You are on page 1of 11

1. ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, v.

BALTAZAR PACLEB,
G.R. No. 130316
2007 Jan 24
FACTS: Petition for review under Rule 45.
Ruperto Javier purchased the lot from Rebecca del Rosario who, in turn,
acquired it from respondent Baltazar and his wife. The title of the property,
however, remained in the names of respondent and his wife.
The instruments in support of the series of alleged sales were not registered.
In 1992, Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No. 6853-D to petitioners
(Ernesto and Elsie) for P75 per sq.m. Petitioners accepted the offer and
gave Javier P200,000 as downpayment for the lot. Javier then delivered his
supposed muniments of title to petitioners.
After the execution of a contract to sell, he formally turned over the property
to petiti oners. At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied
by Ramon C. Pacleb, respondents son, and his wife as tenants.
On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered
possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on, petitioners appointed
Ramon as their trustee over the subject lot. Aside from taking possession of
the property, petitioners also caused the annotation on of a final decision
rendered in their favor.
However, their possession was disturbed when respondent arrived from the
USA and entered into the property, claiming ownership. Petitioners filed an
action for forcible entry in the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioners allegations:
1. that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open, public and
peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the
early part of September 1995.
2. Upon respondents return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly
entered the property by means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and
stealth thereby ousting petitioners and their trustee, Ramon.
3. Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered
owner of the property, refused to vacate the premises and surrender its
possession to petitioners. MTC decision: in favor of petitioners (Ernesto and
Elsie).
RTC: affirmed in toto the MTC.
CA: decision of the MTC and RTC were set aside. Forcible entry case was
dismissed. ISSUE: WON respondent had a prior physical possession of the
subject property.

HELD: Petition DENIED.


RULING: The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. In the grammatical sense, to possess means to
have, to actually and physically occupy a thing, with or without right.
Possession always includes the idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary
that the person in possession should himself be the occupant. The
occupancy can be held by another in his name. Without occupancy, there is
no possession.
Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy,
apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus
possidendi). Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical
possession to justify a ruling in their favor in the complaint for forcible entry
against respondent. In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for
specific performance and damages against Javier, the alleged vendor of the
lot in question) upon which petitioners based their right to possess in the first
place, the trial court categorically stated: The petitioners were never placed
in possession of the subject property on which was planned to be site of a
piggery, nor were they given a clearance or certification from the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer.
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving
in the face of this factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and
receipts in the name of respondent in 1994 and 1995 established the
possession of respondent. The payment of real estate tax is one of the most
persuasive and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess
in concepto de dueo or with claim of ownership. Possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession.
In this case, Ramon, as respondents son, was named caretaker when
respondent left for the United States in 1983. Due to the eventual loss of
trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent transferred the
administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his
return in May 1995. In other words, the subject land was in the possession of
the respondents sons during the contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang
Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10,
1995 executed by them and Ramon to prove a turn over of possession. They
also seek to prove their exercise of rights over the land through alleged
frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as
declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the
MTC.

These instruments, however, fail to convince us of petitioners actual


occupancy of the subject land. First, petitioners themselves acknowledged
that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent.
Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such document
dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the land. Third, there was no clear
proof in the records of the appointment of Ramon as petitioners trustee save
their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time the Kusangloob
na Pagsasauli document was executed, the caretaker of the land was no
longer Ramon but Oscar. Most important, the title of the land in question
(TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name of respondent. As the registered
owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one
of the attributes of ownership.
The Civil Code states: Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized
at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of copossession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one
who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing respondents continuing possession of
the subject property, petitioners allegation that respondent deprived them of
actual possession by means of force, intimidation and threat was clearly
untenable.
In Gaza v. Lim, we held that: Where a dispute over possession arises
between two persons, the person first having actual possession is the one
who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere
usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the property of another
and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire the right to maintain
the action of forcible entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion
might have been.

