ambiguous position regarding this point. In some of his epistles, al-Banna insisted on
Islam's "benevolent" attitude towards minorities114 and maintained that peaceful relations with
non-Muslim states were possible - although Muslims have a duty to "insistently" invite them to
Islam.115 However, elsewhere he asserted that Muslims must fight jihad until all people
proclaim that "there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God,"116 and that
fighting ahi al-kitab (People of the Book, i.e., Jews and Christians) is an obligation that carries a
double reward from God.117 For his part, Qutb insisted that, once "freed" from the jahiliyya, it is
up to the individual to embrace Islam or not.118 However, that does not mean that those who
refuse conversion will be left to rule themselves; obeying the social, moral, economic and
political norms of the Islamic state is non-negotiable.119 In any case, Qutb's seemingly tolerant
attitude conflicts with his negative depiction of Jews and Christians. He wrote in his Qur'anic
exegesis, Fi zilal al-Qur'an:
The people of the Book were against Muslims at the time of the prophet (peace be upon him) and
are against the vanguard of the Islamic renaissance today simply because they are Muslims who

believe in God120 [. . .] They attack the Muslims because they are Muslims, instead of being not
Jews or Christians, and [also] because they [i.e., the people of the Book] are depraved and have
distorted the message that God revealed to them.121
Conclusion
This article has shown that, contrary to what is normally assumed, there are significant
similarities in the views of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In many respects, the latter merely
developed and took to their logical conclusion the arguments of the former - and as we have
seen, those who had known al-Banna seem to have had a high regard for Qutb's writings. Both
men believed that the establishment of an Islamic state was the solution to all problems, and
expected that violence would be necessary to remove the obstacles in the way of their vision.
Both departed from the Islamist reformists' attempts to conciliate Islam and modernity, and
adopted a dismissive and hostile attitude towards the project and values of the Enlightenment.
Both insisted that theirs was the only legitimate interpretation of Islam and condemned those
who did not subscribe to it, thereby paving the way to the radical Islamist groups that declared
Muslim governments, or even whole Muslim societies, apostate and therefore legitimate targets.
The differences between the two were often of terminology, rather than of substance.
In fact, some central tenets advocated by Islamist radicals first appeared in al-Banna's writings.
Maybe the best example is the notion of jihad, which al-Banna considered one of the pillars of
Islam.122 That notion was the main argument of Al-farida al-ghd'iba The neglected duty), an
influential pamphlet written by Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideologue of the organization that
assassinated Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981. Conversely, Qutb has been integrated among the
guarantors of current "orthodoxy." Oliver Carr has pointed out that amongst the main
accusations against Muslim thinker Nasr Abu Zayd, who was forced into exite after being
declared an apostate in his native Egypt, were the accusations against him included not just
criticizing al-Azhar's commentary of the Qur'an, but also that of Qutb, and refusing to relate
everything back to God's sovereignty hakimiyya).12i The appropriation of Islamist discourse has
become a way for the religious establishment to recover its credibility, which had been
undermined by its subservience to the powers that be. In his study of Qutb's exegesis of the
Qur'an, Carr has expressed concern that the perpetuation of "the Islamist episode" could be
"suicidal for Islam and its civilisation."124 If the increasing climate of intolerance and violence
in much of the Muslim world is anything to go by, it would seem that such fears are not
unwarranted.
Footnote
Endnotes
1. Quoted in Gilles Kepel, The roots of radical Islam (New York, San Francisco, Beirut: Saqi,
2005), 64.
2. See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Kilma akhira hawla Sayyid Qutb," available at:
http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=3417

&version=l&template_id=119&parent_id=13; (accessed 30-3-2008). 'Abd al-Khaliq, Al-Ikhwan


