You are on page 1of 26

PROFANE SLAUGHTER

IN
LEVITICUS 17 AND DEUTERONOMY 12:
A LITERATURE REVIEW

by

Shawn I. Craigmiles
197232
SPO BOX 206

Submitted to Dr.Arnold
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for
OT935, Fall 2013
at
Asbury Theological Seminary

Wilmore, Kentucky
November 2013

Introduction
In the course of our study of Deuteronomy in OT935, we have encountered portions of the book
which, at first glance, could be interpreted as modifying or opposing other portions of the Pentateuch.
One such portion is Deut 12, which appears to contain elements that are in opposition to directions
contained in Lev 17. In particular, there appears to be a discrepancy between the warning against and de
facto prohibition of the so-called profane slaughter of sacrificeable quadrupeds in Lev 17 and the
allowance for this same slaughter in Deut 12. However, I question whether the warnings in Lev 17 are
against profane slaughter of sacrificeable quadrupeds. Is it not possible that these warnings are, in the
context of the passage, actually aimed at the sacrifice, not the profane slaughter, of these animals apart
from the centralized cult location?
Based on this question, then, my research is into the topic of the warnings and resultant
prohibitions in Lev 17. My reason for pursuing this research is to attempt to discover whether or not the
prohibition in Lev 17 is (1) against profane slaughter, (2) against sacrifice apart from the central
sanctuary, or (3) some other combination of these two options. Successful resolution of this question
informs other discussions related to Deuteronomy, as Deut 12 cannot rightly be said to be opposing or
modifying Lev 17 if in fact Lev 17 does not prohibit profane slaughter. Further, rightly understanding
this passage helps us to understand the actual concerns of the author(s) of this portion of the Holiness
Code (Lev 17-26), rather than a misinformed caricature of the same. More to the point, we will not be
misreading the passage and construing the writers as concerned with the profane slaughter and
consumption of sacrificeable quadrupeds: instead, we will be seeing the author(s) as concerned with the
1

2
centralization of the cult and with elimination of sacrifices to other entities (
--satyrs or goatdemons?) outside of the encampment.
Classification of Sources
I will be employing two primary indices for classifying my sources before evaluating them. The
first index is the date of the work. I will move from the oldest works to the most recent ones. Where
there is significant interaction between a later work and an earlier one, such as extensive quotation,
allusion, agreement and/or disagreement, I will note this and attempt to show, in brief, how the later
modifies the argument of the earlier. In fact, there is a great deal of interaction between the later works
and the earlier ones, with less than a handful of authors being regularly cited by the majority of the
works.
The second index is specificity of the work with respect to Lev 17: in other words, works which
focus specifically on all or part of Lev 17 will be discussed before other works, say commentaries or
more general articles from the same date, which touch upon the text of Lev 17 without handling it in
depth. This being said, there are several recent (i.e., within approximately the last two decades) journal
articles and essays which focus on Lev 17, with special attention to 17:1-11. There are also, of course,
several commentaries from the last three decades which cover Lev 17 as part of their coverage of
Leviticus alone, or in combination with other books of the Pentateuch.
Intentional Omissions
Finally, there are some other sources that, while referenced or discussed by several of my
sources, will not be consulted for the purposes of this work. In the main, these are rabbinical sources
such as Rabbah Leviticus, the Talmud, the Mishnah, and Sifra. The article by B. Schwartz on profane

slaughter provides several citations to these and other rabbinic works which may be profitably consulted
for illumination of the rabbinical discussion of the issues in Lev 17.1 I do not lightly eliminate these
sources from consideration: however, I must agree with Schwartz concerning the rabbinical handling of
Lev 17, as well as their attempts to illuminate the relationship between Lev 17 and Deut with regard to
profane slaughter:
Now this willingness to forego the logos of syntax and word-order in order to harmonize
contradictory texts is a hallmark of rabbinic midrash. No exception can be taken to either
of the two attempts [by R. Akiba or R. Ishmael], and neither of them is more or less
legitimate than the other. Each interprets the text in partial accord with its plain meaning
in order to resolve the halachic tension between it and the Deuteronomic law. What is
legitimate in midrash, however, has no place in philological exegesis. And so it is
remarkable that many modern commentators follow in the footsteps of R. Akiba and read
vss. 3-4 as though their intent were merely to centralize the cult of YHWH.2
This being said, the debate within the Talmudic literature did foreshadowed, indeed, largely anticipated,
the current scholarly debate, including the general division of interpreters into two opposing camps.
As Schwartz notes,

Baruch J. Schwartz, Profane Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly Code, HUCA
67 (January 1, 1996): 1819, with special attention to notes 9, 11, 12, and 13.
1

Ibid., 20. I think that this an unfair characterization of those who arrive at the
conclusion that the thrust of these warnings are primarily directed toward centralization of the cult: the
term merely seems inappropriate, given how great a change the move from local cultic sites to a
central one would entail for worshippers of YHWH.

