HAZID Report Rev 0

UNITED ENERGY PAKISTAN LTD.
NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT
HAZID REPORT
Feb 2014
Revision: A
REV
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREPARED
CHECKED
APPROVED
22/02/2014
Issued for Review
MSA
Sheraz (MSG)
MSZ
10/02/2014
Issued for distribution
MSA
Sheraz (MSG)
MSZ
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
DEFINITIONS
HOLDS
1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1
2.0
Workshop Scope
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.1
Background
3.0
METHODOLOGY
4.0
MEETING DETAILS
10
5.0
HAZID FINDINGS
11
5.1
Recommendations:
11
5.2
HAZID Comments
13
6.0
HAZID FOLLOWUP
APPENDICES
16
NO TABLE OF CONTENTS ENTRIES FOUND.ABBREVIATIONS

BLEVE
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
BOP
Blowout preventer.
CVP
Capital value process.
DCS
Distributed control system.
EA
Engineering authority.
FEED
Front end design.
HAZID
Hazard identification.
HAZOP
Hazard and operability (study).
HSSE
Health, safety, security, and environmental.
HSSE&O
Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.
IPL
Independent protection layer.
ISD
Inherently safer design.
LNG
Liquefied natural gas.
LPG
Liquefied petroleum gas.
MOC
Management of change.
OMS
Operating management system.
P&ID
Piping and instrumentation diagram.
PFD
Process flow diagrams.
PHSSER
Project HSSE review.
TOR
Terms of reference.
DEFINITIONS
Cause
Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or
incident.
Competent
Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the engineering authority
(EA) to perform a task. Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training,
experience, qualifications, or some combination of these.
Consequences
Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of
toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects
of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage.
Hazard
Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or
reputation.
Hazard identification (HAZID)
Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their
scope. The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
Hazard and operability (HAZOP)
Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating
problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions.
Independent protection layer (IPL)
Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from
proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated
the accident sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during
layer of protection analyses.
Initiating cause
A failure, error, situation, or condition that results or may result in the propagation of a hazardous
event.
Risk
A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or
business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the
magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term risk is used to describe health, safety,
security, environmental, and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events.
Node
A discrete area or portion of an activity, plant, or system that permits a stepwise approach towards
progressing through the HAZID.
Safeguards
Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause
or that would mitigate loss event impacts.
What If analysis
Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a
team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices
concerns about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing
safeguards are adequate.
HOLDS
No holds.
1.0
INTRODUCTION
United Energy Pakistan commissioned HAZID study for Naimat Phase-V Gas treatment and LPG
extraction project. The project is in FEED stage. Detailed design (EPCC) will be initiated soon, a Tender
Document has been prepared by FEED which will form basis of design for detailed engineering. HAZID
looked into generic project and process hazards associated with the project.
A two days session was conducted at UEPL head office in Bahria Complex-1 on 17th & 18th of Feb 2014.
1.1
Workshop Scope
The HAZID will look into Naimat Phase-V scope only. Existing on-going projects, Phase-IV and
TAP will not be subject of this HAZID however hazards due to SIMOPSs and any
interconnectivity between existing and new units will be considered in this HAZID scope.
The purpose of HAZID is to:
Identify potential hazards as defined in the TOR for the HAZID study.
Consider consequences of the hazards.
Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.
Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate

hazards.
Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.
Support objectives of ISD.
2.0
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.1
Background
Naimat Facility is a gas treatment and LPG recovery plant which consists of four (04) phases. Each phase
consists of Amine Sweetening unit and Glycol Dehydration unit along with their utilities. There is a
refrigerated LPG unit and Condensate stabilization unit. Within this plant there is condensate and LPG
storage and loading area.
2.1.1
New facilities (PHASE-V)