al-Muslimun fi mizan al-haqq (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwa, 1987), 115-28.
3. Tariq Ramadan, Aux sources du renouveau musulman. D'al-Afghani Hassan al-Banna: Un
sicle de rforme islamique (Paris: Bayard, 1998).
4. Quoted in Kepel, The roots of radical Islam, 61.
5. Quoted in Sayyid Bashshir Ahmad Kashmiri, 'Abqari al-Islam Sayyid Qutb. Al-adib al-'imlaq
wa'l-mujaddid al-mud'ham fi daw' athari-hi wa injazati-hi al-adabiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Fadila,
1994), 449. A variation of this thesis - put forward by, amongst others, Qutb's brother
Muhammad - is the claim that the radical Islamists known as Qutbists have, in reality, misread
Qutb's message.
6. Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political
Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 126ff.
7. Ana Beln Soage, "Hasan al-Banna or the politicisation of Islam." Totalitarian Movements and
Political Religions 9:1 (March 2008), passim.
8. The term jihad means 'effort' or 'endeavour' as well as "holy war." We have translated it here as
"holy war" because that is the meaning given to it by al-Banna. See "Risalat al-jihad," Majmu'at
rasa'il al-imam al-shahid Hasan al-Banna (Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa, 1998; 261-80), 263.
9. Al-Bannaa, "Risalat al-ta'alim," in Majmu'at rasa'il, 369-86), 372. Similar definitions of Islam
abound in al-Banna's writings.
10. Al-Banna, "Il ayy shay' nad'u al-nas," in Majmu'at rasa'il (35-61), 51.
11. See Al-Banna, "Nahwa al-nur," in Majmu'at rasa'il (63-87), 83-7; "Mishkilatu-na fi daw' alnizam al-islami," in Majmu'at rasa'il (205-223), especially 217-223; "Al-nizam al-iqtisadi," in
Majmu'at rasa'il (245-60).
12. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," in Majmu'at rasa'il (161-204), 164; "Il'l-tullab,"
in Majmu'at rasa'il (293-308), 308; Qadiyatu-na bayna yaday al-ra'i al-'amm al-misri wa'l-'arabi
wa'l-islami wa'l-damir al-alami (Cairo: ?), 43; and passim.
13. However, al-Banna was no socialist: he stressed the God-given right to private property,
endorsed the existence of "God-sanctioned" social inequalities and envisioned a corporate
society not dissimilar to that proposed by fascism. See, for instance, al-Banna's "Nahwa al-nur"
86 and "Al-nizam al-lgtisadi," 257. See also Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 2534, n. 71.
14. This socialist bent was continued by Syrian Muslim Brother Mustafa al-Siba'i", author of
Ishtirakiyyat al-Islam (Islam's socialism, 1958). However, it was gradually marginalized by a

free-market tendency that was helped by the persecution of Nasserist 'socialism' and by Saudi
petrodollars.
15. For instance, his Ma'rakat al-Islam wa-ra'smaliyya (The battle between Islam and capitalism)
and Al-Islam wa'l-salam al-'alami (Islam and world peace), both published in 1951, and his
Dirasat islamiyya (Islamic studies), a compilation of articles published in 1953.
16. Su'ud Mawla, Min Hasan al-Banna il Hizb al-Wasat. Al-haraka al-islamiyya wa-qadaya alirhab wa'l-ta'ifiyya (Beirut: Al-'ula, 2000), 34; Mahmud Jami', Wa-'araftu al-Ikhwan (al-Zarqa',
Maktabat al-Manar, 2004), 26.
17. Mawl, Min Hasan al-Banna il Hizb al-Wasat, 45-7; Mahmud Jami', Wa-'araftu al-Ikhwan,
90, 93.
18. Kashmiri talks of a Soiree in the course of which Anwar Sadat, representative of President
Muhammad Neguib, celebrated Qutb as "the pioneer of the revolution, its teacher, its guardian,
the leader of its leaders." See 'Abqari al-Islam Sayyid Qutb, 166.
19. 'Abd al-Baqi Muhammad Husayn, Sayyid Qutb: Hayatu-hu wa-adabu-hu (Al-Mansura: Dar
al-Wafa', 1986), 46; Mawl, Min Hasan al-Banna il Hizb al-Wasat, 49.
20. It has been suggested that the attack was staged with the help of the CIA, which also would
have had a hand in the 1952 Revolution. See Olivier Carr, Michaud Gerand, Les Frres
musulmans (1928-1982) (Paris: Gallimaud, 1983), 61-2.
21. Twenty-five years, according to other sources.
22. Sayyid Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an (Beirut, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1982), 16-7, 56, 1133; Al-'adala
al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam (Beirut, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1975), 20, 26; Muqawwimat al-tasawwur
al-islami (Beirut, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1986), 44; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din (Cairo: ?), 1 1-2;
Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami wa-muqawwumati-hi, available to download from:
http://www.daawa-info.net/ booksl.php?author=(ProQuest-CSA LLC: ... denotes non-USASCII
text omitted.) (last accessed 30-3-2008), 1.
23. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq (Damascus?: Dar Dimashq, ?), 87, 111; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din,
15-7, 25; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam, 98-9. William E. Shepard explains the articulation of
these concepts in "Islam as a 'system' in the later writing of Sayyid Qutb," Middle Eastern
Studies 25/1 (1989), 31-50.
24. See Abu'l-A'a al-Mawdudi, Al-mustalahat al-arba'a fi'l-Qur'an.- Al-Ilah, al-rabb, al-'ibada,
al-din (Cairo?: Dar al-Turath al-' Arabi, 1975?).
25. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 129, 135, 204; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 15, 1012, 1091; Muqawwimat altasawwur al-islami, 364; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, 109-10; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami,
46-7; Hadha al-din, available to download from: http://www. daawa-info.net/booksl.php?