4
The two sides of the question are represented in Talmudic literature by R. Ishmael and R.
Akiba, the former claiming that the intent is to outlaw what he called profane slaughter
(


) , i.e., the slaughter of oxen, sheep, or goats without first
presenting them as an offering to YHWH and the latter claiming that the intent is to
prohibit making sacrifices to YHWH of oxen, sheep or goats outside of the single
sanctuary (


) , in other words, that this is what scholars call a
law of cult-centralization.3
It is to the sources considering these two sides of the question which we will now turn.
Consideration of Sources
The first major source that I will consider is S.R. Drivers Introduction to the Literature of the
Old Testament.4 Driver refers to Lev 17-26 as the Law of Holiness,5 or H, and posits that these
chapters were added by a redactor under the influence of P (referred to as RP). This incorporation of the
body of material H (previously compiled by Rh) into P by the redactor (RP) proceeded sometimes with
modifications introduced for the purpose of adjusting it more completely to the spirit and system of P, at
other times interwoven with elements derived from P.6

Ibid., 18.

S. R. Driver, An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament, 1965 repr.


(Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1897).
Ibid., 48. Following A.H. Klostermanns 1877 designation of Lev 17-26 as Das
Heiligkeitgesetz.
5

Ibid.

Driver examines the interaction between P and H in his detailed coverage of Lev 17.
Commenting on the subjects addressed in Lev 17, Driver notes that the first is Animals (of a kind
offered in sacrifice), when slain for food, to be presented at the central sanctuary, and their flesh eaten
there as a Peace-offering, v.1-7.7 He includes three potential interpretations for the relationship between
this passage and Deut 12:15, as well as various sources advocating each of these positions:
1.

The injunction belongs to the period between Dt. and P, which he dates to the
period of the exile.

2.

Leviticus 17:1-7 is older than Dt., and is abrogated by it.

3.

The original form of the law in Lev 17:1-7 did not make reference to a central
sanctuary, but presupposed a plurality of legal sanctuaries (Ex. 2024; cf. I Sa.
1432-35), and was accommodated to the single sanctuary only when it was
incorporated in P.8

Driver goes on to note that the Law is not strictly consistent with P; for in P (Lev. 722-27) the
slaughtering of animals for food is freely permitted, the only restriction being that their fat and blood are
not to be eaten. The third of the opinions quoted appears to be the most probable.9
The next work for our consideration is J. Milgroms Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11.10 This is
a rather short article, and as is fitting given the title, focuses on Lev 17:11: however, it is of interest to
our research question in that Milgrom connects the prohibition against the consumption of blood to the
particular sacrifices mentioned in Lev 17:1-7, the which are to be presented and consumed as

Ibid., 50. Emphasis is Drivers.

Ibid., 51. Emphasis is Drivers.

Ibid.

10

Jacob Milgrom, Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11, JBL 90, no. 2 (1971): 149156.

Milgrom offers brief commentary on Lev 17:1-7, which he sees as Ps prohibition of profane

slaughter and directions for the sacral slaughter that allows sacrificeable animals to be consumed.
Milroms thrust in linking Lev 17:11 back to the directions for is the following:
For the moment we may conclude: Lev 17:11 does not concern itself with all sacrifices,
but refers only to the one sacrifice whose flesh is permitted to be eaten by the laity, the

It is the blood of the that would serve as the kippr agent for the lives

of the Israelites.11
Milgrom notes that three of the four categories of animal sacrifices are said to be for kippr, whereas
the ( offering of well-being) is the only sacrifice which never serves in a kippr role.12 His
point is that, as this particular sacrifice is the only to be consumed by the laity, and the only sacrifice
which does not have an expiatory/atoning function, that the blood must be presented for offering upon
the altar in order for the person slaughtering the animal to avoid blood-guiltiness.13
Our interest in this discussion, however, is related to Milgroms assumptions about profane
slaughter, as well as his view of interaction between Lev 17 and Deut 12. Remarking on the concern for
avoidance of the consumption, and in particular, the eating, of blood, Milgrom notes that:

11

Ibid., 152153. With respect to the cohesion of the material within Lev 17, Milgrom
states that The underlying unity of Leviticus 17 is assumed. This is not to say that the materials which
comprise this chapter are of a single hue, as source analysis and form-critical studies have demonstrated.
With the majority of the critics, this paper assumes that this chapter is a reworking by P of older laws
(H).
12

Ibid., 153.

13

Ibid., 156.

