CHAPTER TWELVE Warfare and Its Approximations Certain realities and norms in the international relations of Latin America and che Caribbean have been coercive and violent in nature. This chapter examines those re- alies in the three categories. Warfare is classified in ewo ways: (1) interstate wars fiom the nineteenth century tothe present, involving the ehreat o use of force in the regional subsystem; and (2) internal warfare since the 1950, cartied out by subna- tional guertilla groups with transnational connections, o which the target states and external sates have responded. Efforts at conflict resolution in both categories of warfare are pare of the analysis The idea of wat is extrapolated to include the third category: the coercive diplomacy manifested in military intervention, espionage, subversion, and covert action. (Other kinds of coercive diplomacy are taken up in later chapters.) The three phenomena in fact overlap in content, a reflection of the hazy boundary between open warfare and coercive diplomacy. ‘THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT Violence in the Latin American subsystem has arisen essentially from five sets of ‘causes: (1) boundary and territorial disputes, (2) competition for resources, (3) im- perial and other power disputes, (4) ideological competition, and (5) migration of people and goods. Specific cases of conflicr often involve combinations of these Boundary and territorial conflicts have loomed large as special interest in the foreign policy of almost every Latin American state. Boundary or border disputes flow from disagreements over frontiers berween contiguous sovereignties. They have been prevalent within the region to the extent that every Latin American state with a common land frontier with another has been in conflict; only Caribbean island- states with no contiguous neighbors have avoided such quarrels, Boundary or border disputes are related to territorial disputes, in that they may be part of larger contro- 317ais WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS verses involving sovereign claims. Tertorial conflicts are usually disputes over the possession of land terrain but may extend to oceanic rights. Border and territorial {sputes had eheic root in the Latin American colonial period, and several have per- sisted until recently. Undetermined national boundaries at independence and rival state ambitions gave rise to patterns of strife continuing to the present day. Many have been resolved or suspended, bus some remain potential sources of serious con- flice Inter-American war, the most intense form of subsystem conflict, has been as sociated with boundary and territorial questions. The terran in contention was in some instances of strategic or economic worth and in others of dubious valu; they always had a highly nacionalise conten. Resource conflicts have become increasingly important in furthering national de- velopment and economic well-being. Although the disputes involve land or ocean rights, the energy, strategic, ot food resources are primarily a stake (such as petro- leum, natural gas, minerals, hydroclecticty, and fish). Both classic imperialism and simpler projections of state power ate associated with balance-of power systems and usually include questions of prestige or some other ver~ sion of “national honot.” They have been prominently pursued by the external great powers. A series of European military interventions and other forms of power politics ‘occurred in all parts of Latin America throughout the nineteenth century. U.S. inter- vention in dhe circum-Caribbean has been a continuing twentieth century reality. So- vier attempts at subversion were prevalent beeween the two world wars, as have been US. covert activities since World War Il, For chose Latin American states with power ambitions, border, territorial, and oceanic disputes are related to the geopolitica-srate- gic thrust for territorial expansion and regional influence. Certain nonstate actors also Ste source of conflict, Conspicuous examples are guerilla warfare since the 1950s and the violent aspects ofthe drug trafic from che late 1970s; others include activites by international busines enterprises and multinational corporations. (Often this competition for power has been intertwined with ideological conflict The ideological category goes beyond simple power considerations, however, to deal swith the struggle to impose or resist the imposition of political, economic, and social ‘allics The principal rivalies have been berween dictatorships and democracies, civil jan and military regimes, and democratic capitalism and various forms of Marxism. ‘Conflicts arising from the migration of people and goods are also multifaceted. A majority ofthe ninereenth-cencury European interventions were responses to prob- lems arising from commerce, investments, and immigrants. Foreign investors and resident aliens appealed to their governments for redress when Latin Americans de~ faulted on their debts or mistreated foreign persons and property. Those govern- ‘ments demanded indemnity from Latin American states and at times threatened or tied military force to gain compliance. Other migration confits that have resulted from strains caused by strife involve che movement of people across frontiers for eco- nomic or political reasons, The flow of illicit drugs has lead to considerable violence con the part of traffickers and to contentious interstate relations.\PPROXIMATIONS over the il conflicts are usually disputes a conmne ights. Border and titra several have pet can colonial period, and several wal boundaries at independence and tival fife continuing to the present day. Many sain potential sources of serious con © fem oats confit, has bee The terain in contention was in enh of dubious value they vorth and in others 1 in furthering national de- singly importa a though the disputes involve land or o¢e saa er at sake (uc 3 > ity and fish soa ane pve scat wih tojections of at wie fade questions of prestige or some i ee ued he cel aor ether re of pow: pls veghout the nineteench cencuy. US, inter ee twentieth cencuy rei. So- ce ho wold ah hve BN ce ce ee ed we elle ered wea i Zn i Sc capitalism and various forms of Marxism, ; of people and goods are also. malifaced A ae ae interventions were responses to prob: we Ame foote operty. Those gover” fc rn ds = Oe min a end co conte entious interstate relations. WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS. 319 NINETEENTH-CENTURY PATTERNS AND CASES, Mexico and International Conflict In the nineteenth century, Mexico was especially vulnerable to external intrusions ‘These intrusions involved military intervention, occupation, and grat loss of terri tory at the hands ofthe United States and Europeans. The last US. intervention in ‘Mexico ended in 1914. Britain in 1808 was poised to send an invading force ashore bbut aborted the effort because ofthe necessities of the Napoleonic Wars. Spain sent an expedition to Mexico in 1829 in response to the expulsion of Spanish citizens, bu ic was repelled by disease and the Mexican army. In 1838-1839 France block aded and bombarded Vera Cruz and forced payment of claims to its nationals; the action was dubbed the Pastry War because of the enormous claim submited by a French pastry chef, But the most critical occurrences for Mexico were war with the United States and, later, occupation by France. ‘Mexico’ relations with the United States were dominated by boundary and terri- torial questions in the nineteenth century. The frontier between the United States and Mexico had not been fied when the ltter won its independence; an 1819 treaty, reaffirmed in 1828, agreed to the Sabine River as a boundary. The United States, however, expanding westward across the continent to realize “manifest des tiny,” wanted to designate the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) as the new boundary but could not gain Mexican agreement? ‘The Mexican government generally ignored its sparsely inhabited northern tert tory and granted “Anglo” setlers the right to form a colony. US. citizens who began to serle therein the 1820s eventually clashed with the central Mexican government. In 1836 Texas declared its independence and defeated a Mexican army sent to put it down. Texans wanted to be annexed as a U.S. state, but statchood was denied, largely because ofthe slavery isue. They thereupon established the independent Re. public of Texas, which the United States recognized in 1837. Despite the opposition of Britain and France, who wanted Texas to serve as a buffer between the United States and Mexico, the United States finally made Texas a state in 1845, Continued disputes over the extent of the Texas tertory after US. statehood re- sulted in the U.S.-Mexican war (18461848). Mexico sud that Texas ended at the Nue- <= Rive: the United States claimed that Teaas ended atthe Rio Grande. Full-scale wat- fare ensued, ending with complete U.S. mastery"The war was settled by the Tieay of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848. Under its terms, Mexico quit is claims to Texas, agreed on the Texas boundary fxed atthe Rio Grande, and ceded the rest of is northern territory from Texas to the Pacific Ocean, The United Srates paid Mexico $15 million The vastness ofthe new acquistion—almost haf of Mexico’ tet ¥tory—did nor satisfy some U.S. expansionist. An “all-Mexico” movement demanded [total annexation, but their ambitions were frustrated by the slavery issue. In 1853 the US. Minister to Mexico, James Gadsden, negotiated the purchase from Mexico ofthe * Gila River valley in southern Arizona and New Mexico for $10 milion.320 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS, Mexico was rocked by civil war beginning in 1857, and the government of Benito Jusrer in 1861 dedared bankuptcy and repudiated is foreign debts, France, Britain, and Spain collaborated to coerce Mexico to honor their nationals’ heavy claims, Some of which were fraudulent; their combined flet landed troops at Vera Cruz. ‘The following yeas, in 1862, Britain and Spain reached agreements with Mexico and withdrew, Napoleon Ili had much more in mind, however: He wanted to establish a French empire in Mexico in order to enhance French commerce, contain U.S. cont- rental expansion, and curry favor with the church in France by punishing anticler- cal