A.C. No.

9872

January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA

PRESBITERO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

S.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for
disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by
Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S.
Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBPCBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer
agreement with Presbitero to follow up the
release of the payment for the latters 2.7hectare property located in Bacolod which was
the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The
agreement also included the payment of the
debts of Presbiteros late husband to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the
retained areas of the property, and the collection
of the rentals due for the retained areas from
their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was
supposed to pay P700,000 for the property but it
was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late
husband to PNB for P1,200,000. Presbitero
alleged that PNBs claim had already prescribed,
and she engaged the services of respondent to
represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed
the filing of a case for quieting of title against
PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorneys fee of 10% of the proceeds from the
VOS or the sale of the property, with the
expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but
deductible from respondents fees. Respondent
received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for
the expenses of the case, but nothing came out
of it.
In May 2006, Presbiteros daughter, Ma. Theresa
P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondents services
to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot
located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan,
Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the
property. Respondent undertook to register the
property in consideration of 30% of the value of
the property once it is registered. Respondent
obtained P200,000
from
Navarro
for
the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that

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the registration decree over the property was

already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo.
Navarro alleged that she would not have spent
for the registration of the property if respondent
only apprised her of the real situation of the
property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan
of P1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period
of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of
10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real
estate mortgage over a property located in
Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed
that respondent shall issue postdated checks to
cover the principal amount of the loan as well as
the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the
checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them
in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional
loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions
as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn
against an account in Bank of Commerce,
Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise
discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan
of P1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was
over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent
Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the
263-square-meter property mortgaged under the
third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a
real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter
parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter
property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for
the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few
months. He was able to pay complainants a total
of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either
the principal amount or the interest thereon. In
September 2006, the checks issued by
respondent to complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which
they were drawn were already closed. When

complainants called respondents attention, he

promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a
reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as
counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel.
Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages executed by
respondent in their favor. Respondent countered
that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was
usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed
cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced
them to grant him loans by offering very high
interest rates. He also prepared and signed the
checks which turned out to be drawn against his
sons accounts. Complainants further alleged that
respondent deceived them regarding the identity
and value of the property he mortgaged because
he showed them a different property from that
which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that
respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter
property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold it
for only P150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was
engaged in sugar and realty business and that it
was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro
to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that
Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw
sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the
interest rate and he agreed because he needed
the money. He alleged that their business
transactions were secured by real estate
mortgages and covered by postdated checks.
Respondent denied that the property he
mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value
of the loan. He also denied that he sold the
property because the sale was actually rescinded.
Respondent claimed that the property he
mortgaged to Navarro was valuable and it was
actually worth more than P8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay
complainants when business was good but he
was unable to continue paying when the price of
sugar went down and when the business with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push
through because Presbitero did not help him.
Respondent also denied that he was hiding from
complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who
owed him P530,000 as interest due for
September to December 2005. He denied making
any false representations. He claimed that

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complainants were aware that he could no longer

open a current account and they were the ones
who proposed that his wife and son issue the
checks. Respondent further alleged that he
already started with the titling of Yulos lot but his
services were terminated before it could be
completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging
respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that
he accepted Presbiteros case in February 2006
and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the
position papers submitted by the parties, the IBPCBD found that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The
IBP-CBD
found
that
respondent
borrowed P2,000,000
from
Navarro
and P1,000,000 from Presbitero which he failed to
pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed.
The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents
presented by the parties, respondent did not act
in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD
found that respondent either promised or agreed
to pay the very high interest rates of the loans
although he knew them to be exorbitant in
accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent
likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and
her husband regarding the identity of the
property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged
a
property
to
Presbitero
for P1,000,000 but documents showed that its
value was only P300,000. Documents also
showed that he sold that property for
only P150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to
secure loans by promising her a 10% commission
and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo
would "ride" on the loan by borrowing P300,000
from the amount he obtained from Navarro and
Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he
lost all the money he borrowed in three months
except for his claim that the price of sugar went
down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled
Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of
the postdated checks, and there was nothing in
the records that would show that he informed
them that it would be his wife or son who would
issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection
with Presbiteros VOS with DAR. He was also
negligent in his accounting regarding the
registration of Yulos property which was financed
by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of

violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration,

praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead
imposed upon respondent.

(1) signing drawn checks against the

account of his son as if they were from his
own account;

The only issue in this case is whether respondent

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity

of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true
value of the 263-square-meter lot he
mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans
from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10%
interest on his loans although he knew
that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the
checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to
properly account for the various funds he
received from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money
from a client unless the clients interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent
advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under
suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records
were not clear whether the notice of suspension
respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the
final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise
found that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be
meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May
2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD
with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the
practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return
the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.

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The records show that respondent violated at

least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code
Responsibility provides:

of

Professional

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was
established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He
drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer
pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA
he drafted on the ground that the interest rate
was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter
property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he later
sold the property for only P150,000, showing that
he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondents allegation that
the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract
from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as
to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he
issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose
name is similar to his name. He only claimed that
complainants knew that he could no longer open
a current bank account, and that they even
suggested that his wife or son issue the checks
for him. However, we are inclined to agree with
the IBP-CBDs finding that he made complainants
believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the
first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to
Navarro and the third batch of checks to
Presbitero
through
a
messenger,
and
complainants believed that the checks belonged
to accounts in respondents name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have
ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not
confined to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity.2 The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro

were done in respondents private capacity.
Although Navarro financed the registration of
Yulos lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyerclient relationship. However, respondent was
Presbiteros counsel at the time she granted him
a loan. It was established that respondent misled
Presbitero on the value of the property he
mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To
appease Presbitero, respondent even made a
Deed of Undertaking that he would give her
another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with
respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero
and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the
terms of the loan agreements. Respondent
drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates
were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the
law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from
his sons account whose name was similar to his
without informing complainants. Further, there is
nothing in the records that will show that
respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he
obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the
client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between
the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. 4 We
agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to
fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed
out that respondent received various amounts
from complainants but he could not account for
all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulos
18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent
received P265,000
from
her.
Respondent
countered that P105,000 was paid for real estate
taxes but he could not present any receipt to
prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he
paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was
only for P15,000. Respondent claimed that he
paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and
other expenses but again, he could not

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substantiate his claims with any receipt. As

pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been
less than diligent in accounting for the funds he
received from Navarro for the registration of
Yulos property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether
respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who
had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during
the
clarificatory
hearing
that
respondent
received P50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD
pointed out, the records do not show how
respondent spent the funds because he was not
transparent in liquidating the money he received
from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in
properly accounting for the money he received
from his client, Presbitero.1wphi1 Indeed, his
failure to return the excess money in his
possession gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the
Responsibility provides:

Code

of

Professional

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money

from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he
borrowed P1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At
the time he secured the loan, respondent was
already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondents loan from Presbitero was
secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent
misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were
not drawn from his account but from that of his
son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms
of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan
was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored
because the accounts were already closed. The
interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this
case, was not fully protected. Respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client

Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his

knowledge of the law as well as the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his client.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the

personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board

of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for two
years. Given the facts of the case, we see no
reason to deviate from the recommendation of
the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty
of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing required of him as a member of the
legal profession.7 Instead, respondent employed
his knowledge and skill of the law and took
advantage of his client to secure undue gains for
himself8 that warrants his removal from the
practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the
IBP Board of Governors recommendation
ordering respondent to return his unpaid
obligation to complainants, except for advances
for the expenses he received from his client,
Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.9 Our only concern is the determination of
respondents administrative liability. 10
Our findings have no material bearing on other
judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a
lawyer receives money from a client for a
particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent
for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, he
must immediately return the money to his
client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to
render an accounting, and he failed. He must
return the full amount of the advances given him
by Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances
he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting
to P50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with this order within
thirty days from finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country.