Naimat Phase-V will be adjacent to and fed from Naimat Facility which consists of Separation unit, Amine
Sweetening unit, Glycol Dehydration unit, Molecular Sieve Dehydration unit, Turbo-Expander LPG
Recovery Unit, Condensate Stabilization unit and Sales Gas Compression along with their utilities and offsites.
It is decided that this phase will be a stand-alone and will process Naimat West gas whereas 40 and 85
MMSCFD additional gas from existing Naimat Phases can be processed in Glycol dehydration unit and
LPG unit respectively. There is also provision given in condensate stabilization unit to process
condensate from existing Naimat Phases.
Utilities for Naimat Phase-V will consist of Hot Oil system, Instrument and utility Air system, Fuel Gas
system, Power Generation system, Firewater system, Warm and Cold Flare system. RO (Reverse
Osmosis) system for this phase will be installed along with Naimat Phase-IV RO system.
Storage and Loading facilities will be provided for condensate and LPG. Produced water system will be
installed for disposal of produced water. LP/HP drain systems will also be provided to handle drains
generated during maintenance and shutdown.
Storm water pit is provided at the area where flare stack is situated and have enough capacity to handle
large amount of water generated due to rain fall.
3.0
METHODOLOGY
HAZID was carried out as per industry standard practices. HAZID looked into Major Accidents as well as
HSSE hazards during construction as well as commissioning and operation stage. A set of guidewords or
brainstorming reference list was used during the session. HAZID team was encouraged to consider more
deviations / hazards which may be missing in generic list. For each guideword team did brainstorming,
identifying potential consequences and list existing safeguards and generate recommendations for further
mitigation as required.
A risk Matrix (8x8) was used to risk rank all the identified hazards. The purpose of risk ranking was to
prioritize the findings on a scale. Risk ranking should not be interpreted as Qualitative or Quantitative
risks of the project as at the FEED stage limited technical details were available to assess the risks
accurately hence only relative ranking of findings was done.
HAZID identified a number of actions which were categorized either as Recommendations or Comments,
former being actions to be addressed at FEED to EPCC stage and later (comments) to be either
incorporated in Tender Document or actions already in place but need completion or verification.
4.0
MEETING DETAILS
Workshop Attendees Name
Designation
17/02/2014
18/02/2014
Muhammad Saim Ahmed
Facilitator
Muhammad Sheraz Goraya
Process Engineer / HAZID Scribe
Jamal uddin
Field Production Engineer
Abduallah Sheikh Muhammad
Engineering Manager
Syed Fraz Rizvi
FOE-MKK
Mansoor Ahmed Khan
Mechanical Engineer
Mansoor Ali Khan
Engineering Consultant
Yasir Mahdi
FOE-Central & South
Iqbal Sahto
Facility Manager-MKK
Masood Sarwar
HSE
Muhammad Hani
Process Engineer (ZEL)
Ahsan Nasir
Project Engineer (ZEL)
Muhammad Mudassir Mirza
Sr. Electrical Engineer (ZEL)
Irfan Khokhar
Sr. Instrumentation Engineer (ZEL)
5.0
HAZID FINDINGS
HAZID identified a number of actions to be addressed in Tender Document, during detailed engineering
or management actions addressing issues like regulatory compliance and organization related actions.
Some actions need to be closed before issuing tender document for EPCC others require closure during
detailed engineering (EPCC), some management actions need to be closed during the course of project
e.g. resourcing and development of operating staff, preparation of Emergency Response Plans etc.
These actions and comments are listed below:
5.1
Recommendations:
1.2.2.1 Evaluate flare foundation design in storm water pit considering long
residence time for storm water
1.2.2.2 Consider facility drain system in design for heavy rains case (no
option available for storm water drainage out of facility at present)
2.4.1 Verify that transport protocol for contractor is included in tender
documents
UEP & EPCC
UEP
3.3.1 Verify that Tender Document clearly states that plant and equipment
layout shall be based on Fire & Explosion Hazard Analysis and applicable
NFPA, API Codes and standards, define basis for layout and spacing.
3.3.2 Consider QRA for entire Naimat facility to finalize the layout w.r.t to
risks posed by the project to on-site and offsite population.
UEP & EPCC
3.3.3/20.3 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in

occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not
exceed NEQS limits
4.1.1 Include the updation of Naimat SOP incorporating Phase-V operations
in project scope
4.1.2 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed for safe and
efficient plant operation.
UEP
4.2.2 Communication protocol between EPCC ERP and UEP ERP shall be
defined
4.2.3 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed during
emergencies (including onsite and remote command posts etc.)
UEP
6.1.1 It is recommended to include following studies in project scope:

1) Emergency Evacuation and Response study
2) QRA
3) SIMOPS
4) Dispersion modeling
5) SCEs identification report
UEP
6.3.1 Develop and maintain project hazard and effects register during the
course of project and follow project MoC system
UEP & EPCC
6.4.1 Project MoC system shall be established for change control.

6.4.2 Green field construction work permit system shall be agreed with EPCC
and shall be in line with UEP work permit system.
UEP & EPCC
7.1.2/7.2.2 It is recommended that provision of resources (equipment/man

power) for ER such as Ambulances, trained Emergency Responders etc. as
required, shall be part of Project deliverables considering major impact of
project on MKK ERP
UEP
8.1.1/8.2.1/8.3.1/13.1.1 Project organogram shall include Operation tag for

training need analysis and developing training program.
8.1.2/8.2.2/8.3.2/13.1.3 Staffing requirement to be identified and hiring to be
completed before plant commissioning.
UEP
11.1.1 Verify that ITP (Inspection & Testing Plan) is defined in Tender
Document.
UEP & EPCC
13.1.2 Conduct SIMOPs study