author=(ProQuest-CSA LLC: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) (last accessed 26-2-2008),
7; and passim.
26. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 198, 201; Ft zilal al-Qur'an, 708-9, 1945; Khasa'is al-tasawwur alislami, 45; and passim. Contrary to the terms ulhiyya, 'ubudiyya and hakimiyya, which were
coined by Mawdudi, jdhiliyya (literally, "ignorance") is a Qur'anic term. In its usual sense, it
refers to ante-Islamic society, when men did not know the truth of God. However, Qutb asserted
that "jahiliyya is not a period in time, but a state that recurs every time society deviates from the
program of Islam, be it in the past, in the present or in the future"; Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 224.
27. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 9-10, 28, 144; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 294-5, 1091; and passim.
28. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, pp. 46-7; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1010, 1735, 2009-12; Al-Islam wamushkilat al-hadara (Cairo?: Dar ihya' al-kutub al-'arabiyya, 1962), 183ff.
29. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 2010-1.
30. Qutb, Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 185-6; Ma'rikat al-Islam wa'l-ra 'smaliyya (Beirut,
Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1974), 67.
31. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 207-8; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1216; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fil-Islam, 935. Qutb was particularly critical of the attempts to merge Islam and socialism. See Ma'alim fi'ltariq, 208; Al-'adala al-ijtima iyya fi'l-Islam, 97; Ft zilal al-Qur'an, 1083.
32. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 207-8; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1216, 2009-10; Al-Islam wa-mushkilat alhadara, 183ff.
33- Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 208; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1010, 2010. Moussalli notes that, contrary to
Qutb, Mawdudi had contemplated the possibility of a hybrid system, containing elements of both
Islam and jdhiliyya. See Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 20.
34. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 201.
35. Al-Banna, "Ila'l-tullab," 308; Qadiyatu-na, 43; "Il'l-shabab wa-Il'1-talaba khassatan," in
Majmu' at rasa'il (pp. 89-116), 97.
36. Al-Banna, Mudhakkarat al-da'wa wa'l-da'iya (Cairo: Dar al-Shihab, 1966), 175, 193; "Li'lghayuriyin min abna' al-islam," Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin xv, 17-08-1934, in Majmu'at alrasa'il (336-8), 336; "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-sadis," in Majmu'at rasa'il (309-330), 325; "Il'lshabab," 97.
37. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-sadis," 312.
38. Al-Banna, "Bayna al-ams wa'1-yawm," in Majmu'at rasa'il (136-159), 158.

39. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-sadis," 311. See also Mudhakkarat, 232. Al-Banna uses the
same word, ashab (companions or, more generally, friends), to refer to both the prophet's
Companions - i.e., the people who believed in his message - and the Muslim Brothers. At least
once, he went as far as describing them as "the Companions of the messenger of God." See
"Tahta rayat al-Qur'an," 115.
40. Al-Banna, "Ila'l-tullab," 299; "Al-Ikhwan bayna al-din wa'1-siyasa," al-Nadhir x, 22-4-1939,
quoted in al-Bishri, Al-haraka al-siyasiyya, 54.
41. Al-Banna, "Ila'l-tullab," 296.
42. Al-Banna, "Il'l-shabab," 96-7. See also "Nizam al-hukm,", in Majmu'at rasa'il (225-43), 227;
"Il'l-tullab," 297.
43. Al-Banna, "Da'watu-na," 14-5. Another categorization divided people into six groups: the
diligent Muslim (clearly, the Muslim Brother); the negligent Muslim; the sinful Muslim; the
dhimmi (Christian or Jew) allied to a Muslim state; the neutral dhimmi; and the belligerent
dhimmi; "Risalat al-ta'alim," 379
44. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima iyya fi'l-Islam, 245; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, 9.
45. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 28; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 825.
46. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 183; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 35l4ff. The terms "party of God" and "party
of Satan" come from the Qur'an: "The devil hath engrossed them [i.e., "those who oppose Allah
and his messenger"] and so hath caused them to forget remembrance of Allah. They are the
devil's party. Lo! is it not the devil's party [hizb al-Shaytan] who will be the losers?" (Qur'an
58:19); and "[. . .] Allah is well pleased with them [i.e., those "who believe in Allah and the Last
Day"], and they are well pleased with Him. They are Allah's party. Lo! is it not Allah's party who
are the successful?" (Qur'an 58:22). All translations of the Qur'an are Picktall's.
47. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 2013. See also Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 6; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam,
244, 246, 292-3. During his second trial, Qutb affirmed that although he had written that Islam
had ceased to exist, that did not mean that there were not individual Muslims. See Kashmiri,
'Abqari al-Islam Sayyid Qutb, 173. However, his writings are less equivocal: For instance, he
referred to "the way people understood it [religion] when they were really Muslims" (Fi zilal alQur'an, 825), and unequivocally stated that "today Muslims do not practice jihad because today
Muslims do not exist" (ibid., 1634).
48. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1946.
49. A good example of this is Tariq Ramadan's Aux sources du renouveau musulman. D'alAfghani Hassan al-Banna: Un sicle de rforme islamique (To the sources of Muslim renewal.
From al-Afghani to Hasan al-Banna; A century of Islamic reform). Tibi has described Ramadan's
depiction of an evolutionary link between al-Afghani and al-Banna as "a distorted presentation of

history." See Bassam Tibi, "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe
and to Islam," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8/1 (2007), 51, n. 16.
50. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, 126ff.
51. Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London & New York:
Routledge, 1991), 231.
52. Al-Banna, "Da'watu-na fi tawr jadad," in Majmu'at rasa'il (117-135), 120; "Al-'aqa'id", in
Majmu'at rasa'il (393-431), 398.
53. Al-Banna, "Da'watu-na fi tawr jadad," 120-1.
54. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-ta'alim," 373.
55. Al-Banna, "Al-'aqa'id," 397.
56. Al-Banna, "Bayna al-ams wa' l-yawm," 159; "Risalat al-ta'alim," 378.
57. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-ta'alim," 378.
58. Ibid., 385. The Qur'anic injunction "we hear and we obey" (Qur'an 2:285) became one of the
Society's mottos.
59. Al-Banna, "Bayna al-ams wa'1-yawm," 157-8.
60. Al-Banna helpfully serialized his life in one of the Society's publications. That series was
later compiled under the title Mudhakkarat al-da'wa wa'l-da'iya.
61. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-ta'alim," 380-1. Richard P. Mitchell has remarked on the Society's
authoritarian direction and Hasan al-Banna's sense of mission. See his The Society of the Muslim
Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 295ff.
62. Qutb, Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 162; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1132, 1760; Muqawwimat altasawwur al-islami, 45-6, 364, 370; Haha al-din, 8.
63. Qutb, Muqawwimat al-tasawwur al-islami, 44-6; Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 135; Al-Islam wamushkilat al-hadara, 177; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1132, 1760-1.
64. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 2290, 3110.
65. Qutb, Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 102. See also Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 42-3, 78-9; Fi zilal alQur'an, 932-3, 1016-7, 1734-5, 1948.
66. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 3966-7. See also Muqawwimat al-tasawwur al-islami, 366; Khasa'is
al-tasawwur al-islami, 40.

67. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 17-8.


68. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-jihad," 276-9; "U ayy shay' nad'u al-nas," 39, 55-6. This idyllic picture
is widespread in the Muslim world. The verb fataha (open) is used is Arabic to refer to the lands
occupied by Muslims.
69. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 15-6; Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 246; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 86;
Hadha al-din, 18, 26.
70. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 13-20; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 673; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 1-2.
71. Qu(b, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 673.
72. Ibid., 3980-1.
73. The last point of the Society's "Creed" states: "I believe that the reason behind the Muslims'
backwardness is their departure from their religion, that the basis of reform must be the return to
the teachings and rulings of Islam, and that that [reform] is possible if Muslims work to achieve
it." See Al-Ma'thrat Li'l-imam al-sahd Hasan al-Banna (Cairo: Dar al-tawz' wa'1-nashr alislamiyya, undated), 31.
74. Al-Banna;, "Bayna al-ams wa'1-yawm," 142-4.
75. Of course, the Crusades started over a century before the Tatar invasion, but al-Banna did not
allow historical facts to get in the way of his arguments. Note that, contrary to Qutb, al-Banna
believed in the superiority of the Arabs over other Muslims nations. See "Da'watu-na," 25;
"Da'watu-na fi tawr jadid," 123-4; "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 192. In addition, he saw his
own country, Egypt, as the natural leader of the Muslim world. See Mudhakkarat, 263; "Ila'lshabab," 98; "Tahta rayat al-Qur'an," in Majmu'at rasa'il (101-16), 109; "Mishkilatu-na fi daw' alnizam al-islami," in Majmu'at rasa'il (205-23), 211.
76. The term used is isra'iliyyat, which refers to the stories from the Judeo-Christian tradition
with which Muslim scholars tried to "fill the gaps" in the Qur'an. Muslims eventually came to
see them as Jewish attempts to distort their faith.
77. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 16-7; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 3-5. Qutb often criticized
Muslim theology and philosophy, which he considered a scion of the "pagan" Greek philosophy;
ibid., 3ff, 48; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam, 20.
78. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam, 249-56; Fi zilal al-Qur'a;n, l648ff, 1891; Ma'rikat alIslam wal-ra'smaliyya, 96ff; Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 181; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din,
5-7, 122; and passim. Note that Qutb uses the term "Zionism" anachronistically, to refer to
alleged Jewish conspiracies that preceded the appearance of the Zionit as an ideology.
79. Al-Banna, "Bayna al-ams wa'1-yawm," 154. See also "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-sadis," 322;
"Nahwa al-nur," 66.

80. Ana Beln Soage, "Rashid Rida's Legacy," The Muslim World 98:1 (January 2008), 1-23.
81. As he graphically put it, "What is the use of the preacher repeating every Friday that alcohol
is the work of the devil if the law allows drinking and the police protects the drinker . . . and even
makes sure that he gets home safe and sound?!"; "Ila'l-tullab," 300.
82. Al-Bannau, "Nizam al-hukm," 228-9.
83. Ibid., 228. See also "Risalat al-ta'alm," 376; "Ila'l-tullab," 298-9.
84. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 188. See also "Nizam al-hukm," 229, 232.
85. Al-Banna, "Nizam al-hukm," 235; "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 197; "Ila'l-tullab," 306;
and passim.
86. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-ta'alim," 376.
87. Al-Banna was against women playing any role in public life; her domain is the home. See
"Al-mar'a al-muslima," in Majmu'at rasa'il (281-292).
88. Al-Banna;, "Nizam al-hukm," 238.
89. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-ta'alim," 376.
90. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam, 101ff.
91. Ibid., 102-6; Ma'rikat al-Islam wa'l-ra'smaliyya, 74.
92. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima 'iyya fi'l-Islam, 104-7.
93. Qutb, Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 96-7; Ma'rikat al-Islam wa'l-ra'smaliyya, 12-3;
Al-'adala al-ijtima; 'iyya fi'l-Islam, 117-8; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 322, 1754.
94. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 72, 121; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha; al-din, 63; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1563,
1754-5, 1890, 2144; Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 86.
95. Muqawwimat al-tasawwur al-Islami, 374-5; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, 63-4. However,
Qutb declared that Islamic government is based more on conscience that on legislation, which
smacks of the same nave idealism. See Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'l-Islam, 108, 265; Fi zilal alQur'an, 1009-10; Hadha al-din, 7.
96. Al-Banna, "Mishkilatu-na," 207-9.
97. Qutb, Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 3, 5, 174-5; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya ff'l-Islam, 255,
290-2; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 2144-5; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 31. Qutb often quoted Western
authors like Bertrand Russell or Julian Huxley in his critique of the West, but he did not accept

