Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, petitioners, vs Hon. Intermediate Appelate Court,
Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong, respondents.
G.R. No. 70890
September 18, 1992
FACTS
Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong, the daughter of private respondent
spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and
irresponsible character.
Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter refused, Wendell started making
threats. On that fateful day of January 14, 1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single
gunshot wound each coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi.
There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private respondents herein advanced
conflicting versions of the case. Private respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun,
Wendell took his own life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotic
informant, must have caused the death of Wendell and Julie Ann.
As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action to recover damages
arising from the vicarious liability of the parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180
of the New Civil Code. After trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise,
the counterclaim filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set aside the dismissal of the
case and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case.
Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of requiring them to pay P30,000.00 for moral
damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?
RATIO:
The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who
lives in their company.
Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of a good father of a
family over their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it was only when Wendell died that
petitioners came to know that their son Wendell was a CANU agent and that the gun of petitioner
Cresencio Bili was missing from their safety deposit box.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the
parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in
supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie
and Wendell could have been prevented.
Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the
parents to know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in
supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie
and Wendell could have been prevented. The liability of the parents for damages caused by their
children imposed under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both
quasi delict and criminal offenses.
Tamargo vs CA (1992) 209 SCRA 518
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's
natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted
in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for
adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that
the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child.
BA Finance Corp vs CA (1992) 215 SCRA 715
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly authorized the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the
loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the
order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the
properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment
which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left
their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf
of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite
showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against
his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued against the
said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to
P660,000.00.
an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. This responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be relieved
from liability (rebuttable presumption of negligence).
Merrit vs Government of the Philippine Islands (1916) 34 Phil 1186
FACTS:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, collided with an
ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having
sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone
depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The inquiry at once arises whether
the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom even if the collision was due
to the negligence committed by an agent or employee of the government which is the chauffeur.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Government may be held in this case. NO.
RATIO:
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the
state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official
charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility
in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so
deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the
second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.