HeyJ (2016), pp.

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL

NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS
NICHOLAS E. LOMBARDO, O.P.

The Catholic University of America

I. INTRODUCTION

According to traditional theological narratives, every human living today descends from the
same human couple. The genetic evidence does not challenge this view. Traditional theological
narratives also claim, however, that every human living today descends from the same human
couple and only that same human couple. The genetic evidence not only challenges this view; it
makes it completely unsustainable. It demonstrates that our ancestral lineage cannot have passed
through the bottleneck of a single reproducing pair. It also indicates that the first humans
emerged in the context of a sizeable population, generally estimated around 10,000 successfully
reproducing individuals.
As yet, the decisiveness of the genetic evidence is not widely appreciated among theologians.
While many theologians, perhaps the majority, assume that (probably or certainly) we do not
descend exclusively from a single human couple, they are often unaware that genetic evidence
now available supports this view with near mathematical certainty. Meanwhile, other theologians continue to see traditional theological narratives of human origins as scientifically and
theologically viable. They recognize that evidence from anthropology and evolutionary science
strongly challenges traditional theological narratives of human origins, but they are not convinced that the evidence proves that we could not have descended from the same human couple
and only that same couple. These theologians may not necessarily be committed to upholding
traditional theological narratives of human origins, but they find it difficult to make sense of
Christian convictions about original sin and the purpose of Christs redemptive sacrifice without
appealing to them.
The genetic evidence now at our disposal, however, definitively settles the question. It demonstrates that we could not have descended exclusively from a single human couple.
Consequently, it has great potential for advancing the theological conversation about human origins. The genetic evidence may create significant difficulties for contemporary appropriations of
the doctrine of original sin, or rather make those difficulties unavoidable, but it also provides the
basis for a new theological consensus and a sturdy foundation for further theological inquiry.
This article will briefly outline the genetic evidence and explain why it settles important
questions about human origins. Then it will consider the two principal options for incorporating
the scientific data into theological narratives of human origins. Afterwards, it will turn to scripture passages and magisterial teachings relevant to human origins and argue that they cannot be
interpreted as definitively favoring one option over the other. Finally, it will relate these conclusions to other areas of theological inquiry, particularly the doctrine of original sin.

C 2016 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350
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NICHOLAS LOMBARDO

II. THE GENETIC EVIDENCE

Evidence from the genomes of humans and other primates indicate that the first humans
emerged as a sizeable group, not as a single human couple.1 The evidence is simple and
persuasive. We share common ancestry with chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans.
Orangutans were the first to branch off from our genetic lineage (around 1216 million
years ago), followed by gorillas (around 10 million years ago) and then chimpanzees
(around 6 million years ago).2 Consequently, we are most closely related to chimpanzees,
then gorillas, and then finally orangutans. Yet it does not follow that we are genetically
closer to chimpanzees in every respect. In many instances, human genetic lineages are
closer to those of gorillas or orangutans. This fact has important demographic implications. When humans split from chimpanzees, the population of our common ancestors
must have been large enough to accommodate a wide range of genetic variation.
Otherwise, these genetic lineagesthe ones that we have in common with gorillas and
orangutans but not chimpanzeeswould not have survived.
Furthermore, and more importantly for our purposes, some genes have multiple variations that originated before the split between humans and chimpanzees. For millions of
years, these variations have been passed down from generation to generation. Since any
given individual can carry at most two variations of any given gene (one per chromosome), the fact that multiple variations of the same gene trace so far back means that
our ancestral population could never have passed through an extreme bottleneck of a single reproducing pair.
This conclusion can be difficult to grasp in the abstract. It is helpful to turn to concrete examples. For the DQB1 gene, twelve genetic lineages trace back to the time when humans split
from chimpanzees, around 6 million years ago. (Eight of these twelve lineages go back even further to 15 million years ago.) Yet any human can only possess two genetic variations at maximum, one on each chromosome. Therefore, over the past 6 million years, our ancestors could
never have numbered fewer than six individuals. That is the absolute logical minimum. In actual
fact, the population necessary to transmit these variations over millions of years would have
been much higher.3 Theoretically, these DQB1 lineages could have died out after our split from
chimpanzees, and then developed again independently, with a completely different historical
origin. Statistically, however, it is inconceivable. It would also require an abnormally high rate
of genetic mutation between generations. These conclusions follow from studying merely a single gene. We can draw similar conclusions from studying other human genes separately or
together.4
There is another reason to conclude that our genetic lineage could never have passed through
the bottleneck of a single reproducing pair. Simply by comparing genetic variations found
among humans today, based on what we know about typical rates for genetic mutation and typical years between generations, we can estimate the average population size of our ancestors
over the course of the millennia. We do not need to compare our genome to the genomes of
chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans.
Using one or both of these two methods, scientists have consistently estimated that
our ancestors maintained an effective population on the order of 10,000.5 Effective population counts only reproducing individuals; actual census size is considerably greater.
The census population is generally estimated to be about three times larger than the
effective population.6 Consequently, ever since our genetic lineage diverged from that of
chimpanzees, we have never had fewer than thousands of simultaneously existing
ancestors.7