13.1.4/4.2.1/7.1.1/7.2.1 Include the updation of Naimat ERP, incorporating
Phase-V scenarios, in project scope.
14.1.1 Confirm that UEP health and Hygiene standards is included Tender
Document and EPCC shall comply during the construction activities/camp.
14.1.2 Safe drinking water supply at contractor's camp and work site to be
ensured.
UEP & EPCC
16.1.1 As per API-521, Rupture disc to be installed at u/s of PSVs on

corrosive/choking environment especially at CO2 route. (refer 2010/11
Naimat Phase-2 over pressure incident report & MKK HAZOP
recommendations related to this)
UEP & EPCC
16.12.1/17.3.1 Consider self-contained fire suppression system such as

Inergen etc. for critical buildings for e.g. DCS room, switchgear room etc. as
per governing NFPA
16.13.1 Tender Document defines blow down time as 25 min, this is a
deviation from API-521 15 min depressurization requirement. FEHA shall
determine escalation potentials due to delayed blow down. A cost-benefit
analysis shall be carried out to make decision on savings on flare header size
due to increasing blow down time vs. potential escalation.
17.6.1 Fire response strategy to be defined in Tender Document and EPCC
should provide fire response plan as per philosophy.
UEP
UEP & EPCC
20.3.1 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in

occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not
exceed NEQS limits
22.1.1 Identify firewater source meeting NFPA guidelines
22.7.1 Review drain system design avoiding any connection of HP/LP drains
open to atmosphere
22.12.1 Identify potable water source for facility
UEP & EPCC
UEP
UEP & EPCC
UEP
22.16.1 Communication protocol (for normal & emergencies) shall be

prepared by UEP and provision of communication system /hardware for
conformance to UEP protocol shall be included in tender document
UEP & EPCC
22.23.1 Flare exclusion zone shall be isolated/barricaded as per API-521
EPCC
23.2.1 Review LPG spheres location with respect to FEHA results to

minimize impact of fire, dispersions and BELEVE on adjacent equipment and
surrounding population (consider future population growths along the facility
fence where UEP has no control). Adequate distance from plant fence to be
maintained.
23.2.2 Review LPG storage drain impoundment area design considering
flooding in case of fire water application
23.9.1 Implement condensate storage tank overfilling safeguards
recommended by Buncefield incident investigation report.
5.2
UEP & EPCC
EPCC
HAZID Comments
1.2.3.1/7.1.1 Ensure that Tender Document contains instructions related to

establishment of onsite medical facilities (by EPCC during construction
period) approved by UEP-HSE
UEP
1.2.5.1 Confirm Earthquake zoning given in Tender Document, is it 2A or 2B.
UEP
1.2.7.1 Ensure lightning protection is being considered in Tender Document
UEP
3.2.1/10.1 .1 Refer Naimat Phase-IV and TAP Lesson Learned document for
Transport related and other project lessons.
UEP
3.3.1 Verify that tender document contains requirement of modeling for acid
gas (H2S in acid gas) release scenarios.
UEP & EPCC
3.6.1/15.1.1 IEE initiated with 3rd party consultant, discussion in-progress

with SEPA for study scope. Need to be closed at earliest and obtain NoC.
3.6.2/15.1.2 Address the issue of H2S emissions NEQS non-compliance with
SEPA.
UEP
3.7.1 Consult Legal, PSCM, LMS, C&EA to identify and address social
issues that may arise during construction
UEP
7.2.1 Ensure that Tender document contains instructions that EPCC shall
submit ERP for handling Major accident scenarios during construction phase
for UEP approval.
UEP
10.3.2 QRA shall include LPG + Condensate bowzer movement scenario

10.3.3 Consider separate entrance for loading bowzers and normal plant
entrance
10.3.4/11.1.1 Detailed shipment and inland transport plan to be developed at
Detailed Engineering stage by EPCC, approved by UEP
UEP & EPCC
12.1.1 EPCC shall submit lifting plans for UEP approval
UEP & EPCC
13.1.1 Ensure that Tender document contains requirement for submission of