7
Deuteronomy repeatedly warns about the danger of consuming blood as a result of
allowing profane slaughter (Deut 12:15-6, 23-25) and of permitting the eating of the flesh
of the firstlings by the laity (Deut 15:23). So in the Priestly Code, the blood prohibition
occurs exclusively in the discussion of the , the offering of well-being, the only
sacrifice whose flesh is eaten by the lay worshipper (Lev 3:17; 7:26; 17:1-7; cf. Gen
9:4).14
This article, then, is important to consider as we work to answer our research question: further,
both of the articles that I will be considering next interact with the material in this article while
advancing the discussion of the text and interpretation of Lev 17.
The next article, Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of
Deuteronomy,15 which is also by Milgrom, is primarily concerned with identifying the formulae used in
Deuteronomy to introduce material obtained from other sources, notably E and P. His thesis is that the
clause or or serves a specific literary function in
Deuterononomy: it is, I submit, Ds unique formula by which it indicates its sources.16 Where
Milgroms pursuit in this article intersects our area of inquiry is in his explanation for the reference in
Deut 12:21 to a previous commandment (



) . Milgrom
disagrees with the view that the referent in 12:21 is the command given earlier in 12:15: instead, he
proposes that the command refers back to an accepted method of slaughtering the offering, and that

14

Ibid., 152.

Jacob Milgrom, Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of


Deuteronomy, HUCA 47 (1976): 117.
15

16

Ibid., 3.

8
the technical term employed for this prescribed method is .17 Milgrom asserts that is Ps
exclusive term for animal slaughter,18 and contrasts the meaning of and :
The specific meaning of in H is not slaughter but offer the zebai.e. it refers to
the entire sacrificial procedure, including slaughter (this also holds true for P; contrast

, Lev 9:4 with v.18).Indeed, when H wishes to specify slaughter, it also


resorts to ( Lev 22:28, and cf. v. 29). Thus in all of P (H included) means to
offer the zeba leaving as the exclusive term for slaughter.19
This article, and Milgroms further articulation of his position on the passages under consideration as
presented in his commentary on Leviticus 17-26, are critical to the scholarly discussion. Most, if not all,
of the sources that I will be addressing from this point forward, as well as other sources that are not
included in this literature review, cite Milgroms positions and interact with them to a greater or lesser
degree.
In fact, the next article that we will consider appears in the same issue of the HUCA in 1976.20
Its author, H.C. Brichto, cites both of Milgroms articles, but his greatest interaction is with the latter
one. Brichto actually pursues two trails within his work, the first of which has a direct bearing on our
study. He labels this first endeavor under the heading of Animal slaughter, the meaning of [the]

1955.

17

Ibid., 1315.

18

Ibid., 13.

19

Ibid., 14.

20

H.C. Brichto, On Slaughter and Sacrifice, Blood and Atonement, HUCA 47 (1976):

9
Hebrew term kipper and their relation to one another.21 In the first portion of the treatment, Brichto
proceeds under the assumption that
Three biblical texts, when taken together, contribute elements to an understanding of
Scriptures view on the slaughtering of animals for food with particular reference to the
prohibition of human consumption of the animals blood. These texts, each assigned by
critical consensus to a different documentary provenience, have had a long history of
varied interpretations.22
The passages considered are Gen 9, 1 Sam 14, and, of special interest to us, Lev 17. Brichto
provides a translation and commentary on Lev 17:1-16, and reiterates the standard view that the first
unit, consisting of vv. 3-7, presents the prohibition against secular or profane slaughter, which he terms
as butchering (for )to distinguish it from slaughtering (for ).23 His asserts that
This unit also speaks to the immediate moment, rejecting a current practice and
instituting a new one which is to be permanent (the last sentence in v. 8). Every
butchering of an animal which takes place anywhere but at the shrine constitutes an act
akin to murder for which YHWH will exact the punishment expressed in being cut off
from kin-folk. Such acts now being perpetrated are characterized as slaughter-offerings
(zebm) to satyr-like demons. When the animal is brought to the shrine, however, there

21

Ibid., 19.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid., 2223, 36.

10
to be slaughtered, its blood sprinkled on the altar and its fat parts burnt upon it, this
constitutes a elmm slaughter-offering to YHWH and is altogether licit.24
Brichtos primary interest is in the consideration of kipper in connection with the blood of the animal.
With respect to Milgroms handling of kipper as expiate or ransom, Brichto registers his
disagreement, and pursues an alternative course, arriving at the term to compose or composition.
His evidence for this conclusion is the relationship of the verb kipper to kper, which he pursues in
some depth.25 Brichto also disagrees with Milgrom regarding any conflation of H and P in Lev 17,26 but
finds his earlier mentioned argument regarding the use of persuasive.27
The remainder of Brichtos article focuses on the issues of the relative dating of sources in the
Pentateuch, with special attention paid to the proposals of J. Wellhausen and Y. Kaufmann (which

24

Ibid., 24.