Mexican liberals. Trench troops occupied the capital, and France formed che Empire of Mexico, with prince Archduke Maximilian of Austria, a Roman Catholic, as the chief of Tate. In 1865, atthe end of is own civil wat, the United States, which had eontin- ted to recognize the Judtez government, demanded that French forces be with= drawn, Napoleon IIT removed French troops from Mexico, not only because of the US. position but also because of Mexican forces that continued their resistance out- side the capital cry because of opposition in France, and because ofa tenuous poli. fcal postion in Europe. With French miliary support gone, Judes army deposed ‘Maximilian; he was convicted by court martial and executed, “The 1848 peace treaty between Mexico and the United Staes did not end their border fiction, Numerous incidents continued ro occu into the ewenteth century. US. Marines landed in Mexico in 1913, as the Mexican revolution took an excep- tionally vilene turn. U.S, forces took Vera Cruzin 1914 and hed ie fr almost seven tnonths; General John J. Pershing led an expedition into northern Mexico in an ua Successful attempt to capture General Francisco (Pancho) Villa. This was che last US. (orother foreign) military intervention in Mexico. Southern Cone Conflicts TThe nineteenth century witnessed a series of major South American wats or threats ‘of war and power struggles Involving in one way or another all ofthe subregional seate, the wars were par of a larger expression of Southern Cone power politics and feopulieal thinking The mos intense leadewhip rivalry was among Argentina, spre, and Chile the “ABC” states. Southern Cone conflicts lf legacy of teri ialand boundary disputes, power struggles leading to war and threats of wat, es tent claims of sovereignty, competition for resources, and enduring xenophobia ro- ward neighbors. “The rivalry berween Argentina and Brazil for control of the Rio de la Plata region cenvered on Uruguay in the ealy national period. Porcugal and Spain had contested {he region for ewo centuries in the colonial era asthe major point of contac betwoen their empites. Argentina unsuccessfully tied to maintain the viceroyalty of La Plata lunder ie control during the wars for independence, and afterward it actively med- ‘dled in the other platine states. Brazil, after geining independence in 1822, pursued fan aggresive policy of “manifest destiny,” clashing with Argentine ambitions.S APPROXIMATIONS : ima however: He wanted to establish a and France formed che Empire of M ‘Austria, a Roman Catholic, as the chief of i war, the United States, which had contin- ent, demanded that French forces be with troops ftom Mexico, not only because of the ‘an forces that continued thet resistance out ‘om in France, and because ofa tenuous poit- rilitary support gone, Juirez’s army deposed martial and executed. and the United States did not end their dntinued to occur into the twentieth century. 13, as the Mexican revolution took an excep era Cruz in 1914 and held i for almost seven ‘expedition into northem Mexico in an un- Tianna Chancho) Vile Thr wa ea intion in Mexico. 1 Cone Conflicts aries of raj South American wars or threats Flnone way o another all ofthe subregional {pression of Southern Cone power politics and whe leadership ivalry was among Argentina, oath Cone efi ie alga of or tele leading to war and threats of wa, persis sa our, and enduring xenophobia to ata region {Brazil for control of the Rio de la P mal period, Portugal aid Spain had contested nil era asthe major point of contac between lly wied to maintain the viceroyalty of La Plata t independence, and afterward it atively med- |. after gaining independence in 1822, pursued estiny.” clashing with Argentine ambitions. WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 321 Uruguayan patriots claimed independence from both Spain and Portugal and se- ceded from Bucnos Aires, In 1822 Brazil annexed Uruguay as the Cisplatine province ofthe Brailian empire. In 1825 Unuguay declared its independence from Brazil; Argentina entered the dispute on the side of the rebels; and an indecisive three-year war ensued. Britain, its commercial interests in the area disrupted, imer. vened to force a serlement. Ic pressured Argentina and Brazil into sigaing the Tieaty of Montevideo (1828), in which both countries agreed to recognize Uruguayan in dependence so as to create a buffer state beeween them, But attempts to control ‘Unguay continued throughous the nineteenth century, and intermittent Uruguayan civil war invited Argentine and Brazilian intervention and claims for terzcory. ‘What Uruguayans called the Great War began in 1836. An alliance berween Ar- gentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas and an Uruguayan political faction, the Blan= ‘05, conducted a siege of Montevideo from 1841 to 1851 agains another faction, the Colorados, allied with anti-Rosas Argentines. From 1845 to 1850 French and British naval units blockaded Buenos Aires and hus supported the Montevideans After the withdrawal, Brazil joined the anci-Rosis alignment, parly because it was asoured of a favorable setdlement ofits Uruguayan boundary, and was soon victor. ous. In 1851 Brazil forced a treaty in which Uruguay gave up almost half es etitory along the northern frontier ‘The Paraguayan War (1865-1870), known in Paraguay as the War ofthe Tiple Alliance, resulted fiom the alliance of the Uruguayan Colorados with Argentina and Brazil to resist the expansionist moves of Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano Lépes A Blanco government, having poor relations with both Argentina and Bra, had esponded to Paraguayan overtures fora common policy in 1862. Lépex had in mind a Paraguayan-led empire of central South American sates, including Uruguay and Bolivia, Paraguay invaded Argentina and Brazil near their Uruguayan borders, and in May 1865 the triple alliance of those two states plus Uruguay was formed. A five-year war resulted, ending in March 1970 with Paraguay's complete defeat, Mose ‘of ts male population was killed, and Argentina and Brazil took portions of it tere. tory. Paraguay, no longer a power contender, was eft as a bufler stare between its neighbors Following the movements for independence, the entire boundary between Ar- gentina and Chile from north to south was disp Provide forthe frontier to run along the “highest peaks" ofthe Andes, dividing che ‘watershed. This provision was interpreted dilferently by each state. War wae nan, rovly averted over a portion ofthe northern frontier known as the Puna de Atacama, Aer failing to reach agreement through direct diplomacy, Chile and Argentine agreed to arbitration by the United States. In 1899 the U.S. arbiter divided the dis. Pred teritory, and the decision was accepted by both sides. Pars of the southern boundary remained in dispute, however. The 1881 treaty had divided Tierra del Fuego beeween the two states, giving Argentina sovereignty over Patagonia, and Chile sovereignty over the Stra of Magellan (which Chile agreed to neutrlive), Dis- ‘agreements then arose over the precise demarcation, and in 1896 the disputants ured. In 1881 2 vague sertlementam WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS turned to the British crown for arbitration, King Edward VII handed down his award in 1902. Important conflicts on the west coast of South America that developed in the carly independence petiod continued in some respects into the latter twentieth een- tury. Chile intent on dominating the Pacific coast, pursued aggresive policies to- ward Bolivia and Peru, who in 1836 formed an alliance. Chile, seeing a threat to its economic interests and strategic position, immediately went co war against the Peru Bolivian Confederation. Argentina did the same in 1937, bu, feling less threatened than Chile, played a minor military role. Chile invaded Peru and defeated the com- bined Peru-Bolivian army in 1839, bringing an end to the Confederation. ‘The War ofthe Pacific (1879-1883) was a particularly serious conflict. In 1866 Chileans had discovered vast nitrate deposits in the barren Atacama Desert along the £800-mile Bolivian Pacific coastline, where few Bolivians had setded. In 1874 Bolivia, ceded a portion of its Atacama territory to Chile. The Chileans mined and exported the nitrates under an agreement with Bolivia until 1878, when a dispute over taxcs led to military confrontation. When Chile attacked the Bolivian descr regions in 1879, Peru entered the war on the side of Bolivia. Some major actions were fought at sea, where Chile had supremacy over Peru. The Chilean army invaded Peru and sacked and occupied Lima. U.S. and European governments unsuccessfully at- tempted co mediate a truce. Chile finally defeated the Peru-Bolivian alliance. In the Anon Treaty of October 20, 1883, Peru ceded its province of Tarapact to Chile. Chile was to occupy the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica for a ten-year period, after which a plebiscite was to determine their ature status. Chile and Peru could not agree on the terms of the plebiscite, however, and its continuous post- ponement after 1893 embittered their relations fr the next thirty-Five years. A com- promise was finally reached through U.S. good offices in the Washington Protocol of 1929. Chile annexed Arica and returned Tacna to Per. ‘Chile and Bolivia signed a truce on April 4, 1884, which provided for an indef. nite armistice and for Chilean occupation of Atacam. In 1888 Chile unilaerally rade the Atacama territory its province of Antofagasta. A ceay formally ending the war was not signed until October 20, 1904. Under its provisions Bolivia gave up the tertitory, thereby confirming the loss of its coastline and acces to the sea. In recurn, Chile indemnified Bolivia and agreed to build a railroad from La Paz to Arica for Bolivian use. Chile later allowed Bolivia to use Arica asa fiee port, but Bolivia never abandoned the idea of regaining its own Pacific port. In 1920 it appealed to the League of Nations fora seapore on the grounds that the 1904 treaty was null and void, but the League refused to intervene.