Maintenance plans by EPCC to UEP for incorporation into MAXIMO
13.1.2 Verify that tender document clearly defines independence between
control and ESD systems to be verified as per required SIL levels
14.2.1 EPCC shall Follow confined space working procedures approved by
UEP
EPCC
16.2.1/16.7.1/18.1.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and consider minimizing

congestion to optimize the plot plan with respect to blast overpressure
contours.
16.2.2/18.1.2 OPBs to be located out of blast overpressure contours or
designed to withstand overpressure.
UEP & EPCC
16.3.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and update plot plan as necessary.
16.3.2 OPBs to be located out of fire radiation contours of concern as per
API-521 or design as shelter in place.
UEP & EPCC
16.7.2 Plot plan is preliminary layout. EPCC to finalize the plant boundaries
based on FEHA
UEP & EPCC
16.9.1 SIL study to be done by EPCC. Specifications of SIF, reliability,

survivability, availability and maintenance intervals to be defined on the basis
of SIL study.
EPCC
17.4.1 Location of fired heaters to be finalized based on FEHA results

considering flammable gas dispersion contours and wind directions.
EPCC
17.6.1 FEHA shall provide basis for fire prevention and control engineering,
fire response plan shall be developed accordingly.
UEP & EPCC
22.1.1/22.12.1 SEPA permission required for utilization of groundwater as

potable water or fire water
UEP
22.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations
UEP
22.9.1 Hazop to evaluate the requirement of ESD on IA low pressure
EPCC
22.15.1 Requirement of HVAC for control room and security room to be

established based on dispersion modeling
EPCC
22.17.1 Evaluate R134A as a refrigerant in place of propane, compare cost

and safety aspects for both options.
UEP
22.22.1 Evaluate facility drain system for heavy rains case
UEP
22.24.1 Ensure that sewerage and septic pit scope is included in Tender
Document
UEP
23.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations
UEP
23.9.1 Propane filling arrangement for refrigeration loop for black start to be
kept in design
EPCC
23.10.1 Provision of recycling of off-spec LPG from storage back to recovery

unit to be kept in design
EPCC
24.1.1 Review requirement of BTEX monitoring for heaters and incorporate

provisions for monitoring BTEX in design.
UEP
24.13.1 Evaluate relief requirement on heat exchangers where tube side

operating pressures exceeds 1.5 times of shell side design pressure. Fast
acting relief devices are required on some heat exchanger shell sides.
UEP & EPCC
6.0
HAZID FOLLOWUP
HAZID recommendations are very broad in nature covering various aspects of project from concept to
commissioning and operations. Some recommendations and comments are to be addressed at FEED
stage before issuing tender document, most action are to be taken during EPCC and some management
action have to be taken independent of EPCC but before commissioning.
As has been recommended with HAZID a project Hazard Register shall be established and HAZID
findings shall be added to it (later HAZOP and other studies findings to be added).
It is further recommended to re-validate HAZID at a suitable time during detailed engineering such as
upon completion of process engineering and finalization of plant layout.
Annex-I HAZID Worksheet
NAIMAT PHASE-V (FEED)

HAZID WORKSHEET
Category/Node
Guideword
Hazard Description
Consequence
Safeguards
R
Safety
1.1 Seismic.
1.1 .1 Uneven settling of Plot,

foundation damage
1.1.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
explosion, fatalities,
asset damage
1.1.1 Soil Investigation is

in progress to be made
part of Tender Document
1.1.2 No Seismic
activities (exploration)
planned in area
D2=6
1.2.1.1 Damage to tall equipment/

columns
1.2.1.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
1.2.1.1 Plant design for

100 mph which is
sufficient based on
available historical data
D2=6
1.2.2.1 No threat from river floods.

1.2.2.2 Heavy rains
1.2.2.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
1.2.2.2 Facility flooding
due to heavy rains and
no drainage
1.2.2.1 Facility is
designed for 250 mm
rain in 24 hr
F3=5
1.2 Weather:
1.2.1 High
winds.
1.2.2 Floods.
1. Natural and
Environmental
Hazards
En
Re
2. Security
1.2.5
Earthquake.
1.2.5.1 Earthquake leading to

buildings/ equipment damage
1.2.6 Hurricane.
1.2.6.1 No threat of hurricane
1.2.7 Lightning.
1.2.7.1 Lightning strike on equipment

or person
1.3 Marine life

impacts on
equipment.
1.3.1 Not Applicable
1.4 Subsidence.
1.4.1 Uneven settling of Plot,

foundation damage
1.5 Geological
conditions for
structural
support.
1.5.1 Uneven settling of Plot,

foundation damage
2.1 Assault
2.2 Sabotage
2.3 Crisis
(military action,
civil
disturbances,
terrorism)
1.2.5.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
1.2.5.1 Design for

Earthquake zone 2A
upper moderate as per
area classification issued
by Geological survey of
Pakistan
1.2.7.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
1.4.1 Piping and

equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
1.5.1 Piping and
equipment failure
leading to loss of
containment, fires,
asset damage
D2=6
E3=6

D2=6

D2=6
2.1.1 Not in UEP Experience

2.4.1 Existing UEP
3.3 Proximity to
Populationduring
operations
3.3.1 Vapor cloud explosion and

dense gas dispersion
3.3.2 High H2S conc ( >10 ppm) in
Acid gas Stream
3.3.3 High noise
3.3.4 Heavy vehicle movements see section 10
3.4 Adjacent
Land Use
3.4.1 Flare radiations affecting crops
3.5 Proximity to
Transport
Corridors
3.5.1 No major issues
3.6
Environmental
Issues
3.6.1 H2S at cold vent tip exceeding

