HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted
into an IFMA.
PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully
refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has
complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an
IFMA.
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is
clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the
government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring
PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would
result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local government has
control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and
their stake in the implementation of the project.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted
into an IFMA.
PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. However, only one of the many provinces
affected approved the issuance of an IFMA. PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported
resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion.
PICOP filed a petition for MANDAMUS against DENR Sec Alvarez for refusing to sign and execute the
IFMA contract.
Issue:
Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sanggunian
concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval
of PICOPs application for IFMA conversion.
Held:
NO. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not the
only province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. The approval of the Sanggunian
concerned is required by law, not because the local government has control over such project, but
because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the
implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies to projects that "may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover, and extinction of animal or plant species." The local government should thus represent the
communities in such area, the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic
change if the project is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the resources in the area,
and deserve to be adequately compensated when these resources are exploited.
Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local government before
the requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local government can be applied.

ALCANTARA VS. DENR

FACTS:
Petitioner is a lessee under FLGLA No. 542, issued by the DENR, of nine hundred
twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land (subject land) located in the vicinity of Sitio
Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City.The subject land, however, is being claimed as the
ancestral land of the indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao people, who maintain that they and
their predecessors have been cultivating, possessing and occupying it since time immemorial.
They claim that Christian settlers (settlers) started occupying the area only after World War II. As
a result, there was constant friction between the indigenous inhabitants and the settlers, with the
disputes, at times, erupting in violence. Overpowered, the indigenous people eventually lost
physical control of much of the land.
Petitioner, a son of one of the settlers, used to hold a pasture permit over the subject land,
which was later on converted into FLGLA No. 542 covering the subject property. Petitioner
claims that FLGLA No. 542 has been subsisting since 1983. On April 10, 1990, private
respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes, filed a complaint against petitioner
before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation
of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the land to the indigenous communities.
Private respondents, the Heirs of Datu Abdul B. Pendatun and the Heirs of the Sabal
Mula Gawan Clan (respondents-intervenors), claiming to represent the Blaan and
Maguindanaoan tribes, aver that they have always possessed the land until the first settlers
occupied the area They claim that among those who took the land by force was petitioners
predecessor, Conrado Alcantara. They narrate that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried to retake the land, but failed because the well-armed settlers repelled them. The incident, in fact, led
to the killing of two of their leaders.
Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning the authority of the COSLAP and
alleged that it was the secretary of the DENR who should have jurisdiction to administer and
dispose of public lands. Petitioner also contended that the COSLAP should suspend the hearing
of the case, as the DENR was then hearing a similar controversy. In 1993, despite the pendency
of the COSLAP case, and despite opposition from private respondents, petitioner was able to
renew FLGLA No. 542 when it expired that year. The renewal given to petitioner was for another
25 years, or until December 31, 2018.
Meanwhile, on October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the
Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and promote all the
rights of the country's Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within
the framework of the Constitution
ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGA No.
542, or December 31, 2018, based on his alleged residual rights.
2. Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing
the COSLAP's decision, which has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

HELD:
1. Petitioner may not enjoy possession and use of the land up to the expiration of FLGLA
No. 542, or December 31, 2018, based on his alleged residual rights.
The question whether FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in G.R. No.
145838 in which the Court made the final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued
illegally, and that it was made in violation of prevailing laws; and that it was proper for it
to be cancelled. The Court ruled, thus:
The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the land area being claimed
by private respondents belongs to the Blaan indigenous cultural community since they
have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time
immemorial, a fact which has not been disputed by petitioner. It was likewise declared by
the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the
indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further declared
alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the
indigenous cultural group concerned.

2. There was no grave abuse of discretion in public respondents' implementation of the

COSLAP decision.
It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the
State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over
which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine.[56] Like timber or
mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by
executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever
public welfare or public interest so requires.[57] The determination of what is in the
public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural
resources.[58] Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys
protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.[59] In
cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license
or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the
State

FLGLA No. 542 has not only been withdrawn by executive action to further the public
welfare, it has also been declared illegal or unlawful by judicial authorities for clearly
violating actual provisions of law. Thus, the DENR was under obligation to effect the
cancellation accordingly.
It is clear from the investigation report that petitioner's FLGLA No. 542 is not only illegal
per se, for having been issued contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 410; it has also been
rendered illegal by petitioner's blatant violations of DENR regulations and the FLGLA's
very own terms and conditions. Thus, the DENR had compelling reasons to cancel the
FLGLA.

In conclusion, the Court, in G.R. No. 145838, recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs
to recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory
attained by the private respondents only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a
guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this
controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.

G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND ESTELITA PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4,
1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed of
Sale was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and
the house thereon in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed,
did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. On July 1, 1981, Criselda
Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent
of Thomas Cheesman. The deed described Criselda as being ". . of legal age,
married to an American citizen. Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas
Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his
wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.
An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property
sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively
belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an
American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land;
and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has standing to question the sale.
Held:
Yes. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by
him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null
and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he
is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the
alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in
good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that
Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive
property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the

law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to
the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

AVINO CORPUZ vs. Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPE

G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land, formerly owned
and registered under a certain Florentino Chioco.
To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land in favor
of Virginia de Leon. Upon expiration, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria
Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for four years as guarantee for the loan. The parties
executed a contract which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during
the duration of the mortgage.
Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with DARAB. He alleged
that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation and destroyed the
palay he planted on the land. In the respondent's Answer, she claimed that the contract
allowed her to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter
paid his loan.
Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed a "Waiver of Rights" over the
landholding in favor of respondents. Petitioner denied alleging that the signatures on the
Waiver were forged.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled that petitioner abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya recommending the
reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified
farmer[s]-beneficiaries." The appellate court affirmed decision, hence this appeal.
Issue:

Did the petitioner abandon or voluntarily surrendered his rights as a beneficiary under
PD 27?
HELD:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Supreme Court DENIED instant petition and the assailed Decision and Resolution was
AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioners appeal. The sale, transfer or conveyance
of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian
reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these
rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally
permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said
land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the
property, validly awarded it to private respondents.