2. FRONDARINA v MALAZARTE
FACTS:
The property in question in this case is Lot 5 which was acquired by
Flordelina Santos from Iluminado Amar and was thereafter acquired by Cirila
Gongora. Cirila Gongora, sister of Frondarina, filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the Bureau of Lands.
o Said disputed land was declared in Gongora's name for purposes of
tax declaration and she also paid the real estate taxes on said property
for years.
o Frondarina obtained the disputed lot from her sister thereafter as
evidenced by a Waiver of Rights to the parcel of land.
Frondarina declared the lot in her name for taxation purposes and paid the
real estate taxes on such property for years. She also had the lot surveyed
and fenced it with 4 strands of barbed wire and tended 2 mango and 1
coconut tree on the lot.
Malazartes here came into the picture and out of no where alleged that they
bought the said lot from Romeo Valencia and that they have been residing
on the lot since 1988. On the sad date, they immediately started construction
of their house on the lot without a building permit because their application to
build was not granted due to the complaint filed by Frondarina.
o To support their claim, they presented their caretaker, Lorenza
Andrada to testify in their favor.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the Frondarinas who have sufficiently
established their cause of action against the Malazartes.
But this was overturned by the RTC who stated that the Malazartes were in
actual and physical possession of the lot through their predecessor in
interest Romeo Valencia. o The RTC anchored their decision on the fact that
the Frondarinas were not in actual and physical possession of the land as
such was only possesses by their caretaker
o Allegedly, this caretaker was threatened by the Malazartes but the
trial court deemed this as mere hearsay evidence since the caretaker
was not really presented to testify as witness.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Who are the owners of the lot?
If the aforestated question rules that the Frondarinas are the owners, do the
Malazartes have the right to indemnity as builders in good faith?
Ratio:
The court gives credence to the claim of the Frondarinas that they and their
predecessors in interest had been in peaceful, physical possession of the
said lot since 1971. Although the fact is that none of the parties have actually
been in possession of the land (since it was possesses by their caretakers),

the actuations of the Frondarinas are more in accordance with the usual
course of human conduct and common experience. The claim of the
Malazartes that they occupied said lot for 15 years deserves scant
consideration since his job took up most of his time.
Romeo Valencia also testified that he checked with the BoL and was told
that the lot has not been declared in the name of any person. However, this
statement of his is not true as there was a tax declaration in Cirila's name.
The latter also applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Application before. Seeing
as there is already a falsity and misrepresentation in the testimony of
Valencia, the court rules that his testimony does not constitute evidence of
the truth of the said allegations.

The testimonies of Frondarina were more consistent with one who


has been deprived of possession by force. They sought help from
officials and reported incidents. Such is more in accordance with a
person who has been illegally and unfairly deprived of possession.
The lack of testimony of the caretaker (who was not presented as witness)
was not fatal to the cause of the Frondarinas as ample and circumstantial
evidence was presented.
The tax declarations also, as well as the payments for taxes for the disputed
lots are much earlier than those allegedly made by the Malazartes.
o Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
The Malazartes are not builders in good faith. Considering that they were
informed by the petitioners that the disputed lot was owned by them and had
the right of possession over said lot, still, they persisted on building their
house on it. Respondents therefore are not builders in good faith and shall
lose their house without any right to reimbursement.

3. ESCRITOR V IAC
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the IAC.

FACTS:
Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch,
Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer thereto declaring his ownership
over the lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his deceased
father. The lot having become uncontested, only Miguel Escritor appeared in
order to adduce his evidence of ownership.
On May 15, 1958, the Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned
case, Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating the lot with its improvements in
favor of claimant Escritor and confirming his title thereto. 3Immediately
thereafter, Escritor took possession of the property.
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition
for review of the above-mentioned decision contending that it was obtained
by claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation. 5The petition was
granted on July 18, 1960 and a new hearing was set for September 13,
1960. 6 While the proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died.
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision was
rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in favor of respondent Acuna,
ordering petitioners to vacate the land. 7 A writ of possession was later
issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up their possession. 8
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975 respondent Acuna filed
with the same Court in Civil Case No. 1138-G, a complaint for recovery of
damages against petitioners for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly
possessed by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According to
respondent Acua, the registration of the said lot was effectuated by the
deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice, and misrepresentation.
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the lower
court was reversed in a decision promulgated on October 31, 1984, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one entered
herein, ordering the defendants-appellees jointly and severally (a) to pay the
plaintiff- appellant the sum of P10,725.00 representing the value of the fruits
appellees received for the 13 years they have been in unlawful possession
of the land subject-matter; (b) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P3,000.00
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (c) to pay the costs.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON Escritors possession is in good faith or bad faith?