* "The pesistent Argentine British Falldands/Malvinas dispute began with Argentinas ndependence. The Falkland Islands, known in Argentina as the Islas Malvinas and lo- cated some 300 miles east of southern Argentina, had an ambiguous early history that complicated later claims to its ownership. After discovery of the islands in 1592 France, Spain, and Britain made contending colonial claims. In 1820, Argentina (then the United Provinces of La Plata) took possession based on rights of succession to(OXIMATIONS King Edward VIL handed down his outh America that developed i the repets inc the ler twentieth n> toast, pursued aggressive policies to- walzne, Chile sing threat 8 rediately went to war against che Peru- wen 1937, but ing ls threatened invaded Peru and defeated the comm mend uncon Tn 185 wih barren Aracama Desert along the Mgolivans bad seed. In 1874 Bolivia ie The Chileans mined and exported a 1678, when dpe sacked the Bolivian dt gins in ii Some msjorscon wee ought Phe Chan sy invaded Fe an penn governmens usoeesuly vated the Peru-Bolivian alliance. sa rvs of Tap ines of Tacna and Arica for a ten-year me he Rta at, Chile and Pest a even and its continuous Pos ot ofces in the Washington Protocol oan a hich provided for an inde A cae civ ; a, A treaty formally ending the aa porions Baa eu Be Staineand ase othe en (kd aon rom La Pc Ai or se Arca as fre pot, but Boi neve Pace porn 1920 i appeal the rounds that the 1904 teary was nl cduMalias dispute began wih Ageing’ min Argentina as ‘the Islas Malvinas anc a ra ad an ambiguous cay biory eer discovery of the islands in 1592 +P onal claims. In 1820, Argentina (chen 8 ison based igh of sucesion WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 33 Spanish territory. Briain later claimed ownership. At the same time, private US. seal ing vessels were trespasing on the islands. The Argentine governor seized three of the vesels, which opened up a controversy berween Argentina and the United Sates, dur- ing which the USS Lexington desttoyed the Argentine colony on the Malvinas. Britain ‘ook advantage of the siuation by occupying the islands with military force in 1833. A British naval unie drove off an Argentine secement and established effective British contol forthe next century and a half. Argentina never accepted British rue, and ic regularly protested and asserted its own sovereign claims ‘TWENTIETH-CENTURY PATTERNS AND CASES THROUGH WORLD WAR Il USS. Caribbean Imperialism Daring the fis chicd of the twentieth cencuy, the United States pursued imperal- ism in the circum-Caribbean.* Its behavior was based especially on geopolitical strategic calculations combined with economic moxives and, sometimes, democratic purposes. The beginnings of U.S. imperialism in the region date fiom the U.S. vie- tory in its ten-week war with Spain. In addition to colonizing Puerto Rico, the United Staes intervened on numerous occasions and in various ways in seven states beeween 1898 and 1934—Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala Intervention vatiously assumed the forms of toop land ings and miliary occupations, the establishment of protectorates, electoral spervi sion, and the cretion of customs reeiverships. Most of the interventions were ca. fied out with concer for the security of the Panama Canal, as it was being constructed and then went into operation. In che initial stages of imperialism, the United States asserted its new world power with litle hesitation in order to atain ‘anal rights and to sccure the Caribbean approaches to the Central American ith. ‘mus. A secondary motive later developed —intervention in the name of democracy and antidicraorship, Some interventions occurred to protect the lives and property of US. citizens. For atime, the focus was on the protection of capital investments (Dollar Diplomacy’) US. imperialism increased after the conclusion of the lst European mila inte vention in sovereign Latin America state—Veneaucla in 1902-1903, Europeans re siding in Venezuela had been heavily damaged in a civil war, bu dictator Cipriano (Castro excluded foreign clans. External sates issued ultimatum and; when they were ‘not met, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy blockaded Venezuela in concert. The United States had previously stressed that the Monroe D. grandizement, octtne forbade territorial ag- bbut ie did not protect any state against punishment for fiscal miscon- duct. Afer the blockade began, the United States succesflly pressured the European states to accept arbitration of thir grievances, In 1905 President Roosevelt issued his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and the United Stats thereafter engaged in its own Caribbean intervention, largely in order to preempt that of the Europeans314 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS US. troops were continuously based in Panama from 1902 to 1914 during the construction of the canal. They intervened there during local disturbances from 1918 to 1920 and in 1925. The United States exercised its rights of intervention in Cuba by establishing a provisional military government from 1906 to 1909; it also briefly sent in troops in 1912 and again in 1916 (with some troops remaining until 1922) and threatened ro do so again on numerous other occasions. U.S, forces inter- vened in the Dominican Republic in 1905 to restore order; another troop interven- tion in 1916 was followed by the esablishment of a U.S, military government that lasted until 1924. U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua ftom 1912:to 1925 and from 1926 until 1933, Marines were sent to Haiti in 1914, After a brief withdrawal they returned in 1915 and remained until 1934. U.S. troops were in and out of Hon duras between 1903 and 1925. A brief military intervention occurred in Guatemala in 1920 to protect U.S. diplomats and private interests during political disturbances. ‘The Taft administration (1909-1913) began the U:S. practice of "Dollar Diplo- macy” in the Caribbean region. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox manipulated USS. investments and loans by encouraging financial groups and consortia to extend them in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. This private capital in- volvement led to the landing of U.S. Marines to protect U.S. lives and property. The United States pursued arms control in Cuba and Nicaragua (and Mexico) through supervision of sales and embargoes. US. “fiscal intervention” took place under U.S.- administered customs receiverships in the Dominican Republic beginning in 1905, in Nicaragua from 1911, and in Haiti starting in 1916, The receiverships involved USS. fisel control of the economies and were designed to bring about responsible management and to arrange fora restructuring of international debts. ‘US. armed forces carried out “civie ation” projects during their occupations of Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and che Dominican Republic. Under the aegis of “vie action,” internal order was restored, legal systems were reformed, highways ‘were constructed, public education was improved, and sanitation and public health programs were instituted. Public schools were constructed, teachers were tained, and public administration programs were developed. Little political development took place, however, President Woodrow Wilson added the element of proxdemocracy and antidicta- corship to US. interventions. I should be emphasized that military actions were not inidally engaged in order to bring down dictatorships or promote consticutional- democratic practices, although the refusal to recognize new governments was So mo- tivated. Once military occupation was begun, however, U.S. Marines trained, orga- nized, and commanded the military and police forces in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, in che hope that they would be converted to apolitical forces, and protect future constitutional governments upon the withdrawal of U.S. forces (a hope totally unrealized). The United States coricurrently supervised elections prior to ending occupations. Such elections were held in Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Hit, and Nicaragua. These Wilsonian practices were continued by Presi- dents Harding, Coolidge, and, fora time, Hoover.APPROXIMATIONS 1 Panama from 1902 to 1914 during the fed there during local disturbances from tates exercised its rights of intervention in Y government from 1906 to 1908; it also 2 1916 (with some troops remaining undl merous other occasions. U.S. forces inter- 5 oreoe onder; another toop interven, ihmene of a U.S. military government that 1 Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925 and from in 1914. Aer ri itsowal hey 1d out of Hon- 134, USS. troops were in an ita inenenionacoed in Guten iat interes during pita diurbances began the U.S. practice of “Dollar Diplo- y of State Philander C. Knox manipulated tg financial groups and consortia to extend ti and Nicaragua. This private capital in- sines to protect U.S. lives and proeryThe Saba and Nicaragua (and Mexico) throug! Therein ork ender US ye Dominican Republic beginning in 1905, ing in 1916. The resversip involved dd were designed to bring about responsible cruring of international debs. scion’ projects during ther occupation of hhe Dominican Republic. Under the aegis o te, legal stems wee formed, highways improved, and sanitation and public healt seers consauced caches were cine tere developed. Little politica development the element of pro-democracy and antidicta- be emphasized tha military actions were not wen dicetorhips or promote constitutional sal to recognize new governments Was 50 Begun hover, US Maines ined ore id police forees in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the t they would be converted to apolitical forces vaments upon the withdrawal of US forces (a Sats coneurendysupesied eleiont pre ‘were held in Cuba, Panama, the Dominican + Wilsonian practices were continued by Presi- me, Hoover. WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 325 The United States moved away fiom interventionist policies beginning in 1930, President Hoover reduced the number of tops in the Caribbean, and President Roosevelr largely bated his Good Neighbor Policy on nonincervencion, The last troop contingents left Nicaragua in 1933 and Haid in 1934, leaving no U.S. troops in Latin America forthe first time since 1919. No further direct miliary interven: tions occurred uncil 1965, when forces were sent to the Dominican Republic. Prsi- dent Roosevelt resisted State Department pressures for armed intervention