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Adm. Case No. 8108

DANTE
LA
JIMENEZ
VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY.
FELISBERTO
JR., Respondent.

July 15, 2014

&
L.

LAURO

G.

VERANO,

x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY.
OLIVER
O.
LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY.
FELISBERTO
L.
VERANO,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
(IBP)
finding
respondent
Atty.
Felisberto Verano liable for improper and
inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or
giving the appearance of influence upon a public
official. The Joint Report and Recommendation
submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
recommended that respondent beissued a
warning not to repeat the same nor any similar
action, otherwise the Commission will impose a
more severe penalty. The Commission adopted
the said ruling on 16 April 2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.)
No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No.
10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the
filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano
was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett
and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports
attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys")
werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal
sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3 In a Joint
Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008,
the charges were dropped for lack of probable
cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R.
Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the
evaluation of the case, several media outlets
reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up"
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug
trade.This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional
hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing
that respondenthad prepared the release order
for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of
then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as

founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that
respondent had admitted to drafting the release
order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. They argued that
respondent had no authority to use the DOJ
letterhead and should be penalized for acts
unbecoming a member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint
on respondents alleged violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor
legal processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that
respondent showed disrespect for the law and
legal processes in drafting the said order and
sending it to a high-ranking public official, even
though the latter was not a government
prosecutor.8 Atty.
Lozanos
verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee
on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD
Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a
Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for
the VACCs filing of disbarment proceedings. 10 On
27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his
Complaint on the ground that a similar action had
been filed by Dante Jimenez. 11 On 2 June 2009,
the Court referred both cases to the IBP for
consolidation, as well as for investigation, report
and recommendation. RESPONDENTS VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint
Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against
his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that
the resolution also ordered the immediate release
of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high
hopes of the accused, together with their
families, came crashing down when the PDEA still
refused to release his clients. 12 Sheer faith in the
innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause
prompted him to prepare and draft the release
order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was
overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice
approves
it,
then
everything
may
be
expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues,
the drafted release order was not signed by the
Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap
of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

recommended that he be issued a warning not to

repeat the same or any similar action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may
conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of
initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it
is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in
these proceedings is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of
a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozanos withdrawal of his verified
Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in RayosOmbac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment
case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension
or
disbarment
may
proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance
of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree
with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the
provision
applied
by
the
Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely
upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe
that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influencepeddling not limited to the regular courts, but
even in all other venues in the justice sector,
where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.

The Commissioner noted that both complaints

remained unsubstantiated, while the lettercomplaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been
verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to
prove the charges.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the

Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated
that the PDEA refused to release his clients
unless it received a direct order from the DOJ
Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him
to take more serious action, viz.:

However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11

and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the
release order specifically for the signature of the
DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft
order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public
official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
and

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I

think my only recourse was to see the Secretary
himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a
person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political
also so he opens his office. If Im not mistaken
that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic]
that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga
sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the

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family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw

gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang
kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer
nowI prepared the staff to make it easy, to
make it convenient for signing authority that if he
agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and
send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And
then I sent it first to the Office of the other
Secretary si Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think its a Tuesday I had to do something
and I said I will see the Secretary first with the
parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so
we went to see him after 1:00 oclock or 1:30 in
the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with
Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap
naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x
Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway,
sabi niya what can I do if I move on this, they will
think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na
yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million,
hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang
ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usapsabi
niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the
matter, those particular words, I will study the
matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a
matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were
not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and
we were discussing the case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience
with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and
that "because of my practice and well, candidly I
belong also to a political family, my father was a
Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the
family and he knows my sister was a
Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether
in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete
stranger
to
him."20 Upon
questioning
by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent
admitted that he was personally acquainted with
the Secretary; however, they were not that
close.21
These statements and others made during the
hearing establish respondents admission that 1)
he personally approached the DOJ Secretary
despite the fact that the case was still pending
before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the
preparation of the draft release order on official
DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do
so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The
way
respondent
conducted
himself
manifested a clear intent to gain special
treatment and consideration from a government
agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified
norms for the bar. Respondentis duty-bound to
actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or
may be seen to influence, the outcome of an
ongoing case, lest the peoples faith inthe judicial
process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients
but to the administration of justice.1wphi1 To
that end, their clients success is wholly
subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar
ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not

PALE Cases

Page 7

honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to

bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion
to his clients cause, is condemnable and
unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system."
Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall
not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body." The
succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer
"to impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients
cause must always be within the bounds of the
law.23 A self-respecting independence in the
exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the
present case, we find that respondent fell short of
these exacting standards. Given the import of the
case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that
would not serve as commensurate penalty for the
offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua,
the Court saw fit to impose a six-month
suspension against a judge who likewise
committed acts of influence peddling whenshe
solicited P100,000.00 from complainant Santos
when the latter asked for her help in the case of
her friend Emerita Muoz, who had a
pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because
respondent judge was a former court attorney of
the high court.24 We find that the same penalty is
appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating
Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which
he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six
(6) months effective immediately. This also serves
as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of any
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the
respondents
bar
records.
The
Court
Administrator is hereby directed to inform the
different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6707

March 24, 2006

GISELA
HUYSSEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint 1 for Disbarment filed by
Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while
respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her

three sons, who are all American citizens, applied

for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the
Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant
that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to
deposit a certain sum of money for a period of
one year which could be withdrawn after one
year. Believing that the deposit was indeed
required by law, complainant deposited with
respondent on six different occasions from April
1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000.
Respondent
prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the
amounts deposited by the complainant but
refused to give her copies of official receipts
despite
her
demands.
After
one
year,
complainant demanded from respondent the
return of US$20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. When respondent
failed to return the sum deposited, the World
Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a
member) sent a demand letter to respondent for
the immediate return of the money. In a letter
dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to
release the amount not later than 9 March 1999.
Failing to comply with his promise, the World
Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a
letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged
reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated
to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on
their due dates, the same were dishonored
because respondent had stopped payment on the
same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to
complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the
reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and
gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored.
Complainant deposited the five postdated checks
on their due dates but they were all dishonored
for having been drawn against insufficient funds
or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several
unfulfilled promises to return the deposited
amount, complainant referred the matter to a
lawyer who sent two demand letters to
respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by
complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez,
Director for Bar Discipline, required3 respondent
to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt
thereof.
In
his
Counter-Affidavit
dated
2
July
2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically
received the money mentioned in the complaint,
he could not have appropriated or pocketed the
same. He said the amount was used as payment
for services rendered for obtaining the permanent
visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained
thus:

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Page 8

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor

and likewise a friend of the complainant, the
latter was introduced to me at my office at the
Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself
and three sons, one of which is already of major
age while the two others were still minors then.
Their problem was the fact that since they have
been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10)
years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they
could no longer extend their said status as under
the law and related polic[i]es of the government,
missionary visa holders could only remain as such
for ten (10) years after which they could no
longer extend their said status and have to leave
the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic),
I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine
Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa
and thereafter, provided them with list of the
requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of
which is that the applicant must have a $40,000
deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son
Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age,
has to have the same amount of show money
separate of her money as he would be issued
separate visa, while her two minor children would
be included as her dependents in her said visa
application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her
to a lawyer to work for their application, which I
did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and
followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding
permanent
visa
were
obtained
by
the
complainant and her family. Her son Marcus
Huyssen was given an independent permanent
visa while the other two were made as
dependents of the complainant. In between the
processing of the papers and becoming very
close to the complainant, I became the
intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the
latter would request for whatever purpose was
coursed through me which request were then
transmitted to the complainant and every amount
of money given by the complainant to their
counsel were coursed thru me which is the very
reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the
amount appeared to be huge for services of a
lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to
satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the
following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her
show money from the bank is not really her
money but money of World Mission for Jesus,
which therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration
Law
as
there
was
a
misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later
when the said entity sent their demand letter to

the undersigned affiant and which is attached to

the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the
complainant, was the very same amount used by
her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his
separate permanent visa. These acts of the
complainant and her son could have been a
ground for deportation and likewise constitute
criminal offense under the Immigration Law and
the Revised Penal Code. These could have been
the possible reason why complainant was made
to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas,
complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even
invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant
demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from
me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer
around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the
matter is now being hidden and that the amount
of money is now being sought to be recovered
from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and
being a lawyer I know the consequences of
having signed the same and therefore I had to
answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund
needed but up to the present my standby loan
application has not been released and was
informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same
should have been released last March but was
aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount
to be paid, according to the complainant has now
become
doubled
plus
attorneys
fees
of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4
September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her
Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for
reception of respondents evidence but the
scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at
the instance of the respondent who was allegedly
out of the country to attend to his clients needs.
Reception
of
respondents
evidence
was
scheduled for the last time on 28 September
2004 and again respondent failed to appear,
despite due notice and without just cause.
On
5
November
2004,
Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her
report5 recommending
the
disbarment
of
respondent. She justified her recommendation in
this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no
question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent
himself admitted that he signed the vouchers
(Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his
receipt of said amount from complainant.
Respondent however claims that he did not
appropriate the same for himself but that he

PALE Cases

Page 9

delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.

Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1
March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the
World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint)
where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of
the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody
really intended that the thing would happen that
way. Many events were the causes of the said
delay
particularly
the
death
of
then
Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death
prevented us the needed papers for the
immediate release. It was only from compiling all
on the first week of January this year, that all the
said papers were recovered, hence, the process
of the release just started though some important
papers were already finished as early as the last
quarter of last year. We are just going through the
normal standard operating procedure and there is
no day since January that I do not make any
follow ups on the progress of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of
Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover
the refund of the amount deposited by your good
self in connection with the procurement of your
permanent visa and that of your family. It might
take some more time before the Bureau could
release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are being still compiled are being looked
at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles,
who approved your visa and who died of heart
attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would
be fine later as all the documents needed are
already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it
appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. However, if this is true, how come
only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of
the said sum and official receipts therefore were
never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would
respondent issue his personal checks to cover the
return of the money to complainant if said
amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion
that respondent received the money from
complainant and appropriated the same for his
personal use. It should also be noted that
respondent has failed to establish that the "late
Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit
really exists. There is not one correspondence
from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application
of complainant and his family, and complainant
has also testified that she never met this Atty.
Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to
perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his
position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it
more reprehensible as it has caused damage to
the reputation and integrity of said office. It is
submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02

of Canon 6 of the Code

Responsibility which reads:

of

Professional

case was set for reception of his evidence despite

due notice.

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use

his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties."

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is,

thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it
must be buttressed by a strong evidence of nonculpability; otherwise, such denial is purely selfserving and is with nil evidentiary value.

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors

approved6 the
Investigating
Commissioners
report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondents violation of
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount with legal interest from
receipt of the money until payment. This case
shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman
for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of
Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official task have more restrictions than lawyers
in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to
be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
holds a responsible public office.7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted 8 having
received the US$20,000 from complainant as
shown by his signatures in the petty cash
vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false
representation that that it was needed in
complainants application for visa with the BID.
Respondent denied he misappropriated the said
amount and interposed the defense that he
delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who
assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the
death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse,
the action of respondent in shifting the blame to
someone who has been naturally silenced by
fate, is not only impudent but downright
ignominious. When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
deny the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against
him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him. In the case at bar,
respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records
show that even though he was given the
opportunity to answer the charges and controvert
the evidence against him in a formal
investigation, he failed, without any plausible
reason, to appear several times whenever the

PALE Cases

Page 10

When respondent issued the postdated checks as

his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Such admissions were also apparent in
the
following
letters
of
respondent
to
complainant:
1) Letter13 dated 01 March
portion of which reads:

1992,

pertinent

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last

time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the
latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be
released on said date, I understand to pay the
same to you out of my personal money on said
date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send
somebody here at the office on that day and the
amount would be given to you wether (sic) from
the Bureau or from my own personal money.
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover
the refund of the amount deposited by your
goodself in connection with the procurement of
your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau
could release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are still being compiled and are being
looked at the files of the late Commissioner
Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything
would be fine later as all the documents needed
are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic
delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I
have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6,
1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I
leave the amount vacant because I would want
you to fill them up on their due dates the peso
equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be
sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000
would be well exchanged. I have postdated them
to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover
the whole amount but dont worry as the Lord
had already provided me the means.
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles.
You are aware that I have done my very best for
the early return of your money but the return is
becoming bleak as I was informed that there are
still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment
of the checks I issued, I was of the impression
that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is
time for me to accept the fact that I really have to
personally return the money out of my own. The
issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that