RULING:
We cannot affirm the position of the Intermediate Appellate Court. It should
be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15,
1958, Lot No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In this decision, the said court found to its
satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the land by inheritance from his
father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public,
continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the
Filipino-Spanish Revolution.
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that he is the
legal owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief of ownership, he
continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as
possession in bad faith.
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of
property knowing that his title thereto is defective. 14 Here, there is no
showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that
petitioners were aware that the title of their predecessor had any defect.
Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith,
this should not prejudice his successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the
rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or mode of
acquisition can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not
transmissible from one person to another, not even to an heir. 15 As Article
534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, "one who succeeds by hereditary
title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of the
decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; ..."
The reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its
effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the person who acted in bad
faith; his heir should not be saddled with such consequences. 16
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden
of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the
presumption of good faith remains.
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on
the alleged fraud on the part of the petitioners' predecessor in having the
land registered under his (the predecessor's) name. A review of the record,
however, does not indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not
proven in the cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court.
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of
petitioners, We sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were
possessors in good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for
damages.

4. GO V CA

5. CEQUENA V. BOLANTE
G.R. No. 137944
April 6, 2000
by Kristel Descallar
FACTS:
Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza are brothers.
Petitioners were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. Prior to 1954, a land
in Binangonan, Rizal, was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent Honorata Mendoza
Bolante and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of
Sinforoso of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in
the name of Margarito Mendoza, but respondent Honorata is the present
occupant of the land. In October 1975, Honorata and Miguel Mendoza, son
of Margarito, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of
the land. A case ensued between the parties, wherein the trial court declared
the petitioners (heirs of Margarito) as owners of the land.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession by Honorata since 1985 gave her a better title under
Article 538 of the Civil Code, and that the probative value of the tax receipts
and declarations of the heirs of Margarito diminished in comparison to
Honoratas adverse possession of the land. Furthermore, the CA also ruled
that the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed
by the Honorata and her mother had not been sufficiently established; it was
insufficient to overcome the denial of Honorata and her mother, Eduarda
Apiado. Honorata testified that her mother, never having attended school,
could neither read nor write. Also, Honorata said she had never been called
"Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarito appealed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Honorata enjoys presumption of a preferred
possessor by virtue of her actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession of the land since 1985.
2. Whether or not respondent Honoratas actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land since 1985 proves her ownership over the
land.
HELD:
1. YES.

The Court concedes that although the petitioners dispossessed


the land in 1985, they did not lose legal possession, because
possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents
and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed
the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession.
However, possession by the heirs of Margarito does not
prevail over that of the Honorata. Possession heirs of Margarito before
1985 was not exclusive, as Honorata also acquired it before 1985.
Petitioners father and brother, as well as Honorata and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject
land was occupied and cultivated by the Sinforoso (Honoratas father), as
evidenced by a tax declaration. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took
possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel, while Honorata
and her mother continued residing on the lot.
Upon coming of age, Honorata paid realty taxes from 1932-1948,
while Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid
taxes since 1952. When Margarito died, Miguel continued cultivating the
land despite Honorata and her mother were also living there. In 1985,
Honorata ousted Miguel on the land.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the Honorata is the
preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax
declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period, whereas petitioners' father acquired joint
possession only in 1952.
2. NO.
Honorata argues that she was legally presumed to possess the
subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of owner,
and pursuant to Article 541 of the Code, she is not obliged to show or prove
such title. But the Court ruled that the presumption in Article 541 of the
Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven.
One who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision,
be restored thereto by the means established by law.
Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should
be established in one of the ways provided by law. To settle the issue of
ownership, there is a need to determine who has proven acquisitive
prescription. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession for ten years.
Being the sole heir of her father, Honorata showed through his tax
receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years
since 1932, even after her father died. When she got married, she and her

husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. Her
possession was not disturbed until 1953 when Margarito claimed the land.
Her possession, which was in the concept of owner public, peaceful, and
uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership.
Furthermore Honorata declared and paid realty taxes for the
disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation,
when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be
the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the
subject land, did not acquire ownership. Ownership cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward
the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession.
Also, although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership
through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the
whole lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
Petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was
established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and
receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza is untenable. Such tax
declarations and receipts prove that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title
thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state
and other interested parties.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of
ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In
the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration
of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. Petitioners' claim
of ownership of the land has no legal basis.