25

Ibid., 2736. On pp. 27-28 Brichto explains this choice of terminology, and its
relevance to the discussion, thusly: The biblical context of kper is most closely approximated by the
term composition in its legal sense, the settling of differences. An imbalance between two parties
(individuals, families, clans or larger social groupings) results from a damage or deprivation inflicted
upon one by the other. Equilibrium is restored by a process which consists of a transfer of something of
value (a person, an animal, or a commutation of such in the form of commodity or currency) from the
injuring party to the injured. The acceptance of this value-item by the latter, itself termed the
composition (as is the process itself also), serves to compose or settle the difference. In
Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11, p. 156, note 34, Milgrom commented that by his alternate treatment
of the blood associated with the sacrifice should not be taken as a denial that the blood is the
atoning force in all expiatory sacrifices. In response to this, Brichto asserts that We do deny any
particular atoning force to the blood as such. The atoning force of any expiatory sacrifice is in the
sacrificial rites in their entirety. (Slaughter and Sacrifice [HUCA 47], 29, footnote 22).
Ibid., 36, note 27; Milgrom, Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the
Composition of Deuteronomy, 14.
26

27

Brichto, Slaughter and Sacrifice, 36, note 27.

11
Brichto identifies as JED(H)P and JE(H)PD, respectively).28 This portion also has some bearing on our
inquiry, as Brichto interacts with Kaufmanns source chronology, as well as the interaction of material
from different sources. In response to Kaufmanns assertion that there was no entirely profane
slaughter before D,29 Brichto comments that This might well be trueif H intervened between I Sam.
14 and D.30 Brichtos further treatment of the dating of sources is helpful for framing the issues, if not
for resolving them.
I will comment briefly on B. Levines commentary on Leviticus.31 His interaction with Lev 17,
while not extensive, demonstrates an awareness of the interpretive issues arising both from within the
text, especially with respect to the use and meaning of the term , as well as from the perceived lack
of agreement with Deut 12. He states that
The significance of verses 3-4 has been debated since late antiquity. It was always
apparent that verses 3-4 could be taken to contradict the laws of Deuteronomy 12:15f.
The latter clearly state that the Israelites were allowed to slaughter animals for food
without recourse to the sacrificial altar, so long as they took care to drain the blood from
the slaughtered animal and refrained from eating blood. Such nonsacrificial slaughter of
animals for food became known in the later Jewish tradition as ha-shoet ullin, one
who slaughters nonsacrally.

28

Ibid., 38.

29

Ibid., 37.

30

Ibid., 40, see comment m.

31

Baruch A. Levine, Leviticus: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS
Translation, JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia: JPS, 1989).

12

Levine briefly relates the previously-mentioned dispute between the followers of R. Akiba and
R. Ishmael and the use of the verb , concluding that
It is proper, therefore, to view the verb sh--t in this verse as a term for sacrificing and to
conclude that there is basic agreement between Leviticus 17 and Deuteronomy 12.
Nonetheless, a large body of scholars, following Rabbi Ishmael, continues to regard
Leviticus 17 as representing an earlier stage in the history of Israelite worship, when all
slaughter of animals for food had to be of a sacral character.32
I am particularly interested in this last statement, as it cuts to the heart of the matter: should Lev
17 be seen as a prohibition against profane slaughter, and was this prohibition enacted before or after the
allowance for profane slaughter of Deut 12? These questions can be answered separately, but taken
together, they give rise to the question of whether or not there is at least some interdependence between
the two texts, and at most is one dependent upon or in active opposition to the other? If so, in which
direction is the influence, and why? These questions are left on the table as we move forward in our
literature review. We will see that the different authors have different approaches to answering some of
the questions, and, not surprisingly, different conclusions.
Before engaging with Levinson, we must turn to an essay by B. Schwartz on Lev 17s handling
of the issue of the consumption of blood.33 The major thrust of this work is to show that, in the same
way that psalms, narratives, and prophecies are examined to identify the formal, structural, and stylistic

32

Ibid., 113.

Baruch J. Schwartz, The Prohibitions Concerning the Eating of Blood in Leviticus


17, in Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel, ed. Saul M. Olyan and Gary A. Anderson, JSOTSup 125
(Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1991).
33

13
features of the text and determine the expressive function of each, in order to arrive at or near the
true historical-philological understanding of the texts meaning and significance, so also should texts
from the legal corpus be examined.34 Schwartz endeavors to confine his treatment of Lev 17 to the
rhetorical and literary aspects of the passage: context, structure, formulation, syntax, and terminology.35
In his later article on profane slaughter, which will be considered below, Schwartz references this essay
and his identification of the structure of Lev 17 in it.36 As such, this work will be considered in concert
with his later article, which builds upon material contained herein. Schwartz includes excellent
bibliographies of earlier works, including general Leviticus commentaries and articles and essays related
both to the prohibition of blood consumption in Lev 17,37 as well as the meaning of the verb .38 His
engagement with the whole text of Lev 17, seen as centering on the prohibition against the consumption
of blood in vv. 10-12,39 provides both helpful insights into the internal cohesion of the text
identification as well as some identification of and explanation for what it prescribes and proscribes.