their conclusions. He argued that their condition of "prisoners" of Western civilization prevented
them from seeing that Islam is the solution to the problems they denounced. See Al-Islam wamushkilat al-hadara, 169; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha; al-din, 66, 68, 75; and passim.
98. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya ffl-Islam, 291. Note that, contrary to other Islamists, al-Banna
and Qutb did not pay particular attention to the question of the caliphate, probably because they
did not see its reestablishment as feasible. Al-Banna vaguely alluded to it as a final goal, the
culmination of a long process. See "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 194-5; "Risalat al-ta'alim,"
377. When Qutb used the term khilafa (caliphate), more often than not he was referring to man's
vice-regency of God on Earth.
99. Al-Banna, "Nahwa al-nur," 82.
100. Qutb, Al-Islam wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 161; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 17, 1091; Muqawwimat altasawwur al-islami, 82-3; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, 69-71; Khasa'is al-tasawwur al-islami, 1,
11; Hadha al-din. Available at: http://www.daawa-info.net/ booksl.php?author=(ProQuest-CSA
LLC: ... denotes obscured text omitted.) (last accessed 26-3-2008), 9, 39. In Al-mustaqbal lihadha al-din (The future belongs to this religion), he confidently predicted "the end of the white
man's turn" (59-74).
101. Qutb, Ma'a;lim fi'l-tariq, 3, 5.
102. Al-Banna, "Ila'l-shabab," 95-6; "Tahta rayat al-Qur'an," 110; "Da'watu-na fi tawr jadid,"
129-30; "Risalat al-ta'alim," 375-7.
103. Al-Banna, "Bayna al-ams wa'1-yawm," 155-8; "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 185-6; "La
nuridu fi sufufi-na . . ."
104. Al-Banna, "Iftitah," al-Nadhir 1, 146; "Risalat al-mu'tamar al-khamis," 187.
105. Al-Banna, "Il ayy shay' nad'u; al-nas," 38-9; "Ila'l-tullab," 301; "Risalat al-mu'tamar alsadis," 312.
106. Al-Banna, "Tahta rayat al-Qur'an," 109.
107. Qutb, Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fil-Islam, 256-7; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1091-2, 2011; Al-Islam
wa-mushkilat al-hadara, 181-2; Al-mustaqbal li-hadha al-din, 125-7.
108. Al-Banna, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 23-4, 65-8, 118; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1946-7; Al-'adala al-ijtima
iyya ffl-Islam, 265-6.
109. Al-Banna, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 212.
110. Ibid., 83; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1091-2, 1434.
111. Al-Banna, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 78-9, 83-4; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 294-5.

112. Al-Banna, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 90-1, 106; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1436, 1441.
113. Al-Banna, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 93, 158-9; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 1442, 2008, 2010.
114. Al-Banna, "Nahwa al-nr," 78-9. See also "Ila'l-tullab," 302.
115. Al-Banna, "Tahta rayat al-Qur'an," 114; "Da'watu-na," 25.
116. Al-Banna, "Al-salam fi'1-Islam," 32. "Risalat al-jihad," 265, 270. Those are the words of the
shahada, the formula of conversion to Islam.
117. Ibid., 265, 270.
118. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 87, 105, 111; Al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya fi'1-Islam, 99; Fi zilal alQur'an, 295, 1432, 1440ff.
119. Qutb, Ma'alim fi'l-tariq, 87, 101-2; Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 295.
120. Reference to Qur'an 5:59: "Say: O, People of the Scripture! Do ye blame us for aught else
than that we believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed
aforetime, and because most of you are evil-livers?"
121. Qutb, Fi zilal al-Qur'an, 924. Note that such claims are frequent among Muslim authors
throughout history.
122. Al-Banna, "Risalat al-jihad," 263-5. Of course, in that case the five pillars would become
six. Note that for al-Banna jihad meant "military struggle," and that he rejected its interpretation
as the struggle to restrain one's passions. See his "Risalat al-jihad," 263, 279.
123. See Olivier Carr, Mysticism and Politics. A Critical Reading of Fi Zilal al-Qur'an by
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), 260.
124. Ibid., Carr, Mysticism and Politics, 260-1.
AuthorAffiliation
Ana Beln Soage
University of Granada
Spain
Word count: 8129
Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Apr 2009

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