against the repressive Machado dictatorship in Cuba in 1933, and the 1903 teary with ‘Cuba giving the United States interventionist rights was abrogated in 1934 (the United States retained the Guantanamo naval station). Likewise, the United States concluded a teary with Panama in 1936, giving up tights to incervene in Panaman- jan affairs. The last customs receiverships, in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, were finaly losed in 1941 Soviet Subversion ‘Aficr the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union attempted the contradic- tory policy of simultaneously creating loyal Conimaanist parties in Latin America and establishing traditional diplomatic relations. Aier Uniguay recognized the So- viet Union in 1926, the Soviet embassy in Montevideo served as Latin American headquarters forthe Comintern and the point of dissemination for revolutionary Propaganda, Soviet efforts to stimulate armed insurrections through focal Commu nist parties were atempred in Mexico (1929), Argentina (1930), Chile (1931), El Salvador (1932), Chile (1932), Cuba (1933), and Brail (1935). The insurectons, allof which were suppressed led to outlawing the Communist parties and rupturing relations with the Soviet Union—by 1939 all diplomatic relations between Latin ‘American states and the Soviet Union had been severed. Soviet policy was much ‘mote cautious aftr 1935; Moscow instructed local Communist partis to participate in popular font coalitions Inter-Latin American Conflict Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both located on the island of Hispaniols, viewed each other with suspicion? Afer the Dominican Republic ejected Haitian occupation in 1844, border conflicts were frequent, aggravated by mutual racial nities. In 1874 che wo staes agreed co a vague boundary, which was co be dlin- cated by subsequent negotiations, but ic remained undefined for the next six decades, and frequent border cashes occured. In 1934 and 1935 the presidents of the owo states exchanged viss and announced that all border difficulties had been resolved. As it tuned ou, the difficulties were more intense chan ever. In Octobet 1937 Dominican miliary forces killed atleast 12,000, and pechaps as many a 25,000, Haitian peasants near the border, Little doubs exists that Dominicen dida- tor Rafael Trujillo was esponsible, A sewlement was reached using the peacekeeping326 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS machinery of the Inter-American System, although the papal nuncio accredited to both states was in fact responsible for the settlement signed on January 31, 1938. The Dominican Republic agreed to pay $750,000 as indemnity to, Hsti and to fix responsibility for the “incident.” "The Chaco War berween Bolivia and Paraguay from 1932 to 1935 was an espe- ally iolene and bloody conflict. The war originated in disputes over undetermined tational frontiers The area of che Chaco Boreal, a triangle of tetitory bound by the Pilcomayo, Paraguay, and Parapet rivers, was a void area until boch Paraguay and Bolivia took increased interest in it. Paraguay desired to recover some of is lost na~ tional prestige after the War of che Tipe Alliance; and Bolivia, after the War of the Pacific, looked for an outlet to the Atlantic chrough ports on che Paraguay River. Several frontier treaties were signed, but none went into effect. In 1906 Bolivia be- gan building small fore inthe disputed region, and Paraguay followed suit. Armed ashes in December 1928 led to full-scale war in 1932. Numerous attempts at me- ddation by elements of the League of Nations and ofthe Inter-American System, and in American states acting individually and in concert, failed to sere the tetito- tial isues of to bring the subsequent violence to a halt. By 1935 Paraguay was in ‘Control of most of the Chaco and, with both ses exhausted, a truce was agreed to. "A prolonged and difficlt peace conference worked fiom 1935 until 1939 before ic was able to arrive ata peace seclement, Argentina tok che initiative co organize the proces, and the meetings took place in Buenos Airs. The patieipants were the other Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay) the biter bllgerents, Bolivia and Paraguay; and the United States, which bad been Closely involved in prior peace efforts. The peace treaty adopted in 1938 gave Paraguay, as military vitor, most ofthe disputed acs; Bolivia gained port facilites and tights of passage through Paraguay. The financial and human costs for both sides were huge, Some 50,000 to 60,000 Bolivians and 35,000 ro 40,000 Paraguayans had died in the war. Peru and Ecuador had serious boundary disputes that dated from their earliest rela- tions? Upon independence they both climed che sparsely inhabited Amazon province of Jaen and Mayns lying othe orth ofthe Maran River (which venta tly flows inco the Amazon River. Miliary movements by both sides occured in the darca between July 1941 and January 1942, but no major fighting took place. The ‘United States, which entered World War Il in December 1941, forced a settlement of the dispute and its destabilizing influences in South America, An agreement vas reached in Rio de Janciro on January 29, 1942, in which Ecuador (che weaker bellger- tno) accepted Peruvian sovereignty over the disputed terieory and che United States, ‘Argentina, Chile, and Brazil were named guarantor sates. A mixed Ecuadorian- Peruvian Boundary Commission was subsequently appointed to fx the boundary but, affer about 95 percent of the frontier had been matked, Bewador protested chat i did thot conform tothe agreement, and the commisions work was halted. The dispute re- rained unresolved, and violence was renewed on several occasions (see below); in each jnstance the guarantor states named in 1942 undereook their third-party roleAPPROXIMATIONS aalugh the papa uni cdi Fee snd on mary 3, 1538 + $750,000 as indemnity to Haiti and to fix: y 5 was an expe {paraguay from 1932 r0 193: aoe in dptes oer undermined Bove single of teritory bound by d wes avoid atea until both Paraguay and gy deed wo ecve some of is on sllance; and Bolivia, afer the Wa of the Tanic through ports on the Paraguay Rive. T none vent int effect. In 1906 Bolivia be- a region, and Paraguay fllowed sit. Armed Sarin 1932. Numerous auempts a me- Santen em ad in concer, failed to sete the tert ie By 1993 Pan sn hbo sides exhausted, a euce was apred (0. “ference worked fom 1935 uni 1939 before vane, Argentina cook the iniative wo organize wns he The pee eee rina, rail Chil, Peru, and Uruguay); the nd the United States, which had best he pace teny adopt in 1938 eve Ce dpued faces disputed ate; Blivia gained po a fe Fnancia and human cost for both sides 7 olivians and 35,000 ro 40,000 Paraguayans 1m ther earliest tea ary disputes that dated fro se wo ded the spay inhabited the nih ofthe Maran River (hich event itary moverens by both side oer in he 71942, bueno major hing rok place The {Yar in December 1941, forced a setement of fluences in South America. An agreement was 25,1942 in which Ecuador (he weer blige ver the disputed tertory, and che United Staes named guarantor sates Amie Edna ubequeny appointed wo fx the boundary: bu i had been marked, Bouador protested that ic did he omision work was aed The dpa renewed on several occasions (se below in ea jn 1942 undereook their third-party role WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS a7 Colombia and Peru signed a treaty in 1922, fixing the boundary berween them in the Amazon River Basin, In 1930 the demarcation was fixed by a bilateral commis. sion. Under this plan, Colombia occupied a stip of tetitory called the "Leticia ‘Trapezium,” which included the Amazon River port town of Leticia. In September 1932, an iregular Peruvian band seized the town by force and ejected the Calom- bian officials. The Peruvian government a fist repudiated the act, but later it sup Ported the scaut, sent regular toops into the ares, and declared the 1922 treaty i valid. Colombia then sent milcary forces to the Leticia trttory, and in February 1933 the disputants severed diplomatic relations. ‘The Inter American System and Brazil attempted co sete the matter but Peru adopted an uncompromising position. After a change of government in Pet, how. ever, the disputants adopted a League of Nations proposal whereby they evacuated theic troops fom the are, and in June 1933, a League commission took over is ad- ministration, Peru and Colombia then continued their negotiations with Braiian mediation, from October 1933 until May 1934, when an agreement was reached. A protocol was signed in which Peru expressed regret for the incident causing the dis- pute, reestablished diplomatic relations, and confirmed the Lima Treaty of 1922. ‘Colombia then reoccupied Leticia. POST-WORLD WAR II PATTERNS AND CASES U.S. Cold War Interventions ‘A new factor entered che Latin American subsystem after World Wat Il with the cre ation ofthe U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the cold war, CIA off. cials deliberately participated in the assassination of foreign leaders; erained private aumies bribed chiefs of sate, abor union leaders, and other oficial and polival fig tures; and engaged in various activities to discredit or remove what were considered to be lefist Latin American governments. The CIAS covert interventions in Latin Amer ‘an politics becarne highly controversial in both Latin American and the United Sues, In 1974 and 1975 the US. intelligence community was investigated by a presiden, tial commission and select committees in both chambers ofthe U.S. Congress Former directors of the CIA testified and stated their opposition to further assassinations as an instrument of USS. foreign policy, a position reiterated by Present Ford. The reform ‘movement proved abortive, however, as Congress made do wich “oversight,” the half measure of and the CIA interpreted its reporting requirements as narrowly as pos ble. The Reagen administration gave free rein «9 the CIA. One result was the 1983-1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors, which flouted the oversight prerogatives of the Srat Set Comin nligenc Asie ut artes Soe Prat activites for an inteligence organization ina democratic nation andthe lea ba- sis for those activities sill had not been resolved by the end ofthe cold wan.!2 ‘The fist important case of cold