34

Ibid., 34.

35

Ibid.

36

Schwartz, Profane Slaughter, 16, note 3.

37

Schwartz, Prohibitions, 36, note 1.

38

Ibid., 5152, note 2.

Ibid., 43. Here Schwartz asserts that The merest glance at the content leads to the
same conclusion: all five paragraphs deal with the legitimate and correct manner of disposing of the
blood of those animals which may be eaten. The first two speak of sacrificeable animalswhich, in the
view of this chapter, must indeed be sacrificedand the last two speak of animals which, though they
may be eaten, may not be sacrificed. At the center, between the first two and the last two, stands the
axiom upon which all four depend: that partaking of blood is prohibited. The first two lead to this
axiom and provide its rationale; the last two derive from this axiom and implement it.
39

14

Schwartz focuses particular and extensive attention on v. 11, however, where the motive for the
prohibition is presented.40
Building on his textual analysis in his Prohibitions essay, Schwartz went on to write what is,
arguably, one of the most important works I will address in this paper. As in his earlier work, Schwartz
interacts with the works of Brichto and Milgrom, among others. In this article, Profane Slaughter and
the Integrity of the Priestly Code, Schwartz argues for the following:
Leviticus 17:3-7, in its entirety, is a literary, thematic, and legislative unity, and not (as
held by most critics) a P redaction of an earlier law of H or (as has been recently
suggested) an H redaction of an earlier law of P. Further, it does not pertain solely to
sacrificial animals (as held by many exegetes); rather, it is an absolute prohibition of
profane slaughter of domestic quadrupeds. Finally, it cannot be reconciled with, and may
in fact be ignorant of the law in Deuteronomy 12. The two laws represent thoroughly
distinct approaches, and it is possible that neither one is a development of, or a reaction
to, the other.41
Schwartz helpfully provides a careful explanation of how he views H in relationship to P,42 and devotes
a large portion of the article attempting to demonstrate that the prohibition presented in Lev 17 is

40

Ibid., 4663.

41

Schwartz, Profane Slaughter, 15.

42

Ibid., 1516. Schwartz uses the term P to refer both generally to all P material,
including H, and to the portion of the P material which is not H material, which on p. 15 he calls
strictly-P material. On p. 16 he identifies H material as Leviticus 17-26 and other passages, located
elsewhere in P, that show evidence of belonging to the same stratum of the priestly work. I say
stratum because I do not view Leviticus 17-26 as a book or code in its own right, nor do I feel that
the H passages outside of Leviticus 17-26 can properly be called redaction. Instead, I consider it

15

actually consistent with other P material, such that H does not represent any innovation against P. He
does this by considering other passages, such as Lev 3:17 and 7:22-27, where P legislation likewise
prohibits the consumption of blood and suet reserving these for YHWH.43 He concludes that these
passages deal exclusively with the -sacrifice, and this remains, even in the purely-P texts, the
only recognized way to eat the flesh of slaughtered livestock.44 He reiterates this interpretation by
saying
In Ps cult-centered system, the legitimate way to slaughter and eat the flesh of oxen,
sheep, and goats is as a -sacrifice. Only if they die of themselves or are killed by
beasts may these species be eaten non-sacrificially, and even then only by non-priests and
provided they purify themselves from contamination.45
Schwartz then turns to consider the Deuteronomic Law of Deut 12. In doing so, he compares and
contrasts the views of the two schools, namely P and D, and makes an interesting assessment: in
context, he says
The uniqueness of the priestly view can best be appreciated in contrast to that of
Deuteronomy, as the Deuteronomic law permitting the profane slaughter of livestock
from the herd and flock (12:13ff) reflects completely opposite historical assumptions.
The two schools hold but one idea in common: the general notion that during the

preferable to speak of H as the continuation and completion of the pre-existing priestly work, primarily
of its legal portions. (Profane Slaughter, 15-16).
43

Ibid., 2632.

44

Ibid., 31.

45

Ibid., 38.