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS

III. THEOLOGICAL OPTIONS

From a theological point of view, the genetic evidence gives us certainty about the minimum
population size of our ancestors, but it does not give us certainty about the minimum population
size of the first humans. That question gets into the issue of when hominids first came to possess
immortal souls, and empirical science cannot detect immortal souls. Granted, certain genetic
traits (e.g., those necessary for advanced cognitive and linguistic functioning) might be plausibly
correlated with the presence of immortal souls. Such correlations, however, cannot be demonstrated by empirical science. They require methodologies proper to philosophy and theology.
Consequently, while the genetic evidence provides us with important information about the minimum population size of our ancestors, it cannot, of itself, provide a theological narrative of
human origins, or even a philosophical narrative of human origins.
Before proposing theological narratives consistent with the genetic evidence, we need to clarify exactly how the first humans differed from their immediate nonhuman ancestors.
Theologically, the most certain difference is that the bodies of the first humans were informed
by immortal souls while the bodies of their immediate ancestors were not. But are there any
other ways in which the first humans necessarily differed from their immediate ancestors?
According to Thomas Aquinas and the Council of Vienne, the soul is the form of the body.8 If
we agree, and if we also hold that the human body is intrinsically oriented toward the human
soul and vice versa, it follows that the bodies of the first humans must have been different from
the bodies of their nonhuman ancestors. The bodies of the first humans could not have been
identical to the bodies of their immediate ancestors. There must have been something about their
bodies fitted to their souls. And if there was something about their bodies fitted to their souls,
there must have been something new and different about their genetic traits. If we accept this
conclusionif we accept the idea that the human body and the human soul are intrinsically fitted to each other, and that this intrinsic orientation implies that human bodies are different from
all nonhuman bodiesthen we must also conclude that the genomes of the first humans were
different from the genomes of their immediate ancestors.
Broadly speaking, there are two theological narratives consistent with the genetic evidence
and the inference that the genomes of the first humans must have differed from the genomes of
their immediate ancestors.
In the first narrative, human history begins with one or two humans. They or their descendents interbreed with a large population of nonhumans. The resulting offspring (or at least some
of the resulting offspring) are also human, i.e., hominids with immortal souls. Eventually the
nonhumans die out and only humans remain. Over time, an effective population of 10,000 nonhumans with one or two human anomalies gradually becomes an effective population of 10,000
humans without any nonhuman anomalies.9
In the second narrative, the first humans emerge from multiple communities of nonhuman
hominids. It happens in this way. At a certain point, our nonhuman ancestors are on the verge of
attaining the last genetic traits necessary for ensoulment. Gradually, community by community
(stable hunter-gatherer communities typically consist of 5001000 individuals),10 they overcome the final evolutionary hurdles. Each community transitions from nonhuman to human separately and independently. Eventually, however, the different communities mingle and
interbreed. In this way, an effective population of 10,000 nonhumans gradually becomes an
effective population of 10,000 humans.
For each narrative, there are two ways to explain how the first humans came to acquire the
genetic traits necessary for ensoulment. They can acquire these genetic traits by purely natural
processes, or by a combination of natural processes and divine intervention.