war conflict and U.S cover intervention in Latin ‘America occurred in Guatemala in 1954.1°"The situation was rooted in the 1944328 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS overthrow of Dictator-General Jorge Ubico, after thirteen years in power. The fol- lowing year, elected civilian president Juan Arévalo was inaugurated, and he pro- moted fundamental social reform. He was succeeded in 1951 by President Jacobo ‘Arbenz Guzinén, who initiated a number of radical economic and social changes. His efforts eventually brought opposition from the United States, which accused him of bringing Communists into his government and allowing them too influence Guatemalan politics. Arbena attempted co integrate che Indian majority into the na- tional life chrough labor organization and agrarian reform, bringing strenuous oppo- sition from he powerful landowning class. He employed Guatemalan and foreign lefists in his government (including the Argentine Ernesto “Che” Guevara) and broadened diplomatic contacts with Communist sates. He expropriated United Fruit Company propert By early 1953 Guatemalan exiles were being tained in the neighboring tates of, Honduras and Nicaragua with CIA assistance and support. The resolution that See- retary of State John Foster Dulles pushed through the Tenth Inter-American Confer- cence in 1954 was aimed at weakening Guatemalis postion in the Inter-American System. In June 1954 ten member states, atthe behest of the United States, invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), charging interven- by international communism in Guatemala and highlighting the danger posed to American peace and secuity. The OAS Council met provisionally as the Organ of Consultation and called fora foreign ministers’ meeting. At the same time, a U.S.- sponsored exile force, led by Guatemalan Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, invaded ‘Guatemala from Honduras on June 18, 1954. Before an OAS fact-finding team could arrive in Guatemala, che coup had succeeded and Arbenz had been sent into exiles che foreign ministers meeting was canceled. US. conflict with che Castro government in Cuba was the dominant focus of covert US. actions after 1959.14 Castro's 26th of July Movement, which took power fon January 1, 1959, originally seemed dedicated to liberal democracy. The United States recognized the Castro government.qn January 7, 1959. By the end of 1961, however it was clear that Castro was running a dictatorship. On May 1, 1961, he formally announced that Cuba was “a socialist state,” and the following December hre stated that he would be a "Marxist-Leninist until the lst day of my lif.” These developments were accompanied by Cubs increasing orientation toward the Soviet Union. Castro defied the United Staes early in his regime. He confiscated U.S. end British oil refineries and other USS. investments and property, abrogated the U.S.- Cuban mutual assistance pact, expelled U.S. military missions, and mounted a hos- tile propaganda campaign. The Eisenhower administration canceled all imports of Cuban sugar on July 6, 1960, Three days later Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed Cuba a protectorate and threatened to defend ic with mises agains the United States. Cuban-US. diplomatic eations were ruptured on January 3, 1961. “The United States led multilateral actions as well as took unilateral measures ‘against Cuba. The principal ealy unilateral effort consisted of organizing and fi- rancing a Cuban exile invasion to overthrow, Casto in April 1961. The 1,500-man"IMATIONS thirteen years in power. The fol- do was inaugurated, and he pro- ded in 1951 by President Jacobo cal economic and socal changes. the United States, which accused cand allowing them roo influence te the Indian majority into the na- form, bringing strenuous opp0- inployed Guatemalan and foreign tine Ermesto “Che” Guevara) and st states, He expropriated United ried in he neighboring sates of d support. The resolution that Sec- SC is position in the Inter-American sches of the United States, invoked se (Rio Treaty), charging interven- ‘and highlighting che danger posed sil met provisionally asthe Organ of meeting, At the same time, a US nel Carlos Castillo Armas, invaded Before an OAS fact-finding team vied and Arbenz had been sent into L nt Cuba was the dominant Focus of {July Movement, which took power wd to liberal democracy. The United nary 7, 1959. By the end of 1961, 2 dictatorship. On May 1, 1961, he state,” and the following December tani che last day of my life.” These resignation tova he Sv hs regime. He confiscated U.S. an vr propery abrogated the US iliary missions, and mounted a hos- ministration canceled all imports of er Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev {eo defend ic with mises against the 5 were ruptured on January 3, 1961 § as wel as took unilateral measures effort consisted of organizing and fi- Castro in April 1961. The 1,500-man WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 329 force, which included a large numberof disillusioned former Casto revolutionaries, landed atthe Bay of Pigs on Cuba’ southern coas in hopes of catalyzing a popular uprising, Planned under President Eisenhower and cattied out under President Kennedy, ic was an ucer failure, The Cuban armed forces exsily subdued and impris- coned the invaders.!5 Although the United Staes pledged to desist from any further invasions of Cube as pat of the erlement of che misil crisis withthe Soviet Union in October 1962, it continued actempts to assassinate Castro, In 1975, Senate hear- ings revealed efforts made on Casto’ life chrough various intermediaries from 1960 0 1965. ‘The United States employed clandestine operations in Chile to disrupe the elected Marxist government of President Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973.!6 The CCilean election of 1970 was thrown to the congress when no candidate received a majority. ITT, the U.S. corporation, hen offered a million dollars to the Nixon ad- ministration for a bribery scheme co seck Allende's defeat in the Chilean congres- sional runoff. The offer was made'through John A. MeCone, former director ofthe (CIA and then an ITT board member. The U.S. government, which had financed Al- lende’s opposition in che campaign, declined the offer on the grounds that it would bbe unworkable, but thereafter ie made several efforts to “destabilize” the Allende gov- ‘ernment and discredit hi experiment of "socialism in democracy” USS. officials, including milicary personnel, encouraged Chilean military dissi- dents to make a coup prior to Allende's inauguration. After Allende’ inauguration, the United States encouraged and financed a wide spectrum of opposition groups, including other parties, certain trade and labor organizations, middle-class house. wives, and right-wing tetorist groups; strikes and demonstrations were funded and coordinated through the CIA station in Santiago. In addition, che United States used its influence and voting power in che international lending agencies to put a “credit squeeze” on Chile. Finally, by mid-1973, Chile was in a desperate economic and social situation. The Chilean military overthrew Allende on September 11, 1973, ina brief but bloody coup in which Allende died ‘The later disclosure that the CIA had financed the strikes that preceded the Chilean coup was confirmed by President Ford in a news conference in September 1974, Ford said that USS actions had been carried out in an attempt to help preserve ‘opposition newspapers and parties in Chile. (In fat, the opposition press had con- tinued to prine during the Allende years, and opposition partes, including the most hostile, continued to function; only afer the coup was the press suppressed and were political parties banned). Ford justified U.S. subversion in Chile as being “in the best interests ofthe Chilean people.” ‘The United States sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, in its first di- rect military intervention in Latin America since 1933.17 The intervention took place inthe aftermath ofthe thiry-one-year Teyjillodictaorship and in the context of US. experience with Castro's Cuba: it ended with Trujillo’ assassination on May 30, 1961. Dominican individuals and groups with conflicting purposes struggled ‘with each other after Trujlds death, and none were satisfied with the results. On330 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS, April 24, 1965, a rebel army faction known as the “Consttutionaliss” atempred a coup in support of civilian reformist politician Juan Bosch (who had been elected president and inaugurated in February 1963 but overtheown by a military coup Seven months later). The opposing military “Loyalist” faction was supported by ost miliary units and the national police. Miliary advantage Auctuated between the ewo sides during a civil war lasting more than four months and culminating with US. military intervention. The United Seates landed 405 matines in the capital city fon April 28. The complement was increased thereafter, reaching a high of 23,000 ‘troops (mostly from the U.S. Army) in the vicinity of Santo Domingo, with 10,000 more standing by offshore. “The United States justified the inital woop landing as protection for its nationals residing in the Dominican Republi. nan addeess to the nation on May 2, howevet, Presdene Johnson asserted that Communists had joined the rebels and threatened ro take contol. Because “what began as a popular democratic revolution” had been “teized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators,” said the president, the U.S. goal had changed “to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere." The United States then received OAS endorsement of es interven- tion, but only after a bitter debate, and the U.S. command was transformed into an international peacekeeping force. Except for the Brazilian contribution, the Latin ‘American presence was a token one, and the peacekeeping mission in fat supported the Loyalise military accion. Finally, in late August, a setlement was signed by both sides. A yea later, in September 1966, the peace force was withdrawn. British Disputes “With Guyana, Britain and Venezuela had disputed a large portion of British Guiana from the beginning of Venezuelan independence.!8 The problem continued after Britain granted the territory