NEQS limits for atmospheric release.
3.3.1 Injuries and

fatalities to
onsite/offsite
population, equipment
failure
3.3.2 Exposure to H2S
due to acid gas
dispersion at grade
level, complains of
odors n possible minor
health effects to
neighbors
3.3.3 Health n social
issues due to high
noise
3.3.1 Acid gas vent

design to ensure less
than 10 ppm grade level
H2S conc.
3.4.1 Social issues
3.4.1 Flare height to be

evaluated as per API
521 not to exceed 500
BTU/hr-ft2 at facility
battery limits
3.6.1 Environmental
damage, Non
Compliance with
regulations
3.6.1 Cold vent height to

be such that on ground
concentration of H2S
does not exceed 10
ppm.
D3=7
4.2
Communications
for Contingency
planning
4.2.1 Inefficient communication

during emergency
4.3 Supply
Support
4.3.1 No concerns
4.2.1 Delay in
emergency response
and medical care,
escalation of event
E4=7
Project
Implementation
Issues
5. Contracting
Strategy
5.1 Prevailing
influence
5.2 Legislation
5.3 External
Standards
5.4 External
Environmental
Constraints
6.1 Hazard
Studies
6.1.1 Unsafe design due to

unidentified hazards
6.1.1 Major accident

leading to safety/
environment asset and
reputation damage
6.1.1 Following studies

have been listed in
EPCC scope in tender
Document:
HAZID, Hazop, SIL,
FEHA and Plant Layout
Study, Hazardous Area
D3=7
7.1
Geographical
Infrastructure
7.1.1 No major medical facility for

immediate medical response
7.1.1 Delay in medical

treatment to critically ill
or injured person
7.2 Recovery
Measures
7.2.1 Inadequate emergency

response
7.2.1 Escalation of
event
7.1.1 First aid and

primary care facilities will
be provided at Naimat
along with qualified
medical doctor and
ambulance will be on
standby 24/7.
For secondary and
tertiary treatment patient
will be mobilized to
Hyderabad and onwards
to Karachi if needed.
7. Contingency
Planning
E4=7
8.3 Level of
Technology
9. Construction/
Existing Facilities
9.1 Tie-ins
(shutdown
requirements)
9.2 Concurrent
Operations
9.3 Reuse of
Material
9.4 Common
Equipment
Capacity
9.5 Interface Shutdown/blowd
own/
9.6 ESD
9.7 Skid
Dimensions
(weight
handling/equipm
ent (congestion)
9.8 Soil
Contamination
(existing
facilities)
9.9 Mobilization/
demobilization
8.3.1 Unavailability of
competent/trained staff for DCS, no
prior experience of DCS at UEP
9.1.1 See comment
8.3.1 Unsafe/inefficient
operation leading to
process upset,
production loss or
incident may happen
D3=7
10.4 Helicopter
incidents
11.
Fabrication/installati
on
11.1 Complexity.
11.1.1 Complex construction process
11.2
Modularization.
11.3
Transportation.
11.3.1 Transportation of large

equipment
11.1.1 Project delays
11.1.1 No complex
construction activity
involved, extensive
experience of similar
projects within company
11.3.1 limitation at Port

or inland transport of
large equipment
causing project delays
11.4 Overseas
fabrication
12. Lifting
equipment
12.1
Dropped/swingin
g loads.
12.1.1 Objects falling over live

equipment or personnel working
below
12.2 Collapse of
lifting equipment
(cranes, draw
works, etc.).
12.2.1 Objects falling over live

equipment or personnel working
below
12.1.1 Loss of
containment, fire
hazards, injuries ,
fatalities, asset damage
12.2 Loss of
containment, fire
hazards, injuries ,
fatalities, asset damage
12.3.1 Injuries,
12.1.1 No heavy lifting

over live equipment
involved
12.1 No heavy lifting
over live equipment
involved
Maintenance
philosophy
13.6 Control
philosophy
13.7 Manning
levels
13.8 Concurrent
Operations
13.9 Emergency
Response
14. Health Hazards
14.1 Disease
Hazards
14.1.1 Malaria, Food Poisoning and

other water borne diseases
14.1.1 Health issues in

camp, Project delays
G5=6
14.2
Asphyxiation
hazards
14.2.1 Activities inside closed

equipment/ confined space
14.2.1
Injuries/Fatalities
E3=6
14.3
Carcinogenic
14.4 Toxic
14.5 Physical
14.6 Mental
14.4.1 No additional issues identified