I must face. It may hurt me financially but it

would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders
and was able to secure one last Saturday the
releases of which are on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the
province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am
issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason
of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the
last time, if any of these checks, is returned,
dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary
action against me, I just had to put an end to this
matter and look forward. x x x
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount
of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I
issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all other
checks that are becoming due to some of my
creditors to give preference to the check I issued
to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned
that the bank instead of returning the other
checks I requested for stop payment - instead
honored them and mistakenly returned your
check. This was a very big surprise to me and
discouragement for I know it would really upset
you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the
amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan
to withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not
entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I
bring the same to your place considering that its
quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for
you to immediately deposit today and I was
assured by the bank that it would be honored this
time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is
falsely accused of appropriating the money of
another.
As
correctly
observed
by
the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent would
not have issued his personal checks if said
amount were officially deposited with the BID.
This is an admission of misconduct.
Respondents act of asking money from
complainant in consideration of the latters
pending application for visas is violative of Rule
1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code
which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of
private interest includes soliciting gifts or

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Page 11

anything of monetary value in any transaction

requiring the approval of his office or which may
be
affected
by
the
functions
of
his
office.19 Respondents conduct in office betrays
the integrity and good moral character required
from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a
high public office. A lawyer in public office is
expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government; he
must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to
camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing
another by issuing several worthless checks,
thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance
of
worthless
checks
constitutes
gross
misconduct,20 as the effect "transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus,
paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on
his private duties he owes his fellow men or
society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals."21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a
person in issuing a check knowing at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral
turpitude.22
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only
did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with
the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to
cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not
deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the
practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent
intellectually,
academically
and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the
lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes
suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of

the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss

thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.24

for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office

of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative

cases against lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to
safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose utter disregard of
their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.25These pronouncement gain
practical significance in the case at bar
considering that respondent was a former
member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the
BID. It bears stressing also that government
lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to
the public service, a public trust. As such,
government lawyers should be more sensitive to
their professional obligations as their disreputable
conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye.26

SO ORDERED.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer,

respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following
acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do so.27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the
disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher
Education, demanded sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v.
Barcelona,29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of
the National Labor Relations Commission, who
was caught by the National Bureau of
Investigation in the act of receiving and counting
money extorted from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct;
and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith
of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount he received from the
complainant with legal interest from his receipt of
the money until payment. This case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department
of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

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Page 12

March 4, 2014
A.C.
No.
(Formerly CBD 11-2985)
BENJAMIN
Q.
vs.
ATTY.
WILLIAM
SANTOS, Respondent.

10179
ONG, Complainant,
F.

DELOS

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders
him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To
accord
with
the
canon
of
professional
responsibility that requires him to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for the law and legal processes,
he thereby becomes administratively liable for
gross misconduct.
Antecedents
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was
introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos
Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several
calls and personal interactions between them,
Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In
time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked
him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as
he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that
the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty.
Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice
and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty.
Delos Santos financial stability, Ong handed to
Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the
amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the
latters Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated
February 29, 2008.2 However, the check was
dishonored upon presentment for the reason that
the account was closed.3 Ong relayed the matter
of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter
just ignored him.4 When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint
for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.5 Ong also
brought this disbarment complaint against Atty.
Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint
as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
Findings
and
Recommendation
of the IBP Bar Commissioner
In
his
Commissioners
Report,6 IBP
Bar
Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that
Ong had sufficiently established the existence of
the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos
did not file his answer despite notice, and did not
also
present
contrary
evidence.7 He
recommended that Atty. Delos Santos be held
liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension

from the practice of law for two years, plus the
return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the
complainant,8 be meted on Atty. Delos Santos in
view of an earlier disbarment case brought
against him (Lucman v. Atty. Delos Santos, CBD
Case No. 09-253).
Resolution No. XX-2013-253
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and
approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela
Rama, Jr.,9 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos Santos is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years and ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos to complainant with legal interest within
thirty days from receipt of notice.
Issue
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos
Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Ruling
We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify
the recommended penalty.
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the
duty and responsibility to maintain his good
moral character. In this regard, good moral
character is not only a condition precedent
relating to his admission into the practice of law,
but is a continuing imposition in order for him to
maintain his membership in the Philippine
Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of him to
remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose
confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his
moral character in serious doubt renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.12
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in
order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking
account users.13 The gravamen of the offense
defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
according to Lozano v. Martinez,14 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment and putting it in circulation; the law is
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit,
because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be

PALE Cases

Page 13

abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v.

Martinez:
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society
and the public interest.15 xxx
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware
of the objectives and coverage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law
was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious
effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order.16 He thereby swept aside his
Lawyers Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for
granted the express commands of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL
PROFESSION
AND
SUPPORT
THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
These canons, the Court has said in Agno v.
Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an
enduring high sense of responsibility and good
fidelity in all his dealings, thus:
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high
standard of honesty and fairness expected of a
lawyer not only in the practice of the legal
profession but in his personal dealings as well. A
lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety,
and his behavior should be beyond reproach
anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the
courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are
burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave
at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor
in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers
may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in

their professional or in their private capacity, if

such conduct renders them unfit to continue to
be officers of the court.18
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong
did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him
whether he was acting as such or in a nonprofessional capacity with the obligation to
exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his
relationship with others. There is no question that
a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any
misconduct committed outside of his professional
capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded that he
conduct himself as a person of the highest moral
and professional integrity and probity in his
dealings with others.20
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty.
Delos Santos put into serious question not only
his personal integrity but also the integrity of the
entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that
Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos request for
encashment of the check because of his complete
reliance on the nobility of the Legal Profession.
The following excerpts from Ongs testimony bear
this out, to wit:
COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you
were issued a bounced check by the respondent?
MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him
money because actually he was not even my
friend. He was just referred to me. The reason
why I felt at ease to loan him money was because
the sheriff told me that abogado eto. It is his
license that would be at stake thats why I lent
him the money.21
xxxx
COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are
saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer
issued a bounced check in your favor.

financial standing because of his lucrative law

practice when the contrary was true manifested
his intent to mislead the latter into giving a
substantial amount in exchange for his worthless
post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak
well of him as a member of the Bar.
Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of
serious misconduct, warranting appropriate
administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal
complaint charging him with the violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed,
and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount
of P100,000.00,23 both of which are treated as
mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend him from the practice of law for a period
of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty
to suspension from the practice of law to six
months in order to accord with the ruling in
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Carandang.24
ACCORDINGLY,
the
Court
PRONOUNCES
respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS
GUILTY of violating the Lawyers Oath, and Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of
Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly,
SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR
A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM
NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
Atty. Delos Santos' personal record as an
attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

MR. ONG

A.C. No. 10303

:
Yes, Commissioner.

JOY
A.
GIMENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

COMM. DELA RAMA:

DECISION

Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?