16
wilderness period, all slaughter of oxen, sheep, and goats was sacrificial. From this
point, there form two diverging lines which never meet again. For the priestly authors
were convinced that the slaughter of livestock became sacrificial after the building of the
tabernacle, and before this such slaughter was profane.46
Schwartz continues this treatment in some detail, and makes the interesting assertion that, for the
priestly authors, the change from profane to sacrificial slaughter came by legal enactment, the divine
command that all slaughter of sacrificeable animals was henceforth by definition a sacrifice, either to
YHWH or to the satyrs.47 This is certainly one way to read the text.
However, as we have seen from other works, and as I myself maintain, it is also possible to see
the issue that all sacrifices not presented before the lord as -sacrifices were de facto being
offered to satyrs. According to this view, the emphasis is on the where the sacrifice, as a sacrifice, is
presented and not on an animal being slaughtered without being presented as a -sacrifice. I will
leave the pursuit of that thesis to my next paper. For now, we must turn to the next work, which sees
some potential for explanation in the hermeneutics of legal innovation: I am, of course, referring to B.
Levinsons Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation.48
We have extensively discussed this work in our class, and I will not attempt a full review of
Levinsons material here. In short, Levinsons work attempts to show the purposeful appropriation of
significant words and phrases from earlier sources, and redaction of these same in order to support the

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation


(Oxford: OUP, 1997).

17

innovations pursued by the D redactors. I am not, at this point, attempting to confirm or refute
Levinsons major thesis. I am interested, however, in how his pursuit of this thesis leads him to engage
Lev 17 and comment on its interdependence with Deut 12.
In fairness, I should note that my research question arose as a result of my interaction with the
material covered in Levinson. In his comments on the relationship between Exodus 20:24 (the altar law)
and Deut 12:13-15, Levinson asserted that
For the first time in the history of Israelite religion a distinction has been forged between
cultic sacrifice (at an altar) and secular slaughter (not at an altar). That distinction would
have been a contradiction in terms to the author of the altar law. Prior to Deuteronomy,
all slaughter of domestic animalseven for the purposes of foodwas a ritual activity
necessarily carried out at an altar. There was, in other words, no functional distinction
between the sacrifice of sheep and cattle for cultic purposes and the slaughter of the same
animals for food. Both took place at an altar.49
In support of this assertion, Levinson makes reference in a footnote to the example of Saul and his army
in the field in 1 Sam 14:31-35, and Lev 17:1-9, which, he says, stipulates that all slaughter must take
place at an altar.50 At this point, the previously-noted objection51 of Brichto against Kaufmanns
similar assertion holds here: in response to Kaufmanns assertion that there was no entirely profane
slaughter before D,52 Brichto comments that This might well be trueif H intervened between I Sam.

49

Ibid., 33.

50

Schwartz, Profane Slaughter, 33, see note 21.

51

See p. 12.

52

Brichto, Slaughter and Sacrifice, 37.

18
14 and D.53 Is this, in fact, what Levinson believes to be true? It is not, as his treatment of the dating
of P and D demonstrates:
The date of the Priestly source in relation to Deuteronomy (and Ps relation to the
Holiness Code) remains in dispute. I follow the consensus that considers P and H, in
their present redaction, to follow Deuteronomy.54
Levinson references the views of both Y. Kaufmann and I. Knoll, and briefly discusses how these
proposals for source chronology relate to Wellhausens.55
This issue of the dating of sources is critical for Levinson, as it restricts the direction of possible
influence, dependency, and/or interaction. This is clearly seen in Levinsons comments on the interplay
between Lev 17:2-7 and Deut 12:
The revisionist editors of the Holiness Code rework Deuteronomy in a quite different
direction [from that of the Deuteronomistic editors]. They abrogate Deuteronomys
innovation of secular slaughter and reject Deuteronomys transformation of language,
denying to sacrifice any profane application (Lev 17:2-7). At the same time, in rolling
back Deuteronomys innovation, the authors of the Holiness Code presuppose and
confirm the more profound innovation of Deuteronomy: centralization itself.56

53

Ibid., 40, see comment m.

54

Levinson, Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation, 88, note 107.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid., 153154.

19
As such, Levinsons position is that profane slaughter was not allowed prior to D, allowed by the
innovation present in D, and then rescinded by H. The difficulty with this is that the evidence for the
prohibition of profane slaughter prior to H, and in particular Lev 17, is inconclusive. At least if one
assumes that H dates prior to D, then it can be argued that Lev 17 established the state where profane
slaughter was not allowed, and then D rescinded that. To argue that profane slaughter was outlawed
prior to D, and thus did not exist, based upon the evidence presented in Exodus and 1 Samuel, is
unconvincing. In fact, the next source which I will consider asserts, contrary to Levinson, that profane
slaughter did take place prior to Hs innovation.
In the section on Lev 17 in his commentary on Leviticus 17-22,57 J. Milgrom approvingly cites
Schwartzs proposed structure for the chapter,58 and notes that the text comprises five laws revolving
about a single pivot: the prohibition against ingesting blood.59
Milgrom comments on the rabbinic dispute between R. Akiba and R. Ishmael arising from Lev
17:3-4, and concludes that, with respect to the prohibition on profane slaughter, R. Ishmaels view
should prevail. However, he also notes that
R. Akibas position cannot be entirely rejected. The very fact that the prohibition against
nonsacrificial slaughter is the radical innovation of H implies that heretoforein the time
of Pnonsacrificial slaughter was practiced and approved..., provided that the slaughter
took place on an improvised stone and that the blood was drained.Thus R. Akibas

57

Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22: A New Translation with Introduction and


Commentary, AB 3A (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
58

Schwartz, Prohibitions, 4243; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1449.