14.7 Working
Hazards
14.7.1 Snake bite, high temperature

in summer
14.8 Transport
14.7.1 Injuries,
fatalities
14.7.1 Snake bite kit

available at site
E5=8
15.5
Contaminated
Ground
15.6 Facility
Impact
15.6.1 Facility to be constructed on

agricultural land/ orchids.
15.7 Waste
Disposal
Options
15.8 Timing of
Construction
16. Inherently safer

design
characteristics
15.6.1 Minor ecological

damage
15.7.1 No Concern
15.8.1 No Concern
16.1 Sufficient
equipment
design pressure
for all high
pressure
scenarios.
16.1.1 Equipment expose to

pressures exceeding design
pressure e.g. SIWHP is 4800 psig
approx.
16.1.1 Mechanical
failure, loss of
containment
16.2 Maximize
spacing
between blast
source and
buildings and
equipment of
concern.
16.2.1 OPBs located within blast

overpressure contour
16.2.1 Building damage

leading to
injuries/fatalities
16.1.1 Equipment are

design on 1200 psig and
protected by PSVs and
ESDVs.
E5=8
D4=8
16.5 Minimize
inventories of
hazardous
materials.
16.5.1 Condensate & LPG

inventories
16.6 Use less

toxic, reactive,
flammable,
explosive
materials,
radioactive.
16.6.1 No Concerns
16.7 Reduce
size of
congested
volume that can
hold a vapor
cloud.
16.7.1 See comment
16.8 Simplify
plant design and
operation.
16.8.1 No Concern
16.9 High
equipment or
instrumentation
reliability.
16.9.1 Protective equipment failure

to meet reliability specifications
16.10 Design
occupied
buildings to
withstand a
16.10.1 No additional concern
16.5.1 Major fire &

BLEVE Hazard, Loss of
life and asset damage
16.9.1 Failure to
perform upon demand
leading to accidents
16.5.1 Spill containment

and Fire protection
system provided on
condensate and LPG
storage
D3=7
16.13 Minimize
time exposed to
a hazard.
17.1 Pool.
17. Fire
16.13.1 Equipment/ structural failure

due to extended exposure to fire,
delayed blow down
17.1.1 LPG, Condensate, NGLs
16.13.1 Escalation of
event
17.1.1 Pool fire at

Condensate storage,
loading area and
separator area, BLEVE
of LPG vessels,
Propane tanks Leading
to asset damage,
injuries and fatalities
D3=7
17.1.1 LPG facility

design as per API 2510/
NFPA-58
17.1.2 Condensate
facility design as per
NFPA-30 in line with
OGRA directives
17.1.3 Fire protection on
overall plant as per
NFPA guidelines
17.1.4 As per Tender
Document, fire
protection layout and
design requirements to
be developed based on
FEHA
17.2.1 LPG facility
design as per API 2510/
NFPA-58
17.2.2 Condensate
facility design as per
NFPA-30 in line with
OGRA directives
E3=6
18. Explosion
17.4 Sources of
ignition
17.4.1 Ignition of released

hydrocarbon
17.5 Equipment
layout
17.6 Fire
Protection &
response
17.7.1 See comment
18.1 Operator
protection
18.1.1 No additional concern, see

comment
18.2 BLEVE

comment
18.3 Vapor
cloud explosion

comment
18.4 Confined
space
18.5 Dust

comment
18.5.1 No Concern
18.6 Other
(detonation,
etc.)
18.6.1 No Concern
19.1 Hot
process.
19.1.1 Amine, Glycol, Hot Oil,

Debutanizer Waste heat recovery
17.4.1 Fire & explosion

leading to asset
damage and
injuries/fatalities
17.4.1 Hazardous area

classification to be done
by EPCC
17.4.2 Open flames eg.
Hot oil burners are
located outside classified
area
D3=7
18.2.1 BLEVE of LPG

Vessels to be avoided by
design as per API-2510
18.3.1 Control room is
blast resistant as per
API-752
19.1.1 Personnel
injuries on contact with
hot surfaces
19.1.1 Personal
protection insulation is
provided where process
H6=6
20.3.1 Tender Document

defines noise limits 85
dB as per NEQS.
20.3 Noise
20.4 Stored
energy.
20.5 Electrical
shock
20.6 High
voltage/low
voltage electrical
hazards.
20.7 Static
electrical
hazards
20.8 Ionizing
radiation
21.1 Earthquake
21.2
Foundations
(subsidence,
scour)
21.3 Corrosion
21. Structural
Failures
21.4 Fatigue
21.5 Weight
control
21.6 Primary
structure
20.3.1 Noise in plant residential and

adjacent population exceeding
NEQS limit
20.3.1 Health issues,

social unrest

states requirement for
NEQS in general
(including noise level in
residential areas).
H6=6