independence in 1966 as Guyana. The dispute had seemed setled in 1899 when the decision ofan international court of arbitration was tccepted by both partes. However, in 1962 Veneruela reasserted is claims, declaring the 1899 agreement void. Venezuca had hired U.S. attorneys to represent its casein 1899; in 1962 ie discovered chat the wll of one of those attorneys had stated that ase- cet “deal” had been made between the British representatives and a Russian arbiter ‘Veneziela wanted the boundary t0 be moved some 150 miles to the east to the Essequibo River, a change that would give Venezuela about 53,000 square miles of territory constituting approximately three-fifths of Guyana. Venezuela protested ‘Guyanese independence, asserting thatthe boundary question should have fist been settled. In 1966, Great Britain, Guyana, end Venezuela signed an agreement estab- lishing « mixed border commision and providing that, ifthe commission filed co solve the problem by May 1970, the dispute would be referred to the World Court fr the UN secretary general. The mixed commission failed in its mission, but with ‘Greet negotiations the chee states signed another agreement on June 18, 1970. The agreement suspended the 1966 protocol and provide for a rwelve-year “cooling-\PPROXIMATIONS n asthe “Constitutional” attempred a ician Juan Bosch (who had been elected 363 but overthrown by a military coup ary “Loyalist” faction was supported by ¢. Miltary advantage fuctuated berween ¢ chan four months and culminating with aes landed 405 marines in the capital city sed thereafter, reaching a high of 23,000 vicinity of Santo Domingo, with 10,000 landing as protection forts national Vedas tothe nation on May 2, homee, ad joined theres and eretene popular democra revoluon” had been and of Communist conspirators,” said the Ip pen anodes Communi sin teovned OAS endorsement fs imerten- sSUSS command was wansformed nto an orth ein coburn, he atin in penskepingmison in at support ite. “Agus ‘a settlement was signed by both peace force ws wits Disputes ad disputed a large portion of British Guiana spendence.'¥ The problem continued after cnce in 1966 as Guyana. The dispute had n ofan international court of arbitration was 362 Venecuela reasserted its claims, declaring {hired U.S. attorneys to represent is case in of one of those attorneys had stated that ase iis representatives and a Russian abit se moved some 150 miles tothe east co the jive Venezuela about 53,000 square miles of hreeffths of Guyana. Venezuela protested the boundary question should have firs been a, and Venezuela signed an agreement estab- a providing that, ifthe commission fled to ape would be feed co the World Cour ‘commission filed in its mission, but with Sere net on je 18 1570 The col and provided for a twelve-year “cooling: WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 331 ff” period, to be extended automatically unless either Venezuela or Guyana decided ‘otherwise. (The agreement was so extended in 1982). In the meantime, Guyana was fire to develop the disputed area, and Venezuela was to press no further claims. With Guatemala, A long history of conflict existed over the ownership of Belize, formerly the colony of British Honduras. Guatemala and Great Britain signed a treaty in 1850 in which Guatemala recognized British sovereignty over Belize in return for certain concessions, one of which was the construction of a road connecting ‘Guatemala City with the Adantic coast. Since Britain never built the road, Guatemala declared the treaty void in 1939 and reasserted its claims on the grounds of territory inherited from Spain. Brain replied that Spain never effectively controlled the area, that it was nota parc of the colonial Guatemalan jurisdiction, and chat anyway, Spain had ceded the area to Britain in 1670, Britain maintained contro. Guatemala reasserted its claims in the 1950s, when Britain began to consider granting independence to Belize. Belize did not join the shorc-lived West Indies Fed- eration formed in 1958 and refused a Guatemalan proposal in 1960 that ic become an internally self governing “Free asociated state” under Guatemalan sovereignty. Guatemala broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963, wher the latter allowed Belize internal self government. Guatemala and Belize both rejected a US, proposal in 1971 that Belize be granted immediate independence on condition it would “con- sult” with Guatemala on foreign and defense matters. Belize desired independence but feared a Guatemalan military invasion once British protection was gone; Britain was willing to grant independence but not to guarantee the defense ofthe new state. Finally, in 1991, Britain relented on the security issue and granted Belize indepen- dence, leaving a British force in Belize to guarantee its territorial integtty Guatemala refused to recognized Belize asa new state Mexico laid claim to parc of Belize based on succession rights to Spanish sover- «ignty, bu only asserted its right to participate in any discussions on the status ofthe area, Mexico stared that it would not reactivate its claims if a solution was reached based on the wishes ofthe Beizen people On September 6, 1991, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano recognized Belize as 4 sovereign stare. Guatemala and Belize commenced diplomatic relations. Two years lacer, Guatemala and Belize pledged to refrain from using force against each other. In January 1994 Britain withdrew most of ts garrison and handed over defense espon- sibilities ro Belize. With Argentina. In 1982 Britain’s continuing dispute with Argentina over the Falkland or Malvinas Islands escalated into wa? In 1965 the United Nations Gen- cral Assembly, at Argentinds behest, had approved a rezolution urging the two states to negotiate a resolution ofthe sovereignty question. Britain acquiesced, and in 1971 agreements were reached on matters of commerce, communications, air service, edu- cational and medical facilities, and cultural exchanges, In 1975, a British govern ‘ment study reporting the possibility of oil in the surrounding continental shelf com332 WARFARE AND TTS APPROXIMATIONS plicated mauers Britain proposed a “leae-back” scheme, whereby Argentina woud be granted forma sovereignty bu Britain would continue administrative control in order to alow the Falkland inhabitants sufficient time to adjust to eventual Argen- tine governance. Setters had migrated to the Flllands afer the asetion of Bish control in 1833; in 1980 they numbered about 1,800. Most of the Falklanders Strongly desired the status quo, wanting neither annexation to Argentina not inde- pendence. The British Palamentdeeaed the lase-back formula in che face of op positon by the Falkland lobby. “Argentina chen sought to recover the Malvinas by free. On April 2, 1982, At gent invaded and cook military contol ofthe inhabited porsons of che Bait Peikland Islands colony, saying it was enforcing is rightful sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas. The British government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, dis- parched naval force eo the South Atlante, 7,000 miles from southern English eee and appealed for support fiom the United Nations and the European Com Prunity (EC), The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 502, which aondemned che Argentine action, demanded an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces, and called on both governments to seek a diplomatic solution o ther differ ences ‘The Soviet Union did not veto the resolution, apparently satisfied with the Siemma facing the United States. The EC also responded favorably co the British “pea, adopting a resolution on April 16 condemning the legal Argentine agres- Sen againe a testory linked to the Community and urgently appealing tA. genta to implement UN Security Council Resolution 502. The EC alo banned tems sales ro and embargoed import ftom Argentina “The United States had quickly engaged in an intense mediation effort, hoping to commence negotiations and avoid open warfare. Secretary of State Alexander Hal pursued “shut diplomacy” fom Apel 7-19, with visits co London and Buenos Mites The Thatcher government argued that democracies should nor appease dicra- tom and must resist aggression, and insisted that Britain would not consider negot tions until Argentina unconditionally withdrew its troops in accordance with the Se- curity Council resolution. A “paramount consideration” for the British was thatthe Sishes of resident FalKlanders be respected. The Argentine government, in turn, said yearould not temove its troops not begin negotiations until Britain recognized Ar- getinesovteigney over the ialands and recalled its naval eas force. The US, effre effectively ended in impasse on April 19. ‘Aagentina turned to the Incet-American System for support. The inal response from other Latin Ametican states was resuained. A meeting of the OAS Permanent ‘Council from April 5-13 resulted only in a “resolution of concer’ that offered its “fiendly cooperation inthe seach fora peaceful setdemen.” Argentina invoked the Rio Treat just as the US, mediation effoc ended, nd che Twentieth Meeting of Con sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was convened April 26-28. By this ime British forces had penetrated the hemispheric security one as defined in the Rio Tear. The foreign ministers adopted a resolution supporting Argentine chims co soversigaty but ‘refused to invoke any sanctions, as Argentina hed requested, against Britain,>ROXIMATIONS ck? scheme, whereby Argentina would uld continue administrative conttol in ient time to adjust to eventual Argen- Falklands afte che assertion of British bout 1,800. Most of the Falllanders her annexation to Argentina not inde- ¢ lease-back formula in the fice of op- vinas by force. On April 2, 1982, Ar- Fhe inhabited portions ofthe Bish ag its rightful sovereignty over the Islas Thre Minister Margate Thache, di :, 7,000 miles from southern English vted Nations and che European Com sponded with Resolution 502, which ‘an immediate withdrawal of Argentine ck a diplomatic solution co thei differ- esolution, apparencly satisfied with the also responded favorably to the British ‘ndemning the illegal Argentine aggres- cuunity and urgently appealing co Ar- | Resolution 502. The EC also banned tina “Bh intense mediation effort, hoping