NICHOLAS LOMBARDO

According to the purely natural explanation, the necessary genetic traits appear through natural processes alone, that is, through the normal mechanisms of the evolutionary process. Since
new genetic traits do not usually appear in more than one individual in the same place at the
same time, the genetic traits necessary for ensoulment probably appear in a single individual
and then spread by reproduction. (It is theoretically possible that the genetic traits could have
appeared in two or more individuals at the same time by purely natural processes. Statistically,
however, such an occurrence would have been extremely improbable.) The purely natural explanation plays out differently in the first and second narratives. In the first narrative, the genetic
traits develop in a single individual and then spread throughout the entire population. In the second narrative, individuals within multiple communities acquire the genetic traits completely
independently of each other. The genetic traits spread first within their communities and then
eventually throughout the entire population.
According to the interventionist explanation, God guides the evolutionary process so that the
first humans appear in pairs. The final genetic obstacles to ensoulment are not overcome by natural processes alone. To allow the first humans to reproduce with other humans, God ensures
that the necessary genetic traits appear simultaneously in two or more individuals. In this scenario, God does not suspend the evolutionary process, miraculously creating humans from the
preexisting matter of nonhuman hominids. He simply ensures that natural genetic mutations
happen at just the right time in just the right way.
The interventionist explanation plays out in similar ways in each of the two narratives. In the
first narrative, God intervenes so that a male and a female with the genetic traits necessary for
ensoulment are born in the same geographic region at approximately the same time. Sooner or
later, their offspring interbreed with nonhumans. As the genetic heritage of the first man and the
first woman spreads, the hominid population gradually becomes human. In the second narrative,
God intervenes in a more dramatic fashion. Instead of intervening to ensure the emergence of a
single human couple, God intervenes on a massive scale. God intervenes so that the necessary
genetic traits appear in a short span of time throughout an effective population of 10,000 hominids. From the first moment that humans appear on the earth, they are surrounded by numerous
other humans. Consequently, human and nonhuman interbreeding never takes place to any significant degree, at least not at the beginning. Later there may be some interbreeding with nonhuman hominids, but if so, it happens only after the appearance of a stable human population, and
it plays a minimal role in shaping our genetic heritage.11
IV. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

The first narrative has its advantages. New genetic traits generally start with one individual and
then spread by reproduction. Consequently, by tracing the earliest human populations to one or
two reproducing individuals, the first narrative fits neatly with the basic principles of evolution.
Moreover, the first narrative harmonizes better with traditional theological accounts of human
origins. It also allows for two interesting possibilities with symbolic and theological significance. If the first human appeared alone, and if that first human was male, then the first human
female might well have been his daughter. Such a story of human origins would make the actual
history of humanity correspond in an interesting way to the biblical story of God creating Eve
from Adams side (Gen 2:2123), and it would frame the Incarnation of the New Adam in the
womb of the New Eve as a reversal and Irenaean recapitulation of human origins. This story of
human origins would also enhance patristic exegesis of John 19:3137. It would give additional
reason to interpret the blood and water flowing from Christs side on the cross as symbolically

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS

teaching that the Church, the bride of Christ, comes out of Christs pierced side just as Eve, the
bride of Adam, came out of Adams pierced side. Alternatively, if the first human appeared
alone, but that first human were female and the first human male were her son, it would allow
for the Incarnation to represent a recapitulation without reversal of human origins.
The second narrative has its own advantages. Its advantages depend on whether it is combined with a natural or interventionist explanation for the emergence of the first humans.
Combined with a natural explanation, the second narrative shares the same coherence as the first
narrative with the basic principles of evolution. New genetic traits generally start with one individual and then spread by reproduction. Sometimes, however, when a particular population is
on the verge of evolutionary process, new genetic traits appear in multiple individuals independently. Consequently, by tracing the earliest human populations to single individuals in multiple
communities, the second narrative likewise fits neatly with the basic principles of evolution.
Combined with an interventionist explanation, the second narrative can avoid suggesting that
God built interbreeding into his plan of creation. There is something prima facie unsavory about
the idea of interbreeding between humans and nonhumans. Yet unless we hold that God intervened to make this interbreeding unnecessary, we must posit that it happened. If we conclude
that this interbreeding would have run counter to human dignity, then God could not choose it
as his means to bring about a stable human population; it would be unfitting for God to do so. It
would contradict Gods goodness. By holding that God brought a population of 10,000 humans
from 10,000 nonhumans in roughly the space of a generation, we can avoid this problem. In this
scenario, humans would not need to interbreed with nonhumans to maintain an effective population of 10,000. Likewise, there would be no need to attribute anything unfitting to God. This
scenario is not the only way to avoid the problem. We can also avoid it by holding that interbreeding started only after sin entered human history. This scenario, however, has a significant
advantage: it avoids the problem entirely without having to appeal to any particular account of
original sin.
Furthermore, there are difficulties in thinking that interbreeding between humans and nonhumans could lead to successful reproduction. Granted, biologically, it would not be at all surprising if the first humans could generate human offspring with their nonhuman contemporaries.
Evolution takes place through gradual, incremental change. Consequently, from a biological
point of view, it is eminently plausible that the first humans would be similar enough to their
nonhuman contemporaries (the genetic equivalent of their immediate ancestors) to generate
human offspring with them. Theologically, however, the matter is not so simple. The transition
from nonhuman to human involves the acquisition of an immortal soul. It is not difference in
degree; it is a difference in kind. It is more akin to an electron making a quantum leap from one
orbit to another than to a plant growing imperceptibly day to day. There exists no parallel to this
kind of transition anywhere else in the animal kingdom, and we have no way to verify empirically that it could happen. Consequently, the question of whether the first humans would have
been able to reproduce successfully with nonhumans is not as clear cut as it might seem. It could
conceivably be the case that the genetic traits necessary for ensoulment are so unique and special that they require divine intervention, and that hominids possessing these genetic traits cannot successfully reproduce with hominids that do not. By positing divine intervention, however,
the second narrative can avoid these difficulties entirely. By claiming that the first humans
emerged together in a population of 10,000 individuals, the problem of whether the first humans
could interbreed with their nonhuman contemporaries becomes moot.
Whatever the ultimate merits of these narratives and explanations, all of them are consistent
with the genetic evidence. Even the interventionist explanation is fully compatible with the
genetic evidence. The interventionist explanation goes beyond the genetic evidence and its most