20.6.1 No Concerns
20.7.1 Ignition during sampling,
loading bowzers
20.7.1 Ignition of
hydrocarbon releases,
fire, fatalities, asset
loss
20.7.1 Grounding
requirement for bowzer
loading and sampling
included in Tender
Document
E3=6
20.8.1 No Concern
21.3.1 Loss of containment due to

corrosion
21.4.1 No concerns
21.3.1 Fire & explosion

leading to asset
damage and
injuries/fatalities

defines corrosion control
design and management
as per UEP practices
21.4 No cyclic load
21.5.1 No Concerns
21.6.1 Soil investigation
D3=7
22.2 Fuel Gas
22.2.1 See comment
22.3 Heating
Medium / hot oil
22.3.1 No additional Concern
22.4 Diesel Fuel
22.4.1 See comments
22.5 Power
Supply
22.6 Steam
22.5.1 No Concern
22.7 Drains
22.7.1 Open to atmosphere HP

drains connection
22.8 Inert Gas /

Nitrogen
22.9 Instrument
Air
22.9.1 See comment
22.10 Waste
Storage and
Treatment
22.11
Chemical/fuel
Storage
22.12 Potable
Water
22.12.1 See comments
22.13
Demineralized
water
22.7.1 Loss of
containment, fire
hazards
E3=6
22.17
Refrigeration
System
22.18 HP Drains
- Amine
22.19 HP drains
- Glycol
22.20 HP drains
- Hydrocarbon
22.21 HP drains
- LPG
22.17.1 See comment

22.22 Plant
drains / storm
drains
22.22.1 See comment
22.23 Flares
22.23.1 Personnel exposure to flare

radiations within flare exclusion zone
22.24 Sewerage
22.24.1 See comments
23.1 Inventory
22.23.1 Injuries, burn
H5=5
23.5 Hot Oil

23.6 Pyrophoric
(pigging mud)
23.7 Over
Pressure
23.8 Over/under
Temperature
24. Loss of

23.8.1 No concerns
23.9
Excess/zero
Level
23.9.1 See
recommendation/comment
23.10 Wrong
Composition/Ph
ase
23.10.1 See comment
24.1 Hazardous
chemicals
(including
hydrocarbons).
24.1.1 See comment
24.2 Extremes
of design
operating
envelopes,
process, and
utilities.
24.3 Potential
for deviation
outside design
conditions.
24.4 Air ingress.
24.3.1 No concern
24.4.1 No concern
vessel failures.
24.13 Heat
exchanger tube
leak or rupture
24.13.1 See comment
24.14 Process
line failures
Annex-II
Risk Framework HSE Impact Levels
Levels A-C maintain the visibility of risks with the potential for catastrophic impact even
if their probability of occurrence is extremely low. The upper level of this framework is
defined by the most severe level of impact ever seen in industry.
SEVERITY
HEALTH AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL
Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any

environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains
in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can
only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to
5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which

remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only
be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5
years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which

can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and
up to 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be
restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Catastrophic health/ safety incident

causing widespread fatalities within
or outside a facility.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can
only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to
5 years.
The potential for 10 or more fatalities

(or onset of life threatening health
effects) shall always be classified at
this level.

can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be
restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Comparable to the most catastrophic

health/ safety incidents ever seen in
industry.
The potential for 100 or more
fatalities (or onset of life threatening
health effects) shall always be
classified at this level.
Catastrophic health/ safety incident
causing very widespread fatalities
within or outside a facility.
this level.
BP's commitment to health, safety and the environment is paramount; this is reflected in BPs HSE goal of "No Accidents, No Harm to People, and
No Damage to the Environment". No accident, injury, or loss of containment causing damage to the environment is ever acceptable to BP. BP is
using this framework (equivalents of which are used throughout industry) to support the consistent prioritization of actions to eliminate or mitigate
HSE risk and as part of BP's Performance Improvement Cycle to deliver continuous risk reduction.
Very major health/ safety incident

this level.
30 or more injuries or health effects,
either permanent or requiring
hospital treatment for more than 24
hours.
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be

can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
SEVERITY
HEALTH AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL
Major health/ safety incident
1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic,

actual or alleged.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Medium impact health/ safety

incident
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and

which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Single or multiple recordable injury

or health effects from common
source/event.
be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which
can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Low impact health/ safety incident
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and

which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
10 or more injuries or health effects,

either permanent or requiring
hospital treatment for more than 24
hours.
High impact health/ safety incident

Permanent partial disability(ies)
Several non-permanent injuries or

health impacts.
Days Away From Work Case
(DAFWC)
First aid
Single or multiple over-exposures

causing noticeable irritation but no
actual health effects
Risk Framework Business Impact Levels
SEVERITY*
Non-Financial Impact
Public or investor outrage on a global scale.