to fare. Secretary of State Alexander Haig 19, with visits to London and Buenos + democracies should nor appease dict hat Britain would not consider negotia- ‘ew its troopsin accordance with the Se- sideration” forthe rth was that che The Argentine government in turn su Cgovaons unl Betsinrecopaed Ar Aled its naval task force. The USS. effort System for support. The initial response ned. A meeting of the OAS Permanent ‘resolution of concecn that offered its ‘afl setdement.” Argentina invoked che ded, and the Twentieth Meeting of Con- convened April 26-28. By cis time British ty zone as defined in the Rio Tieaty. The rring Argentine claims to sovereignty but had requested, against Britain. WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 333 ‘The United States ended its neutrality on April 30, in favor of Britein and in strong, opposition to Argentina. Secretary Haig sai that “in light of Argentina fal- ture ro accept a compromise, we must take concrete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the use of unlawful force to resolve dis- putes.” Among other measures, the United States suspended all military exports and Export-Import Bank credits to Argentina It promised material support for British forces on request, short of direct miliary involvement. “The EC, UN, and Inter-American System continued ther efforts as military c- tion escalated, EC support for the British postion had faltered, especially with the heavy loss of life cha followed the sinking of an Argentine cruiser on May 2. Te was widely perceived that the British had violated their own rules of engagement and croded its moral advantage as the victim of aggression. Following relentless British bargaining, however, the majority decided to extend the sanctions against Argentina indefinitely, In the UN Security Council, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar reported that his efforts had brought no agreement. ‘The inter-American forcign ‘ministers meeting was reconvened May 27-29. The final resolution, adopted after a Latin American display of hostility toward the United States, condemned British counterforce but again refused sanctions. ‘After the military campaign came to an end on June 14, the EC lifted its sanc- tions. On July 12 President Reagan announced that U.S. economic sanctions were no longer necessary. (The ban on military transfers, predating the conflce and re- ‘quiring a human rights certification to Congress, was not lifted uncil December 1983, when a new civilian government was inaugurated in Buenos Aires) Britain continued is own sanctions and enforced a 200 nautical mile exclusion zone, It kept riltary power in the area ("Fortress Falklands’), despite the expense to the British treasury and the depletion ofits NATO forces. The disputants remained without diplomatic relations and technically at war, as Argentina had not formally declared an end to hostilities. Argentina continued co press its case for sovereignty in the United Nations. Communication did occur how- ver, with Argentina and Britain speaking through Brazil and Switzerland, espec- tively, as their intermediaries: direct secret talks, begun in December 1983, broke down in acrimony. Formal talks were finally commenced, and in February 1990, al- most eight years after the South Atlantic war had ended, Briain and Argentina reestablished diplomatic relations. Subsequent agreements were signed regarding in- vetmene promotion, miliary meverens in the South Atacand sr and ea inks between Britain and Argentina. Argentina continued to claim sovereignty over the bland and Benin cootinue vo jst euch lime “7 Latin American Insurgency Contemporary guerilla warfare was introduced with Fidel Casto’s succesful exile invasion of Cuba and subsequent defeat of dictator Fulgencio Batista Similar con- fics emanated from the Caribbean but extended into South America and, to an ex-364 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS tent, Mexico, After about a year of consolidating his power in the wake ofthe re lution 's euceess on January 1, 1959, Castro openly encouraged violent revolution in the rest ofthe hemisphere and gave direct assistance to guerilla movements, espe- ‘ally in Venezuela, Peru, and Guatemala, Guertila activities in Latin Amerie inten sified in 1963 and 1964, and Cuban support continued until abour 1968. During. that time, Cuba added Colombia to is list of targets, and Che Guevara led the in- surgency in Bolivia (see Chapter 11). "While Cuba urged and actively supporeed violent revolution inthe rest ofthe r= ion, the Soviet Union favored relations through “normal” diplomatic and economic Shannels, Soviet policy had continued to be generally unprovocative during World ‘War I and dhrough the 1950s, and after dhe war its covert activities and its support for Latin American revolutionary groups vacllated. The Soviet Union urged caution in the carly 1960s, following Casts success in Cuba, and throughout the extended petiod of guerilla warfare. Most orthodox (Moscow-oriented) Communist parties followed the Soviet lead and rejected armed insurgency in favor of more cautious tactics, China supported the militant Cuban posture forthe violent overthrow of ex- isting regimes, although i simultaneously attempted to increase its own diplomatic and trade contacts with Latin American staes By late 1968 Castro had come to terms with the Soviet Union and tacitly ac- cepted the Soviet doctrines of peaceful coexistence and evolutionary transition to so- Gialism, Major guerilla effors had been liquidated in Peru and Bolivis and effec- tively controlled in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala, Furthermore, economic problems forced Cuba to rely more on the Soviet Union. As the Cuban economy fl- vered, Soviet influence increased, and Cuban policy conformity may have been the price for continued Soviet assistance. Casto largely withdrew his support of insur- fency movements, seeming t resign himelf atleast temporarily tothe Futility of e=- porting revolution. By 1970, after a year and a half of Cuban silence roward Latin ‘Kmeriean revolution, insurgent leaders began to criticize Castro for his withdrawal ‘of support. The Soviet Union preferred cooperative state-to-state interaction after the mid-1960s, but ie occasionally supported subversive activities that led ro confice ‘vith Latin Ametican states—Colombia in 1967, Uruguay in 1968, Mexico and dor in 1971, Bolivia in 1972, and Chile in 1973. ‘Soviet-Cuban support of guerrilla warfare revived with the successful Sandi Jed Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 and with increased insurgent activites in other ‘Central American countries. In the new insurgent era, che Soviet Union and Cuba atin disagreed over the appropriate approach. Their postions were reversed, how- ever, with Cuba urging caution and the Soviets presing an activist policy. | Inter-Latin American Disputes euador and Peru. Continuing conflict berween Ecuador and Peru was an exten- sion of the crisis of 1942. In September 1955, Ecuador presented a complaint 0 the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) thatthe presence of Pe-PPROXIMATIONS ating his power in the wake ofthe revo openly encouraged violen revolution in assistance ro guettila movements, espe- erilla activities in Latin America inten- ort continued until about 1968. During ‘of targes, and Che Guevara led the in- d violent revolution in the est ofthe re- ough ‘normal diplomatic and economic be generally unprovocative during World ve war its covert activities and its support ed. The Soviet Union urged caution ss in Cuba, and throughout the extended « (Moscow-oriented) Communist parties ed insurgency in favor of more cautious n posture for the violent overthrow of ex- attempted to increase its own diplomatic 1s with the Soviet Union and tacitly ac- distence and evolutionary transition to s0- ‘iguidated in Peru and Bolivia and effec- and Guatemala, Furthermore, economic Soviet Union. As the Cuban economy fal- ran policy conformity may have been the ro largely withdrew his support of insur- “Af at leat temporaily tothe fatty of ex- and a half of Cuban silence roward Latin ‘gan to criticize Castro for his withdrawal >poperative state-to-state interaction after ted subversive activities that led ro conflict in 1967, Uruguay in 1968, Mexico and lein 1973. are revived with the succesful Sandinista with increased insurgent activities in other rsurgent era, the Soviet Union and Cuba cach. Their postions were reversed, hov- wviets pressing an activist policy. cxican Disputes, bbeeween Ecuador and Peru was an excen- +1955, Ecuador presented 2 complainc to ican States (OAS) chat the presence of Pe- WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 335, ruvian army units on the border and nearby warships indicated an invasion of Ecuador. Ecuador had also submitted the matter directly to the guarantor states (Ar- sgentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States) named in the Rio Protocol of 1942, re- questing that they investigate the facts on sit. The OAS Coun deferred to chat process ‘The guarantor states appointed a military investigating committe, which completed air and land reconnaissance over the area in question and observed noth- ing “abnormal.” The mater, after some thetorical fourishes by Ecuador and Peru in the OAS, was closed. However, in 1961 Ecuador declared the Rio Protocol null and void yet Ecuador later in fact recognized the role ofthe guarantor states. In January 1981 Peruvian sireraft atacked chree Ecuadorian military outposts in the disputed area and evicted the troops. At Ecuador's request, the Nineteenth Meet- ing of Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened for a brief meeting in February and urged a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the military forces, co which both disputants agreed. The meeting then defered to the actions of the four guarantor sates, who sent a military commission to the area to monitor and assist che cease-ie and the troop withdrawals. Once again, the specific incident was thus setled but not the un- derlying dispute. Ecuador and Peru engaged in a thiry-four-day undeclared war commencing on January 26, 1995 in the disputed border region. Ecuador again accepted the good offices of the guarantor states in order to end the hostilities and restore peace, seem- ingly