59

Milgrom, Leviticus, 1448.

20
view, even if held invalid for the present MT (stemming from H), holds logically for the
prior historical situation prevailing under P.60
Milgrom maintains, as in his earlier works, that refers to the method by which the animal is
slaughtered: he makes clear, however, that does not include within its meaning the purpose for
which the slaughter is being performed.61 As such, could be and sometimes was associated with
nonsacrificial slaughter.62 For Milgrom, however, this is not a problem, as the use of in this text is
related directly to the ,63 and likely is, as well.64 Building on his perception that
can refer to both sacrificial and nonsacrificial slaughter, Milgrom says that
This fact leads to the conclusion that this law prohibits all common, nonsacrificial
slaughter and, instead, demands that meat for the table initially be offered up as a
sacrifice. Heretofore, those who could not readily make the journey to the sanctuary
would slaughter their animals at home. Not that they would have been permitted to drain
the animals blood on the ground (as later demonstrated by D, of Deut 12:16, 24), but
more likely, in keeping with Sauls remonstrances, (1 Sam 14:31-35), they would have
slaughtered their animals on a stone. Indeed, since H insists that the blood of game be

60

Ibid., 14521453.

61

Ibid., 1452, 1453.

62

Ibid., 1452. He cites Gen 37:31; Num 11:22; 1 Sam 14:32; and Isa 22:13 as examples
external to Leviticus, and Lev 14:5 and 50 as examples within P.
63

Ibid.

64

Ibid., 1454.

21
buried (vv. 13-14), one must assume that special slaughtering conditions, such as those
imposed earlier by Saul, would have been required for domesticated animals.65
As noted above, Milgroms position is contrary to that of Schwartz from Profane Slaughter:
Milgrom submits this opposing view to cross-examination:
If, however, it is assumed, as it is by most scholars (most recently Schwartz 1996b; 24),
that P (not just H) totally banned nonsacrificial slaughter after the construction of the
Tabernacle, what is H stating that is new? If H merely repeats an extant P law code, it is
offering no innovation at all! Indeed, once it is granted that H continues Ps assumed
policy of multiple sanctuaries, the only possible remaining innovation of this first law
(vv. 3-7) is the total abolition of common slaughter. Moreover, if H is not innovating but
illucidating the underlying intent of the lmn-law (Schwartz 1996b:32), why wasnt
all of chap. 17, which deals with the problems ensuing from consuming meat, appended
at the end of chap. 7, where it logically belongs?66
It should also be noted from this that Milgrom does not see in this text a program of cult centralization in
an approved sanctuary: this is borne out by observing his later comment on v. 7 that
the plain meaning of this declaration is that the ban on nonsacrificial slaughter is to be
permanent (a ban that Deut 12 nullifies), and that it is more logically the pragmatic
consequence of Hs assumption that there always will be multiple sanctuaries, none in
easy access of every Israelite.67

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid., 1455.

67

Ibid., 1463.

22

He contrasts his view with that of Schwartz, who regards the H legislation as idealistic, and not
particularly concerned with the enactment of its specific requirements.68 Milgrom strongly objects to
this characterization, saying that This categorical statement flies in the face of every H chapter, which,
as will be shown, grapples with reality, attempts to reform, and adds rationales at every turn in order to
convince its audience.69 The importance of this, as well as Milgroms previously-mentioned works,
to our inquiry should be evident to the reader.
The last source which I will be evaluating is U. Rterswrdens essay Deuteronomium 12,20
und Leviticus 17.70 The authors interest is the relationship between these two, and in particular

Schwartz, Profane Slaughter, 41. Schwartz statement is worth quoting here: More
importantly, priestly legislation, far from reflecting reality or making real efforts to shape it, is aimed at
expressing the law as it once was and should have remained. P, as distinct from D, is not programmatic;
its aim is not to convince and to reform but rather to concretize its beliefs in absolute, idealized,
utopian laws. The ideal, for the priestly legists, is not in the future. Rather, these laws, they recount,
were kept in full only once in Israelite history, during the blessed period when the tabernacle of YHWH
accompanied the Israelites from Mount Sinai to the land of Canaan. Thereafter they remained on the
books, but the priestly authors were well aware that they could be kept only imperfectly. The
prohibition of profane slaughter and the insistence that livestock be eaten only in the form of a
sacrifice is nothing more than an idealistic, unequivocal, uncompromising expression, translated into
terms reflecting the priestly idea of the ever-centralized cult, of what was in any case accepted custom:
the eating of livestock on special occasions onlywhich for the priestly legists could mean only one
thing: as a
-sacrifice, slaughtered at the entrance of the tent of meeting. (Profane Slaughter,
1996, p. 41).
68

69

Milgrom, Leviticus, 1463.