BRION, J.:

MR. ONG

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-264 1 of the

Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which
imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide)
the penalty of one-year suspension from the
practice
of
law,
revocation
of
notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension
from being commissioned as a notary public, for
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
(Notarial Practice Rules).2

:
They uphold the law, they know the law. He
should not have issued the check if you know it
cannot be funded because actually I have many
lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for
lawyers.22
Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his
duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in
all his dealings with the public. Any transgression
of this duty on his part would not only diminish
his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode
the publics faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole. His assuring Ong that he was in good

PALE Cases

Page 14

April 22, 2015

The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno
(Cimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty.
Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's
office; (2) falsification;

(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive

language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even
before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and
receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had
notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with
deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. 6 She
also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and
irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty.
Zaide's former client. She engaged the services
of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law
Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that
involved her husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,
Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the
complaint for estafa and violation of RA
30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan)
filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno
posited that by appearing against a former client,
Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the
representation
of
conflicting
clients'
interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty.
Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the
same administrative complaint that Somontan
filed against her.10 In another civil case where she
was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty.
Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as
someone
suffering
from
"serious
mental
incompetence"
in
one
of
his
pleadings.11 According
to
Gimeno,
these
statements constitute intemperate, offensive and
abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed
from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007,Atty.
Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March
29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it
appeared on the notarial page of this document,
his notarial stamp and falsified signature were
superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually
notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed
that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it
appear that he notarized it before his admission
to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries,
Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to
simultaneously use several notarial registers in
his separate satellite offices in order to better
cater to the needs of his clients and
accommodate
their growing number.14 This
explains the irregular and non-sequential entries
in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was
never his client since she did not personally hire
him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services
of ZMZ where he previously worked as an
associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her
relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty.
Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's
partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should
not be held liable for representing conflicting
clients' interests.

PALE Cases

Page 15

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate,

offensive,
and
abusive
language
in
his
pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order
setting the case for mandatory conference. 17 After
this, both parties were required to submit their
position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May
18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide
administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests,
and using abusive and insulting language in his
pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a)
and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
when he maintained several active notarial
registers in different offices. These provisions
respectively require a notary public to "keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered papers" and to "keep only
one active notarial register at any given
time."19 However, Commissioner Magpayo opined
that
Atty.
Zaide
should
not
be
held
administratively liable for usurping a notary
public's office. The investigating commissioner
noted that the evidence presented on this issue is
not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and
notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition even after his admission to the Bar and
receipt of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the
evidence presented proved that Gimeno was
indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed
with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired
ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend
them in their annulment of title case. The retainer
of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its
lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorneyclient
relationship,
the
investigating
commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not
be held liable for representing conflicting
interests since the annulment of title case is
totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint
that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty.
Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that
Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and
abusive language when he called Gimeno a
"notorious
extortionist"
in
one
of
his
pleadings.22 For violating the Notarial Practice
Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended
that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months,
and for another six months for employing abusive
and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP
Board of Governors (Board) opined that the
evidence on record fully supports the findings of
the investigating commissioner. However, the
Board modified the recommended penalty and

imposed instead the penalty of one year

suspension from the practice of law, revocation of
notarial commission, if existing, and two years
suspension from being commissioned as a notary
public.24

document. How this happened is not clear from

the evidence before us.

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the

Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this
was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013
resolution.26

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial

Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial
registers in several offices. Because of this
practice, the following notarized documents had
been irregularly numbered and entered:

b. Maintaining different
separate notarial offices

notarial

registers

in

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of
Governors' findings and recommended penalty,
Special Power of Attorney
and accordingly confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall
Secretary's Certificate
discuss each of the main issues that the parties
identified.
Affidavit of Quitclaim
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office

Affidavit of Loss

As the investigating commissioner found,

Gimeno
Affidavit
of Two Disinterested
did not present any concrete evidence to show
that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition prior to his
admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
Petition for Issuance of Owner's
commission.
Duplicate
copy
It appears that this document originally
carried
the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary
public.1wphi1 Atty.
Zaide's
signature
Affidavitand
of Parental Consent
notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number,
PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date
Confirmation
of his notarial commission, were
merely of Sale
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten
name.
Deed of Absolute Sale
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details
stamped on the document are his true
information. However, he denied that he
personally stamped and signed the document. In
fact, this document never appeared in his
notarial register and was never included in
his notarial report for the year 2002. He
contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and
used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he
was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document
was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details
as a lawyer and as a notary public had not
yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar
only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not
have obtained and used the exact figures
pertaining to his roll number, PTR number,
IBP number and the expiration date of his
notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of
any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as
a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization,
leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could
not have notarized the document before his Bar
admission and receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional
details, which were only generated after his Bar
admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002

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Page 16

Date

Doc. No.

Page

Boo

6/20/05

273

55

18

10/28/05

226

46

18

10/31/05

272

55

18

4/17/06

54

11

25

4/17/06

310

61

25

4/17/06

72

15

25

4/19/06

461

93

23

4/21/06

283

56

25

4/27/06

304

60

25

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules

provides that "a notary public shall keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection as provided in these Rules, a
chronological official notarial register of notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered pages." The same section further
provides that "a notary public shall keep only one
active notarial register at any given time." 28 On
this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously
keeping several active notarial registers is a
blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a
notary public to maintain only one active notarial
register and ensure that the entries in it are
chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial
register" rule is in place to deter a notary public
from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who
perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each
lawyer, the notary public must also personally
administer the notarial acts29 that the law
authorizes him to execute. This important duty is
vested with public interest. Thus, no other
person, other than the notary public, should
perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register

need to be in chronological sequence in order to
address and prevent the rampant practice of
leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to
allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's
explanation that he needed to maintain several
active notarial registers in separate offices so he
could accommodate the increasing number of his
clients requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should
not trivialize his functions as his powers and
duties are impressed with public interest. 30 A
notary public's office is not merely an incomegenerating venture. It is a public duty that each
lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial
commission
must
faithfully
and
conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the
requirements of his notarial commission. His
flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the
Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and
excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
[should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted
that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.1wphi1
In Anion v. Sabitsana, 31 the Court laid down the
tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interests between and
among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of a
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired
through
their
connection
or
previous
employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of
interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against
Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide
and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ.
Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged
ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject
matter and is not in any way connected to the

PALE Cases

Page 17

complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno

with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and
where Atty. Zaide represented her family
pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since
this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the
other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared
against
Gimeno
involved
Somontan's
Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her
alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan
entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged
corruption as an examiner in the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of
title case and the Ombudsman case are totally
unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of
Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan
engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ.
More importantly, nothing in the record shows
that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any
confidential information which he acquired while
he was still their counsel in the annulment of title
case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should
not be held liable for violating the prohibition
against the representation of conflicting interests.
Use
of
abusive
dealings

intemperate,
offensive
and
language
in
professional

The prohibition on the use of intemperate,

offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts,
his clients, or any other person, is based on the
following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply
that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in
another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide
used the following demeaning and immoderate
language in presenting his comment against his
opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE,
INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice
System, and the Department of Justice in
particular, where the taxpayers paid for her
salary over her incompetence and poor

performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear

manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers
serious mental incompetence as regard her
mandate
as
an
Assistant
City
Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint
in the use and choice of his words - a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not
offensive.36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the
members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial
to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must
be dignified.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found
GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and,
abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon
8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility.
His
notarial
commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and
he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1)
year from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL
G.
VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06
December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos
(resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases,
violation
of
the
('ode
or
Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to
complainant, and gross immorality for marrying
two other women while respondents first
marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the
Second Division of this Court required respondent
to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March
2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4