NICHOLAS LOMBARDO

natural explanation, but it does not contradict it. Of course, to say that a theological narrative is
consistent with the empirical evidence does not mean that it is plausible. There might be many
explanations for a murder that are consistent with the evidence but which are nonetheless
implausible. For the purposes of this article, however, it suffices to note that each of these narratives and explanations are consistent with the genetic evidence. It is left to the reader to make
any judgments about their plausibility.
V. SCRIPTURE AND MAGISTERIAL TEACHING

As evidenced by the New Testament (see esp. Matt 19:8; Luke 3:2338 Rom 5:1219; 1 Cor
15:2026, 2 Cor 11:3; 1 Tim 2:1215, Jude 1:4), claims about human origins have figured prominently in Christian teaching from the beginning. For centuries, especially after Augustine but
before him as well, Christians understood these claims in a straightforward historical sense.
They did not necessarily read Genesis literally, but they did read Genesis as teaching that a single man and a single woman were the exclusive common ancestors of every human living today,
and that by sinning they lost the idyllic state in which they had been created for themselves and
their descendents. Through the work of historical-critical scholarship, it is now widely accepted
(if not universally so) that the human authors of Genesis were interested first and foremost in
explaining and describing the human condition, not in history in any modern sense of the term,
and that many subsequent Jewish and Christian readings of Genesis almost certainly went
beyond the intentions of the human authors. For example, judging from extant materials, it is
only after the exile that Jewish exegetical traditions began to understand the sin of Adam and
Eve in terms of a historical rupture that divides the human condition into before and after.12
Consequently, of itself, Genesis cannot be taken as favoring or excluding any of the narrative
options surveyed above. It is certainly theologically legitimate to read the divine author of
Genesis as intending more than the human authors intended, especially in light of Christian revelation. It is also well within the realm of possibility that the human authors intended to make
some historical claims about human origins, and that these historical claims favor or exclude
some of the narrative options. Yet any such position must be argued and defended; it cannot be
taken as following self-evidently from any responsible reading of Genesis. The same applies to
other scripture passages relevant to human origins: especially when they manifest intracanonical reliance on Genesis, they cannot be taken as favoring or excluding any of the narrative
options without further argument and interpretation.
Magisterial teaching has pronounced on controversial questions about human origins only
relatively rarely, most notably at the Council of Carthage (418), the Council of Orange (529),
and the Council of Trent (1546). Magisterial interventions on evolutionary theory have likewise
been few and far between. No ecumenical council has ever formally addressed the subject of
polygenism (the view that the first humans included more than one reproducing pair) and its
compatibility with Christian doctrine, and the only papal encyclical to do so was Humani generis (1950). Arguably, it also constitutes the first and only magisterial document to speak authoritatively on the question of polygenism.13 No authoritative teaching has ever been promulgated
before, and no authoritative teaching has been promulgated since.
The official Vatican translation of the relevant passage in Humani generis reads as follows
(see below for the text of the Latin original):
When, however, there is question of another conjectural opinion, namely polygenism, the
children of the Church by no means enjoy such liberty. For the faithful cannot embrace that