the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for
temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can
demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation
is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of
commodatum.
6. Pajuyo vs CA
G.R. No. 146364
June 3, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pajuyo paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a lot,
where Pajuyo subsequently built a house. In 1985, Pajuyo and private
respondent Guevarra executed a Kasunduan wherein Pajuyo allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free, on the condition that Guevarra would
maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised
that he would vacate the premises upon Pajuyos demand.
In 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded
that the latter vacate the house. Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment
case against Guevarra before the MTC.
Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title over the lot since it is within
the area set aside for socialized housing. MTC rendered its decision in favor
of Pajuyo, which was affirmed by RTC. (MTC and RTC basically ruled that
the Kasunduan created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant
relationship).
CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the ejectment case is without
legal basis since both Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the said lot.
CA further stated that both parties are in pari delicto; thus, the court will
leave them where they are. CA ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease
contract, but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price
certain.
ISSUE: W/N the contractual relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra was
that of a commodatum NO
HELD:
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a
certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it
is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing
belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand
the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or
after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If

The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to


Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not
require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in
good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a
contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are
also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has
treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlordtenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the
termination of the lease. The tenants withholding of the property would then
be unlawful.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of
commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over
possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or
to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or
contracts of commission, administration and commodatum.70 These
contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing
received.
Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like
him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Guevarra should know that there must be
honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan.
Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it.
The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo
and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested property.
The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of
Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor
in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as
there would still be an implied promise to vacate.

7. Republic v Ballocanag

because she was able to build the structure on the subject lot with
the prior permission of the owner.

8. Esmaquel v Coprada
Facts:
Petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla
filed an ejectment case against respondent Maria V. Coprada
before the MCTC when the latter refused to vacate a parcel of land,
with an area of 253 square meters and covered by a TCT claimed
by the petitioners who are registered owner, upon demand.
Respondent occupied said lot and constructed their residential
house, under the condition that they will vacate the premises
should petitioners need to use the same. Furthermore, respondent
and her family have been occupying the subject premises free of
rent, including payment of realty taxes.
Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners
of the subject land. However, she averred that in 1945, Emiliana
Coprada, Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original owner who gave
permission to her late husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject
lot as their permanent abode, because of her love and affection for
her nephew, and also, due to the fact that the lot is virtually a
wasteland.
When Emiliana died, the ownership of the property was inherited
by petitioner Victoria. Respondent alleged that Victoria sold to her
for P2,000.00 in installment and which was fully paid in 1962.
Due to their close relationship, the agreement was never reduced
to writing and since then she has been the one paying the realty
taxes due on the property. After the sale, respondent built on the
lot a semi-concrete structure.
Respondent stated that petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even
granting, without admitting, that respondent's claim of ownership
is improper, respondent argued that she is a builder in good faith,

MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that


laches had already set in which prevented petitioners from
questioning the validity of the purported sale between
Victoria and Maria. RTC reversed MCTCs judgment ruling that
respondent's occupation of the subject property was by virtue of
petitioners' tolerance and permission, hence, respondent is bound
by an implied promise that she will vacate the property upon
demand and her possession became unlawful after the petitioners
demanded her to vacate the property.
Upon review, the CA reversed the Decision of the RTC and affirmed
in toto the Decision of the MCTC.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict
respondent from the subject property.
HELD: An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed
by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 93542, registered in the name of the
petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she
acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of
an oral sale, the Torrens
title of petitioners must prevail.
Petitioners'
title over the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration


that
the
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens
title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, citing the case of Co v. Militar, the Court
held that: The Torrens System was adopted in this country because
it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and
binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass
upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding
for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of
the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. x x x
Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property is not barred
by laches.
In Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as
Attorney-in-Fact v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia
Perlas and Spouse Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre, the
Court held that:
x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any
person illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible
and can never be barred by laches.

In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:


As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even
if
it
be
supposed
that
they were
aware
of
the petitioners'
occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred
by laches.
Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is by mere
tolerance or permission
of
the
petitioners,
without
any
contract
between
them, respondent is bound by an implied
promise that she will vacate the same upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against her.
Since respondent's occupation of the subject property was by mere
tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article
448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession
may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as
builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and
Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer
tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith.
At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises in
1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and
tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a
person who builds on land with the belief that she is the owner
thereof.

You might also like