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Page 18

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied
by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees
to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against
unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral
conduct for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit
their
respective
verified
Position
Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on
15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on
01 August 2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he
was employed by respondent as a financial
consultant to assist the latter on technical and
financial matters in the latters numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with
different courts. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued
by the court in the cases they would handle, in
addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients. He alleged that, from February to
December 2002, respondent was able to rake in
millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation
cases
they
were
working
on
together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to
the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders
issued by the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the
fees paid by their clients. 9 Complainant appended
to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in
unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of
Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his
legal services and solicit cases. Complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his
Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi
and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients. 12
On the third charge of gross immorality,
complainant accused respondent of committing
two counts of bigamy for having married two
other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13
July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO)
certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein
respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on

15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took

place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on
28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia
Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07
September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso
in Ermita, Manila.13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges
against him. He asserted that complainant was
not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and
Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent
alleged
that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent
in performing his job as a financial consultant,
resulting in the latters dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was
no verbal agreement between them regarding the
payment of fees and the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents
showing that the salary of complainant had been
paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation,
respondent denied committing any. He contended
that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would
handle the legal aspect of the corporate
rehabilitation case; and that the latter would
attend to the financial aspect of the case such as
the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this contention,
respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005
entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.; 18 and
an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, VicePresident for Operations of the said company. 19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent
assailed the Affidavit submitted by William
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value,
since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address
the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous
marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion
to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies
of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO. 22 The appended
Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places
and names of the contracting parties indicated in
the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The
first marriage contract submitted was a marriage
that took place between respondent and Pilar M.
Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July
1980.23 The second marriage contract was
between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion,
and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court
Compound of
Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a
marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E.
Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in
Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage

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Page 19

Contracts, respondent was described as single

under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his
Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not
marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case. 25 Thus,
respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He
disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were
filed against him by the complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission
that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B3270.27 He also filed another Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with
Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently
discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in
the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their
annulment, because they were purportedly null
and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its
reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory
hearing
on
20
November
2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the
hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness
to attend and moved for the suspension of the
resolution of the administrative case against the
latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of
the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to
the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila
against respondent, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The
first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage
contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano
was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as
Criminal
Case
No.
07-257126,
charged
respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin
Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for
his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal
cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended
the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the
proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna.
Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.36
IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008,
promulgated its Report and

the

Commission

Recommendation addressing the specific charges

against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares
in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have
been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered
to
determine
respondents
administrative
liability.
On
this
matter,
complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the
part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated
the rule on the solicitation of client for having
advertised his legal services and unlawfully
solicited cases. It recommended that he be
reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he
violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found
respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through
documentary
evidence
that
respondent
committed bigamy twice by marrying two other
women while the latters first marriage was
subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of
respondent, the Commission recommended that
he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors,
through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted
and
approved
the
Report
and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the recommendation to disbar him was
premature. He contends that the Commission
should
have
suspended
the
disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the
separate cases he had filed for the annulment of
the marriage contracts bearing his name as
having entered into those contracts with other
women. He further contends that the evidence
proffered by complainant to establish that the
latter committed bigamy was not substantial to
merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus,
respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to
archive the administrative proceedings pending
the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed
with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of
Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondents disbarment.44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the
IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

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Page 20

While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first

charge against respondent, we do not concur with
the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against
respondent for the nonpayment of the formers
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on
an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer
is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to
divide the fees for legal services rendered with a
person not licensed to practice law. Based on the
allegations, respondent had agreed to share with
complainant the legal fees paid by clients that
complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant,
however,
failed
to
proffer
convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an
agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by
the layperson is null and void, and that the
lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical
conduct.
Considering
that
complainants
allegations in this case had not been proven, the
IBP correctly dismissed the charge against
respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully
soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant
submitted documentary evidence to prove that
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts
by respondent to advertise the latters legal
services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the
IBP established the truth of these allegations and
ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent
indeed used the business entities mentioned in
the report to solicit clients and to advertise his
legal services, purporting to be specialized in
corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts
of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code,
which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for
the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in
business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a
nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a
member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend
itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used
as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers
behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of
law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a

financial and legal consultant, was indeed a

vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically for
corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C" 49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

privilege to practice law. Second, lack of

qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court.

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement

for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client
agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the formers loan
obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code,
because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof

rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.54In this case,
complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies
to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latters first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering
into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a
negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied
that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed
separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian
and the other in Calamba to declare the second
and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the

lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether
the former is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that
certain ethical considerations governing the
attorney-client relationship may be operative in
one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether
respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not
proven the degree of prevalence of this practice
by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to
reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and
15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed
bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate
this
allegation,
complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three
(3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that
they were submitted after the administrative case
had been submitted for resolution, thus giving
him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are
not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case
is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the
bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v.
Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with
procedure such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits
of desistance by the complainant do not apply
in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have
so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public.
The
admission
qualifications
are
also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the

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Page 21

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the

Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered
by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the
NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers
marriages to two other women aside from his
wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing
evidence proving that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member
of the bar. The documents were certified by the
NSO, which is the official repository of civil
registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage
and death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent
evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery
of the second and the third marriages, he filed
civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We
perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and
found that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code
provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any
grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondents regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton
disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross
ignorance of the law on what course of action to
take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact
that respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. In
Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held
thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined

members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
good moral character required of them not only
as a condition precedent for their admission to
the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is
expected to be competent, honorable and reliable
at all times since he who cannot apply and abide
by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be
expected to do so in his professional dealings nor
lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and
honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in
other relations. The administration of justice, in
which the lawyer plays an important role being an
officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a
sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to
disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following
charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal
advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for
engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the
name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7360

July 24,2012

ATTY.
POLICARIO
I.
CATALAN,
JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

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Page 22

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I.

Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three
causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in
the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio)
for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776
for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline
Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa
liable only for the first cause of action and
recommended the penalty of reprimand. The
Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified
Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a
suspension of six months, then to a suspension of
two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00,
"People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon
y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case
Atty.
Catalan
was
one
of
the
private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty.
Silvosas manner of prosecuting the case, and
requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve
Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused
Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a
case where he previously appeared as public
prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.1Atty. Catalan also
alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa
and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest
bias in the accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa caused
numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case
by arguing against the position of the private
prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor
Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalans request
to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon
case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the
accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November
2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to
reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the
Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case
for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans
brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed
the findings of the investigating judge and
downgraded the offense from frustrated murder
to less serious physical injuries. During the
hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified
that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider
her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated
murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the Sandiganbayans decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa
of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse

(Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa

before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance
by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of
Lanticses
father-in-law,
Arsenio
Cadinas
(Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for
more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded
P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set
up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa.
GMA
7s
television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was
offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by
the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas
defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of
Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M.
SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as
minimum, up to three years, six months and
twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php
10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for
under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty.
Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The
trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies
any relationship between himself and the
accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa
dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as "selfserving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan]
and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa
admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that "conviction
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not
amount to a crime." He further claims that "it is
not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted,
but his capacity as a public officer, the charge
against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against
public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15
September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

PALE Cases

Page 23

As for the first charge, the wordings and

prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty.
Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 1024600. [Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role
in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that
he is presumed to have acquainted himself with
the facts of said case and has made himself
familiar with the parties of the case. Such would
constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The
fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his
appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still
constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain
difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this
instance, the conflicting allegations are merely
based on the word of one person against the
word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement
denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio
stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take
note that the alleged incident occurred more than
seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006.
Such a long period of time would undoubtedly
cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even
the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly
points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion
for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in
said case nor was he ever involved in said case.
The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not
binding upon this Commission. The findings in a
criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been
presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty.
Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board
of Governors increased the penalty of Atty.
Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to
two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant
received the notice of the Resolution and the
records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first
cause of action and modify its recommendations
in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that
"A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in

connection with any matter in which he had

intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on
the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that
"A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed"
and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer
shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty.
Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his
involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims his
participation as public prosecutor was only to
appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation as collaborating counsel was limited
only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty.
Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in
Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged
in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor when he is listening to his clients
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause
in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the
existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility
of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone
to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife,
not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of
conflicting
interests
applies although
the
attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in
good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of
bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint
before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there
is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the
facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty.
Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling,

PALE Cases

Page 24

however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa

made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed.
Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June
1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and
had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was
no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on
the other hand, merely denied the accusation and
dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of
a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him.
He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of
him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the
filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses
do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution
of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by
any interested person. There can be no doubt of
the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of
the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B
reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person. The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of
any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in
government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not
presented as a witness in the present case. There
is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in
Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public
record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported
his
allegation
by
submitting

documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayans

decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa
himself admitted, against his interest, that he is
under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section
27. Disbarment
or
suspension
of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer
review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime
involving
moral
turpitude.
In
Magno
v.
COMELEC,11

him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary

to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting
interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio
merit
at
least
the
penalty
of
suspension.1wphi1 Atty.
Silvosas
final
conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly
falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows
as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of
the crime. We are constrained to impose a
penalty more severe than suspension because we
find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the
exacting standards of morality and decency
required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that
his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and
betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and
Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court
Administration for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

we ruled:

A.C. No. 5299

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect

admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court

Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

1. the offender is a public officer;

August 19, 2003

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or

receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;

x-----------------------x

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or

present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which
it is his official duty to do; and

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents.

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform

or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third
element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits
an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes
a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact
that the offender takes advantage of his office
and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on

PALE Cases

Page 25

G.R. No. 157053

August 19, 2003

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of
the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number
and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her

husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in

handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that
her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
which is payable at the time of filing of the case
and the other half after a decision thereon has
been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of
the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.2

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties

were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,

in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation
of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.3

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be

done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts

imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that
the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to
law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.4

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated
October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G.
Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per
the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

PALE Cases

Page 26

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the

use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

SEC.
27. Disbarment
and
suspension
of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice
of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making
much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized
by
candor,
fairness,
and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on

their practice, or dealing directly with their

clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed
the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements.
While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to
violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free
Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the
October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is
that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution
still
considered
sacrosanct
despite
the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients
that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might
have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is
not
altogether
proscribed.
However,
for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would
bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the
name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable. 21 Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon,
of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyers name
and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere

PALE Cases

Page 27

supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade

journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of
which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law.
(emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in
view
of
the
foregoing,
respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective
upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his
record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6422

August 28, 2007

WILFREDO
T.
GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENIAMINO A. LOPEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a complaint dated September 24, 2002,
complainant Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia charged
respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez with
violation of his oath as a member of the bar and
officer of the court, and misrepresentation,
amounting to perjury and prayed that respondent
be suspended or disbarred.
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina
Sarmiento, applicant in LRC Case No. 05-M-96
which was pending in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15. 1 Sarmiento
sought the registration and confirmation of her
title over a 376,397 sq. m. tract of land. This was
granted by the court.2 The case went all the way
to the Supreme Court and ultimately, the RTC
decision was upheld. The decision became final
and executory and the RTC, in an order dated
February 21, 2002, directed the Land Registration

Authority (LRA) to issue the decree of registration

and certificate of title.3 The LRA failed to comply,
prompting the complainant to file an urgent
motion to cite the LRA administrator or his
representative in contempt of court. Hearings
were scheduled.
On September 19, 2002, respondent, claiming to
be the counsel of the heirs of Sarmiento, filed his
entry
of
appearance
and
motion
for
postponement.4
Complainant alleged that he was surprised by
this, considering that he had not withdrawn from
the case. He contended that respondent should
be sanctioned for misrepresenting to the court
that he was the counsel of all the heirs of
Sarmiento and omitting to mention that
complainant was the counsel of record. According
to him, his attorney's fee was arranged on a
contingent basis and therefore, the attempt of
respondent to enter his appearance at the final
stage of the proceedings was tantamount to
"unfair harvesting" of the fruit of complainant's
labors since 1996.5
It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the
following
compulsory
heirs:
Gina
Jarvia
(Angelina's daughter by her common-law
husband Victor Jarvia), Alfredo, Zenaida, Wilson,
Jeanette and Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's
children by her husband prior to her relationship
with Victor). Complainant presented an affidavit
executed by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku wherein
they stated that they did not engage the services
of respondent and that they recognized
complainant as their only counsel of record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was
merely representing Zenaida and Wilson Ku 6 who
sought his help on September 19, 2002 and told
him that they wanted to retain his services. They
allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent them
in a hearing scheduled the next day. Because of
the scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file
an entry of appearance with motion for
postponement. He asserted that it was an honest
mistake not to have listed the names of his
clients. He claimed it was not deliberate and did
not prejudice anyone. He insisted that he had no
intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The investigating commissioner,
Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, in his report and
recommendation dated January 8, 2004, found
respondent guilty of misrepresentation and
violation of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to specify in
his entry of appearance the individuals he was
representing. He recommended that respondent
be strongly reprimanded for his act with a
reminder that a repetition of the same or similar
offense would be dealt with more severely. This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution passed on February
27, 2004.
We affirm the factual findings of the IBP but
modify the penalty recommended.