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS

opinion which maintains that either after Adam there existed on this earth true men who did
not take their origin through natural generation from him as from the first parent of all, or
that Adam represents a certain number of first parents. Now it is in no way apparent how
such an opinion can be reconciled with that which the sources of revealed truth and the documents of the Teaching Authority of the Church propose with regard to original sin, which
proceeds from a sin actually committed by an individual Adam and which, through generation, is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.14

At the time of the encyclicals promulgation, theologians disagreed among themselves about
how to interpret this passage. In a journal article published in 1951, Gustave Weigel gives an
extensive bibliography of Catholic commentaries on Humani generis published in English,
French, German, Italian, Latin, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, and Spanish, along with some nonCatholic commentaries, and then summarizes their contents.15 On the topic of polygenism,
Weigel notes that commentators agreed that the encyclical had forbidden the teaching of polygenism as a theory compatible with Christian doctrine, but they disagreed about whether it had
definitively pronounced on the question. Augustine Bea was among those who judged that the
document had not spoken definitively on polygenism. He wrote:
The encyclical does not enter into the scientific side of the question. It is content to reject as
irreconcilable with dogma two recent attempts at explaining original sin. Whether there can
be forms of polygenism which can be brought into resonance with constant Church-teaching,
is a question that is shelved. The Church has no grounds for making any statement on the
point; she can rest satisfied with explaining solid doctrine, and leave it to the representatives
of science to see if perhaps new forms of polygenistic theory can be found which do not contradict dogma. For the moment the question is not urgent, for the representatives of the natural sciences themselves do not consider polygenism as probable.16

Karl Rahner approaches the matter differently but makes a similar judgment. In an article published a few years after Humani generis, Rahner examines scripture texts and magisterial teachings supporting monogenism. He concludes that monogenism is theologically certain, but he
also concludes that the evidence is not sufficient to rule out polygenism as a theological
possibility.17
The view of Humani generis that Bea and Rahner represent does indeed seem correct:
namely, that it does not definitively rule out polygenism as compatible with Christian doctrine.
The passage on polygenism does not make a direct statement about its truth or falsity. It also
gives the distinct impression of having been crafted with great care, as though it was intended to
give the impression of resolving the issue while also stopping short of a definitive, irreformable
judgment, perhaps in order to forestall any possibility of future embarrassment. Whatever the
truth of the texts meaning, however, the sheer fact that two of the greatest Catholic scholars of
the twentieth century did not think that Humani generis had resolved the matter definitively
strongly suggests that, whatever its author intended, the text as it stands cannot be taken as a
definitive magisterial judgment on polygenism. In order for magisterial determinations on matters of Christian doctrine to be authoritative and definitive, they must be clear and unambiguous
about what they mean to determine. Otherwise, they cannot be held to satisfy the necessary condition of having been publicly promulgated.
In the years since Human generis, despite many appropriate opportunities (notably Gaudium
et spes 13, 18; Paul VIs Credo of the People of God, 16; CCC, 385421, 100514; and John
Paul IIs Address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on 22 October 1996), magisterial interventions on human origins have avoided the topic of polygenism. In the meantime, numerous

NICHOLAS LOMBARDO

theologians have come to embrace polygenism, or at least assume its theological acceptability.
Especially given this very public shift in opinion among theologians, the magisterial silence on
polygenism strongly suggests that those charged with preserving the deposit of faith do not think
that Christian doctrine necessarily excludes polygenism.
For this reason, magisterial teaching cannot be taken to have definitively resolved the question of polygenism or the number of first humans. Christian tradition and the assumption by
bishops, theologians, and laity alike for some nineteen centuries that we descend from a single
human couple carry significant theological weight, and proper theological method requires that
they be given due consideration. Nevertheless, while they must be given due consideration, they
do not of themselves resolve the question. They can be deployed in the course of argument, but
they do not themselves constitute an argument. They must be interpreted.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the genetic evidence outlined above definitively disproves traditional theological narratives of human origins as understood by those telling them.
When Trents Decree on Original Sin refers to our common origin in Adam, for example, it
does not formally exclude the possibility that we also share a common origin in thousands of
nonhuman hominids, but the authors of that decree surely presumed that having a common origin in Adam meant that he and he alone fathered all subsequent humans. Consequently, to identify the enduring doctrinal content of earlier magisterial interventions on human origins, we
must interpret them in ways other than their authors understood them. Otherwise we will end up
with results contradicting the scientific evidence. This point is worth bearing in mind. We can
certainly argue for some version of monogenism, but the possibility of arguing for the kind of
monogenism once held universally by Christians no longer exists. Therefore, we cannot simply
reassert traditional theological narratives on the strength of their antiquity or ecclesial authority
nor can we construct new theological narratives of human origins without interpreting tradition.
There is no escape from the task of interpreting traditional theological narratives and discerning
which aspects are historically accurate and which aspects are not.
VI. IMPLICATIONS