Threat of global loss of license to operate.
Financial Impact
(EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE,
BUSINESS
VALUE LOST)
>$20 billion
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market US, EU, Russia.
Intervention from major Government US, UK, EU, Russia.

Public or investor outrage in major western markets US, EU.
$5 billion - $20 billion
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset
in a major market.
Intervention from other major Government.
$1 billion - $5 billion
Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration.
Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets
in a major market.
Interventions from non-major Governments.
Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited interest-group outrage

in a major market.
$100 m to $1 billion
Prolonged adverse national or international media attention.

Widespread adverse social impact.
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment.
Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.
Limited interest-group outrage in non major market.

Short term adverse national or international media coverage.
$5m -$100 m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU.

Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level
consequence
Prolonged local media coverage.
Local adverse social impact.
$500k-$5m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
Short term local media coverage.
Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).
$50k -$500k
Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise
episode).
<$50k
The colours in the above table are for use on a Risk Management Matrix (RMM). This is a tool used by
BP group leadership to report and manage SPU, segment and BP group risk. For those risk events
which are included in the RMM, the following guidance applies:
Risks with Impact levels C and above are recorded on the BP group RMM.
Risks with Impact levels D and above are recorded on the segment RMM.
Risks with Impact levels H and above are recorded on the SPU RMM.
In some cases, Level D impacts may be elevated to BP group impact. For risks in category D, the
segment Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Office (COO) or Strategic Performance Unit
Leader (SPUL) will determine whether a particular risk should be elevated.
Risk Matrix
The numbers (1-15) in the above matrix reflect the relative levels of risk (risk rating) with 1 being the
lowest level of risk and 15 the highest.
The colours in the table relate to reporting and endorsement levels for action plans (see Annex 4).
Where data exists to support a quantitative estimate of probability / frequency, or a reasonable
estimate of probability / frequency can be made, use of the numerical probability / frequency
criteria is preferred. If not, the qualitative descriptions can be used. However, the verbal
descriptors are based on the following assumptions and if any of these are not met, this needs to be
taken into consideration when estimating likelihood.
Life of a facility is around 30 years.
There are around 100 facilities across the BP group where a similar event could occur.
BP represents around 1-10% of the whole industry.
When positioning a risk event on the matrix, it is not usually possible to precisely determine the
likelihood and severity of an event in advance of it happening. Reflecting this uncertainty, the
position on the matrix is therefore, only approximate.
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UNITED ENERGY PAKISTAN LTD.

NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT

Issued for Review

Issued for distribution

NO TABLE OF CONTENTS ENTRIES FOUND.ABBREVIATIONS

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.

Capital value process.

Distributed control system.

Front end design.

Hazard and operability (study).

Health, safety, security, and environmental.

Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.

Independent protection layer.

Inherently safer design.

Liquefied natural gas.

Liquefied petroleum gas.

Operating management system.

Piping and instrumentation diagram.

Process flow diagrams.

Project HSSE review.

Consider consequences of the hazards.

Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.

Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate

Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.

Support objectives of ISD.

New facilities (PHASE-V)

Workshop Attendees Name

Muhammad Saim Ahmed

Muhammad Sheraz Goraya

Process Engineer / HAZID Scribe

Field Production Engineer

Abduallah Sheikh Muhammad

Syed Fraz Rizvi

Mansoor Ahmed Khan

Mansoor Ali Khan

FOE-Central & South

Process Engineer (ZEL)

Project Engineer (ZEL)

Muhammad Mudassir Mirza

Sr. Electrical Engineer (ZEL)

Sr. Instrumentation Engineer (ZEL)

UEP & EPCC

UEP & EPCC

3.3.3/20.3 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in

6.1.1 It is recommended to include following studies in project scope:

UEP & EPCC

6.4.1 Project MoC system shall be established for change control.

UEP & EPCC

7.1.2/7.2.2 It is recommended that provision of resources (equipment/man

8.1.1/8.2.1/8.3.1/13.1.1 Project organogram shall include Operation tag for

UEP & EPCC

13.1.2 Conduct SIMOPs study

UEP & EPCC

16.1.1 As per API-521, Rupture disc to be installed at u/s of PSVs on

UEP & EPCC

16.12.1/17.3.1 Consider self-contained fire suppression system such as

UEP & EPCC

20.3.1 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in

UEP & EPCC

UEP & EPCC

22.16.1 Communication protocol (for normal & emergencies) shall be

UEP & EPCC

22.23.1 Flare exclusion zone shall be isolated/barricaded as per API-521

23.2.1 Review LPG spheres location with respect to FEHA results to