PALE Cases

Page 28

Lawyers are officers of the court who are

empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the
causes of their clients. The law imposes on them
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities.
Membership in the bar imposes on them certain
obligations.7 They are duty bound to uphold the
dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other
and otherwise conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times.8
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the
original applicant. Upon her death, the attorneyclient relationship was terminated. However,
complainant was retained as counsel by Gina
Jarvia and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of
appearance with motion of postponement in
behalf of the "compulsory heirs of the late
Angelita Sarmiento" when in truth he was merely
representing some of the heirs but not all of
them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation
which could have deceived the court. He had no
authorization to represent all the heirs. He clearly
violated his lawyer's oath that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court."
Likewise, the CPR states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the CPR demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or

indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules.
He made it appear that he was entering his
appearance as counsel for all the heirs of
Sarmiento which was highly unfair to complainant
who had worked on the case from the very
beginning (i.e. since 1996) and who had not been
discharged as such. It is true that without the
formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of
record, respondent would merely be considered
as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless, by being
less than candid about whom he was
representing, respondent undeniably encroached
upon the legal functions of complainant as the
counsel of record.1avvphi1
We cannot casually brush aside what respondent
did. Even assuming that it was not a calculated

deception, he was still remiss in his duty to his

fellow lawyer and the court. He should have been
more careful about his actuation since the court
was relying on him in its task of ascertaining the
truth.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Beniamino A.
Lopez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) month for violating Canons 8
and 10, Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the
commission of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant
for appropriate annotation in the record of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8261

March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C.

TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY.
RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F.
VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT T.
QUILALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C.
TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In
this
consolidated
administrative
case,
complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C.
Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio,
Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly
falsifying a court order that became the basis for
the cancellation of their annotation of the notice
ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in
the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad
as counsel of the complainants in a civil action
they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week
of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They
impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on
TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim,
as well as the notice of lis pendens. 1 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort.

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Page 29

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated

April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No.
8261),2 the complainants narrated that as the
surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio
and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the
deaths of their parents a residential lot located at
No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24,
2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon
and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they
immediately caused the annotation of their
affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an
amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their
dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell
the property and the proceeds thereof would be
equally divided between the parties, and the
complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn
respectively by the complainants (as the
plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the
terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio,
Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its
order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the
defendants lack of objection thereto and the
defendants willingness to similarly withdraw their
counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of
the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May
16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact
Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone
calls and visits to his office; that they found out
upon verification at the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City that new annotations were made on
TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation
of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.8seeking the cancellation of the
affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2)
the annotation of the decision dated May 16,
2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by
the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the
complainants
Motion
to
Withdraw
Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter request
dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala,
Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that
it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed
the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the
complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as
Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and
their notice of lis pendens under primary entries
PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set
Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009,
and directed the parties to submit their
respective
memoranda
and/or
supporting
documents
on
or
beforesuch
scheduled
hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose
whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved,
or remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance

from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid
him
for
his
professional
services,
the
complainants felt that said counsel had
abandoned their case. They submitted that the
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and
their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted
from the connivance and conspiracy between
Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from
the taking advantage of their positions as officials
in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty.
Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan,
the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby
prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the verified
complaint.11 Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his
Comment
dated
August
17,
200912 that
complainant Robert Torres had been actively
involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q07-59598, which included the mediation process;
that the complainants, after having aggressively
participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had
been deceived into entering the agreement in the
same way that they could not feign ignorance of
the conditions contained therein; that he did not
commit any abandonment as alleged, but had
performed in good faith his duties as the counsel
for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-0759598; that he should not be held responsible for
their representation in other proceedings, such as
that before the LRA, which required a separate
engagement; and that the only payment he had
received from the complainants were those for
his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every
hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the
other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom
he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the
letter request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon
Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no
knowledge about how said letter-request had
been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and
that the present complaint was the second
disbarment case filed by the complainants
against him with no other motive except to
harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated
September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr.,
another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the
actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on
TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the
annotations was undertaken in the regular course
of official duty and in the exercise of the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no
irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and that the
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby
discounting any involvement in the proceedings
in the case.

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Page 30

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilalas allegation in his
Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.s signature that appeared below the
cancelled entries, the complainants filed another
sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26,
2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment
complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and
was later on consolidated with A.C. No.
826117 because the complaints involved the same
parties and rested on similar allegations against
the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to
belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261. 18 On
his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he
adopted Atty. Quilalas Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for
being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that
a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether his
conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates all
lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are
similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
same Code not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to
disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants allegations of the respondents
acts and omissions are insufficient to establish
any censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) enumerates the
general duties of the Register of Deeds, as
follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of
Deeds. x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to

immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary
science stamps and that the same are properly
canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the present or of such denial in writing,
stating the ground or reason therefor, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
(Emphasis supplied)

validity or invalidity of a document registered by

the Register of Deeds.

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds

is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act
or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor the
exercise of judgment.22

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal

agreement in order to establish conspiracy
because conspiracy may be inferred from the
circumstances attending the commission of an
act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be
established
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard.
Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio,
Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each
other in order to cause the dismissal of the
complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
they presented no evidence to support their
allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the
records indicated their own active participation in
arriving at the amicable settlement with the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence,
they could not now turn their backs on the
amicable settlement that they had themselves
entered into.

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the

Court underscores that registration is a merely
ministerial act of the Register of Deeds,
explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous
or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of
competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern
to see whether the documents sought to be
registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of
authority or irregularity committed by Atty.
Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with
respect to the cancellation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not
the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letterrequest dated June 30,2008 had been falsified,
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to
determine inasmuch as their duty to examine
documents presented for registration was limited
only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letterrequest and the RTC order, they found the same
to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for
them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents
performance of duty, the complainants were not
bereft of any remedy because they could
challenge the performance of duty by bringing
the matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as
provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v.
Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately
within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the

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Page 31

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and

Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each
other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case
No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable
settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of
the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The
complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with
having abandoned their cause since the issuance
of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008. The
complainants charges are devoid of substance.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.

Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong
in their doing so. It was actually their obligation
as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 A lawyer shall encourage his clients
to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.1wphi1
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the
amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
subsisted.28
Anent the complainants charge of abandonment
against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglecta legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged
the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr.
served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.

assistance, the complainants obtained a fair

settlement consisting in receiving half of the
proceeds of the sale of the property in litis,
without any portion of the proceeds accruing to
counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did
not competently and persuasively show any
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as
far as their interest in the litigation was
concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable
for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the
perceived inattention to any other matters
subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598.
Unless
otherwise
expressly
stipulated between them at any time during the
engagement, the complainants had no right to
assume
that
Atty.
Victorio,
Jr.s
legal
representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law
Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients;

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Page 32

hence, the rendition of professional services

depends on the agreement between the attorney
and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.s alleged failure to
respond to the complainants calls or visits, or to
provide them with his whereabouts to enable
them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment
without the credible showing that he continued to
come under the professional obligation towards
them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-0759598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless
disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty.
Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.