The conclusion that we do not descend exclusively from a single human couple is not new.
Scientists have long viewed it as the best explanation for the observed data, and many theologians have long accepted it as such. What is new, or at least relatively new, is the degree of certainty offered by evidence from the human genome that our ancestral lineage could not have
passed through the bottleneck of a single reproducing pair. By ruling out the possibility in such
a clear and definitive way, the evidence provides theologians as yet unwilling to abandon the
traditional theological narrative with a compelling reason to do so. For this reason, the evidence
has the potential to advance considerably the theological conversation about human origins. It
promises to provide theologians with a new common starting point to address as-yet unresolved
questions.
Foremost among these unresolved questions is how to formulate the doctrine of original sin
in light of what we know about evolution. While many theologians have made constructive proposals, nothing approaching consensus currently exists. In the face of the sheer difficulty of the
task and the wide array of proposals on offer, ranging from the very traditional to the very radical, the question seems to have reached an impasse.18 Over the past thirty-five years, many
scholars have written on related subjects such as nature and grace, creation and evolution, and
the problem of evil and suffering, and some scholars have offered reconstructions and critiques
of historically significant accounts of original sin (such as those of Augustine or Thomas

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS

Aquinas), but relatively few have proposed contemporary interpretations of the doctrine of
original sin.19 The genetic evidence discussed in this paper has the potential to advance the conversation beyond impasse in two ways: by providing new data points about human origins,
andinsofar as these new data points demonstrate that traditional theological narratives of
human origins cannot be taken at face valueby making it impossible to resolve theological
questions about primeval history purely by appeals to authority, whether scriptural or
magisterial.
Whether or not the evidence proves to be a positive catalyst for theological reflection, the
task of constructing a theological narrative of human origins that can command wide consensus
remains a pressing concern. Christian faith presupposes a narrative, and until we can agree on
the narratives beginning, at least in broad outline, our ability to communicate the Christian
narrativeto ourselves as well as to otherswill remain fundamentally compromised. By
surveying different options for theological narratives of human origins in light of what we now
know about the human genome, this article has aimed to advance our progress toward such a
consensus.20
Notes
1 For an up-to-date, accessible overview of what we have learned about human origins from genetic
research, see Eugene E. Harris, Ancestors in Our Genome: The New Science of Human Evolution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014). For briefer summary, with particular attention to the implications for traditional Christian beliefs about human origins, see Dennis R. Venema, Genesis and the Genome: Genomics
Evidence for Human-Ape Common Ancestry and Ancestral Hominid Population Sizes, Perspectives on
Science and Christian Faith 62 (2010): 16678. For a synthetic overview of the latest science about the history of human expansion around the world, see Brenna M. Henna et al., The great human expansion,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109 (2012): 1775864. For
a popular introduction, see Nicholas Wade, Before the Dawn: Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors
(New York: Penguin, 2006).
2 Aylwyn Scally et al., Insights into hominid evolution from the gorilla genome sequence, Nature 483
(2012): 169175. A wide range of speciation times have been suggested. For example, another recent study
found much later dates, with human-orangutan speciation at 913 million years ago and human-chimp speciation at around 4 million years ago. See Asger Hobolth et al., Incomplete lineage sorting patterns among
human, chimpanzee, and orangutan suggest recent orangutan speciation and widespread selection Genome
Research 21 (2011): 34956.
3 Francisco J. Ayala and Ananias A. Escalante, The Evolution of Human Populations: A Molecular
Perspective, Molecular Phylogenetics and Evolution 5 (1996): 188201 at 190.
4 In an often-cited article in Science, Francisco Ayala used research on the DRB1 gene to demonstrate why
our ancestors could never have passed through a bottleneck of a single hominid pair. According to Ayala, for
the DRB1 gene, there are thirty-two variations with lineages tracing back to our common ancestors with chimpanzees. Consequently, at any given time, our ancestors could never have numbered fewer than sixteen simultaneously reproducing individuals. See Francisco J. Ayala, The Myth of Eve: Molecular Biology and Human
Origins, Science 270 (1995): 193036. For a discussion of Ayalas conclusions and their implication for
theological questions about human origins, see Kenneth W. Kemp, Science, Theology, and Monogenesis,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2011): 21736, esp. 224. Ayalas conclusions about the
DRB1 gene have been challenged by other scientists. One study suggested only seven variations trace back to
our common ancestors with the chimpanzees; a later study concluded that only four variations trace back six
million years, and a fifth developed around five million years ago. See Tomas Bergstrom et al., Recent origin
of HLA-DRB1 alleles and implications for human evolution, Nature Genetics 18 (1998): 23742; Jenny von
Salome et al., Full-length sequence analysis of the HLA-DRB1 locus suggests a recent origin of alleles,
Immunogenetics 59 (2007): 26171. These scientific challenges to Ayalas research have often been used for
theological ends to argue against Ayalas larger point about the impossibility of a bottleneck of a single hominid pair. See Ann Gauger, Douglas Axe, and Casey Luskin, Science and Human Origins (Seattle, WA:
Discovery Institute Press, 2012), 10522; Dennis Bonnette, Origin of the Human Species, 3rd ed. (Ave Maria,