Udo Rterswrden, Deuteronomium 12,20-28 und Leviticus 17, in Gerechtigkeit


und Recht zu ben (Gen 18,19): Studien zur altorientalischen und biblischen Rechtsgeschichte, zur
Religionsgeschichte Israels und zur Religionssoziologie. Festschrift fr Eckart Otto zum 65. Geburtstag,
ed. Martin Arneth and Reinhard Achenbach, Beihefte zur ZABR 13 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010),
217226.
70

23
whether or not Lev 17 assumes the centralization of the cult.71 In the course of his exploration of the
relationship, Rterswrden touches on the issue of the abolition of profane slaughter in the text. He
acknowledges the interpretation which sees such a prohibition here not irrefutable.72 He outlines two
potential interpretations regarding the relationship between Lev 17 and Deut 12 (translation mine):
The Holiness Code assumes centralization of the cult, but does not abolish profane
slaughter. A recent advocate of this supposition is K. Grnwaldt.
The Holiness Code abolishes profane slaughter: however, it does not assume
centralization of the cult. A recent advocate of this supposition is J. Milgrom.73
Rterswrdens contribution takes into consideration several of the most recent works which I have
surveyed in this paper, including those of Schwartz and Milgrom.

71

Ibid., 223.

72

Ibid.

Ibid. He goes on to note, however, that the conclusion which no advocate of either
position would endorse, includes within it that Lev 17 assumes centralization of the cult and prohibits
profane slaughter. (Deuteronomium and Leviticus [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010], 224).
73

24

Conclusion
By the very nature of this assignment, I have been forced to be very restrictive in my selection of
sources to evaluate and interact with. I have tried to focus on those sources which were cited and
engaged by the majority of authors commenting solely on Lev 17, or on the relationship between Lev 17
and Deut 12. As I surveyed the available commentaries, articles, and essays, the works evaluated in this
paper presented themselves for consideration, both by volume of citations, as well as acknowledgment
that it was these sources which best represented the ongoing discussion around Lev 17. As I move to the
next paper, in which I will engage directly with the text of Lev 17 myself, I will, undoubtedly, engage
with some of the other sources not evaluated in this paper. Based on that engagement, I may conclude
that some of those sources should have been included in this literature review.
However, for the time being I feel that these dialog partners are the best to help me answer my
research question: Is it not possible that these warnings are, in the context of the passage, actually aimed
at the sacrifice, not the profane slaughter, of these animals apart from the centralized cult location? In
fact, what I will attempt to show in the next paper is that, beyond being simply possible, it is actually
probable that this is the aim of the passage. My reasons for pursuing this inquiry, and the subsequent
advancement of the thesis presented above, is to better understand what this passage means, in its
context, and the ramifications of this interpretation on other texts which seem to exhibit interdependence
with it.

25

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brichto, H.C. On Slaughter and Sacrifice, Blood and Atonement. HUCA 47 (1976): 1955.
Driver, S. R. An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. 1965 repr. Cleveland, Ohio:
World Publishing Company, 1897.
Levine, Baruch A. Leviticus: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation. JPS
Torah Commentary. Philadelphia: JPS, 1989.
Levinson, Bernard M. Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation. Oxford: OUP,
1997.
Milgrom, Jacob. Leviticus 17-22: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB
3A. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
. Profane Slaughter and a Formulaic Key to the Composition of Deuteronomy. HUCA
47 (1976): 117.
. Prolegomenon to Leviticus 17:11. JBL 90, no. 2 (1971): 149156.
Rterswrden, Udo. Deuteronomium 12,20-28 und Leviticus 17. In Gerechtigkeit und Recht
zu ben (Gen 18,19): Studien zur altorientalischen und biblischen Rechtsgeschichte, zur
Religionsgeschichte Israels und zur Religionssoziologie. Festschrift fr Eckart Otto zum
65. Geburtstag, edited by Martin Arneth and Reinhard Achenbach, 217226. Beihefte zur
ZABR 13. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010.
Schwartz, Baruch J. Profane Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly Code. HUCA 67
(January 1, 1996): 1542.
. The Prohibitions Concerning the Eating of Blood in Leviticus 17. In Priesthood and
Cult in Ancient Israel, edited by Saul M. Olyan and Gary A. Anderson. JSOTSup 125.
Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1991.

You might also like