GR 46179 case digest

GR 46179 January 31, 1976 Virata/OChoa/Borilla bacoor Cavite

L25071 July 29, 1972 San Pedro Busline / Central Bank of the Philippines
L6291 San Pedro Busline / Central Bank of the Philippines
89007 March 11 1991
Juan C coardona (commercial bank and Trust) NLRC and BPI
33171 May 31 1979
Porfirio Cinco/ Hon Mateo CanonoyCebuLorenzo Barria Mandaue 2nd Branch
50959 July 23 1980
Heirs of pedro Tayag SR VS Honorable Feranndo Al;cantara Philippine Rabbit

Luis Tan William Hon David Nitafan RTC

76965 GR William Tan

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G.R. No. L-25071

GEORGE W. BATCHELDER
vs.
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-25071 March 29, 1972
Facts:
Monetary Board Resolution No. 857 requires Filipino and American resident contra
ctorsfor constructions in U.S. military bases in the Philippines to surrender to
the Central Bank theirdollar earnings under their respective contracts but were
entitled to utilize 90% of theirsurrendered dollars for importation at the pref
erred rate of commodities for use within or outside said U.S. military bases. Re
solution 695 moreover, denies their right to reacquire
at the preferred rate
ninety per cent (90%) of the foreign exchange the sold or surrendered earningsto
Central Bank for the purpose of determining whether the imports against proceed
s of contracts entered into
prior to April 25, 1960
are classified as dollar-to-dollar transactions ornot.George Batchelder, an Amer
ican Citizen permanently residing in the Philippines who isengaged in the Constr
uction Business, surrendered to the Central Bank his dollar earningsamounting to
U.S. $199,966.00. He compels Central Bank of the Philippines to resell to him$1
70,210.60 at the preferred rate of exchange of two Philippine pesos for one Amer
ican dollar,more specifically P2.00375 which was denied by the court.He then con
tended that said decision failed to consider that if there was no contract oblig

ating the bank to resell to him at the preferred rate, the judgment of the lower
court can and should nevertheless be sustained on the basis of there being such
an obligation arising from law
Issue:
Whether or not Central Bank has the obligation arising from law to resell the US
$154,094.56 to Batchelder at the preferred rate.
Held:
Central Bank was intended to attain basic objectives in the field of currency an
d finance.
It shall be the responsibility of the Central Bank of the Philippines to administ
er the monetary
and banking system of the Republic.
It shall be the duty of the Central Bank to use the powersgranted to it under th
is Act to achieve the following objectives:
(a) to maintain monetarystability in the Philippines;
(b) to preserve the international value of the peso and theconvertibility of the
peso into other freely convertible currencies; and
(c) to promote a risinglevel of production, employment and real income in the Ph
ilippines."It is, of course, true that obligations arise from 1) law; 2) contrac
ts; 3) quasi-contracts;4) acts or omissions punished by law and 5) quasi-delicts
.
One of the sources an obligation thenis a law. A legal norm could so require tha
t a particular party be chargeable with a prestation or undertaking to give or t
o deliver or to do or to render some service. It is an indispensable requisite t
hough that such a provision, thus in fact exists. There must be a showing to tha
t effect.As early as 1909 in Pelayo v. Lauron, Court through Justice Torres, cat
egorically declared:"Obligation arising from law are not presumed." For in the l
anguage of Justice Street in LeungBen v. O'Brien, a 1918 decision, such an oblig
ation is "a creation of the positive law."
They are ordinarily traceable to code or statute. It is true though, as noted in
the motion for reconsideration following People v. Que Po Lay, that a Central B
ank circular may have the force and effect of law, especially when issued in pur
suance of its quasi-legislative power. That of itself, however, is no justificat
ion to conclude that it has thereby assumed an obligation.
-----------------------------------81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages

Double Recovery of Civil Liability

In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby
causing the latter s death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action fo
r homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata s lawyer reserv
ed their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion
. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their
right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it wa
s ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Bo
rilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages base
d on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was alrea
dy acquitted and that the Virata s were merely trying to recover damages twice. Th
e lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.

HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choo
se between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Artic
le 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent
act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation o
f criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal neglig
ence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana . But said article f
orestalls a double recovery.
-----------------------------------Torts And Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al. (1
979)
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article
2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and op
erated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident. At the pr
e-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule
111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever st
age it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been re
ndered
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property durin
g the pendency of the criminal action
HELD:
YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the sa
me act or omission of the defendant
primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly rec
ognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Arti
cles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent c
ivil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In n
o case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act o
r omission charged in the criminal action.
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the ac

t or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independe

ntly of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only in
juries to persons but also damage to property
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done
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