accepting the Rio Protocol asthe basis for negotiations. In February 1995 the disputants signed agreements providing fora cease-fire and for the separation of the armed forces, with outside observers verifying compliance. The cease-fire held, and the process of separating forces began on March 30; all roops were withdrawn by May 3. The guarantor and disputing states then met to agree on the creation of a de- militarized zone, prisoner exchange, the opening of the border, and the removal of mines in the area, The guarancor states continued to uphold the validity of dhe Rio Protocol, but also seemed willing to consider its revision. ‘The Beagle Channel Dispute. ‘The dispute between Argentina and Chile over ‘ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel involved competing geopolitical and strategic calculations, access to possible petroleum and other resources, and the status of conflicting claims in the Antarctic. In 1971, Argentina and Chile agreed to submit their century-old dispute to binding arbitration as prescribed in existing bie lateral treaties. Accordingly, the Brith crown appointed a five-judge international court of arbitration (all of the judges were members of the International Court of Justice). After six years of hearings and studies, the court rendered a decision in 1977, finding thar the thre islands (Picton, Lennox, and Nueva) were “unquestion- ably Chilean,” thus giving Chile control ofthe resource-rich sea area, Buc in January 1978, in defiance of established international norms regarding peaceful setlement of disputes, the Argentine military government rejected the ruling. From its point of view, Chilean possession of the islands negated the fundamental Argentine bioceanic principle that Chile was by nature a Pacific coast power and that Argentina must336 WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS have hegemony in the Atlantic zone; furthermore Chilean rights in the Adlantic (Ocean would threaten Argentina’ Antarctic claims. "When the dispuranes were on the verge of war in late 1978, the Holy See observer to the OAS proposed papal mediation. Both governments readily acepted this offer. ‘The entre southern boundary zone, including the Beagle Channel and the contigu- ‘ous oceanie triangle, was submitted for papal consideration. Two years lates, on De- cember 12, 1980, the pope presented his peace proposal Chile was given sovereignty lover the thre islands plus a narrow finge of terctoral waters. Contiguous Adantic waters were designated a condominium "sea of peace” reserved for common of con- ‘certed activities. Chile seemed ready to accept the papal decison, although i had re- sisted the sea-of-peace idea because the ocean resources were more important than the islands a such, Argentina did not reject the proposal, but it was clearly reluctant to sccept a Chilean presence in the Atlantic, The process was interrupted by the ‘Anglo-Argentine war of 1982. ‘After the war the negotiating climate for Argentina and Chile seemed unpropi- tious, Chile was convinced that Argentina had not negotiated in good faith since 1971 and had been too willing to consider the use of military force. Argentina scrongly resented Chile's neutrality in the 1982 Anglo-Argentine wat, which i saw as aiding Briain, The British crown had been removed from its traditional role as in- termediary between Argentina and Chile, and the United States was in no positon to take initiatives. The United Nations lacked precedents in regional American dis- putes, and the isputans were not inclined to submit ro the Inter-American System. Holy See mediation remained open, but Argentina’ stalling tactics seemed to de- value thar option. Yer the new civilian government in Argentina was determined to ‘overcame the difficaltes. The papal mediating role was revived; on November 29, 1984, the foreign ministers of Argentina and Chile signed a teary in the Vatican, which was ratified by both states and went into effec in 1985. “The eeaty recognized Chilean possession of che thee islands, with sovereignty ex- tending south to Cape Horn, and gave Chile maritime jurisdiction over a surround- ing ewelve-mile-wide zone; Argentina had the right to exercise fre navigation. Spe- ciffc limitations on Chilean rights, however, removed the possibility of maritime projection or claims of sovereigay that would normally accompany texicril pos- Session, That is, Chile had physical access to the Atlantic Ocean but did not hold Fights co juridical claims. Argencina was given maritime jurisdiction over the area outside the twelve-mile zone. The sea-ofpeace idea from the 1980 proposal had been discarded. The treaty specified chat Argentine jurisdiction was not limited by requitements related cither to sovereignty or joint economic exploitation. The bi- ‘oceanic principle was recognized, with Cape Horn established as che base for mar- itime boundaries. The parties agreed to create a binational commission to facilitate the economic integration of the region, and to abstain from warfare in the area. The agreement was a clear compromise aimed at satisfying the fundamental concerns of ‘ach side. Chile got the islands and access ro surrounding resources; Argentina re- tained contsol of the Atlantic area and jurisdiction over the eastern mouth of the Scrat of Magellan co the north,PROXIMATIONS crmore Chilean rights in the Atlantic Jaime. war in late 1978, the Holy See observer governments readily accepted this offer, ig the Beagle Channel and the contigu- Peonsideration. Two years lates, on De- ce proposal. Chile was given sovereignty F territorial waters. Contiguous Atlantic ‘of peace” reserved for common or con- se the papal decision, although it had re- an resources were mote important than the proposal, but it was clearly reluctant ie. The process was interrupted by the wntina and Chile seemed unpropi- ‘tener ingot ce er the use of military force. Argentina £82 Anglo-Argentine wat, which it saw as emeved frm ts traditional role a n- nd the United States was in no position red precedents in regional American dis- cosmic Inter-American Sytem, trgentin’s stalling tactics seemed to de- amen in Argentina vas determined (© ting role was revived: on November 29, nnd Chile signed a treaty in the Vatican, into effect in 1985. ‘ofthe three islands, with sovereignty ex- Je maritime jurisdiction over a surround- che right co exercise free navigation. Spe- re eoved the pols of marine yuld normally accompany terstorial pos- tothe Manic Ocean but did not hold sjven maritime jurisdiction over che area ‘peace idea from the 1980 proposal had Argentine jurisdiction was not limited by of joint economic exploitation. The bi- pe Hom established as the base for mar- cate a binational commission to facilitate to abstain from warfare in the area. The at satisfying the fundamental concerns of $ to surrounding resources; Argentina re- trsdiction over the eastern mouth of the WARFARE AND ITS APPROXIMATIONS 337 Caribbean Conflict. After World War II a number of boundary and ideological clashes occured in the Caribbean atea.® External actots joined in urging, opposing, ‘or resolving the conflcrsin various patterns. The confit initially entailed disaffected s invading their own national homelands, and then extended to guerilla warfare both in the Caribbean area and throughout much of the rst of Latin America, Shortly after the war, exiles from a number of circum-Catibbean states gathered in other nearby states (0 plan revolutions. Considerable talk was heard about a Caribbean Legion, said to be sponsored by local reform governments in Cuba, Guatemala, and Costa Rica and composed of politcal exiles and adventurers dedi cated to the overthrow of dictatorships in the Caribbean. Charles Ameringer con- cludes that the Caribbean Legion in fact never existed as a military organization with a permanent central command. Rather, he says, “the term was applied. indiscrimi- nately to a series of exile military operations and plots” with different leadership, sponsors, and objectives 28 The dictators (especially Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Anastazio Somoza of Nicaragua) in turn encouraged activities against their atleast nominally democratic neighbors. Haiti, which was not so easily classifi- able, was also involved, To see the conflict simply asa confrontation between democracy and dictatorship distorts reality In 1950 an OAS investigating committee issued a report noting that cals fighting against their home governments tended 0 join with people of other nationalities who had similar purposes. Ie said chat many of them were idealistic in- dividuals who, deprived of democratic guarantees in their own states, sought to change political life. But others were “adventurers, professional revolutionaries, and ‘mercenaries whose primary objective was the promotion of illegal traffic in arms and expeditions against countries with which they have no ties whatsoever.” Whatever ‘heir motives, their activites involved the use of certitory by states in violation of in- ternational obligations. El Salvador—Honduras War. An incerstate war occurred in 1967 between El Sal- vvador and Honduras over boundary and migration issues. For most ofthe twentieth ‘century, Salvadorans had lef cheir densely populated homeland and migrated, legally and illegally, to lightly populated Honduras across an ill-defined border. Their earch for work and land provoked Honduran resentment, and military skirmishes fre- quently occurred. The worst fighting in sixty years accurred in a week-long unde- clared wat in July 1969, Honduras had instituted a land reform program afecting the Salvadoran land squatters just as an emotionally charged soccer championship series was being played by the rvo national teams. Following the rioting atthe iol match, Honduran mobs attacked Salvadoran aliens, diplomatic relations were suspended, and troops were placed on alert. The conflict was thus dubbed the “soccer war,” but the conflict was hardly a trivial one. The armed forces launched fl-scale attacks. The (OAS arranged a truce, which went into effect on July 18, and maintained a peace- ‘keeping team on the frontier. An estimated 3,000 persons were killed during the con- flict and 7,000 injured, along with extensive property damage. The dispute was set aside with the onset of sustained Central American violence after 1979.