10

NICHOLAS LOMBARDO

FL: Sapientia Press, 2014), 21725. Nevertheless, even if Ayalas conclusions about the DRB1 gene do not
stand, his larger point, about the impossibility of our genetic lineage passing through the bottleneck of a single
reproducing pair, does stand. Since he published his article The Myth of Eve in 1995, our knowledge of
human and primate genomes has expanded exponentially, and the same point could be established from a vast
array of other data points.
5 Studies consistently estimate the ancestral effective population at around 10,000, but there is some variation depending on the data and method used. Two of the best recent studies estimate 9,000 and 14,000, respectively. See Ilan Gronau et al., Bayesian inference of ancient human demography from individual genome
sequences, Nature Genetics 43 (2011): 103135; Michael G. B. Blum and Mattias Jakobsson, Deep
Divergences of Human Gene Trees and Models of Human Origins, Molecular Biology and Evolution 28
(2011): 88998.
6 Harris, Ancestors in Our Genome, 39.
7 An important clarification is necessary. Although taken as a whole the human race has never had fewer
than thousands of simultaneously existing ancestors from the time of speciation onwards, subsets of the human
population give evidence of significant bottlenecks in their genetic ancestry. Most significantly, according to
the widely accepted Out of Africa theory, the first humans appeared at a location in sub-Saharan Africa
between 60,000 to 200,000 years ago. Later, a small band of pioneers left Africa and their descendents colonized the rest of the world. Those of us who descend from that small band of pioneers give evidence of a significant genetic bottleneck in our ancestry; the rest of us do not. For an overview of the Out of Africa theory
that incorporates recent scientific developments, see Brenna M. Henn, L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, and Marcus W.
Feldman, The Great Human Expansion, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (2012):
1775817764.
8 ST I 76.1; Council of Vienne (131112), can. 1.
9 Kenneth Kemp proposes such a theological narrative of human origins. See Kemp, Science, Theology,
and Monogenesis, 23132.
10 Marcus J. Hamilton et al., The complex structure of huntergatherer social networks, Proceedings of
the Royal Society 274 (2007): 21952202, esp. 2198; Henna, The great human expansion, 1776162.
11 Recent evidence strongly suggests that descendants of those homo sapiens who left Africa interbred with
homo neanderthalensis and homo denisova. It is a matter of anthropological and theological controversy, however, whether or not homo neanderthalensis and homo denisova would have possessed immortal souls and thus
been as theologically human as any representative of homo sapiens.
12 On this historical origins of the idea of the Fall, see Nicholas E. Lombardo, Evil, Suffering, and
Original Sin, in The Oxford Handbook of Catholic Theology, ed. Lewis Ayres and Medi Ann Volpe (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, in press).
13 This historical claim excludes from consideration such things as documents of the Pontifical Biblical
Commission on the grounds that they do not constitute authoritative judgments of the magisterium.
14 Cum vero de alia coniecturali opinione agitur, videlicet de polygenismo, quem vocant, tum Ecclesiae filii
eiusmodi libertate minime fruuntur. Non enim christifideles eam sententiam amplecti possunt, quam qui retinent asseverant vel post Adam hisce in terris veros homines exstitisse, qui non ab eodem prouti omnium protoparente, naturali generatione originem duxerint, vel Adam significare multitudinem quamdam protoparentum;
cum nequaquam appareat quomodo huiusmodi sententia componi queat cum iis quae fontes revelatae veritatis
et acta Magisterii Ecclesiae proponunt de peccato originali quod procedit ex peccato vere commisso ab uno
Adamo, quodque generatione in omnes transfusum, inest unicuique proprium. Humani generis, 37.
15 Gustave Weigel, Commentaries on Humani generis, Theological Studies 12 (1951): 521549.
16 Augustine Bea, Die Enzyklika Humani generis: Ihre Grundgedanken und ihre Bedeutung, Scholastik
26 (1951): 3656 at 54, as translated and quoted by Weigel, Commentaries, 546.
17 Despite the fact that Rahners article argues for monogenism, it remains one of the best demonstrations
of the compatibility of polygenism with scripture and magisterial teaching. See Karl Rahner, Theological
Reflexions on Monogenism, in Theological Investigations, Volume I: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, trans.
Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 22996. Later, Rahner becomes more favorable to polygenism, but there is great underlying continuity with his earlier approach. See Karl Rahner, Evolution and
Original Sin, Concilium 26 (1967): 6173.
18 Among Catholic theologians, the Second Vatican Council inaugurated a period of intense interest in the
doctrine of original sin and its reinterpretation. The conversation continued for some years. Despite some significant theological progress, however, it quickly fragmented as theologians came to radically different conclusions about which aspects of traditional formulations should be retained and which aspects should be
discarded. By the early 1980s, the conversation seems to have run its course, perhaps in recognition that

EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS AND THEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF HUMAN ORIGINS

11

theological reflection had reached an impasse. For a sense of the post-conciliar conversation about original sin
among Catholic theologians, see James L. Connor, Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches, Theological
Studies 29 (1968): 21540; George Vandervelde, Original Sin: Two Major Trends in Contemporary Roman
Catholic Reinterpretation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1975); Brian O. McDermott, The Theology of Original Sin:
Current Developments, Theological Studies 38 (1977): 478512; Siegfried Wiedenhofer, The Main Forms
of Contemporary Theology of Original Sin, Communio 18 (1991): 51429. For an overview of Catholic theology of original sin from its earliest origins in Jewish exegesis up through the present day, see Nicholas E.
Lombardo, Evil, Suffering, and Original Sin. Among Protestant theologians, a similar impasse had been
reached much earlier. They had already been engaged for decades in the sort of theological exploration about
original sin that became widespread among Catholic theologians only after the Second Vatican Council.
19 Despite the ecumenical neglect of the doctrine of original sin, significant monographs and edited collections offering constructive proposals about original sin have appeared over the past twenty years. They include:
James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes (New York: Herder & Herder,
1998); Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, Development, Contemporary Meanings (New York: Paulist Press,
2002); Christophe Boureux, Christoph Theobald, and John Stephen Bowden, eds., Original Sin: A Code of
Fallibility (Concilium 2004/1; London: SCM Press, 2004); Darryl P. Domning and Monica K. Hellwig,
Original Selfishness: Original Sin and Evil in the Light of Evolution (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing,
2006); Raymund Schwager, Banished from Eden: Original Sin and Evolutionary Theory in the Drama of
Salvation (Leominster, Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2006); Ian A McFarland, In Adams Fall: A Meditation on
the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 2010); Jesse Couenhoven, Stricken by Sin,
Cured by Christ: Agency, Necessity, and Culpability in Augustinian Theology (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013); Hans Madueme and Michael Reeves, eds. Adam, the Fall, and Original Sin: Theological,
Biblical, and Scientific Perspectives (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014).
20 I would like to express my gratitude to the many friends and colleagues who offered comments on
research related to this article, especially Nicanor Austriaco, O.P., for his comments and suggestions on the scientific aspects. I would also like to thank the Department of Theology and Religion of Durham University,
which welcomed me as a Visiting Fellow in 2014 and where I completed much of the research for this article.